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United States National Security Strategy For The Next Century
AUTHOR Major Richard A. Conty, Jr., USMC
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - National Security
                   EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title:   UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
                    FOR THE NEXT CENTURY
Thesis:  I  propose  that  the  U.S.  use  technology  to
"annihilate"  enemies  rather  than  following  its  current
policy of maintaining a large standing army to fight other
large standing armies by conventional means.
Issue:   During the Reagan years this country rebuilt its
armed forces and improved and built upon existing national
strategic goals.  My proposed national  security strategy
for the 21st century will improve upon the strategy now in
place,  because  if  current  strategy  is  continued  this
country will  run out of manpower and money supporting a
large  armed  force.    I   propose   that   we  use   high
technological weapons  to destroy our enemies,  reduce the
size  of  our  armed  forces  overseas,  create  a  National
Service within the United States for all 18-20 year old
literate males.  Examples are given of how high tech can
work  for  us.   Other  examples  are  given  of  what  other
countries do with National Service.  The armed forces would
be used to augment the U.S. Customs Service.  The National
Service will be a basis for teaching entry-level skills in
a wide variety of professions.
Conclusion:  The  United  States  can  no  longer  afford
economically or demographically to man an enormous armed
force.  We can still be a world power in all the important
arenas  without  having  forward deployed ground forces  in
Europe and the Far East.  We must take care of our  own
internal problems in the country and stop being the world's
policeman.
          UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
                    FOR THE NEXT CENTURY
THESIS STATEMENT.  I propose that the U.S. use technology
to "annihilate" enemies rather than following its current
policy of maintaining a large standing army to fight other
large standing armies by conventional means.
I.    STRATEGY BACKGROUND
         A.  C & S College Strategy Symposium
         B.  United States current strategy (unclassified)
         C.  Proposed concept
II.   THREE MAJOR REASONS PROPOSED CONCEPT WILL WORK
         A.  Technology
         B.  Dwindling manpower pool
         C.  More economical
III.  U.S. OBJECTIVES/INTERESTS
         A.  Peace
         B.  Protect interests at home and abroad
         C.  Defensive posture
         D.  Monroe Doctrine
         E.  Trade/economics
IV.   NEED FOR TECHNOLOGY/IMPROVEMENTS/ASSUMPTIONS
         A.  Strategic Defensive Initiative (SDI)
         B.  Other high-tech platforms
             1.   AWACs
             2.   Satellites
             3.   EA-6Bs
             4.   SR-71s
             5.   Strategic Air Command (SAC)
             6.   Submarine forces
V.    POLICY OF "ANNIHILATION"
VI.   WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS
         A.  Far East
         B.  Europe
VII.  REDEPLOYMENT OF OVERSEAS FORCES TO CONUS
         A.  Border patrol
         B.  Drug interdiction
         C.  Terrorist interdiction
VIII. ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL SERVICE
         A.  18-20 year-old males
             1.   Armed Forces
             2.   Reserves
             3.   Non-combat type services
IX.   PRESIDENTIAL DESIRES
          UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
                    FOR THE NEXT CENTURY
         This  research  paper  presents  a  strategy  that
blends some of the concepts and positions given during the
strategy symposium at the Marine Corps Command and Staff
College  this  past  fall,  current  open  source  national
strategy,  along  with  some  of  my  own  ideas  that  are  a
dramatic   departure   from   current   national   security
strategy.   I  propose  that  the  U.S.  use  technology  to
"annihilate"  enemies  rather  than  following  its  current
policy of maintaining a large standing army to fight other
large standing armies by conventional means.
         I will set the stage for what I will build on.
President Reagan in his 1988 White House report stated that
at  the  outset  of  his  administration  he had four broad
objectives  that underpinned our national  strategy.   They
were:
         First,  to restore our nation's military
         strength  after  a  period  of  decline  in
         which  the  Soviet Union  overtook us  in
         many  critical  categories  of  military
         power;
         Second,  to restore our nation's economic
         strength   and  reinvigorate   the   world
         economic system.
         Third,    to    restore    the    nation's
         international prestige as a world leader;
         and
         Fourth,   to  restore  pride   among   all
         Americans  and carry our message to the
         world    that    individuals    and    not
         governments    should    control    their
         economic,    spiritual    and    political
         destinies.
