Low Intensity Conflict: A War By Any Other Name
CSC 1988
SUBJECT AREA National Military Strategy
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: A WAR BY ANY OTHER NAME
by
Major J. A. Robbs
Royal Australian Infantry Corps
Command and Staff College
Education Center
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134
9 May 1988
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
1. Introduction
Philosophy and Theory of Conflict 1
Problem 2
2. Low Intensity Conflict in General
Defining Low Intensity Conflict 6
The Conflict Spectrum and Characteristics of LIC 11
Conclusion 15
3. The Significance of Low Intensity Conflict
An Example 17
Recent Military Focus and Development 20
Western Vulnerability 28
Future Conflict 37
4. An Overview of the Main Types of LIC
Insurgency 44
Counter-Insurgency 6O
5. An Overview of other LIC
Aid-to-the-Civil-Power 77
Foreign Internal Defence 79
Terrorism and Terrorism Counter-action 80
Peacekeeping and Peacemaking 84
Peace-Time Contigencies 90
6. Guiding Strategy and Tactics
National Philosophy 92
National Security Strategy 96
Military Doctrine 98
7. A Force That Caters for LIC
National and Strategic 102
Tactical 108
8. Preparation and Training for Conflict
Higher Command 112
Operational Art 114
Tactical 116
Individual 120
9. Conclusion 126
Endnotes 128
Bibliography 138
Appendices
A. Definitions
B. Conflict Spectrum
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY OF CONFLICT
The following postulates, whether judged as empirical,
hypothetical, true or false, are a relevant starting point
for the examination of conflict.
* Harmony and disharmony are natural, inevitable, and
evolutionary characteristics of mankind.
* Disharmony is resolved by peaceful or violent
means, as reflected by a spectrum of conditions
from peaceful competition to violent conflict.
* The peaceful resolution of conflict is preferable
and common, but yet to preclude the option of
violence: models of intra-national and spiritual
harmony are neither analagous to, nor bind,
international relations at this point in time.
* Conflict and its resolution is multidimensional,
multi-level, and integrated.
* States, sub-national groups and trans-national
groups may come into conflict with each other and
prosecute this conflict with violence. Whatever the
origins of the conflict it is played out in the
environment of the "state system": often in an
attempt to alter the status quo of that system.
* Force may be employed by individuals in an
anarchical or irrational manner, but it is used by
the state and the interest group in the pursuit of
objectives.
* The use of force is limited by capacity, risk and
objectives.
* At a minimum, a state will seek a capacity of
force commensurate with the threat to its survival,
once security is achieved a state will seek the
ability to pursue interests.
* The status quo of the state, if not its survival,
can be threatened within all levels of conflict, but
the most decisive effect is achieved by unlimited
force.
* The state's ability to project violence is
institutionalized in armed forces, i.e., armies,
navies, and air forces.
PROBLEM
The objective of armed forces is to win wars: trite but
true. Armed forces may posture and project power by inference
if able to project violence by action. Military victory in
war is the reason d'etre for an army. This rationale may be
over-ridden by higher strategy, but a non-combatant or
incompetant army defies definition and justification in the
West. (1)
The role of the armed forces is supportive of the state
in the pursuit of national interests. Regardless of the level
of a conflict, military action must be integrated with action
in the political, social, economic, and psychological
dimensions of a problem. The military dimension is
predominate in the higher levels of conflict. Hitherto, the
West has considered the higher levels of conflict the
predominate threat, despite a continuing need to operate in
lower levels of conflict. (2) The rationale for this focus was
substantial, but now the concept is dated.
Success in present and future conflicts requires the
ability for integrated action in all dimensions and at all
levels in proportion to the threat or interest. This concept
is well expressed by the authors of "Integrated Strategy and
Discriminate Deterrence":
Because our problems in the real world are
connected and because budgets compel trade-offs,
we need to fit together strategies for a wide range
of conflicts: from the most confined, lowest
intensity and highest probability to the most
widespread, apocalyptic and least likely. We want
the worst conflicts to be less likely, but that
holds only if our weakness at some higher level..
..does not invite such raising of the ante. For
genuine stability, we need to assure our adversaries
that military aggression at any level of violence
against our important interests will be opposed by
military force. (3)
The logic of "Integrated Strategy and Discriminate
Deterrence" (4) is relevant to all Western nations,
irrespective of size. Even in a relatively benign strategic
environment such as Australia enjoys currently, defence
preparedness must address the maintenance of capabilities
applicable to other levels of conflict than the near term
threat. (5)
Within the combat environment of the future (6) the
objective of armed forces remains to win wars, regardless of
type or complexity. The question remains, "How?". There are
two extreme solutions: with unlimited resources a nation may
structure, equip, and train forces for each type and region
of conflict; or, with limited resources, have one force
attempt to do everything. The reality is a compromise
tailored to each nation's situation. Perhaps with the
exception of the United States, there are few Western nations
that can afford the maintenance of large "specialized
modules" within an army. Even the United States is limited in
this regard by the number and variety of contingencies it
must face; For example, the US Marine Corps, must retain a
diversity of war-fighting skills for employment world-wide.
These tasks range from the amphibious assault by conventional
forces to hostage rescue in a foreign country. (7) An example
of the flexible use of armed forces has been illustrated by
the United Kingdom of Great Britain. The same units of this
force have operated proficiently in counter-insurgency in
Northern Ireland, in mechanized operations with the British
Army on the Rhine, and fought in the Falklands War.
For reasons that will be examined later, most Western
states already possess significant professional armies for
fighting in the higher levels of conflict. However, the
recent wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan, the conflicts in
Northern Ireland and Latin America, and modern terrorism,
illustrates that such conventional armies may not win easily
in lower levels of conflict. Even if a conventional army is
not defeated in such a conflict, it is likely to be
debilitated.
