Does Our Nation's Security Strategy Address The Real Threats?
AUTHOR LCDR. Charles J. Fairchild, USMC
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: DOES OUR NATION'S SECURITY STRATEGY ADDRESS THE
REAL THREATS?
I. PURPOSE: The National Security Strategy of 1989
addresses the expected primary threats that could confront
the United States. This paper analyzes several of the more
significant threats associated with national security
strategy.
II. Thesis: Deterrence remains the framework from which the
United States Security Strategy is structured. Low-intensity
conflict, nuclear weapon proliferation, and diminution of
presidential prerogative represent serious challenges to the
success of national security strategy and the protection of
our freedom in the future. The national security strategy
must appropriately address these threats and effectively
promote changes to thwart them.
III Data: Failure to identify and implement a pragmatic
structured national security policy, which would properly
addresses low-intensity conflict, nuclear proliferation, and
loss of presidential prerogative, has led the United States
down a path of uncertainty. Since the advent of atomic
weapons, the United States has buried its head in the sand of
deterrence against total nuclear war. Certainly, deterrence
has and continues to avert total nuclear war, but the
astonishing list of political and military failures of lesser
conflict indicate the ultimate answer is elsewhere.
IV. Conclusion: In the final analysis, the cornerstone of
any new strategic gains is the meshing of national will
political objectives, and military resources. Any new
national security strategy must be inscribed in clear and
understandable terms as to the objectives of political and
military strategy with an enlightened assessment of all
aspects of low-intensity conflict, nuclear proliferation, and
presidential prerogative.
Does Our Nation's Security Strategy Address the Real
Threats?
Deterrence remains the framework from which the United States
Security Strategy is structured.
Low-intensity conflict, nuclear weapon proliferation, and
diminution presidential prerogative, represent serious
challenges to the success of national security strategy and
the protection of our freedom in the future.
The national security strategy must address these threats
properly and implement necessary changes.
I. National Security Strategy
A. Origins
B. Framework of policies
C. Does the strategy address low-intensity conflicts,
nuclear proliferation, and presidential prerogative
II. Low-intesity conflict
A. Soviet threat
B. Third world environment
C. Terrorist attacks
D. Failures of current policy
III. Nuclear proliferation
A. Deterrence and the delicate balance of power
B. Nuclear weapons club
C. Countries soon to enter the nuclear club
IV. Presidential prerogative
A. Executive Branch formulates and implements strategy
B. Clear expression of policy
C. Results of confusion
D. Congressional resurgence
E. Diminution of presidential prerogative
F. Presidential power
DOES OUR NATION'S SECURITY STRATEGY ADDRESS THE REAL
THREATS?
Until 1986, the United States had no written National
Security Strategy. At that time, Congress mandated the
Executive Branch to publish a National Security Strategy, and
in 1987 the first document called "The National Security
Strategy of the United States" was published. The
fundamental, strategic nature of this document is threefold:
one, furnish a historical perspective to past strategic
structure; two, delineate the interest of the United States;
three, analyze the threat and objectives of the United
States, and the means to achieve these objectives. 1
Our National Security Strategy, in essence, was born of
necessity from the atomic ashes of World War II. As the war
ended, the United States was the supreme nuclear power, but
shortly thereafter, in 1949, the Soviet Union began testing
its own atomic weapons.2 For the first time, the United
States began to realize the very real, indisputable
possibility of nuclear attack on the Continent. Since then,
any strategic thought concerning national policy, by force of
impending threat, had to revolve around the implications of
attack from the Soviet Union-- either via nuclear delivery
systems against populations centers in the United States, or
nuclear and conventional attack in Europe. The United
States, as well as its allies, have long believed that its
national security interest would be in jeopardy if a hostile
state, or league of hostile states, were able to dominate the
European land mass. Historically, the strategic significance
of Europe was exemplified by the two world wars that we
fought defending it during this century.
With this formidable threat in mind, the United States
and its Allies have undertaken a defensive posture known as
"deterrence" in which the Soviet Union is made to realize
they face the undeniable fact that aggression in any form
will be met with a force of like response. For nearly forty
years, the impending threat of mutually assured destruction
(massive civilian casualties and large scale economic
destruction) of the Soviet Union has proven effective in
deterring war.3
Deterrence remains the framework from which the United
States Security Strategy is structured. But is this strategy
the balustrade which protects the United States from all
threats. World events have demanded a new enlightenment and
restructuring of purpose which must be reflected in our
current National Security Strategy. Low-intensity conflict,
nuclear weapon proliferation, and presidential prerogative,
represent serious challenges to the success of national
security strategy and the protection of our freedom in the
future. The national security strategy must address these
threats properly and implement necessary changes. Deterrence
alone is not the answer.
security strategy policy.
