Elite Forces Past And Present
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - History
Author Major George A. Biszak
ELITE FORCES PAST AND PRESENT
OUTLINE
Special units, since World War II, have added a new
dimension to warfare, but their value has only recently come to
light in view of current low-intensity conflict and terrorist
activity.
I. Development of elite forces
A. Formation of the Raider Battalions
1. Early thoughts of Commando Units
2. Designation as Raider Battalions
3. Missions of the Battalions
4. Review merits of such elite units
B. Formation of Army's Green Beret
1. Mission of special unit
2. Value of "unconventional" forces
C. Formation of Delta Force
1. Mission of special unit
2. Value in relation to terrorist activity
II. Similarities of three units
A. Well trained personnel
B. Presidential contacts
C. Internal struggles for existence
III. Maintaining "readiness" forces
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: ELITE FORCES PAST AND PRESENT
I. Purpose: To examine from a historical viewpoint and give a
present day perspective on elite forces.
II. Thesis: Special units since World War II have added a new
dimension to warfare. Often overlooked in favor of larger
campaign studies their value has only recently come to light in
view of potential involvement in a low-intensity conflict or
terrorist act. The military must make an all out effort to
maintain these units at a high state of readiness.
III. Data: During World War II the Marine Corps produced an
elite within an elite in the form of its four Raider Battalions.
Its purpose was to perform special operations in advance of
conventional force arrival. Although deactivated in 1944 the
special operations capability has been reborn in the form of
present day MEU (SOC) units. The Army's elite unit the Special
Forces or more commonly referred to as the Green Berets overall
mission is to wage unconventional warfare with specialized
training. Throughout the Viet Nam War, the Special Forces were
assigned several different missions but for the most part found
themselves in the position of trying to put down guerrilla
insurgency in friendly territory. The flexibility of the Special
Forces was demonstrated on the raid of Son Tay prison compound.
Although unsuccessful because of poor intelligence their value
was realized for future use. In the early Seventies with an
increase of terrorist activity Delta Force was activated to
suppress terrorist activity against U.S. citizens and its
interests. Also unsuccessful in its attempt to free U.S.
hostages in Teheran it is still an active force and in view of
current terrorist activity its need has not diminished.
Ironically each of these units created turmoil within their
respective chain of command.
IV. Conclusions: Present day elite forces are not faced with
the struggle for existence that plagued these units in their
conception. After several years of review and with the current
possibility of a low-intensity conflict special operational
forces are an active and viable asset to the military today.
V. Recommendations: with todays' ever present threat of
terrorist activity and possible Third World involvement it is
imperative that the Special Forces and Delta Force be maintained
at a high state of readiness. Having recognized the need with
the formation of MEU (SOC) the Marine Corps is once again capable
of performing special operations.
Since the beginning of recorded warfare there have been
forces in various sizes, often referred to as elite forces.
Elite, as defined by Webster's dictionary is "1. the group or
part of a group selected or regarded as the finest, best, most
distinguished, most powerful, etc." These elite forces and their
operations are often overlooked and resented in favor of larger
campaign studies. Their deeds and heroics have not been disputed
but their role in the strategic, operational and tactical levels
of war have been questioned. Are these elite units still
effective today? Do we have to many and are they feasible for
future warfare?
In Defeat into Victory by Field Marshall Sir William J.
Slim, the Field Marshal concluded that most special units are
wasteful and have more disadvantages than advantages. "He
believed there was one type of special unit that should become an
essential component of any modern army. This special unit is one
that operates deep behind enemy lines, whose purpose is to
disrupt the enemy, to collect information, to work with
indigenous peoples, to sabotage enemy installations, to
assassinate enemy commanders. The troops who made up this unit
would require many qualities and skills not expected in the
ordinary soldier and would use many methods beyond his capacity.
Field Marshal Slim felt they could achieve strategic results is
handled with imaginative ruthlessness."1
The Unites States Marine Corps in any book mentioning elite
forces is referred to as such a unit. However during World War
II the Marine Corps produced an elite within an elite in the form
of its four Raider Battalions, which in March 1943 became the 1st
Raider Regiment.