The armed forces and the interests of the West have been
debilitated in the past by Low Intensity Conflict. For this
reason, and others discussed in Chapter Three, the West is to
continue to be engaged in Low Intensity Conflict. It is the
most likely combat environment in the near future. Western
democratic states possess inherent vulnerabilities in this
environment which are likely to make LIC an increasingly
attractive option for those unable to "win" by other means,
peaceful or violent.
The problem for a Western democratic nation is to
maintain and employ an appropriate strategy, force and
tactics for the conduct of Low Intensity Conflict while
meeting the other requirements of national strategy and
without denigrating the ability of the state to conduct a
higher level of war.
CHAPTER TWO
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT IN GENERAL
DEFINING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
There is a plethora of terminology covering the subject
of Low Intensity Conflict. Many of the terms are abstract and
have a political and philosophical context as well as a
military definition. In addition, there are both subtle and
distinct differences among single service, joint service, and
international terminology in this field. For the purpose of
clarity, a table of comparative definitions is included as
Appendix A.
Colonel Richard H. Taylor, US Army, provided a useful
definition of Low Intensity Conflict in the Military Review
of January 1988 when he described it as an environment in
which:
Interests are contested; organized violence
is used to effect or influence outcomes; all
elements of national power are employed; the
military dimension is employed primarily for its
political, economic and informational effect;
military violence is employed indirectly or limited
by time and objective." (1)
It is an environment that spans a range of struggles of
varying nature and intensity. Figure 1 lists these struggles
by military definition. (2) These struggles, or operations,
are generally considered as above the environment of
"peaceful competition", but below the threshold of "war".(3)
The boundaries that differentiate LIC from peaceful
competition and higher conflict are blurred. Each conflict
must be analysed in detail to determine its precise nature
Figure 1
EXAMPLES OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
Offensive Operations Defensive Operations
* Insurgency * Counter Insurgency
* Aid-to-the-Civil Power (4)
* Foreign Internal Defence
* Terrorism (5) * Terrorism Counter-Action
* Peacemaking Operations * Peacekeeping Operations
* Peacetime Contingency * Peacetime Contingency
Operations Operations
and the appropriate response. Conflict easily transitions
between levels and many of the strategies found in the LIC
environment concentrate on controlling the time and place of
transition. This is the case for the revolutionary strategies
of Leninism, Maoism, and the Cuban model.
The Vietnam War, for example, was played across three
levels of conflict: firstly, insurgency by the Viet Cong
against the South Vietnamese and their allies; secondly,
guerrilla war and limited war by the Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese Army against the South Vietnamese and their
allies; and, finally, general war between North and South
Vietnam. (6) The transition from one level of conflict to
another during the Vietnam War was indistinct, with different
levels of violence conducted simultaneously in different
regions or even within the same area but by different
forces. (7)
A fundamental lesson in preparing for LIC is to be wary
of templating a response in accordance with the academic or
political categorization of the conflict. Each conflict is
unique and unlikely to fit exactly within a military
definition. For example, the Multinational Force II in Beirut
in 1983 was committed with an implied mission of
"peacekeeping": world there have been a more appropriate
tactical emphasis by the commander of US Marines in MNF II if
the mission had stressed a role of Foreign Internal Defence
instead of "presence"? (8) Commanders at all levels,
including politicians, must remember that a classification of
a conflict is of little consequence to soldiers ambushed and
killed, whether by insurgents or by regular troops.
The further lesson to be derived from a comparison of
the definition and reality of Low Intensity Conflict is the
need to be prepared to fight above or below the initial level
of violence. Not only can the transition be swift, but what
constitutes Low Intensity Conflict and what is "war" is a
relative perception. There are aspects of Peacetime
Contingency or Peacemaking Operations that in a microcosm are
war, i.e., operations that are tactically and strategically
the same as those effected during a higher level of conflict.
In some cases, the difference is that the LIC is regionally
confined. If an environment of LIC has been established then
it normally requires more than police work. In order to be
successful in this environment armed forces may act as a
police force but they must be trained as if for war. An army
is capable of carrying out police work, but a police force
cannot be effective beyond the domestic state of peaceful
competition unless it becomes an army.
By the current definitions Low Intensity Conflict is not
war. However, many aspects of these types of conflict are
analogous to war and the conflict itself may be a campaign
within or complementary to a war. Future warfare is likely to
be less coherent, less compartmentalized, and conducted
without much regard to current definitions and perceptions of
what is, or what is not, war. (9) Already, there are few
constitutionally declared wars. The United States and the
Soviet Union possess the ability to oppose each other
directly, indirectly, or through a combination of both.
These states are able to wage conflict in any combination of
level, region, and time frame. The United States perception
of Low Intensity Conflict, for example, places such conflict
within the frame-work of contest between the Soviet Union and
the West:
While the Soviets cannot be branded as
instigators of all revolutionary movements, their
strategy clearly is to exploit domestic vulnerabilities
in foreign countries to promote the emergence of
regimes under Soviet influence control. All this is
accomplished under the rubric of "peaceful coexistance"
with the United States and the West, defined as a
continuing contest in which all forms of struggle
are permissible short of all-out war. (10)
Certainly there are other causes of international
conflict in the world apart from USA-USSR rivalry: there is a
larger ideological rivalry of East-West; the competition
between the developed and undeveloped nations; a potential
challange to other religions by Islam; and, the destability
offered by various combinations of sub-national groups and
states attempting to subvert the "state system". As more
states, and even sub-states, gain high-technology, wealth,
and international influence, the pursuit of interests by
armed conflict will be less constrained by region and method.
The advantage in this environment will be held by the state
or group able to orchestrate efforts across a spectrum of
conflicts. A Low Intensity Conflict may constitute only one
"battlefield" in a larger war.