The United States can ill afford or even hesitate to
prepare for the prevailing undercurrents of conflict emerging
from the Third World today and in the future. The United
States faces a continuum of conflict evolving from the
political and economic unrest primarily in the Third World
countries. The unrest prevalent in these countries will
repeatedly evolve into armed conflicts which imperil our
national interest on a global scale.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff has defined low-intensity
conflict as a limited politico-military struggle to achieve
political, social, economic, and psychological objectives.
It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic,
and psycho-social pressures through terrorism and
insurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to
a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints
on the weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence.4
Increasingly in the world today, the preponderance of
conflict revolves around these small, dirty, little wars
which receive little interest until another conflict demands
attention.
To this point in history, the United States political
structure and the U.S. Military have continued to follow a
strategy that is designed to reinforce NATO forces against an
all out offensive, ostensibly by the Soviet Union and its
surrogates. Pre-deployed ground and forward-deployed naval
forces (under the assumption that an orchestrated attack from
the Soviet Union along the European front is the more likely
threat that will effect the United States and NATO countries)
have received the bulk of U.S. defense dollars.5 Military
thought in this arena appea8rs to have ignored the ever
increasing conflicts arising in the Third World. The
escalation and increased propensity toward revolution and
counterinsurgency in destitute nations create a global as
well as national security threats that cannot be easily
disregarded. Since deterrence has proven to be incapable of
resisting these conflicts, a reorientstion of current
political and military strategic thought processes is
necessary for a secure nation in the future.
The Soviet Union has come to realize a strategic nuclear
war would be a disaster of immense proportions, and that even
if a war of this nature could be won, the fabric of their
social and economic structure would be at risk of extinction
The enormous price exacted by a strategic nuclear attack is
not one the Soviet Union is willing to pay.
The Soviet Union is currently experiencing dire economic
stagnation. They have structured their military and civilian
economies separately, each functioning independently of the
other. Current military spending approaches 18% of their
gross national product which consequently places tremendous
internal stress on civilian economic sectors. The civilian
economy can no longer support such a disproportionate
spending pattern. At this point in time and extending
into the near future, the Soviets must devote a larger
portion of their gross national product to the civilian
economy. The future continued growth of their military
forces stands in jeopardy until the future economy enjoys a
sound footing. The Soviets, therefore, must reduce the size,
deployment, and build-up of their armed forces. One only has
to realize the overtures toward military nuclear arms
limitations, the withdrawal from Afghanistan and their
expressed interest in force reductions in Europe hallmark
their need to reduce military spending with consequent
buttressing of their economy.
In the Third World environment, the political elitist and
colonial power structures were unable to establish the
necessary infrastructure, create politico-economic stability
or deal effectively with the ethnic differences present in
most indigent countries. These governmental shortcomings
promote fertile ground for continued political diffusion,
provide unstable government structures, resurrect growing
contingents of unskilled labor with little economic
substructure to maintain them, and foster a growing need for
technological advancement. The Soviet Union sees involvement
in the Third World as low cost, low risk operations with high
political strategic payoff--especially in areas along the sea
lines of communication of the democratic world. The Soviet
Union has substantially redirected its emphasis from world
domination through nuclear destruction and large scale
conventional warfare into fomenting communist revolution in
Third Countries that are unstable and have a high degree of
revolution potential.6 There is no question this threat is
real. Thirty-nine wars are currently being conducted in the
world today with the majority either directly or through
proxies supported by the Soviet Union. In this way, they
can threaten our peace, security, and freedom.
The United States still has the greatest accumulation of
military power than any other nation, but many theorist on
war argue that much of its might is directed toward
implausible threats. The general consensus among military
planners is that continued readiness of manpower and
equipment focused on the proposed European areas of battle,
presupposes these same forces are ready and equipped to fight
organized terrorism, counterinsurgency, and revolution in
Third World Countries which are characteristically distant
locales, remote areas, and usually unfriendly.7
The hijacking of Trans World flight 847, the Iranian
hostage crisis, the terrorist attack on the U.S. embassy in
Lebanon and the Marine barracks there, and the Nicaraguan
conflict, while individually appearing finite in scope,
present a broad range of low-intensity conflicts for which
the U.S. has failed to suitably plan, prepare, and equip.
These tragic failures of U.S. geo-political policy and
strategy underscore the strategic dead end U.S. policy makers
have allowed themselves to follow.
A definite sense of reluctance permeates American policy
makers thought processes (directly as a result of the Vietnam
war and indirectly from strong moral and ethical
considerations based on an increasingly liberal society)
creating a reluctance to support conflicts militarily. The
United States, however, cannot adopt a policy of
nonenvolvement or indifference only to watch the Soviets
nibble away at our interest abroad, narrow our sea lanes of
communication, and slowly strangle the economic support
developed in the the Third World.
