The Maturing of America AUTHOR Major Paul H. Watson,USMC CSC 1988 SUBJECT AREA General TITLE: THE MATURING OF AMERICA I. Purpose: To establish a framework for understanding Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) from the perspective that because of its nature, LIC encompasses all the elements that comprise the formulation of U.S. national security policy. II. Thesis: In view of LIC's broad nature, the U.S. is faced with the prospect of reassessing the manner in which it views national security in general: its overarching policy of containment, its view of the threat, and its internal mechanism to deal with the formulation and execution of policies designed to combat the threat. Moreover, not until we understand the vitality of LIC as a concept, can the preceding be addressed. Furthermore, there is a direct correlation between the political acceptance of LIC conceptually within government and our ability to critically analyze the preceding three points. III. DATA: The world since the close of World War II in 1945 has found itself in a truly unique position vis a vis historical context. Elements of this new world order included the fall of the Old World's empires and the former colonies searching for paths towards modernization/industrialization. The Soviet Union's previously unsaleable product of communism, which received a tremendous uplift when they modified their strategy to conform with Mao Tse-tung's more nationalistic-modernistic approach, became viable. The concomitant development of indigeneous nationalists and the Soviet's new appeal, which would provide for quick industrialization, appeared from the U.S. perspective as a monolithic effort. Also at work was a growing movement that that contended that only violence could solve the Third World scene when an inexperienced U.S. assumed a position of world leadership. In turn, a military solution of containment, as embodied in NSC-68, became an institutionalized U.S. response. This is the source of U.S. confusion and its understanding is imperative if the U.S. is to effectively deal with low intensity situations. Understanding is only the first step. The U.S. must build a more efficient mechanism for formulating and implementing foreign policy. Although LIC calls for more of a non-military response, the U.S. governmental structure is poorly equipped; as such, the U.S. defers to the military solution out of convenience. Both the Executive Branch and its relations with the Congress must be examined. The issue of coordination and unity of effort are critical in LIC. Recent years have given rise to optimism. First, are the several setbacks the Soviet's have incurred in the developing world (e.g. Egypt, Angola) as far as their method of quick economic development. Also, there has been a rise in active resistance against Soviet influenced regions (e.g. Afghanistan and Cambodia). Finally, a more enlightened approach is contained in the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy's report entitled "Discriminate Deterrence." This report has yet to be officially sanctioned. Perhaps, it is this political message more than anything which must be kept in mind when speaking of LIC and strategies to diffuse situations of this ilk. IV. Conclusions: "Discriminate Deterrence" challenges current conventions. It is within this context that LIC if found. Not until there is a pragmatic approach towards the lesser developed world and national security is understood from a broader perspective (not just defense related issues) can there be progress. In other words, due to the increasing inter-relationship among the world's economies, a greater appreciation for the impact of domestic policies on international events must be advanced (e.g. protectionism versus assisting the developing world's economies). V. Summary: The appeal of the Soviet model for development has been discovered to be a hoax. In the meantime, the U.S. must return to pragmatic international politics. Pragmatism has been the hallmark of U.S. domestic politics and must be applied to the international arena instead of dogma. Politics being what it is, however, will determine the degree of interest focused on LIC and when. Until that time, we can only attempt to emplace a viable strategy and mechanism to cope with low intensity situations. MATURING OF AMERICA OUTLINE THESIS: The only way the U.S. can cope with LIC is by reevaluating its policy of containment, its view of the threat, and its internal mechanism for formulating and executing policy. INTRODUCTION I. Setting, Cast, and Political Theory A. Post World War II World 1. U.S. position of leadership 2. Decolonialization 3. Modernization 4. Nationalism B. Containment 1. World Communism 2. NSC-68 3. Korean War 4. Korea-Indochina connection C. Political Violence and Political Warfare D. Summary 1. Convergence of influences 2. Analysis/Synthesis problem II. The Structure A. Method of Analysis 1. Organizational 2. Inter-governmental relations 3. Political B. Executive Branch 1. Department of State (DOS) (a) Current organization (b) Problems 2. Department of Defense (DoD) (a) Current Organization (b) Problems 3. Geographical Commander-in-Chiefs (CinCs) 4. National Security Council (NSC) (a) Role of: (1) NSC (2) NSC Staff (3) Interagency coordination (b) Problems C. Legislative branch 1. Executive Legislative Relations 2. War Powers Resolution of 1973 3. Diversity III. Old Problems, Old Ideas, and New Outlook A. Return to Pragmatism 1. Discriminate Deterrence 2. Decline of Soviet model 3. U.S. activism 4. National Security Decision Directive (NSSD)-277 B. Coordination and Direction 1. Lead agency issue--DOS/NSC 2. Inter-Executive (a) DOS (b) DoD (c) Regional CinCs 3. Moral ascendency-legitimacy 4. Executive-Legislative (a) Consensus vs. decisionmaking structures (b) Constitutional battles and political efficacy (l) War powers (2) Foreign relations (3) Political reality CONCLUSION A cartoon drawn some years ago depicts a general sitting in an anteroom and a three-piece-suited civilian, holding his head low, walks out the door with a sign reading "World Stage." The caption reads, "It's your turn." The obvious inference is that once diplomacy, as a distinct tool, fails the military then steps in to solve the problem. Again, by inference, the different instruments of foreign policy are viewed not only as separate, but also their implementation occurs at discrete periods of time. Nothing could be further from the truth. Despite the often quoted Clausewitzian phrase regarding the military instrument of policy, we view the introduction of military forces as an either or proposition. The American mind views the use of military as one of last resorts. Additionally, there's a view of subordination; that is, during peace politics is dominant while during war the military instrument is on top. In summary, we tend to keep the two separated, even though our actual or potential enemies do not. In the new thinking, political ends are always the objective. Referring to the Vietnam War, Edward Lansdale has written that the North Vietnamese "saw their armed forces as instruments primarily to gain political goals. The American generals saw their forces primarily as instruments to defeat enemy military forces. One fought battles to influence opinions in Vietnam and in the world, the other fought battles to finish the enemy keeping tabs by body count"1 Low Intensity Conflict (LIC)2 epitomizes the complete integration of diplomacy and warfighting. As viewed within a broader policy perspective, LIC encompasses all the elements required to construct a coherent foreign policy (i.e., economic policy, political development, an understanding of "their" political culture, sociological components, etc.). In essence, diplomacy, like its domestic political brother, is never dominated by warfighting elements. It is precisely this misunderstanding, however, that has rendered our approach anachronistic when dealing