C4I2: A Command Dilemma
AUTHOR Major Charles E. Cooke, USMC
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - C4
Click here to view image
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
C4I2 A COMMAND DILEMMA
I. PURPOSE: To identify the criticality of integration of
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence and
interoperability (C4I2 ) systems at tactical command levels in
the USMC and to investigate the impact of the theft of C4I2
technology by the Soviet Union.
II. PROBLEM: C4I2 systems burden commanders through
tactical limitations, enemy technology theft, logistical support,
human interaction, and tactical employment; however, C4I2
systems are force multipliers that provides the tactical
commander with state-of-the-art equipment to control and maneuver
his forces.
III. DATA: The commander's need for command and control
procedures and information is as old as the military itself.
Command and control is a function performed by commanders and the
entire range of C4I2 systems are dependent on the performance
of thousands of people. Today's C4I2 systems must survive
interoperability in a joint environment. That is, they must
provide services to and accept services from other systems, units
or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to
operate effectively together. Accepting the premise that human
interaction is critical to C4I2 systems' success, then
survivability, responsiveness and flexibility reduces the clouds
of uncertainty on the battlefield. This paper reviews the
dilemmas of what C4I2 systems a commander faces on the
battlefield. These C4I2 dilemmas include: (1) Addressing
the relationship between command and control; (2) operational
direction from a joint interoperability perspective; (3)
analyzing the interface of command, control and the commander's
intent; (4) and assessing the impact of technology thefts by the
Soviet Union.
IV. CONCLUSIONS: C4I2 systems rule the battlefield.
Systemically blending them with weapon systems creates a powerful
force in combat. Recognition of the above relationships and the
maintenance of the proper balance between C4I2 systems are
essential elements to winning future battles and campaigns.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS: The USMC must become better managers of
C4I2 systems at the tactical level. U.S. armed forces should
conduct more joint/NATO operations and exercises to increase
C4I2 systems compatibility. C4I2 systems should be built
to do only what is necessary and be kept simple and inexpensive.
C4I2: A COMMAND DILEMMA
Thesis Statement: C4I2 burdens commanders through tactical
limitations, enemy technology thefts, logistical support, human
interaction, and tactical employment; however, C4I2 systems
are force multipliers that provide the tactical commander with
state-of-the-art equipment to control and maneuver his forces.
I. Commander's battlefield needs
A. Command and control
B. Communications
C. Intelligence
II. Interoperability requirements
III. Command, control and commander's intent
A. Strategy
B. Objectives
C. Center of gravity
IV. Strategic impact of C4I2 systems
A. Nuclear
B. Conventional
V. Technology thefts
A. U.S.S.R
B. Allied profits
VI. Future Developments: Meeting the CINC's C4I2 needs
A. Procurement
B. Interoperability
C. Timeliness
C4I2: A COMMAND DILEMMA
Command and control on the modern battlefield is a major
concern. How is a commander expected to use all the information
available, make decisions and issue orders in the most effective
and efficient manner possible? The problem is not a new one but
one that must be addressed.
Current command, control, communications, intelligence, and
interoperability (C4I2) policies hamper the commander's
ability to effectively adapt C4I2 technology to the
battlefield. Yet, without this technology, the Marine Corps
would resemble an underdeveloped nation's army of the past -- led
by the horse cavalry instead of the air cavalry. The Marine
Corps cannot ignore C4I2 technology. Instead, the Marine
Corps must harness and adapt C4I2 systems to battlefield use
by changing policies so that battlefield commanders are as
comfortable with C4I2 employment as they are with tactics.
The key element in structuring C4I2 systems is to ensure
the total system is responsive to the commander's mission of
defeating the enemy on the battlefield. To accomplish this
mission they must be just as survivable, and endurable as the
weapons they support.
COMMAND AND CONTROL PHILOSOPHY
Present USMC doctrine pertaining to command and control is
mechanistic, emphasizing facilities, procedures and organization.
The humanistic functions engendered in command and leadership are
subordinated to the concept and function of control. Current
doctrine fails to address the relationship between command and
control. The recognition of that relationship and the
maintenance of the proper balance between command and control are
essential to winning future battles and campaigns.