American leadership must deal with this burden by being
very selective in choosing those conflicts that more directly
reflect the nations strategic policy. The United States will
have to depend (as demanded by popular public support) on
high-technology, low manpower operations in support of
foreign governments, allies, or revolutionary parties in
low-intensity conflicts. 8
The decreased possibility of direct confrontation,
between NATO forces and the Soviet Union, on the European
front coupled with the Soviets continued use of subversive
tactics and coercive diplomacy in the Third World necessitate
a revaluation of present national security strategy to
encompass this new threat-- low-intensity warfare.
Since the experimental explosion of their first atomic
weapon, the Soviets have posed a grave threat to the
continued domestic stability of the United States via the
impending possibility of full scale nuclear war. Both their
first strike capability and retaliatory power have permeated
an uncomfortable feeling throughout the American populace.
As time has shown, the United States and its nuclear
allies through the display and deployment of nuclear weapons
have successfully deterred the Soviet Union from using its
nuclear arsenal. The Soviet nuclear threat is a real one,
but there remains an even greater threat which goes
relatively unnoticed and unchallenged. Nuclear proliferation
has become a slowly spreading and ever-expanding cloud of
impending devastation since the first use of these weapons.
The unwelcome spread of nuclear weapons to other nations
threatens the status quo of our fragile envelope of
protection-- deterrence. The ever-present delicate balance
of power among nations with nuclear arsenals is at risk of
confrontation caused by the spread of these weapons thereby
fostering a deleterious instability in the world.9
There are at present six nations with the bomb-- the
United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, China
and India. 10 All these countries have exploded nuclear
devices, but they do not remain the only candidates holding
this means of destruction. Pakistan hoodwinked the European
uranium consortium and gained technical help for its bomb
program. Pakistan may be ready for a test in a few years.
South Africa may have exploded a nuclear device in 1979.
Israel, according to some estimates, may already posses two
hundred nuclear warheads. Colonel Muammar Quaddafi has a bid
on the world market to buy the "Moslem bomb." If the Iranian
revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini had occurred years later,
the Shah could have developed a bomb from the four nuclear
power plants under construction. In addition, Iraq would
have had nuclear weapons if Israel had not preempt its
attempts by destroying the supposed nuclear research
plant. 11
Even more worrisome is the unbelievable numbers of other
countries capable of developing nuclear weapons. Some of
these countries are our allies, but the situation is no less
disconcerting. The Federal Energy Research and Development
Agency compiled this list of bomb-potential nations:
Countries technically capable of detonating a
nuclear device within less than one year and up to
three years if they chose to do so: Argentina,
Canada, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, and
Sweden.
Countries capable of detonating a nuclear device
within four to six years: Belgium, Brazil,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, South Korea, The
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Switzerland.
Countries capable of detonating a nuclear device
within seven to ten years: Austria, Denmark, Egypt,
Finland, Iran, Mexico, Portugal, Romania, Turkey,
and Yugoslavia. 12
The Agency developed this inventory in the early
eighties. This registry of nations crashing the nuclear club
seems a very startling. The possible scenarios are
terrifying. Suppose Libya, who is determined to acquire
nuclear weapons, receives a gift of the bomb from Pakistan as
an act of Islamic solidarity. Colonel Quaddafi brandishes it
against Israel, and the crisis escalates. The Soviet Union,
Libya's ally, joins the confrontation and so does Israel's
ally, the United States; the conflict quickly builds to
regional and then a global nuclear catastrophe.
The Soviet threat is known. There are carefully
calculated counter forces in place to thwart any actions the
Soviets take. Where there is a lack of direction and purpose
no preparations can be made, no plans set into motion, and no
defenses bolstered to provide and effective defense. A
heightened awareness should be proposed by our leadership, a
greater voice raised by civilians, and a redirected National
Security Strategy should be set in motion.
Look not to the Soviets in fear of nuclear attack.
Rather, direct attention to those emerging nations who are
developing the powers of mass destruction. The burgeoning
numbers of these countries in the nuclear club is a direct
overwhelming threat to our national security which must be
pursued in the National Security Strategy. 13 The United
States can protect itself from an unknown nuclear attack
precipitated by the undaunted spread of nuclear arms, yet if
there is no preparation there is no protection.
Successful administration of a complex and far-reaching
policy like our National Security Strategy must have sound,
concrete objectives with a single, strong leadership to carry
it out. The executive branch formulates National Security
Strategy and employs it by exercising the elements of
National Power-- political, economic and military. 14 To
more concisely focus the three elements of National Power,
strong political leadership is necessary to promote a unity
of purpose.
Our National Security Strategy has a global influence,
yet we do not have one voice but many voices expounding a
direction for policy-- the executive branch, the legislative
branch, the media, and the public. There should be no
confusion of our purpose in countries that threaten the U.S.
If there are many sources dictating policy decisions, the
success of those policies is diluted in direct proportion to
the confusion expressed by the sources. There is more
effective control if our goals are expressed by one leader.