This formation of the Raider Battalions was an epic struggle
that was the result of some political desires and for the most
part was disliked by most senior Marine Corps officers. The idea
of elite or raider type forces was experimented with throughout
the thirties. These forces were deployed in advance of the main
landing force for the purpose of raiding and patrolling. Their
employment was from destroyers and high speed transports and they
would go ashore in rubber boats. As the Unites States continued
to observe the results of the allied commando units and the
success they had, President Roosevelt was intrigued with the idea
of forming a United States version of the commando units.
Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Captain James Roosevelt, USMCR, the
Presidents son, wrote to the Commandant of the Marine Corps
proposing the formation of a commando type of unit along the
lines of the British commandos and Chinese guerrillas. The
Marine Corps had already initiated a program in the form of
redesignating the 1st Battalion 5th Marines as the 1st Separate
Battalion with a mission to raid and act as an advance force to
larger forces. In addition Major General Thomas Holcomb,
Commandant of the Marine Corps, indicated that the overall
mission of the Marine Corps and the training Marines received was
similar to the commandos training and there was no need for a
special name.2
The Commandant of the Marine Corps on 14 January, 1942
requested Major General Holland M. Smith, Commanding General,
Amphibious Force Atlantic and Major General Charles F.B. Price,
Commanding General, Department of the Pacific, to comment on a
proposal to appoint Colonel William J. Donovan, USA, to Brigadier
General, USMCR, with duty as the commanding officer of the Raider
unit.3
General Smith recommended against the appointment of Colonel
Donovan as well as the overall raider concept. This was based on
similar views of the Commandant that Marine units could be
trained to accomplish raid or commando type operations without
the help of outside personnel or an elite unit designation.
General Price viewed the project as acceptable only if the
personnel were recruited directly and not taken from existing
units as to further weaken the shortage of qualified officers and
senior NCO's in the expanding force .4
On 4 February 1942, in response to a Commander in Chief
Pacific Fleet directive, the Commandant of the Marine Corps
ordered organization of the 2nd Separate Battalion on the west
coast. In addition partly to avoid a political appointed as a
leader of the 1st and 2nd Separate Battalions, Lieutenant
Colonels Merrit A. Edson, and Evans F. Carlson, were assigned to
command the redesignated 1st and 2nd Raider Battalions.5 LtCol
Edson had served in France in World War I, had been a Marine
pilot, an observer of the Sino-Japanese hostilities and captain
of the Marine Corps rifle and pistol team. The executive officer
for 1st Raider Battalion was Major Samuel B. Griffith who had
observed the British commando training program. LtCol Carlson
had travelled extensively with the Chinese (Communist) Eight
Route Army guerrillas and had observed their tactics. The
executive officer for the 2nd Raider Battalion was Major James
Roosevelt.
"The mission of the two new raider units was threefold:
to be the spearhead of amphibious landing by larger
forces on beaches generally thought to be inaccessible;
to conduct raiding expeditions requiring great elements
of surprise and high speed and to conduct guerrilla
type operations for protracted periods behind enemy
lines . "6
After extensive training both units departed stateside with
the 1st Raider Battalion going to Samoa and the 2nd going to
Hawaii. The 2nd Marine Raider Battalion, for the most part,
became the more publicized Battalion of the eventual four
battalions. The 2nd Raider Battalion first saw action on 24
August 1942, on the island of Makin. The raid was to divert
Japanese reinforcements from reaching Guadalcanal. Of the 221
men who landed, the Raiders lost 30, the Japanese about 100 with
extensive damage to their supplies. The 2nd Raider Battalion's
success in the Makin raid was wildly acclaimed back in the
States. However the Marine Corps evaluation of the raid was
mixed. The end result was valuable lessons had been learned and
the Raider concept could be of value in later operations.7 On 20
September 1942, the 3rd Raider Battalion was activated and on 23
October 1942, the 4th Raider Battalion was activated. The
Commandant of the Marine Corps was opposed to the added raider
battalions but it had been determined at a higher level of
command that the activation would take place.8
On 3 November 1942, the 2nd Raider Battalion landed at Aola
Bay on Guadalcanal. It was this operation that silenced many of
the critics of the raider concept. With orders to cut off and
annihilate the feared 230th Japanese Infantry Regiment the end
result was the Raiders killed over 500 enemy soldiers using the
guerilla tactics that Lieutenant Colonel Carlson had learned from
the Chinese 8th Route Army several years earlier. After this 30
day patrol, with the loss of only 17 of their own men, General
Vandegrift cited the Battalion for outstanding service.9
The Raider Battalions continued to perform in a similar
fashion throughout the south Pacific. Finally on 26 January
1944, the Battalions were redesignated as the 4th Marine Regiment
which had been lost in the Philippines in 1942.