Given this doctrinal state of affairs, an appropriate command
and control philosophy for the Marine Corps must be determined
-- that is, a command and control philosophy which will support
winning future battles and campaigns. A theory of command and
control is also needed to support this philosophy.
In the July 1986 issue of the Military Review magazine, U.S.
Army Major Timothy L. McMahon states most doctrinal publications
define command and control as a whole -- an inseparable entity --
failing to recognize the separate natures and functions of each.
Even when the terms are defined separately, the mechanistic
nature of control is reflected in the definition of command1.
Only rarely are the humanistic functions of leadership used to
define command in this context. Current command and control
doctrine must be inadequate when the definitions upon which that
doctrine is based are inadequate. The terms need to be defined
separately and then as a joint process.
COMMAND
Command is the dynamic process of the identification and
promulgation of intent and the infusion of will in subordinate
commanders and organizations. It clarifies priorities and
direction. It is oriented toward the coordination of effort and
the reduction of internal conflict. The process directs
adherence to standards providing behavioral certainty. Command
is subject-oriented rather than mechanically oriented. The
functions of effective leadership are the primary means used to
achieve effective command2.
CONTROL
Control is a support mechanism for command. It is
mechanically oriented and characterized by high volume, routine
and vertical communications; the coordination of activities
between internal and external elements; and the creation of
structure which limits command involvement3. Management
procedures are the primary means used to achieve efficient
control. Communications, computers and intelligence are tools
used to support command and control.
COMBINED COMMAND AND CONTROL
The separate definitions suggest what the proper relationship
between command and control ought to be. Control mechanisms
support the intent of the commander by providing necessary
decisionmaking information, ensuring that all subordinate
commanders and organizations are operating according to the
commander's intent, and creating a structured base from which to
exercise command.
Command and control as separate entities -- the latter
designed to support the former -- are in a dynamic relationship.
That is, a tension, or balance, exists between command and
control. The commander must maintain the proper balance. The
command and control process is oriented toward the accomplishment
of a given mission or the fulfillment of the commander's intent.
This balance is not fixed. Environmental conditions influence
the balance, and the primary one is uncertainty.
As the situation facing the commander becomes less certain,
control increases with the objective of creating certainty. The
actions of subordinates are limited to reduce uncertainty. The
ideal command environment exists when the commander's intent and
will are so well assimilated and control measures are so subtly
applied in the context of command functions that certainty is
maintained in the face of changing environments. Figure 1 --
which follows -- depicts this theory.
SEE FIGURE 1 INSERT -- NEXT PAGE
Control, communications, computers, intelligence, and
interoperability support the functions of command. They are a
necessary means to command, but they neither are an end in itself
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nor contrary to command.
STRATEGIC C4I2
Strategic C4I2 systems are designed to meet three vital
needs: to supply the warning and intelligence necessary for the
National Command Authorities to make decisions, to provide
command centers and decision aids, and to provide the capability
to transmit that decision to the military and their control
operations. C4I2 systems enable the NCA, JCS, and commanders
at appropriate subordinate levels to plan, direct, coordinate and
control the operations of U.S. military forces.
From a strategic context, C4I2 for nuclear forces
includes essential elements in the deterrence of nuclear war. As
noted by Charles A. Zracket in his article "C3I" dated 22 June
1984:
The present C3I system has vulnerabilities associated
with its reliability, survivability and endurance under
attack, thereby weakening deterrence by increasing the
ambiguity in our capabilities4.
Development of a reliable and enduring C4I2 system would
reduce the ambiguity alluded to by Charles Zracket. Its
reliable, positive control of nuclear forces would give the
national leadership more time to assess situations, ensure
discriminate retaliation, and improve our ability to manage
crises in combat. These capabilities could help to stop a war
rapidly should one start. A reliable and enduring C4I2
system will be needed for a long time to come, even if a freeze
on strategic nuclear forces were accomplished or other arms
control successes achieved. Indeed, C4I2 systems may be the
best source today of confidence-building measures to reduce
tensions and the threat of nuclear catastrophe.
