Korea-Alliance In Transition
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy
Author Major Larry D. Beaver
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: KOREA-ALLIANCE IN TRANSITION
I. Purpose: To analyze the U.S.-R.O.K. relationship in light of
growing Korean nationalism and capabilities to determine
adaptations which may be required in the future.
II. Problem: There is a growing anti-American movement in South
Korea. It is largely composed of younger individuals but is
spurred throughout the populace by a swelling national pride.
South Korea is one of the worlds economic powers and is becoming
a military power in Northeast Asia. On the other hand, the U.S.
is experiencing a shrinking defense budget and is rapidly
approaching difficult economic times. It is time for a change in
the alliance on the Korean peninsula. It may soon be demanded by
both parties in the bilateral relationship.
III. Data: Korea is of great importance. America must retain
South Korean loyalties to the western world. Its strategic
military, geographic, and economic characteristics are of great
significance to the west. Koreans are seeking greater influence
and command over their armed forces in peacetime as well as a
self-sufficient military capability. Nuclear sensitivities have
surfaced- and the South Koreans are desiring a greater impact in
the control and use of nuclear weapons in a conflict. Further,
Koreans are questioning what the American policy of "horizontal
escalation" will mean for them in a global conflict. Then
ultimately a large and growing segment of the population is
requesting the reduction and final withdrawal of American troops.
IV. Conclusion: The Korean alliance is maturing. Korea is
ready to assume a position of strength. America and Soutn Korea
must adapt their relationship to accommodate this new ability.
The alliance is ready to stand side-by-side and not one behind
the other.
V. Recommendation: The U.S. should modify the Combined Forces
Command structure to allow Korean control of their military at
least in peacetime. The Americans should include the Koreans in
policy concerning deployment and employment of nuclear weapons in
a peninsular conflict. The implications of our national strategy
must be discussed with the Koreans as to what we expect of them
and they of us. Finally, given certain conditions, the reduction
and withdrawal of American troops bust be considered.
KOREA-ALLIANCE IN TRANSITION
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement. With growing economic and military capability,
South Korea is ready and able to assume greater responsibility
for its defense. In light of the Republic of Korea's growing
nationalistic pride and fervor, the U.S.-R.O.K. alliance must
adapt to accommodate this maturing Northeast Asian partner.
I. An Alliance Requiring Change
A. Korean Viewpoint
B. American Viewpoint
II. The Strategic Importance of Korea
A. Geographically
B. Politically
C. Economically
D. Militarily
III. The Rise of Korean Nationalism and Adaptations
A. The CFC Military Command Structure
B. Nuclear Weapons Policy
C. U.S. Maritime Strategy Implications
D. Reduction of U.S. Forces in Korea
KOREA-ALLIANCE IN TRANSITION
It has been over 35 years since the cessation of hostilities
on the Korean peninsula. Yet, American soldiers and airmen still
occupy wartime positions and stand a wartime footing ever alert
to the danger of a lightning war being precipitated by the
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK, North) against the
Republic of Korea (ROK, South). Many young Koreans and American
taxpayers are beginning to question-the necessity of the American
presence. Two passages reflect the emphasis of these concerns.
The first provides insight to the Korean perspective.
To a considerable extent American attitudes, behavior
and policy have not kept pace with the growth of South
Korea's power. They still reflect their origins in an era
when Korea was weak and undeveloped. Yet the R.O.K. is
already at the point where it could achieve military
superiority on the Korean peninsula if it wished to do so,
and its economic drive has distinguished it as a foremost
exemplar of rapid development. But Americans have not
absorbed these changes in South Korea's strength and its new
sense of self-importance, changes that will necessarily
affect the U.S. role and position in Korea. (8:1038)
The second develops the more pragmatic view of the Americans.
Whatever may be the benefits of the Korean alliance to
the United States, the costs are considerable--economically,
militarily, and politically. In economic terms, the costs
of maintaining U.S. forces on the K.orean peninsula are
substantial, despite large sutsidies from South Korea. The
direct cost of maintaining U.S. troops in Korea in 1984,
excluding weapons, equipment, plant, and reinforcements, was
estimated at $ 2 billion. Total costs of the Korean
commitment are likely to be much greater. U.S. Asian
deployments, of which the Korean contingent is the largest
component, are placed at $ 47 billion. In a period of
fiscal austerity, pressures to reduce the overseas military
burden are building in Congress, and will probably continue.