Low Intensity Conflict may not be defined as "war", but
it is best approached by politicians and the military alike
with the same philosophy and determination that a higher
level of violence would command. Such an approach aids in
establishing the continuity of intention from the leader of
the state to the soldier in the "war", and across all the
dimensions of the conflict. Thinking of the conflict in terms
of a "Small War" (11) does not prejudice the conduct with
inappropriate tactics, but makes it easier to translate the
intention into understandable and achievable objectives in
the field. It should be noted that the revolutionary
strategies to be found in the LIC environment aim to destroy
this continuity. The first disconnection within the West is
that the struggle may not be perceived as "war", that it may
not command the same respect or effort as "war". The counter
is found in the education of the politicians, military, and
public on the nature of specific conflicts and conflict in
general:
Clearly, only well informed opinions can serve
our nations. This is one of the main reasons why it
is necessary to develop an appropriate policy
framework for open, declaratory statements that
educate the people of the free world on the reality,
nature, and long term impact of modern insurgency. (12)
THE CONFLICT SPECTRUM AND CHARACTERISTICS OF LOW INTENSITY
CONFLICT
The official definitions of Low Intensity Conflict
describe an environment in which a number of characteristics
are predominant and which must be addressed during
preparation for future conflict. However, a clearer
understanding of this environment and its relationship to
other levels of conflict is gained by viewing LIC in relation
to the conflict spectrum. A diagram of the spectrum is at
Appendix B.
From an understanding of the general nature of LIC it is
possible to deduce general characteristics of the environment
for which national strategy and its military component must
cater. In turn, this strategy drives the preparation and
conduct of the armed forces. This process must be completed
before a specific conflict arises or subsequent responses are
likely to be defensive and reactive, i.e., the initiative has
already been lost. The strategy should be based on pre-
empting LIC or utilizing it to advantage. Both these paths
require, as in other forms of warfare, the seizing of
initiative. This is most commonly by offensive action, but in
a conflict where the military dimension is less a factor,
then the military command must be attuned to seizing
psychological, political, social or economic initiative with
less combat force than unrestrained war. This restriction of
violence must not be translated into the tactical martyrdom
of troops. Nor should it be construed as at odds with the
principles of war. (13) The restriction on violence should be
appreciated in accordance with the principle of "economy of
force". In LIC it is the application of this principle that
is not always understood by soldiers or statesmen.
The general characteristics of the Low Intensity
Conflict environment may be described as follows:
* It is conducted within three theatres: intra-state,
inter-state, and a combination of intra- and inter-
state.
* The intra-state level of disharmony and violence is
above that resulting from routine domestic crime and the
ability of the state to resolve without resort to
military force, but below civil war or foreign invasion.
* The inter-state level of disharmony and violence is
above the posturing and threat of military force, and
the limited and indirect military violence that is
incidental to peaceful inter-state competition (14) but
below war.
* A combination of intra-and inter-state disharmony
and violence may be undertaken in an orchestrated manner
by both states and sub-national groups. Such campaigns
are normally played-out under the pervasive shadow of
the East-West competition. This bi-polar competition may
feed on the existing disharmony to be found in the Third
World and among disgruntled sub-national groups.
However, there is a potential for other rivalries, such
as the North-South competition, to be manifest by a
combination of intra and inter-state conflict. This
environment is increasingly open for exploitation by
players other than the USSR and the USA. (15)
* Military violence alone is not the decisive factor
of resolve. It is limited by constraints on the
weaponry, tactics, and quantity of force. (16)
* Military violence is employed in concert with
action in the political, social, economic, and
psychological dimensions of the conflict. This action
may be executed by military forces as well as other
agencies.
* The LIC environment focuses on maintaining or
changing the structure of a state and the pursuit of
state interests by "extra-legal" means short of war. It
also includes those groups, who are sub-national or
trans-national in nature, that attempt by actions such
as terrorism to change the status quo of international
relations. These groups are generally ineffective unless
supported, at least covertly, by a state.
* The maintenance or change of the state by means
short of war is primarily the environment of insurgency
and counter-insurgency. In particular, the change or
overthrow of the established state from within by
illegitimate means such as subversion, terrorism, and
revolution. Much of this environment is the world of
revolt against the status quo of society, politics,
economics and the balance of power.
* The pursuit of state interests short of war is the
projection of limited military power to effect limited
objectives, such as Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations,
the protection of sea lanes from piracy, and hostage
rescue.
* There will often be a dual nature to LIC operations
depending on whether the environment is at home or
abroad. One state may conduct counter-insurgency for
survival while it is assisted by another state in the
pursuit of national interest. This difference of
perception is another area of potential incoherence and
disunity of effort.
* The conflict may be over a protracted period of
time because of the inability to resolve it decisively
by force. In fact, the conflict may never be resolved
but move to a different level. If this level is within
the environment of "peaceful competition" then the West
is likely to consider that the democratic processes have
won and are at work. Other political philosophies are
likely to consider this situation a setback, but not a
loss. In this environment a winning strategy is not
only pre-emptive, but vigilant, protracted and
evolutionary.
CONCLUSION
The following features may be concluded as appropriate
to the general philosophy and strategy in preparing for,
and conducting, Low Intensity Conflict. They are deduced by
examination of the definition and genereral characteristics
of Low Intensity Conflict, and the environment in which it is
conducted.
* Low Intensity Conflict is analogous to war and requires
the same philosophical, strategical, and tactical approach as
war.
* Low Intensity Conflict can be waged in isolation or as
part of war. National and military strategy must integrate
the strategy to conduct Low Intensity Conflict into a
strategy that addresses a spectrum of threats that may arise
in a variety of combinations.
* The strategy, force structure and tactics of an army
should maximize the elements common to the conduct of all
conflict and cater for the differences.
* Strategy, tactics and force structure must be competent
in the higher levels of conflict and adapt to fight LIC
rather than visa-versa. An army must be at least capable of
fighting conventional warfare.