with low intensity situations. In light of LIC's broad nature, the U.S. is faced with the prospect of reassessing the manner in which it views national security in general: its overarching policy of containment, its view of the threat, and its internal mechanism to deal with the formulation and execution of policies designed to combat the threat. Moreover, not until we understand the vitality of LIC as a concept, can the preceding be addressed. Herein lies the rub, there is a direct correlation between the political acceptance of LIC conceptually within government and our ability to critically analyze the preceding three points. In other words, does LIC have a constituency in Washington. UNDERSTANDING The close of World War II in 1945 marked the beginning of a trend that would continue at a steady pace until 1979, when the Soviet action in Afghanistan caused Third World nations to give pause to ready acceptance of the Soviet model of modernization. Prior to World War II, despite attempts by certain internationalists, the U.S. relied on its insular position from what was viewed as European internecine wars; not to mention strict adherence to the famous battle cry of avoiding "foreign entanglements." Unfortunately, after World War II there could be no retreat from international involvement. It is at this time that two seemingly unrelated subjects would be found under the American lexicon. They would however, as time elapsed, find themselves at odds with one another and prove to be our bane. One was dismantling of the western world's colonies. The other was the position of both miliary and economic strength which the U.S. emerged from the war. In fact, it was the newly established nation's view of the United States' seeming omnipotence that played heavily in pitting the two sides against one another, while also having a hand in the choosing the strategy to implement. The transition from a traditional society to a modern one is an arduous task. It is a transformation politically, economically, socially, and intellectually. An impressionistic review of this transition conveys the idea that mankind benefits greatly from this process; indeed it does. When major and rapid changes are introduced, however, no two elements of society adapt themselves at the same rate. The results are less than harmonious. "Modernization must be thought of, then, as a process that is simultaneously creative and destructive, providing new opportunities and prospects at a high price in human dislocation and suffering."3 A frequent bridge used to gap the traditional to the modern society is nationalism. An excellent vehicle to unify and motivate; unfortunately, it easily lends itself to totalitarianism, witness German National Socialism, Italian Fascism, and soviet Communism. The modernizing nationalist element of communism and the role that aspect had played in the creation of the Soviet Union became the Soviet's new strategy come the fifties. Ironically, it was a strategy adopted from Mao Tse-tung. Prior to Mao's thoughts, the Soviets could not unify theory and practice. They were unable to appeal to either nationalistic movements or the modernization forces of the less developed countries. As Kautsky points out: .... they thought of themselves as the vanguard of an industrial proletariat and, therefore, of their revolution as an example to the West. The result was that they fell between two stools. In the West, where there was a proletariat, the appeal of Communism failed because its real achievement was irrelevant in already highly industrialized countries. In the underdeveloped countries, where its achievements were highly relevant, its appeal failed because it obscured that relevance by insisting on the proletarian and hence Western nature of Communism. For this reason Communist propaganda could do little or nothing to overcome Communism's general lack of progress before World War II.4 The new strategy "turned Communism from a professedly proletarian into a frankly nationalist movement."5 The validity of this new concept was provided additional credence by pointing to the role the Communist Party, not Russia, had in defeating Nazi Germany and Imperialist Japan. Couple this gain in prestige with a program that promised rapid modernization and industrialization, and the Soviets had gained the interest of the intellectuals in the less developed world. This is where nationalists and communists, from the U.S. perspective but not necessarily in reality, became synonymous. To carry this thought to its logical conclusion; the Soviet's were the vanguard of the international party, remember this is the time of monolithic communism--as we saw the world, conflicts with a nationalist flavor were undoubtedly Soviet inspired. Additionally, any rhetoric made by the indigenous intellectual which spoke of anti-imperialism (anti-colonialism); destruction of the old social order (elimination of aristocratic rule); denunciation of the western model (grave concern over becoming dependent on western capital and a minimal, if any, political culture to breed a liberal democracy) only confirmed our suspicion. Unlike professor Kautsky's assertion that this strategy began around 1947, I contend that it was not until shortly after the Geneva Conference of 1954 when the "Restoration of Peace In Indochina" was agreed upon. 6 The difference of almost eight years is based on three events and the difference in time is critical to the understanding of the source of U.S. governmental confusion regarding North-South relations. First, the United States's adoption of NSC-68 in September 1950, the Korean War, and finally the subsequent U.S. response to president Truman's dilemma regarding Indochina from 1950 to 1952. Persistent East-West hostility was the underlying supposition of NSC-68. While danger of war through miscalulation during a crisis was not underestimated, the more likely avenue would be premeditated Soviet aggression. The logical response would then be to build strong conventional forces while entering a series of alliances close to the Soviet Union. These maneuvers were designed to support the policy of containment. This endeavor would clearly call for larger military expenditures than had previously been contemplated. So, as Lawrence Freedman finds, "NSC-68's main purpose was to impress upon its bureaucratic readership the Soviet threat to world peace, best blocked thorough increased military preparedness (emphasis added) in the non-Soviet world."7 The prospect of greater outlays was not well received. Criti- cism came not only from fiscal conservatives, but also from such individuals as the recently displaced George Kennan. Kennan, the author of "containment," regretted the "unsubtle analysis of Soviet intentions."8 These concerns, however, were easily dismissed by September 1950 when Truman finally approved NSC-68. In June 1950 the North Koreans moved south.9. With this event NSC-68 gained acceptance which it may not have, but more importantly accomplished its primary goal of institutionalizing the military response to Soviet adventurism. This is not to say that our armed response to the North Koreans was incorrect--it was the only answer. The wrong response(s) would come later. The codifying of NSC-68 was only half of the repercussions felt when the invasion occurred. Serving as the epicenter, the Korean War began to take shape as the first of many advances against the free-world. Events within the early fifties were quickly viewed as pieces of a puzzle which quickly fit our perceptions. It was the Korean War which compelled the U.S. into a more active role in the Indochina War. It was natural to view Ho Chi Mihn's plan as but an element of the communist's worldwide plan. Add to this feature the U.S. anxiety over France's support for the creation of an European Defense Community. Since we viewed the Soviet's most capable threat in Europe, giving it more weight than Southeast Asia, we