The Operational Level: Vital Knowledge For Today's Officer
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Operations
Author Major Charles Bauland
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL: VITAL KNOWLEDGE FOR TODAY'S OFFICER
I. Purpose: Educate the military officer on the operational
level of war and its implementation through campaign planning.
Also, to convince the officer of their importance and his
obligation to study them and to acquire the ability to apply
them.
II. Problem: The study of the operational level of war has
been neglected by the U.S. military since World War Two.
Knowledge of this level of war and the ability to apply it
through campaign planning is crucial to a nation's success
in war. Future success of the United States in war may de-
pend on a renewed interest by the officer corps in the oper-
ational level.
III. Data: Germany's failure in World War Two and the U.S.'s
in Vietnam, are examples of not heeding the tenets of the
operational level. These two cases emphasize, in particular,
the critical importance of avoiding a strategic-operational
disconnect, i.e., the strategic objectives being unclear or
unsupportable by-operational level capabilities. Under
current U.S. military structure, the unified command com-
mander, the theater Commander-in-Chief (CINC), is the oper-
ational level commander. As this level of war commander, he
is responsible for theater operational planning. This
planning is realized in the form of the campaign plan. How-
ever, within the services, there is currently confusion as
to what campaign planning and the campaign plan are. This
situation also applies in the joint regime. The development
of joint doctrine for campaign planning would be a first
step toward resolving this problem. A proposed definition
of a campaign plan is offered; further, what a campaign
plan should contain is also given. Success at the oper-
ational level mandates the requirement for a standardized,
joint doctrine.
IV. Conclusions: A resurgence of the study of the oper-
ational level of war and campaign planning has been
taking place since the early 1980's. This trend must con-
tinue. Acceptable joint doctrine must be developed and
embraced by the services to insure the theater CINC's
ability to integrate each service's unique capabilities
at the operational level. The individual officer has a
professional responsibility to undertake the study of the
operational level, understand his service's contribution
to the joint effort, and be able to implement his
knowledge through campaign planning.
V. Recommendations: The services must continue to emphasize
the study of the operational level by their officer corps.
The military education system for officers, from pre-com-
missioning to war college level, should emphasize study of
the operational level and campaign planning commensurate
with an officer's grade.
THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL: VITAL KNOWLEDGE FOR TODAY'S OFFICER
OUTLINE
THESIS STATEMENT: The American officer has an obligation
to understand and appreciate the operational level of war
and its implementation through campaign planning.
I. The study of war as a trilogy
A. The three levels of war
B. The neglect of the operational level in study
and practice
C. The three levels of war: defined, compared and
their interrelationship
II. Historical examples of the importance of the oper-
ational level to success in war
A. Germany
B. Vietnam
III. The crucial relationship of the strategic level to
the operational level
IV. The Commander-in-Chief's (CINC's) relationship to the
operational level
A. Operational planning
B. Responsibilities of a theater CINC
C. Political constraints on the CINC
V. The importance of the enemy's center of gravity to the
operational level
VI. Campaign planning and the Campaign Plan
A. The service and joint definitions
B. The problems associated with the current
definitions
C. A recommended interservice definition
D. A recommended framework for a campaign plan
VII. Conclusions
VIII. Recommendations
THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL: VITAL KNOWLEDGE FOR TODAY'S OFFICER
"War, like Gaul, is divided into three parts."1 Thus,
Colonel David Jablonsky in his "Strategy and the Operational
Level of War: Part I," metaphorically introduces an important
concept. War needs to be studied as a trilogy on three dis-
tinct levels: the strategic, the operational, and the tactical.
This paper is about the middle level, the operational level
of war. It is concerned with the American officer's obli-
gation to understand and appreciate the concept of the oper-
ational level of war and its implementation through campaign
planning.
The operational level connects all levels of war and
is crucial in insuring that the military instrument is
effective in achieving the nation's overall strategic goals.
