The Ace As A Maneuver Element
AUTHOR Major Steven B. Donnell, USMC
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: THE ACE AS A MANEUVER ELEMENT
I. Purpose: To establish the ACE as a maneuver element
within the MAGTF.
II. Problem: Historically, the ACE has been relegated to
a subordinate, supporting role to the GCE. Marine Corps
doctrine is responsible, and as a result, the ACE is reac-
tive not proactive.
III. Data: The Marine Corps has repeatedly fought the GCE,
not the MAGTF. Training programs have promoted this atti-
tude with the Combined Arms Exercises being a good example.
In fact, the MAGTF planning cycle calls for the GCE to devel-
op the courses of action regardless of which element may be
the focus of effort. Due to the expeditionary nature of the
MAGTF, the GCE cannot stand alone on the battlefield for any
period of time without the employment of the ACE's combat
power. Since Close Air Support is just one sub-function of
the ACE's capabilities, the ACE can provide additional sup-
port to the MAGTF commander in the form of aviation maneuver
elements that can see and shade the battlefield. Aviation
maneuver elements can operate as the focus of effort, sup-
porting attack or in a reserve capacity. The implications
are many and varied: The GCE will have less direct support,
the ACE, at times, will operate like the GCE, and the MAGTF
planning cycle will need revising to allow the ACE to devel-
op courses of action as the focus of effort.
IV. Conclusion: The ACE is not only a supporting element
for the GCE, but an additional maneuver element for the
MAGTF.
V. Recommendations: That the unique capabilities of
aviation maneuver elements be recognized as a viable force
within the MAGTF and the changes necessary to employ
aviation maneuver elements be made.
THE ACE AS A MANEUVER ELEMENT
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement. The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) is more
than just a supporting arm for the Ground Combat Element
(GCE) , it's an additional maneuver element that can assist
the MAGTF commander in winning on the battlefield.
I. Introduction
A. ACE as a supporting arm
B. ACE as a maneuver element
1. JCS Pub l definition
2. Examples
a. Patton in Europe
b. Vietnam War
II. Employment Considerations
A. Focus of Effort
1. Air Superiority
2. Reconnaissance
3. Airfield Seizure
B. Supporting Attack
1. Deception
2. Flank Security
3. DAS short of the FSCL
C. Reserves
1. FMFM 5-4A example
D. Limitations
1. Sustainability
2. Target Acquisition
E. Advantages
1. Mobility
2. Firepower
3. Intelligence Collection
III. Implications
A. Command and Control
B. MAGTF Planning Cycle
1. Courses of Action
2. Apportionment and Allocation of Assets
C. ACE as the GCE
1. GCE OPCON to the ACE
2. Mission Type Orders
3. Commander's Intent
IV. Implementation
A. MAGTF planning cycle revisions
B. Apportionment and Allocation
C. DAS short of the FSCL
D. Aviation instruction in GCE tactics
E. CAX revisions
F. Turf battles
V. Conclusion
A. The perfect plan
THE ACE AS A MANEUVER ELEMENT
The Marine Corps has historically advertiged itself as
an Air-around team with Marine Air supporting ground maneu-
ver elements to present an integrated, combined arms force
to the enemy. This concept has served the Corps well over
the years; however, coordinating supporting arms is a diffi-
cult task. As a result, the Marine Corps has invested heavi-
ly in its live fire, Combined Arms Exercises (CAX) at the
Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC), Twentynine
Palms, California. The CAX program is the primary means to
train and evaluate the officers and men of the Ground Combat
Element (GCE) in the orchestration of supporting arms.
Unfortunately, this puts the ACE (Aviation Combat Element)
in a subordinate role to the GCE rather than a equal member
of the MAGTF (Marine Air Ground Task Force). Although this
paper is not about the CAX program itself, the training
environment at MCAGCC fosters an attitude that the ACE is
best employed as a supporting arm for the GCE. While this
may be true in some cases, the fact is the ACE is more than
a supporting arm: it is an additional maneuver element that
can assist the MAGTF commander in winning on the battle-
field.
