Marine Aviation Logistics Support Concept
AUTHOR Major George J. Hayn, Jr., USMC
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: MARINE AVIATION LOGISTICS SUPPORT CONCEPT
I. PUPRPOSE: To report on the current status of the Marine
Aviation Logistics Support Concept (MALSC) and to evaluate
the ability of the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS)
to deploy and employ as an integral component of the Marine
Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Air Combat Element (ACE).
II. PROBLEM: Although the complex challenges of providing
logistics support for the MAGTF ACE are theoretically met by
MALSC, the true confirmation of the ACE's supportability and
sustainability will only be accomplished by fully exercising
the deployment/employment cycle. The ACE must exercise in
peace the same logistics support that it requires in war;
otherwise, the logistics will not be there when required.
III. DATA: Marine Corps aviation is not organized in
garrison as it will be as the ACE of a MAGTF. In order to
provide the six functions of Marine aviation, all aircraft
types are combined in the MAGTF ACE from the source Marine
Aircraft Groups (MAGs). The transfering of aircraft is not
so much the problem, as is the transfering of the logistics
support. The organization that is tasked with performing
logistical support for the aviation units attached to the
MAG/the MAGTF is the MALS. The other concepts that
facilitate support of the composited ACE are the Contingency
Support Package (CSP), and the Fly-in Support Package (FISP).
The CSP includes personnel, parts, support equipment and
mobile facilities. The FISP contains parts required at the
squadron/detachment organizational maintenance level for a
specific duration. The primary means by which the composited
MALSs and CSPs are both transported to and can operate in
theater is the Aviation Logistics Support Ship (T-AVB).
IV. CONCLUSIONS: The MALSC, encompassing the MALS, CSP,
FISP and T-AVB, is quite sound in theory, but should be fully
exercised in order to prove and improve upon the concept
while simultaneously conducting realistic training.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS: The USMC must insist upon two annual
Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) training exercises, one in
the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) Pacific, and one in the FMF
Atlantic, to be conducted utilizing the full Maritime
Prepositioning Force (MPF) ACE together with all assiciated
Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS), U.S. Transportation
Command assets, and both T- AVBs. Two exercises such as these
should be the capstones to the annual continental U.S.
training cycle.
OUTLINE
MARINE AVIATION LOGISTICS
SUPPORT CONCEPT
THESIS: The Marine Aviation Logistics Support Concept
(MALSC)is a concept that provides the aviation
logistics support for the Marine Air Ground Task
Force (MAGTF) Air Combat Element (ACE). However,
in order to be a credible concept, MALSC must be bully
and continually exercised in realistic training
scenarios.
I. ORGANIZATION OF MARINE CORPS AVIATION
A. Garrison
B. MAGTF ACE Transition Challenge
C. Comparison witn USN Transition
II. MALSC
A. Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS)
l. Evolution From Headquarters and Maintenance
Squadron
2. Unity of Command
B. Aviation Logistics Support Ship (T-AVB)
l. Description
2. Utilization
C. Fly-in Support Package (FISP)
D. Contingency Support Package (CSP)
l. Personnel
2. Support Equipment
3. Mobile Facilities
4. Spares and Repair Parts
III. Concept of Operations
A. Deployment with Assault Follow-on Echelon
B. Employment
IV. deed to Exercise the MALSC
MARINE AVIATION LOGISTICS SUPPORT CONCEPT
The purpose of this paper is not to make the reader an
expert aviation logistician, but to show that all of the
elements except the training necessary to implement the
Marine Aviation Logistics Support Concept (MALSC) are now, or
will soon be in place. After briefly illustrating Marine
Corps aviation's organizational challenges, I will proceed
directly to a discussion of the key factors in supporting the
transition of Marine Aviation from garrison to a deployed
mode.