were reluctant to antagonize the French. AS if events were not unfolding quick enough, add the domestic problem facing Truman. Accused by senator Joseph McCarthy for the loss of China and being soft on communism, the president could ill afford the loss of Indochina. When the president announced the U.S. commitment to Korea he stated: "The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion...and will now use armed invasion and war." He similarly directed "the acceleration in the furnishings of military assistance to the forces of France and the associated states in Indochina."10 An area of only tangential concern to the U.S. had become vital-- and Indochina and Korea became linked. Since the communist Chinese were the source of support for both these theaters, and the Soviets were the vanguard of the Communist party, the U.S. had no other resort than to respond in kind. From hence forth, any problems in the third world where there was even a hint of communism, the U.S. solution would be the military rather than the non-military side. Several authors, such as Chalmers Johnson, see Mao tse-tung as the one who developed the tactic of guerrilla warfare and molded it into a strategic concept of revolutionary warfare. Mao blended the thoughts of previous theorists including Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and T. E. Lawrence with his Marxist-Leninist beliefs. The resultant was an extremely coherent body of politico--military theory. It is this strategy that has become the basis for most of the contemporary practitioners of revolutionary warfare. Until very recently the U.S. has failed to effectively act upon this theory that our leaders claim they appreciate. Echoing Clausewitz, Mao emphasized the subordination of military operations. "War cannot for a single moment be separated from politics." He continues, "Politics is war without bloodshed."11 To date, despite the volume of material written on revolutionary warfare, the U.S. has yet to recognize that the end is political and not military victory. To compound this shortcoming, our universal response to worldwide hotspots ran counter to the flexibility of political warfare. As Mao explains: the difference in circumstances determines the difference in guiding laws of war; the difference of time, place and character. The laws of war in each historical stage have their characteristics and cannot be mechanically applied in a different age. All guiding laws of war develop as history developes and as war develops; nothing remains changeless.12 In this manner, Mao was not referring to the U.S. concept of war with armies clashing, or the western notion of peace. Instead, he was speaking of "politics"--" war without bloodshed." Competing nations are at war, it is the level of violence with its corresponding degree of civility that is controlled. At no other time has our inability to understand and to translate that mental process into a meaningful national policy more evident than our experience in Vietnam. As former Chief of Staff of the Army, General Weyand, stated: ... The major military error was a failure to communicate to the civilian decisionmakers the capabilities and limitations of American military power. There are certain tasks the American military can accomplish on behalf of another nation....They can carry the war to the enemy on land, sea, and air. These tasks require political decisions before they can be implemented, but they are within the military's capabilities. But there are also fundamental limitations on American military power... the Congress and the American people will not permit their military to take total control of another nation's political, economic, and social institutions in order to completely orchestrate the war... The failure to communicate these capabilities and limitations resulted in the military being called upon to perform political, economic, and social tasks beyond its capability while at the same time it was limited in its authority to accomplish those military tasks of which it was capable.13 So we further obscured the true nature of military force and its relationship to policy. Turning again to Clausewitz, "policy knows the instrument it means to use" and that "only if statesmen look to certain military moves and actions to produce effects that are foreign to their nature do political decisions influence operations for the worse."14 There is one last conceptualization to discuss, and it too is a legacy of Mao's and relates directly to the term political warfare. The increasing reliance of violence as a means to the end, or what is referred to as "political violence." These apostles of violence have grown in numbers. Unlike the U.S. philosophy that violence is a tool of last resort, this new breed views mayhem as the first and only truly applicable tool to gain influence. Mind you, this is not violence for violence sake but relates directly to both the worlds changing map and the notion that nations, even emerging ones, are always at "war." The difference is outlook. As Frantz Fanon exclaims, "(t)he violence which has ruled over the ordering of the colonial world,..., that same violence will be claimed and taken over by the native."15 What one draws from such books as Fanon's is an appreciation for their frustration; similarly a perspective of seething hatred. The contempt, yet yearning for the "settlers" world, can only be reconciled by "absolute violence."16 What one must walk away with from the preceding pages is the multiplicity of factors at work. A convergence of influences. Rapid decolonialization and the concommittant quest for rapid modernization; nuclear stalemate, yet an increasing reliance on violence; world order distinctly different from the world of 1939. (Hitler's dream of a new order was achieved afterall.) Finally, add to this the backdrop of the communication explosion experienced during this same period, and it is no wonder the world found itself dazed. What does the foregoing have to do with LIC? Everything. It is the totality of the issue itself that is the problem. The problems with LIC run deeper than a lack of understanding of the problem. It lies with the way we address problems of a human origin. (Remember LIC is a human condition problem.) We take a country and break down its problems, i.e. social, economic, political, security, and prepare solutions for each individual category. We analyze. We fail, however, to reconstruct the separate elements and view it as one--synthesis. This failure is only compounded when analysis starts with a preconceived notion of the origin of the problem. If faulty analysis and lack of synthesis fail to provide the correct focus for LIC, then the structural defects of the government's national security process hinder direction. This lack of direction can be attributed to three specific impediments. These hindrances reduce the coordination and implementation of matters as they pertain to LIC. Broadly speaking, these sore spots can fall under: organizational, inter-governmental relations, and the domestic political dimension. THE STRUCTURE The Constitution, as interpreted by legislation and judicial decisions, is the source of authority for governmental affairs. Embodied in this document and subsequent decisions, a conscious effort was made to incorporate tension and diffuse power. The same elements that detract from the effective pursuit of a LIC policy. LIC requires extensive coordination across inter and intra-departmental lines within the Executive Branch, while also working closely with the various committees and the Legislative Branch as a whole. Additionally, authority must be vested in a body which not only coordinates activities but can also direct an agency or department to accomplish a required task: Unity of Command. Returning to the Vietnam War, Harry Summers cites the U.S. failing on this regard. Although we did not obtain Unity of Command in the Vietnam War, this failing