One of the greatest assets of the Raider Battalions was a
constant reappraisal of troop organization, an intense review of
weapons and tactics which eventually helped form the foundations
for small unit tactics in the Marine Corps today. It appears
that the Raider Battalions main enemy was not the enemy on the
field of battle,but personnel within its ranks who did not desire
this type of elite unit. The leaders of these elite battalions
were without a doubt some of the finest in the Corps. Highly
professional, experienced and innovative, they are examples to be
followed. It is my personal opinion that the recent designation
of MEU (SOC) Marine Expeditionary Unit - Special Operations
Capable is similar to the Raider Battalions of World War II, in
that they receive additional training in special operation,
weapons and tactics. And unlike the Raider Battalions they are
perceived as a valuable asset to the Marine Corps.
The Armys' elite unit, the Special Forces, was formed on 9
July 1942. Originally called the First Special Service Force, a
joint American - Canadian unit, it was commanded by Major General
Robert Frederick. The mission of the force was to perform
sabotage operations in Norway, but instead were sent to Europe.
They served with distinction in the battle for Monte La Difensa
in the Mount Maggiore hill mass. Later they were deactivated
after service in France.1O They were activated in 1952 at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina. Unlike the epic struggle for existence
that the Raider Battalions of the Marine Corps faced, the Special
Forces struggle was for adoption of the green beret. President
John F. Kennedy was an advocate of Special Forces based on his
conviction that this type of unit had a great potential as a
counterinsurgency force.11 During September 1961, while visiting
the Special Warfare Center, President Kennedy authorized the
wearing of the green beret by Special Forces troops. The overall
mission of the Special Forces is unconventional warfare with the
individual soldier being trained in five basic military
occupational specialties: U.S. and foreign weapons; medical
techniques; communications; intelligence operations and
engineering. The Special Forces found itself playing a peculiar
role in South Viet Nam. Trained to wage unconventional war under
conventional war conditions, the war in Viet Nam never fell into
the conventional category. The end result was that Special
Forces found themselves in the position of trying to put down
guerrilla insurgencies in friendly territory. Throughout the
Viet Nam war, the Special Forces assumed many different missions
including the establishment of the Civilian Irregular Defense
Group (CIDG) whose job was to develop the ethnic minority groups
of the country into fighting units. In the mid 60's Project
Leaping Lena eventually became Project Delta. The mission was
for Special Forces A detachments to train Viet Nam Special Forces
and CIDG troops in techniques of long range patrolling with a
mobile strike force to react to this information. In addition
mobile strike forces were capable of conducting raids, ambushes,
combat patrols and other small-scale combat operations.