My thesis is that the complex challenges of providing
logistics support for the Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) Air Combat Element (ACE) are mat by the resources of
the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS). However,
unless the MALS capability to deploy/employ is exercised in
conjunction with the Aviation Logistics Support Ship (T-AVB),
then our warfighting capability will not only be untried, but
also untrained. According to the MAGTF Master Plan draft,
permanehtly assigned MAGTFs will train as they intend to
fight. (27: prologue) Unfortunately, concomitant realistic
logistics training is non-existent. Even more disturbing is
the fact that combat service support training for the ACE is
the least realistic of all!(9:46)
Hopefully, the bibliography appended to this paper
provides basic references and background reading for
continued thought, discussion and action by others, like me,
who are not only involved in, but dedicated, and committed to
supporting Marine Aviation.
Almost all USN and USMC personnel are aware of the fact
that Naval Aviation is comprised of both USN and USMC air
arms. Less well known are the differences between how the
two services transition the support of their air elements
from a garrison to a deployment mode. The transition from
garrison to deployment support is wuch smoother and more
readily accomplished for the USN than for the USMC. The
reason is that the USN has organic aircraft carriers
outfitted for deployment, While the USMC is dependent upon
the USN or USAF for strategic lift.
The Marine transition from the garrison, or Marine
Aircraft Group (MAG), to the deployment, or Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) Air Combat Element (ACE), is a
complicated transfer of aircraft, personnel, support
equipment, supplies and mobile facilities from the esisting
homogeneous MAG to the multi-mission capable multi-
type/model/series (T/M/S) heterogeneous MEB ACE. This
organizational upheaval was well addressed recently in an
article in the October, 1988 issue of the Marine Corps
Gazette by Captain Timothy Junette. (See figure 1 which
illustrates the transfer of squadrons from their parent MAG
to the MAGTF MEB ACE.) Captain Junette's recommendation is
that the Marine Corps reorganize its air wings in accordance
with the MAGTF MEF/MEB ACE structure. (11:19) He also
suggests that the initial investment in personnel, facilities
and support equipment necessary to accomplish a MAG to MEB
Click here to view image
ACE reorganization should be seriously considered for a
phased implementation. Until much a reorganization occurs,
he contends that Marine aviation will not be a fully
integrated MAGTF team member.
The Navy accomplishes the same garrison to deployment
transition by moving the various squadrons and detachments
from their parent Naval Air Stations (NASs) to their carrier
battle group/carrier air wing assignment. This process is
streamlined in that the support equipment, supplies, and
maintenance facilities are prepositioned on board each
carrier in anticipation of the exact composition of the air
wing. Support at each air station is provided for thirty
days duration at peacetime flying hours, whereas carrier
support is provided at ninety days duration at combat flying
hours. Additionally, each type aircraft at the NAS is only
supported at a fixed percentage of the number of aircraft
assigned there to accommodate the reduced numbers when the
squadrons deploy to the carrier air wing. (Refer to specific
T/M/S weapon system planning document.) The end result is
that USN aircraft have prepositioned support at either the
NAS or on board the carrier.
MAGs are outfitted just like carrier's with ninety days
of support at combat flying hours.(25:1-5) Marine Corps Air
Stations (MCASs) are outfitted just like NASs, but usually
only for search and rescue and other "headquarters"--type
aircraft. An expension of the role of the MCAS in support of
Marine aviation a'la the NAS with their integral aircraft
intermediate maintenance and supply departments could provide
a partial answer to the MAG/MEB ACE transition dilemma.
Procedures are currently in place to support Marine
Corps aviation's transition from MAG to MEB ACE; however,
these complex procedures, the Marine Aviation Logistics
Support Concept (MALSC), are theoretical and yet to be
actually exercised.(2:7-2) A process similar to the Navy's
whereby the MB's are outfitted by fixed and rotary wing
T/M/S aircraft should be inplemented with MEB
deployments replacing the current WestPac unit deployment
scenario. For example, the 9th MEB, which is the WestPac
amphibious MEB of III MEF, could be the rotational MEB to
WestPac in a revised unit rotation cycle that would be
tailored in accordance with MAGTF concept.
