The Caribbean Basin: A Strategic Concern
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy
Author Major David Burgess
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
I. Purpose. To underscore the significance of the
Caribbean Basin to our national security.
II. Problem. We must focus greater attention on the region.
III. Data
A. Few appreciate the vast differences in the region
between the continuous landmass which constitutes
Central America and the islands that are spread
across the Caribbean.
B. The economic importance of the region to the U.S. is
greatly underestimated by most.
C. The immigration problem and the growing communist
threat should besource of great concern to our
national security.
IV. Conclusions. Currently, our national security strategy
is too heavily weighted to the defense of Europe at the
expense of our own hemisphere. We must direct greater
attention to the Caribbean Basin or face serious peril
to our national security in the future.
V. Recommendations.
A. Operationally. Maintain our military presence in the
region through aggressive security assistance
programs and an aggressive operational exercise
program.
B. Strategically.
(1) Place a greater priority in the security of the
region in the President's annual National
Security Strategy Report.
(2) Intensify efforts to economically develop the
region, while continuing attempts to isolate
Cuba.
(3) Renew, and maintain, our support for the
Nicaraguan Resistence.
(4) Be prepared to use military force as a means to
secure vital national interests in the region.
THE CARIBBEAN BASIN: A STRATEGIC CONCERN
Thesis: Our national security is inextricably tied to that
of our neighbors in this hemisphere. We must focus greater
attention to the region, particularly those nations of the
Caribbean Basin or risk jeopardizing future national
security.
I. Historical Perspective (U.S./Regional Relationships)
A. Monroe Doctrine
B. Twentieth Century
(1) Pre WW II
(2) Post WW II
II. Regional Diversity
A. Caribbean Islands
B. Central America
III. The Threat
A. Military build-up in Cuba and Nicaragua
(1) Soviet Presence
B. Fostering unrest in the region
IV. Countering the Threat
A. Operational Level
B. Strategic Level
Our national strategy for over forty years has focused
on preventing the Soviets from dominating the Eurasian
landmass. Although successful, this strategy has been at
expense of our oun hemisphere where the Soviets have
established two surrogate nations while fostering political
unrest in numerous others. Our geographic, or territorial,
security is inextricably tied to the security of our
neighbors in this hemisphere and we must focus greater
attention to the region, particularly those nations
of the Caribbean Basin.
This volatile region should be of particular concern to
those of us in the military because it is the most likely
area in which we could be involved in the coming years. It
is, therefore, imperative that we gain a more basic knowledge
of the region and its issues in order to appreciate its
strategic and operational significance to our national
security.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
We have long exerted great influence over the Caribbean
Basin dating back to the Monroe Doctrine. President James
Monroe issued the doctrine in 1823 over growing concern of
Throughout this paper the term "Caribbean Basin" will be
defined as the geographic area of the Caribbean Sea,
including all the rim islands (excluding The Bahamas), all
littoral states (from Mexico up to Colombia), and one
country not contiguous to the Caribbean, El Salvador.
growing concern of European expansion in the region. The
doctrine announced to the world that the United States
considered the Western Hemisphere as no longer a place for
European colonization and that any future act to exert
influence or control over existing states in the region would
be considered an act of hostility. It, in essence,
established the United States as a paternal overlord for the
region. A role maintained throughout the 19th century,
culminating with our defeat of the Spanish in Cuba in 1898 in
the Spanish-American War. In the first three decades of this
century our militarily active role has been even greater.
The U.S. approach during this period was a comprehensive
pacification policy, the synthesis of which was "carrot" and
"stick." (8:78) It provided guidelines for U.S.
interventions in the Western Hemisphere during the era.
These interventions were not to annex territory, but to
enhance U.S. security. The Army was in the vanguard
initially with action first (1906 -1909) in helping to quell
an armed insurrection in Cuba against the U. S. sponsored
government, and again when it occupied Veracruz, Mexico
during the Mexican revolution. (8:78)
The most significant action in the region during this
century, however, has been undertaken by U.S. Marines.
