Maritime Prepositioning Forces--Are They What They Seem?
AUTHOR Major Douglas A. Darling, USMC
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCES--
ARE THEY WHAT THEY SEEM?
I. Purpose: To investigate current doctrine concerning
Maritime Prepositioning Forces (MPF's), how it came into being
and will it provide the guidance needed for future employment.
II. Problem: Although never intended to replace amphibious
shipping, MPF's have gained instant credibility within our own
organization simply because the forces, once assembled, have
overwhelming combat power; however, current MPF doctrine does
not address the most likely deployment/employment environment.
III. Data: MPF's grew out of the decline of defense spending
in the late seventies. Today, MPF's provide America strategic
sealift sorely needed. Current doctrine stipulates several
prerequisites prior to MPF employment. The most important of
these being a secure/permissive/benign area in which to conduct
the operations. This doctrine is in disagreement with senior
Marine Corps leaders- statements and ideas concerning MPF
capabilities. Additionally, the current doctrine does not
address MPF utilization across the spectrum of warfare.
IV. Conclusions: MPF doctrine is in need of updating to
reflect the most likely type and place of employment in the
future.
V. Recommendations: The Marine Corps needs to refocus its
concept of operations for MPF's in order to give the National
Command authorities the options for employment. The best way
to do this is through changes in current doctrine; training
and education; and tailoring the MPF ships for more
flexibility.
MARITIME PREPOSITIONIN6 FORCES--Are They What They Seem?
During the Carter Administration many decisions were made
that would be regretted for years to come. Among the most
detrimental was the erosion of America's military and the
industrial base that supports it. For decades, our National
Strategy of Deterrence had worked--in large part due to our
strategic systems, their Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and
America's ability to rapidly move combat forces to crisis areas
around the world. During the years 1976-1980, as our fleet of
World War II amphibious Ships reached the end of their
lifecycle, government policy, world trade recession, and the
Soviet Navy expansion into a global naval power exposed a
significant weakness in U.S. strategy: strategic sealift.
To answer, in part, the problem of sealift shortfall, a
Presidential directive was issued in March 1979 providing
guidance establishing formation of contingency forces to meet
non-NATO commitments. (2:35) This force was called the Rapid
Deployment Force (RDF) and evolved into what was then called
the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). In conjunction
with development of the RDJTF, a new concept was developed that
placed equipment and supplies aboard ships which would be
positioned around the worlds troubled areas. If called upon,
the RDJTF would marry-up with the ships and prepare for
hostilities. This concept saved tremendous amounts of air-lift
and allowed a much faster assimilation of combat capability.
The concept was named near term pre-positioning ships (NTPS)
program.
Simultaneously with the establishment of RDJTF and it's
NTPS, the U.S. Navy was tasked to enhance the mobility of the
Marine Corps. (2:35) Although this was the true beginning of
the Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) program, much confusion
and intermixing of terms and concepts surrounded the program
start-up due to RDJTF and NTPS.
Essentially, the major differences between the two programs
were NTPS was a joint force primarily directed towards
Southwest Asia (SWA) and contained fifteen days of supply (DOS)
aboard ships which must unload at port. MPS, on the other
hand, was a Navy/Marine unique team with worldwide capability
and ships with thirty DOS which could unload in-stream or
in-port. This concept today has evolved into Maritime
Prepositioning Forces (MPF) consisting of; equipment and
supplies prepositioned aboard forward deployed Maritime
Prepositioning Ships (MPS), a Marine Expeditionary Brigade
(MEB) and a Naval Support Element (NSE) that are airlifted into
an objective area to assemble with their equipment in
preparation for operations ashore. (11:ES-1) This forward
basing of equipment and supplies saves time and money and helps
alleviate sealift shortfall.
Just what are these MPF's and how will they be used?