When the Commandant renamed the MAGTF's as
expeditionary, he aptly described the mission of the MAGTF.
That is, an armed force organized to accomplish a specific
objective in a foreign country.(l:138) Expeditionary also
means light, mobile forces ready to deploy on short notice.
As light infantry the GCE cannot stand alone on the
battlefield for any period of time without the employment of
the ACE's combat power. Since Close Air Support (CAS) is
just one sub-function of the ACE's capabilities, the ACE can
provide additional support to the MAGTF commander in the
form of aviation maneuver elements that can see and shape
the battlefield.
The ACE operating as a maneuver element is not a new
concept. Patton often used the 8th Air Force to protect his
flank during the European campaign in WW II.(2:686) American
aviation units operating out of air bases in Thailand during
the Vietnam War were not only maneuver elements but the main
effort, with Marine ground units providing airfield securi-
ty. Maneuver is defined as the employment of forces on the
battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or
fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in re-
spect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.
(1:220) Obviously, an aviation unit could qualify as a
maneuver element based on this definition. Indeed, the CSSE
(Combat Service Support Element) would also qualify under
certain conditions.
Would the ACE operating as a maneuver element change the
mission of Marine Corps aviation? No, not at all. The
primary mission of Marine aviation is still to participate
as the supporting air component to the Fleet Marine Force,
i.e., MAGTF, in the seizure and defense of advance naval
bases and the conduct of such land operations as may be
essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. Operating
as a maneuver element under the direction of the MAGTF
commander could hardly be construed as a violation of the
mission of Marine Corps aviation. Would the ACE operating
as a maneuver element require additional capabilities beyond
the six functions normally associated with Marine aviation?
Again, the answer is no. The issue is not what the ACE can
do, but how the ACE is employed.
Any employment of the ACE as a maneuver element would
probably fall into three categories: focus of effort (main
attack) , supporting attack, or reserves. The ACE could
become the focus of effort simply as the only effort at a
given point in time. A good example would be pre-landing
operations during an amphibious assault where the ACE is
tasked with gaining air superiority. Similarly, the ACE
could be the main effort in the first phase of an attack as
the MAGTF's eyes and ears with its various reconnaissance
aircraft determining the size and location of enemy forces
prior to any ground units crossing the line of departure.
In both cases described above the ACE is the main effort
by default. They are the only unit in action; therefore,
not competing with other units for the priority of fires.
Nevertheless, in each case the ACE is conducting a critical
phase of the MAGTF's operation essential to the
accomplishment of the mission. Another example of the ACE
as the main effort would be during the evacuation of
noncombatants where the MEU(SOC) (Marine Expeditionary (Unit
[Special Operations Capable]) must seize an airfield and a
port facility. With the infantry battalion taking the port,
the ACE commander would be responsible for seizing the
airfield and, no doubt, would need ground forces assigned to
his operational control.
There are many possible missions that the ACE can per-
dorm in a supporting role, such as simulated troop lifts as
part of a deception plan. Even though the ACE possesses
different capabilities than the GCE, there are certain sup-
porting attacks suited to the abilities of an ACE maneuver
element. Providing flank/rear security is a viable mission
for the ACE. FMFM 5-4A. Close Air Support and Close-In Fire
Support provides an excellent example. (4;J-1,2,3)
In this situation a battalion is tasked with defending a
corridor on the regiment's left against an enemy armored
thrust, while the remainder of the regimental assets are
maneuvered. During the ensuing battle. the Battalion AO
(Air Officer) passes control to a FAC(A) , Forward Air Con
troller (Airborne) , due to poor visibility. Flying in a
UH-1N the FAC(A) employs three flights of AH-1W Cobras armed
with TOW missiles and 2.75 rockets, plus a flight of
AV-8B's. Under the cover of friendly artillery, the first
flight of Cobras attacks the armored column forcing them to
deploy. As the engagement progresses, the second flight of
Cobras continues the attack while the first flight proceeds
to the FARP (Forward Arming and Refueling Point) to rearm
and refuel. The AV-8B's are called in; however, due to
counterbattery fire, the friendly artillery, a 155mm
battery, is unable to provide marking or SEAD (Suppression
of Enemy Air Defense) fires. Instead, the Cobras mark and
suppress with 2.75 rockets as the AV-8B's first drop air
delivered mines to trap the enemy and then reattack with
CBU's (Cluster Bomb Units). With the enemy in retreat, the
final flight of Cobras held in reserve pursues by fire to
exploit the withdrawing forces.
