The U.S. Can Defeat Trans-National Terrorism
AUTHOR LCDR. Ralph E. Haney. USN
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - National Security
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: THE U.S. CAN DEFEAT TRANS-NATIONAL TERRORISM
I. Purpose: To remind the reader that the U.S. is capable
of defeating terrorism, if only we will correctly identify
the problem and then use our power wisely.
II. Problem: Terrorism has taken on a larger-than-life
aspect which makes us think that there is nothing anyone can
do to solve the problem. We must reeducate ourselves, our
allies, and our enemies that in fact every group has its own
strengths and weaknesses. The major difficulty is admitting
that our current policy at least has some areas which could
use some revision and at worst has been completely unsound.
III. Data: Terrorism has become a commonplace occurrence.
The world's population has become calloused with respect to
our vision of terrorism. We have bought off on the idea that
terrorists are simply criminals instead of correctly classify-
ing them as para-military organizations representing govern-
ments in exile. This reclassification would make a signifi-
cant difference in the way we go about combatting the terror-
ist threat. While it technically lends an air of "respect-
ability" to the terrorist, it also opens up an entirely dif-
ferent view of anti-terrorist actions as they would then fall
under the international rules of warfare. This would also
make it legal to go after the financial support arm of terror-
ism, thereby severing the artery carrying the lifeblood of
any organization.
IV. Conclusions: The only way to beat a terrorist group is
to utterly destroy their capability to wage warfare (unconven-
tional or otherwise). This includes a multifaceted approach
to the problem, attacking them simultaneously in the econom-
ic, political, and military arenas.
The U.S. Can Defeat Trans-National Terrorism
Thesis: The United States can defeat terrorism, if we are
dedicated to winning the battle.
I. Introduction
A. Brief history of trans-national terrorism.
B. Why it is important to the reader.
II. Understanding the enemy.
A. Terrorist's problems.
1. Recruiting.
2. Training.
3. Operations.
4. Morale.
5. Discipline.
6. Financing the revolution.
7. Armament procurement/manufacture.
B. Reality versus deception.
III. Understanding our options.
A. Economic.
B. Political.
C. Military.
D. This is a war.
THE U.S. CAN DEFEAT TRANS-NATIONAL TERRORISM
The United States is the most powerful nation on the
face of the Earth, yet the popular perception of our govern-
ments handling of terrorism is uniformly bleak. The death
toll is rising, in the last ten years, Americans have been
harassed, attacked, and murdered by trans-national terror-
ist groups (see Appendix A). The U.S. government seems
ineffective in responding to terrorist activities, Why?
Are terrorists invincible? Is the power of the United
States eroding? Is this something new on the world scene?
This paper will attempt to answer some of these questions,
with the focus on how the U.S. can win the war against
terrorism.
Terrorism is nothing new, the idea that it is legiti-
mate to attack and forcibly remove an offensive government
has been around since Brutus organized the assassination of
Caeasar. "Tyrannicide" (6:7) became a popular pastime and
was practiced by almost every nation to some degree or
another. Modern terrorism though finds its roots in the
twentieth century. During the Second World War the allied
powers wrote and then airdropped to the French Resistance
copies of a handbook for subversive activities. This hand-
book included detailed information on how to construct a
homemade bomb and where to place those bombs to have the
most devastating effect on the German war machine. (3:67)
This book was to form the foundation of the training for
many of the terrorist organizations during the `50's and
`60's. Then a Brazilian revolutionary, Carlos Marighela,
wrote the definitive book on terrorist campaigns, "Handbook
of Urban Guerilla Warfare", which was to become the blue-
print for the major terrorist groups of the `70's and
`80' s.
The first step in understanding U.S. anti-terrorist
policy is to remember that any anti-terrorist action under-
taken unilaterally by America must: be in response to a
specific terrorist act, utilize the principle of proportion-
al response, and be diligently prosecuted to a successful
conclusion. You must also take into account the mood of
the people and the tenor of the current opposition at
home. The opponents of unilateral action by the U.S. erro-
neously view military force as abhorrent and completely
separate from economic and political actions. This is a
fallacy which fails to recognize the interrelationship
between the economics of power, the power of politics, and
the politics of military force.
Any successful attempt to stem the rising tide of ter-
rorism must use every weapon in the national arsenal.
These weapons are many and varied. In the area of econom-
ics, we have at our disposal boycotts, the impounding of
U.S. holdings, trade restrictions, and naval blockade. Our
political tools include travel restrictions, limiting
exchange of or recalling diplomatic personnel, severing all
foreign aid to countries harboring or refusing to extradite
terrorists, etc. Finally, militarily, there is a wide
range of employment options, extending from gunboat diploma-
cy to nuclear annihilation. The opponents of unilateral
action against terrorists somehow believe that employing
economic sanctions, diplomatic action, or military force
might anger those at whom we are directing our retribu-
tion. They fail to see that if terrorism goes unpunished,
it flourishes. They are concerned about the poor interna-
tional image we might engender by our strong stand. In
reality, our image would probabiy be enhanced by refusing
to buckle under to the terror tactics employed against us.