(9:86)
It must be generally accepted that the Korea of today is
indeed a far cry from the Korea of the 195O's. It has become an
economic giant and a significant military power in Northeast
Asia. There is a rising swell of national pride within South
Korea with its attendant expectations and problems. Too, America
must recognize and adapt to the reality of the world as it exists
today accommodating both the burgeoning of Korean nationalism and
the fiscal restraints brought on by economic austerity.
America's role in Korea is changing, and it must. The
peninsula of Korea and the foothold that South Korea occupies is
of vital strategic import to American interests in Northeast
Asia. If the United States is to continue its long tradition of
close military, economic, and political cooperation with South
Korea then America must no longer fear the rise of Korean
nationalism but must come to understand it and develop new
attitudes and means of dealing with this most valued ally.
Just as Berlin is a focal point in Europe where the
interests of great powers meet, Korea is the focal point in
Northeast Asia where the world's four great powers paths cross.
South Korea has come to present the symbol of where communism
stops and capitalism begins It's strategic importance to the
United States is inestimable. The Korean peninsula is
geographically, politically, economically, and militarily
significant to American interests.
Our foreign policy in East Asia is focused on Japan and its.
gateway to the continent--Korea. Located in the heart of the Far
East, the peninsula of Korea is of great strategic importance.
Extending southward from Manchuria and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.), it is bounded on the north by the
Yalu and Tumen rivers. The peninsula is bordered by three bodies
of water: in the south by the Korea-Strait, in the west by the
Yellow Sea, and in the east by the Sea of Japan. (10:457)
The Korean peninsula is 966 kilometers long and 217
kilometers wide. The eastern half is covered by a rugged,
largely unpopulated mountain range. On the west coast lies a
coastal plain containing most of the agriculture and the
population. The northern portion has most of the natural
resources. Coal and ore mines have undergone heavy development
during the past eighty years. The South has traditionally been
the breadbasket, with 22% of the arable land and therefore farmed
intensively. There are very few good ports on the east coast.
The south and west coasts are much better off as they support a
large fishing and maritime shipbuilding industry. (7:190)
On the grander strategic scale, Korea has a significant
geographic importance (Ref. Fig. 1). In the sea it lies astride
the critical Korean Strait that forms a choke point for a major
sea lane that travels from Vladivostok all the way to Southeast
Asia. Further, the Korean peninsula is a classic invasion route
to Japan and to some degree presently serves as a forward defense
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shield to create a more secure Japan. (12: 14l) It is a "dagger
pointed at the heart of Japan." Considering John Keenan's
global strategy of "containment" for the communist world, Korea
is a frontline state. It stands toe-to-toe with arguably the
most aggressive communist dictatorship in the world. South Korea
also provides the only military installations available to the
United States in Northeast Asia providing us a strategic foothold
on the Asian continent during conflict.
Bounded on the north by the Peoples Republic of China and
the Soviet Union and only thirty miles from the closest Japanese
island, the Korean peninsula is the one area where the interests
of the four great powers in Asia (the U.S., the U.S.S.R., the
P.R.C., and Japan) converge. (13:1) The key to preserving
Japan's independence, our most vital Northeast Asian ally, rests
in the survival of a free South Korea. This delicate balance is
dependent upon U.S. support and participation in the defense of
the Republic of Korea.
For economic and nationalist reasons, both Koreas desire
reunification, but on their own political terms. It is unlikely
that either the North or the South will be successful in their
attempts at reunification due to the strong political currents in
the region.
North Korea will remain impoverished and militarized as long
as Kim Il Sung is in power. The North will continue-to pursue
a strategy of violence, including assassination, terror, and
armed threats, to try to frighten the South into capitulation.
(7:195)
South Korea continues to pursue a dual strategy, that of
maintaining a strong and reliable army while expanding the
economy in heavy industry and consumer goods. (7:195)
The United States wants to keep enough combat power in the
region to prevent North Korea from attacking the South. Further,
America wants to ensure some overly aggressive South Korean
government doesn't decide to attack the North. The U.S. appears
to be satisfied with the status-quo. (7:195)
The Kremlin will not easily give up a satellite (i.e.
