Low-Intensity Conflict And The Marines: A Seabased Solution

CSC 1989

SUBJECT AREA - Operations

ABSTRACT

LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT AND THE MARINES: A SEABASED SOLUTION

Major Andrew J. Budka, United States Marine Corps

15 May 1989

The purpose of this paper is to examine low-intensity

conflict, believed by the Marine Corps to be the most likely form

of war it will face in the 1990's. It examines the suitability

of primarily seabasing our effort, new weapons systems

acquisitions over the last decade, and the new technologies being

fielded.

The paper will first study low-intensity conflict, identify

its characteristics and dimensions, especially its roots in

social or economic grievances. General and specific United

States' responses are then discussed. One particular problem

accentuated in the late twentieth century is that often a nation

that needs our forces to aid in combatting an insurgency is the

very nation that cannot politically afford to have a massive

infusion of American combat forces on its soil and still survive

as a government.

The concept of totally seabasing our forces to adapt to this

new political reality is then introduced and its advantages and

disadvantages presented. Decidedly viable under certain

conditions, the Marine Corps' role in such an endeavor becomes

obvious. Its long association with the Navy, the special

equipment and tactics developed over the years, and new

technologies now extant, allow the Marines to now remain offshore

and still conduct a low-intensity campaign..

Dozens of books, magazine articles and official ducuments

and studies were used as references. Material on low-intensity

conflict abounds. Information on seabasing is scarce and is

still somewhat conceptual.

WAR IN THE MODERN ERA SEMINAR

LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT AND THE MARINES:

A SEABASED SOLUTION

Major Andrew J. Budka, USMC

(15 May 1989)

Marine Corps Command and Staff College

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Quantico, Virginia 22134-5050

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Contents i

Introduction 1

Chapter

I. Low-Intensity Conflict: Its Dimensions 7

and Characteristics

II. U. S. Response Towards Low-Intensity Conflict: 14

General

III. U. S. Response To Low-Intensity Conflict: 18

Specific

IV. Seabasing a Low-Intensity Conflict Effort 22

V. Seabasing and the Marines 33

VI. Seabasing, Mobility and Support 43

VII. Intelligence Support 57

VIII. Conclusions 67

Endnotes 69

Bibliography 77

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AND THE MARINES: A SEABASED SOLUTION

INTRODUCTION

The post World War II decades have been a time of relative

peace between the United States and the USSR and their respective

allies, especially in Europe. The atomic bomb and the United

States' strategy of deterrence, developed around this weapon's

incredible destructive potential, has served to avert a major

world war among the industrialized nations since 1945. But as

even a cursory glance at a daily newspaper will reveal, intense

conflict between the ideologies of East and West, and

contemporarily, also outside the bipolar "cold war" axis, has

continued without cessation for the past forty-five years. This

entry of new movements, like Iran and the Shia Lebanese, not

linked to Washington or Moscow, whose proponents show no

hesitation to use terrorism, shows no signs of abatement, despite

the almost cyclic warming and cooling of US - USSR diplomatic

relations. In fact, the tempo of the constant struggle between

western ideologies and communism may even quicken, now that

anti-communist insurgencies have gained victories in various

locales about the globe, the most salient example of which is the

recent Soviet defeat and subsequent withdrawal of its army from

Afghanistan at the hands of the guerrillas collectively known as

the Mujahidin (i.e. "holy warrior" in Arabic). Likewise, the

rise of radical Islam, dedicated to cleansing the Muslim world of

the "Decadence" of the Western values (and especially those of

the United States) argues for increased tension and conflict

throughout the Middle East and South Asia.

Even though there has excited a relative peace between the

superpowers since the end of the Second World War, dozens of wars

have been waged since that time, usually fought in the

underdeveloped Third World between those espousing the different

ideologies of the West and the Soviet Union, or more recently,

radical Islam. This type of war, in which scores of countries

and movements have become embroiled in the last several decades,

was known in the past by a variety of rubrics such as:

- War of National Liberation

- Guerrilla Warfare

- Revolutionary War

- Small War

- Limited War, etal.

Contemporarily it is usually referred to in professional parlance

as "low intensity conflict." 1

As described presently, low-intensity conflict is usually

conducted within the confines of one country, (although some

portions of its neighboring states' territory may be used as a

sanctuary, e.g. the Nicaraguan Contra's use of bases on the

Honduran side of the Honduras - Nicaraguan border) between allies

of surrogates of the superpowers. Occasionally, the superpowers

themselves enter the fray, often to their regret (witness the

tragic results of the United States' failure in South Vietnam,

1964 - 1973, and the Soviets' aforementioned campaign in

Afghanistan, 1979 - 1989). More recently, countries like Iran

have seen fit to wage terrorism and guerrilla war on its more

conservative regional neighbors, like Kuwait and Lebanon.

The goal of these bloody struggles is the seizure of

political power in order to determine the future course of a

nation along certain ideological or religious lines.2 In this

regard, until the 1980's at least, most wars which could be

dubbed low-intensity conflicts were communist or Marxist inspired

insurgencies desiring to overthrow authoritarian governments tied

to the West or fledgling democracies of the Third World, allied

with and supported by primarily, the United States. In spite of

its nuclear arsenal, the United States seemed almost helpless in

the face of these assaults as more and more nations succumbed by

force of arms to these Marxist/communist insurgencies throughout

the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's.

Indeed, this style of conflict appeared to be the inevitable

outgrowth of nuclear stalemate between the United States and the

Soviet Union since atomic weapons rendered all-out war almost

unthinkable. Therefore, alternatives to pursue the struggle

against the West had to be developed, alternatives that stopped

short of nuclear or total conventional war.3 In fact, as

recent history records, the communists were highly successful in

their endeavors as nation after nation fell to Marxist

revolutionaries. (To name a few: Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia,

Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, South Yemen

and the active terrorist groups in Western Europe, South America,

and Africa.)

William J. Olson, writing in the February 1989 issue of

Military Review has noted the following:

Since 1945 the United States has used force or the

threat of force to protect its interests over five

hundred times, mostly in the Third World. Virtually

all of these have been low-intensity conflict

situations, many of them involving multi-year United

States commitments. 4

In spite of this impressiveand eye-opening number of military

interventions or threats, it seemed our country, until recently,

lacked a coherent and comprehensive strategy for coping with the

almost endless stream of low-intensity conflict situations. The

deep and widespread criticisms of our interventions in Grenada

(which was successful) and Lebanon (which was not), are a case in

point. One hopes that our nation's extensive aid of the Afghan

insurgents and those of UNITA fighting the communist and Cuban

supported government of Angola augurs propitiously that our

future policy will be one of coherent commitment to those

resisting totalitarianor authoritarian regimes or movements.

The present Marine Corps Commandant, General Alfred M. Gray,

has stated on numerous occasions, both publicly and in print,

that he believes that United States military forces will most

likely be involved in future low-intensity conflicts and that the

real chances of conventional or nuclear war in Europe between

NATO and the Warsaw Pact are remote, at least more remote than a

conflict in the Third World. Thus, under his leadership and

direction, the Marine Corps is therefore developing doctrine for

low-intensity conflict campaigns while continuing, of necessity,

the honing of our skills for fighting the less likely mid or high

intensity types.5

The Marine Corps, of course, is no stranger to what is now

called low-intensity conflict. Long involved in combatting

insurgents and guerrillas in the late nineteenth and early

twentieth centuries in the Philippines, Haiti, Dominican

Republic, Nicaragua, et al., the Corps published its Small Wars

Manual6 in 1940, just prior to the United States involvement in

World War II. (Indeed. it may have been the inadvertent, but

unfortunate timing of publishing this guide to guerrilla war just

prior to the advent of America's entry into the biggest

conventional war of modern times that caused this book's

overshadowment to such an extent that many Marines, active and

retired, did not even know of its existence until its reprinting

in 1987.)

The Small Wars Manual represents a distillation of almost

fifty years of tactical knowledge gained from constant

involvement in guerrilla war. Add to this the wisdom gleaned

from our experience in Vietnam and recent technological advances

in warfare, and the Marine Corps should possess a sound,

institutional basis from which to successfully prosecute any

low-intensity conflict and achieve a denouement advantageous to

United States national interests.

Therefore, this paper will examine low-intensity conflict

and possible Marine Corps roles in any future foreign struggle.

The first section will highlight low-intensity conflict, delving

into its complexities and characteristics. The next sections

will propose some uniquely Marine Corps capable solutions, i.e.,

sea-basing our combat units. The advantages and disadvantages of

sea-basing a MAGTF (Marine Air-Ground Task Force) will be

examined as well as acceptable platforms from which to operate

new weapon systems and equipment recently developed that give our

forces an advantage and a greater use of intellignece collection

assets required to find the enemy, so thathe can then be located

and neutralized or destroyed.

CHAPTER I

LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT: ITS DIMENSIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS

The words "low-intensity conflict" indicate a spectrum of

war categorization has been developed and that its components

must include a mid and high-intensity category as well.

High-intensity conflict as currently defined involves a

conventional or nuclear war with the USSR or Warsaw Pact,

involving full-mobilization of our nation's resources, mechanized

and armor heavy forces, naval as well as land and air

engagements, and very high attrition of men and material. The

mid-range is something less severe, but contains most of the

elements of the high-intensity fight, to include a mechanized

battlefield.1 It would still be a vigorous and conventional

style campaign, probably against nations of lesser power than

those of the Warsaw Pact.

The high and middle range are therefore relatively easy to

grasp mentally since they describe the large scale, conventional

wars with which most people are familiar. However, some problems

are encountered in conceptualizing the "low" end of this

spectrum. As Professor Lewis B. Ware noted as recently as August

1988:

In the past few years, the academic and military

communities have been paying increased attention to

low-intensity conflict. There is general agreement

that for the foreseeable future, low-intensity

conflict will remain the dominant form of violent

confrontation in most parts of the world. Yet despite

this apparent consensus, there exists no universally

accepted definition of low-intensity conflict on which

to construct a strategy of containment.2

Indeed, Professor Ware is quite correct for in researching

this topic, I came across numerous definitions of low-intensity

conflict, two examples of which, in their diversity, serve to

illustrate the point:

Low-intensity conflict is a limited, politico -

military struggle to achieve political, social,

economic or psychological objectives. It is often

protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic and

psychological pressures through terrorism and

insurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generally

confined to a geographic area. .3

Internal defense and development assistance operations

involving actions by United States combat forces to

establish, regain or maintain control of specific land

areas threatened by guerrilla warfare, revolution,

subversion and other tactics aimed at internal seizure

of power.4

Other definitions abound, but the term low-intensity conflict generally

implies guerrilla warfare or counterinsurgency operations to military

professionals. However, too often, it paints a verbal picture to the

laymen (or politician) of a relaxed condition of combat in which little

substantive action occurs or, worse, a military activity of little

danger or importance. Air Force Colonel Dennis Drew writing in a 1988

Cadre Paper summarizes it this way:

Low-intensity conflict is a dismally poor title for a

type of warfare in which thousands die, countless more

are physically or psychologically maimed and in the

process the fate of the nation hangs in the

balance. 5

Others refer to it as a "euphemism" for a type of conflict which

fits uneasily into a precise category. Taken in toto, however,

the term low-intensity conflict will serve as an umbrella under

which the following sub categories may be included:

- Insurgency/Counterinsurgency -

- Terrorism/Counterterrorism

- Peacekeeping Operations

- Peacetime Contingencies

A quick examination of our contemporary world will immediately

identify the nature of each of these categories.

Insurgency/Counterinsurgency. Basically, this is guerrilla

warfare in its classic sense. The ongoing struggles in El

Salvador, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Cambodia for example fit this

category precisely.

