Artillery- A Different Perspective
AUTHOR Major J. S. Dill, USMC
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Artillery
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title ARTILLERY - A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE
Thesis. Although Marine Corps Artillery effectively supports a
conventional non-mechanized maneuver element; it fails, however,
to adequately support a mechanized force that is employing the
concept of maneuver warfare in a high mobility environment.
Issue. Maneuver warfare will require new artillery fire support
techniques, mostly these will be techniques that provide rapid
close fire support to the ground combat maneuver elements Point of
Main Event. Artillery support will be worthless if it is not
rapidly responsive. The amount of ordnance delivered on a target
is less important than the rapid effect of ordnance on the
target. The essential element of artillery fire support for
maneuver warfare is time.
Maneuver warfare is more than just movement, it is movement
relative to the enemy. A combatant employing maneuver warfare
tactics leads from the front focusing on the every situation by
using initiative and rapid operational tempo. The importance of
artillery fire support in maneuver warfare cannot be over
emphasized. Obviously speed in movement and mobility are key
aspects. However, tactical fire direction, positioning, fire
planning, movement plans, resupply, all must contribute to foster
tempo of operations not just fast moving howitzers. The
artillerys function will be to keep up with the movement force
probably travelling as an element of the force in order to provide
rapid suppression fires.
Conclusion. The mission of Marine Corps artillery will not
change. Artillery will always have to provide timely, close,
accurate and rapid fire support to the maneuver force. However,
the importance of artillery fire support in maneuver warfare
cannot be over emphasized. The artillery's function will be to
provide rapid suppression fires in order to neutralize the enemy
so that ground combat element can accomplish its mission. What
will change is the tactics and techniques used to provide the
required fire support.
ARTILLERY - A Different Perspective
THESIS STATEMENT: Although United States Marine Corps artillery
effectively supports a conventional non-mechanized maneuver
element; it fails, however, to adequately support a mechanized
force that is employing the concept of maneuver warfare in a high
mobility environment.
I. USMC Artillery
A. Mission
B. Roles
1. Close Support Fires
2. Counterfires
3. Interdiction Fires
II. Traditional Warfare Versus Maneuver Warfare
A. Concept of Traditional War
l. Managerial Approach
2. Tactical Objectives
3. Success Depends on Attrition
B. Concept of Maneuver War
l. Disrupt the Enemy's OODA Loop
2. Gain and Maintain the Initiative
3. Destroy the Enemy's Command and Control System
4. Firepower used to create gaps
III. Artillery Support
A. Traditional Warfare
l. Movement Serves Firepower
B. Maneuver Warfare
l. Firepower Serves Movement
Throughout history the artillery has been referred to
as "The God of War" or "The King of Battle" and its
importance has been emphasized by such Great Captains as
Frederick the Great, Napolean and Rommel to name a few.
Napoleon was the first commander in history to use his
artillery as a mobile force employing it as a whole at the
decisive time to create a "gap" thus enabling his maneuver
elements to defeat the enemy. Napoleon felt that "the
artillery, like other arms, must be collected in mass if
one wishes to attain a decisive result."1 One might say
that the mission of Napoleon's artillery was to destroy or
neutralize the enemy by cannon fires. Today, the mission
of the artillery is to destroy, neutralize or suppress the
enemy by cannon, rocket and missile fires, and to assist in
integrating all fire support into combined arms
operations.2
Although Marine Corps artillery effectively supports a
conventional non-mechanized maneuver element; it fails,
however, to adequately support a mechanized force that is
employing the concept of maneuver warfare in a high
mobility environment. Doctrinally the minimum adequate
support for committed units is considered to be one field
artillery battalion in direct support of each committed
Regiment. Traditionally artillery provides close support
fires, counter fires and interdiction fires as required for
maneuver forces. These fires suppress, neutralize,
canalize or destroy enemy attack formations or defenses,
obscure his vision and otherwise inhibit his ability to
visually acquire friendly targets, and destroy targets deep
in the enemy's rear with long range fires.
Close support fires engage enemy forces, weapons, or
positions that are threatening or can threaten friendly
forces. They allow the commander to rapidly multiply
combat power effects and shift fires quickly about the
battlefield. The MAGTF commander provides close support to
his maneuver elements by assigning tactical missions to the
artillery. The four standard tactical missions are direct
support (DS), reinforcing (R), general support reinforcing
(GSR), and general support (GS). These missions make
artillery support immediately responsive to maneuver
forces. Close fire support expands the depth of the
battlefield, erodes enemy forces and inflicts damage well
beyond direct fire ranges.
