Offensive Air Support And Maneuver Warfare: Do The Military Reformers Understand Them?
AUTHOR Major Eddie A. Daniels, USMC
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT AND MANEUVER WARFARE:
DO THE MILITARY REFORMERS UNDERSTAND THEM?
I. Purpose: To point out misconceptions that several
military reformers, specifically Mr. William Lind, have
concerning the use of offensive air support and Marine
aviation on the maneuver battlefield.
II. Problem: The U.S. Marine Corps has undertaken an
extensive modernization program of its aviation units to
meet the demands of offensive air support and other
missions critical to the MAGTF's warfighting
capability; however, some military reformers are voicing
concepts that would adversely impact the Corps' ability
to conduct these missions safely and effectively.
III. Data: With the adoption of maneuver warfare as its
doctrine, Marine Corps aviation is another maneuver
element to help the MAGTF commander win on the battle-
field. Using offensive air support, the MAGTF comman-
der can support his ground forces in the form of close
air support and deep air support, while assault support
gives him maneuverability. Mr. William Lind and other
military reformers are questioning the efficacy of some
combat-proven methods and aircraft in the performance of
these missions. They question the use of air as the
main effort of the MAGTF, the value of air inter-
diction, and the survivability of the helicopter on the
maneuver battlefield. Additionally, they challenge the
need for air superiority and advocate that surface-to-
air missiles and antiaircraft artillery will not be a
threat on the maneuver battlefield. The reformers
propose a slow-speed aircraft that can take a lot of
small-arms fire and survives by high-energy jinking as a
replacement for the F/A-18 and the AV-8B.
IV. Conclusion: The reformers' proposals indicate a lack of
experience in offensive air support, its requirements,
and military aviation in general. Their ideas would
adversely impact the Corps' ability to conduct these
missions safely and effectively.
V. Recommendations: The Marine Corps must ensure that it
closely evaluates the reformers' proposals and adopt
only those that would enhance our performance on the
maneuver battlefield. While their intentions are good,
the lack of experience in combat aviation can result in
dangerous proposals.
OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT AND MANEUVER WARFARE:
DO THE MILITARY REFORMERS UNDERSTAND THEM?
OUTLINE
Thesis statement: The U.S. Marine Corps has undertaken an
extensive modernization program of its aviation units to meet
the demands of offensive air support and other missions
critical to the MAGTF's warfighting capability; however, some
military reformers are voicing concepts that would adversely
impact the Corps' ability to conduct these missions and to
utilize Marine aviation safely and effectively.
I. Offensive air support missions
A. Deep air support B. Close air support
II. Factors essential to the success of the missions
A. Air superiority
B. Communications
C. Response time
D. Target location and identification
E. Pilot training
III. Reformers' misconceptions
A. Aviation and the MAGTF main effort
B. Air interdiction and maneuver warfare C. Helicopters
on the maneuver battlefield
D. Air superiority and offensive air support
IV. Performance and the close air support aircraft
A. Deficiency of the current Marine Corp inventory
B. Reformers' proposed design
C. The Surface-to-air threat
D. Survivability and mission completion
OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT AND MANEUVER WARFARE:
DO THE MILITARY REFORMERS UNDERSTAND THEM?
With the adoption of Maneuver Warfare as its doctrine,
the Marine Corps has another maneuver element to help the
MAGTF commander win: Marine Aviation. Primarily in the form
of offensive air support, Marine air can out maneuver enemy
units and apply combat power quickly and effectively at the
critical place and time needed.
Offensive air support missions are of particular
interest to ground forces throughout the world. Effective
offensive air support, or the lack of, can mean the differ-
ence between victory and defeat on today's battlefield. The
U.S. Marine Corps has undertaken an extensive modernization
program of its aviation units to meet the demands of
offensive air support and other missions critical to the
MAGTF's warfighting capability; however, some military
reformers are voicing concepts that would adversely impact
the Corps' ability to conduct these missions and to utilize
Marine aviation safely and effectively. These reformers have
little or no experience in this area and the lack of
experience is evident in many of their ideas.