According to current doctrine "MPF operations are a strategic
deployment option,
the salient requirement of the operation is a secure area. In
addition there must be adequate strategic airlift, off-load
forces, arrival airfield, port/beach, and a road network
between the port/beach and the airfield. "(11:1-1--1-3)
Translated, the above characteristics require two hundred-fifty
C-141 (or equivalent) Military Airlift Command (MAC) sorties,
people to do the work, a beach or port at which to off-load the
ships, a C-141/C-5 capable airfield, roads to get back and
forth, and above all else a secure/permissive/benign area in
which to accomplish all of the above. Additionally, "The
unique nature of MPF operations require timely political and
military decisions by a wide spectrum of command's, agencies
and organizations from the National Command authority down
through the chain of command to the forces which make up the
MPF."(11:2-1) and finally, in plain English Operational
Handbook (OH) 7-6 states "MPF deployment operations are
essentially logistical in nature. "(11:ES-2)
Are MPF's what they seem? No, they are not. Although never
intended to replace amphibious shipping, MPF's have gained
instant credibility within our own organization simply because
the forces, once assembled, have overwhelming combat power;
however, current MPF doctrine does not address the most likely
employment.
To see how this perception (immediate, upon demand combat
power) can flourish, one needs only to look at a Table of
Organization (T/O) for a MPF MEB. It includes a Regimental
Landing Team, Direct Support Artillery Battalion, Tank
Battalion(-), Assault Amphibian Battalion(-), two Light Assault
Vehicle Companies, Combat Engineer Battalion(-), Recon Company
and when teamed with the TAVB, the MEB has the capability to
perform all six functions of Marine aviation. Add to this
Combat Service Support for the 16,000 Marines and the ability
to sustain itself for thirty days and you have a force to be
reckoned with. It's easy to compare, side-by-side, MPF and
amphibious operations because the names and sizes of the units
are the same. Here are some excerpts from congressional
testimony by senior Marine Corps leaders regarding MPF's:
"This contingency response program is one of the most
significant developments in recent Marine Corps history"(10:7);
"Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) has added a truly new
dimension to our projection forces"(10:8); "It [Maritime
Prepositioning Ships] substantially increases mobility,
sustainability and flexibility in the projection of naval
power. "(10:7)
Even our current doctrine leads one to believe MPS and
amphibious operations are synonymous; "Maritime prepositioning
can be used for introducing forces to:
(a) Preemptively occupy and defend key points along
lines of communications.
(b) Support an ally or friendly nation.
(c) Reinforce an amphibious operation.
(d) Occupy/reinforce advances naval bases.
(e) Augment fleet defense by providing tactical air
support from ashore.
(f) Establish a sizeable force in support of a
sustained operation ashore.
(g) Send political signals. ll(11:1-3)
But what signals are we sending? Our National Maritime
Strategy, forward naval presence, bust be credible to our
enemies in order for deterrence to work. How can MPF's be
considered power projection when friendly ports and permissive
airfields will, in all likelihood, not be in a crisis area?
Some experts list approximately one hundred-fifty ports/beaches
that meet the requirements stated in current doctrine for a MPF
operation. Of these one hundred-fifty, only about one percent
are considered in friendly countries. With budget problems at
home and foreign aid dwindling, the probability that access
once "friendly" nations provided is now in jeopardy. If MPF's
are selected, forcible entry from the sea will be a
prerequisite to the "logistical" operations to follow.
Hand-in-hand with the strategic mobility that MPF provides, a
requirement for tactical mobility exists that only an
amphibious force can provide.
Let's not fall into the "fix-all-trap." To fix the paucity
of amphibious shipping we propose independent operations for
MPF's. To fix the problem with overseas bases we now have
MPF's or floating supply depots. To fix the problem of
terrorism we will use MPF to send political signals.
We need to ref ocus our concept of operations for MPF's.
To help focus, the following questions can be asked:
a. Where/when is the most probable place of deployment for
MPF's today?
b. In low/mid-intensity conflicts will there be "timely
political and military decisions by a wide spectrum of
commands..."?(11:2-1)
c. In the battle of the future will all of our heavy lift
aircraft make it to the objective area?
d. With the advent of runway denial munitions, if the
aircraft make it to the objective area will they be able to
land?
e. Should we depend on host nation support to accomplish
our mission?