The oft used phrase that a "MAG is just like a CV" is
no longer valid, and should now be restated to a "MEB ACE
is just like a CV." This reprioritization will help
accelerate the pace of the evolutionary changes from the MAW
to the MEF ACE.(27:4-1) Until such time as the Marine Corps
decides whether it will continue to maintain the existing
MAW structure or fully implement the MAGTF concept, the
supporting establishment will be required to work twice
as hard to support the dual structures--both MAG and MEB ACE.
The T-AVB and the activation of the MALS are steps
in the right direction that I will address later in this
paper. While the USN provides a streamlined model for the
complex but smooth deployment of Naval Aviation, the USMC
continues to wrestle with the difficult integration of
Marine Aviation into the MAGTF model.
Nearly all Department of Defense personnel are familiar
with the Marine Corps amphibious operations scenario in which
the Marine Division (ground combat element) assaults the ob-
jective from amphibious ships. During this evolution, fixed
wing aviation support will be provided either by the carrier
air wing, or from a benign airfield, and Marine organic ro-
tary wing support will come from the LPH, the LHA, or also
from a benign airfield. However, how and when are the rest
of the Marine air combat element (ACE), and its aviation
logistics squadrons introduced into the operational theater?
The answer varies with each scenario, but is primarily de-
pendent upon the mode of transportation used to move the
forces.
You may be wondering why an individual should concern
himself with a topic as mundane as aviation logistics
support. The reason is twofold. Primarily, without its
supporting logistics element the estimated half-life of
the average tactical aircraft squadron is three days! The
Marine Corps, through the naval aviation inventory control
point, the Navy Aviation Supply Office, has procured Fly-in
Support Packages (FlSPs) consisting of high usage
organizational parts to support the ACE. (14:30) Secondarily,
and personally, as an unrestricted aviation supply officer,
aviation logistics is my raison d'etre.
The Marine Logistics Squadron (MALS) is tasked with
providing the supply and intermediate maintenance support
required by the operational squadrons. (5:1) MALS functions
as the aviation force multiplier in the areas of maintain-
ability, sustainability, and some of the others "...ilities"
with its ninety day endurance support package. A primary
goal for the MALS is to deploy/employ as readily as a USN
carrier's maintenance and supply departments.
What is a MALS? As of 1 October, 1988, the MAGs were
reorganized. (5:1-5) This reorganization focused primarily on
the redesignation of the Headquarters and Maintenance
Squadron (H&MS,aka HAMSTERS)to the MALS. Under the previous
H&MS organizational concept, the maintenance, supply,
avionics, and ordnance officers were not only H&MS billet
holders, but also special staff officers for the group
commander. This concept was in direct opposition to the
Clausewitzian principle of unity of command with these
special staff officers in the unenviable position of having
to serve two masters, both the H&MS and MAG COs. The MALS
concept rectifies this dual loyalty quandary because the MALS
CO becomes the sole individual who is responsible to the MAG
CO for aviation logistics support. The maintenance, supply,
ordnance, and avionics officers (and their departments) now
work directly, and only, for the MALS CO. I will not be
addressing the integration of the key logistics functions
performed by the Marine Air Control Groups, Marine Wing
Support Groups and Marine Wing Weapons Units in this paper.
Even the USN is in the process of adopting the MALS
concept at its Naval Air Stations. An initiative is underway
to create Aviation Support Activities (ASA) by combining the
Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Division and the Aviation
Support Division. (18:4) When implemented, this initiative
is expected to significantly improve both support and readi-
ness.
Another quantum improvement contained within the MALS
command structure is the designation of the CO/XO billets as
unrestricted aviation maintenance and supply officers. I am
not implying that the aviators and naval flight officers who
predominantly held these billets in the past were
incompetent. We have our combat aircrews, but where are our
combat logisticians? (3:23) My point is: Who is more
capable of "fighting" the aviation logistics squadron than
the aviation logisticians? From my extensive H&MS
experience, I see the need for a technically competent CO,
with an in-depth knowledge of both the Navy supply and
maintenance systems. This is a prerequisite, especially
when he will be confronted with the complex challenge of
coordinating with others in forming composite MALS.