While C4I2 systems are delicate and complicated to
maintain, they are force-multipliers in winning on the
battlefield. Thorough and detailed pre-combat planning prevents
periods of confusion, doubt, and indecision in times of war. For
the Marine Corps, planning for C4I2 systems efficiency and
survivability must address the (1) nuclear, biological, and
chemical (NBC) environment; (2) the environment that house and
protect the C4I2 systems; and (3) our ability to operate,
maintain, standardize and employ C4I2 equipment on the
battlefield.
TECHNOLOGY THIEVES
In today's nuclear environment, many military strategist
believe new U.S. weapons may make Americans less secure. Bruce
Van Voorst states in 12 February 1989 Time magazine:
Hopes of achieving national military superiority disap-
peared in the radioactive clouds over Hiroshima; today
nuclear deterrence is built on the shaky assurance that
either the U.S. or Soviet Union could absorb an attack
and still devastate its enemy in response. By this log-
ic, a first strike would never be attempted5.
However, if a first strike is attempted by either nation,
C4I2 technology will provide the stabilizing alerting force.
Experts warn that weapon systems such as the Strategic Defense
Initiative and the just -- unveiled Stealth bomber could make the
world more dangerous by prompting a hostile Soviet response.
Other weapons that were first introduced by the U.S., such as
cruise missiles and multiple-warhead ICBM's, have been copied by
the Soviets and now pose a greater threat to Americans. The
weapon systems are depicted in figure 2 below.
Click here to view image
Just how destabilizing such systems could be was recently
illustrated when the army conceded that SDI could severely
threaten the Soviet Union's satellite system. Both the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. depend heavily on low-orbit satellites for military
intelligence, navigation and communications. The star wars
antimissile weapons sitting in space, could easily be turned
against Soviet satellites traveling in predictable orbits. Such
a prospect is as unacceptable to the Soviets as it would be to
the U.S. To combat this advantage the Soviets are willing to do
whatever is necessary to protect their systems and their defense
network. If that means stealing C4I2 technology from the
U.S. then they will do it. U.S. former Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara describes SDI as:
So destabilizing that he believes the Soviets would "be
justified in shooting the system down, even in peace-
time"6.
Another concern or burden that today's battlefield commanders
must confront is the possibility that the Soviet generals might
be tempted to launch a pre-emptive attack on the radar avoiding
B-2 stealth bomber, which former Defense Secretary James
Schlesinger boasted:
"Makes obsolescent $200 billion worth of Soviet air
defenses"7.
Traditional wisdom holds that U.S. bombers are not first strike
weapons, since they would take up to eight hours to reach their
targets. But if the B-2 can fly over undetected, the Soviets
could reasonably fear a sneak "decapitation" attack on their
leadership. In this case as stated by the June 1988 Aviation
Week magazine:
"This new U.S. deterrent might serve to incite them, not
reassure them"8.
Strategic advantage can vanish quickly as the Soviets steal or
copy U.S. military technology and turn it against its inventors.
Former Secretary McNamara states that:
It takes the Soviets on the average only four years to
catch up to U.S. advances and then the weapons may pose
more of a threat to Americans than to Soviets9.
The U.S., for example, already has both air and sea launched
cruise missiles, and plans to build thousands of new, advanced,
low-observeable "stealth" versions. Because they fly slowly
compared with ICBM's, American cruise missiles are not by
themselves considered a first-strike weapon -- like bombers, they
take hours to hit targets deep inside the Soviet Union.
But Soviet cruise missiles represent a far- reaching threat to
the U.S. Half the American population and industrial capacity
sit within 150 miles of the ocean coasts, where cruise missiles
launched from Soviet submarines could strike quickly and
unexpectedly. The U.S. has virtually no defense against such
missiles, particularly when the Soviets also employ stealth
technology. The threat is compounded by the difficulty in
negotiating a cutback in cruises; they are so small and portable
that their numbers would be almost impossible for either side to
verify, and conventionally armed missiles cannot be distinguished
from nuclear weapons10.
As you can see, technological developments continues to
burden future battlefield commanders. To combat these new
developments, we must train harder and allot more money for
future research. We must also convince our allies and developers
not to sell our secrets to the enemy at any price.