Czechoslovakia). Russia appears pleased to keep North Korea poor
and militarized, relying on Russian arms and economic support. A
militarized ally is always useful to the Soviets. North Korea
gives Russia the ability to threaten Japan and China without
directly involving Russian troops. (7:195)
The Chinese would love a demilitarized Korean peninsula and
a united, neutral Korea. Getting Russia and the United States
off the peninsula would create a pliant buffer state between
China and Japan. (7:195)
The Japanese are in the throes of being the world's economic
power. They are deeply tied to South Korea in bilateral economic
agreements. Japan would prefer to see the status-quo remain in
place with the U.S. providing a very visible military deterent
supporting a political and military buffer-state between it and
the communist powers, China and Russia. Japan, although not
technically a military partner of South Korea, is beginning to
realize the necessity of engaging militarily in defense of the
region on a limited scale. They would not readily accept losing
South Korea as a free state on this historical invasion route.
A graphic depiction of superpower interest in the region is
illustrated in Figure 2. (7:196) Although China is Russia's
major threat in Asia, Korea is its backyard. The United Sates
is interested in maintaining its South Korean ally and protecting
Japan. China has an interest in neutralizing a Russian ally and
using Korea as a buffer state. The Japanese see Korea as the
classic invasion route over the centuries. But the overriding
factor in all the strategic political rivalries is that they all
wish the peninsula to remain peaceful.
Once one of the largest recipients of American economic and
military aid, the Republic of Korea can no longer be regarded as
a struggling, underdeveloped country. In fact, in 1987 South
Korea achieved a gross national product (GNP) of $ 118 billion,
larger than Austria; a per capita income of $ 2,813, higher than
Portugal; and a trade volume of $ 88 billion, which placed it
twelfth among the world's trading nations. (2:385) South Korea
has in many respects followed the Japanese "model" of riding from
complete devastation by war to economic greatness. This progress
has been founded in several factors: a firm conimitment to
development, a strong partnership between government and
business, a well-educated, disciplined and industrious work
force, and a positive integration with the international economy.
(2:385) South Korea has two major trade partners in the
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international economic arena, Japan and the United States.
South Korea is now Japan's second largest trading partner in
Asia. Japan accounts for 25% of all South Korean trade. (2:391)
In 1986 Korea bought 34% of its imports from Japan, primarily
machinery and intermediate goods. Japan also accounted for 19%
of South Korean export business. (9:77) Further, the Japanese
account for 47% of all foreign investment in South Korea. (2:391)
Through the past three decades the United States has been
the principal sponsor of the Republic of Korea's economic
success. The U.S. looms largely as South Korea's primary
economic trade partner. South Korea stands as America's seventh
largest trade partner. (8:1045) In 1986 the U.S. was a customer
to South Korea for over $ 19 billion (8:1053) in exports and in
1987 purchased over 30% of South Korea's products. (2:391) The
U.S. also accounted for 21% of foreign investment in South Korea.
(2:391) After decades of deficits, Korea is managing to achieve
significant trade surpluses with the United States amounting to $
7.6 billion in 1986 and approximately $ 9.5 billion in 1987.
(8:1046) But the South Korean economy is not without its
problems as the trade deficit with Japan and the trade surplus
with the United States continue at high levels.
Traditionally, Koreans do not like to live beyond their
means and being in debt to foreigners above all is disturbing for
a nationalistic people. South Korea ranks as the world's fourth
largest debtor among less developed countries, and Asia's
largest, with a debt approaching $ 45 billion. (8:1045) The
Koreans feel that the bilateral deficit with Japan, just over $ 5
billion in both 1986 and 1987, threatens their ability to service
their international debt and indirectly contributes to
protectionist frictions with the United States and the EEC.
(2:390)
The success of Korea in penetrating the U.S. market is
meeting increasing resistance. The Korean economy is burdened by
an overwhelming dependence on continued growth of export markets.
The Koreans are attempting to shift export production away from
traditional products such as clothing and electronics into
products with a higher value added through requiring more skilled
labor and advanced production techniques. These industries
include ship-building, steel, petro-chemical products, and motor
vehicles. (9:77) The wave of protectionism sweeping the United
States, Korea's largest export market, is due in part to this
renewed threat of Korea, especially in automobiles. The American
Congress terminated U.S. military credits to South Korea on the
grounds tnat a country with such a large trade surplus could
afford to pay for its own weaponry. America is also beginning to
put pressure on Korea to open its own market doors to allow
American exporters new opportunities as these have been closed
very much like those of Japan.