Observing exercises and reading books on offensive air
support can enlighten one on the basic concepts of these
missions, but cannot replace the knowledge acquired through
actual training, participation, and experience.
In order to understand the misconceptions of the
military reformers, we must first understand what offensive
air support is and factors affecting the success of these
missions.
Offensive air support is described in FMFM 5-1 as:
A Marine Corps term to indicate those
air operations that actually deliver firepower
against enemy ground forces for the destruc-
tion or neutralization of installations,
equipment, and personnel.(15:7)
Offensive air support consists of close air support and
deep air support missions. The distinction between the two
is the amount of coordination required with supported ground
units. (16:2)
Deep air support, or interdiction, is a classical use of
aviation as a maneuver element. It is attacking enemy
targets and personnel beyond the boundary where close
coordination with the ground unit is required. This boundary
is called the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL). By
utilizing deep air support, enemy targets, follow-on
echelons, and reinforcements can be sufficiently attrited in
order to reduce their influence on the ground battle.
Additionally, FMFM 5-4A states that close air support
(CAS) missions are:
Air actions against hostile targets
which are in close proximity to friendly
forces and require detailed integration of
each air mission with the fire and movement
of those forces.(13:1.2)
Close air support occurs inside of the FSCL, requiring close
coordination with other fire support and ground maneuver
units. Generally, close air support is utilized when
artillery, naval gun fire or other supporting arms are unable
to provide the necessary fire support.
There are two types of CAS missions: preplanned and
immediate. Preplanned CAS is further broken down into
preplanned scheduled and preplanned on-call. Preplanned
scheduled CAS missions, according to FMFM 5-4A. are:
...anticipated and requested sufficiently
in advance to permit detailed mission
coordination and planning. They are executed
at a specific time specified by the supported
unit and aircrews are assigned a time on
target (TOT).(13:1.3)
A preplanned on-call mission requires the aircraft to be
loaded with ordnance for the specified target type, but not a
specific target, and placed in an alert status awaiting a
launch request from the supported unit. All mission
essential information is usually not available to the aircrew
prior to takeoff.
An immediate CAS mission is:
An airstrike on a target which is not
identified and requested sufficiently in
advance to permit detailed mission coordination
or planning. These missions are executed
in response to requests by the ground combat
element to strike targets of opportunity.
Prompt execution of these missions is normally
a requisite. .. mission coordination must
be accomplished while the CAS flight is
en route, with the attack aircraft being
briefed by the direct air support center
(DASC), tactical air coordinator (airborne),
(TAC(A)), or terminal controller....Successful
execution of this mission is, therefore,
highly dependent on extensive and reliable
radio communications. Only by thoroughly
practiced, standardized procedures can this
be accomplished in a minimum communication
environment. In the extreme case of no
communications, immediate CAS is precluded.(13:1.3)
Marine Corps manual FMFM 5-4 states the principal
consideration in the employment of offensive air support is
the MAGTF concept of operations. It must be integrated and
coordinated with the ground scheme of maneuver to have
significant effect on the battle. Aircraft that are randomly
operating and attacking targets without regard for the
concept of operations may disrupt the scheme of maneuver and
cause additional confusion on the battlefield. At worst,
friendly casualties may be incurred through incorrect target
identification or the aircraft may be shot down by friendly
fire.
However, to enhance the success of any offensive air
support mission, local air superiority must be attained. Air
superiority may be achieved through the use of fighter
aircraft or surface-to-air missiles, or a combination of the
two.
Another key consideration is communications. As
previously stated, reduced communications require that pilots
be thoroughly trained and utilize standardized procedures.
When communications are precluded, CAS missions cannot be
executed because of the high degree of coordination required
to support the ground scheme of maneuver and prevent
fratricide.
Also, response time is paramount in the conduct of
offensive air support. If airpower cannot be applied to
influence the battle at the appropriate time and place
needed, then its value is diminished.