Even though the ACE was in support of the GCE during
this engagement, the MAGTF commander could have assigned
this mission to the ACE instead of the GCE, thereby allowing
the infantry battalion to remain with the regiment. In
doing so, the ACE maneuver element would have become an
adjacent unit to the regiment, responsible for defending,
delaying and destroying enemy forces within a geographical
area, without having to seize, occupy and hold a particular
piece of terrain.
If there is one area on the battlefield where the ACE
could have a major impact as a maneuver element, it would be
air strikes against hostile targets shore of the FSCL (Fire
Support Coordination Line), but beyond the area normally
associated with CAS (Close Air Support). Generally, this
area would include first echelon reinforcements, lateral
lines of communications, assembly areas for massing forces,
forward based helicopters and any other surface targets that
pose a direct threat to friendly forces. The Army and Air
Force has labeled air strikes into this region as BAI
(Battlefield Air Interdiction). (3:F-3) Since the air strike
would be short of the FSCL, coordination with the FSCC (Fire
Support Coordination Center) is required, but control,
essentially the decision as to where, when and how to
strike, rests with the ACE.
Doctrinally, the Marine Corps does not recognize
BAI.(6:7) Instead, air strikes on hostile targets beyond
observation of friendly lines are performed by the ACE,
primarily at the request of the GCE. This method works but
it puts the ACE in a reactive role similar to CAS, when
preferably, ACE maneuver elements could actively pursue
these targets on their own initiative given the proper
mission-type orders from the MAGTF. In this manner, the ACE
would be a MAGTF main or supporting attack, which, in con-
junction with the efforts of the GCE, would mutually support
the accomplishment of the overall mission.
Even though the ACE can operate as a maneuver element
similar to the GCE, it has certain limitations unique to
aviation. Unlike troops, aircraft have to be fed about
every two hours and since man, not God, made the machines,
they tend to break more often. Similarly, pilots have a
crewday limitation based on their ability to function
effectively in the cockpit under combat conditions,
especially during periods of reduced visibility and
darkness. As a result, sustainability is a key planning
factor for the MAGTF and the ACE when employing aviation
maneuver elements.
In order to survive in a high threat environment an
aircraft must be able to operate at high airspeeds. Unfortu-
nately, a pilot in a fast moving aircraft has difficulty
acquiring and identifying hostile targets without someone on
the ground to assist. Since aviation maneuver elements
infer a certain amount of autonomous operations, aircraft
may have to make repeated passes over the target area, there-
by increasing their exposure to enemy fire. With advances
in technology, the ability of pilots and/or aircraft to
acquire targets will improve, but unless an airborne or
ground source can put the pilot's eyes on the target,
single-pass destruction flights will be hampered.
While airspeed may be a drawback to target acquisition,
it gives the aviation maneuver element great mobility above
the battlefield. This mobility allows the ACE to respond
quickly to hostile threats or attack deep into the enemy
rear. Further, the ACE can deliver a tremendous variety of
firepower at a given point and time and gather intelligence
over a large area with real time data link to the TACC (Tac-
tical Air Control Center).
Of all the possible missions listed thus far for an ACE
maneuver element, there are none that Marine aviation has
not done before. Whether an aircraft is part of a maneuver
element or not, it still drops bombs or carries troops and
supplies. So what's different about an aviation maneuver
element? The answers are command and control. No longer
will just the GCE be in command on the battlefield with the
ACE in a supporting role. As the focus of effort, the ACE
will be responsible for the accomplishment of the MAGTF
mission, and possibly, terrain and ground forces. As a
maneuver element, the ACE will exercise more control over
its own actions and the shaping of the battlefield.