In response, South Korea is consciously trying to diversify
itself away economically from overdependence on its main
partners, Japan and the United States, through Koreanization of
imports and expanding efforts to export to the European Economic
Community. Nevertheless, they will still remain the Republic of
Korea's main trading partners.
The Republic of Korea's major security concern lies with the
threat inherent in the stated ambition of its communist neighbor
to the north to reunify the country by force on its own terms.
North Korea is a highly militarized state and reveals an
extremely offensive orientation in support of its stated goal.
Further, Kim Il Sung has acknowledged that the North is ready to
intervene in the South, should domestic turmoil there ever
present the opportunity. As a result, South Korea maintains a
high state of readiness out of concern that the North might
attempt a surprise attack.
An integral part of South Korean security is the Mutual
Defense Treaty with the United States signed in 1953. A major
component in the South Korean defense structure is the sizeable
commitment of U.S. forces to it--the largest outside of the U.S.
commitment to NATO. The U.S. deploys over 40,000 Army, Air
Force, Marine, and Navy personnel in South Korea who regularly
train with South Korean forces in simulated wartime exercises
such as Team Spirit.
The armed forces of the Republic of Korea are comprised of
the Army, Air Force, and Naval Marine Force. The South Korean
forces are heavily influenced by the U.S. military in terms of
organization, command, arms of service and dress. Their
equipment has been and continues to be exclusively U.S. (Ref.
Fig. 3). (6:541)
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Noteworthy from the order of battle is the 1950's vintage of
a significant portion of the Korean armed forces equipment. The
imbalance that has arisen as a consequence of inadequate
modernization for the R.O.K. could establish the conditions
necessary for the renewal of conflict on the Korean peninsula.
The R.O.K. is seeking greater defense self-sufficiency and
upgrade through a series of five-year Force Improvement Plans
(FIPs). The first FIP covered from 1976-1980, but was extended
one year due to fiscal constraints. The second completed in 1986
covering the years 1982-1986 emphasized development of the
indigenous arms industry. (6:540) Much of the South Korean
arsenal has been purchased from the U.S. in the past, but the
R.O.K. is moving to produce in-country all unsophisticated items
used by the armed forces. This full-scale modernization coupled
with a determination on the part of the United States to deter
foreign intervention will certainly contribute to preventing
conflict on the Korean peninsula.
That consensus rests on a general agreement that the
U.S. military relationship with South Korea contributes
importantly to the regional balance of power, and that the
United States could not extract itself from the equation
without heightening the risk of war on the peninsula and
without far-reaching effects in Japan and the rest of East
Asia. Over half of all American ground and air combat
forces in the western Pacific are based in Korea under
extremely attractive operational arrangements. While the
mission of these forces is defense of South Korea, they are
also a vital constituent of the strong U.S. presence
throughout Northeast Asia, a presence that has offset
growing Soviet power and undergirded our own ties with
Japan, China, and the R.O.K. as well as improving relations
with them.
These realities...also mean that the R.O.K. cannot
eliminate a continuing dependency on the United States. In
these circumstances Washington needs to adjust its military
ties with Seoul not only to accommodate the evolving
requirements of both sides but also the new nationalism in
Korea. (8:1052)
The U.S.-R.O.K. military relationship should be reviewed and
revised to ensure that America's policies and posture accommodate
both South Korea's new strength and national pride and promote
the national interests of the United States.
The United States seems suspicious of nationalistic
assertion by virtually any third world or developing nation. The
Americans are particularly suspect of the rising South Korean
nationalistic attitude toward U.S.-Korean relations. This outcry
may result significantly as being a consequence of American
paternalism. Within the military, nationalistic concerns about
the consequences of the present military structure of the
alliance are beginning to emerge. Several concerns require
timely attention: the Combined Forces Command structure, nuclear
weapons policy, implications for Korea in the U.S. global
strategic doctrine of "horizontal escalation," and the reduction
of the American presence in South Korea. (9:85)
Due to the overwhelming dominance of U.S. forces in the U.N.
force fighting during the Korean War, the U.S. commander was
given operational command over all forces including those of
South Korea. When in 1953 President Syngman Rhee refused to sign
the armistice, the U.S. commander became solely responsible for
U.S. -R.O.K. enforcement of the agreement. The military command
structure still reflects those Korean War conditions. The senior
U.S. military commander in Korea is in charge of almost all South
Korean, as well as American forces in wartime and a good portion
in peacetime, as well in the guise of one of seven command
positions he holds in the Combined Forces Command. (15:35) Third
command arrangement is a painful reminder to South Koreans of
their dependence on the United States and is beginning to grate
on nationalist sensitivities.