Politically, American and European societies are being
persuaded by Mikhail Gorbachev that the Soviet Union is no longer
a threat to our way of life. The January 1989 issue of U.S. News
and World Report states that Gorbachev is proclaiming a defensive
doctrine of "reasonable sufficiency":
To create the impression of a military still able to
defend the motherland but less threatening to other
nations11.
As military leaders and battlefield commanders we must closely
analyze this proposal and realize that his goal is to make
military reforms as economically as possible without sacrificing
Moscow's relative strategic position. To achieve this goal, the
Soviets will and are stealing technology.
As noted earlier, the Soviet Union lags about four years
behind the U.S. in scientific development. Worry about
technology, in fact, may be the single greatest force behind
Gorbachev's military reforms. Israeli technicians found
Soviet-made tanks captured during Mideast wars faulty in design.
American experts examining the MIG-25 foxbat interceptor
delivered by a defector in 1976 first guffawed at wings of
stainless steel, not aluminum and ancient vacuum tubes12.
However, contempt gave way to grudging respect when they
concluded that the MIG-25 could do what it was supposed to:
Bring down a U.S. SR-71 spy plane. Often the Soviets can put
stolen western technology into the field faster than the
embarrassed originators.
For the first months and years of the Gorbachev era, western
analyst remained skeptical of his intent to reduce the threat. Of
course they said Moscow needed to cut costs to rescue its
economy. Afghanistan was going badly. A longer leash for
Eastern Europe was risky, but Gorbachev could not deny satellites
the liberalization he decreed at home. Yes, he had accepted
unprecedented on-site inspection under the INF treaty, but INF
looked steadily less like a good bargain for the democracies.
Gorbachev simply could not afford, the skeptics concluded, to
sacrifice the fundamental Soviet reliance on huge offensive
forces.
The Gorbachev strategy is eroding West European will for
modernized forces and encouraging Americans anxious to cut
defense costs. Skepticism about Gorbachev is less fashionable,
especially in West Germany. Gorbachev dares hope that NATO's
disarray is permanent. By reducing the perceived threat, he
increases his credibility with his own uneasy generals. As the
Vienna negotiations run their course, he may be asking them for
harder decisions, to accept conventional parity at lower levels,
putting their natural instinct for superiority at risk. They can
take some comfort from geography. It alone argues that their
troops east of the urals, immune from negotiated cuts, can always
drive toward the Atlantic faster than Americans withdrawn can
recross it.
For the battlefield commander, Gorbachev's foreign-policy
dimensions significantly cloud the order of battle in future
conflicts. In the February 1989 issue of U.S. News and World
Report, John Galvin (European Secretary charged with defense of
the west) states:
The uncertainties are so great that he sees risks in any
likely outcome. The Soviet metamorphosis could prove
more dangerous than periods we have seen in the past.
The Soviets were big but predictable. Now they are big
and not so predictable13.
The Soviets say they are revising their military encyclopedia.
Their Defense Minister (Dimitri Yazov) stated in the March 12,
1989 issue of Time magazine that their main objective is to
practice defensive goals14. Whether this strategy is a fact or
not our commanders must be prepared to confront them. Superior
C4I2 technology is one way for the U.S. to reduce the burdens
on commanders and achieve victory in such a battle.
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT: MEETING THE CINC'S NEEDS
The challenges to the C4I2 system is to determine what is
required to synchronize the force and meet the CINC's needs. We
must also incorporate the following improvements to increase
capabilities:
* Get the most out of what we are buying.
* plan systems to meet guidance and doctrine require-
ments.
* Make the systems interoperable where needed.
* Do only what is necessary, and keep C4I2 systems
relatively simple and inexpensive.
* Bring C4I2 systems on-line in a timely manner
At the same time, military services want to capitalize on
emerging technology and be flexible enough to respond to changes
in the requirements and in the threat. The Marine Corps'
approach to satisfying requirements should reflect flexibility to
use the right tool for the right job. Several factors make the
task particularly challenging. C4I2 systems are unique in
their required degree of "cross-service" applications and
interoperability with allied nations. There is a rapidly
evolving technology base, multiple requirements for systems
interfaces and a high degree of reliance on automatic data
processing hardware and software.