Terrorism/Counterterrorism. The most recognizable of the

facets of low-intensity conflict, this type of warfare has truly

proliferated since the PLO fist began highjacking airliners in

1967/1968. Acts of terrorism, predominantly carried out against

the United States, Israel, or the West have become so much a part

of the daily news that we tend to forget how lethal and,

unfortunately, successful they continue to be. For example:

Since 1968 there have been 8000 recorded terrorist

incident resulting in more then 5,500 dead and 11,000

wounded. In 1985 alone there were nearly 900 deaths

resulting from 851 incidents.8

Peacekeeping Operations. U. S. military participation in

the United Nations Peacekeeping force in the Middle East is the

most obvious. We have Marine and Army officers and Army troops

in Lebanon, Israel, Syria and the Sinai Desert of Egypt to help

monitor the potentially explosive situations which have festered

for so long in that region. Duty in this region can still be

quite dangerous as witnessed by the February 1988 kidnapping of

Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins, the Commanding

Officer of the United Nations observers in Lebanon, probably by

elements of the radical Hizballah or "Party of God" organization

of the Lebanese Shiite Muslims; an organization supported and

financed by Iran.

Peacetime Contingency. The most recent representation of

this subcategory of low-intensity conflict was the substantial

United States naval presence in or near the Persian Gulf to

assure freedom of navigation in 1987 and 1988. The long conflict

between Iran and Iraq had as one of its facets an increasingly

effective campaign against oil tankers servicing the Gulf's oil

industry. The United States agreed to put under U. S. flag

Kuwaiti owned tankers which had come under Iranian attack due to

Kuwait's heavy financial support of Iraq. Our navy was

successful in its mission, as the sea lines of communication were

kept open and oil continued to flow freely from the Persian Gulf

to Europe and Japan.

It is readily apparent that unlike combat at the mid or

high-intensity level, low-intensity conflict is more amorphous

and somewhat difficult to precisely define. It is also often

difficult to tell which side is winning or losing over the long

period of time such conflicts occur. War in the low-intensity

conflict realm is usually undeclared and often fought indirectly,

against a shadowy enemy who is rarely seen. In the other

categories, war is theoretically declared between two or more

states with military success on the battlefield a clear

indication of victory or defeat. Success in low-intensity

conflict is often measured differently, and victory over the

enemy in battle may not be enough to win the war. For example,

Israel's long and complete domination of its war with the

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its decisive

victories over assorted Arab national armies in 1956, 1967, 1973,

and 1982 have achieved little in the way of true success. The

prolonged and continuous uprising of Palestinian youth on the

West Bank despite Israeli military dominance is ample evidence of

this. It is difficult to defeat "ideas" with military force, and

the idea of a Palestinian homeland is a potent concept indeed.

The primary objective of an insurgency or terror

organization may not be the defeat of its enemy on the military

battlefield. Rather it is the domination and control of the

state's population. It is often not even against the government

of a country per se, but against the social structure which props

it up.9 They seek to change the opinion and accepted notions

that a population retains about its government.

Insurgents or terrorists want to garner support for their

ideological activities by making the government appear impotent

and ineffective. Through attacks on governmental institutions

the guerrillas hope to provoke a strong government reaction which

impacts adversely on the government's own citizens, thus

alienating the very people it is trying to protect. The

insurgents attempt to win popular support either through

persuasion, i.e. the government is illegitimate, or coercion,

i.e. the government is incapable of protecting its populace.

Therefore the populace must support the insurgents or risk being

severely punished by them.

Once the governmental structures are paralyzed and rendered

ineffective, the insurgents move into the vacuum created and

replace normal governing mechanisms with there own. They will

begin to collect taxes, provide rudimentary medical services, and

generally administer the region as they see fit. As Professor

Bernard- Fall noted, "When a country is being subverted, it is not

being out-fought, it is being out-administered. "10

Insurgents in a low-intensity conflict will always try to

exacerbate any social grievances to turn popular support their

way. Unfortunately, in too many Third World nations this is all

too easy to do. Often using a "two-pronged" assault of both

political and military options, insurgents will use some of the

following to further their ends:11

- Guerrilla Warfare

- Terrorism

- Political Front Organizations (For example: A legitimate

political group that is controlled by the insurgents will

disguise its anti-government activity behind a legal

facade. The political party Sinn Fein, for example,

serves as a cover for the outlawed Irish Republican Army

(IRA) in Northern Ireland and Great Britain.)

- Psychological Operations (These are designed to exploit

the media in order to gain sympathy and support from the

indigenous population for insurgent activities. A good

example of this is "Radio Venceremos", the voice of the

leftist communist guerrillas in El Salvador, which

conducts daily broadcasts designed to garner popular

support.)

The bitter insurgency in El Salvador provides clear examples of -

the aforementioned patterns. The Marxist guerrillas, the

Farbundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), attack both the

government by assaulting army garrisons, assassinating mayors of

cities, bureaucrats, and the economic infrastructure which

supports the government by dynamiting electric power stations and

pylons, buses, trucks, etc. In regional pockets where the

government's administration has collapsed, e.g. in Usulutan

Province, the guerrillas have established their own

administration. In other areas, where government support is

strong, the FMLN is using coercion to change peasant hearts and

minds through a concerted land mine campaign aimed arbitrarily at

the population and by forcing the peasant farmers off their land

if they do not actively support the FMLN.12

To summarize, the concept of low-intensity conflict

encompasses a number of categories short of conventional war to

include insurgency/guerrilla war, terrorism, psychological

operations, etc. The United States, if it deems its national

interests are at stake, must move to counter this aggression

anywhere in the world. Let us next briefly examine actions that

our government can take short of introducing Marines or U. S.

Army troops.

CHAPTER II

U.S. RESPONSE TOWARDS LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT: GENERAL

R. Lynn Rylander, writing in the Naval War College Review

states the following:

As important as they are, contingency response,

peacekeeping and counterterrorism must constitute a

small portion of the U. S. response to low-intensity

conflict. In fact, the nature of low-intensity

conflict argues for a response that relies heavily, if

not exclusively, on local capabilities.1

In other words, in most cases, foreign military intervention is

the last resort in a low-intensity conflict and the solution that

is least desirable. Success depends on local popular support for

the government we are aiding.

There are several options the United States can apply short

of troop introduction. Our policy makers must study and truly

comprehend the given situation carefully in order to determine

what actions from our menu of solutions would be appropriate and

effective. The Joint Chiefs of Staff publication titled the

Joint Low Intensity Conflict Final Report proposes the following

points be considered prior to any United States commitment to

enter with military aid.

In dealing with insurgency and counterinsurgency,

then, a number of factors influence the United States

approach:

- The uniqueness of each situation

- The necessity for appropriate skills and

equipment

- The vital importance of unity of effort

- The priority of training which is a vital

United States role2

The report states that there is no formula one can simply plug in

to solve a given low-intensity war. This is self-evident, but

apparently forgotten often enough to warrant its frequent

repetition.

Secondly, the report reminds us that applying conventional

armies with conventional equipment to low-intensity situations is

often doomed to failure. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan

they did so with mechanized or motorized, tank heavy divisions.

Worse, Soviet combat divisions dragged their extensive anti-air

and anti-tank assets along as well, even though the Afgan rebels

posed no air or armor threat. Soviet units became confined to

their garrisons and their mechanized forays to find guerrillas

accomplished little. These conventional units applied to an

unconventional war proved a liability.

Thirdly, unity of effort is vital in order to prevent our

own units from working at cross purposes. One could make a case

that much of the criticism over our military confusion on Grenada

was due to a separate Army and Navy command operating on that

island concurrently.

The last point is the most important and cannot be stressed

enough. Any low-intensity combat in which we become involved

must not become "Americanized" as did, for example, our effort in

Vietnam. An overwhelming American presence will sap the morale

of those we are trying to help and they will become sullen and

resentful with our intrusions and demands on how they should run

the war. Interjection of our troops must only be the absolutely

last resort. As the Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Report

stresses, "United States policy and strategy for low-intensity

conflict should focus on supporting a host country and on

minimizing any direct United States involvement. "3 We must

train those we seek to help to fight for themselves.

More than the military aspect of any United States response

to a low-intensity conflict, a positive political, economic, and

civil action program must be instituted as well. Because of the

often complicated and ambiguous nature of this type of warfare,

our strategy must of necessity be two-pronged. R. Lynn Rylander

wrote thusly:

Conflicts of this sort grow out of real or perceived

inequities such as conditions that outstrip resources,

poverty, collapsing demand for a country's exports and

political systems that concentrate power and wealth

into the few at the expense of the many.4

He continues by stressing the following:

First we must deal with the underlying instability

that fuels such conflict and counter Soviet and

surrogate exploitation. This requires a comprehensive

and coordinated program of: economic, humanitarian

and security assistance; diplomatic initiatives

designed to resolve regional conflicts; the use of

military forces in counterterrorism, contingency

response and peacekeeping operations...5

The first part of any American strategy in this regard must

include initiatives to which the Marine Corps and the United

States military can contribute little, with the exception of

training the indigenous military forces. The State Department,

Agency for International Development, and other civilian

organizations must take the lead. In fact, without this effort,

any military intervention would probably not succeed. As Colonel

Drew concludes, "To be successful in an insurgency the government

must first excise the sources of popular unrest. . . . "6

Once this has been accomplished, or at least programs

initiated, then the military can begin to identify and target

insurgent support organizations and ultimately defeat them.

In other words, the serious social grievances that pervade

the Third World provide a fertile ground in which insurgent

activity may grow. This must be changed. If a nation makes no

effort to better the lot of its citizens economically and

politically, then our military support is ultimately a waste of

time, because the underlying factors of social unrest will not be

eradicated.

This is clearly seen in the French campaign to end the

insurgency in Algeria from 1957 to l963. Although the French

defeated the National Liberation Front (FLN) militarily, they had

totally alienated the majority Muslim population, and were never

able to reconcile the deep social grievances. Algeria was

granted independence in the final outcome despite French military

superiority. 7

In general, military solutions to LIC, are the least

advantageous. The country undergoing such a struggle must be

willing to rectify the underlying causes of the problem,

otherwise it will continue to fester. The United States can aid

this effort primarily through its foreign and mechanisms which

foster economic growth, political and social change, and projects

aimed at improving the general welfare of the population. A

certain amount of prodding local foreign officials to change will

also be necessary. Those benefiting from a particular political

or social infrastructure, no matter how unjust, are reluctant to

give up their elite status for what they perceive as an insecure

future.

CHAPTER III

UNITED STATES' RESPONSE TO LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: SPECIFIC

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Final

Report outlines specific steps a United States program should

take if committed to a low-intensity conflict.1 As previously

mentioned, United States combat troops must be the last resort.

The first step must be a combination of humanitarian

assistance/civic action to a nation's population and secondly,

security assistance and training to the besieged nation's

military. Both United States military engineers and medical

personnel can actively participate and provide exceptional

service in this facet of low-intensity conflict. Most

low-intensity conflicts occur in the impoverished or

underdeveloped nations of the Third World, i.e. South and Central

America, Africa, and Asia. Societies here are divided into the

rich and the poor with little middle class extant. The great

bulk of the population dwells in abject poverty with little hope

of bettering their lot. Those who are better educated have

rising expectations which the traditional economic system cannot

meet. In fact, the greatest source of frustration is often the

bureaucratic obstacles and red tape erected by the government to

prevent upward social and economic mobility and protect the

monopoly interests of the wealthy. The free market does not

exit, only mercantilism in its worst 18th century phase.2

The majority have little access to proper medical care or

education, since the economic and social infrastructure is

rudimentary as well, especially in rural areas. Paved roads,

electricity, running water, and proper sanitation are usually

nonexistent.

In this regard, American military medical assets can have a

tremendous impact. Medical teams, for example, dispatched to a

besieged country could help eradicate, ".. .childhood and tropical

diseases, intestinal parasites, malnutrition and poor

sanitation. "3 Our military engineers could assist the effort

by constructing roads, dams, bridges, schools, airstrips, and

small rural dispensaries or hospitals.4 The host country's

doctors and engineers could serve along side ours, eventually

taking over the effort. Proper public relations work would play

down American assistance and accentuate the role of the national

officials.