         Our national security strategy continues
         to be aimed at reinforcing the gains we
         have  achieved  in  each  of  these  areas,
         while employing all the elements of our
         national power -- political, economic and
         military  --  in  a  coordinated  way  to
         advance  the  full   range  of   national
         security interests.1
President Reagan also wrote about U.S. interests:
         Our  National  Security  Strategy  reflects
         our  national  interests  and  presents  a
         broad  plan  for  achieving  the  national
         objectives that support those interests.
         The  key  national   interests  which  our
         strategy  seeks  to   assure  and  protect
         include:
         1.  The survival of the United States as
         a free and independent nation, with its
         fundamental   values   intact   and   its
         institutions and people secure.
         2.  A healthy and growing U.S. economy to
         provide   opportunity   for    individual
         prosperity and a  resource base  for our
         national endeavors.
         3.  A stable and secure world,  free of
         major threats to U.S. interests.
         4.   The    growth   of   human   freedom,
         democratic institutions,  and free market
         economics throughout the world, linked by
         a  fair  and  open  international  trading
         system.
         5.     Healthy   and    vigorous  alliance
         relationships .2
         There are three major reasons why the strategy I
am  proposing  is  better  than  that  currently  in  place.
First, because of the great advances in weapons technology,
our  current  policy  is  outdated.   Second,  my  proposed
strategy is essential because of the dwindling pool of men
qualified to serve in our armed forces.  To meet projected
out-year  end-strengths  would  almost  certainly  require
reinstituting   the   draft.    For   political   reasons,
reinstitution  of   the  draft   is   highly  unlikely   in
peacetime.   Third,  my  proposed  strategy  would  be  more
economical because it would eliminate our physical presence
in  the  Fear  East  and  in  Europe  as  we  know  it  today.
Furthermore, it would place those returned troops into jobs
at  home  that  would  help  our  society  and  our  economy.
Although   my   proposal   is   both   economically   and
demographically  more  practical  than  current  policy,  it
would not reduce our ability to meet our current national
strategy  and  national  objective  goals.   This  shift  in
policy will allow the U.S. to remain a superpower.
         No longer would we play "tit for tat."  No longer
would we allow U.S. Treaties or U.S. sovereign soil abroad
to be violated.  We should adopt as one of our principles
of   war,   as   the   Soviets   have,   the   principle   of
"annihilation. "   The  U.S.  currently  is  satisfied  with
containment.  However, the policy of containment has failed
in the past.  Containment failed in Korea, Cuba and Vietnam.
         The  principle  of  annihilation  was  indirectly
espoused by Patton in the closing days of World War II to
solve problems he foresaw with the Soviet Union.   Patton
advised that, rather than stopping in Berlin in 1945, the
U.S. should advance into the Soviet Union and overtake its
government.   He  predicted,  that  if  the  U.S.  did  not
dismantle the new Soviet Union,  their grandchildren would
kill our grandchildren.  This is a good possibility.
         To  eliminate  world  confusion,  the  U.S.  should
notify  other  countries  of  our  policy  shift.   These
statements would be distributed in writing to all countries
via the United Nations:
         o Our intent is never to start a war.
         o We will protect our interests at home and abroad.
         o We are in a defensive posture.
         o  Monroe  Doctrine  is  an  absolute,  i.e.,  no
intervention into our hemisphere.
         o Trade with all nations is desired.
         If we implemented the policy of annihilation,  it
would  become  the  responsibility  of  every  member  of  a
foreign nation to keep their government in check or they
will pay the ultimate price.  Some leaders or factions of
countries would put us to the test.  In response, we should
announce to the world that it is not our intent to use our
impending attack on a stated nation or group as a stepping
stone  to  invade  somewhere  else,  but  rather  that  our
intention  is  to exact retribution for violating American
interests.   We  should  warn  other   countries  not   to
interfere.  Then we should "annihilate" the problem.  This
would only have to be tested once to convince others that
reprisal will be certain, immediate and harsh if American
interests are violated.