Counterfires attack enemy indirect fire systems such as
mortar, artillery, and air defense units. Counterfires
allow freedom of action to supported maneuver forces and is
accomplished with mortars, cannons, guns, and aircraft. It
must be remembered that counterfire is not a separate
artillery battle but rather a combined arms battle. Within
the artillery, counterfire is normally the responsibility
of General Support or General Support reinforcing units.
Interdiction fires disrupt, delay, neutralize, or
destroy enemy forces that, because of range limitations or
other reasons, cannot fire their weapons on friendly
forces.
Since I've established a foundation for the mission and
roles of the artillery, I'd like to compare the concept of
traditional warfare to maneuver warfare.
Traditional or "attrition warfare" is the managerial
approach to warfare focusing on body counts, kill ratios,
target servicing and mutual bludgeoning contests. Forces
are ground down by casualties. War is reduced to a simple
mathematical equation and the side with the most men and
material can absorb losses, endure the meat grinder longer,
and win by being quantitatively superior. Tactical
objectives sought are terrain features, attacks are
frontal, and defenses are linear. Battles are set piece
and movement is ponderous. Speed of operations is
sacrificed for the methodical coordination of supporting
arms. There is an over reliance on technology to do the
job.
Technological solutions for combat are emphasized
instead of tactical ones. David Palmer in his book,
"Summons of the Trumpet" notes how the helicopter provided
United States forces in the Republic of Vietnam with
superior technological mobility, but it was the North
Vietnamese army that clearly retained superior tactical
mobility by staying light on their feet. The attrition
style of war continues to seek technological answers to
tactical problems. Combat effectiveness is replaced by
managerial efficiency and the net result of such a high
degree of reliance on technology is an overwhelming depen-
dence on machines. Tactics are simply disregarded.3
Historically, the military forces of the United States of
America have fought the traditional or attrition warfare of
force on force, meat grinder style of war. Ulysses Simpson
Grant followed it, John J. Pershing followed it, Dwight D.
Eisenhower followed it, and the United States Marine Corps
fought it throughout World War II.
The concept of maneuver warfare is best thought of as a
continuous tactical thought process. One that seeks to
combine tactics, techniques, and the art of war in
imaginative ways to cut inside the enemy's observation,
orientation, decision and action cycle commonly referred to
as his OODA loop. The enemy's cohesion and fighting
organization are destroyed by staying ahead of him in
thought and action thus forcing him to be reactive vice
proactive in a given tactical situation. This requires the
commander to create a fluid and turbulent environment for
the enemy, by repeatedly presenting the enemy with new,
unexpected, and tactically dangerous events and operational
crises. The idea is to gain and maintain the initiative so
that the enemy is responding to one perceived situation
when he's hit with another. If successful, the enemy is
overcome by a feeling of hopelessness and shock. No matter
what he does, he is always one step behind reacting to an
old crisis. The primary objective is the enemy's mind.
The ultimate goal is to destroy his nerve network and his
command and control system. The common operational theme
is to move forces into unexpected places at unexpected
times, with surprising speed.
Firepower is used to divert the enemy's attention,
exploit his weaknesses, create gaps within his surface,
shatter cohesion, and create dangerous tactical events
which ultimately affect his observation, orientation,
decision and action loop. Firepower in a maneuver context
allows the commander to close with the enemy for decisive
action. This is unlike attrition warfare where firepower
is generally used at great ranges in a standoff mode. The
operational theme is to kill the enemy man by man and
destroy each machine one by one, in set piece battle. The
enemy is never actually closed with nor is the moment of
decision forced upon him when he can least handle it.4
Therefore, maneuver warfare is based on operational tempo.
Speed, and mobility are key aspects emphasizing the
disruption of the enemy's cohesion and tactical thought
process denying his ability to make correct and timely
decisions on the battlefield. Its focus is on the enemy
with commanders leading from the front and controlling the
speed of operations. On the other hand, traditional
warfare is fought from a position of overall numerical
superiority in both men, materials, and firepower to reduce
enemy forces through attrition.