was not the cause of our defeat but rather the symptom of a larger deficiency-- failure to fix a militarily attainable political objective. Without such an objective we did not have unity of effort at the national level, which made it impossible at the theater level. "Unity of command," our definition states, "obtains unity of effort by the coordinated action or to obtain either unity of effort or unity of command.17 Currently, only the president occupies this central position. He must not only make policy, but then coordinate and direct as required the implementation of that policy. Despite this degree of operational involvement, the underlying assumption remains that Congress has already given their collective advice and consent. The number of players within the national security arena are numerous, and the question remains: How well are these separate elements orchestrated towards a common end? The thrust of this section is to briefly discuss the three previously mentioned trouble areas, as they pertain to: Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DoD), the five geographical unified combatant commands, and the National Security Council Staff. Finally, while the preceding are within the purview of the Chief Executive, no discussion on foreign policy is complete without taking into account the Congress. A point to keep in mind during the succeeding discussion on the executive side, is that the reader will note that there is a great deal of movement from one department or agency to another, and then back again. This occurs because of the nature of the beast, i.e. the National security process; that in fact, the roles of these organizations are intertwined; yet, the issues that these organizations deal with, are still able to be "stovepiped." In short, there is a natural tendency for national security issues to blend, but instead there is an unnatural effort to compartmentalize. For the most part, the rationale is a logical one--to break down (analyze) a complex world. Compartimentalization, however, if not integrated (synthesize) at a meaningful central point, leads to parochialism, incomplete information and institutional biases which are sometimes defended to unhealthy ends. DOS is responsible for government-to-government relations and for the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, as directed by the President. Operationally, the State Department is organized along regional lines, with five regional bureaus: European and Canadian Affairs; African Affairs; East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Inter-American Affairs; and Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. The heads of these regional bureaus, all Assistant Secretaries of State, report to the Deputy Secretary/Secretary of State. DoD is organized in a similar fashion, but with an important difference. The regional heads for African Affairs, East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Inter-American Affairs, and Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs all report to the Deputy Secretary/Secretary of Defense through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)(ASD(ISA)). (An interesting anomaly has the European/NATO regional director under the Assistant secretary of Defense (International Security Policy)). The ASD(ISA) plays a pivotal role in dealing with LIC on a day-to-day basis. The incongruence of bureaus does not hinder inter-departmental liaison at the Washington level, as much as it does for the CinC or his staff. More importantly, the geographic lines of State or Office of the Secretary Of Defense (OSD) do not correspond to the regional CinC's area of operation. So the CinC must deal with multiple bureaus within both. Additionally, the CinC must work through CJCS and OSD prior to working with state in detail. Even though all CinCs have a political Advisor (POLAD) he may not be "cut in" on state's real position. Not to mention the caliber of individuals sent to the POLAD position in the first place. Similar to what occurs in any other organization, the CinC establishes informal networks to gather and exchange information.These relationships are more a function of personality, and do not necessarily institutionalize the apparent needed communication channels. Perhaps one of the more salient problems is State's view of LIC in general. Many within the Department think first of LIC as a military problem. This is simply reinforced by the term itself. Who other than the military resolves "conflicts"? Secondly, their answer to the non-military aspect of LIC is quickly responded to by stating that LIC doesn't alter the way business is conducted. The integration of organizations even within DOS is difficult. Since socio-economic development is the linchpin to most low intensity situations a key participant is U.S. Agency for International Development (AID). Members of AID, on the other hand, have some very real reasons why they do not want their organization to have a thing to do with LIC. AID receives significant congressional support, i.e. money, for their projects and there are concerns that a close relationship with either the CIA or DoD would be to AID's detriment. This concern over being tainted extends beyond the Hill. The appearance of being a front for military or intelligence operations in another country, in which AID is operating, again is not viewed as something helpful. Much to AIDs chagrin, in Vietnam they did in fact become an unknowing front, so there is some foundation for concern. As previously stated, DOS thinks of LIC as business as usual so in fact they lack the "concepts or principles" of the whole notion of LIC.18 Simply put, there is no sense of urgency. The argument could be made that DoD already has a good handle on the situation so there is no need to get involved. A more subtle overtone can be detected though. In effect, what State thinks is that it is being told that it is not doing its job correctly Nevertheless, State could be receiving a message no one would receive well. Continuity is clearly a key to LIC, and this notion runs counter to both the way the U.S. conducts diplomacy at the government's most senior diplomatic and foreign policy making positions. Every four years, or at best eight, several ambassadorial posts change, while the senior policy making positions within State also turn over. These political plums are reality. This does not make long range policy (fifteen to twenty years) making easy. In this regard DoD and the military are much more stable. From being inherently more structured, the military and DoD can more readily exert unity of effort. Also, unlike State, the military and DoD are much less susceptible to changes brought upon by new administrations (less budgetary issues). Despite this structural advantage, DoD should not take up the mantle of LIC; nor is LIC universally accepted within the Department. Just the fact that DoD was told that it was not doing its job very well, when it was directed by Congress to get interested in Special Operations (SO)/LIC, may have caused less than an endearing effect for LIC advocates with their skeptics. Once again, some contend Congress was meddling but as good soldiers the lawmaker's order would be carried out; maybe not too quickly or with the complete spirit of the law. For others, "their" day had finally arrived. The budget slice for special operations had always paled against the strategic or conventional lines. If Congress unwittingly viewed special operations as the principal military instrument in defusing low intensity situations, well so be it. The key was congressional visibility which equates to more funds. The dollar side of LIC was not lost on certain congressional members either, as is evident with the stationing of one of the Army's light infantry divisions in Alaska. (How does a light division in Alaska enhance the security of the U.S. from LIC? Perhaps the unit's acquired skills in mountain