Comabat Engineers And The MAGTF
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Operations
Author Major Bruce Bissett
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: COMBAT ENGINEERS AND THE MAGTF
I. Purpose: To investigate the employment of combat engineer
units in support of the MAGTF with specific attention to
their role in providing close combat support to maneuver
units.
II. Problem: The Combat Engineer Battalion (CEB) is
responsible for both combat support and deliberate
engineering tasks. In combination with the fact that staff
cognizance for engineer efforts rests with the G/S-4, the
focus of CEB units over the years has been oriented on
combat service support vice combat support tasks. The end
result is that duplication of effort between engineer units
has occurred and the overall quality of engineer support has
been degraded.
III. Data: In the Fleet Marine Force (FMF), there are three
units responsible for providing engineer support. These are
the Combat Engineer Battalion of the Marine Division, the
Engineer Support Battalion (ESB) of the Force Service
Support Group, and the Engineer Operations Division of the
Marine Aircraft Wing. Although some of the tasks performed
by these units are similar (e.g., production of potable
water), the mission, employment, organization, and focus of
each unit is different. CurrentLy, the CEB and the ESB are
both responsible for performing CS tasks. All three units
are responsible for accomplishing deliberate engineering
tasks of a CSS nature. During training exercises it is
common for mobility, countermobility, and survivability
tasks to be performed "constructively." As a result, we are
not training the way we intend to fight and valuable combat
engineer assets are not being effectively employed.
IV. Conclusions: Effective employment of engineer assets is
critical to the success of the MAGTF as a combined arms
team. In order to be successful on the next battlefield, we
need to train the way we intend to fight. The most
effective way of accomplishing this is to assign engineer
tasks based on the capabilities and responsiveness of each
engineer unit. This can best be accomplished by allowtng
the CEB to focus on combat support tasks under the staff
cognizance of the G/S-3.
V. Recommendations: That the personnel and equipment within
the CEB dedicated to deliberate engineering tasks be
transferred to other units. The CEB should concentrate on
mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks which
directly support maneuver units. In order to maximize the
contribution of combat engineer units, staff cognizance for
combat engineer efforts should be transferred to the G/S-3.
COMBAT ENGINEERS AND THE MAGTF
OUTLINE
Thesis: In order to more effectively employ combat
engineers, the Marine Corps needs to focus the efforts of
the combat engineer battalion on combat support tasks,
transfer existing combat service support responsibilities to
other units, and reassign staff cognizance for combat
engineer efforts to the G/S-3.
I. Units responsible for performing engineer tasks within
the MAGTF
A. Combat Engineer Battalion
B. Engineer Support Battalion
C. Engineer Operation Division
II. Engineer tasks
A. Mobility
B. Countermobility
C. Survivability
D. General engineering
III. Employment of engineer units
A. Combat support versus combat service support
B. Staff cognizance for engineer efforts
COMBAT ENGINEERS AND THE MAGTF
The mission and employment of combat engineers is often
misunderstood and frequently overlooked. Many Marines think
of combat engineers as construction troops "in the rear"
building roads, bridges, and airfields. While these tasks
are performed by engineer units, they are not the primary
focus of the Combat Engineer Battalion (CEB). The primary
mission of the CEB is to "increase the combat effectiveness
of the Marine division by rendering close combat engineer
support."(1O:15) The secondary mission is to provide
limited deliberate engineering support (e.g., essential
temporary construction, utilities support). As a result of
these dual missions, the CEB is responsible for performing
both combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS)
tasks.
Since the Vietnam War, a disproportionate amount of
effort has been expended by combat engineer units on
deliberate engineering tasks of a CSS nature, at the expense
of their primary mission of providing combat support to
maneuver units. In addition, a significant portion of the
equipment possessed by the CEB is not capable of supporting
CS tasks in the forward areas. Rather, this equipment is
essentially commercial construction equipment designed for
use in rear areas in support of CSS tasks.
Another factor which has caused the focus on CSS tasks
is the fact that staff cognizance for engineer efforts rests
with the G/S-4 (who is CSS oriented) instead of the G/S-3
(who focuses on operations and CS). The cumulative result
has been a less than optimal employment of combat engineer
assets.
In order to more effectively employ combat engineers,
the Marine Corps needs to focus the efforts of the combat
engineer battalion on combat support tasks, transfer existing
combat service support responsibilities to other units, and
reassign staff cognizance for combat engineer efforts to the
G/S-3.