Special Forces troops with CIDG troops were used with
conventional forces in conventional combat operations.12
However one of the more daring operations was the raid on
SonTay prison. A ground force of 56 U.S. Special Forces men
commanded by Colonel Arthur D. Simons, a highly experienced
unconventional warfare expert, attempted to rescue American
prisoners of war supposedly being held at SonTay prisoner of war
camp 23 miles west of Hanoi. Several months of intensified
training resulted in a failed rescue attempt because intelligence
had not ascertained that the prisoners had been moved four months
earlier to another prison camp. Final approval for this mission
was given by President Nixon13 and although no prisoners were
found, no lives were lost and one of the ground elements killed
100 to 200 Chinese or Russian advisors.14
With the end of the Viet Nam war, Special Forces lost some
favor within U.S. Army circles. From almost 13,000 men in 1969
to less than 3000 by 1980 there future looked bleak.15 However,
faced with the reality of a possible low-intensity conflict, it
has been realized the valuable asset these forces can play in the
various strategic levels of war and their potential, if used
properly, for dealing with low-intensity conflicts. Special
Forces, with their groups prepared for operations in certain
geographic regions, are invaluable in the event follow-on
conventional forces are committed. Their tactical and technical
expertise along with their knowledge of the geographies,
language, climate and abilities to train local friendly forces
expands the United States' abilities to conduct and win a low-
intensity conflict or aid other friendly nations in fighting
them.
It is my opinion that through most of the Viet Nam War, the
Special Forces were not properly used. This, I feel, is due in
part to political constraints and the somewhat conventional
mindset that some of the military leaders were in at the time.
However the numerous type missions the Special Forces were tasked
with provided invaluable tactical and technical expertise for the
present day forces to employ. Through their professionalism,
they enlightened the military world as to the value of having an
unconventional type force and have established the foundation for
other forces such as the Navy Seals, Delta Force, and, to a
degree, the Russian SPETSNAZ forces. Special Forces truly
represents the meaning of an "elite" force.
In late August, 1976 a conference was conducted at the Army
Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, to examine the role of
the light infantry division. This conference was chaired by
General Bill DePuy. General Kingston was tasked to explain what
Special Forces could do in support of the light infantry. In
general discussion, following General Kingston's brief, General
DePuy talked about special operations and the British SAS forces
and how the Army should organize a similar unit. For Colonel
Charlie A. Beckwith, commandant of the Special Forces School in
attendance at the conference it was a dream come true. A long
proponent of this type of force, having spent a tour with the 22
SAS Regiment, he along with Colonel Tom Henry were assigned the
task of developing this special force. During the many months of
development, Colonel Beckwith suggested to General DePuy the name
of Delta. General DePuy approved his recommendation.16 The
mission of Delta Force is to deal with terrorist incidents
affecting the United States and its' interests. The struggle for
the formation of Delta was met with a great deal of opposition
within the Special Forces and Ranger communities, however on 19
November 1977, Delta Force was activated.
A little less than 2 years later a group of Iranians seized
the American embassy compound in Teheran and took 53 occupants
hostage.17 On 16 April, 1980, President Jimmy Carter authorized
the usage of Delta Force to rescue the American hostages. On 24
April, 1980, operation "Eagle Claw" commenced. Although the
rescue attempt failed, it was not the fault of the Delta Forces
on the ground. The reason for failure was attributed to
logistics and poor weather intelligence along with less than
adequate training among the various units involved.18 Delta
Force is still an active force and more than likely will appear
again if U.S. citizens are threatened by some form of terrorist
activity.
Although each of these units, the Raider Battalions, Special
Forces and Delta Force were activated in different decades and
for different reasons, there are many similarities that are
common to each of these units. Their missions can all be
classified as offensive in nature. To take the fight to the
enemy and strike at the right time with a well trained and well
rehearsed unit for whatever purpose. Highly trained, these
forces often provided to the conventional forces invaluable
knowledge in the areas of tactics, weaponry and troop
organization.
Elite or special type forces are often depicted in movies
like the "Dirty Dozen" as misfits or jail birds, however with
these three units that is not the case. The men that served in
these units were hand picked by the men who were to lead them.