These humanitarian and civic action programs can bring the

government and the people closer together. In many cases it will

be the first time that citizens undertstand that their government

is looking after their general welfare by providing the basic

services the more developed nations have come to expect. As Mr.

Peter Bohansen and Captain W. H. Burgess, USA, point out in their

December 1987 CLIC Paper, "Civic action projects can bring the

military and the populace closer together in common cause, where

the military and the civilians in building needed. ..projects of

long range effect that will be there long after the military has

departed. "5

These concrete endeavors can give a nation's population a

stake in its continued stability and the hope of a better

personal and national future. Therefore, they must be targeted

at the local, grassroots level to be effective. As several

authors have stated, the "key terrain" in a low-intensity

conflict is the country's people. This is an insurrectionists

ultimate strategic target.6

Just as these humanitarian assistance and civic action

programs must be central to our effort, they are but one-half of

the equation of effective low-intensity conflict prosecution.

The second part of our military involvement, short again of a

commitment of combat troops, must be a viable and vigorous

military security assistance program aimed at bettering the

capabilities of an embattled nation's military forces. This type

of aid should focus on the small unit level." . . .ensuring that

local forces are credible and adequate to meet potential

threats.. . "7 Well trained, enthusiastic government forces

will be the best insurance, "... to minimize the possibility that

United States combat forces may be called in. "8 In a

low-intensity conflict scenario, security assistance includes

such activities as Military Assistance Groups (MAG's), which work

out of the United States Embassy and help a host government

determine which type of weapons, military hardware, and training

are required; special operations forces like the Green Berets who

will train the indigenous military personnel in counter

insurgency techniques and guerrilla warfare; and mobile training

teams which improve the technical expertise of complex equipment

operators, especially in communications and aircraft

maintenance. All of these American security assistance personnel

must work hand-in-glove with the local military units to shore up,

their expertise so that they may carry on the military campaign

themselves. As one commentator put it: "Counterinsurgency

success will depend on the besieged government's maintaining

control of the counterinsurgency effort in appearance and in

fact. "9 The aforemeirtioned Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Final

Report echoes this opinion as follows:

United States policy and strategy for low-intensity

conflict should focus on supporting a host country and

minimizing any direct United States involvement. "10

Massive American intervention, a la Vietnam, can rapidly

become a rallying point for popular support against a Third World

government, sap its military's initiative and morale, and bolster

the insurgent cause and propaganda.11 Moreover, in this

regard, it is only logical that we should do all in our power to

effectively train a host nation's forces since it is they who

best operate among their own people. They know the terrain as

well as the guerrillas, thus, in theory, nullifying their

advantage to a great degree. The people then see that their

government is vigorously combatting the insurrection, which lifts

their morale as well. Finally, the limited presence of American

troops as advisors and trainers will not be misunderstood or

resented.12 The national government we are supporting must be

seen by its citizens as vigorously in control of the

anti-guerrilla campaign, only aided by its American ally. The

majority will not resent American aid, but will resent the

appearance that the United States is dominating and controlling

national leaders.

CHAPTER IV

SEA-BASING A LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT EFFORT

As was emphasized in the preceding chapters, the United

States should be extremely circumspect before committing its own

tactical units into the fray of a low-intensity conflict. It is

wiser to provide training, economic, and military support to the

threatened national government, permitting its forces to fight

its own war.

Unfortunately, there will be times when an insurgency,

especially one aided and abetted by foreign powers, will begin to

overwhelm a small government's capabilities, and American combat

forces will be required to help restore the balance of power.

The usual practice in the past, i.e. from the late 19th

century onward, saw our forces arriving in a foreign country to

conduct a low-intensity campaign and immediately begin to

construct garrisons, barracks, depots, bases, and, more recently,

airfields. However, as we enter the 1990's, it is becoming less

and less desirable and efficient for a large, overt American

presence be part of our support of a friendly nation requiring

low-intensity conflict assistance.

Events of the past few years have witnessed a backlash of

foreign national unhappiness against our bases secured by long

standing treaty commitments. For example, in 1988 our ostensible

NATO ally, Spain, ordered the closing of a United States Air

Force base near Madrid, the Spanish capital. Its wing of F-16

fighters were forced to relocate to Italy. The Prime Minister of

Greece (and former American citizen) , Andreas Papandreau, has

conducted two successful election campaigns in which the closing

of extensive United States air and naval facilities were a

central tenet. This despite Greek membership in NATO. In 1986,

the newly elected ruler of the Sudan, Sadiq-al Mahdi, bowing to

Islamic fundamentalist pressure in that African nation, closed

our prepositioned supply facility at Port Sudan on the Red Sea.

In the Philippines, it appears more and more likely that by the

middle or late 1990's we will see Philippine nationalism demand

the removal of United States ships and forces from Subic Naval

Base and Clark Air Base.

As troubling as this is, equally worrisome is the growing

trend of nations which, although they desire our help, are unable

for political, social, or cultural reasons to accept a large

scale American presence on their soil. This was clearly

demonstrated during the recent United States naval operations in

the Persian Gulf in which the American fleet escorted reflagged

Kuwaiti tankers entering and exiting the Straits of Hormuz,

protecting them from attacks by Iran's naval and air forces.

Even though the American navy was there at Arab behest, no Arab

littoral state, not even Kuwait, could politically risk allowing

American ships to base themselves in Arab ports. As one author

noted, "The oil states preferred an over-the-horizon United

States presence..." because many of them contained large Shiite

Moslem minorities and the governments considered these citizens

potentially sympathetic to Iran.1 Because it was in our

interest to protect the free flow of oil to Western Europe and

Japan, the United States government chose to live with this

handicap and make other arrangements for the repair and

replenishment of our ships.

It appears likely that this precedent may be followed in

future American low-intensity conflict efforts. It may be in our

national interest to aid country "X" in its prosecution of a

counterinsurgency, even though a large scale presence of American

forces might be a political liability to the host government.

Therefore, the United States would have to adapt new basing

tactics in the face of a possible hostile reception to the

introduction of a large foreign military presence on country

"X's" soil.

Sensitivities such as this are especially noticeable in the

Middle East and Central and South America where, rightly or

wrongly, a large percentage of any nation's population view the

United States as the world's foremost imperialist power and

aggressor. Colonel Robert Barrow, a future Marine Corps

Commandant, correctly noted while at the National War College in

1972: "No matter how good our intentions may be, the presence of

large numbers of foreign personnel are most often resented by the

people of any country. "2

As the former Commander-in-Chief of the United States'

Southern Command based in Panama, retired Army General Paul

Gorman, recently stated at a forum debating the low-intensity

conflict problem:

The United States will have to find alternatives to

our present system of overseas bases. We have become

overly dependent upon our ability to fly material and

people hither and yon in the world. Also, we have

become overly dependent upon enclaves on foreign soil

from which we conduct business. I suspect that in the

future, particularly with respect to support of

foreign insurgtncies, we will place a much greater

dependence on maritime assets.3 (Emphasis mine.)

Besides the present political realities, United States land

bases on foreign soil present other disadvantages. First of all,

any large scale American presence tends to "Americanize" the

conflict, as our forces takeover more and more of the war effort,

thus sapping the host nation's military morale and vigor.

Secondly, when American combat troops are quartered in a

nation to help quell an insurgency, they automatically generate a

requirement for facilities and logistics bases. This in turn,

requires even more troops to staff and operate them. Once

established, these bases of combat service support (and the same

can be said of combat air fields and the support and maintenance

they require) then generate further needs for more combat troops-

to guard these facilities from insurgent attack. The American

commander can either take units away from the insurgency campaign

for guard duty or request more augmentation, thus increasing the

number of our forces. This causes, "...a disproportionate

buildup of troops in country who are not engaged directly in the

defeat of the insurgency. "4

Thirdly, American troops operating out of fixed land bases

are vulnerable to constant enemy surveillance in a low-intensity

conflict, since by its very nature this type of warfare implies a

certain amount of civilian support for the endeavor. This enemy

surveillance and monitoring will almost always observe the

movement of units, readiness, tactical preparations, etc., thus

alerting the insurgents to imminent tactical activity by American

forces.

Fourthly, the construction costs of these facilities, bases,

and airfields are expensive.

In terms of money, the development of bases can be a

very costly enterprise. In this respect, the Vietnam

conflict has cost billions of dollars, spent on a

variety of property and assets of which very little is

recoverable.5

Fifthly, when considering contingency options, forward bases

overseas are becoming increasingly difficult to obtain.

Furthermore, even some of those presently accessible may be lost

to the United States in the future. The giant naval complex at

Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam is one salient example of a base

previously important to the United States that is now being used

by the Soviet Far East Fleet! Also, it often takes protracted

negotiations, restrictive agreements, and exorbitant costs to

secure a site desired.6

Sixthly, land based facilities, depots, and airfields are

all vulnerable to enemy interdiction. It is a military axiom

that even the best security can eventually be penetrated. In an

era when long range mortars of up to ten miles of range are

extant worldwide, the scope of the security problem is readily

apparent.

Therefore, as General Gorman's previous insight revealed,

the United States may be forced to eschew land basing in a future

low-intensity conflict and its attendant problems for a smaller

sea based commitment. By its very nature, sea basing offers a

number of advantages and solves many of the problems just

reviewed. Also, two thirds of the world is covered by water and

that a large majority of the world's states, especially those of

the underdeveloped areas, have access to the oceans and in many

cases, long littorals. Moreover, it is a that in nations which

own a coastline, the bulk of that state's people live relatively

near to the sea. As Colonel Barrow noted in his 19 study:

The mountainous, jungle covered or arid hinterland...

is much too inhospitable for any but small scale

habitation. The most fertile land usually lies near

the coast in the coastal lowlands or piedmont

regions. 7

Sea basing a counterinsurgency force, then, would probably

provide access to the greatest percentage of any nation's

population, and the control and influence of the population

remember is both the insurgents' goal and center of gravity. For

example, South Vietnam had a coastline of almost one thousand

miles. Practically, "...fifty percent (of its population) lives

within twenty-five miles of the coast. . .and ninety percent live

within fifty miles. 8

When considering activity in the Persian Gulf similar

demographic statistics are found:

Despite being a desert environment, much of the

Arabian peninsula is littoral. Most of the

peninsula's population and oil works are within one

hundred miles of the sea. No point in Qatar is more

than thirty-one miles and Bahrain is an island.9

Therefore, a sea based counterinsurgency force operating in

offshore waters could be used, ... .as a relatively invulnerable

base from which (to) make a flexible and versatile response to

(low-intensity conflict) requirements."10

Insurgents always retain the capability, by the very nature

of guerrilla warfare, to harass our bases, interdict our lines of

communication, and ambush our patrols. But rarely do insurgents

in any law-intensity conflict have the wherewithal to threaten a

naval force, especially one operating over the horizon and

continuously on the move. This creates an enormous psychological

advantage for the sea based force since tactical surprise may be

possible in almost every attack.

Moreover, sea basing a counter insurgency force can overcome

many of the disadvantages faced by land based forces previously

enumerated. The following is a list of sea basing advantages:

First, sea-basing will keep the United States' commitment of

combat forces relatively small, probably no more than a Marine

Expeditionary Brigade in size, due to the number of ships

available. Limiting American combat involvement will prevent the

"Americanization" of the war effort. This indirectly tells the

host country that our assistance is contingent on its own forces

continued aggressive prosecution of the campaign, and that their

concrete results and performance are fundamental to our

participation.

Second, sea-basing will alleviate to a great degree the

political liabilities engendered for a host government associated

with the large scale basing of American troops on its soil. At

the same time, the sea-basing combat effort would bolster host

government morale by firmly committing American troops to the

fight.