         When   the   United   States   started   developing
"safeguard"  in  the  1960s,  skeptics  in  the  scientific
community  believed  that  the  key  technologies  needed  to
build an antiballistic missile ("ABM")  system were simply
out of reach, similar to modern day skeptics are convinced
that today's Strategic Defense Initiative ("SDI"), or "star
wars," is a grand delusion.
         Today, SDI's critics and proponents alike
         agree  that  one  of  the  most  daunting
         challenges will be writing the computer
         programs  that will  run the system  ....
         The software will require some 10 million
         lines of operational code for controlling
         sensors, identifying and tracking targets
         and  pointing  weapons.   What's  more,  it
         will  have  to  work  perfectly  the  first
         time, since there is no practical way of
         testing   it.    Some   leading   software
         specialists  say  it  simply  cannot  be
         done.3
         I maintain that SDI is a very important link in
our overall defensive strategy.  Lieutenant General Daniel
O.  Graham    (ret.),   Director   of   High   Frontier,   a
Washington-based, pro-SDI organization, says
         If Phase I of SDI could stop 30 percent
         of  a  massive  Soviet  attack  it  could
         certainly deal with accidental or rogue
         attacks by the likes of Colonel Kaddafi
         of  Libya  --  an  increasing  concern  as
         long-range   missiles    proliferate   in
         third-world countries. 4
         Doug Bandow,  a senior fellow at the Cato Insti-
tute, a Washington-based think tank, offers this food for
thought:
         If thousands of years of bloody history
         have proved anything, it is that there is
         no utopian answer to the problem of war.
         And a space-based defense would not make
         nuclear weapons obsolete.  The threat of
         a  nuclear  holocaust  is  too  serious  to
         ignore, however.  Maybe SDI will turn out
         to  be  too expensive or too complex to
         deploy.   Maybe  --  maybe not  and we'll
         never know unless we try.5
         To  implement my proposed strategy, we must make
certain changes and assumptions.  We must assume we have a
foolproof Strategic Defense Initiative ("SDI") program in
place.  In 1988, then-President Reagan, an advocate for SDI
wrote:
         Our   SDI   program   is   making   great
         progress, moving us toward the prospect
         of a safer world -- one which depends
         for  its  security on strategic defense,
         rather  than  on  the  threat  of  mutual
         nuclear retaliation.6
         We would also need to  continue  to  improve  and
maintain our AWACs, satellites, EA-6B type coverage, SR-71s
and   the   full   spectrum   of   intelligence   gathering
capabilities.  We would need to increase the size of our
submarine forces  and the size  of  Strategic  Air  Command
("SAC").  Some of these national assets would be armed with
cruise-type  missiles  that  would  have  different  warheads
available depending on the target  and desired effect on
target,   from  conventional  High  Explosive   ("HE")   to
dial-a-rad clean or dirty nuclear weapons.  The use of such
weapons platforms gives us the stand-off advantage of never
having to close with and destroy the enemy by fire and
maneuver of close combat.  Right now we have the capability
of  relatively  pin-point  accuracy  at  the  right  time  and
place.  We still would meet our national objectives,  such
as  deterrence,   escalation  control  and  favorable  war
termination without the bloodying of U.S.  ground forces.
Our  expanded,  unseen  and  underwater  "gunboat  diplomacy"
would  give  us  command  and  control  of  the  seas.   Also
surface combatants having harpoon, cruise and the newest
missile, standoff land-attack missile ("SLAM").
         Our current technology gives us the capability of
going directly to the enemy capital.  We no longer have to
fight a long war of attrition and many campaigns to get to
a capital and its leadership as has been our history in
warfare.  Technology now allows us to fight with little or
no  risk  to  our  forces.   By  having  weapons  that  can
literally  fly  into  someone's  house that we specifically
target, we now take out the problem at the top, not at the
bottom.   Eliminating enemy  leaders,  headquarters,  command
and control systems, etc., will immediately turn the tide
of war or terrorism to a neutral status.
         If we were to follow my strategy, we would leave
our  European  and Far  East  allies  the  responsibility of
protecting themselves.   However,  we would make  clear  to
allies and enemies alike that in time of need, such as in
the event of Soviet aggression or attack, we will attack
the Soviet Union in order to protect our friends and comply
with treaties.  We would still protect our allies, but from
afar.   Devoting  large  amounts  of American  manpower  and
resources to our allies is no longer necessary to protect
U.S. interests.