Our friends overseas will overlook our faults and our ene-
mies are going to think the worst of us anyway.
Understanding your opponent is essential to victory.
It is important, therefore, to examine, analyze, and under-
stand the problems, approaches to solutions, and the vulner-
abilities of today's modern terrorist.
What are Yasser Arafat's leadership challenges? How do
you motivate a 19 year old to get behind the wheel of a
truck loaded with explosives, drive it into a military
compound, and push a detonator? This is a complex problem
which most of us as military leaders have not had to face
this decade. How do you motivate someone to die for a
cause? The answer for today's modern terrorist is very
complex but the first element is training. Just as a young
Marine is thrust suddenly into boot camp, so too, the young
terrorist is thrust suddenly into the world of para- mili-
tary operations. His training is just as rigorous as any
military training program and his entrance exam is infinite-
ly more difficult, usually requiring him to prove his loyal-
ty to the cause by killing an enemy before being accepted
(3:66).
There are only two things which ultimately influence
terrorists to do their leaders bidding; fear of punishment
and hope of reward. Fear of punishment is self-explanatory
but hope of reward can be expanded from ideas as simple as
self-satisfaction in a job well done, to the quest for
great riches or power. These two basic tenets form the
cornerstones for the foundation of any successful terrorist
organization. From the first minute that a new recruit
joins a terrorist cell, he must be convinced that his life
is meaningless if he ever becomes a liability to the organi-
zation. Conversely, rewarding a young man/woman who spent
his formative years in makeshift refugee camps, where forag-
ing for food was a daily struggle, is easy.
There is another very important aspect to leading a
youngster to die for Allah. He must be assured that his
family is going to be taken care of after he gives, "the
last full measure of devotion". The difficulty is that
Lloyds of London doesn't issue a terrorist comprehensive
life insurance policy. Yasser has solved this problem by
having Khadafi issue these life insurance policies for
him. If a terrorist dies or is wounded on "active duty"
his family receives $200,000-$500,000 from the Libyan dicta-
tor (3:84).
Islam is a driving force in the entire Arab world and
control of a select group of people within the hierarchy of
the Islamic world can and does pay great dividends. The
Mullahs and Muftis of Islam are a uniquely sacrilegious
group (viewed through western eyes) because of their appar-
ent lack of regard for human life. It is incomprehensible
for a westerner to believe that a religious leader would
espouse a philosophy which would have his parishioners take
to the streets in a war against the "infidels". In order
to get a young man to become a martyr for Allah, he must be
convinced that death in the cause of Palestine is the same
as dying to further the cause of Islam. This would mean
instant admission into paradise and a place of honor with
Mohammad. Someone has been remarkably successful in guid-
ing the religious leadors of Islam in espousing these dead-
ly principles. After the indoctrination of a new new ter-
rorist recruit, he is dispatched on his first operation.
Commencing operations abroad though requires the estab-
lishment of a monetary base of support. Financing the
operations of a terrorist group requires a significant
portion of their time. It is impossible for a terrorist to
conduct surveillance of a rich western industrialist while
wearing a turban and toting an AK-47. A great deal of
money must be spent in order to make an Arab youngster look
like a wealthy businessman. Staying in the finest hotels,
eating in the best restaurants, flying in the first class
section of an aircraft, all take money. Different terror-
ist organizations have solved their financial dilemma in
different ways. In Peru, the Sendero Luminoso initially
solved their cash problem by robbing banks and today are
supplementing this with cash derived from providing securi-
ty for drug shipments through territory which they control
(1: 229). In Uruguay, the Tupamaros have solved the problem
through the use of kidnapping and extortion (3:184). The
PLO, however, has reached a new and unique high-water mark
in the financing of terror. They have employed several new
and innovative methods for carrying on the fight to liber-
ate Palestine. First, they used legitimate Arab states to
foot the bill for their nefarious activities, although this
practise has been largely discontinued, with only Saudia
Arabia and Libya continuing to give significant annual
support. Secondly, they established a network of facto-
ries, commercial farms, and banking facilities which rivals
the financial acumen of any multinational conglomerate in
the world today. Finally, they imposed a five percent
income tax on all Palestinians. Through the use of these
various financial enterprises the PLO has control of
between 2 and 5 Billion dollars in assets. (1:109)
The first rule of warfare is to isolate your enemy from
his sources of supply. The U.S., however, has cautiously
avoided confronting this part of the problem. It is almost
as though we were afraid of the PLO's economic clout as an
entity and did not want to cut off their logistics. In
fact, it is here that the terrorists are very vulnerable.
Their assets must be protected and can be destroyed. Dur-
ing the Israeli invasion of Lebanon most of the cash con-
trolled by the PLO was in the Arab bank and though most of
these assets were in jeopardy, the bank managed to salvage
most of the assets intact and those that were lost were
made good by the bank. The world community must denounce
terrorism, its proponents and the "legitimate" businesses
who either cooperate with them or are a part of the organi-
zation.