Marines landed in Nicaragua in 1912 to protect American lives
and property and to ensure the victory of pro- American forces
over rebel factions. Later, they were the primary occupying
force following the breakdown of law and order in Haiti in
1915 and in Santo Domingo in 1916. The Marines would stay in
the Dominican Republic until 1924. During this period they
engaged in counter-guerilla operations where they gained
experience and knowledge which they would use in their most
notable involvement in the region, the second intervention in
Nicaragua.
The Marines second Nicaragua intervention in 1927, also
known as the Sandino Affair, had striking similarities to
events and issues which face the same area today. Marines
were introduced to Nicaragua to implement an agreement
between the U.S. and liberal factions trying to overthrown
the conservative government. Complicating the issue was the
threat, real or perceived by the U.S. government, that Mexico
had hegenomic designs on the area and was acting as the
Soviet Union's principal agent. Augusto Cesar Sandino was a
guerilla leader opposed to the U.S. intervention and
determined to rid his country of the American presence. He
would conduct a successful guerilla campaign against the
Marines by using neighboring Honduras as a sanctuary as well
as a source for recruits and arms. (The Marines were
prohibited by the U.S. government from crossing the
international borders in pursuit of the guerillas. Another
familiar ironic aspect is that arms for the guerillas were
being smuggled in from El Salvador across the Gulf of
Fonseca.) (8:80)
The Marines would spend six years in the country
fighting Sandino and his forces before President Hoover
decided to withdraw due the deteriorating economic situation
at home and the anti-interventionist pressure from both at
home and abroad. (8:81) (From their involvement in the
region the Marines would publish their Small Wars Manual,
1940 which has recently gained new interest within the
Corps.)
Upon our departure from Nicaragua, our nation
would not intervene again until Marines landed in the
Dominican Republic in 1965 to help quell a leftest revolt,
and then again, most recently, with the Grenada intervention
in 1983. With few exceptions, however, our attention has
primarily centered on other parts of the world since the
early decades of this century. Specifically, since the
outbreak of World War II the focus of our national strategy
has been on Europe, and the Western Pacific, where it has
basically remained through today.
REGIONAL DIVERSITY
Few appreciate the significance differences, culturally
and geographically, between countries of Central America and
the islands which make-up the Caribbean. Central America is
a continuous landmass to our south, dominated by its Spanish
heritage. The Caribbean, however, consists of the islands
of the Greater and the Lesser Antilles, which are very
diverse in their cultural heritage.
Although dominating the large islands of the Greater
Antilles, the Spanish heritage is limited to Cuba, the
Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico. All three territories
were claimed by Spain in the latter part of the 14th Century.
Spanish is the official language of all three, while the
sugar industry, followed by the cattle and tobacco
industries, dominates their agricultural and economic base.
The French have also significantly influenced the
islands of the region. Haiti (sharing the island of
Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic) is the largest of
French inspired islands. Although the majority of its
population are descendants of Africa, French is the official
language of the country. Haiti's primary economic base is
also agricultural with its primary products being coffee,
bananas, and sugar. Haiti, unfortunately, is recognized by
most as the poorest and most backward country in the Western
Hemisphere.
The French also settled, and still control, the islands
of the Lesser Antilles of Guadeloupe, Martinique, the small
island of St. Barthelemy, and they share part of the island
of St. Martin with the Dutch. The sugar industry is the most
important product of these islands, although the tourism
industry is of almost equal significance to their economies.
As with practically all the islands of the Lesser Antilles,
the majority of the population are descendants of Africa,
with a small number of native Indians (Caribs), and also a
small group of European extraction, in this case French.
The Dutch settled islands include the small group of
islands of Aruba, Curacao, and Bonaire (commonly referred to
as the Netherlands Antilles). Further north in the Lesser
Antilles, the Dutch also claim the islands St. Eustatius,
Saba, and their share of the island of St. Martin, or St.
Maarten.
The final European nation to have established great
influence over the islands of the Caribbean is, of course,
the British. This influence extends from the large island
nation of Jamaica, to the British Virgin Islands, and to the
majority of the islands of the Lesser Antilles, to include:
Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Christopher and Nevis,
Montserrat, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Barbados, Grenada, and Trinidad and Tobago. The
English still exert control over the islands of Anguilla,
Montserrat, as well as the British Virgin Islands. (Also
controlled by the English are the Cayman Islands which lie
directly below Jamaica.) In all of these islands English is
the official language, and sugar their primary agricultural
product, although tourism is equally critical to their
economies.