Effective employment of engineer assets is critical to
the success of the MAGTF as a combined arms team. "Among
the hard lessons learned in what the Soviets call the `Great
Patriotic War' was the critical role played by engineer
troops in large combined arms operations."(5:56O) In order
to maximize the contribution of engineer units in support of
the MAGTF, engineer tasks need to be assigned based on the
capabilities and responsiveness of each engineer unit.
In the Fleet Marine Force (FMF), there are three units
responsible for providing engineer support. These are the
Combat Engineer Battalion of the Marine Division, the
Engineer Support Battalion (ESB) of the Force Service
Support Group (FSSG), and the Engineer Operations Division
of the Marine Wing Support Squadron, Marine Wing Support
Group, Marine Aircraft Wing. Although some of the tasks
performed by these units are similar (e.g., production of
potable water), the mission, employment, organization, and
focus of each unit is different.
The CEB is organized and equipped to perform both CS and
CSS tasks. As discussed above, the primary mission of the
CEB is to render close combat engineer support to elements
of a division. The CEB consists of a headquarters and
service (H&S) company, an engineer support company, and four
combat engineer companies. Typically, one combat engineer
company, reinforced with elements of the H&S and engineer
support companies, supports each of the infantry regiments
within a division. These engineer companies operate in
close proximity to the forward areas and focus their efforts
on combat support tasks (i.e., mobility, countermobllity,
and survivability) which are expeditionary or temporary in
nature. Although the fourth combat engineer company
(reinforced) can be used to augment one of the other combat
engineer companies, its principal function is to accomplish
engineer tasks in support of the division as a whole.
Examples include assisting division rear units in the
construction of protective positions and conducting engineer
reconnaissance tasks.
The mission of the Engineer Support Battalion is to
"increase the effectiveness of the landing force by
accomplishing general engineering missions of a deliberate
nature."(1O:35) These tasks typically include the
construction and operation of fixed and floating bridges,
the installation and operation of bulk fuel facilities, the
maintenance and repair of roads, and the construction of
expeditionary airfields. The primary focus is on CSS tasks
although the battalion does have the capability to perform
limited CS tasks.
The ESB consists of a H&S company, a support company, a
bridge company, three engineer companies, and two bulk fuel
companies. Normally, the engineer companies operate under
centralized control of the ESB. In certain situations,
however, the engineer companies may be attached to or placed
in direct support of division or wing elements. In the
combat support role, the ESB is capable of performing many
of the tasks primarily assigned to the CEB. This is because
of the similarities in equipment and personnel skills. Due
to the number of deliberate engineering tasks to be
accomplished in support of the MAGTF, however, the ESB will
rarely have the resources to perform CS tasks.
The Engineer Operations Division is responsible for
providing engineer support of a deliberate nature in support
of the Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW). Tasks performed include
the construction and maintenance of mission essential base
camps, utilities support, and material handling support.
The Engineer Operations Division is tasked with providing
"the full range of engineer support for the Air Combat
Element."(14:1-23) The support provided by the Engineer
Operations Division is exclusively CSS in nature.
Of the three engineer units discussed above, only the
CEB and ESB are capable of providing close combat engineer
support. Due to the number of deliberate engineering tasks
to be performed, however, the ESB will rarely be available
to perform CS tasks. All three of the engineer units are
responsible for and capable of performing engineer tasks of
a deliberate nature. Although the CEB and ESB are similar
in some respects, the principal difference is that the
efforts of the ESB are more equipment intensive and
permanent. For example, a combat trail constructed by the
CEB would be improved into a main supply route by the ESB.
Close combat engineer support has three principal tasks:
mobility, countermobility, and survivability. The primary
task of the CEB is to enhance the mobility of maneuver
elements. This is accomplished by reducing obstacles, both
natural (existing) and man-made (reinforcing). Mobility
enhancement focuses on reducing the effects that obstacles
have on the employment of weapons systems and equipment.
"Mobility, combined with firepower, is the principal
ingredient in maneuver, whereby a force gains positional
advantage over the enemy."(15:2-l3)
U.S. forces in South Vietnam and Soviet forces in
Afghanistan both experienced the debilitating effect that
relatively unsophisticated opposing forces can have on the
mobility of combat forces. Although both countries enjoyed
significant firepower and mobility advantages over their
opponents, guerrilla forces were able to severely restrict
operations by the effective employment of mines and other
obstacles. In Afghanistan, the mujahedin mine warfare
campaign was "successful in slowing and halting Soviet
columns, isolating Soviet garrisons, and limiting
counterinsurgency operations."(5:563) U.S. forces in
South Vietnam experienced the same difficulties.