Third, seabased forces can receive better food and rest

aboard ship than in a land based garrison since the continuous,

often large security and perimeter guard requirements would be

removed. The forces then would better prepared, because they

would be better rested, for the physical and psychological rigors

of counterinsurgency operations. 11

Fourth, seabased forces are inherently mobile and can move

quickly, parallel to the shore, and at the same time

over-the-horizon, unseen by the enemy, to any distance the

situation may require.12

Fifth, the difficulties of logistics and supply and its

attendant buildup ashore are greatly reduced, "...to that

required to accompany lightly equipped forces for a specific

tactical mission. "13

Sixth, the constant requirement of land-based security at

logistics bases, garrisons, airfields, etc. is reduced or

eliminated and a more favorable tooth-to-tail ratio between

combat and support troops can be maintained. Therefore, a

greater percentage of American combat forces can be used for

their primary purpose, i.e. directly confronting the guerillas in

civic action programs (medical, etc.) or in combat if the

situation has deteriorated to that extant.

Seventh, once the conflict is resolved, seabased forces can

much more easily extract themselves than land-based units. The

ships simply sail away, and no large scale American support

infrastructure and its associated refuse remain.

Eighth, in many countries where a low-intensity conflict may

be fought, the national infrastructure, lines of communications,

etc., are poor or nonexistent, and those few arteries available

are easily interdicted. But, a seabased effort with its mobility

of ships and helicopters will not be as dependent on the roads

and highways.

Ninth, seabased, over the horizon forces can embark unseen

by the enemy or his agents and hit the guerrillas with tactical

surprise much more often than land-based forces which are always

under surveillance. This effectively counters a major guerrilla

advantage.

Tenth, a seabased force, like one land-based, can conduct

psychological operations by including a communications ship of

some type, ". . .complete with a television and radio broadcasting

station and a capability to publish leaflets and other material,

etc... "16

Therefore, sea-basing is a potent, economy of force tactic

that has application in the years of budget constraints the

American military is now facing. However, despite all the

advantage inherent in a sea-basing concept, no one method is

perfect, and in fact sea-basing troops has its disadvantages as

well.

First of all, the relatively small size of the commitment

already mentioned as an advantage is also disadvantage, since it

may be simply too small to cope with the insurgency at hand.

Clearly, such a small force would have been of little help in

Vietnam, although it was effective in the Grenada operation.

Vietnam's scope of war, considering the outright invasions from

the North, was too large for a regiment or even a division to

effect to any degree.

Second, there cannot be a serious air or naval threat to the

task force of embarked ships. Normally, in a low-intensity

conflict, this is not a problem.

Third, adverse weather or conditions at sea can greatly

affect operations ashore, even if weather inland is suitable for

combat operations.

Fourth, the ships assigned to the sea-basing task force must

remain in the operations area for the duration of the effort and

therefore are lost to the Navy for other contingencies or

operations.

Fifth, even though sea-basing may preclude the establishment

of considerable facilities and logistics bases ashore, certain

logistical problems will be encountered in a purely seabased

effort as well. Geoffrey Till notes that Great Britain in its

Falklands' Campaign had a problem: ". . .with the tremendous

consumption rates of modern warfare. ..forces ashore had

constantly to be restocked with everything they needed to

continue military operations. "18

Sixth, the depth of operations ashore will be limited by the

range of the helicopters or aircraft available to the seabased

units. If range is a problem however, then LFM 02 suggests:

"...the temporary establishment of austere helicopter bases at

points near the extreme radius of action..." 19 to extend the

availabe depth of operating ara, which in most locales should

be enough to prosecute the counterinsurgency effort.

In conclusion, seabased forces then can fulfill a variety of

tasks:

- Serve as a highly responsive reserve or reaction force to

exploit a situation where the host nation's army is in

contact;

- Conduct raids or interdiction operations independent of

the host nation force;

- Serve as a deterrent force, if necessary, which is a more

traditional role of Marine units already afloat;

- Because of their probable helicopter assets, be used to

secure areas not easily accessible to regular ground

forces, for a specific denial or reaction mission. Units

like these would be free from dependence on beaches,

airfields and the usual overland lines of communication.

CHAPTER V

SEA-BASING AND THE MARINES

The Marine Corps, as a naval service and the nation's

advertised "force in readiness", is the obvious candidate to

prosecute a low-intensity conflict from the sea-based mode.

Marine Corps tactics, equipment, and doctrine have been shaped

over two centuries by our close association with the Navy and our

constant employment from ship to shore and back again.

Despite our acquisition of more and more heavy equipment

since World War II, to include tanks, large caliber and self

propelled artillery, various types of aircraft and helicopters,

armored personnel carriers, etc., the Marine Corps still remains

essentially a light infantry force that plans to operate mainly

as foot mobile infantry. This would especially be true in a

low-intensity conflict. Light infantry is best suited for a

counterinsurgency campaign even in this age of technological

sophistication.

But more than just infantry, the Marine Corps has created in

its Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) concept a complete

package of air and ground assets which give the Marine rifleman

tremendous firepower and flexibility. British historian Geoffrey

Till has stated,

The USMC should be regarded primarily as a light force

always on patrol with the fleet and ready to be

inserted anywhere at a moment's notice. It is par

excellence the force for seabased military

intervention and diplomatic display especially in the

Third World.1

Based at sea with helicopters providing the primary

ship-to-shore movement, a Marine force has two methods of

mobility i.e. the helo's or surface landing craft themselves, and

the ships which can range any coastline in hours or days. Since

mobility and rapid reaction are two keys to successful

counterinsurgency, a Maine force of even battalion or regimental

size could play a large and important role in assisting a foreign

government and its military to prosecute a low-intensity

conflict. No matter what the scale of seaborne operations, they

could be considerably effective because our forces could

"... strike against a hostile shore from an unexpected or

advantageous direction... " . 2 It is this flexibility "... which

is one of the greatest strategic assets that a maritime power can

have. "3

Since 3 March 1776, when a force of 220 Marines and 50

sailors made the first American amphibious raid on Nassau Island

in the Bahamas, the Marine Corps has made more than one hundred

major amphibious landings in all areas of the world.4 This

long tradition and institutional experience can be adapted today

to low-intensity conflict, giving the United States, depending on

the particular circumstances, an option to use the sea as a base

for combat on land. Unlike the classic amphibious operations of

World War II, where naval task forces with Marine units ranging

in size from one to three divisions assaulted the Pacific island

bastions of Japan, operations in low-intensity conflict require

smaller, highly air and sea mobile forces capable of rapid

response at a moments notice to guerrilla attacks up to one

hundred miles from the ships serving as sea-bases. The required

rapid response time and mobility must therefore be coupled with

sophisticated, highly technical intelligence collection and

communication systems to assure success against an acknowledged

elusive guerrilla enemy.5 Therefore, operations in

low-intensity conflict should be "...rapier like thrusts,

designed to keep guerrilla forces dispersed, preoccupied,

distracted, and harassed at every turn. "6 Speed and range, in

addition to flexibility, are essential to any reaction force.

Helicopters, then, are the vital component of any sea-based

operation since they offer the ability to traverse the rugged

terrain guerrillas usually use as their sanctuary.

Rapid reaction to or even preemption of guerrilla operations

will frustrate their chances of success. One author argues that

a Marine counterinsurgency force will accrue more success by

demonstrating to the guerrillas that it can go anywhere or appear

suddenly at unexpected times or places, rather than simply

chasing guerrillas to engage and eliminate them. This is

important since insurgents are loathe to fight when outnumbered

or outgunned.7 If they never feel safe or secure, guerrillas

are less likely to conduct bold operations, or for that matter

larger scale operations, since the more people involved in an

operation, the more easily detectable it becomes.

The idea that an American counterinsurgency force should

adopt the tactics of the "rapier thrust" makes even more sense

when the political and operational constraints under which such a

unit would operate in any future low-intensity conflict. While a

commander operating in the conventional war arena can rely on

heavy firepower or large mechanized forces to win battles, the

commander in a counterinsurgency fight is not allowed the luxury

of massive artillery or air strikes against suspected targets,

since these could easily cause the loss of innocent, civilian

life, thus playing into the guerrillas' strategy. Such mistakes

must be avoided at all costs or a national government, and the

United States as the country which supports it, will soon lose

the loyalty of the people who are the center of gravity in a

low-intensity conflict.8

In order to maintain a low profile, American forces should

be more optimally used in the remoter, rural areas vice large

cities or urban areas. Let the host nation forces primarily

react to urban attacks and limit the Marine counterinsurgency

force to the countryside. This serves the purpose of

concentrating our power where the guerrillas are probably

strongest and allows the government we are aiding to be seen as

the primary guarantor of public security. Marine forces can then

concentrate on ferreting out guerrilla bases, supply caches,

infiltration routes, and sanctuaries, thus allowing the

indigenous military units to secure the most important populated

areas. Marine units operating from sea bases must be prepared to

be rapidly inserted and to engage in small unit actions under

austere conditions at extended distances from the ships serving

as the sea base.10

Utilizing the advanced intelligence collection assets,

whichwill be discussed in greater detail in Chapter VII, Marine

forces could be employed as a strike force to quickly react

against concentrated guerrilla attacks, as reinforcements for

indigenous troops in combat, or as a raid force against newly

discovered guerrilla base camps or infiltration routes, etc.

Leaving the basic security effort to indigenous forces, sea-based

Marine units would be free to spotlight targets of high

psychological profile such as guerrilla headquarters or time

sensitive targets like a staging area.

Because the sea-based effort would generally operate out of

sight and over the horizon, Marine forces could initiate attacks

at a time and location totally unexpected by the insurgents.

Sea-based operations would stand a higher probability of success

because they could avoid the constant surveillance afforded

guerrillas if our units were solely based on land. Therefore, a

sea-based force could use its swift mobility to focus its full

combat potential at a precise location.11

Remember that since the Second World War, a revolution has

occurred in the conduct of amphibious operations with the advent

of new weapons systems like the helicopter (and its successor,

the tilt-rotor airplane) and surface craft of high speed like the

air cushioned vehicle. Marine units can now launch raids or

conduct operations from up to 50 miles from the shore, as opposed

to the 4000 yard limit with conventional amphibious landing

vehicles. The speed, range, and surprise provided by the

helicopter and its successors, and the air cushioned vehicles now

entering the fleet are extremely important devices needed by

acounterinsurgency force to bring guerrillas to battle.

Guerrillas, remember, will fight according to Mao-tse Tung's

dictum that when facing a stronger military force they should,

Withdraw when he advances, harass him when he stops, strike him

when he is weary, pursue him when he withdraws." 12

Rarely do guerrillas have the strength or firepower to

confront regular forces in a pitched battle. Therefore, they

seek to retain the initiative by choosing the time and place of

attack and to never give battle unless possessed of clear

advantage.

Economy of force is a requirement in a low-intensity

conflict, especially concerning any committed American force.

Sea-basing a counterinsurgency force insures economy because the

"tooth to tail" ratio of support to combat forces can be kept

low. The need for a large scale, support troop buildup would be

eliminated.

A sea based force would also have to be limited in size

because of the number of ships the United States Navy has

available. A Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) built around a

battalion of infantry normally requires three to five amphibious

ships for a deployment. Extended operations off the coast of any

country in the throes of guerrilla war may require some

additional ships for proper support. A Marine Expeditionary

Brigade (MEB), constructed about an infantry regiment requires 20

or more. A Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) with an infantry

division as its core requires at least 56 ships to embark in its

entirety. 16 Because the United States Amphibious fleet will

only number 84 ships by 1998 (provided all future budget funding

remain intact), it is not possible for our country to use more

than a division of infantry in a sea-base mode. Optimally, a

brigade is probably the largest unit we could comfortably

sea-base for extended low-intensity operations due to shipping

constraints, maintenance and repair requirements of the

individual vessels (l5% are off-line at any one time17), and

amphibious commitments to other geographic areas such as the

Pacific and Mediterranean Sea. However, this is not necessarily

detrimental to our low-intensity conflict effort, since we

primarily want to use nonmilitary means, already identified as

the primary tactic, when conducting counterinsurgency

operations. The military aspect can only be supplemental.