What the C4I2 community needs are affordable systems that
meet the national defense objectives and contribute to the U.S.
war fighting capability. The C4I2 community must ensure that
the technology used contributes to the mission and is not
"technology breeding technology". Maintaining efficient
man-machine interfaces are essential. Matching the architectures
described earlier does not mean that C4I2 systems must look
alike, from the national level command centers to the combat
units in the field. Computers do not need to be all big main
frames or all micros. Increased expenditures for computer
technology do not necessarily mean a corresponding increase in
military capability. Alternative system designs need to be
assessed critically. There is, for example, a place for
individual micros. The equipment needs to be tailored to the
job, the people and the environment. In the November 1984 Signal
magazine, LtGen. C.E. McKnight, Jr. stated:
"There is a tendency to move the garrison (Strategic-
systems at Corps level) to the field". What we have in
some cases are large, bulky equipments, quasi-fixed,
outsized loads, which are difficult to airlift, con-
tractor dependent for support and burdened with a
lengthy acquisition process, which almost guarantees
obsolescence upon deployment15.
Solutions to the requirements for monitoring activities around
the globe, conducting operations and being prepared for complex
modes of warfare involve technology that spans the realm of data
processing, sensors, radio and fibre optic communications,
position determination and navigation. There are clearly
technological applications that improve our operational
capabilities. We need to be selective and realistic in our
application of technology and employ those advances that provide
an improved operational capability.
The goal of the C4I2 community must be to match the
systems to the job within the constraints of affordability in
dollar costs and manpower, to give the operating commands the
best systems to support their missions.
CONCLUSION
On the battlefield, few plans are executed and even fewer are
completed with certainty from start to finish. In peacetime,
Captain W.F. Fullam states in his book, History of Communications
Electronics:
We talk a great deal, drill a great deal, work very
zealously and accomplish little or nothing in the few
vitally important points that would tell in war16.
Over the years our nation's defense has moved forward with
technology -- from hand and arm signals to multichannel radio
terminals, from pigeon messengers to honda motorcycles, and from
wireless telegraph to space satellites. C4I2 systems'
integration -- command, control communications, computers,
intelligence, interoperability -- represents another
breakthrough. Wise use of these systems and improved technology
can enable commanders to make decisions faster and more
accurately.
Like many new technologies, C4I2 systems provide great
opportunities for use in defense systems. Although they
introduce problems that must be managed at the tactical level,
they are a tremendous force multiplier for the small unit
commander. The future challenge is to make C4I2 systems
survivable, inexpensive, reliable, and maintainable on the
battlefield. Once effective training is completed on C4I2
systems, our forces will be prepared for a decisive victory.
FOOTNOTES
1Timothy L. McMahon, "The Key to Success: Developing a C2
Philosophy", Military Review (July 1986), p.42.
2Joe Holloran, "Command, Control, and Interoperability",
Signal (August 1987), p.38.
3McMahon, 44.
4Charles A. Zracket, Command, Control, Communications and
Intelligence (C3I)", Military Review (June 1984), p.82.
5Bruce Van Voorst, "Two Sides of the Nuclear Sword", Time
(6February 1989), p.24.
6Jacob V. Lamar, "Will This Bird Fly?", Time (December 1988),
p. 21.
7Henry Trewhitt, "The Next Arms Control Treaty", U.S. News
and World Report (December 1988), p.20.
8Edward Aldridge, "How the Stealth Evades Detection?",
Aviation Week (June 1988), p.14.
9 Margaret Carlson, One Superpower to Another (Stackpole
Books and Press, 1987), p.22.
10Voorst, p.45.
11Douglas Stanglin, "When Ideology Bows to Economics", U.S.
News and World Report (January 1989), p.30.
12Henry Trewhitt, "A Different Call to Arms", U.S. News and
World Report (March 1989), p.18.
13Trewhitt, p.24.
14LtGen. C.E. McKnight, Jr., USA, "Meeting the CINC's Needs",
Signal (November 1984), p.30.
15Captain W. F. Fullam, History of Communications-Electronics
(Harper Press, 1965), p.6.
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