* The West's strategy for LIC is likely to be in pursuit
of national interest abroad, but its LIC strategy should also
cater for threats at home
* The conduct of LIC requires a coordinated effort across
the full range of political, social, economic, and military
dimensions that make up a state. Military violence is not
normally the decisive factor in LIC as a balance of power may
be achieved by an opposing combination of other factors.
However, the possession of a superior violence capability
confers the major advantage in LIC and all conflict. A
strategy may allow the employment of this capability in a
discriminating manner, but it must never surrender this
potential willingly. A strategy must at least aim to gain or
hold the balance of military power.
CHAPTER THREE
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
AN EXAMPLE
On the 23rd October 1983, a truck laden with
the equivalent of over 12,000 pounds of TNT crashed
through the perimeter of the US contingent of the
Multinational Force (MNF II) at Beirut International
Airport, Beirut, Lebanon, penetrating the Battalion
Landing Team Headquarters building and detonated.
The force of the explosion destroyed the building
resulting in the deaths of 241 US military
personnel. (1)
Almost simultaneously with the attack on the US Marine
compound, a similar truck bomb exploded at the French MNF
headquarters. (2) These attacks were executed on behalf of a
revolutionary group by single "terrorists" and supported
directly or indirectly by other states. (3)
The bombing was a military and political success for
those groups who opposed the MNF II presence and mission in
Lebanon and were unable to eject it by direct combat. The
MNF II was withdrawn from Lebanon by April 1984 in the face
of a seemingly impossible task and a lack of international
public and political support. It had failed to aid the
Lebanese Armed Forces carry out its responsibilities as
directed by the force mission. (4)
The bombing was classified by the US as, "..tantamount
to an act of war using the medium of terrorism." (5) No doubt
the perpetrators would agree with the US that the bombing was
an act of war, but would debate the label of " unlawful use
of violence" (6) attached by the US definition of terrorism.
Whatever the semantics of the label, the Beirut bombing is a
good example of violent conflict below the threshhold of war,
and which the layman does not perceive to be the legitimate
face of war. This type of conflict is classified as Low
Intensity Conflict. (7)
The significance of the Beirut bombing is that two
nuclear superpowers suffered a tactical defeat at the hands
of a much lesser force, and that the political objectives of
four major powers working in concert were thwarted by the
same lesser force. There are valuable lessons to be learned
or relearned from the incident, and many of these have
already been absorbed by the West. Ironically, the increasing
threat of LIC to the USA was the subject of a report
completed in June 1983 by the Defence Technical Information
Center for the US Army Training and Doctrine Command. The
report was prophetic:
Hardly a day passes without a terrorist
incident occurring somewhere in the world. Although
the United States has not so far been a primary
target of attack, any optimism that this benign state
of affairs will continue is misplaced. Used as a
strategic weapon, the vectored terrorist threat
offers certain unique advantages in the pursuit of
foreign policy objectives... Too, the initial
uncertainty about the origin of attack often limits
the full range of diplomatic and military responses.
For the Soviet Union and its proxies-and certain
of the radical national and subnational groups on
the terrorist scene-terrorism may offer an
irresistibly low-cost, low-risk means of engaging
the West in low-intensity conflict.... The days in
which terrorism was confined to isolated instances
of social disruption may well be over. Contemporary
terrorism has become a tactic of strategic value
whether employed by neo-nihilistic subnational groups or
by nation states. (8)
The major lessons to be learnt from the Beirut bombing
by the Western states were: the utility of Low Intensity
Conflict and military might does not automatically assure
victory.
The latter maxim is acknowledged by the US military with
the popularization of "manoeuvre warfare theory" over
"attrition warfare theory", and the need to fight with brain
as well as brawn: a concept that is as old as combat and long
incorporated in the philosophy of armies with meagre
resources and facing quantitatively superior foes. This
should not denigrate the quantitative approach to warfare;
for sometimes it is the most expeditious way to win a
conflict. Despite the desirability of "minimal violence"
espoused in current LIC doctrine, (9) the option of massive
force must not be surrendered. The relative balance of force
is no less a consideration in LIC than any other conflict,
with the militarily weaker antagonist seeking to negate or
gain superiority of force as a precondition to achieving
subsequent objectives.
The philosophies of quantitative and qualitative warfare
are complementary, and the reality of battle requires the
co-ordinated application of both. The crux of tow Intensity
Warfare is to reduce the advantage of quantitative military
power in the resolution of conflict until that power or
objectives are obtained. If the former is achieved before
the latter, then increased options are available in the
pursuit of objectives.
Soldiers, politicians and the public must understand how
to employ and defeat the various types and strategies of LIC.
(10) It requires an integrated effort no less serious than
war.
RECENT MILITARY FOCUS AND DEVELOPMENT
LIC is not a new phenomena, (11) although it has
recently become a popular subject. To be successful in LIC,
it is necessary to understand not only the general nature of
the LIC environment, but the evolution of LIC. The evolution
points to not only why it is utilized but why it has been
successful against the West. Understanding these aspects
helps to formulate an appropriate strategy, tactics and
training for LIC. The evolution of LIC also points towards
some inherent vulnerabilities of the West in this environment
and how to avoid them in the future.
The lessons of the Beirut reiterate those of the Vietnam
War, the war in Afghanistan, the conflict in Northern
Ireland, modern terrorism, and numerous revolutionary
struggles of this century. However, Western democratic states
have tended to focus their attention on the upper end of the
conflict spectrum (12) as the greatest and most probable
threat requiring military action, rather than viewing
conflict as a continuum of escalation, diminution, and
integration of violence levels. There have been
understandable reasons for this focus and the relegation of
LIC behind conventional and nuclear warfare in importance.
Perceived Threat.