Who will command the fixed- and rotary-wing Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) MALS? A parent MEB MALS has
been identified for each of the six fixed- and six rotary-
wing MEB air combat elements (ACEs).(27:4-3) Each MALS CO
should assume command for his assigned composite MEB MALS
and the other staff billets should be coordinated with the
joining MALS. Specific table of organization (T/O) billet
assignments should also be made for each contingency.
What are some additional pertinent factors to be con-
sidered when planning for the deployment of the MALS?
After the task organizations of the parent MALS have been
determined, the only remaining job is to transport approxi-
mately 500 mobile facilities (MFs=8'x8'x20' containers), 700
Marines, and other miscellaneous bulk equipment and supplies.
(12:3) This is no small endeavor, and it is further
complicated by the requirement to be operational in theater
within a constrained timeframe in order to support the ACE's
fly-in echelon.
Previous exercises such as Team Spirit, Northern Wedding
and Bold Guard have reconfirmed the fact that, even though it
is possible to support a small detachment with a supply pack-
up and a rapid logistics support umbilical cord to the home
base, this ad-hoc type operation would not be feasible for an
actual MEB commitment. It is imperative that the Marine
Corps, if it really professes to be the nation's "force in
readiness," must plan to cut its support umbilical cord and
rely on organic maintainability and sustainability. (for an
opposing viewpoint see 21:14-15)
The primary means for transporting Marine forces is in
ships. Unfortunately, strategic sealift is a dangerous weak-
ness in the fundamental structure of U.S. strategy.
Admiral Thomas Hayward, former CNO put it most bluntly,
"Without adequate and reliable sealift, none of the (U.S.)
military plans is executable."(1:31) General Alfred M. Gray,
Commandant of the Marine Corps, has provided this dictum for
Marine Corps planning and readiness: "Light enough to get
there, heavy enough to win. " (19:27)
During the Reagan administration more than $7 billion
was invested in sealift. What did we get for our money?
Eight fast sealift ships, two hospital ship's, ten heavy lift
vessels, too aviation logistics support ships, and 91 ready
reserve fleet ships. (8:63) The Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF)
is a fleet of sealift ships that can be deployed on 5, 10 or
20 days notice. (13:23 and 25:4-4)
Current options for transporting the MEB's two MALS
from the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) to the theater of
operations include USN amphibious shipping, USAF Military
Airlift Command (MAC), Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), and
the Military Sealift Command (MSC) Ready Reserve Fleet. (RRF)
A partial solution to the problem of having transportation
dedicated to the deployment of the MALS was implemented with
the procurement, modification, and activation of the Aviation
Logistics Support Ships (T-AVBs).(16:1-5)
Two T-AVB ships are in the RRF in layberth status for
five day readiness. (25:2-5) The total cost of the program
through FY 91 will be $44.7 million (22:58) as opposed to the
higher initial budget estimates. (26:TABLE 1) Even though a
C-141 can accommodate three MFs (vans), it would still
require approximately 200 sorties to deploy the two composite
logistics squadrons by air, with the additional qualifying
assumption that we have access to a benign airfield! Al-
though airlift will have to augment the overall deployment,
sealift will, of necessity, be the prime mover since MAC will
probably be seriously overtasked in any major confrontation.
The T-AVB, a converted commercial container ship, is the
best existing solution to the dedicated lift requirement of
the aviation logistics support element. (2:7-1 and 4:67)
Depending upon whether the T-AVB is loaded to support func-
tioning or tightly stowed MFS, its capacity varies from
approximately 300 to 65O TEUs (twenty foot equivalent units)
(28:1-4) Berthing is available for 300 marines plus crew.