A clear expression of policy will enable other countries of
the world to know what to expect when their policies conflict
with those of the U.S. In return, a certain amount of
deterrence can be expected-- our major strategic goal.15
The "START Treaty" was negotiated from a position of
unity in the United States and has resulted in an agreement
with Soviet Union that could cut strategic offensive arms by
50 percent. In contrast, our confused, indecisive policies
in Nicaragua have served us poorly because we failed to
approach these policies with a unified leadership;
furthermore, these policy vacillations in Nicaragua create a
fog that obscures our political goals in other Latin American
countries.
Until the Vietnam war, the president had power of
executive prerogative, especially during war, to administer
national security policy with only minor interference from
congress. 16 Presidential initiative brought the U.S. into
a war in Asia which gradually became unpopular. Nightly, the
American public experienced the horrors of war via
television. As a consequence, presidential prerogative came
under attack. Congress passed the "War Powers Act" which
helped to precipitate a resurgence of congressional power and
a dilution of presidential power. The constitution gives the
president the power to make and execute national security
policy, but it also gives or grants congress the power to
make war. Hence, there has been an adversary relationship
developing between the executive and legislative branches.
The formulation and execution of U.S. policies and
strategies should be reflected by a clarity of positive
leadership from the executive branch. The current power
structure between the executive and legislative branch should
be reassessed with an accentuation on executive prerogative.
The congress can never speedily make any decision or speak
with unity. The reluctance of congress to provide the
financial resources necessary to support our National
Security Strategy is a cause for rising concern. 17 When our
leadership formulates policies, initiates strategy, and fails
to carry them out because congress wavers, a diverse message
is sent to the American people and to those countries
affected by these policies. An ambiguous stance on security
policy results in a failure of the policy or strategy to the
detriment of our National Security interest and threatens our
national structure.
Technology access exposes leaders failures and successes
quickly. A more informed public and congress closes the gap
between leaders and followers informatively. There is a
necessity for consensus in congress and in the public toward
a better understanding of our National Security Strategy,
thus enabling the U.S. to speak with unity.
Ronald Reagan understood the need for presidential
prerogative when he wrote:
America's national power is sometimes thought of
only in coercive or military terms. I believe,
however, that national power is also derived from a
nation's moral legitimacy and leadership, as we
exemplified by the Marshall plan after World War II-
an act of strengthening allies, of enlightened
self-interest. Today nations understand that the
effective use of national power is something more
than the simple use of force and we seek to follow a
National Security Strategy that ensures we have
rapport with other nations based on credibility
rather than simple capability. 18
The president must boldly answer the big questions without
fear of reprisal. A decrease of congressional involvement in
executive affairs would allow the president to effectively
administer the National Powers in order to secure our future
freedom. "The direction of war implies the direction of the
common strength and the power of directing and employing the
common strength forms a usual and essential part in the
definition of the executive authority," with these words
Alexander Hamiltion described the valued role of the
presidentin national security affairs.19
The president plays multiple roles in the execution of
policy, but he also acts as a party leader, a national
spokesperson, a peacekeeper, a manager of prosperity, and a
world leader. The complexity and scope of administering to
national security affairs has increased the need for
augmentation of the presidential staff which greatly diffuses
the responsibility-- adding voices to policy making. The
elements of this collective institutionalization of national
security administration are the National Security Council, the
State Department, the Department of Defense, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and the Office of Management and Budget,
all playing a role in national security. If the products of
these agencies are to be clear and concise, they must be
filtered through the president as the leader in national
security.
Our forefathers structured the Constitution in order to
diffuse the power structure between the congress and the
president. As Jordon and Taylor wrote, ". . . the president is
the commander and chief. . ., but he has nothing to command
unless congress uses the power it possesses to raise and
support armies and to support and maintain a navy. "20
The president must be the focal point of National Security
Strategy. The actions of congress are painfully slow and open
to world scrutiny. During a crisis, only the president can
make expedient, prudent National Security Policy decisions.
The workings of congress are spread across many committees
which may unduly influence its policies. As a result, there is
no focal point in congress to express the broad views held;
each committee tends to formulates its own views. Still,
congress could be unduly swayed by public opinion (especially
the House of Representatives) because members are worried about
reelection. The general public is often better informed than
in the past but it is mostly influenced by the news media which
tends to bend the news to its own designs. The news media may
unwittingly contribute to a public opinion which does not
consist of all the vital information necessary to make a
correct decision on a National Security level.
The congress, the media, and the public continue to
challenge and question the policies of the executive branch
hindering its function as intended by the constitution. A
search for an adequate answer to this problem insures dilemma.
There are no easy answers, for we live in a democracy based on
freedom of expression; nevertheless, in order to realize the
success of our National Security Strategy there can be, as in
the military, only one leader.
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