Firstly, nations have evolved armed forces for purposes
ranging from the projection of force by violence, to the
possession of force for defence. Nationhood requires at
least the ability to protect the state against the greatest
perceived threat, generally defined as foreign. In most cases
this threat has been seen a loss in the highest level of
conflict: general war. The perceived consequences of such a
loss range from apocalyptic destruction of the country, and
even life on earth, to the loss of statehood and the ability
to implement will. Whatever the real consequences, they are
equated with national survival and too serious to gamble away
with a lack of preparation based on a prediction of the
future level of conflict. The, validity of this proposition is
obvious in the case of the United States, whose principal
threat is seen as the "global challenge posed by the Soviet
Union" (13).
All states must be prepared for war, if only for
survival. Not only can the bi-polar nature of global conflict
enmesh a country without waring or preventive recourse, but
the environment can change unpredictably to pit one country
against another. The recent Falklands War is a case in
point. Such a conflict was constrained to a region, but still
a significant and unexpected war for the participants.
The military strategy of a nation must address high and
mid level conflict as a priority. Nuclear and global war has
been prevented since World War II by deterrence and the
prospect of Pyrrhic victory. Deterrence is a major factor in
the containment of violence and the maintenance of national
security for all countries, nuclear and non-nuclear. It is
essential that, "Our military capabilities and competence
must command respect." (14)
One consequence of the institutionalization of massive
force in support of the established nations, has been the
increased utility of Low Intensity Conflict for the "weak".
Intra-and inter-state antagonists, who wish to avoid the
potentially catastrophic consequences of a direct conflict,
must employ strategy and tactics to remove the advantage of
of military power held by the enemy,i.e., turn a weakness
into a strenghth and vice versa. Such an antagonist, whether
of domestic or international origin, may seek to change the
status quo by engaging the enemy state in an orchestration of
attack, which not only includes low level military conflict,
but political, social, economic and psychological dimensions.
The strategy and tactics of LIC, and in particular
revolution, have evolved in line with the evolution of
conventional military power and the "state system". The
stratagies of LIC are well developed by those groups who do
not possess the power of a state and by those who operate
outside of the state system.
The current utility of LIC has been hightened by the the
great number of world alliances and the bi-polar nature of
global politics. The use of maximum military force against a
weaker state, may be curtailed by the risk of bringing into
the conflict a stronger ally of the enemy or by other factors
which make the prosecution unprofitable at a higher level of
conflict.
Western Perception of War
A second reason for the Western pre-occupation with high
level conflict over LIC, is rooted in the Western perception
of war. By the turn of the 20th Century, Western democratic
countries were well evolved and progressing on a path of
stable and prosperous nationhood. In most cases the
revolutionary fires of change had been replaced by the
processes of democracy. The West attributed its dynamism and
prosperity to the superiority of its political system; it
still does. The two most catastrophic events that upset this
progress were World War I and World War II. The Western
perception of war points to the waste of resources and the
disruption of evolutionary and peaceful progress. The world
wars changed the status quo of global affairs to the current
bipolarity, reducing the pre-eminence of most Western powers,
such as The United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Perhaps the
only Western power to profit, in any way, from the wars was
the United States. And even then, it was thrust into the
demanding and unenviable role of Western leadership. After
World War II, the spectre of a dismembered Germany reminded
the West of the consequences of losing a war. In the Western
view, whatever good was gained out of the War was gained by
winners. The subsequent development of Japan is a
counterpoint to that view, but has remained over-shadowed by
the nuclear destruction of Japanese cities. This event has
continued to crystalized world attention on the possible fate
of losers in a future high level conflict.
World War II also acted as the catalyst of change and
revolution in the Third World. It accelerated the Third
World towards nationhood and dismembered empires. Eventhough
many of these colonies were no longer profitable to the
colonial powers, the war replaced the Western sense of
evolutionary and paternal change with the fait accompli of
revolution and a demand for self-determination. Consequently,
the West was involved in wars that did not conform to Western
perception, e.g. Algeria and Palestine., Moreover, these wars
could not be won by the tried and tested methods of previous
successes and showed little respect for the military might of
which the West was proud. These wars helped to perfect the
strategies of revolution employed in the LIC environment of
today.
Given this history, it is not surprising that war is
considered a very serious business in the West and generally
unprofitable, regardless of who wins. The Judaic-Christian-
Greco-Roman-Renaissance-Enlightenment-Scientific tradition,
supports this view of war. The West is unlikely to
undertaken war lightly and would rather avoid direct
involvement in LIC.(15). The West will fight for survival and
national interest, but generally only when all other avenues
of resolution have been exhausted, including the avenue of
compromise.
There are signigicant advantages in engaging a
militarily superior state that is reticent to go to war in a
level of conflict below that perceived as "war". This is
especially if the issues are not initially seen to threaten
state survival. Insurgent strategy aims to exploit this
characteristic by not only debilitating the military
opposition but the national will to fight. This attack was
used to good effect during the Vietnam war in the 1960's and
70's.
History of Mediocre Performance
A third reason for the post Vietnam reticence by some
Western nations to address the conduct of LIC was as a result
of the Western defeat in that war. Although the Western
Allies were not defeated militarily, they were never-the-less
defeated politically. The principal conflict of this type
that the West has been able to hold up as a success is the
Malaya Campaign of 1948 to 1959. (16) The relevance of that
campaign for future LIC is arguable. Even in other areas of
LIC, such as peacekeeping, the West has been thwarted more
often than not. (17) No-one willingly chooses a method of
combat in which they believe they are unable to win or in
which they have been hitherto unsuccessful. This is one
reason why TIC has proliferated and insurgency remains a
favoured strategy of potential enemies of the West. It is
also the soundest reason for the West to acquire competence
in LIC, and counter-insurgency in particular
Although formulated in the aftermath of the Vietnam
war, the Australian doctrine for counter-insurgency
operations addresses the danger of surrendering initiative in
the LIC environment and is relevent to the West:
Resolutions to avoid involvement in 'foreign'
or 'internal' wars irrespective of their origin or
motivation will only encourage insidious Communist
expansion. The time will eventually come when a
stand will again have to be taken to contain it
within acceptable limits, probably for reasons of
trade and economics, if not ideological ones.