         Implementing  my  proposal  is  not  just  a  sound
defense  strategy.   It  is  also essential because of  the
diminishing pool of qualified people to serve in our armed
forces.   Demographics  show us that the U.S. male cohort
eligible for military service is decreasing, while the need
for more men in uniform is rising.   Part of my proposed
strategy to deal with the dwindling qualified male cohort
and to save money is to reduce the size of our active duty
ground forces  abroad.   Furthermore,  it  frees up a large
number of these young people to combat problems facing us
at home.
         Our returned armed forces would be an invaluable
asset here at home.  Most would become part of the Reserves
or  the Guard.   Some of  the newly returned European  and
Korean occupation forces would be transformed into border
patrol,  drug and terrorist interdiction forces, primarily
on our southern border.  Others would augment U.S. customs
in  ports.   Only  5%  of  overseas  incoming  cargo  is
inspected.  Most of the small decked amphibious ships would
go into the reserves also.  Assisting on the seaward side
would be several new fleets of hydrofoils for intercepting
and destroying incoming drug smugglers.
         The real threat to this nation is not a nuclear
exchange with the Soviets.  The greatest external threats
to  this  nation are  "hot head"  leaders who could export
terrorism and drugs to our country.  Internal problems like
drugs,  pollution, overpopulation, mismanagement of natural
resources  and  illiteracy  present  grave  dangers  to  our
society and our economy.
         Under my proposal, the Marine Corps would remain
intact  and play a major part of our country's Force in
Readiness.   The Marine Corps could  best  be  utilized  in
several  ways.   Along  with  the  large  decked  amphibious
ships, the Marines would go right to the source of the drug
growers  and manufacturers.  Marines would defend against
drugs as they would other enemies of our nation, foreign or
domestic -- by annihilation.  Foreign soil assaults would
be conducted with or without the help of the host nation.
This would eliminate the supply side of the problem.  The
demand side needs to be treated from within.
         Also,  Marines  could be used in mobile  training
teams,   along   with   U.S.   Army   Special   Forces   in
underdeveloped or new nations that need and request basic
military training  to  train their armed forces to ensure
peace  and tranquility in their own nations  to ensure  a
democratic society.   These U.S. forces could also be used
to  assist  in  keeping  the  peace  in  time  of  a  hostile
insurgency of a democratic nation.  The key would be for us
not to get involved with attrition warfare but to go to the
top of the insurgency leadership and eliminate it.
         An  essential  component  of  this  reduced  active
posture would also include an increased reserve, including
National Service of some sort for all males 18-20 years of
age.   Under  this concept,  all functional,  literate males
between 18 and 20 years of age would have to participate in
activities   that   benefit   our   national   defense   and
well-being, such as active duty military service,  reserve
armed forces,  the National Guard, the Peace Corps, Vista,
Fish and Game,  national hospital service,  National Parks
and state roads commissions and the like.
         National Service is widely accepted and expected
in  many  countries.   Below  is  listed what  is  currently
mandatory in some of our NATO ally countries:
         West Germany:  Men drafted for a 15-month
         term in the military may instead serve
         three years  with  the  police  or  border
         patrol,  two years overseas in a program
         like the Peace Corps or  10  years  part
         time as a volunteer for civil defense and
         disaster  relief.   Conciencious  objectors
         may substitute 20-month civilian service
         in lieu of military or police service.
         France:  All  men  serve  one  year  of
         compulsary   service,   either   military,
         domestic civilian or overseas civilian.
         Denmark:   Lottery in which about 40% of
         all 19 year old men serve for nine months
         in the military.
         Spain:   Men serve 18 months in military
         upon  turning  21.   Exceptions  for  only
         sons.