(24:7-1 and appendix B-12,13) Unfortunately, there are only
two of these Seabridge class roll-on, roll-off ships, one
homeported in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and the other in
Long Beach, California. (see figure two)
Activation of the deployinent cycle would commence with
the warning order to the units involved. (23:3-3) The most
important thing for the MALS to do during its work-up
initiation is to identify the actual aircraft deckload and
ACE task organization to ensure there is no deviation from
the deckload upon which the contingency plan was based. Once
the numbers and types of aircraft are identified, the parent
MALS can begin coordinating the selective process of staging
the support equipment, and supplies with the other supporting
MALS, and assigning the personnel to the task-organized
units.
The notional Mobile Prepositioned Ships (MPS) MEB ACE
Click here to view image
includes roughly 75 fixed-wing and 60 rotary-wing aircraft.
(20:3) A MALS is required for each major type of aircraft,
i.e. rotary or fixed-wing. In order to embark and deploy
the entire MEB ACE on a single T-AVB, the MFs would have to
be stowed in an inaccessable mode, precluding any operations
enroute.(28:1-4) In all likelihood, the employment of the
fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft will be to geographically
separate operating sites. Each MALS has about 500 Marines,
so at least 700 would have to be airlifted. How then do we
simultaneously deploy both of the MEB ACE's MALS to the
objective area while maintaining unit command, control, and
operational flexibility? The answers consistently boil down
to additional strategic lift, and an encounter with the
circumstance.
Strategic lift deficiencies are in the too often
neglected realm of logistics support. Those of us in the
Department of Defense who are wrestling with the challenge of
integrating people, doctrine, and technology, must concomit-
antly consider the issues of logistics support and strategic
lift. As S.L.A. Marshall wrote in The Soldier's Load and the
Mobility of a Nation:
Strategy is the art of the general. And like
any other art, it requires patience to work out
its basic concepts. But the odd part of it is
that among higher commanders that branch of the
art most apt to be treated with a broad stroke,
though it calls the loudest for the sketching in
of minute details, is the logistics of war. (15:3)
The ability of the aviation logistics system to support
the MAG squadrons while in garrison is proven. However,
supportability is a proper concern during the transition from
the current garrison MAG structure to the combat organized
MEB ACE. It is possible to have only one or two T/M/S
aircraft in a MAG, whereas in a MEB ACE there will be
approximately four different T/M/S helicopters, and seven
various fixed-wing aircraft. This variety is essential if
all six functions of Marine aviation are to be available in a
single combat package.
Although the aircraft squadrons remain intact, their
supporting establishments must be reorganized and reoutfitted
to provide support for the reconstituted air arm. This
reorganization of the supporting establishments is now
accomplished, and the necessary logistics support can be
provide by theMALSC.
The Contingency Support Package (CSP) was
developed in recognition of the fact that we are
not logistically organized in peacetime in the
manner in which we intend to deploy in wartime. (5:3)
The "tailoring" of the support requirements for the MEB
ACE is accomplished via the CSP concept. The CSP consists of
people, support equipment, supplies, and MF's. Even though
the squadron's material remains stays with them, replenish-
ment and support of that material is the responsibility of
the reorganized MEB ACE MALS. Organizational support equip-
ment will either deploy with the aircraft squadron, or will
be available from the Mobile Prepositioning Ships (MPS), or
from the Norway prepositioning program. (24:6-4)
Customary naval aviation maintenance procedures are
accomplished at three levels. They are the organic or
squadron level, the intermediate, and the depot. A key
decision in the tailoring of the CSP is the level of repair
capability desired at the intermediate level. The choice is
either to have the MALS repair components on site, or to
retrograde the repairables to the depot concurrent with a
supply reorder requisition.