In Central America, as previously stated, the Spanish
heritage dominates, however, by no means is this domination
total. In Belize, formerly British Honduras, the English
still wield influence, while there is considerable native
Indian population in each of these nations. In actuality,
the bulk of the population is a mix of the native Indians
and the European settlers, primarily the Spanish. Spanish is
the predominate language throughout Central America, while
the economies are agriculturally based with sugar, bananas,
and tobacco as their primary products.
THE ISSUES
The economic importance of the Caribbean Basin to the
U.S. is underestimated by most. With the exception of Canada
and Western Europe, the countries that constitute the region
are the greatest consumers/importers of U. S. goods in the
world. Our imports of $30m a year from the region, also
represent one of the highest rates relative to other
nations/regions of the world. (3:541)
We are dependent on the countries of Central America
for such strategic raw materials as antimony, manganese and
tin. Further, we receive 96 percent of our bauxite, and 40
percent of our petroleum (including our entire strategic
reserve) from the region. (7:19)
Investment opportunities are also abundant in the
region. The population is expected to grow to 549 million by
the end of the century. Currently, 20 percent of our total
foreign investment and 72 percent of our entire investments
in the Third World are in Central America, a region with
enormous economic growth potential. (8:19)
Equally significant, are the Caribbean sea lines of
communication (SLOCs) which are vital arteries of our
shipping, both commercial and military, from the major U.S.
ports on the East, West, and Gulf Coasts to every area of the
world. In event of a European war, these SLOCs would carry
half of the supplies required by the NATO forces. (5:vi)
The Basin accounts for over 35 percent of the legal
immigrants into the U.S. each year, not to mention the untold
millions of illegal aliens. They register more than 50
percent of our annual growth rate and live on the margins of
our society. We currently have the fifth largest Spanish-
speaking population in the world. (7:21)
The numbers of illegal immigrants tend to increase
relative to the political unrest in a particular area. From
El Salvador the number of immigrants to the U.S. (legal)
increased from 6. 1 million in 1980 to 10. 1 million in
1985. (3: ) Presently, Nicaragua has the highest refugee
rate from the Basin with an estimated 500,000 to 750,000
having fled the country since the Sandinista Revolution.
(4: A27)
Recently, U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh
called the situation with immigrants coming across the Texas
border "very acute." In 1987, 405 refugees crossed the Texas
border seeking asylum, however, in the last six months of
1988, 28,810 applied. Of those, 47 percent were Nicaraguans,
22 percent Salvadorans, 11 percent Guatemalans, and 11
percent Hondurans. (1:A2O)
Also acerbating this problem is the young age structure
and high fertility rates of many Basin countries. Most of
these countries can expect to have their populations double
by the turn of the century. Of these nations, Mexico's
population growth represents our most severe concern.
Population increases among young Mexicans are likely to
result in an even heavier influx of Mexican immigrants into
the U.S. in the coming years. We share a common border of
almost 2000 miles with Mexico and it is by far our largest
source of immigrants, legal and illegal. If Mexico were to
experience widespread political unrest through a communist
insurgency, our current refugee problems will be
comparatively minor.
THE THREAT
The Soviets appreciate the importance of the area. They
are committed to their two surrogates and in further
spreading their influence in the area which they refer to as
our "strategic rear." Cuba and Nicaragua have developed two
of three largest (Mexico being the third), and certainly the
two most sophisticated, military forces in the Caribbean
Basin.
Cuba has one of the largest and most advanced armed
forces in the world and it continues to grow. In 1970, 1.3
percent (109,000 personnel) of population were in the
military. By the end of 1981, that figure had doubled to
more than 227,000, regular and ready reserve personnel. This
figure represents over 2.3 percent of a population of close
to 10 million, and, as comparison, is almost ten times that
of its regional neighbors. These forces are well-trained and
many have gained combat experience in campaigns overseas in
Angola and Ethiopia.