The following quotation is taken from the "Report of the
Special Subcommittee on Tactical Air Support" concerning the
adequacy of close air support during the Vietnam War:
According to men fighting on the ground in
Vietnam, whether Army or Marine, the most
important single ingredient of close air support
is getting on target fast. The Vietnamese war is
a hit and run war in which the attackers strike
suddenly and fade away rapidly.
To a man pinned down by rifle or mortar fire,
a minute can seem like an hour, and any delay can
be the difference between life and death. The pilots
who have flown in Vietnam have agreed fully that
what they want more than anything else is to be
over the target when needed.(12:4868)
Once the CAS pilot has arrived in the vicinity of the
target, he now faces the difficult task of locating and
destroying it. The pilot's ingress speed and delivery
tactics are factors, and are dependent on the threat level.
In a low threat environment he may be able to slow down or
make multiple passes to locate the target. As the threat
level increases, his survival and mission success is
dependent on speed, surprise, and tactics. The necessity for
marking the target becomes essential. In high threat
environments, CAS may be precluded.
In order for all the considerations previously mentioned
to be employed in a manner that will impact the battle in a
positive way, pilot training and proficiency must be high.
Offensive air support is among the most difficult missions to
master. Marine Corps pilots who fly these missions are
professionals. They have studied the surface-to-air threat
and the capabilities of their aircraft, its systems and
performance. They have trained in accordance with the Marine
Corps' Training and Readiness manual and are well versed in
the tactics. Additionally, the pilots must have a clear
understanding of the MAGTF commander's intent and concept of
operations.
Tactics, weapons systems, and aircraft capabilities are
constantly being evaluated through exercises to determine
their effectiveness against the perceived threat, and
recommended changes are submitted as appropriate.
The Marine Corps has adopted maneuver warfare as its
doctrine. Marine Corps Manual OH 6-1 defines maneuver
warfare as:
An approach to war which emphasizes disrupting
the cohesion of the enemy's tactical units and the
mental process of the enemy commander -- his ability
to make correct and timely decisions -- rather than
simply attempting to inflict casualties at a greater
rate than they are sustained.(14:1.5)
In simple terms, it is forcing the enemy commander to
react at an ever increasing rate to our actions until he is
overcome by events. It is not attacking his strong points,
but his weak points. It is applying pressure on him at
unexpected places, causing confusion on his part.
In a battle of this type, points of main effort may
change quickly. Supporting arms must also be able to
redirect its fire support in accordance with the change.
This change in the main effort requires some sort of
communications exchange if effective fire support is to be
massed.
With the understanding of these basics of offensive air
support and maneuver warfare, we can now focus on the
military reformers' perceptions and recommendations. Only
those that would be detrimental to offensive air support and
the use of Marine aviation in general, will be addressed.
The majority of the comments and recommendations to be
considered here are those of Mr. William Lind, president of
the Military Reform Institute.
In articles published in the Marine Corps Gazette and a
currently unpublished manuscript, Mr. Lind and his reformers
have described their perceptions and ideas for changes in
the application of offensive air support and Marine aviation.
In several instances, these concepts and ideas are flawed,
generally due to a lack of experience in the offensive air
support area and military aviation as a whole. In other
areas, however, they are very perceptive and their
recommendations are certainly worth considering.
One false premise the reformers make is that "air"
should not be the main effort. In his manuscript, Mr.Lind
says:
...when we speak of an air Schwerpunkt.
we are not saying that air is the Schwerpunkt
for the MAGTF.. . .Because in almost all
situations it is the ground battle that is decisive,
the Schwerpunkt for the MAGTF is defined in terms
of the ground battle....the air Schwerpunkt
is the answer to the question, "What can air do that
nothing else can do that will have decisive effect
on the ground battle?" In other words, the air
supports the ground. It is possible that there could
be a few situations where an action by aviation
would be the total force Schwerpunkt. ... But
history suggests this will happen seldom, if ever.