Yasser's next and potentially largest problem is one of
internal discipline. In 1971, "Black September", a sup-
possedly radical splinter group of Fatah was formed. Led by
Abu Nidal, this group allegedly attempted to assassinate
Arafat. In reality, Black September was a sanctioned part
of Fatah and was formed to allow Arafat to be able to
achicve "plausible denial" (3:165). Arafat wanted to pre-
serve his freedom to continue with to conduct terrorist
operations and still be seen as an effective leader with
whom it was possible for the West to negotiate. Arafat did
issue a death warrant for Abu Nidal, but this was just
another part of the deception. The fact that Abu Nidal is
providing a "front" for the Fatah is the only adequate
explanation as to why Arafat's organization has been unable
to track him down and assassinate him. Ironically, this
deception has also had a negative impact on the PLO within
the Palestinian community. Nothing is so destructive to an
organization as the perception that the leadership cannot
arrive at a consensus about what the goals, methods, and
results should be.
The standardization of weapons and ammunition is anoth-
er problem facing terrorist organizations. This becomes a
problem beginning with initial training and then on through
the execution of operations. It is a problem in training
because if there is a wide diversity of weapons, there must
be a corresponding increase in the time required to
adequately train an individual in the care and use of multi-
ple weapons. Operations are also significantly complicated
as it becomes more difficult to obtain four or five differ-
ent calibers of ammunition rather than concentrating on
acquiring, stockpiling, and issuing only one type of ammuni-
tion.
It doesn't take a rocket scientist to realize that the
series of problems enumerated above are the same problems
faced by major military organizations around the world;
recruiting, training, operations, morale, discipline,
budgetary constraints, and armament procurement. The
"bottom line" is that we often forget to wear the other
guy's moccasins for a while and if we did we might find
that the PLO and other trans-national terrorist groups are
not merely international criminals but highly trained
paramilitary organizations. This is an important
distinction because we handle the two different threats in
two completely different ways. Police handle criminals;
but they are not trained, equipped, or mentally prepared
to cope with paramilitary organizations. Military
operations conducted against sovereign nations are acts of
war and evoke the complete diplomatic, economic, and
military retaliation of the state so attacked.
Terrorism is on the rise worldwide and the U.S. is the
target of trans-national terrorist groups (see Appendix
A). Even though the Western World doesn't always support
U.S. anti-terrorist actions (economic, political, or mili-
tary), the U.S. can and must take unilateral action to
defeat the terrorist threat.
The most important part of our plan must be a national
resolve to prosecute these operations to a successful con-
clusion. This is a war. We will have to recognize that
casualties are a foregone conclusion. We must be prepared
to sacrifice some of our civil liberties in order to defeat
the terrorist at his own game. We must be prepared to
identify, track down, abduct, prosecute, and execute
international terrorists: irrespective of the furor this
may create in Libya or Syria or anywhere else.
The world's terrorists strive to achieve their objec-
tives through a campaign of fear. If they believe they are
in danger, they will have to spend considerably more time
planning for their own safety and will, therefore, have
less time to devote to the conduct of effective planning
for offensive operations.
All this is not to say that the U.S. does not want or
need the help of our allies and indeed the entire world
community; we do. It should be a matter of the utmost
importance for the President to attempt to rally interna-
tional support for anti-terrorist collective action. If,
however, the United Nations and/or our allies cannot or
will not take effective action, we must. Our task is to
educate the international community to the reality of what
terrorists are and to unequivocally meet these military
challenges with the full power of a nation at war. World
War II history taught us that an international policy of
placating despotism is an open invitation for despotism to
spread. The U.S. can win the war against trans-national
terrorism. America must meet these military challenges and
must do so across the spectrum, utilizing all the economic,
political, and military options open to us. We cannot
afford to allow terrorism to continue to spread unchecked.
Our very existence as a free people is at stake.
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A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Adams, James The Financing of Terror. New York: Simon
and Schuster, Inc., 1986.
2. Dobson, Christopher Black September, Its Short, Violent
History. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1974.
3. Dobson, Christopher and Payne, Donald. The Terrorists
Their Weapons. Leaders, and Tactocs." New York:
Facts On File, Inc., 1979.
4. Haskins, James Leaders of the Middle East. Hillside, New
Jersey: Enslow Publishers, Inc., 1985.
5. Jones, Frank Thomas Bradford Sendero Luminoso: Origins,
Outlooks, and Implications. Monterrey, California:
Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, 1986.
6. Laqueur, Walter. The Terrorism Reader, A Historical
Anthology. Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1978.
7. Morgenthau, T. "Aftermath of the U.S. Raid on Libya".
Newsweek. April 28, 1986; p. 31.
8. Reese, M. "How Can We Fight Back". Newsweek. September
15, 1986; p. 2.
9. Bush, George. Public Report of the Vice President's Task
Force on Combatting Terrorism. Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1986.
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