Since in low-intensity conflict combat operations are

decentralized and conducted primarily by units of battalion size

or smaller, a battalion or regimental size American force

operating from a mobile sea base could provide an impact to the

war effort greater than its size would indicate. Units such as

these possessing the mobility of ships and helicopter or fast

surface craft are well suited for operations against guerrillas.

These forces are mobile in two ways, first by helo or surface

craf t to the land target area, and second, by the fact that the

ships are mobile platforms in themselves and can move

perpendicular to the entire length of any country's coastline.

Therefore, battalion or regimental sized Marine units could

effectively carry out any number of operations in low-intensity

conflict, especially now that the Marine Corps is instituting the

special operation capable (SOC) units in its afloat forces. By

virtue of intensive training in raid techniques and other special

operations, these combat units will have an increased chance of

combat success in a low-intensity conflict. The Rand Corporation

for example, published a study in 1985 that compared 100 commando

raids, 77 of which were successful. The analysis revealed that

the obstacles to raid success like distance or geography can be

overcome by smaller units using mobility and surprise. The basic

conclusion was that raids or interdiction operations can be very

effective if undertaken by well trained and highly mobile

forces.18 The optimal size unit was found to be 25 to 50

personnel, carried in two or three small helicopters, though

larger units of 100 - 200 could be quite successful if highly

trained. Although Marine SOC units are not commandos in the

classic sense of the word, the increased emphasis on hard

training was found by the Rand study to be the significant

determinant of suocess.19

The Rand study also found that commando raids which used

vehicles like trucks or jeeps had the highest rates of success,

1OO% or eighteen of eighteen cases studied. Interestingly, the

helicopter had the next highest rate of 89%, with boat raids

being successful 78% of the time. Commando attacks on foot were

only successful 71% of the time.20

It must be noted that Marine forces will have to be well

trained in rapid planning in order to respond effectively to

low-intensity operations. Raids and interdictions of guerrilla

bases and supply lines, staging areas and caches will require a

response time of hours vice days. There are precedents and one

will be cited Soviet World War II history. As Geoffrey Till

relates:

According to some accounts, sixty-one of the one

hundred and thirteen amphibious assaults conducted by

the Soviet Navy in the war were organized the day

before. 21

Most of these were small scale operations launched from the sea

to put forces behind the enemy's line for disruptive purposes.

Also, the Greek Navy in the late 1940's civil war in that

nation used seaborne raiding parties to interdict guerrilla

columns infiltrating down the coast or to isolate guerrilla units

fighting in the coastal areas.22 Coastal waters, therefore,

can be of significance operationally, a fact that must be

appreciated more often. The sea, unlike inland terrain with its

often rough topography, usually offers a relatively flat plain

over which forces can move at will, even in weather conditions

that could halt land campaigns.23 By orienting on the enmy,

sea-based forces need not concern themselves with long, overland

supply lines or forced marches. They can instead, using the air

and water mobility at hand, land troops in close proximity, at

multiple points, to guerrilla units in order to cut off their

retreat, surround their camps or interdict their infiltration

routes.

Major Andrew Pratt, USMC, in an article titled

"Low-Intensity Conflict and the United States Marine Corps

provided a matrix delineating coastal accessibility and seaborne

entrance by geographic areas.24

Amphibious

Area Accessibility Characteristics

South East Asia Significant Virtually all capitals

and major cities are

seaports or in close

proximity to the sea;

only Laos is land-

locked

Middle East/ Significant Most countries acces-

North Africa sible from the sea

Europe Significant No major power is

land locked

Latin America Most vital areas Most capitals or im-

accessible portant cities are

ports

Far East Significant Only Mongolia is not

accessible from the

sea

Sub-Saharan Some areas Fourteen countries

Africa inaccessible are landlocked

South Asia Significant Most major countries

accessible by the sea

As shown, most countries of the world have at least some

part of their territory accessible by the sea. Therefore, a

sea-based MAGTF is able to solidly influence a land war presently

and, by virtue of the new technologies and weapons systems

discussed in the following chapters, even more so in the future.

Since the largest unit the United States could comfortably sea

base would be a Marine Expeditionary Brigade, the size of our

commitment would be limited, forcing most of the responsibility

of the prosecution of a low-intensity conflict on the threatened

government. That of course, as previously discussed, is the

preferred strategy.

CHAPTER VI

SEA-BASING, MOBILITY AND SUPPORT

If the Marines are again committed to a low-intensity

conflict, they must emphasize small unit leadership, mobility,

surprise and intelligence. The intelligence aspect will be

discussed in the next chapter and it is not the intention of this

paper to argue the merits of effective small unit leadership,

though reams have already been written on this issue. However,

if the bulk of our forces are sea-based, they will absolutely

require mobility, par excellence, to successfully prosecute their

tactical effort. Fortunately, our technology has developed and

fielded (and is still developing) the necessary platforms,

airframes and equipment to ferry our troops from an

over-the-horizon seabase to a battle area well inside the

supported country.

Because foreign domestic pressures and political constraints

may limit the ability of our government to base a large number of

troops on another nation's soil, American options in aiding a

counterinsurgency effort can be limited. On one hand we could

use airborne forces, i.e. parachute or air assault, based in the

United States or neighboring countries willing to aid the effort,

but as one author notes, "...purely airborne forces have the

disadvantage of not arriving in coherent tactical entities. "1

So too, they cannot be dropped in rough terrain or dense foliage

which limits their usefulness.

Therefore, sea-basing American troops may be the only

remaining alternative. Mobile seabases are politically sensitive

in that they keep the vast majority of American troops out of

sight, free from strategic dependence on overland lines of

communications, and land bound logistics bases, and all but the

most austere of airfields and helicopter landing zones. As

General Paul Gormen, the former Commander-in-Chief (CinC) of the

Southern Command, headquartered in the Panama Canal Zone,

recently stated regarding this subject:

...the United States will have to find alternatives to

our present system of overseas bases. We have become

overly dependent upon our ability to fly material or

people hither and yon in the world. Also, we have

become overly dependent upon enclaves on foreign soil

from which we conduct our business. I suspect that in

the future, particularly with respect to support of

foreign insurgencies, we will place a greater

dependence upon maritime assets.2

These assets are presently available in the United States'

Navy and Marine Corps, though somewhat limited by numbers. Our

amphibious fleet, for example, currently numbers 67 ships, not

nearly enough when one stops to consider that it takes more than

50 to lift just one of the three Marine divisions extant. (It is

interesting to note that planning for Operation Olympic, the

scheduled, but never launched initial invasion of mainland Japan

of November, 1945, called for nine American divisions to be

landed on D-Day alone, from three thousand amphibious ships!)3

Provided proper congressional funding, the United States hopes

to increase its amphibious fleet to eighty-four by 1998,4 and

this will include seventeen of the smaller amphibious helicopter

carriers of the LPH, LHA, and LHD classes and seventeen of the

new LSD-41 class ship, to be discussed shortly. However, numbers

alone can be misleading. As J. D. Hessman states:

Just as important to the success of an amphibious

operation is having available the right "mix" of

ships. The proper mix would provide not only troop

berthing and sufficient cargo space...but also: well

decks for landing craft; helicopter flight decks;

command and communications facilities; hospital/

medical evacuation spaces; and beaching

capabilities5

In this regard, a sea-based counterinsurgency effort might

congist of just one ship providing only intelligence or

psychological warfare support to a foreign government; three to

five ships supporting a MEU, or 25 or more to support a MEB.

Actually, in a low-intensity conflict scenario, ship requirements

may be reduced to a degree because, unlike a normal amphibious

deployment, a Marine unit fighting a counterinsurgency effort

probably would not embark its tanks, selfpropelled artillery,

heavy towed artillery like the M-l98's, large numbers of trucks,

air defense control units, etc.

The Navy has three classes of amphibious aircraft carriers

in its fleet. These types would be called upon to carry the bulk

of the load in a low-intensity conflict, include the older LPH

class, which is nearing its obsolescence, the more recent vintage

LHA, and the modern LHD class, the first of which, the Wasp

(LHD-1) , has already been commissioned.

At 844 feet in length, and weighing 40,500 tons, the LHD is

an impressive platform from which to conduct either amphibious

assaults or counterinsurgency warfare. Twelve are scheduled to

be built, and this would provide enough lift for one MEF and one

MEB.6 Given the current budget climate, however, it is

doubtful all 12 will be built, at least not in the timeframe

envisioned.

The LHD can carry almost 190O Marines, in addition to its

sailor crew of 1,080. Besides carrying helicopters and vertical

takeoff fixed wing aircraft, like the AV-8B Harrier, the LHD can

launch air cushioned vehicles (LCAC's) from its stern well deck,

something the LPH and LHA classes cannot do, thus giving the

Marines two rapid entry options.

An improvement over the current LHA class (which itself was

a substantial improvement of the LPH type), the LHD can carry up

to 42 CH-46 helicopters or a mix of 30 or so planes of all typed

and still have room for a detachment of six to eight Harriers for

close air support.7

Furthermore, the LHD has a significant anti-submarine

warfare capability (ASW) not found in the two earlier classes.

If necessary for sea control purposes, an LHD can carry up to 20

Harriers and six ASW helicopters.8 With six fully equipped

operating rooms and a 600 bed hospital, the LHD could also aid a

nonmilitary low-intensity effort of humanitarian assistance,

especially after some type of natural disaster, to help a

struggling population regain its equilibrium.9

But its the addition of the well deck which illustrates the

biggest difference in capability between the LHD and its

predecessors, the LPH and LHA. Three, high speed LCAC's (to be

discussed in greater detail) enable to LHD to land troops over

70% of the world's beaches and thus provide an alternative to

helicopters for operations near the coast.

Seabases like the LHD and LHA are sophisticated platforms

that can transport Marines to a low-intensity fight, sustain them

while there, and provide the mobility and close air support

required. These mobile airfields would be basically impervious

to guerrilla attacks, while at the same time not requiring the

extensive guard details to secure the facilities and airplanes,

thus freeing the Marines to concentrate on attacking the

guerrillas. Land bases, on the other hand, are constantly

threatened by insurgent attacks, as recently proven in

Afghanistan. The Soviets discovered, as have all nations

fighting low-intensity conflicts, that aircraft at fixed

installations are vulnerable to damage or destruction 24 hours a

day for they make an extremely lucrative, vary large target.10

In these days of long range mortars reaching 10 miles or more,

and small multiple rocket launchers that can be easily dragged

over almost any terrain, securing an airfield from attack or

harassing fire becomes an enormous, burdensome, and manpower

intensive undertaking. Guerrilla capabilities since our

involvement in Vietnam have required militaries worldwide to

rethink their tactics, though the Soviets seemed not to profit

from American mistakes in this regard.

Supplementing the helicopter/VSTOL carriers is the remainder

of the amphibious fleet consisting of the long serving LST class

(the newest of which were constructed in the 1960's) , the LPD

class, with its well deck for launching amphibious vehicles, and

the new LSD-41 class which modernizes the fleet and upgrades its

capability. Weighing 15,000 tons, and possessing a length of 609

feet, these newly designed ships carry a crew of 352 and can

accommodate 248 Marines. Two LSD's serving with an LHD/LHA/LPH

could easily base a battalion of Marines with its aviation

element, if supported by another ship or two bearing the

logistics effort. Sporting a well deck and a flight deck, this

ship carries four LCAC's for fast surface landings and can land

even the largest of helicopters to include the CH-53E.11

Far more capable than its predecessors, the new LSD-41 class

could even operate independent of the remainder of the task force

for a period of time if several operations were to occur

simultaneously.