The Cuban offensive capability is second only to that of
the U.S. in the region. The Air Force has over 200 MIG
intercepters, including MIG-23's. The Navy has two Foxtrot
and Whiskey class submarines, a Koni-class frigate, and over
20 fast-attack missile craft in addition to numerous patrol
craft. In the event of a U.S. - Soviet confrontation, the
Cuban offensive capability possesses a considerable threat to
tie down a substantial number of our forces. (5:v)
Of increasing concern is the growth of the Nicaraguan
armed forces. They are currently dedicating over 50
percent of their national budget to the military, estimated
to be 74,000 strong (three times the size of the former
forces of Anastasio Somaza). (7:21) These numbers compare to
El Salvador's 44,000, Guatemala's 32,000. Honduras' 18,000,
and Costa Rica's small civil guard of 8,000. In
sophistication, Nicaragua owns more tanks and armored
vehicles than all of the above countries combined. (For
those that would argue this is in response to U.S.
aggression, the Sandinista's initiated this build-up at a
time when their revolution still enjoyed strong support at
home and abroad. )
Their is also an overt Soviet military presence in the
Basin, using Cuba as a forward staging base:
- Soviet reconnaissance aircraft regularly deploy to and from
Cuban bases; the naval ship visit program, begun in 1969,
continues to send task groups into the Caribbean, making
port calls in Cuba.
- A Soviet intelligence-collecting station (the largest
outside the USSR continually monitors U.S.
telecommunications traffic.
- A special Soviet brigade, consisting of approximately 3000
personnel, continues to billeted near Havana. (5:xi)
There are 25 Marxist insurgent groups operating in
Central America, most supported by the Soviet bloc, Cuba and
Nicaragua. All of these groups share a contempt for
democratic rule. To assist, Soviet aid to Cuba exceeds what
they provide to the rest of the world combined (some $6.3
billion in 1987). (7:20) In El Salvador, Cuba and Nicaragua
have played key roles in serving as transshipment centers for
the arming of the Salvadoran guerillas, as well as unifying
the insurgents efforts and giving them strategic direction.
While there is little doubt of Cuban and Nicaraguan training
of Salvadoran guerillas, there is also evidence of Cuban
training of the insurgents in Guatemala, Honduras, and the
Dominican Republic. In Guatemala, for instance, many of the
more than 2000 active guerillas have received Cuban
training. (5:55)
COUNTERING THE THREAT
OPERATIONAL LEVEL
General F. F. Woerner, USCINCSOUTH, recently stated:
"When referring to possibility of warfare in Southern
Command's theater of operations,. ..call it high
probability instead of low-intensity conflict. This type
of warfare will not be won solely with the technological
quick fixes. Rather, the campaign plans are time
intensive and require credible consistency over the long
haul. Progress will be measured in small increments
rather than the quick successes to which we and the
American public are more attuned and have come to demand
as a matter of course." (7:18)
The challenge for the U.S. military in the Basin is
great, particularly considering, in contrast to the Soviets,
our actual presence in the region has decreased since the
70's and early 80's. Military reductions in the Basin have
included the closing of Ramey Air Force Base and Fort Brooke
in Puerto Rico as well as force cuts at the facilities in
Puerto Rico, Panama, and Guantanamo. Probably most
disturbing is the recent news that U.S. Forces Caribbean will
soon close.
U.S. Forces Caribbean, located in Key West, Florida, was
formed from the Caribbean Contingency Joint Task Force
(CCJTF) which, in turn, was born out of concern over the
Soviet brigade in Cuba in 1979. A sub-unified command of
USCINCLANT, U.S. Forces Caribbean area of responsibility
includes the Caribbean (all the islands) and the waters
adjacent to Central America and South America. (USSOUTHCOM,
located in Quarry Heights, Panama, is responsible for the
landmass of Central America and South America. )
This will leave us with three major facilities in the
Caribbean Basin: Roosevelt Roads in Puerto Rico, our bases
in Panama, and the Guantanamo Naval Station in Cuba. These
three bases, however, are strategically located:
1. Puerto Rico, at the gateway to the Caribbean.
2. Panama, at the Canal Zone and at the southern rim of the
Basin.