The history of attempts to achieve decisions by air
alone is one of repeated failures.(10:6-7)
There is a minor disagreement with the above quote.
What is not realized is that Marine aviation is a co-equal
maneuver element of the MAGTF. The Norway Air-Landed MEB
scenario is an excellent example of where Marine air has much
greater mobility and maneuver than do the ground forces and
is the main effort of the MAGTF. Marine aviation makes the
scenario feasible.
In the concept of maneuver warfare, if the designated
main effort is stopped by enemy forces, the main effort
should be shifted. Aviation is fully capable of assuming the
role of the main effort, as necessary. Consideration should
be given to the following when determining the point of main
effort: intelligence, speed or reaction time, depth,
firepower, flexibility, survivability, command and control,
all-weather/ austere capabilities, logistics, and the enemy's
center of gravity. If the balance of these considerations
shift in favor of Marine aviation, then the main effort
should also shift to Marine aviation. The Commandant has
stated that the purpose of Marine aviation is not to support
the ground units, but to help the MAGTF commander win the
battle.(5)
The reformers believe that air interdiction means
attacking fixed targets and is, therefore, of little value in
maneuver warfare. Mr. Lind says:
...In general, destroying fixed targets --
LOCs, rail yards, supply dumps, etc. -- does not
have much effect on the enemy's ability to fight
effectively. The targets that matter are, in
general, enemy combat units, and more specifically
units that are doing something critical in the
ongoing battle.
Attacking fixed targets -- interdiction bombing
-- has a long history of failure... (10:10)
The definition of deep air support in Marine Corps
Manual FMFM 5-1 and the definition of air interdiction in JCS
Pub 1 are very similar, and is an:
Air action conducted against enemy targets
which does not require detailed integration of
each mission with the fire and movement of friendly
ground forces. Deep air support missions are
normally conducted beyond the fire support
coordination line (FSCL).. ..The most important
of the deep air support tasks is air interdiction.
...air interdiction plays a vital role in the
design of deep air support to neutralize or destroy
the enemy's fighting capability.(15:100)
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel summed up the impact of air
interdiction during the Normandy invasion as follows:
During the day, practically our entire
traffic -- on roads, trucks and in the open
country -- is pinned down by powerful fighter-
bomber and bomber formations, with the result
that the movement of our troops on the battle-
field is almost completely paralyzed, while the
enemy can maneuver freely. Every traffic defile
in the rear areas is under attack and it is very
difficult to get essential supplies of ammunition
and petrol to the troops.(6:476-77)
The use of deep air support, or air interdiction, is
both desirable and critical in maneuver warfare. When
coordinated with the ground scheme of maneuver, it is deadly
to the enemy.
The survivability of the helicopter on the maneuver
battlefield is seriously challenged by Mr. Lind:
A battlefield where forces are intermixed also
poses a major challenge to helicopters. The attack
helicopter, because its ability to hover, may be
significantly better able to find and identify
targets than can a fixed-winged aircraft. But all
helicopters face a new and serious survivability
problem. Helicopters attempt to survive by flying
very low -- nape-of-the-earth. But on battlefields
where forces are intermixed, this means they will
continuously be flying low over enemy units. Modern
ground forces have a large number of automatic
weapons, and they can be counted on to point them
in the direction of helicopters and shoot. Directly
over them, at low level, helicopters will be
relatively easy targets.(10:9)
Helicopters will be vulnerable to enemy fire, as will
every other type of aircraft. Army Brigadier General Patrick
Brady, Chief of Army Public Affairs, was an Army combat
helicopter pilot during the Vietnam War and a recipient of
the Medal of Honor for his exploits as a pilot. In the
General's opinion, the helicopter is more survivable than
other types of aircraft and the tank on today's battlefield.
General Brady sighted the helicopter's maneuverability and
ability to use the terrain as the principal reasons.(2)
The assumptions that Mr. Lind bases his argument on are:
(1) the battlefield will be intermixed, and (2) helicopters
will continuously be flying low over enemy units. The
battlefield may be intermixed with forces, and it may not be.