Inevitably, such a stand will involve containment
of insurgencies. Thus examination of the subject
cannot be swept'aside. It is imperative that an
effective counter to Communist revolutionary
techniques be devised and perfected." (18)
Asia and Latin America contains numerous developing
democratic countries that are involved in counter-insurgency
and require aid from developed Western countries. While
countries such as the US term this aid as Foreign Internal
Defence Operations (19), the nature of the conflicts will
range from terrorism through insurgency to guerrilla warfare
and possibly to the extent of mid-intensity war, as
experienced in Vietnam (20). These conflicts are likely to
threaten the very survival of the state and the level,
quantity, duration, and spirit of the aid must be cognizant
of this fact. The survival of Western democratic states is
entwined with the promotion of stability and the self-
determination of allies, rather than an introspective and
isolationist policy (21). Foreign and defence policies that
are based on principles of "isolationism", "non-alignment",
and purely self-defence, surrender initiative and limit
options in a LIC environment.
Not a Matter of Survival.
Most western democratic countries have yet to experience
the threat of LIC within their own borders. That is, while
LIC may threaten national interest, it has yet to threaten
national survival. These conflicts have been played out
generally in the Third World, with the exception of
terrorism, which is a relatively small, although dramatic,
aspect of the conflict spectrum. However, the possible need
for the conduct of LIC within the democratic state, in the
form of Aid-to-the Civil-Power (22) or counter-insurgency,
should not be overlooked. The need for such a contingency
has been demonstrated in the USA by the call out of National
Guard units to quell civil disturbances, and in the United
Kingdom with the British Army commitment to Northern Ireland.
In Australia, in areas of low threat the most creditable near
term scenarios are those which hypothesise externally
sponsored insurgency and terrorism for limited diplomatic or
economic gains, and as an adjunct of more peaceful
strategies. (23) There are probably few democracies that
contain a society so harmonious that interest or ethnic
groups, desiring separation from the state or a change of
status quo by extra-legal means, do not exist. (24) In the
future such groups may grow in power and violence by
utilizing the international drug trade to an extent requiring
military aid to the police. The drug trade itself may import
the opportunity for foreign inspired insurgency within the
West Appropriate 'till Now!
The final rationale for the state of military
preparedness in Western democracies today, is
appropriateness. Nuclear and conventional global wars have
been prevented since World War II by "deterrence" and the
principle of a balance of power. Instead of seeking to
redress that balance with a quantitative gain, antagonists of
all kinds, have moved towards the other end of the conflict
spectrum to redress the balance with a qualitative
application of violence.
The military in the West moves by evolution rather than
revolution. It is responsive to change providing the change
is perceived or predicted. The West analyses the history of
conflict as a guide for the future. However, it is debateable
whether sufficient effort has been spent on analysing the
future face of conflict as it may be, and as we
intend to make it.
WESTERN VULNERABILITY
General
The Western democratic state possesses some inherent
vulnerabilities in the LIC environment. A significant segment
of the revolutionary strategies which operate in this
environment have either evolved or been initiated to exploit
these vulnerabilities. In other aspects of the LIC
environment the tenet of successful operation may be in
contrast to the Western perception of war-fighting and
therefore ignored. This is not to stress that the democratic
state must be forever besieged by insurgency and reactive in
the LIC arena. Many of these vulnerabilities are also found
in non-democratic states and many affect equally the
performance of the state in higher levels of conflict. It is
to stress that these vulnerabilities must be recognized and
taken into consideration in the preparation for, and conduct
of LIC.
The Individual Versus the State
A corners tone of Western democracy is the creation of an
environment in which individual freedom is balanced against
social responsibility. The competing needs of individuals and
the state are resolved by peaceful and institutionalized
means: The democratic state does not discourage dissension,
but recognizes its legitimacy within
the state and the "rules". This characteristic ceases to be a
strength when the means for resolving dissension are
undeveloped, or perceived as inadequate or unfair, i.e., when
the "rules" are considered illegitimate. Then, the inherent
belief in an individual's right to follow will and maximize
potential, coupled with a belief in the legitimacy of
dissension, creates the environment of revolution. The
quandary for the democratic state is that it not only
recognizes the legitimacy of dissent but creates an open and
free society in which dissent may be manipulated into
subversion.
While the democratic state recognizes the legitimate
right of individuals to revolt against an oppressive state,
it is sustained by a domestic commitment to peaceful change
and is respectful of sovereign integrity. It is difficult to
elicit public support for the promotion of violent revolution
in foreign countries unless exceptional circumstances exist.
The ability of the West to operate with initiative in the LIC
environment may be inhibited by public opinion and some
inherent belief that the "means do not justify the end".
This is particularly true when the nature of an operation
does not fit the Western perception of what is fair or when
the operation is not seen as essential to state survival.
Quite often public opinion will apply presonal or domestic
moral analogy as a guide to the conduct of international
affairs. Other political beliefs are not as constrained by
this juxtaposition, nor operate with the same morality. The
application of communist revolutionary theory can be
particularly pragmatic. (25)
The West must be sympathetic to democratic revolution in
developing countries stifled by corrupt and illegitimate
government and maintained by foreign power. However, rarely
can the West offer the dynamic "quick fix" that
revolutionaries hope to achieve. Many of the problems of the
Third World, unlike those of pre-revolutionary United States
and France, call for an evolutionary change. By definition,
the revolutionary wants dramatic and immediate change and
more often than not, the goal is not democracy. Violent
revolution alone cannot institute nor sustain democracy,
whereas the well-developed and cohesive strategies of
Leninism, Maoism, and the Cuban model, offer the
revolutionary fervour a seemingly easier avenue to goals.