Frequently, during training exercises, natural obstacles
(e.g., rivers, gaps) and enemy emplaced obstacles (e.g.,
minefields and craters) are successfully breached
"constructively." As a result, the obstacle only exists on
paper and the personnel and equipment needed to conduct an
actual breach are not employed. Obviously, maneuver
elements and engineer units gain little training value from
this type of exercise scenario. Given the critical need for
mobility on the modern battlefield, realistic training
opportunities need to be pursued in peacetime exercises.
One of the key MAGTF capabilities to be emphasized cited in
the MAGTF Master Plan is the "capability to breach
obstacles, including minefields, under fire, with no
significant reduction in momentum."(11:6-3) Also noted was
the lack, in training exercises, of "realistic breaching
events"(11:7-69)
In order to be successful, our forces need to be able to
quickly employ obstacles to delay, disrupt, and kill the
enemy. The use of obstacles enhances the effectiveness of
our weapons systems and increases the time available for
target acquisition by slowing or stopping the enemy. "The
inherent mobility of enemy mechanized and motorized forces
must be countered by extensive and coordinated use of
obstacles."(15:2-17) Combat engineer units are ideally
suited to assist units in the accomplishment countermobility
tasks. Engineers can reinforce natural obstacles by
emplacing antitank and antipersonnel minefields as well as
constructing antitank ditches. These efforts will disrupt
an enemy attack by restricting and channelizing his movement.
The emplacement of man-made obstacles, however, is slow,
labor and equipment intensive, and requires significant
logistics support. "Whereas maneuver units cover tank
ditches with guns whose rounds are clocked in kilometers per
second, the tank ditches themselves are installed at rates
measured by meters per hour."(1:38) The result is that the
construction of obstacles may not match the tempo of combat
operations unless we train extensively during peacetime.
During training exercises, combat engineers can emplace
minefields using inert mines, create craters and other
vehicle obstacles, and employ wire obstacles to restrict the
movement of personnel. All of these obstacles can be
removed later with little, if any, environmental damage and
can significantly improve the realism of our training
exercises. Too often, however, these countermobility events
are not included in training exercises. As a result, many
commanders have grown up "without appreciating the
importance of the proper application of engineer resources
on the battlefield."(4:176)
The final combat support task of combat engineer units
is to assist in survivability enhancement measures.
"Survivability measures are subdivided into two categories:
fighting positions for protection of personnel and equipment
directly involved in combat; and protective positions for
protection of personnel and equipment not directly involved
with fighting the enemy." (9:1-6) These positions can be
quickly constructed depending on the time and type of
terrain available and, again, can be covered over once these
positions are vacated. Too often during our training
exercises, however, unnecessary environmental and time
constraints preclude the construction of these positions.
At the very least, a sampling of positions should be
constructed to enhance the training provided to all
personnel.
The result of not including mobility, countermobility
and survivability events in training exercises is that
units are not training the way they intend to fight. The
first firefight is not the time to learn how to perform
these tasks. In addition, since close combat engineer tasks
are not routinely included in training exercises, problems
with existing doctrine and equipment are not highlighted.
The result has been a stagnation in the development of
doctrine, tactics, and equipment suited for mobility,
countermobility, and survivability tasks on the modern
battlefield.
To be sure, the accomplishment of deliberate engineering
tasks of a CSS nature are critical to the success of the
MAGTF. These tasks support the operations of the entire
MAGTF and contribute to the sustainability of the force.
Deliberate engineering tasks typically include mobile
electric power services, construction of temporary camps and
storage facilities, production of potable water, hygiene
services (e.g., laundry, shower facilities), construction,
maintenance, and repair of roads and expeditionary
airfields, and material handling support.
As noted earlier, the accomplishment of deliberate
engineering tasks is the primary responsibility of the
Engineer Support Battalion of the FSSG and the Engineer
Operations Division of the MAW. Also requiring the CEB to
perform these tasks causes duplication and does not result
in the efficient use of engineer assets. Since the CEB is
principally tasked with providing close combat engineer
support, any efforts expended on deliberate engineering
tasks detracts from the primary mission. Although some
duplication is expected, the dual missions assigned to the
CEB cause a dilution of effort.