Our commanders should be wise enough to protect their flanks
and rears to prevent encirclement, allowing for
reinforcements and logistics resupply by helicopters without
them "continuously flying low over enemy units." Attack
helicopter pilots use tactics whereby they position
themselves in defilade near critical areas or LOCs. As the
enemy comes within range, they pop up and fire, then
reposition themselves in defilade for subsequent attacks.
This tactic is effective and survivable.
The helicopter provides maneuver to the MAGTF commander,
allowing him to rapidly displace ground forces and force the
enemy commander to react. If the enemy forces are utilizing
helicopters, then the MAGTF commander should also, or he may
find his forces out-maneuvered by the enemy. It must be
understood that one doesn't deploy helicopters to an area
that is prohibitive to its survival. The helicopter has its
place.
The importance of air superiority as it relates to the
ground battle is also challenged.
The reformers do not realize the vital service air
superiority and air-to-air missions perform for the MAGTF
commander in allowing him to prosecute offensive air support
and assault support missions. Mr. Lind sees it this way:
Usually, we are told that we must win air
superiority before we can do much ground support.
The air-to-air battle is given priority in time:
it comes first.
Maneuver warfare challenges this dictum on two
counts. First, the purpose of aviation is to help
achieve a decision on the ground. Therefore, the
ground situation, not some abstract rule, determines
the priority of air-to-air compared to air-to-ground.
If the ground battle is such that air must concentrate
on air-to-ground action at the outset in order to have
a decisive effect, then this is what it must do. If,
for example, the enemy catches us by surprise at the
outset and breaks through our rear with major armor
forces, aviation must concentrate on helping destroy
those forces. It must do so at once; it cannot wait
while it first fights a private battle with the enemy
air force.
Secondly, enemy air may or may not be a
significant threat to our ground forces, depending
on how well it can meet the above challenges. Is it
focused on doing something decisive? Can it mass
quickly in the face of the unexpected? Can it
operate in a fluid, rapidly changing situation,
i.e., with mission orders? Can it distinguish
friend from foe on the ground where forces are
intermixed? Can it effectively hit targets that
matter, such as our reserves while they are moving
to do something of critical importance? If not, it
probably won't matter much. It will cause random
attrition, but it is not likely to have a decisive
effect. This is true even if it has lots of aircraft
and modern ones.(10:14-15)
Marine aviation has the capability of flying both air-
to-air and air-to-ground missions simultaneously, in support
of each other, and the ground commander.
Air superiority over the objective area or battle area
is essential to the MAGTF commander in the prosecution of his
battle, and the number of sorties required to accomplish this
is determined at air apportionment and allocation
conferences. Air superiority accomplishes several things.
First, it prevents enemy close air support and deep air
support missions from being executed against MAGTF forces.
Secondly, it allows offensive air support missions to be
flown in support of MAGTF forces. Also, it assists the MAGTF
commander in maneuvering heliborne forces rapidly on the
battlefield to critical locations with a reduced threat from
enemy air or air defense weapons. In this context, air
superiority also means the destruction or neutralization of
enemy surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery.
With the advent of nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons (NBC), the MAGTF commander cannot allow even small
numbers of enemy aircraft to fly over his ground forces in
hopes of determining if they are going to do something
decisive, or to see if they can identify friend from foe,
etc. We must remember that aircraft are essential to
intelligence collection and enemy aircraft must be denied
overflight rights. This prevents their massing of forces
against us at a decisive point.
Air defense entails the use of aircraft, antiaircraft
guns, and surface-to-air missiles and is a critical component
of the commander's responsibility for security and protection
of his force.(14:4.23) One cannot eliminate air-to-air
missions from the air defense concept; they are an integral
and coordinated part of protection on the battlefield from
enemy air activity. Therefore, air-to-air operations are an
essential element of maneuver warfare.