Although it can be argued that revolution is as much a part
of democracy as any other political philosophy, the promotion
of democratic revolution has lagged behind the Communist use
of revolution. In this manner the West is seen as defensive
and reactive, conducting counter-insurgency rather than
insurgency. Efforts to promote such revolution have been
furtive and secretive in a way as to avoid public debate and
the likely debilitation of effort. This procedure in itself
reduces the options and the power that the democratic state
can employ in the conflict. Further-more, if the operation
is discovered then subsequent opposition may be intensified,
and any political embarrassment magnified. Centralized and
totalitarian states are unlikely to be so constrained by
public opinion.
Democratic Public Opinion
The responsiveness of the state to public opinion is the
central strength and appeal of democracy. It is also a
central weakness in the conduct of a sustained and protracted
strategy. Consensus by committee is not necessarily an
efficient way to win a conflict. In a climate of free speech
public opinion is accessible to foreign and internal foes
with their campaigns of disinformation. Uninformed public
opinion is particularly vulnerable to psychological
manipulation, which in turn can motivate a population to
rebel, reject or acquiesce, and can undermine the will of the
opposition and their supporters.
In the conduct of LIC abroad, a democratic population
may fail to identify the conflict as akin to a "war". It may
fail to appreciate the long term consequences of losing the
conflict and it may not believe it deserving of a total or
large commitment, especially over a protracted time. This is
because the modern Western perception of war does not embrace
war, or indeed conflict, as a natural condition of mankind.
Instead, democratic societies view war as an aberration in
which the expenditure of resources is rarely profitable
regardless of the outcome. Hence, war or anything resembling
it is under-taken with much public debate. And in a
democracy it requires the support of the people to divert
resources from constructive use to a substantial war effort.
Often public opinion dictates that the conduct of war be
geared towards achieving a favourable and efficient result as
quickly as possible. To this end, the short-term application
of superior force is considered a valid strategy. But if the
threat is not directly seen to immediately endanger the
democratic population itself, then it will be reticent to
support a protracted conflict which is perceived as another's
fight and appears unwinnable. If this perception includes a
doubt as to the moral and ethical right of the nation to
conduct the conflict then democratic support will be
difficult to attain or maintain.
The proliferation of the mass media and supporting
technology will increasingly bring the actions of government
and its agencies, such as the army, under public scrutiny.
This scrutiny is likely to be conducted without all the facts
of a situation and from an environment often far removed from
the action.
The Short Term Outlook
The philosophical outlook of a democratic society
contains a certain hedonism which has been acquired as an
extension of individualism and the relative material
prosperity gained following World War II. The hedonistic view
tends to shorten the outlook towards achievable and tangible
rewards within the short term. When this domestic short-
sightedness is coupled with the frequent election of state
officials, then it is even more difficult to maintain a long
term and cohesive stance in the LIC environment. Assuredly,
this process of change allows the redress of performance,
however this positive aspect must be balanced with the virtue
of "persistence" which is required in all endeavours.
Profit
The need for tangible reward is reflected in that aspect
of capitalism requiring a discernible and substantial profit
from every endeavour. In the extreme this motive limits state
foreign policy and the expenditure of resources in the
conduct of seemingly "unprofitable conflict". While this
concern balances adventurism and encourages state
accountability, it can prevent an effective counter to the
opposing strategies of protracted conflict. (26) It may
dictate the use of inappropriate and expedient measures that
exacerbate the root causes of the conflict, and indeed prove
the conflict to have been unprofitable. The provision of
security assistance funds tied to a design of short term
material profit is unlikely to assist a Third World country.
If the provision of foreign aid is in effect designed to
exploit the beleaguered country rather than build self-
sufficiency, then it is more likely to exacerbate the
conflict. After all, this is one of the practices that
created the present instability within the Third World.
Cultural Arrogance
Another inhabiting factor for Western democracies in
conducting LIC outside of their own immediate defence is
their "cultural arrogance". This arrogance is as a result of
their relative strength and prosperity in comparison to most
of the countries in which the LIC environment is likely to
arise, particularly the Third World. It may also be manifest
by a strong belief that it is the superiority of their
democratic system, over and above geographical and historic
luck, that has given rise to this strength and prosperity.
This is in part human nature, but it can lead to poor
performance in the LIC environment if this attitude is not
understanding of the root causes of the conflict and neither
sympathetic nor respectful of the local allies. It can lead
to a dictatorial and patronizing approach that fails to
recognize the need for self-determination and the development
of an internal solution. It can embroil the supporting
country in a protracted conflict and foreign occupation akin
to neo-colonialism.
It may also be argued that the Western attitude towards
the problems of the Third World is tinged with a "guilt
complex" because of the disparity in wealth and the past
and present exploitation of these countries by the West. Such
an attitude is vulnerable to manipulation and emotionalism
which inhibits a rational approach to LIC.
A further extension of "Western cultural arrogance" may
be the attempt to impose a Western solution as a template on
a problem that must be solved within a regional context of
culture and history. A templated solution may be proffered as
a condition of domestic support from within the Western
state. It may not be enough that the supporting forces and
statesmen be understanding of the local situation, but public
opinion from abroad must be supportive. This is difficult to
obtain if the beleaguered country is anything but a clone of
the supporting state's perception of democracy. It appears an
ironic quirk of democratic public opinion that it can respect
a "winner" as a logical validation of democracy's just reward
and secretly scorn a loser as unworthy, and still it can be
ernoted to sympathy for an underdog and disrespect for state
leadership. The need is for education and information to
remove the destabilizing effects of emotional public response
on the conduct of state and the prosecution of conflict.
Willingness to Compromise
As the peaceful resolution of conflict has been
institutionalized within the democratic state, so has the
process of compromise grown in favour. When this
characteristic is coupled with other factors, such as the
state's reticence to enter a war or engage in seemingly
unprofitable endeavours, then it is susceptible to the facade
of "reasonableness". This strategy forces confrontation to a
point below that of war and relents with an offer of
compromise that takes a very small objective. The process is
repeated until the state has been debilitated by degrees.