On an international scale, legally the U.N. Command may have
to remain in place with an American in charge to enforce the
armistice agreement unless and until this agreement is replaced
by a treaty between the beligerants. However, change to allow
South Korean command over its own ground forces at least during
peacetime will be necessary to maintain high levels of military
cooperation. There has been a fundamental slight delivered to
the national pride of the Korean military commanders who own the
overwhelming majority of defense forces, i.e. eighteen divisions
for the Koreans vice one division for the Americans. It is
unlikely that American forces would ever be placed under a South
Korean commander, however American dominance of command
responsibilities does not appear to be possible much longer given
the present social environment. (8:1047)
During the past twenty years, U.S. nuclear weapons have been
present on the Korean peninsula and have been one of the pillars
of the Korean defense strategy. Policy commits the use of these
weapons against invading North Koreans especially in the defense
of Seoul, the supreme strategic objective in all of South Korea.
Tactical considerations for use of tactical nuclear weapons are
arguable. The proximity of friendly troops and Seoul, a city of
10 million a mere 30 kilometers south of the DMZ, begs the
question of feasibility of use. Further, the Koreans, are not
only beginning to question the use of such weapons, but also that
they would be used by Americans, i.e. foreigners not Koreans.
Korean sensibilities are additionally irritated by the exclusion
of Korean military planners and commanders from the nuclear
command structure. There must be a rational joint control
command structure placed over U.S. nuclear weapons (9:85)
Americans are extremely sensitive about their own nuclear weapons
on their own soil. One can only surmise that similar Korean
national feelings exist and are especially susceptible to the
aspect of foreign command and control.
The United States Maritime Strategy as detailed by admiral
James D. Watkins in January 1986 introduces the concept of
"horizontal escalation" as the process of denying the Soviets the
luxury of fighting a one-theater war. (16:13) This doctrine
suggests that a war with the Soviet Union may be conducted in a
region of the world other than where the initial conflict breaks
out. Therefore, it becomes quite obvious Korea could become the
scene of a major war for reasons that have nothing to do with
South Korea's defense against the North. This fact distresses
the South Koreans somewhat. The R.O.K. seeks primarily the goal
of local defense on the Korean peninsula with a mixture or
blending of regional deterence provided by its alliance with the
United States. The U.S. on the other hand tends to place
strategic primacy on regional deterence vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union with a component of that strategy being local defense of
South Korea from Northern agression. (12:149) It is reasonable
to believe that doubts have begun to surface about the wisdom of
such an affiliation by military members with a nationalist bent.
The U.S. and R.O.K. must seek a formulation of joint strategies
on terms more strictly tied to Korean definitions of national
interest, while also providing for the common defense of the
region against a growing Soviet threat. (9:85)
With growing nationalist sentiment and political upheaval
there has been an effort to reduce the visibility of American
troops in South Korea. The recently installed Bush
Administration reiterated the American commitment to a free
R.O.K. and that an adjustment of the military relationship
between the nations would be well-conceived and in the interests
of both nations. In other words, the U.S. is not reducing its
strength in Korea as yet; however, as R.O.K. military
capabilities grow the reconsideration of some reconfiguration or
withdrawal of some of the 40,000 American forces in Korea will be
forthcoming. With the potential for the R.O.K. to reach war-
fighting parity with the north by the mid 90's, the need for so
many troops will decrease. However, there are many factors the
U.S. will have to consider before taking such an action other
than just the simple pressure of some urban unrest.
As we enter the decade of the 90's reduction of forces may
well be justified for a number of reasons: a self-sufficient
Korea, a remilitarized Japan, Gorbachev's initiatives in force
redutions. But, among the most touted will be the cost savings
as America enters a time of fiscal restraint. If forces are
withdrawn on the basis of saving money, it must be realized that
probably no money would be saved by returning them to the United
States or rebasing in the Pacific. The expense of such a move
and the construction and support of facilities would likely be
greater than costs are now (5:64) Thus the impact that this
would have on the federal budget would have to be carefully
considered as well as the alternative sites availabe for basing
in an ever shrinking world.