According to LtCol Bingham of the U.S. Air Force:
Past campaigns have often achieved success
even though few commanders seemed to understand
how or why ground maneuver and air interdiction
complemented and reinforced each other, let alone
the importance of their synchronization. Instead,
favorable circumstances, including air superiority
and often overwhelming air resources, generated
dubious choices for the enemy more by accident
than by design. Unhappily, this is not likely to
be the case if we are faced with a Soviet offensive.
As this assessment should make clear, not only do
we need to quickly gain and maintain air superiority,
we must also synchronize ground maneuver and air
interdiction. (1:28)
In his analysis of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Clarence
Olschner has this to say concerning air superiority:
The breakout losses by time...reflects the
extreme difficulty of providing close air support
and interdiction where air superiority has not
been achieved. The demand for ground support
under these conditions cost the IAF 80 aircraft
in the first three days and cost the EAF 150
aircraft in the last eight days of the war.(11:70)
And:
Air superiority can be achieved over the
modern battlefield only by defeating both
the surface-to-air and air-to-air capabilities
of the enemy.(11:82)
In the following vivid description, General Herzog gave this
account of support for the 3d Armor Battalion during the same
war:
As the sun rose, four Israeli Skyhawks swooped in
to bomb the Syrians, but as they approached their
target the tell-tale signs of surface-to-air missiles
were seen. All four planes exploded in the air in full
view of the hard-pressed troops of the battalion.
Undeterred, a second flight of four planes flew in.
Two exploded.(7:87)
It is clear from the previous accounts that before
aircraft can conduct offensive air support and other missions
in support of the MAGTF and operate as a maneuver element in
its own right, suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) is
critical to preclude unacceptable aircraft losses.
The reformers have voiced their opinion that aircraft
currently in the Marine Corps' inventory are inadequate to
conduct offensive air support on the maneuver battlefield.
As stated in Mr. Lind's manuscript:
Aircraft such as the F-13 and AV-8 depend
on speed for survival, but at high speed aircraft
often cannot find and identify enemy units, which
are the prime targets. We need a new ground support
aircraft for both CAS and armed reconnaissance. Its
basic characteristics should be:
o Slow speed but very good agility (a combination
of classic and energy maneuverability and transient
characteristics). Slow speed is necessary to do the
mission; survivability comes from constant high-
energy jinking. Systems that permit aircraft to place
ordnance accurately while jinking are of critical
importance.
o Ability to take hits from small automatic
weapons and keep flying and fighting. The main
threat in this environment is not SAMs and
dedicated anti-aircraft guns, but automatic weapons
fire from machine guns and individual weapons....
o Low cost, because only large numbers of
aircraft can have a decisive effect on the ground
battle. (10:26-27)
The F/A-18, A-6, and the AV-8B were developed to perform
specific mission requirements under current and projected
threat capabilities. The performance designed into these
aircraft was not a guess on the part of the manufacturer, but
a collection of specific military specifications derived from
actual combat lessons-learned and exercises.
Even in slow-speed aircraft, the pilot will have
difficulty finding and identifying targets as friend or foe,
attacking those targets, and surviving. Camouflage, dust and
smoke will further hinder the pilot's efforts. John Killen
says:
From the tentative beginnings in the latter stages
of World War I, manned aircraft have been used to
augment ground firepower through the delivery of a
variety-of munitions with an ever-increasing set of
capabilities. Throughout this history, it was
recognized that the man in the air needed help to
identify when, where, and against what to deliver his
ordnance. (9:77)
Once a pilot enters a combat zone in a slow-speed
aircraft, he is affording the enemy a greater amount of time
to bring weapons to bear on him. In the case of CAS, his
proximity to the earth's surface will require him to allocate
much of his time to avoid hitting the ground. His visual
lookout and comprehension of cockpit sensors alerting him to
impending enemy anti-air attack will consume more of his
concentration. Once the shooting starts, the pilot is going
to be more concerned about his survival, regardless of
whether his aircraft can take a lot of small-arms fire.