To answer these, the following suggestions are provided with
a brief explanation and rationale:
a. Tie, inextricably, amphibious doctrine and MPF doctrine
together. The most probable form of MPF employment in the next
ten years will be in a reinforcing/sustaining mode. Any number
of modern day scenarios can be written where a forward deployed
MAGTF (Marine Expeditionary Unit ((MEU)) must be supported.
The MEU could conduct an opposed amphibious landing to secure a
port/airfield for the follow-on MPF unit. This is not as
simple as it sounds without practical experience. The
compositing of MAGTF's is a much talked about but little
practiced idea in the Marine Corps today which should not be
tested during hostilities. If in fact there is friendly host
nation support, the job becomes all the easier. Port
facilities, indigenous labor, traffic control and security will
not need to be taken forcefully. We should however, prepare
for the worst-case scenario.
b. Training and educating Marines in MPF operations. There
should not be a single exercise in the future without the role
of MPF being considered. According to former Secretary of the
Navy, John F. Lehman, Jr., "...the status of our Merchant
Marine fleet and shipbuilding capability are absolutely
critical."(13:10) How do we expect our equipment and supplies
to arrive at the objective area if not by MPF? MPF has been
operational since 1985, yet not until 1989 were MPF exercises
conducted at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College! We
must teach and train all Marines in the effective use of MPF's.
c. Change the capability in the MPF Ships to transit more
Marines. Again, the worst case scenario would be proliferation
of hand-held surface-to-air missiles (SAM's) around the arrival
airfield. This is not to suggest that the Marines could
conduct an offensive landing but aircraft and airflow cannot be
the only option for moving people. "The capability and space
are currently on the MPF ships. Little or no modification is
required. " (16)
d. Tailor MPF loads for maximum flexibility. The current
load plans for the MPF ships have no flexibility for
off-loading supplies and equipment of a unit any smaller than a
MEB. This reduces the contingency response and supportability
of any selective off-load. By tailoring the ships' loads,
small unit contingency response packages could be supported.
Certainly, this course of action is not without penalty. There
will be reduced cube and square due to somewhat inefficient
loading but the increased flexibility given to commanders far
out-weights the disadvantages.
The idea that MPF's can only be used in an environment where
there is little threat; where the host nation is anxious for
the U.S to be there; and when there is advance decision making
by policy makers is the ideal. Our doctrine, education and
training should provide the flexibility of deployment AND
employment.
Are MPF's what they seem? No, they are more! MPF's give
America the strategic sealift sorely needed. The capability
exists today to make MPF's the dynamic force which provides the
National Command authorities strategic flexibility. With only
the addition of forward-thinking MPF doctrine and training, the
Marine Corps can continue it's tradition of "any clime or
place."
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1.Aquilino, John and Sanders, James. "Strategic Sealift:
The Achilles Heel of America's Defense. " Amphibious
Warfare Review, 6 (Winter 1987-1988), 30-35.
2.Brown, David B., LtCol, USMC(Ret). "MPS: An Evolving
Entity. " Marine Corps Gazette, Jan 85, 34-39.
3.Brown, David B., LtCol, USMC(Ret). "MPS: Aviation Combat
and the TAVB." Marine Corps Gazette, Feb 85, 64-67.
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Crucial Role." Marine Corps Gazette, Mar 85, 71-75.
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in the Objective Area." Marine Corps Gazette, Jul 85,
75-83.
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Prepositioning--How Much is Enough?". Amphibious Warfare
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10.U. S. Marine Corps. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
Requirements and Programs Division. Marine Corps 1987
Concepts add Issues, Washington, D.C., Feb 87.
11.U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education
Command. Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Operations,
OH 7-6. Quantico, Jun 87.
12.U. S. Marine Corps. MAGTF Warfighting Center, Marine Corps
Combat Development Command. MAGTF MASTER PLAN--FINAL DRAFT,
Feb 89.
13.Watkins, James D., Admiral, USN. "The Maritime Strategy."
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14.Wells, Mike. "Maritime Prepositioning--A New Dimension for
Rapid Deployment." ARMED FORCES, Mar 88, 122-126.
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12-22.
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