warfare training?) Aside from the obvious pork-barreling, General Gorman comments on a more serious side regarding the marriage of SO and LIC. "Ill-conceived" in that it jumbles together two problems, each important in its own right, which have only a narrow region of overlap, and which require quite different responses from the national leadership, within the Administration as well as Congress. The Bill, by mashing these distinctly different issues into mandated organizational "fixes," has probably obviated improve- ments in national readiness for "low intensity conflict" for years to come, and exacerbated intramural conflicts within the Department of Defense over special Operations Forces' roles and missions, force structure, resource allocations, personnel policies, and R&D and procurement.19 Each President brings to office his own foreign policy agenda and the best manner to see it carried out. He alone establishes whom he will turn to for advice, whether it is an individual or an institution. The establishment of the National security Council (NSC) with its supporting staff was designed to provide a forum for just such advice. While the NSC remains a highly personal instrument and its frequency of use varies; the NSC staff "...has developed an important role within the Executive Branch of coordinating policy review, preparing issues for Presidential decision, and monitoring implementation."20 In addition to the small professional NSC staff, the NSC has been frequently supported by committees comprised of representa- tives of various relevant national security departments and agencies. Again, however, the administrations have "differed in the extent to which they have used these interagency committees."21 Figure 1 illustrates the organizational structure and subordination of the interagency groupings for LIC. Of note, the LIC board is in fact the NSC principals and has yet to meet. The SIG has met only twice. They met once to review the congressionally mandated status report on SO/LIC within the Executive Branch and the other to review its own internal progress. The four working groups and the interagency group are all chaired with military personnel even though they are not wearing their "military hats". (What possible signals could this send to DOS or Congress, for example.).The ability of the WGs and IG to hammer out solutions is critical to the decision making process for LIC. This allows viable solutions and alternatives to policy be presented to the NSC, this is in addition to the principals own thought on the subject. The point is the NSC itself must not be the initial focus of these diverse agencies. There are two clear reasons for this. First, is that "a key lesson for every successful player in the bureaucracy is to realize [is] that Click here to view image nothing is ever settled...The various agencies will continue to press their respective priorities, seeking to avoid committing resources ...."22 Thus by maintaining a higher vantage, the SIG and NSC can keep these distractions in perspective, which will allow the issue at hand to stay focused and on track. The second may not be as cynical, but is equally practical. An old military axiom states that if the commander is personally involved too soon, his options are reduced. (Not to mention the risk of quickly putting personal prestige on the line.) The authors of The Irony of Vietnam found this truism also. "The top--the inner circle of the President, White House staff, and cabinet-level appointees--remains the only place where military, diplomatic, and domestic political imperatives are brought together, and this is what made the stakes in Vietnam so high."23 Alexander Hamilton in Number 74 of The Federalists wrote: "Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand." Hamilton was obviously defending the propriety of Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution. He added that the Commander-in-Chief clause was "so consonant to the precedents of the state constitutions in general, that little need be said to explain or enforce it." Hamilton could not foresee the tremendous power which this language was to provide the President. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the President's special position in this area, i.e. his role of Commander-in- Chief, and his central position as the leader in foreign affairs. The court's decision in US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation (1936) pointed towards the external nature of the resolution as opposed to affairs which are solely internal. In this area, Justice Sutherland found that the President possessed not only the powers given him by statute, but also "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations."24 The preceding is very typical and its basic assumptions are still articulated, but the Supreme Court has continued to very skillfully skirt the ultimate question; that is, how is the basic conflict between Article I, Section 8 and Article I, Section 2 resolved? Additionally, to what extent is there consultation between the executive and legislative branches prior to entering hostilities. Some contend that the constitutionally protected power to declare war has been rendered meaningless due to the President's control of the armed forces. His Commander-in-Chief role, coupled with his role as "sole organ," provide him with powers so tremendous that they in effect "cancel out the most important grant of external authority to Congress, the power to declare war."25 When viewed in a historical sense, the last time Congress declared war in advance of hostilities was in the Mexican War of 1845.26 With the passage of the Gulf of Tokin Resolution, it was regarded that President Johnson had sufficient congressional authorization to escalate hostilities. In fact, while testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 17, 1967, Assistant Secretary of State Katzenbach argued that the resolution gave the President as much authority as a declaration of war. Much to Congress' chagrin, by 1972 they had to agree. Herein lies the genesis of the War Powers Resolution of 1973. The passage of this statute, however, gave Congress the mistaken impression that a cure for the disease had been found; unfor- tunately, the treatment was still directed at only one of the symptoms. The War Powers Resolution represented an attempt by Congress to spell out the dividing line between the constitu- tional power of Congress to declare war and the President's power as Commander-in-Chief. The fact the law came into existence only after President Nixon's veto was overridden destroyed one of the objectives of one of the principal sponsors. Senator Javits (R-NY) had hoped that Congress would be able to work out a "methodology" for joint presidential-congressional action that would signal a new compact between the two. This agreement would result in a better applica- tion of the Constitution in what is generally considered a gray area. It is indicative of the War Powers Resolution controversy that there cannot even be agreement on how many times the law should have come into play since its inception. Secondly, the question of whether it has been complied with while its procedures were being followed still looms. Both the Mayaguez incident and the most recent peacekeeping operation in Lebanon highlight these points. The focal point for these two contoversial applications of the law is not as much the procedural requirements levied upon the President, as it is the inability of the two branches to coordinate foreign affairs. A requirement that always exists, but within LIC it is only accentuated. Additionally, it is not simply policy that has become vulnerable to attack from Congress: it's Congress' view of executive primacy. In light of the increasing internal and external pressures to formulate a method to establish a coherent and consistent foreign policy, we are driven towards a joint congressional-executive