United States Marine Corps artillery, throughout its
history has supported, for the most part, maneuver elements
that are not mechanized by using traditional firepower
attrition tactics and techniques which emphasizes the
timely amount of accurate ordnance delivered on a target
vice rapid effect on a target. However, if a maneuver
element within the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is
mechanized and identified as the Point Of Main Effort
(POME), the artillery commander needs to figure out how to
bring his artillery up with the mechanized force to provide
responsive and rapid support that might not have pinpoint
accuracy, the key word here is rapid. Maneuver warfare
will require fire support techniques that provide immediate
artillery fires that are rapidly available. The essential
element of artillery support will always be time and if
fires are not responsive, they will be worthless.
Therefore, the artillery commander has the potential of
being confronted with a mobility problem. This mobility
problem, simply stated, is that a fast moving mechanized
task force could out run its supporting artillery in the
movement to contact phase, the exploitation phase or in an
attack to seize deep objectives, such as landing force
objectives. Since the artillery cannot shoot while it's
moving, the artillery commander is faced with a dilemma.
Traditional doctrine and techniques dictate that the
artillery commander move his artillery by unit, by echelon,
or by battery "leapfrogging" in order to provide timely and
accurate fire support to the ground combat element.5
When the artillery commander employs conventional
doctrine does his artillery unit possess the adequate
mobility required to solve the difficulty in keeping up
with a mechanized task force? I submit the answer to this
question is no. This is due to the disparity between the
mobility of the artillery and the type of equipment it
would support in a mechanized task force such as Assault
Amphibian Vehicles (AAV's), M60 tanks, and Light Assault
Vehicles (LAV's). If the fire support provided is not
responsive enough to the maneuver element, the maneuver
force will out run its support and be forced to come up
with an alternate means of fire support in order to meet
the mission. The key to the field artillery man's success
in battle is his ability to focus combat power.6 In
order for the artillery to support a maneuver force
employing the concept of maneuver warfare, the artillery
above all must be capable of great mobility.7 However,
if the artillery is task organized into a "fire support
package" with a mix of howitzers to support a mechanized
maneuver unit the artillery commanders dilemma of mobility
could be overcome.
A new perspective to the employment of artillery
support could be explained in the following hypothesis
scenario. To provide artillery support for a Marine
Air-Ground Task Force maneuver element that is mechanized,
one approach is for the artillery to replace its wheeled
vehicles with Assault Amphibian Vehicles (AAV's) or
possibly Light Assault Vehicles (LAV's), of course this
would be a trade-off which the Marine Air-Ground Task Force
commander would have to determine. The idea is to task
organized the artillery so that it is a lean and highly
mobile fighting force. Of course the preferred weapon
system would be the Ml09 self-propelled howitzer but towed
howitzers could also do the job, with great mobility, if
prime movers and ammo carriers were tracked vehicles.
Although this approach might limit sustainability, it would
enhance the feeling of all around protection and the
ability of the field artillery to keep up with the
mechanized maneuver force. The artillery would deploy in
visual contact with the mechanized maneuver force. As
mentioned previously the conventional doctrine of
"leapfrogging" batteries or moving in echelon would be
abandoned since it might result in firing batteries being
left in vulnerable positions or never being able to catch
up with the fast moving maneuver force. Tactical control
of firing batteries would be centralized, controlled by the
battalions Operations Officer (S-3), to ensure that
adequate fire support is provided while technical control
would be retained by firing batteries. Battery movement
would be characterized by move-hipshoot-move tactics.
Firing batteries would have to be ready to engage direct
fire targets if the situation dictated and fire support
coordinators would have to make and update simple quick
fire plans. Fire support coordinators must also develop a
fire support scheme of maneuver that reflects the maneuver
commander's intent and compliments the scheme of maneuver.
Movement would be based on the tempo of operation, the
artillery commander would lead from the front seeing the
battle with the maneuver commander. The relationships
between the maneuver commander and the supported commander
would be similar to that described in Shelford Bidwell and
Dominick Graham's book Fire Power, "I found the infantry
brigade commander and the field artillery commander at the
side of the road, their wireless sets chattering away and
the pair of them jointly and effectively in touch with what
was going on and in charge of the battle. This enabled
fire-plans to be developed quickly, to support whatever was
required and the action needed to implement that support
such as the issue of orders and the attack of targets
almost simultaneously."8
The tactics for this approach call for the artillery to
be dedicated or in "Direct Support" of the mechanized
maneuver force and moving as an element of the maneuver
force which would provide not only flank security, but also
antiair security. This technique is designed to
specifically support mechanized offensive operations in the
delivery of rapid and focused fires while retaining
mobility and agility. Whenever the mechanized task force
encounters opposition, the artillery would provide high
volumes of rapid fires, 2,000 to 4,000 meters to the front
and flanks of the force, to create gaps in the enemy's
surface thus enhancing the maneuver capability of the
mechanized task force.