At this level, the commander's basic mission:
... is to determine the sequence of actions most
likely to produce the military conditions that will
achieve the strategic goals (see Figure 1 for the
process). The operational commander, in other words,
must be constantly interacting with the strategic
level even as he gauges his adversary and determines
how to use tactical forces to accomplish that
sequence of actions. It is this interaction that
makes strategy the key to the operational level
of war.2
It should be noted that awareness and study of this
level of war has been neglected in the recent past, notably
since World War Two. Colonel L.D. Holder, in his "Operational
Art in the US Army" states, "For all practical purposes, the
study of operations ended in the US Army after World War II,
... We have not only neglected to discuss operational art,
but have refused to even think about it."3 Only since the
early 1980's has a resurgence of interest on the operational
level and campaign planning occurred.
click here to view image
In order to build the foundation to grasp the concept
of the operational level of war and its importance in the
trilogy, let us begin by defining the three levels of war
and show their intimate connection with each other. The
U.S. Army's FM 100-5 Operations, describes military strate-
gy as the:
... art and science of employing the armed forces of
a nation or alliance to secure policy objectives by
the application or threat of force. Military strate-
gy sets the fundamental conditions of operations in
war or to deter war. It establishes goals in thea-
ters of war and theaters of operations. It assigns
forces, provides assets, and imposes conditions on
the use of force.4
From a wider perspective, Colonel Michael Morin of
the U.S. Army War College defines the strategic level of
war as "... the level of war at which a nation or group
of nations determines national or alliance security ob-
jectives and develops and uses national resources to
accomplish those objectives."5 As the continuum of war
extends, the strategic level transitions into the oper-
ational level.
Referring again to FM 100-5, the Army's perspective
on the operational art (in the U.S. lexicon, operational
art and operational level of war are synonymous for the
purpose of this paper. However, academic disagreement
over this previously accepted equivalency has recently
occurred. See "The Operational Trilogy" by Colonel John F.
Meehan III.) is "... the employment of military forces to
attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of
operations through the design, organization, and conduct
of campaigns and major operations."6
Another definition of the operational level further
refines the concept. Colonel Morin defines the oper-
ational level of war as:
The level of war at which campaigns and major oper-
ations are planned, conducted and sustained to
accomplish strategic objectives within theaters
(areas) of operations. Activities at this level
link tactics and strategy by establishing operational
objectives, sequencing events to achieve the oper-
ational objectives, initiating actions, and applying
resources to bring about and sustain these events.7
The tactical level of war, the level with which the
neophyte officer is first introduced, and, in some cases,
unfortunately never moves beyond, is described in FM 100-5
as "... the art by which corps and smaller unit commanders
translate potential combat power into victorious battles
and engagements."8 For Colonel Morin's part, he describes
the tactical level as "... the level of war at which
battles and engagements are planned and executed to
accomplish the objectives assigned to tactical units or
task forces."9
Now that we have established a common ground by clari-
the requisite definitions, it should be apparent that, as
illustrated in Figure 1, there is a clear-cut linkage from
the strategic to the operational to the tactical levels.
Colonel Holder delineates that linkage from one viewpoint:
At its upper end, where it connects with strate-
gy, operational art is truly a military art-the
fitting of means to the tasks at hand, the analysis of
complex situations, and the designation of military
objectives which, when secured, will fulfill the needs
of strategy. At its lower end, operational art ad-
dresses the ways in which campaigns are designed and
pursued in a theater-determining when and where to
fight, disposing forces in anticipation of battle, and
acting to derive the greatest advantage from tacti-
cal actions whether or not fighting takes place.10
Colonel Morin takes another tack in relating the oper-
ational level to the strategic and the tactical. He states
that, "These activities (at the operational level) imply a
broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they
ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical
forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes
are exploited to achieve strategic objectives."11
The importance of appreciating the operational level
cannot be overstated. Without clear-cut, understandable
guidance in the form of strategy, neither exquisite oper-
ational art or brilliant tactical application will make up
for it. Colonel Jablonsky illustrates this point, quoting
Marcus Tullius Ciciero, "... (an) army is of little value
in the field unless there are wise councils at home."12
Another prime example of the importance of a true
understanding of the operational level's critical
relationship to the strategic is Germany's performance
during World War Two. Despite exceptional operational and
tactical ability, shortcomings in the strategic concept
affected the outcome of the war. Colonel Jablonsky further
notes:
Germany was defeated primarily because Hitler's
strategic objectives exceeded his military capa-
bilities. To this strategic-operational disconnect,
Hitler's field commanders responded, as one his-
torian has noted, "like short-money players in a
table-stakes poker game, concentrating on winning
battlefield victories to demonstrate their `victu'
and avert the end as long as possible."13
There is a striking similarity in the underlying
reasons for Germany's failure in World War Two and the
United States' failure in Vietnam. I am referring to the
absence of operational level of war considerations in the
conduct of the Vietnam war and, further, the operational-
strategic disconnect that we now realize, too late, existed.