Repair of complex aircraft components takes specially
skilled personnel, a vast array of test equipment, and parts
for both the components and the test equipment. The level of
repair analysis is based on a number of factors of which the
most important is the component's inherent mean time between
failure. (10:3-7) The foregoing analysis helps to determine
whether the supporting MALS will either attempt to repair the
broken parts, or will stock extra components. Stocking extra
parts to compensate for the lack of repair capability can be
a very expensive proposition. Current CSP policy is to
establish a limited MALS repair capability with the supply
department's stocking objectives adjusted accordingly.
Almost all of the MALS' equipment, primarily supply
assets and maintenance equipment, are housed and are trans-
portable in the 8'x8'x20' MFs.(22:D-5,6) These MFs are
similar to the containers used in private industry. The
TAV-Bs have been specifically altered to accommodate these
vans.
Even though MALSC can theoretically support the MEB ACE,
the concept is yet to be exercised and tested. The building
blocks are in place--the CSP, the T-AVB, and the MALS. Now is
the time to practice in peace what we will do in war. "CSPs,
FISPs, MPS, and T-AVBs provide the means by which Marine
Aviation Logistics can rapidly task organize in support of a
MAGTF. "(5:3)
CONCLUSION
The Logistician's Lament
Logisticians are a sad embittered race of men,
very much in demand in war, who sink resentfully
into obscurity in peace. They deal only with facts,
but must work for men who traffic in theories. They
emerge during war because war is very much fact.
They disappear in peace because, in peace, war is
mostly theory. (3:30)
Can you imagine a football team preparing for the big
game without having had integrated training? In a real sense
that is exactly how the Marine Corps is currently conducting
MAGTF training. The backfield, the ACE, is practicing on one
field, the linemen,the GCE, are practicing on another, and
the logisticians; well, they are not even practicing, but are
"waterboys" for the ACE and GCE on their separate fields!
The analogy is not as far-fetched as it may seem. "The real
danger of these training inadequacies is that commanders do
not fully appreciate the impact of logistics on operations.
And logisticians will be unable to assist the commander
because they have not been educated ..."(3:24)
The success of the implementation of the Marine Aviation
Logistic Support Concept (MALSC), and its integration with
MAGTF training will be a function of command attention and
leadership. It will be costly and time consuming; however,
just as in the popular oil filter commercial, it is truly a
"pay me now, or pay me later" proposition. The impact on
peacetime flight hours and readiness required to conduct
realistic combat logistics training is readily apparent, and
therein lies the mandate for command attention. (2:7-2)
The MALSC is not just a scientific means of adapting the
ACE to the didactic time-phased force deployment lists, but
is aviation logistics doctrine that will assist in
determining what can and, perhaps even more importantly, what
cannot be accomplished. MALS commanders should not have to
guess what the ACE commander needs to support the MAGTF.
With realistic training in true operational scenaries, the
ACE commander would know exactly what he wants, and the MALS
commander will be able to tell him whether or not he can
provide it. "Continual neglect of the logistical art is
potentially more dangerous than our earlier neglect of the
operational art" (17:40)
This is a very exciting and dynamic era for the MAGTF
ACE. Because of MALSC, even former "HAMSTERS" are acting
boldly and audaciously. Before becoming overly optimistic,
there are still several challenges that confront MALSC.
Without delving into minutiae, the following some issues that
are yet to be fully resolved.
1. Support of remain behind units at the parent MAG.
2. Integration and inclusion of reserves in the
"Total Force" MALSC.(7:l)
3. Integration and inclusion of MWWUs, MWSSs, and MACGs
in fully operational and logistical ACE exercises.
4. Establishment of direct access by the deployed ACE
MALS to the supply system. Elimination of duplicate
unit identification codes for deployed and remain
behind units.
5. Minimization of peculiar T/M/S support systems. (As
an apostle of the "Hornet Support Plan", I must
plead guilty under extenuating circumstances!)
Unity of effort is not possible without unity of under-
standing. I truly hope that this paper contributes to a
better understanding of the challenges of aviation logistics,
and generates continued thought and discussion about the
MALSC and ACE supportability.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Aquilino, John, Sanders, James
"Strategic Sealift: The Achilles Hell of America's
Defense".