compromise. This task is far from simple. As David Truman has written: The political process rarely, if ever, involves a conflict between the legislature and the executive viewed as two monolithic and unified institutions. The actual competing structures on each side are made up of elements in the legislature and in the executive, reflecting and supported by organized and unorganized interest.27 The truth of the matter leads to a complex situation where the picture is further complicated by the influence of coalitions consisting of like-minded individuals and groups from both institutions, who are arrayed against similar coalitions also based in both institutions, pursuing an alternative policy. This willingness of Congressmen to align themselves with other members or outsiders underscores a central point: to understand that its influence is often exerted by one of its many parts.28 Congress is not a simple and single institution. Additionally, the efforts to further decentralize it, coupled with the increase of personnel and information available to individual members has altered not just "the process but the product."29 The most powerful administrative unit within Congress has traditionally been the committee. But the multiplicity of individual views and the sheer number of committees make the discussion of national security issues difficult. In actuality, neither the Senate nor the House have a focal point for these matters. While there are various committees for foreign or defense issues, their scope is limited to primarily appropriations. Congress' inability to produce policy is a consequence of this structural disunity. The politics of compromise becomes the main vehicle to accomplish a given task. While the "democratization" of Congress is useful for domestic policies it complicates the issue when dealing with foreign powers. The problem is further exacerbated when viewing the increasing centralization and power of the executive branch since 1945; i.e. the creation of the National Security Council. AN OPENING The last two sections were designed to establish the philosophical tenets of the last forty-two years and place them in historical context. Without an understanding of this setting, there can be no progress in the subject entitled LIC. Secondly, a cursory glance at the principal players and the system at large tasked with formulating and implementing the United States' national security objectives. This was not done in an idealized fashion, but rather from the perspective of real world constraints. I would like to conclude with some observations and comments. Using Richard Haass' model, proposals will be made which can be grouped along structural, political, and attitudinal lines. We must understand that the answer to LIC, and national security in general, does not lie within a single group. The problem of harmonizing inter-departmental or presidential and congressional authority in the field of foreign affairs is not institutional, or is it exclusively political. There is a growing movement to reevaluate the way America views national security. The heart of this movement is engendered in the report by the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. "Discriminate Deterrence," as the report is entitled, challenges the status quo in many ways. This document has the potential to shape our future as much as "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" did. The most optimistic note is not as much content as it is approach. "Discriminate Deterrence" is a return to pragmatic foreign policy. The U.S. has traditionally taken this practical approach until recently, unencumbered by dogma or a set formula. More specifically,to dismiss "the Third World as an irrelevance except as a battleground against the forces of communism," and our "lack of sympathy for nationalist movements if they betray any tilt toward the soviet Union" is not pragmatic. 30 This is not to say that the Soviets have not exploited situations for their own gain, or attempted to instigate trouble when they could; nor can it be said that Roussea or Locke's concept of government is not diametrically opposite to the Marxist -Lenninist model. The point to be made is communism is just an idea and ideas do not propogate themselves. They are transmitted either by true believers or by those who think that they can further their own agenda. In short, we need to take a deeper look when determining the threat. The Soviets in the 1970's contended that the correlation of forces had irrevocably shifted in their favor. Their fragile effort, however, began to unravel and by the mid-eighties the soviets method for quick development was uncovered as a fraud. Cambodia, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Angola are all in economic disarray. As of now, their are approximately 500,000 insurgents combating soviet-supported regimes.31 The practice of U.S. support to certain insurgencies began with help to the Afghans, which was started by the Carter administration and expanded by President Reagan. This was with the full support of the Congress. Subsequently, Congress has repealed prohibitions on aid to the rebels in Angola and authorized aid provided to moderates in Cambodia and the Contras (whom we will return to later). "The fiscal cost of supporting these insurgencies is less than $1 billion a year, about one- third of one percent of the defense budget"; the payoff is clearly substantial.32 Furthermore, the U.S. should now understand that all "socialists or communists," are not alike. We routinely deal with a socialist French or Italian government. We have also entered into meaningful discussions with avowed "Marxist" nations such as Mozambique or Zimbabwe. While we have engaged in constructive intercourse with the left, we have dealt with the extreme right (e.g. Marcos, Papa Doc, and now Noriega). The message is we are opposed to authoritarian regimes; especially when they run counter to the United States' national interest. On the other hand, the U.S. must become more tolerant of governments which are not liberal democracies and we should not try to cast the world in our image. We must take into account cultural variances. We cannot impose our political precepts across the board. For example, how do we impose a secular notion of government to a people who believe governments are ruled by the Shari'a--Law of Islam. Just as NSC-68 has reigned for the last thirty-eight years, National security Decision Directive (NSDD)-277 will hopefully bring "the nations resources to bear on the "set of fractious problems" facing this nation for the remainder of the century.33 The establishment of a Board for LIC within the NSC is laudable, but is still only a first step. As was indicated, what is needed goes well beyond coordinating the work of the separate agencies. LIC cannot be viewed narrowly as if it was a subset of the United States' overall national security objectives. This gives rise to who analyzes the international situation and subsequently synthesizes it; then conducts strategic planning. In turn, the question of central direction and resource allocation come into play. So the problem is no longer "coordination" but of adjudication which transcend separate agency perspectives. Does the NSC take up this central role or the State Department? Should a secretariat within the NSC be formed? This issue is central to LIC. It requires extensive deliberation and there are currently no pat answers. What is known is the planning should be carried out jointly, while the internal direction should be performed by the inter-agency committee within the NSC, or perhaps a secretariat. When dealing externally DOS must be the lead agency. Coordination and direction is also required at the CinC level. As previously discussed, the ability for the CinC to conduct business with DOS is severely hampered. The CinCs should be given authority to deal formally with regional bureau