         Below is an example of a voluntary program:
         Britain: Volunteers may enter either the
         Voluntary  Service  Overseas  (VSO),  the
         British equivalent of the Peace Corps, or
         the Community Service Volunteers  (CSV),
         which covers a range of human services.7
         In my proposal, the large, broad-based Reserve and
Guard components would serve as a force  in  readiness  in
case  the  need  arose  for  the  U.S.  to  fight  a  more
conventional attrition war.  The other components of  the
National  Service would  educate,  provide  jobs  and  entry
level skills for young men and women and save money.  To
increase competition for the active-duty positions, thereby
ensuring  that the military will get  the highest quality
applicants,  active-duty military would receive higher pay
and better benefits.  Men reenlisting past their two year
commitment  would  receive  other  benefits.   All  people
successfully  finishing  whatever  two  year  program  they
entered  would  be  eligible  for  GI  Bill-type  education
benefits.   Only  active-duty  armed  forces  members  would
qualify for VA-type housing loans at reduced rates.
         In summary, our nation must be strong and have the
national  will  to  fight  and  win.   The  "old"  ways  of
attrition warfare are obsolete.  We as a country no longer
have to project ourselves on  a  hostile  shore  forcibly,
tactically  maneuver  to  an  enemy  and  conduct  massive
campaigns to break the enemy.  Technology now allows us to
annihilate the appropriate target, such as enemy leadership
and  command  and  control.   We  can  no  longer  afford,
economically  or  demographically,  to  have  an  enormous
standing armed force that liberals argue "does nothing" in
peacetime other than be present and one that drains the
economy of manpower  and money.   Former  President  Reagan
says it best:
         We  must  never  forget  that  freedom  is
         never really free; it is the most costly
         thing  in  the  world.   And  freedom  is
         never   paid   for   in   a   lump   sum.
         Installments    come    due    in   every
         generation.   All  any of us  can  do  is
         offer  the  generations  that  follow  a
         chance for freedom.8
         In the final analysis, this is the assurance that
our national security strategy seeks to provide.
         To help protect our friends and allies, and other
U.S.  interests abroad, we must not only possess national
strength,  but we must be able to project  this power  --
diplomatic  and  informational,  economic  and  military  --
across  great  sea  and  air  distances.   In  the  military
sphere,  we  must  maintain  the  capability  to  secure  our
worldwide lines of communication; to project military power
quickly; to sustain forces at great distances for extended
periods of time; and to pose a credible deterrent to those
who  might  contemplate aggression against our allies  and
friends.
         We as a country must be ready to employ military
power in coordination with diplomacy and economic policy.
The  ultimate  goal  when  applying  military  force,  or
projecting  military  power,  is  to  encourage  political
solutions.   War  is  the least desireable alternative,  but
only by being prepared to wage war  successfully can we
deter it.
                                   ENDNOTES
1   Ronald  Reagan,  "National  Security  Strategy  of  the
    United States (The White House, January 1988), p. iv.
2   Reagan, 3.
3   Harry Manning, "Star Wars," International Combat Arms,
    the Journal of Defense Technology (January 1989), p. 19.
4   Manning, 21.
5   Manning, 25.
6   Reagan, iv.
7   Joseph P. Shapiro "The Push for National Service," U.S.
    News and World Report (February 13, 1989), p. 23.
8   Reagan, v.
                       BIBLIOGRAPHY
1.  Carlucci,  Frank C.   Annual  Report  to  the  Congress,
    Fiscal Year 1990.
2.  Department of Defense.   "America  ...  and the Defense
    Challenges Ahead"  Defense 89 (January/February 1989).
3.  Housman,  Damian.   "SLAM"  International  Combat  Arms.
    The Journal of Defense Technology (March 1989), 88.
4.  Kelley,  Paul  X.   "The  Amphibious  Warfare  Strategy"
    U.S. Naval Institute (January 1986), 18.
5.  Manning, Harry.  "Star Wars"  International Combat Arms
    The Journal of Defense Technology (January 1989), 18.
6.  Reagan,  Ronald.   "National  Security  Strategy  of  the
    United States"  The White House (January 1988).
7.  Schneider,  Barry R.   "Evaluating the Strategic Triad"
    Journal of Defense & Diplomacy (January 1989), 34.
8.  Shapiro,  Joseph P.,  Sheler,  Jeffrey L.,  and Whitman,
    David.  "The Push for National Service"  U.S. News and
    World Report (February 13, 1989), 20.
9.  Westwood,  James T.   "Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare"
    Journal of Defense & Diplomacy (February/March 1989),
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