There are additional implications with the ACE as a
maneuver element, as listed below.
1. The MAGTF planning cycle is inadequate.
2. The ACE must use GCE tactics.
3. The GCE will become a supporting unit.
4. The GCE will have less support aircraft.
Historically, the Marine Corps has fought the GCE with
the ACE and CSSE in subordinate, supporting roles. Doc-
trine dictates it. (7:3-6) In the MAGTF planning cycle the
GCE develops the courses of action while the ACE and CSSE
produce concepts of employment and estimates of supportabili-
ty. What if the ACE was the focus of effort during a partic-
ular phase of an operation? Would not the ACE be the best
qualified to develop those courses of action? If not, cer-
tainly the MAGTF staff should. In any event, if the ACE
determines that he needs ground forces to accomplish the
mission, the GCE will need to provide an estimate of
supportability. Currently, the planning models do not have
the flexibility to allow the ACE and GCE to reverse their
traditional roles.
As a maneuver element operating in a similar manner to
the GCE, the ACE must use GCE tactics. Specifically, the
ACE must be able to function effectively with mission-type
orders. Further, he must understand commander's intent to
the extent that he can continue to fight without further
guidance and, more importantly, that the aviators and any
ground forces under his charge be able to do the same.
The idea of ground forces under the control of an
aviator is a scary thought, at least in the minds of most
grunts and probably quite a few aviators, too. The fact
that some MAGTF commanders are aviators does not count,
since their MOS is coincidental to their position as the
overall commander. FMFM 3-1 discusses in great detail the
various ways of assigning one unit to support another.
Whether it's OPCON, attached, direct support, general sup-
port, or reinforcing, eventually, the ACE will have to pro-
vide some guidance to the ground forces supporting his
scheme of maneuver.
As soon as one maneuver element is employed by the ACE
for operations independent of the GCE, the total number of
aircraft available to support the GCE is reduced. Not only
does the ACE have to provide backups for the scheduled
takeoff, but must set aside a reserve component for that
maneuver element. This may be frustrating to a company
commander who is unable to get helicopters to lift his unit,
or AV-8B's for a CAS mission,but that aviation maneuver
element may be performing a mission that an infantry company
or battalion would normally have to do, or engaging enemy
forces that otherwise might be directed against his unit.
The concept of an aviation maneuver element may be a
palatable thought to most; however, if this maneuver element
is to be fully incorporated into the MAGTF, some fundamental
changes are necessary.
The Marine Corps needs to develop a MAGTF planning cycle
that allows that element of the MAGTF which is the focus of
effort to develop the courses of action for the MAGTF com-
mander's approval. A generic model will not work: the FMFM
3-1 version being a good example.(5:47) Ultimately. the
perfect MAGTF planning cycle would be versatile enough to
facilitate compositing into higher and adjacent planning
models such as joint, amphibious or MEU(SOC) rapid plan-
ning. Regardless, as long as the GCE continues to develop
the courses of action, the ACE and CSSE will not be fully
employed and the MAGTF will suffer as a whole.
The MAGTF staff would not be a good choice for develop-
ing courses of action. If they did, there would be no need
for ACE and GCE commanders. Instead, all the squadrons and
battalions would work directly for the MAGTF commander and
his staff. Besides, in joint operations the MAGTF will be
too busy dealing with higher and adjacent units to tell the
division and wing commanders how to employ their units.
While on the subject of planning, the ACE needs to spe-
cifically address apportionment and allocation in the Avia-
tion Estimate of Supportability. Under current formats the
ACE dicusses his ability to support the various courses of
action in general terms. If operating in the joint arena or
when utilizing aviation maneuver elements, more detailed
planning is required for two reasons. First, ACE maneuver
elements reduce the number of aircraft available to the rest
of the force -- the GCE and CSSE need to know for their own
planning. Second, apportionment is the determination and
assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or
by priority that should be devoted to the various air opera-
tions for a given period of time. (1:32) Allocation is the
translation of that apportionment into total number of sor-
ties by aircraft type available for each operation. (1:24)
If the ACE's assets are not fully utilized by the MAGTF,
then the Air Component Commander of the joint Task Force can
siphon those "excess sorties".