The maneuvering required by a slow-speed aircraft in
avoiding surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery
fire would be necessarily extensive and probably preclude the
pilot from engaging the ground target. If the target is not
marked in some fashion, the chances of proper target
engagement are inversely proportional to the threat to the
pilot's survival.
And lastly, the reformers assume surface-to-air missiles
and anti-aircraft artillery will not be a significant threat
on the maneuver battlefield, as stated in the quote on page
15. This is a deadly assumption to make. Figure 1 shows the
Soviet-Warsaw pact integrated air defense system (IADS) for
the battlefield.(3:6)
The following account clearly shows what can happen to a
modern fighting force when antiair defenses are deployed
effectively, as in the Yom Kippur War:
The A-4 Skyhawks played the heaviest ground-attack
role, with Phantoms and Mirages giving air cover. The
Israelis' targeting was so precise that tank commanders
could call down air strikes only a few yards from their
positions. But losses were heavy, for among the defense
screen that the Syrians had moved up to their Golan
lines was the latest Soviet mobile anti-aircraft
missile, the SAM-6. . . In the first afternoon, Israel
lost thirty Skyhawks and about ten Phantoms over Golan,
all to SAM-6s or the devastating flak of the mobile ZSU-
23 anti-aircraft batteries...which chewed up the
Skyhawks if their pilots dropped to deck level in an
effort to beat the SAMs. There were rarely any
parachutes... .The scale of losses was so clearly
insupportable that in mid-afternoon, Chief of Staff
Elazar actually abandoned air strikes over Golan....
(8:161)
The Soviet systems are mobile and accompany the ground
units. Because the Soviets realize their systems are less
effective when on the move, they deploy them in leapfrog
fashion so that there is continuous anti-aircraft coverage.
(4:1-36) "Exposure to surface-to-air defenses could be
significally decreased by aircraft maintaining very low
altitude and high speed under the weather and under defense
radar coverage throughout the entire flight". (12:5)
The type aircraft the reformers promote must be
inexpensive because the Marine Corps would need a large
reserve due to attrition.
The topics discussed were an attempt to point out some
perceived misconceptions on the part of Mr. Lind and other
military reformers. The profession of military aviation is
demanding, both physically and mentally. To perfect and
maintain the capability to perform the various missions
assigned requires continuous training and application. When
others make recommendations that will affect aviation combat
performance and have not trained in or experienced that
profession, we must look closely at their proposals.
Since maneuver warfare is doctrinal within the Marine
Corps, the use of Marine aviation as a maneuver element in
its own right must be accepted and exploited by our leaders.
One could make an exceptional case for Marine air as the main
effort in the Norway Air-Landed MEB scenario.
The first essential order of battle for the MAGTF
commander before he can begin his ground battle is to ensure
that his ground forces will not be destroyed by enemy air
action. He must prevent his forces from being the object of
enemy air reconnaissance and observation which would allow
the enemy to mass an attack against our critical areas. He
must use his offensive air support, or interdiction
capability, to take the battle to the enemy. The MAGTF
commander's intent and concept of operations has to be
understood by all elements of his command.
The next conflict will be a "come as you are" event.
The Marine Corps will go into combat with the aircraft
currently in its inventory. The F/A-18, AV-8B, and A-6 are
superb machines designed to accomplish their missions and
survive on today's battlefield. Replacing them with inferior
aircraft would be a step backwards. The helicopter gives the
MAGTF commander mobility in the maneuver warfare arena. Its
vulnerability to small-arms and antiaircraft fire has to be
realized, then employed accordingly.
The military reformers have our best interest at heart
and their ideas should be listened to and evaluated. Good
recommendations often come from those not so closely involved
in a specific endeavor. However, we must be careful that
those proposals which would be detrimental to our success in
combat be eliminated. Experience is essential.
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Bibliography
1. Bingham, Price T. "Ground Maneuver and Air Interdiction
in the Operational Art." Parameters. XIX NO.1 (March
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