3. Guantanamo, in Castro's Cuba, on the northern rim of
the Basin. (5:62)
With a force build-up in any of these facilities
unlikely, the U.S. military must continue to provide a
signifcance presence in the Basin in order to counter Soviet
encroahment in the region. This must be done through
aggressive security assistance (Foreign Military Sales [FMS],
Military Assistance Program [MAP], and the International
Military Education and Training Program [IMET]) and a
consistent, active operational exercise program.
STRATEGIC LEVEL
The importance of preventing the Soviet Union from
dominating Western Europe, Asia, and the Middle East cannot
be under-emphasized. We are often preoccupied, however,
with the other areas of the world at the expense of our own
hemisphere.
We have carried an excessive burden in the defense of
Europe far too long. Earlier, the presence of our forces in
Europe surely deterred Soviet aggression. Currently, though,
this argument is losing validity. The Soviets realize they
would gain far greater problems than they would solve by
attempting to militarily dominate Western Europe. Recently,
former Navy Secretary James Webb argued a similar point,
recommending that it is time we bring a large percentage of
our European forces home. He believes that our force
structure in Europe is strategically vulnerable, stating:
". . .the potential loss of much of our Army and aviation
assets in an initial communist thrust would affect our
worldwide operations far more quickly than the Soviets."
(He further states that such a reduction would help to ease,
or reduce, our nation's budget deficit and trade deficit by
eliminating military bases which,
". . .pump billions of dollars into the economies of our
trade competitors....") (6:C2)
If we are to avert serious peril to our national
security, we must begin easing our preoccupation with the
defense of Europe and immediately focus greater attention,
means, and effort in preventing communist gains in the
Caribbean Basin. In doing so the National Command Authority
should consider, or attempt, the following:
- Place a greater priority on the security of the region in
the President's annual National Security Strategy Report, a
document which announces to all what we consider vital to
our national interest. In the most recent edition of the
report, January 1988, maintaining the security of the
Europe dominates our national strategy, while the Western
Hemisphere is relegated to secondary, if not tertiary,
concern.
- Intensify efforts to economically develop the region.
- Intensify efforts to economically isolate Fidel Castro's
Cuba. He is hub of all communist activity in the Basin.
- Renew, and maintain, our military support for the Nicaragua
Resistance (Contras). Any desire that the Sandinistas will
ever fully implement the Guatamala Peace Accords is
unrealistic. They have made similar promises in the past
which were broken. We cannot afford to wait under false
hopes that they will eventually honor the accords, while
their only current organized resistance is disassembled due
to lack of support/resolve on the part of the U.S.
Government.
Finally, the National Command Authority, as a last
resort, must be prepared to use military force in the region
to ensure the protection of our vital national interests.
President Johnson upon deciding to use the military to
intervene in the Dominican Republic in 1965, stated:
"We have resisted communism all over the world: Viet Nam,
Lebanon, Greece. What have we done on our own
doorstep. .. . If I intervene, I can't live in this
hemisphere. If I don"t I can"t live in this country."
(2: 19)
If we fail to direct greater attention to this critical area
in the near-term, President Johnson's thoughts will again
find relevance, only this time the stakes will be much
higher.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Bradlee, Benjamin C., ed. "U.S. May Detain Nicaraguans
While Asylum Is Decided. " The Washington Post
(February 8, 1989).
2. Brownlee, Kenneth L. "AMERICAN ACTIONS IN THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC AND GRENADA." NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL,
Monterey, California, THESIS (June 1985).
3. Hoffman, Mark S., ed. The World Almanac and Book of
Facts, 1988.
4. Krauthammer, Charles. "Wright's Failed Nicaragua
Policy." The Washington Post (February 10, 1989).
5. Stodder, Joseph H. and Kevin F. McCarthy. "PROFILES OF
THE CARIBBEAN BASIN IN 1960/1980: CHANGING
GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC DIMENSIONS."
A RAND NOTE, published for the U.S. Air Force (December
1983).
6. Webb, James H. "Five Quick Fixes for 89: Bring the Boys
Home." The Washington Post (January 8, 1989).
7. Woerner, Fred F., General, U.S. Army. "THE STRATEGIC
IMPERATIVES for the United States in Latin America."
Military Review (February 1989).
8. Yates, Lawrence A. "From Small Wars to
Counterinsurgency: US Military Interventions in Latin
America since 1898." Military Review (February 1989).
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