Strategic objectives were unclear. No operational level
commander, i.e., a theater commander-in-chief (CINC) ever
queried the National Command Authority (NCA) for clear-
cut strategic objectives.
Rather, NCA direction ran direct from the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to the Commander of U.S. military forces in
Vietnam-- a tactical commander. This lack of specific oper-
ational direction was significantly responsible for a con-
fused, sporadic effort by the U.S. military to achieve
vague objectives.
With no operational level commander to translate
strategic objectives into operational objectives, there was
a loss of focus. What occurred was, according to Colonel
John F. Meehan III in his astute article, "The Operational
Trilogy," a loss of that very focus:
If he (the commander) loses his focus, if he becomes
actively involved, in the tactical activities of his
command to the extent that he loses his perspective,
he may win the battles but fail to execute his mission.
This was our great failure in Vietnam. We became so
enamored of tactical successes that we failed to recog-
nize that the sum of these tactical successes would
not yield the strategic objective (itself unclear) we
sought. 14
In On War, Clausewitz knew of the imperative of clear-
cut strategic guidance when he stated that one should not
go to war "... without first being clear in his mind what
he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to
conduct it."15 As previously indicated, the United States
had no evident strategic objectives in Vietnam. Jablonsky
observes:
Without these objectives, there could be no overall
grand strategic design. In the absence of such a
design, the Joint Chiefs advocated a strategic
concept that included partial mobilization, land and
air actions in Laos and Cambodia, a naval blockade
of North Vietnam, and the preparation of a US lo-
gistics base in Thailand to deter intervention by
the People's Republic of China. The fact that these
recommendations were never fully accepted consigned
General Westmoreland to a protracted struggle of
attrition at the operational level. As a consequence,
the Chiefs became caught up in MACV (Military
Assistance Command Vietnam) requests for ever higher
force levels that could only be reviewed, as General
Palmer (General Bruce Palmer, former Vice Chief of
Staff of the U.S. Army) has pointed out, "in a stra-
tegic vacuum without a firm feeling for what the
ultimate requirement might be."16
Strategic guidance, however, will not accomplish
national objectives even if properly applied through
the operational and tactical media. The strategic
guidance needs also to "... contain a balanced blend of
ends (objectives), ways (concepts), and means (resources)."17
Applying the proper balance of the ends, ways, and
means is more of a contemporary problem than one encountered
in the past. Jablonsky quotes Henry Kissinger," In the past
the major problem of strategists was to assemble superior
strength; in the contemporary period, the problem more
frequently is how to discipline the available power into
some relationship to the objectives likely to be in dis-
pute. "18
Further, the proper balance of ends, ways, and means
should ideally result in a minimal amount of tactical
engagements to achieve the desired strategic objectives.
Jablonsky believes that this balancing did not occur during
the Vietnam conflict.19 General Palmer also perceived that
it was the government's responsibility "... to see that the
ends and means are kept in balance -- that the strategic
objectives under the strategic concept adopted are achievable
with the forces and other resources expected to be availa-
ble. "20
Within the U.S. military structure, commanders charged
with responsibility for the operational level of war are
found at the theater level. Specifically, they are the
unified commanders -- the CINC's, e.g., CINCPAC, CINCLANT,
CINCCENT. In the theater, the CINC, in order to attain
strategic objectives, designs a unified operational plan.