Some authors have suggested that even commercial ships, with

structural modifications like add on helicopter landing decks,

could have utility in a low-intensity conflict.12 Generally,

the liabilities of commercial ships outweigh their positive

aspects. However, they most likely would only be used as a last

resort. Passenger liners most obviously come to mind, but

Roll-on/Roll-off (Ro-Ro) ships and other general purpose

freighters might prove useful. Merchant ships are built with

speed and endurance in mind and generally lack the proper

communications, damage control, and replenishment capabilities a

sea-base will require.13 Also, commercial vessels offer little

ability to transfer cargo at sea, and some types cannot transfer

any cargo at all. A damaged ship would have to return to port

and take all the equipment stored in its hold with it. The

British used commercial ships in their Falklands Campaign in 1982

and their general lack of berthing space was a problem. As

Colonel Brosnan explains, this lack of berthing "...separates

sailors and Marines from their equipment and drivers from their

vehicles; it forces pre-H-Hour transfers." 14 This problem is

accentuated by the commercial ships paucity of helicopter landing

spaces, which for any sustained campaign would have to be grafted

upon the ship. (On the bright side, many British troops were

quartered aboard the Queen Elizabeth II ocean liner. Despite the

fact that there equipment was on another vessel, its safe to

assume that most troops would be satisfied with this arrangement,

especially if the alternative was an LST.)

Getting from the seabase to the shore must be by either the

air or water's surface. The Marine Corps' helicopter fleet has

long demonstrated its superb capability to ferry men and supplies

and to provide them fire support once the battle is engaged.

This mobility provided by the ships coupled with that

provided by the air results in a synergism that utilizes the

advantages of both. Tactics proved in Vietnam, and further

refined, would allow a helicopterborne force to move behind

guerrilla units engaged by a foreign government, cut off their

routes of escape, attack their base camps and keep them off

guard.

Present helicopters in the Marine Corps' inventory include

those with a primary mission of troop transport like the CH-46,

equipment and supply transport like the CH-53, utility vehicles

like the UH-1, and fire support craft like the AH-l Cobra. All

of these can be based on the LPH/LHA/LHD carriers and the LSD.

Generally, helicopters have a combat radius of 100 miles or so.

However, with the construction of mobile, non-permanent. austere

refueling bases, that relatively short range could be extended,

if required.

Howeve,1 with the eventual acquisition of the new MV-22

Osprey, tilt wing rotor airplane, the problems of a helicopter's

limited range will be solved. Scheduled to replace the CH-46

workhorse, the Osprey will prove ideal for low-intensity conflict

by virtue of its striking capabilities. The first improvement

will be the extension of range, already cited. More importantly,

it is a more maneuverable and more than twice as fast, clocking

250 knots versus the Sea Knight's 120 knot maximum speed. A

fully loaded Osprey can carry almost an entire platoon of combat

loaded Marines and its employment will be limited "...only by the

commander's imagination." 15

Neither has technology neglected high speed travel over the

sea's surface. Present amphibious vehicles like the LVTP-7 are

limited to 4000 yards from the beach, and require 15 minutes to

complete the ship-to-shore journey. An even greater disadvantage

is that all surprise as to the location of the landing or assault

is lost with the arrival of the amphibious ships only 4000 yards

off the beach. However, an air cushioned vehicle can make the

4000 yard distance in only two minutes. Most importantly, the

LCAC can launch from 25 miles or more from the beach, totally out

of sight, and maintain the surprise of its final destination.

Moreover, the LCAC can make the 25 mile journey in just 32

minutes. 16

LCAC's have other advantages too.

Unlike conventional landing craft, the LCAC's will

ride a pressurized cushion of air to, and over, the

beach hurdling underwater obstacles with minimal

susceptibility to enemy mines and guaranteeing a quick

and dry delivery of both men and equipment.17

Furthermore, LCAC's, unlike conventional landing craft, are not

as restricted to the type of beach on which they can land.

Worldwide, according to studies, only 17% of all coasts are

assailable by conventional landing craft of all types. With the

LCAC, that percentage jumps to over 70%!18 For example, in the

Persian Gulf, sand bars, salt marshes, and other types of natural

obstacles restrict conventional landing craft to only 14% of the

coast. The LCAC, riding on its air cushion, can traverse 70 -

90% of this littoral.19

Capable of carrying up to 70 tons of cargo or 150 troops,

the LCAC when used in combination with helicopter assaults in the

near shore area can rapidly position troops to trap guerrillas,

interdict their lines of communications, and raid their caches

and bases. The element of surprise could be retained more often

due to the LCAC's operational range and speed.

Once landed by either air or surface, Marine forces will not

be left unsupported. They can be continuously resupplied by

helicopters. Satellite communications will allow constant

contact with the seabase even at distances of several hundred

miles. The support infrastructure for troops engaged on land is

further enhanced now that the AV-8B Harrier, ground support

aircraft is part-and-parcel of our aviation inventory. Troops

ashore will have ready access to on-call air strikes even under

the most difficult conditions.

It received high marks during the 1982 British - Argentine

war over the Falkland Islands. Sea-based Harriers provided the

British fleet its sole fixed wing air defense force, and were

credited with shooting down some 24 Argentine aircraft. The

Harriers also served as the army and Marines total close air

support package in attacks on the islands proper. 20

With respect to the Marine Corps, it first embarked a six

plane detachment of Harriers as part of a MEU's aviation combat

element (ACE) in early 1987.21. With the ability to operate

from an austere airstrip, the AV-8B can quickly respond to ground

support requests of Marines engaged in battle. Harriers need not

be tied strictly to their sea bases. Austere bases can be

established relatively quickly at some remote site to support

troops in action. Fuel bladders, ammo pallets and a small

maintenance crew can be detached from the sea base and placed

inland on a temporary basis (three - four days) to help prosecute

an attack, etc.

Although helicopters and fixed wing aircraft will continue

to provide most of fire support in a low-intensity conflict,

naval gunfire can still be useful and available under certain

circumstances, even though most naval ships today only carry 3 or

5 inch guns that have ranges less the 10 miles. The range is

limited even further when one considers that the Navy will not

bring a ship closer to the chore than the 12 fathom curve. In

some cases, this means a fire support ship will not venture

closer than 2 or 3 miles from the shore. However, the Navy still

has four battleships with nine, 16 inch guns each capable of

hurling a 2700 pound shell 23 miles.22

Geoffrey Till, in his book, Modern Seapower, mentions that

naval gunfire support to land forces has proven to be "extremely

effective despite years of scepticism by the West. "23 This

occurred as recently as 1982 by the British in the Falklands. At

first glance it might appear that naval gunfire would be of only

marginal effectiveness, but a closer look indicates the

opposite. During the Korean War, for example, ". ..the battleship

Wisconsin, using 16 inch guns, destroyed numerous targets on

reverse slopes at an average range of 16 miles,"24 confirming

the Navy's claims regarding the range and accuracy of these

weapons. The average expenditure of ammunition per destroyed

target at that 16 mile range was between 15 - 23 rounds.

Even the small Greek navy during that nation's communist

insurgency/civil war from 1947 - 1949 "...delivered gunfire

ashore to assist some village or to support an army unit in the

attack, operating near the coast, on the average of four times a

week. "25 Therefore, if naval gunfire is within range it can

prove extremely effective. One caveat, especially regarding the

16 inch guns, is that naval gunfire will be of little use against

guerrillas fighting near villages or towns because of the chance

of civilian casualties.

For long range, surgical fire support, sea-based Marine

units may want access to calling on naval cruise missiles like

the Tomahawk. Possessing pin point accuracy and a range of up to

250 to 1500 miles, these missiles could be used effectively under

certain circumstances. For example one scenario might go

something like this:

Through various intelligence sources, the embarked

intelligence section discovers that various guerrilla leaders

will be meeting in a certain farmhouse to determine their next

attack. The meeting place will be well guarded and the rough

terrain makes a heliborne attack risky. By properly programming

a Tomahawk to find this particular farm house, the missile could

be timed to arrive approximately one hour after the meetings

start.

So far I have hoped to show that seabasing a Marine unit can

be a viable, and possibly advantageous, option in a

counterinsurgency operation. The United States military has the

platforms in its Navy, the troops in its Marines, fire support

(air, ground, sea) and logistics, also shipborne. Seabasing has

its own set of problems, however, which must be addressed.

First, although the helicopter is essential to any

sea-basing effort, the modern proliferation of shoulder fired

air-to-surface missiles like the Redeye or Grail or Stinger puts

these airframes in jeopardy. Gone are the days when troop laden

helicopters could set down in the middle of an ongoing fire fight

and still expect to survive. Today, helicopters must land on a

battle's peripheries, and the Marines they carry must rely on

their legs to take them the rest of the way. The British lost 20

helo's in the Falklands operation, 10% of its force. Once the

Stinger was introduced into Afghanistan, it changed the course of

the war against the Soviets. In Vietnam, helo's flying into

harm's way proved extremely vulnerable, so much so that during

the eight year course of the war, 1,700 were shot down, crashed,

or were destroyed on the flight line.26

Secondly, with sea-based operations the withdrawal of our

forces after the action takes on added significance. Marines

tend to focus on getting to the battle, and closing with the

enemy. But in a sea-based effort, withdrawal is a part of the

total effort. Therefore, it must be given careful, detailed

planning and attention. Fortunately, withdrawals in

low-intensity operations are rarely conducted under enemy

pressure. Even so, the place and time must be pre-planned to

avoid leaving a unit stranded in guerrilla territory awaiting

extraction. Insertion by helo and withdrawal by LCAC (and vice

versa) are options, and in some cases, even small units (platoon

or smaller) by submarine. On the other hand, once insurgent

forces are engaged, no withdrawal should be made until they are

destroyed or contact completely broken.27

A third problem is in the limited numbers of ships available

for the seabasing effort. Essentially, the Navy does not

currently possess sufficient ships to lift an infantry division

and its equipment. A seabased MEB would require 20 ships or more

at least, not including replacement, replenishment, and security

vessels. Since our amphibious fleet is divided between the East

and West coasts, one fleet would have to seriously deplete its

assets just to support the brigade. Recalling that 15% of the

fleet is also undergoing maintenance or repair at any one time, a

sustained commitment at low-intensity conflict implies difficulty

sustaining other commitments.

Finally, concerning logistics, Marine planners in a seabased

environment will be required to support the effort almost totally

from ships, without the benefit of establishing large supply

bases ashore. However, for particular operations or special

circumstances, small, mobile facilities could be constructed as

needed, realizing that the helicopter would be the primary means

of transport. The British rediscovered in the Falklands that

even a small war in the modern era involves tremendous

consumption rates of ammunition, fuel, and replacement parts, and

that forces ashore had to be constantly restocked with everything

in order to continue operations.28 Some new and innovative

supply techniques may have to be developed, although much will be

decided by the geography and enemy capability.

Suffice it to say that it probably will not be possible to

develop any large logistics effort ashore prior to an operation

as this might become an intelligence tipoff to the enemy of our

impending action. Nonetheless, all necessary supplies could be

broken and made ready for transport and placed on a ship

operating nearer to the coast than those carrying the Marines

themselves in order to shorten supply lines somewhat.

Along the same lines, it is important in a counterinsurgency

strike not to weigh our Marines down with an over abundance of

gear, as so often has happened in the past. Most of us still

remember film footage of Vietnam or the stories of veterans of

that war and recall how they were obviously carrying in excess of

100 pounds of pack and gear while on patrol. Let the extraneous

gear be helicoptered in at a later time, so that the Marines need

only carry ammunition, water and a days rations.

In the next LIC, Marines will rely on the Navy's reduced

amphibious fleet capability to transport them to the area of

operations. Once there, combat troops will be taken ashore by

helicopter, its fixed wing replacement, the tilt rotor Osprey, or

over the water by the LCAC family of air-cushioned vehicles. A

variety of aircraft, like the Harrier, and some ships, such as

the battleship Missouri, will supply the fire support.

Finding the insurgents and bringing them to battle is often

a problem, and the next chapter will discuss intelligence

support. The Marine Corps has the wherewithal to arrive in the

area of conflict ready to fight. The difficulty often lies in

discovering where and when an elusive enemy can be engaged.