The reason for delivering a rapid volume of fire to the
front and flanks of the task force is to immediately
suppress the enemy. As Mr. Bill Lind has described in his
book, "Maneuver Warfare Handbook," Firepower is very
important in maneuver warfare. Some people have accused
maneuver warfare advocates of downgrading the importance of
firepower but nothing could be further from the truth.
What changes in maneuver warfare is not the importance of
firepower, but the purposes for which it is used.
Traditional attrition warfare uses firepower mostly the
way the term implies, to reduce enemy numbers through
attrition. Movement serves firepower; you move to get into
a better firing to cause more attrition.
Maneuver warfare uses both firepower and movement in a
maneuver context. What does this mean? Usually, you are
moving not just to a better firing position, but to create
a series of unexpected and dangerous situations for the
enemy. Only this kind of movement qualifies as maneuver.
The main role of firepower is to help you maneuver.
Firepower is used most often to suppress the enemy while
you move around or through him.9
Nonetheless, there are three obvious disadvantages in
using this approach in the employment of artillery. The
first disadvantage is the inability to mass fires you
probably won't be able to mass all batteries at the same
time. The second is the increased difficulty in command
and control while moving. Finally, the third disadvantage
is the added training requirements in order to be
proficient in this approach. However, in a high tempo of
operations environment the artillery might be unable to
provide timely fire support and if the mechanized task
force out runs the range of its artillery, the artillery
certainly cannot mass its fires. Nevertheless, there are
distinct advantages if the artillery deploys as an element
of a mechanized maneuver force. There is a reduced
operational separation between the supported maneuver unit
and the artillery since the artillery commander is leading
from the front with the maneuver commander. Also as part
of the maneuver element the artillery's flanks are
protected and it is inside the maneuver force antiair
defense envelope. But most importantly the artillery will
always be within supporting range of the maneuver force.
We must remember that under the maneuver warfare concept,
the artillery will become part of a focused violence and
will have to rely on speed to overwhelm the enemy with
concentrated fires at decisive points in time and space.
Maneuver warfare is more than just movement, it is
movement relative to the enemy and its a function of
operational tempo. Obviously speed in movement and
mobility are key aspects of the concept. However, tactical
fire direction, positioning, fire planning, movement plans,
resupply, all must contribute to faster tempo of operations
- not just fast moving howitzers.
The importance of artillery fire support in maneuver
warfare cannot be over emphasized. It must be remembered
that the essential element of artillery fire support is
time vice pinpoint accuracy. The artillery's function will
be to provide rapid suppression fires in order to
neutralize the enemy so that the ground combat element can
accomplish its mission.
Therefore, the requirement for autonomous artillery
operations in support of maneuver warfare demands not only
technical, but also tactical excellence coupled with
detailed planning, continuous training, and vigorous
execution. As the United States Marine Corps moves towards
a mechanized task force concept, the mission of the
artillery is not going to change. Artillery will always
have to provide timely, close, accurate and rapid fire
support to the maneuver force. What will change is how
that fire support will be provided. Task organizing
artillery into light, lean, and mobile fighting elements
that are responsive and fast is the solution.
ENDNOTES
1"Napoleon's Army," Colonel H.C.B. Rogers OBE (Hippocrene
Books, New York, N.Y. 1982).
2"Fire Support Tactics and Techniques," (U.S. Army Field
Artillery, School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, 1987).
3"Maneuver Warfare Readings," (Command and Staff College,
United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development
Command, Quantico, VA, FY 1989).
4Ibid.
5"The Key to Field Artillery--Focusing Combat Power,"
General Crosbie E. Saint, Field Artillery Journal, October 1988.
6Ibid.
7"The Rommel Papers," B. H. Liddell Hart, (The Easton Press,
Norwalk, Connecticut, 1988).
8"Fire-Power British Army Weapons and Theories of War,
1904-1945," Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham. (George Allen
and Urwin Publishers, London, U.K., 1982).
9"Maneuver Warfare Handbook," William S. Find (Westview
Press, Inc. Boulder, Colorado, 1985).
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