Amphibious Warfare Review Winter 1987-88, 30-35.
2. Aviation Logistics Support Ship Feasibility Study (T-
AVB) prepared for Headquarters, U.S. MARINE CORPS
by Tracor, Inc. November, 1982
3. Bartlow, Gene S. "The Operator-Logistician Disconnect"
Air Power Journal, Fall 1988, 23-37.
4. Brown, David B. "MPS: Aviation Combat and the T-AVB"
Marine Corps Gazette, February 1985, 64-67
5. CMC Washington D.C. Message 240057Z Dec. 87
Subject: USMC Aviation Logistics Support Concepts
6. CMC Washington D.C. Message 290006Z Sept. 88
Subject: Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS)
and Marine Aircraft Group Headquarters (MAG HQ.)
Implementation Guidance/Information
7. CMC Washington D.C. Message 100001 Z Feb. 89
Subject: Reserve Contingency Support Package
Implementation (POA & M)
8. Demers, W.A. "Transportation: A Long Way to Go"
Military Forum, Jan./Feb. 1989, 49-50,63.
9. Gullet, H.W. "How Tactical Is Our CSS Training?"
Marine Corps Gazette March 1986, 103-108.
10. Integrated Logistics Support Guide
Defense Systems Management College
Fort Belvoir, Virginia May 1986.
11. Junette, Timothy E. "Reorganizing Marine Corps
Aviation" Marine Corps Gazette October 1988, 18-
21.
12. Kennedy, Michael, and Haglund, Randall
"The Aviation Logistics Support Ship
(T-AVB): An Aviation Supply Perspective", Naval
War College, Newport, R.I. 1984
13. Kitfield, James, and Elliot, Frank
"The Defense Transportation Delemma"
Military Forum September 1988, 16-24.
14. Kuhlman, Linn, Miller, and Roberts
Supply Management
Industrial College of the Armed Forces,
Washington, D.C. September, 1975
15. Marshall, S.L.A. The Soldier's Load and the
Mobility of a Nation, Marine Corps Association
Quantico, Virginia, 1980
16. Naval Warfare Pub 22-8 (Rev C) July 1987
MSC Support of Amphibious Operations
17. Newell, Clayton R. "Logistical Art", Parameters
March 1989, 32-40.
18. Proceedings of the 43rd Aviation Logistics Officers
Conference, 15-17 November 1988, sponsored by the Navy
Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
19. Schwab, Ernest L. "Amphibs and Preposistioning:
How Much is Enough?"
Amphibious Warfare Review, Winter 1987-88, 25-29.
20. Second MAW SOP For the Aviation Logistics Support Ship
(T-AVB)
Draft Dated 1 October, 1985
21. Sickler Jr., Robert I.
"A Logistics Operational Concept To Go with The
T-AVB", Naval War College, Newport, R.I. 1988
22. Truver, Scott C. "Sealift for the Overseas Connection"
ARMED FORCES JOURNAL, August 1986, 54-59.
23. U.S. Marine Corps LFM 03
Amphibious Embarkation
MCCDC, Quantico, Va. 1987
24. U.S. Marine Corps OH 7-6
Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Operations
MCCDC, Quantico, Va June 1987
25. U.S. Marine Corps OH 7-8
Deployment of the Assault Follow-On Echelon
(AFOE), MCCDC, Quantico, Va June 1988
26. U.S. Marine Corps. "Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS)
Aviation Combat Element Support", A Letter From CMC To
CNO, Washington D.C., 2 March, 1982
27. U.S. Marine Corps, MCCDC, Warfighting Center, "MAGTF
MASTER PLAN" Draft, December,1988, Quantico, Va.
28. U.S. Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command. Amphibious
Warfare and Strategic Sealift Program.
"T-AVB information Manual", Washington, D.C. 1986
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