This "... operational planning involves bridging the gap
between strategic and political aims and actual military
measures."21 The unified operational plan that results
from the planning is more precisely called a campaign plan.
The campaign plan is the mechanism which transforms the
intent of the operational level of war into a tangible
framework. It is the mechanism which lays out the oper-
ational level commander's plan to translate strategic
objectives into military objectives. This "... theater
campaign plan must conform to strategic requirements and
provide guidance to ground, air, and sea forces in a clear,
effective concept of operations."22 (See Figure 2.)
A CINC, as the operational level of war commander,
"... must think big," as Field Marshall Slim observed.23
click here to view image
Jablonsky further notes that, "... at this level the
commander must deal, however derivatively, with stra-
tegic goals that require him to focus on broad but decisive
operational objectives extended over time and space beyond
the tactical realm. These objectives can range anywhere from
destruction of committed forces or reserves to co-opting
allies to even more abstract goals such as eroding the enemy's
public support. "24
In view of his role as the operational level commander,
Colonel Morin comprehensively lays out a framework of the
responsibilities of a theater CINC:
a. A CINC must understand his operational environ-
ment and the global and regional threats within
it.
b. A CINC must determine his theater strategy based on
the strategic direction he receives and his own
estimate of the situation.
c. A CINC must determine how he intends to organize
his theater and provide unified direction for the
conduct of warfare or taking appropriate actions
to achieve the President's strategic direction.
d. A CINC must integrate the types of military oper-
ations or forms of warfare that must be unified
to achieve the strategic direction.
e. Finally, a CINC must provide the vision which
ensures a unity of effort in the planning and
conduct of military campaigns and operations.25
CINC's interpret the national strategic direction and
insure that strategic and operational direction is meaning-
fully understood by his subordinates within the theater. As
previously discussed, in order that strategic objectives
are sure to be attained, the NCA should "... allocate
forces to him, define the logistical support available,
identify the enemy, and impose time or space requirements
for the operation."26 These elements must be incorporated
into the successful campaign plan.
Aside from the designation of ends, ways, and means,
the operational level commander must be aware that national
objectives, in general, are also constrained by internation-
al and domestic political considerations. "These consider-
ations, in turn, determine actions or methods that can con-
strain commanders at the operational level." notes
Jablonsky.27 An example of current international political
consideration for the operational level commander is the
demand by the Europeans for a forward defense concept in
NATO.
Where constraints and restrictions may negatively
impact the attainment of desired military objectives and,
in turn, the ultimate strategic objectives they are based
on, operational commanders have a duty to "... seek either
relaxation of the offending restrictions or adjustment of
the goals accordingly."28 Jablonsky quotes Liddell Hart
in support of this concept, "The military objective should
be governed by the political objective, subject to the
basic condition that policy does not demand what is mili-
tarily. . impossible. "29
Again, I turn to the Vietnam conflict as a cardinal
of what may happen if the operational level com-
mander does not make the political leadership aware of
conflicting goals or restrictions which inhibit attain-
ing national objectives. Jablonsky emphasizes "... the
importance of such a process was demonstrated during the
Vietnam War when US military leaders failed to advise the
civilian leadership that the strategy being pursued was
not working and that it would in all probability fail to
achieve American objectives."30
To be successful, the operational plan must seek to
disrupt the enemy's center of gravity, a concept originated
by Clausewitz. In disrupting (which does not necessarily
mean destroy, since a center of gravity may not be a physi-
cal thing, as we shall see) the enemy's center of gravity,
objectives are attained which "... makes the enemy's po-
sition untenable either in the entire theater or in a sig-
nificant part of it."31 Holder goes on to expand the
center of gravity concept:
The concept of center of gravity assists planners
in concentrating on narrow, well defined objectives,
but it does not solve the problem of discovering
what those centers actually are. They may be
straightforward terrain or force objectives,
such as the control of an industrial region or a
capital city or the defeat of a large opposing for-
mation. "Soft", nongeographical aims, though, like
physical security or loyalty of a population, are
just as likely.32
The importance of the center of gravity concept should
be obvious. It is particularly important to the operational
level of war commander, but applies across the continuum of
war. Jablonsky notes that when the "strategic link" can be
ascertained "... what Clausewitz termed the enemy's center
of gravity stands revealed, and it is possible to take the
initiative, even control of the war, by focusing on
the hub of all power and movement, on which everything
depends.' "33
Jablonsky cites the example of the Punic Wars in support
of his analysis. Here Scipio attempted to defeat Hannibal
on the Italian peninsula, but failed. Correctly choosing the
Carthaginian's center of gravity, Scipio moved his legions
to North Africa. This move forced Hannibal to cease cam-
paigning in Italy, and return to Carthage. After this re-
turn, Hannibal was ultimately defeated.