If the ACE is to maximize its assets, then the Marine
Corps must recognize and label this grey area between CAS
and DAS. Procedures need to be developed that allow ACE
maneuver elements, CAS diverts or airborne alerts to immedi-
ately engage hostile targets beyond CAS range without bureau-
cratic delays. Perhaps, SOP's or letters of agreement be-
tween the ACE and GCE (FSCC) could streamline the coordina-
tion/deconfliction procedures for air strikes short of the
FSCL. Or, more simply, the flight leader could be given a
full tank of gas, a full load of ordnance, the commander's
intent two levels up (ACE and MAGTF), and told to pass his
BDA (Bomb Damage Assessment) to the G-2 upon landing.
Aviators need to learn GCE tactics with emphasis on
mission-type orders, commander's intent, and de-centralized
control. The Commandant's new PME program is a good start,
but it's long term and not enough by itself. The wing
should mirror the division's AO program by having a company
grade infantry officer assigned to each squadron as a liai-
son, instructor, and advisor to the commanding officer.
Once the ACE and GCE are on the same sheet of music, the
CAX program needs to be changed. Too much money and time is
being invested not to include the ACE in operations other
than providing the GCE with CAS and assault support. The
GCE "higher headquarters" should be replaced with a MAGTF
headquarters and squadrons should be evaluated on how well
they operate as maneuver elements in concert with the
MAGTF's mission.
Finally, the Marine Corps has got to come to terms with
the ACE as a maneuver element. Waging turf wars will only
complicate the transition. This means disregarding old
perceptions, maintaining open minds, avoiding stereotypes,
and dropping the heat shields. The infantry community
should be able to trust an aviation unit on its left flank
and the ACE can no longer think of Schwerpunkt as a bad
German wine.
Regardless of how the ACE may be employed, the ultimate
objective is a fully integrated MAGTF with all three
elements (ACE, CSSE, GCE) providing the assistance necessary
for the MAGTF commander to win on the battlefield. Perhaps
the following excerpt from a "concept of operations" best
illustrates this idea.
Phase One. The ACE is the focus of effort with its
reconnaissance aircraft enabling the MAGTF commander to see
the battlefield.
Phase Two. The ACE remains the focus of effort as maneu-
ver elements shade the battlefield by gaining air Superiori-
ty and interdicting the enemy's capability to reinforce the
head-knocking area to the extent that the GCE can chew them
up.
Phase Three. The GCE becomes the focus of effort and
prosecutes the battle within the head-knocking area with the
ACE providing CAS and assault support.
Phase Four. After the attack reaches a culminating
point, the CSSE becomes the focus of effort with the ACE
providing aerial resupply.
As the example above shows, the ACE can play a pivotal
role either as a main or supporting attack. And if the
capabilities of Marine aviation are to be fully exploited,
then the Marine Corps must fight the MAGTF, not the GCE, and
in doing so, employ the ACE as a supporting and maneuvering
element.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dictionary
Of Military Terms, JCS Pub 1. Washington, D.C., l987
2. Farago, Ladislas. Patton: Ordeal and Triumph. New York: I
Obolensky, 1964.
3. U.S. Army. Department of the Army. Fire Support in
Combined Arms Operation, FM 6-20. Washington, D.C.
1984.
4. U.S. Marine Corps. Close Air Support and Close-In Fire
Support. FMFM 5-4A. Quantico, 1988.
5. U.S. Marine Corps. Command And Staff Action, FMFM 3-1.
Quantico, 1979.
6. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Aviation, FMFM 5-1. Quantico,
1979.
7. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine,
FMFM 0-1. Quantico, 1979.
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