heads (Assistant Secretary level) and the different chiefs of missions within their respective theater. Furthermore, since low intensity situations do cut across regional boundaries, the geographic CinCs must cooperate among one another better than in the past (e.g. the difficulties during the Persian Gulf operation with CINCCENT and CINCPAC). Before turning to the Legislative Branch, the important issue of trust and confidence must be discussed. Interestingly enough, it is the notion of legitimacy that LIC hinges on. Not just the legitimacy of that foreign government which the U.S. is supporting, but more importantly, the actions of our government as perceived domestically. If our actions are viewed as legitimate, both the Congress and the people, for the most part, will support the issue. The Mujahadeen are a case in point, while the intermittent and limited assistance provided the Contras illustrate the other end. Over the past forty years the "most controversial acts of the U.S. government have been efforts to mount and then deny involvement in ill-conceived and poorly conducted paramilitary operations which ultimately sapped support at home and abroad for policies of strategic importance." In view of the media's reach and the increasingly assertive role of Congress it is futile to have "plausible denial." Attempt to invoke such denial in light of U.S. sponsorship are "certain to engender popular disbelief which will ultimately be translated into outright political opposition."33 A clear distinction between covert and clandestine operations must be made. The difference principally being one of plausible denial while the other is confidentiality. If the former is chosen to support foreign insurgents the operation should be under the cognizance of the CinC in whose region the insurgency is located. No laws would have to be changed since this action is explicitly provided for under the title of "Special Activities." Not only can the CinC manage the problem but any governmental department could, if the President desires. This would all be done, of course, with the advice and consent of Congress. The difficulty with Congress is not as much building a decision making structure which embodies a joint executive-- legislative organization as it is a consensus building process. A vehicle could be fabricated to facilitate coordination. The creation of a joint congressional committee, with a non-- legislative mandate--along the line of the Joint Economic Committee--could be established. In addition, the committee could serve as the coordinator for the separate committees; thus establishing itself as the focal point for the executive. This would minimize the organizational problem, but the rub of reconciling domestic and international politics are still unattended. Illustrative of this situation is the further reduction of sugar imports. The sugar quota was cut by 25 percent which when added to the three previous years accounts for a 75 percent cut. This costs the Philippines, for example, $150 million a year in foreign exchange. The sugar areas of the Philippines is where the insurgency against that fragile democracy is occurring.34 The cuts were required by the Food Security Act of 1985 which was passed despite the Reagan administration's objections. It requires that the sugar program be run at no cost to the government. In other words, if domestic (voters and a highly effective sugar lobby) production rises, imports must fall.35 Surely, if low intensity situations are primarily a socio- economic problem which calls for a non-military solution, how can actions such as this be in the United States' best interest? A finer point is the tremendous interrelationship among the numerous and diverse policies of the government and how they find there way under the rubric of LIC. As Samuel Huntington observed: "...Acceptable policies are produced not by the ratiocination of a Lippmann-like intellect but by the interests, interactions, and compromises of highly practical politicians. What politicians see and what they can accomplish are, in turn, heavily influenced by the institutions in which they operate. For U.S. national security policy the relations between the president and Congress and between the two parties are crucial. In recent years neither of those relations has helped to promote the formulation of "sound" policies.36 The intensifying competition between the two branches has led to unprecedented intrusions by Congress into the "day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs, the micromanagement of defense, and the regulation of executive behavior in ways that surely would amaze the founding fathers."37 Members of the executive branch, on the other hand, have sought loopholes and ways to circumvent the system. The lack of restraint by both parties serves only as an injustice to the Republic at large. The president must take Congress into account when formulating policy; Congress must recognize the "sole organ" status of the executive and understand the difference between policymaking and implementation. To be sure, the heart of this debates resides in the War Powers Resolution. Future president's primary obstacle and chief reason for executive reticence in the past to expand cooperation with Congress can be viewed as being partially removed. By President Reagan's acknowledgment of the War Powers Resolution during the Beirut Peacekeeping Operation, he has in fact enjoined Congress to join him in foreign policy. While in comparison, the previous presidents dealt the Congress a fait accompli. Secondly, the added dimension of bipartisanship, more specifically its absence, becries another reason for consensus building. This too requires restraint and an education process. Here then are some observations and a few modest proposals, although said with much less tongue-in-cheek than Mr. Swift. The ability to conduct the nation's foreign policies and when those matters become a matter of a national security there must be mechanism established to resolve the problem. This requires an effective and reasonably efficient means to conduct business within the executive branch and between the legislative and executive branches. Indeed, returning to Hamilton and The Federalists, foreign relations power was vested in neither branch. As was written in Number 75, foreign relations constituted another branch; that the power to conduct foreign relations seems... to form a distinct department, and to belong properly, neither to the legislative nor the executive. The qualities elsewhere detailed as indispensable in the management of foreign negotiations point out the Executive as the most fit agent in these transactions, and the operation of treaties as laws pleads strongly for the participation of the whole or a portion of the legislative body in the office of making them. Finally, to temper this entire discussion on LIC, political reality cannot be forgotten. As Leslie Gelb so accurately points out "...the expert may be right or he may be wrong, but the risks of being wrong loom much larger at the top than at the bottom. Bureaucrats could talk all they wanted about taking risks and managing the consequences of defeat; political leaders had to take the risks and suffer the consequences."38 Similarly, "Discriminate Deterrence" with its low intensity call to arms has had very little influence so far. It has drawn little media attention and even less official administration acknowledgment. It is interesting to note that terrorist counteractions, an element of LIC, is a much more saleable product. Why? It is politically expedient. Terrorism and its effects have our national attention. Political reality dictates what will be focused on and prior to that attention we can only attempt to build an institutional mechanism that will respond once activated. Additionally, LIC and foreign policy in general can only be resolved by a pragmatic approach. Accepting and correcting mistakes made, once discovered, and without losing the vision which brought this country to where it is today. ENDNOTES 1Low Intensity Conflict is political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low Intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed forces. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low Intensity Conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications. (NSSD-277) 2Guenter Lewy, American In Vietnam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 438. 3Cyril E. Black, "The Dynamics of Modernization," in The Developing Nations, ed. Frank Tachau (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1972), p. 37. 4John H. Kautsky, "The Communist Perspective," in The Developming Nations, ed. Frank Tachau (New York: Dodd, Mead & company, 1972), p. 151. 5Ibid. 6Ibid. 7Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 69. 8Ibid, p. 70. 9The North Koreans invaded two months ahead of the previously planned and coordinated schedule set with Moscow; the invasion caught the Soviet's by surprise as much as the West and accounts for their surprising exit from the critical UN security council meeting. 10The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United states Decision Making of Vietnam, Senator Gravel ed. (Boston, 1971), p. 373. 11Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writings (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1963), pp. 97-98. 12Ibid, p. 56. 13Fred C, Weyand, "CDRs Call," as quoted in On Stretegy: The Vietnam War in Context, Harry G. Summers, Jr. (Quantico, C&SC Reprint, 1983), pp. 49-50. 14Karl Von Clausewitz, On War, as quoted in Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, (Quantico, C&SC Reprint, 1983), pp. 49-50. 15Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, Tr. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1963), p. 40. 16Ibid., p. 37. 17Summers, P. 92. 18William J. Olson, Director of the Low Intensity Conflict Organization in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC, personal interview about LIC, Washington, D.C., March 11, 1988. 19Gorman, Paul. Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, U. S. Congress. 20President's Special Review Board, Report of the President's Special Review Board, p. II-4. (Tower Report) 21Ibid. 22Stuart L. Perkins, Protracted Warfare: U.S. Force Structure and C3. (Medford: Lecture at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, April 22-24, 1987). 23Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979), p. 238. 24United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation et.al. (1936); as quoted in Herman Pritchett, The American Constitution, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1969), p. 357. 25Herman Pritchett, The American Constitution, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1969), p. 358. 26Ibid., P. 357. 27David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf, 1951), p. 433. 28Richard Haass, "The Role of the Congress in American Security Policy" in American Defense Policy, ed. John F. Reichart & Steven R. Sturm, 5th ed. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 551. 29Ibid. 30Michael Howard, "A European Perspective on the Reagan Years," Foreign Affairs, 66 (America and the World 1987/88), p. 488. 31Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence, p. 14. 32Samuel Huntington, "Coping with the Lippmann Gap," Foreign Affairs, 66 (America and the World 1987/88), p. 461. 33RCWG memo to Regional Conflict Working Group, Subj: RCWG Input to the Commission Report, dtd 14 Sep 87 (Draft 4.0, Alexandria, VA). 34Clyde H. Farnsworth, "U.S. Cutting Sugar Imports In Blow to Trading Partners," New York Times, December 16, 1987, Section D, p. 1. 35Ibid. 36Huntington, p. 475. 37 Ibid. 38Gelb, p. 238. BIBLIOGRAPHY Baylis, John, Ken Booth, John Garnett, and Phil Williams. Contemporary Strategy 2nd ed. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1987. Black, Cyril E. "The Dynamics of Modernization," in The Developing Nations. ed. Frank Tachau. New York: Dodd, Meade & Company, 1972. Commission On Integrated Long-Term Strategy. "Discriminate Deterrence." U.S. Printing Office, January 11, 1988. Cornell,Thomas. Guatemala Desk Officer, U.S. Agency for Inter- national Development, Department of State. Personal interview about DOS'S role in LIC. Washington, D.C., February 26, 1988. Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. Tr. Constance Farrington. New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1963. Farnsworth, Clyde H. "U.S. Cutting Sugar Imports In Blow to Trading Partners," New York Times, December 16, 1987, section D., p. 1. Freedman, Lawrence. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. Gelb, Leslie H. with Richard K. Betts. The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979. Gorman, Paul. Testimony before the House Armed services Committee, Congress. Haass, Richard. "The Role of the Congress in American Security Policy," in American Defense Policy. ed. John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1982. Howard, Michael. "A European Perspective on the Reagan Years." Foreign Affairs, 66 (America and the World 1987/88), 478-493. Huntington, Samuel P. "Coping with the Lippmann Gap." Foreign Affairs, 66 (American and the World 1987/88), 453-477. Kautsky, John H. "The Communist Perspective," in The Developing Nations. ed. Frank Tachau. New York: Dodd, Meade & Company, 1972. Kuster, Thomas J. Major (P) USA, Operations Officer, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC. Personal interview about LIC and interagency internal organization. Washington, D.C., March 11, 1988. Lewy, Guenter. America in Vietnam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. Lord, Carnes. "Rethinking the NSC Role." Comparative Strategy, 6 (Number 3, 1987), 241-280. Olson, William J., Director of the Low Intensity Conflict Organi- zation in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC. Personal interview about LIC, Washington, D.C., March 11, 1988. Perkins, Stuart L. Col. USA., Chairman Intelligence Working Group Interagency Committee for the NSC on LIC. Personal interview about LIC. Langley, Virginia, February 26, 1988. Perkins, Stuart. "Low Intensity Conflict: The Nature of the Threat. (Unpublished Lecture), 1987. Perkins, Stuart. "Protracted Warfare: U.S. Force Structure and C3, 16th Annual Conference on Protracted Warfare--The Third World Arena: A Dimension of U.S. --Soviet Conflict. Medford: The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, April 22-24, 1987. Perle, Richard, "Launching the right answer at the right question." U.S. News & World Report, 25 January 1988, p. 47. President's Special Review Board. Report of the President's special Review Board, February 26, 1987. (The Tower Commission) Pritchett, Herman C. 2nd ed. The American Constitution. New York: Mcgraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1969. "RCWG Input to the Commission Report" (Draft 4.0), dtd 14 Sep 87. Memorandum for the Regional Conflict Working Group. (Commission on Integrated Long-Term strategy, 1801 N. Beauregard St., Alexandria, VA.) Sheehan, Neil, Hedrick Smith, E.W. Kenworthy, and Fox Butterfield. The Pentagon Papers. Toronto: Bantam Books, Inc., 1971. Summers, Harry G., Jr. On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context Reprint Quantico: C&SC, 1983. Trewhitt, Henry. "Uncle Sam in a Grave New World," U.S. News & World Report, 25 January 1988, pp. 45-57. Truman, David. The Government Process. New York: Knopf Press, 1951. "Sugar Plan Advances," New York Times, December 17, 1987, Section D, p. 22. "Uncle Sugar's Sugar Deal," New York Times, December 21, 1987, Section A, p. 22. Wright, Benjamin Fletcher, ed. The Federalists. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1961. X. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." Foreign Affairs, 25 (July 1947), 466-582.
|Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list|