Jablonsky also credits Sherman's campaign in the
"heart" of the Confederacy with being decisive in the Civil
War. He criticizes the Confederacy for maintaining its
main effort in northern Virginia, likening it to Hannibal's
failure to prevent the Roman effort on Carthage's center of
gravity, Carthage itself.
Thus far, we have looked at, in some detail, the oper-
ational level of war and touched on its relationship to
campaign planning. Let us now turn to the particulars of
the campaign plan itself. What is a campaign plan? How is
it defined? Is there intraservice or interservice doctrine
for developing campaign plans? What are the particular
characteristics of a campaign plan? The remaining portion
of this paper will address these questions and overall
campaign plan development.
As noted previously, CINC's are responsible for
campaign plan development. The campaign itself is subject
to a number of different definitions which presents a
problem to a CINC or his staff officers attempting to
develop a plan to conduct a campaign. For example, the
Army's FM 100-5 defines a campaign as "... a series of
joint actions designed to attain a strategic objective
in a theater of war.... "34 FM 101-5-1 describes a cam-
paign as a "... connected series of military operations
forming a distinct phase of a war to accomplish a long
range major strategic objective. "35
In the joint realm, and ,for that matter, the only
publication which currently defines a campaign plan,
is Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication Number 1. It
states that a campaign plan is a "... plan for a series
of related military operations aimed to accomplish a
common objective, normally within a given time and space."36
In 1974, JCS Publication 2 had perhaps the best
definition, since replaced by the foregoing JCS Pub 1
definition. JCS Pub 2 defined a campaign plan as a:
... broad plan to accomplish a long-range major
strategic objective. Usually divided into a series
of related military operations. A campaign plan is
a device used by major commands to express the
commander's decision in terms of specific operations
projected as far into the future as practicable....
Its purpose is express an orderly schedule of the
strategic decisions made by the commander to allow
sufficient time to procure and provide the means to
secure desired or assigned objectives.37
The current JCS definition is very general. As Mendel
and Banks note, "... it could apply to almost any plan.... "38
The 1974 JCS Pub 2 is more refined and detailed than the
currently accepted definition but still leaves some
question as to what a campaign plan is and what it is
supposed to do.