The leaders of these units understood their missions, knew the
demands that would be required and selected the best men
available for their units. These men were highly disciplined,
dedicated and truly professionals at waging unconventional
warfare. Bold and innovative, their rules for tactics were more
often than not based upon their own personal experiences. They
were men who knew the enemy as well as themselves and continually
did the unexpected. They were disciples of Stonewall Jackson's
motto `mystify, mislead, and surprise'. Their training was the
envy of conventional force commanders. They were allotted
resources in training areas, weapons and ammunition however
extremely small in comparison to the overall allocations by
conventional forces. Their unconventional training was often
misunderstood by conventional commanders but usually provided
some form of tactical or technical expertise to the conventional
commanders.
Ironically, each of these units had some form of
Presidential contact. In the case of the Raiders, it was
President Roosevelt's desire to have such a unit. The Special
Forces were authorized by President Kennedy to wear the Green
Beret and it was President Nixon who gave the approval for the
rescue attempt of the prisoners of war at SonTay. With Delta
Force, it was President Carter who authorized the attempt to
rescue the hostages in Teheran. With such presidential interest
in these units, one can conclude that some form of envy existed
among the conventional forces.
In addition, these units had to continually fight for their
existence. The Raiders were disbanded in the latter part of
World War II. The Special Forces saw a severe cutback in
personnel and assets after Viet Nam. Delta Force, from its very
beginning, was in competition with a force called Blue Light,
which, in the end, Delta Force eliminated from the competition.
Then, after the failed rescue attempt, they were carefully
reviewed for future use.
Both the Special Forces and Delta Force remain a strategic part
of our armed forces today.
With a high probability of future involvement in a low-
intensity conflict or some form of terrorist activity against the
Unites States, it is imperative that the Special Forces and Delta
Force be maintained at a high state of readiness. Although the
Raider Battalions were deactivated over 45 years ago the
realization of their value has not gone unnoticed. With the
recent addition of MEU (SOC), the Marine Corps is once again
capable of performing, if needed, special operations.
Bibliography
Beckwith, Col. Charlie A., and Donald Knox. Delta Force.
New York: Dell Publishing Co. ,Inc. 1983.
Collins, John M. Green Berets, SEALS, & SPETSNAZ.
Great Britain: A. Wheaton & Co. Ltd., Exeter, 1987.
Eshel, David. Elite Fighting Units. New York: Arco
Publishing, Inc., 1984.
Hoffman, Bruce. Commando Raids: 1946-1983.
Santa Monica: The Rand Corp., 1985.
Knight, David C. Shock Troops. Greenwich:
Bison Books Corp., 1983.
Quarrie, Bruce. The World's Elite Forces. New York:
Berkley Publishing Group, 1985.
Schemmer, Benjamin. The Raid. New York: Harper and Row,
1976.
Updegraph, Charles L. Jr. U.S. Marine Corps Special Units of
World War II. Marine Corps Historical Reterence Pamphet.
Washington, D.C., 1972.
1.Col Charlie A. Beckwith and Donald Knox, Delta Force (New York:
Dell Publishing Co., 1983), P.44.
2.Charles Updegraph, Jr, U.S.Marine Corps Special Units of World
War II (Marine Corps Historical Reference Pamphlet, 1972), pp.1-
2.
3.Ibid. ,p.2.
4.Ibid.
5.Ibid. pp 2-3.
6.Ibid.p.3.
7.David C. Knight, Shock Troops (Greenwich: Bison Books Corp.,
1983), p.115.
8.Updegraph, pp .15-17.
9.Knight, p.116.
10.Ibid.p.159.
11.Ibid.p.161.
12.Ibid.pp.168-169.
13.Benjamin Schemmer, The Raid (New York: Harper and Row,
1976) ,p.115.
14.Ibid.p.171.
15.David Eshel, Elite Fighting Units (New York: Arco Publishing,
Inc. ,1984) ,p.168.
16 .Beckwith,p .95.
17.Bruce Hoffman, Command Raids: 1946 - 1983 (Santa Monica: The
Rand Corporation. , 1985) , p .47.
18 .Hoffman, pp .47-48.
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