CHAPTER VII

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

The nature of low-intensity conflict places a premium on the

collection, processing, and analysis of sometimes very perishable

information. It demands a taxing, extensive effort to ferret out

insurgent design and intentions. No longer simply the realm of

spies or secret agents, intelligence analysts today also tap

sources of radio and communications (SIGINT and COMINT),

electronic emissions (ELINT) and take photographs from drones,

aircraft and satellites of enemy activity (PHOTINT). In the

initial stages of an insurgency, infiltrating the insurgents

organization continues to be the most viable means of discovering

their plans and thus the old craft of human intelligence (HUMINT)

pays the greatest dividends. This is especially true in a

low-intensity conflict since in the incipient states, the

insurgents are usually formed into tightly knit cells and usually

only use messengers for communications. Therefore, the other

forms of intelligence just mentioned are of only marginal use.

The problem is that American intelligence collection is

strongest in the SIGINT, PHOTINT, ELINT realms, and especially in

the Third World, weakest or nonexistent in the HUMINT realm.

This is for a variety of cultural and particularly American

reasons. For the most part, except for advice and training, we

must rely upon the national government we are supporting to

predominantly acquire the human intelligence collection, at least

during the initial stages of our involvement. To expect for

Americans to arrive in country `X' and quickly establish an agent

network that will infiltrate the insurgent network is naive. It

will take years of hard effort. Americans can only hope,

initially, that the host government has a vigorous intelligence

system monitoring guerrilla activities.

However, our technology offers a variety of methods to

support a foreign government or seabased Marine unit in its quest

for information on insurgent capability. General Gorman

maintains this opinion:

For example, the single most important sort of

assistance that the United States can give a potential

insurgent force or a potential free political movement

is tactical intelligence. The kind of tactical

intelligence that we are most likely to be able to

contribute most readily is technologically derived.1

Also, Americans must be able to determine the vital

information requirements that fit the particular campaign being

waged. As Dr. Henry Kissenger, the former Secretary of State,

once said: "I don't know how to ask for good intelligence, but I

know it when I see it. "2 The problem is to direct collection

assets to look for particular things. It is of little use to

say, "Send everything - we'll sort it out. "3 To a certain

extent. I believe the Marine Corps tragedy of November 1983 in

Lebanon can be traced to just this type of attitude.

Since our intelligence strength resides in our SIGINT,

PHOTINT, and ELINT capabilities, our entire low-intensity

conflict effort to support a foreign government could consist of

one ship conducting both collection of information and its

subsequent analysis. Connected by secure communications to an

American liaison office in the foreign government military

headquarters in she American Defense attache at the U. S.

Embassy, this seabased intelligence platform could direct a

comprehensive intelligence collection effort using a variety of

assets. Once confidence in working with our foreign colleagues

is established, possibly several representatives from its

military and civilian intelligence organizations could work in

the ship's intelligence "fusion" center processing the raw

information from multiple sources into understandable and useful

intelligence. As one author stated:

The challenge in low-intensity conflict is to monitor

an enemy not yet conducting continuous or even

frequent operations, not yet organized into easily

identifiable military formations, whose success may

not depend on battlefield success.4

Part of the intelligence collection effort must be directed

to understanding why certain elements of the population are

rebelling in the first place. America must understand the

political factors underlying the guerrilla movement.5 Once

thin is known our country can better direct our collection assets

to target precise groups, places, or things for information. In

this regard, a seabased Marine effort would have multiple assets

with which to collect intelligence, some being organic to the

Marine Corps itself, and others derived from national or theater

assets.

Beginning with national assets, if our counterinsurgency

effort were the only war in which the United States was engaged,

Marines could count on a certain amount of satellite photographic

support. Although these amazingly technical marvels are designed

primarily for the strategic realm, they can be extremely useful

in a low-intensity conflict. They can surveil remote areas to

discover guerrilla base camps, caches, etc. Although sea-based

Marines would not receive direct satellite communications, they

would have access to those that do and thus information could be

passed expeditiously.

A seabased counterinsurgency effort could also depend on so

called "theater support", meaning those under control of the

area s Unified or Specified commander. Theater assets usually

mean the high flying U-2 or SR-71 spy planes capable of taking

photographic and infrared images. Like satellites, these air

breathing platforms fly high enough so as to be unseen while at

work.

On the tactical level, the Marine Corps possesses its own

photo/reconnaissance platforms and signals intelligence assets.

As an insurgency expands and tries to conduct larger and more

sophisticated operations, it invariably must begin to rely on a

certain amount of radio or emission type communication. The more

radios the guerrillas use, the easier it is for Marine collection

assets to exploit.

Another recent technological development that bears great

potential in the counterinsurgency sphere is the synthetic

aperture radar (SAR) or side-looking airborne radar (SLAR) in

Marine parlance. First used by the Air Force in the 1960's in

Indochina, significantly advanced systems are now in the

inventories of some Marine Corps aviation units.6 Since a

low-intensity conflict requires a twenty-four hour, all weather

surveillance effort, the SLAR system becomes invaluable because,

"...darkness and adverse weather do not inhibit (its) use..."7

Airplanes equipped with SLAR are launchable from aircraft

carriers, and the systems 50 mile range offers a political

advantage regarding American presence and overflight rights.

Sensitive areas can still be imaged even if flight over them is

"...not authorized or militarily advisable. "8 Thus, a SLAR

equipped Marine Corps aircraft could take off from an aircraft

carrier in the Caribbean, fly along the Honduran border and look

up to 50 miles into Nicaragua to ascertain activity in remote or

near-border areas. It could be done at night or in bad weather

when ordinary imaging systems like cameras would not be useful.

Moreover, a SLAR equipped aircraft can provide a data link

directly back to the seabase's intelligence spaces providing

real-time information on guerrilla activity. This allows the sea

based Marines to quickly act on perishable or very immediate

data.

Although somewhat less capable, Marine aviation units also

possess a propeller driven craft, the OV-l0, Bronco which is

equipped with a Forward-Looking Infra-Red (FLIR) system which can

provide all-weather information as well. Unlike the SLAR which

emits active radar energy to detect movement, etc., the FLIR is a

totally passive system which gives the enemy no indication of any

technical activity. However, the OV-l0 is a much slower, and

less capable airplane, hence, it is therefore more vulnerable to

ground fire and surface-to-air missiles.

A promising technology just being fielded by the Marine

Corps is that of the Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) family. This

system has progressed tremendously since its development in the

1960's. The Marine Corps is establishing RPV units in its

division intelligence sections and it is quite capable of being

launched and recovered from ship. Colonels J. G. Karch and J. R.

McGrath have delineated a variety of tasks that an RPV may do,

most of which are applicable to a low-intensity conflict.9

1. Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Especially of likely

ambush sites, friendly lines, potential helicopter landing zones,

choke points, rear areas, and battle damage assessments (BDA);

2. Maneuver Support. In order to locate enemy positions,

armor, etc.;

3. Intelligence Support. Fly deep in enemy territory to

discover reserves, etc.;

4. Scouting and Patrolling. Especially in rugged terrain

where fast mobile scouts would be restricted;

5. Fire Support. Provide observation of impact areas to

adjust fire;

6. Convoy Support. Provide route surveillance, breakdown

locations, choke points, etc.;

7. Communications Relay.

RPV's are amazingly cost effective and can operate for a

fraction of the cost of manned fixed wing or helicopter craft.

Also, besides being cheaper to manufacture than airplanes, there

are significant other savings in the areas of pilot training,

maintenance, manpower and fuel. As one author notes, the annual

fuel consumption of an RF-4 aircraft is 460,000 gallons, while an

RPV performing the same mission would use only 2,280 gallons.10

The RPV's have one other overriding advantage in that they do not

risk a pilot's life to garner high risk intelligence information.

RPV's flew over 6000 aerial photography missions over

Vietnam from ships at sea.

Pictures taken by RPV's of schools, hospitals and

residential areas proved invaluabe politically by

showing that, contrary to claims by the Hanoi press,

the United States had not been deliberately bombing

the civilian population of North Vietnam.11

Most RPV's have a range of at least 100 miles, allowing them

to be operated from mobile seabases and still cover substantial

parts of most countries. Future RPV's will be smaller and may be

"...owned and operated by even company size units as a scouting

asset. "12

Virtually undetectable by radar and inaudible at the 3000 or

4000 feet, an RPV is a very survivable intelligence collection

platform. The Israelis have used them with devastating effect in

Lebanon from l980 onwards. They destroyed, by attack aircraft,

dozens of Syrian surface-to-air missile sites discovered by the

RPV without losing an airplane in the process.

Future RPV technology envisages them not only finding

targets, "...but also to designate them by laser for attack by

copperhead shells or similar ordnance. "13 In fact, RPV's could

prove to be a terrific asset in that a series of them could

monitor activity in a targeted area 24 hours a day, weather

permitting. Obviously, in inclement weather, a switch to SLAR or

some other suitable collection asset will occur.

Finally, the Marine Corps possesses another passive

detection system first used in Vietnam but upgraded significantly

in capability as the technology has progressed. These are the

family of Unattended Ground Sensors, or UGS as they are known.

These intrusion devices offer unique capabilities with respect to

detecting suspected guerrilla infiltration in remote areas.

Vietnam veterans still remember the old "McNamara Line" which

extended across the border between North and South Vietnam.

Consisting of numerous types of sensors, its intent was to detect

enemy infiltration from the North into the South. Although it

worked more or less as designed, it was ultimately unsuccessful

as the North Vietnamese simply begin crossing into Vietnam

through Laos and Cambodia. The Marine Corps, however, in the An

Hoa basin campaign used UGS with devastating success.14

For low-intensity conflict purposes, seismic and acoustic

sensors are ideal. Present day sensors can detect an individual

moving at distances up to 100 feet and vehicles up to 1000 feet.

A skilled operator can usually distinguish between types of

vehicles or numbers of individuals.15 Acoustic sensors are

used basically the same way and have a range similar to that of

the human ear. Acoustic sensors are not operated at all times,

but are usually activated upon indication from a seismic

sensor.16

Sensors can be emplaced by airplane or helicopter which is

important for seabased forces. To extend their range radio relay

sites can be established on high ground overlooking the sensor

string to send the information, line of sight, to an operator

many miles away.

The object of the intelligence collection assets just

discussed is to allow Marines in LIC to be more than a reaction

force. Over time an intelligence data base is constructed,

insurgent patterns of operations and movement become apparent,

and can be anticipated. Once this stage is reached, and it is a

matter of time and effort for the most part, Marine forces can

plan interdiction operations to hit tbe insurgents before they

initiate an attack.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

Low-intensity conflict is simply a new label for an old type

of warfare, dating back centuries in time. In the multi-polar

world of the 1990's, LIC situations will continue to fester and

erupt throughout the world. Allies and friends of both

superpowers will be involved which means that the United States

must be prepared to come to the aid of a threatened nation if

deemed in our interest.

A large and important lesson learned by the United States in

Vietnam was that American dominance of the combat effort did not

necessarily insure victory. The nation we are assisting must

have popular support and be perceived by the people as an honest

broker in their lives. This is a tall order given that the

governments of so many developing countries are steeped in

corruption or tyranny. Any massive United States support of a

corrupt dictatorship will be viewed as approval of its repression

of its people. This is a perception the United States does not

want to project.

Moveover, a LIC must be solved prior to the military phase by

removing, as much as possible, those grievances which cause men

to rebel. Political reform, economic opportunity and rising

expectations of the population will keep the wolf of

low-intensity conflict from the door of a nation in most cases.

In this regard, United States military efforts with its engineers

and medical personnel can pay big dividends.

Unfortunately, many nations have already reached the combat

stage of the conflict where terrorism or guerrilla war are

occurring. It is now judged that a massive United States

presence, a la Vietnam, may not serve anyone's interests.

Americanization of the effort should be avoided. More than this,

even nations desiring large scale American assistance may not be

able to pay the political price such presence would entail.

Therefore, it may serve our interests to strictly limit our

land-based presence, replete with large airfields, logistics

bases, and military camps, and keep the bulk of our combat troops

quartered at sea.

This sea based concept would serve to limit our involvement,

but still participate in the military prosecution of the war.