At this point, it is necessary to note that al-
though there is a JCS definition for a campaign plan,
there "... exists today no properly sanctioned doctrine
for campaign planning in either the joint or combined
arenas."39 Hand in hand with the neglect of the study
and application of the operational level of war, cam-
paign planning too has been the victim of benign ne-
glect. Mendel and Banks further observe that:
There is no document approved by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff as doctrine for theater warfighting, campaign-
ing or campaign planning. Similarly, there are no
such documents in the combined theaters that con-
tain major U.S. forward--deployed forces--Europe and
Korea. This lack of comprehensive doctrine is the
basic factor contributing to the ambiguity surround-
ing what a campaign plan is, who should prepare it,
what it should address, and what the process is for
developing it.40
As can be readily seen, there is no concept agreed
upon by the four services as to what a detailed, proper
campaign plan is. For the purpose of this paper, I will
offer the definition of a campaign plan proposed by
Mendel and Banks in their article "Campaign Planning:
Getting It Straight," as one that should be mutually
agreeable to the four services:
A campaign plan translates strategic guidance into
operational direction for subordinates. It provides
broad concepts for operations and sustainment to
achieve strategic objectives in a theater of war or
theater of operations. It provides an orderly
schedule of strategic military decisions that embody
the commander's intent. The campaign is the com-
mander's vision of how he will prosecute his portion
of the war effort from the preparation phase through
a sequence of military operations to a well defined
conclusion that attains the strategic objective. The
campaign plan clearly defines the initial phase(s)
of the campaign and unambiguously establishes what
spells success at the end of the campaign; however,
in recognition of how war's "fog and friction" can
affect planning and operations, the mid-phases of
the campaign plan may necessarily show less defini-
tion. Campaign plans therefore are supplemented
with options (contingency or outline plans) for
shifting lines of operation and accepting or de-
clining battle in order to provide flexibility in
dealing with the changing situation.41
A campaign plan must also focus on the enemy's center
of gravity. This orientation will maximize the theater
commander's ability to make the enemy's "... position in
the theater disadvantageous, rob him of the initiative or
his will to continue the fight, and defeat him. "42
Overall, the "seven tenets" of a campaign plan offered
by Mendel and Banks perhaps gives the military officer of
any service the best framework to understand and base pre-
paring a campaign plan:
Seven Tenets: A Campaign Plan
Provides broad concepts of operations and sustainment
to achieve strategic military objectives in a theater
of war or theater of operations; serves as the basis
for all other planning and clearly defines what
constitutes success.
Provides an orderly schedule of strategic military
decisions; displays the commander's vision and intent.
Orients on the enemy's center of gravity.
Phases a series of related military operations.
Composes subordinate forces and designates command
relationships.
Provides operational direction and tasks to sub-
ordinates.
Synchronizes air, land, and sea efforts into a cohesive
and synergistic whole; is joint in nature.43
CONCLUSIONS
Both the study and practice of the operational level
of war and campaign planning have been neglected. A re-
surgence of interest for both has surfaced in recent years
and must be continued. Why? To avoid, in the future, the
strategic-operational disconnect which, as I have shown in
this paper, contributed so significantly to the calamitous
loss of the Vietnam War.
In the broad, philosophical context, I contend that all
military officers need to be familiar with the entire
spectrum of war from its extension as an "act of poli-
cy" in the Clausewitzian sense to the specific appli-
cation of force on the battlefield. Pragmatically, since
today the operational level of war and campaign planning
are manifested in theaters of operations under the
auspices of CINC's, the prudent officer needs to be con-
versant in currently accepted military thought-- that
there are three levels of war and campaign planning is
a vital adjunct to the operational level.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The professional military education of officers
needs to include the study of the operational level of
war and campaign planning to a much greater extent than
has occurred in the decades since World War Two. This
should be accomplished to a degree commensurate with the
officer's rank and experience.
In commissioning programs, all candidate officers
should be exposed to the operational level of war as
part of the continuum of war. The concept of campaign
planning should be introduced. At the intermediate
service school level, field grade officers should be
steeped in the operational level and taught the me-
chanics of campaign planning, as they will be the
future staff officers who will have to do it. At the
senior service school level, senior officers need to be
exposed to the operational level and campaign planning
from the broadest view possible,i.e., military and
national strategy.
General John Galvin, the current NATO military
commander, in a recent issue of Defense 89, suggested a
similar program when he recommended, "... at each level,
the schools should seek to broaden the officer's horizon.