Another factor that must be considered is how troop
reductions would be perceived by nations in the area. Certainly,
the Koreans and Japanese would have to be consulted. The U.S.
would require a high degree of credibility and also a confidence
on the part of Korea and Japan that they could handle increased
responsibility for their own defense. The U.S. on reduction or
withdrawal may offer the reason that it is husbanding a vital
portion of its military capability thus preserving its
flexibility to respond more effectively to any threat arrising in
the area. (5:65)
These two allies may be rightfully concerned about the
American's ability to respond in the event of crisis. Several
conditions must exist before the U.S. could safely reduce its
presence in Korea. One is that intelligence sources woud have
to be enhanced so as to provide adequate warning of a surprise
attack or the imminent outbreak of hostilities. A second is that
America must have the strategic mobility to move a significant
amount of force into the arena to either deter or defeat an
aggressive act. (5:64) Presently the U.S. does not possess
either one of these capabilities and to purchase them is more
cost prohibitive than keeping troops in place. Finally, the
R.O.K. must carry to fulfillment the ongoing and future
modernization of the R.O.K. armed forces to stabilize the
military balance between the north and the south.
It will be essential. for the United States to ensure that no
misleading signals about unwavering commitment are delivered to
any external player--North Korea, the Soviet Union, or China.
There must be no circumstances which might give the impression
that the United States is reducing its presence due to fiscal
restraint, a surge in isolationism, or bowing to internal
pressure.
Professor Yuan-Li Wu of the University of San Francisco
provided a statement on this issue of perceptions
...The more confident an ally is in his own capability
and in the capability and resolve of the United States, the
lower will be the required level of U.S. presence on the
spot. The same applies to the perception of the adversary.
All of this implies that both the safe level of U.S. force
reduction and the geographical aspect of deployment of a
smaller force in Pacific-Asia are functions of confidence.
When allied confidence is low, a greater presence and more
forward defense will be required The contr&ry is true when
confidence is high or building...When confidence is fully
reestablished, force reductions required for budgeting or
other reasons will be safe and feasible (5:66)
As Admiral Gaylor has commented, "...The presence that
counts is the presence that's were the East Asian leaders can
see its..." If peace and stability are our goals on the Korean
peninsula then it seens essential that the United Statea should
retain its bases and forces in the area. This objective will not
be obtained without cost, economic and political. There simply
is no inexpensive way to maintain bases ard forces overseas.
Futher, to remove forces from the area of potential aggression
is to risk aggression occurring. Reducing American presence and
visibility under the present nationalistic political and social
conditions must be considered. But, not at the risk of losing
the trip-wire functions, bi-lateral linkages, and uniquely
American military capabilities that have served in preserving
South Korea's security as well as stability throughout Northeast
Asia.
Clearly, in view of the rising tide of national sentiment,
America must reevaluate its military structure and posture in
Northeast Asia on the Korean peninsula. Korean command over
their own forces is a logical outgrowth of the development of a
highly professional officer corps and a military self-sufficiency
in many areas. The deployment of American nuclear weapons on
foreign soil, always a contentious issue, brought wide-ranging
protest in Europe in the past decade. It should not be
surprising or upsetting that the Koreans are beginning to
question the wisdom of their use, as their conventional power
grows, as well as desire an input into their command and control
and employment. The American naval strategic issue of
"horizontal escalation" is bothersome to Koreans because it
carries with it the implication of involvement in the world war
that may start in Europe or the Middle East and have nothing to
do with Korean national interest. For a nation that looks
primarily to local conflict and has a limited regional interest,
this strategy presents problems that complicate ties to the U.S.
and their sensitivities must be considered by national command
authorities. Reducing the presence of American forces on the
peninsula, though not a time sensitive issue, must be evaluated
in light of South Korean military capabilities, perceptions of
friend and foe alike, and ultimately the U.S. federal budget.
These issues are complex and intertwine. Only through a truly
dedicated effort and understanding by both South Korea and the
United States can a mutually beneficial and reliable agreement be
reached on these issues. America must recognize the import of
Korean nationalism and must make some accommodations to maintain
a strong alliance. The Koreans on the other hand, while
nationalism is a natural outgrowth of a strong nation, must not
let its fervor get out of hand and destabilize a relationship
that forms the basis of stability in Northeast Asia.
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16. Watkins, Admiral James D. "The Maritime Strategy," in The
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