A solution to the combat support versus deliberate
engineering dilemma is to transfer the responsibility for
deliberate engineering tasks from the CEB to other units.
As an example, the water purification equipment and
personnel could be transferred to the Headquarters Battalion
of the Marine Division since these assets would normally be
employed in the division rear area. A second example would
be to transfer the equipment and personnel used for road
construction and repair to the ESB of the FSSG. Since the
ESB is already tasked with road construction and repair, the
impact would be minimal. These changes would allow the CEB
to focus on combat support tasks and be more responsive to
the needs of the maneuver commander. By transferring the
equipment and personnel associated with CSS tasks, the CEB
would become more mobile and could concentrate solely on
combat support tasks.
The end result of realigning responsibilities between
the three engineer units would be a tailored approach to
engineer support of the MAGTF as a whole. The CEB would
focus solely on combat support tasks in direct support of
the maneuver elements. Deliberate engineering support would
be provided by the ESB in support of the entire MAGTF to
include the division, wing, and FSSG. The mission of the
Engineer Operations Division would remain essentially
unchanged. This realignment of efforts would allow each
unit to concentrate on a more narrowly defined mission and
eliminate unnecessary duplication. Equipment, doctrine, and
tactics needed to support the combat support mission could
then be evaluated to determine if deficiencies exist.
A second reason why a disproportionate amount of
engineer effort has been expended on CSS tasks over the
years is that staff cognizance for engineer efforts rests
with the G/S-4. This relationship has caused a tendency to
orient combat engineer efforts on deliberate engineering
tasks. Since the responsibility for combat support and
tactical issues rests with the G/S-3, the combat engineer
officer is frequently not a part of the planning process and
as a result, the maneuver commander does not receive the
full benefit of his engineer assets. The idea of
transferring staff cognizance to the G/S-3 is not a new
idea. Rather, this recommendation has been made repeatedly
over the years. For example, the Marine Corps Mine Warfare
Conference held in 1983 recommended that the engineer
officer be assigned as "a special staff officer under the
cognizance of the G/S-3."(17:1-A-3) More recently, the
MAGTF Master Plan has recommended that the engineer officer
be placed "under the responsibility of the G/3."(11:85)
The solution is to assign staff cognizance for combat
engineer efforts to the G/S-3. This relationship will more
closely support combat operations and focus the efforts of
combat engineers on mobility, countermobility, and
survivability tasks. The G/S-4 would continue to maintain
staff cognizance over deliberate engineering tasks. These
tasks would be performed by elements of the ESB as part of a
combat service support element (CSSE) providing direct
support to the division.
The employment of combat engineer units to accomplish
mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks is not a
new idea. These types of tasks have been accomplished by
combat forces for hundreds of years. However, in order to
maximize the contribution of combat engineer units on the
next battlefield, the Marine Corps needs to train the way it
intends to fight. This can be accomplished by assigning
mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks to CEB
units during our training exercises. General engineering
tasks of a CSS nature would be assigned to the ESB and the
Engineer Operations Division in order to focus the efforts
of the CEB.
In order to focus on combat support tasks, the existing
equipment and personnel dedicated to deliberate engineering
tacks would be transferred froin the CEB to other unite.
The result would be engineer units tailored to support
selected mission areas. The CEB would concentrate on combat
support tasks while the ESB and the Engineer Operations
Division concentrated on deliberate engineering tasks.
Finally, staff cognizance for combat engineer efforts
would be transferred from the G/S-4 to the G/S-3. This
transfer will result in more responsive combat engineer
support and will focus the efforts of combat engineer units
on combat support tasks. This will also provide the
supported commander an engineer staff officer who is focused
on the combat support tasks of mobility, countermobility,
and survivability. Deliberate engineering tasks performed
in support of the division would be accomplished by ESB
units under the staff cognizance of the G/S-4.
The end result of the changes recommended would be a CEB
exclusively focused on the combat support tasks of mobility,
countermobillty, and survivability. By expanding the
capabilities of the ESB and the Engineer Operations
Division, no degradation in deliberate engineering support
would occur. Rather, since deliberate engineering effort
would be concentrated, economies of scale and efficiencies
would result. With the reassignment of deliberate
engineering responsibility and the associated personnel and
equipment, the transfer of staff cognizance for combat
engineer efforts to the G/S-3 should be adopted.
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