For example, the command and staff colleges should focus
on the operational level of war, stress joint operations
and introduce strategy, while the war colleges should
devote serious time to the higher perspective, strategy
and its development, both national and military. "44
With a career long program in place such as this,
officers from the junior to the senior grades will be
continually presented with the main concepts of the
operational level of war and campaign planning. More
importantly, there should be a corporate capability
throughout the officer corps of all services to put these
concepts into practice. It is now time for the officer
corps to undertake the study of the operational level of
war and its adjunct, campaign planning, understand the
concepts, accept their necessity, and finally, vigorously
apply them. I believe the security of the United States
will be the better for it.
FOOTNOTES
1 David Jablonsky, "Strategy and the Operational Level
of War: Part I," Parameters Vol. XVII, No. 1, (Spring 1987),
p. 65.
2 Jablonsky, p.65.
3 L. D. Holder, "Operational Art in the US Army: A New
Vigor," Essays on Strategy III, (Washington,D.C.: National
Defense University Press, 1986), p.116.
4 U.S. Army, FM 100-5 Operations, (May 1986), p.9.
5 Michael J. Morin, Military Strategy and Unified
Operations (Draft), (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College,
1988), p.I-10.
6 FM 100-5 Operations, p.10.
7 Morin, p. I-10.
8 FM 100-5 Operations, p.10.
9 Morin, p.I-11.
10 Holder, p.117.
11 Morin, p.I-10.
12 Jablonsky, p.65.
13 Jablonsky, p.65.
14 John F. Meehan III, "The Operational Trilogy,"
Parameters Vol. XVI, No. 3, p.15.
15 Jablonsky, p.67.
16 Jablonsky, p.67.
17 Jablonsky, p.66.
18 Jablonsky, p.66.
19 Jablonsky, p.67.
20 Jablonsky, p.67.
21 Holder, p.118.
22 Holder, p.118.
23 Jablonsky, p.71.
24 Jablonsky, p.71.
25 Morin, pp.I-14-15.
26 Holder,p.118.
27 Jablonsky,p.68.
28 Jablonsky,p.69.
29 Jablonsky,p.69.
30 Jablonsky,p.69
31 Holder, p. 119.
32 Holder, p.119.
33 Jablonsky, p.71.
34 William W. Mendel and Floyd T. Banks, Jr., Campaign
Planning, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1988), p.6.
35 Mendel and Banks, Campaign Planning, p.6.
36 Mendel and Banks, Campaign Planning, p.6.
37 Mendel and Banks, Campaign Planning, p.6.
38 Mendel and Banks, Campaign Planning, p.6.
39 William W. Mendel and Floyd T. Banks, Jr., "Campaign
Planning: Getting It Straight," Parameters, September 1988,
p.43.
40 Mendel and Banks, "Campaign Planning," p.44.
41 Mendel and Banks, "Campaign Planning," pp.45-46.
42 Mendel and Banks, "Campaign Planning," p.46.
43 Mendel and Banks, "Campaign Planning," p.46.
44 John R. Galvin, "How Can We Nurture Military Strategists?,"
Defense 89, January/February 1989, p.28.
BLIOGRAPHY
Galvin, John R. Gen, USA. "How Can We Nurture Military
Strategists?" Defense 89 (January/February 1989).
Holder, L.D. LtCol, USA. "Operational Art in the US Army:
A New Vigor." Essays on Strategy III. Washington, D.C.:
National Defense University Press, 1986.
Jablonsky, David Col, USA. "Strategy and the Operational
Level of War: Part I." Parameters Vol. XVII, No. 1
Meehan, John F. III Col, USA. "The Operational Trilogy."
Parameters Vol. XVI, No. 3.
Mendel, William W. Col, USA and Banks, Floyd T. LtCol, USA.
Campaign Planning. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College,
1988.
Mendel, William W. Col, USA and Banks, Floyd T. LtCol, USA.
"Campaign Planning: Getting It Straight." Parameters
(September 1988).
Mendel, William W. Col, USA."Theater Strategy and the Theater
Campaign Plan." Parameters (December 1988).
Morin, Michael J. Col, USA. Military Strategy and Unified
Operations (Draft). Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College,
1988.
U.S. Army. FM 100-5 Operations. May, 1986.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