Also, sea-basing could apply to other forces as well, providing

intelligence, psychological warfare or medical support. It helps

maintain a low, United States profile while providing positive

support to the threatened government.

Sea-basing can be accomplished, albeit to a limited degree,

by present day United States Navy and Marine Corps assets.

Several new classes of ships (and the older work horses), can

quarter Marines engaged in a low-intensity effort. Our proven

helicopter fleet, its replacement, the Osprey tilt rotor

aircraft, and the new generation of air cushioned vehicles will

provide the required, over-the-horizon lift our forces need to

exercise surprise on the battlefield.

So too, our intelligence technology, if properly employed

will provide dividends in locating guerrilla units; infiltration

routes, assembly areas and supply points. Infrared imaging and

synthetic aperture radar applied to aircraft and the remotely

piloted vehicles (RPV's), coupled with advances in unattended

ground sensors and signals intelligence will prove valuable

complements to a threatened nations human agent network.

Although sea-basing Marines in a low-intensity conflict

solves some problems, it creates a few of its own Probably most

salient of these is the limit sea-basing places on the size of

our force. Given shipping constraints, a combat regiment might

be the largest force considered practical, since anything larger

would experience sustainment problems.

The best solution is to attack the problem before it

escalates to the insurgent phase. If a conflict already is in

the insurgent phase, as in El Salvador, then provide the means to

allow the threatened government to fully prosecute the war. This

may include the participation of American forces. If it does,

limit their numbers and scope and do not Americanize the effort.

END NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. John Shy and Peter Collier, "Revolutionary War", Makers of

Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton University Press,

1986), p. 817.

2. J. W. Klingaman, "Policy and Strategy Foundations for

Low-Intensity Conflict", Cadre Paper, (Air University, 1986),

p. 9.

3. Paret, p. 818.

4. William J. Olsen, "Low-Intensity Conflict: The Institutional

Challenge", Military Review, Number 2, February, 1989, p. 7.

5. USMC Operation Concept Paper for Low-Intensity Conflict,

(Working Paper), 1989, p. 6.

6. NAVMC 2890, Small Wars Manual, (Reprint of the 1940 Edition,

Washington, D. C., 1987)

I. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT: ITS DIMENSIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS

I. Major General Donald Morell, USA, and Major Michael Ferguson,

USA, "Low-Intensity Conflict: An Operational Perspective",

International Defense Review, Volume 17 Number 9, 1984, p.

1220.

2. Low-Intensity Conflict in the Third World, ed. Lewis B. Ware,

(Air University Press, August, 1988), p. 1.

3. "Operational Considerations for a Military Involvement in a

Low-Intensity Conflict", CLIC PAPERS, (Army - Air Force

Center for Low-Intensity Conflict, June, 1987)

4. FM 100-20

5. Colonel Dennis M. Drew, USAF, "Insurgency and

Counterinsurgency - American Military Dilemmas and Doctrinal

Proposals", (Air University, March, 1988), p. 4.

6. Lewis B. Ware, p. 164.

7. Joint Low-Intensity Final Report, p. 1-3.

8. R. Lynn Rylander, "The Future of Marines in Small Wars",

Naval War College Review, Autumn, 1987, p. 65.

9. Joint Low-Intensity Final Report, p. 4-6.

10. Ibid, p. 1-4.

11. Ibid, p. 4-5.

12 Colonel J. D. Waghelstein, USA, El Salvador: Observations

and Experiences, (U. S. Army War College, January 1985)

II. U. S. RESPONSE TO LIC: GENERAL

1. R. Lynn Rylander, p. 69.

2. Joint LIC Final Report, p. 4-22.

3. Ibid, p. 9-1.

4. R. Lynn Rylander, p. 65.

5. Ibid, p. 67.

6. Colonel Dennis M. Drew, p. 35.

7. Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows, (Doubleday, Garden City

New York, 1975), Chapters 70 and 71.

III. U. S. RESPONSE TO LIC: SPECIFIC

1. Joint LIC Final Report, Chapter 6.

2. Hernando De Soto, The Other Path, 1989.

3. Colonel Edwin Carns, USA (Ret) and LTC Michael F. Huebner,

USA, "Medical Strategy", Military Review, Number 2, February,

1989, pp 37-43.

4. Colonel Clinton Willer, USA, "Engineer Challenges", Military

Review, Number 2, February 1989, pp 30-36.

5. Peter Bohansen and Capt W. H. Burgess III, USA, "US Aid to

Democratic States Facing Totalitarian Revolutionary Warfare:

Twelve Rules", CLIC PAPERS, ( Army - Air Force Center for

Low-Intensity Conflict, December, 1987) p. 4.

6. Ibid, p. 3.

7. Morelli and Ferguson, p. 1220.

8. Ibid, p. 1220.

9. Bohansen and Burgess, p. 8.

10. lLt A. Wasielewski, USMC, " Seapower and Counterinsurgency",

Proceedings, December, 1986, p. 65.

11. J. W. Klingaman, p. 17.

IV. SEABASING A LIC EFFORT

1. 1Lt A. Wasielewski, p. 65.

2. Colonel Robert H. Barrow, USMC, Seabased Counterinsurgency -

A New Dimension of Sea Power, National War College Term

Paper, Washington, D. C. 1970, p. 48.

3. General Paul Gorman, USA, (Ret), Low-Intensity Conflict:

Support for Democratic Resistance Movements, (Center for the

Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, January,

1988) pp 24-25.

4. Colonel Barrow, p. 43.

5. Ibid, p. 42.

6. Ibid, p. 42.

7. Ibid, pp 49-50.

8. Ibid, pp 49-50.

9. lLt Wasielewski, p. 65.

10. Colonel Barrow, p. 48.

11. Landing Force Manual 02, "Doctrine for Landing Forces",

(USMC, Quantico, Virginia, 1971) p. 190.

12. Ibid, p. 189.

13. Ibid, p. 189.

14. Colonel Barrow, p. 68.

15. Geoffrey Till, Modern Sea Power, (Brassey's London, 1987),

pp 117-118.

16. Colonel Barrow, p. 68.

17. LTC Arthur T. McDermott, USMC, "Sea Basing: One 0ption",

Marine Corps Gazette, July, 1973, p. 19.

18. Geoffrey Till, pp 121-122.

19. LFM-02, p. 191.

V. SEABASING AND THE MARINES

1. Geoffrey Till, pp 112-113.

2. Ibid, p. 110.

3. Ibid

4. Admiral J. J. Clark., USN-, and. Captain D. H. Barnes, USMC,

Sea Power and its Meaning, (New York, Franklin Watts, 1966)

p. 78.

5. Charles Wolf, Jr., Controlling, Small Wars, (Santa Monica,

California, Rand Corporation, December 1968), p. 7.

6. Colonel Drew, p. 43.

7. Ibid, p. 42.

8. "Operational Considerations for a Military Involvement in

Low-Intensity Conflict", p, 7.

9. Ibid, p. 12.

10. Ibid, p. 13.

1l. Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Final Report, p 6-10.

12. Colonel Drew, p. 43..

13. Colonel Barrow, p. 89.

14. NAVMC 2710, "Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF)"

(Washington, D. C., Department of the Navy, 28 May l985),

p. 6.

15. Ibid, p. 8.

l6. Major M. J. Cross, USMC, "Sealift and Our Amphibious

Capability", Marine Corps Gazette, VoIume 68., March 1984,

p. 42.

l7. J. D. Hessman., "Attackers, Amphibs and the New Athenians

SEAP0WER, Number 11, November 1981, p. l9.

18. Bruce Hoffman, Commando Raids: 1946 - 1983 (Santa Monica,

California, Rand. Corporation, October 1985), p. 24.

19. Ibid, p. 11.

20. Ibid, p. 14.

21. Geoffrey Till, p. 110.

22. Colonel J. C. Murray, USMC, "The Anti-Bandit War", The

Guerrilla and How to Fight Him, ed. LTC T. N. Greene, USMC,

(New York, Praeger, 1962), p. 108.

23. Captain Richard S. Moore, USMC "Blitzkreig From the Sea:

Maneuver Warfare and Amphibious Operations", Naval War

College Review, Number 6, November-December 1983, pp 42-43.

24. Major Andrew N. Pratt, USMC, "Low-Intensity Conflict and

the United States Marine Corps", Low-Intensity Conflict

and Modern Technology, ed. LTC D. J. Dean, USAF, (Alabama,

Air University Press, June, 1986) p. 300.

VI. SEABASING, MOBILITY AND SUPPORT

l. General Paul Gorman, "Low-Intensity Conflict: Not Fulda, Not

Kola", Army Field Manual 100-39, pp 65-66.

2. Low-Intensity Conflict: Support for Democratic Resistance

Movements, p. 24.

3. Major M. J. Cross, p. 41.

4. Ibid, p. 45.

5. J. D. Hessman, p. 19.

6. J. D. Hessman, "Sting of the Wasp", Sea Power, Number 9,

August, 1987, p. 35.

7. Ibid

8. Ibid

9. Ibid

10. Geoffrey Till, pp 75-76.

11. LCDR T. J. McKearney, USN, "Launching the New Assault Wave",

Proceedings, United States Naval Institute, Newport,

November-December, 1987, p. 44.

12. Colonel J. F. Brosnan, Jr., USMC, "An Amphibious Landing?

With Civilian Ships?", Naval War College Review, Number 2,

March-April, 1986, p. 36.

13. Ibid, p. 38.

14. Ibid, p. 40.

15. Major Andrew N. Pratt, p. 305.

1. Ibid, p. 304.

17. J. D. Hessman, p. 23.

18. Ibid

19. Ibid

20. LTC J. C. Lillie, "Seabasing the Harrier", Marine Corps

Gazette, Number 5, May, 1987, p. 79.

21. Ibid, p. 78.

22. The Washington Times, 20 April 1989, p.1.

23. Geoffrey Till, pp 121-122.

24. Commanders M.W. Cagle and F. A. Manson, USN, The Sea War

in Korea, (Annapolis, U.S. Naval Institute, 1955,

pp 332-334

25. Colonal J. C. Murray, p. 108.

26. Major J. P. Etter, USMC, "New Aircraft Require New

Thinking", Proceedings, Volume 113, November. 1981 p. 38.

27. LFM-02, p. 191.

28. Geoffrey Till, pp 121-122..

VII. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

1. General Gorman. p. 24.

2. Charles T. Purkis, "Intelligence Requirements for Low-

Intensify Conflicts", Low-"Intensity Conflict and Modern

Technology, p. 182.

3. Ibid., p. 185.

4. LTC J. M. Oseth, USA, "Intelligence and Low-Intensity

Conflict", Naval War Collage Review, Number 6, November-

December, 1984, p. 25.

5. Ibid, p. 25.

6. Robert E. Lanbert and Charles R. Dotson, "Synthetic

Aperture Radar in Low-Intensity Conflicts", Low-Intensisty

Conflict and Modern Technology, p. l55.

7. Ibid

8. Ibid

9. Colonels L. G. Karch and J. R. McGrath, USMC, "RPV's for

Company and Battalion Size Units", Marine Corps Gazette,

Volume 1, January 1989, p. 22.

10. William Ruhe, "Fly in the Sky Report", Sea Power, Number 7,

July, 1981, p. 24.

11. Ibid

l2. Bill Sweetman, "Unmanned Air Vehicles Make a Comeback",

International Defense Review, Number 11, 1985, p. 1772.

13. Ibid, p. 1773

14. Colonel Richard S. Friedman, "Intelligence and the War on

Land", Intelligence Warfare, (New York, Crescent Books,

1983) , p. 157.

15. Ibid

16. Ibid

17. Ibid

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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N. J., 1975. Two volume history of guerrilla warfare from

ancient times to the present. A little too much emphasis

on Vietnam.

Cagle, M. W. CDR, USN and Manson, F. A. CDR, USN. The Sea War in

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Describes in detail a much overlooked part of

Clarke, J. J. Admiral, USN and Barnes, D. H. Captain, USMC.

Seapower and Its Meaning. Franklin Watts. New York, 1966

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