This is an ancient covert tactic. The defense is manoeuvre
and counter-nibble or dogmatism and escalation, or a
combination of both. If at some point in LIC the state and
the democratic population must be committed to offense, it is
best before the battle begins. The state's ultimate defense
is still its ability and willingness to wage war at so high a
level that the enemy risks defeat in combat.
A State for Peace
Perhaps the greatest inhibition that the democratic
state posses in the LIC environment, or any war environment,
is the fact that the democratic state is designed for peace
and not war. it respects and values life in this world and
aims to maximize the potential of that life. it has
difficulty in comprehending and therefore countering those
philosophies that preach destabilization in perpetuity, (27)
and that use it as a tactic to achieve goals. The West has
largely outgrown the need for martyrdom, outside of war.
Western democratic armies reflect their society and also
the strengths and weaknesses of those societies. it is beyond
the scope of this paper to enumerate those weaknesses but it
suffices that many of the characteristics of men and
organizations vital for success in war are not readily
fostered within a peacetime environment. As that peacetime
environment is prolonged the more difficult it is to maintain
the art of warfare and to focus on the skills for success in
battle. In short, an army may be debilitated by peace. With
only small wars to contest, the West may forget or ignore the
practice and lessons of high level conflict. Already, many of
the soldiers and officers have no real experience in war.
There is a danger that higher level conflict may be regarded
as an academic theory while the practice of lower level
conflict may debilitate forces and distort tactics and
strategy beyond usefulness in the next war.
FUTURE CONFLICT
The utility of LIC and the West's poor performance
hitherto in this level of conflict is justification for the
preparation of an army for future LIC. In order to balance
this preparation against other competing needs a realistic
assessment of the future face of conflict is required. It is
possible to derive from the extrapolation of history and
current trends some probable scenarios of the future. It must
be realized that the generic grouping of the "West" precludes
the examination of the minutia of each country and its
relationships which is necessary to gain a "truer" vision of
the future. However, the dynamism and multitude of variable
factors should dictate a general view of the future, rather
than one that ties the preparation for future conflict to a
specific scenario. This is not to prevent the formulation of
contingency planning but rather to maintain the inherent
flexibility necessary for responding to the constant review
of contingency planning that must take place. The state will
need to maintain in all departments those multitude of area
experts that play "what if? games".
Bearing this in mind, the following prediction on the
future of LIC is a useful start point:
The next twenty years will be a period of
small conflicts--wars of opposition dr liberation,
wars fuelled within or as proxies of larger powers,
conflicts below the level of war but with the power
to topple nations or cripple governments.
...The future does not offer the prospect of
less conflict than the past: in fact, the political
entropy we face suggests an increasing breakdown of
the established order and thus more, smaller
conflicts. (28)
While it is probable that in the near term LIC will
continue to be the most likely level of conflict, it is
unrealistic to view it in isolation. In some regions LIC will
occur in isolation, but it is also likely to spill over the
boundaries of its definition and equally likely to occur in
concert with a higher level of conflict. If LIC is viewed as
an entity in isolation, then the resultant response is to
seek a solution in specialization of forces, strategy, and
tactics, whether such a response is appropriate or not. If
recent history is indeed a trend, then LIC will continue in
concert with at least mid-intensity conflict. Since 1975
there have been twelve conflicts involving substantial
commitments of conventional forces. (29) The concept of a
general army should not be precluded so early. (30)
Perhaps a scenario that better expresses the concept of
multi-dimensional and inter-related conflict lies within this
passage:
The three components of armed conflict-
conventional war, guerrilla war, and terrorism-
will coexist in the future, with both governments
and subnational groups employing them individually,
interchangeably, sequentially, or simultaneously,
as well as being required to combat them...
Warfare in the future will be less
destructive than the first half of the twentieth
century, but less coherent.
Warfare will cease to be finite. The distinction
between war and peace will dissolve...
...Armed conflict will not be confined by
national frontiers. ...
With continuous, sporadic armed conflict,
blurred in time and space, waged on several levels
by a large array of national and subnational forces,
warfare in the last quarter of the twentieth century
will come to resemble warfare in the Italian
Renaissance or warfare in the early seventeenth
century, before the emergence of national armies. (31)
There is no doubt that man will posses the means of
technology to wage conflict in a truly multidimensional and
multi-level manner across the globe. (32) But states are only
likely to do so if it is to their advantage and they can
maintain control of the battle. It is debatable that a state
will embark on such a strategy if it is likely to lead to the
type of anarchy portrayed in the above prediction. Such
turmoil could easily bring about the uncontrolled use of
nuclear weapons. While sub-national groups may not be so
constrained by the fear of identification, reprisal and
anarchy, they must first obtain the resources necessary to
project significant violence and it must be possible to
fulfil their objectives by this action.
Herein lies a fundamental fact of future conflict: Until
such time as a method of sure nuclear defence renders nuclear
weapons obsolete then conflict will be conducted in their
shadow. The variable is whether the present system of
restraint emplaced by deterrence and the state system will
remain valid.
It is also true that the increasing inter-relationship
of states makes it highly unlikely that regional wars will
remain exclusively regional affairs. At least in the near
future the Soviet Union will continue to seek global
expansion and the United States will oppose it and promote
"The growth of freedom, democratic institutions, and free
market economies throughout the world." (33) This bipolarity
is likely to be challenged, if not eroded, by the economic
rise of such countries as Japan and China (34) in the twenty-
first century. The rise of these countries will introduce new
factors and further complicate the conduct of conflict.
This increased complication will also be as a result of
changes in technology that give the super-powers the ability
to control seemingly "incoherent warfare" with improved
sensors, communications and information processing. This
technology will flow to minor powers and subnational groups
and be coupled with a world-wide diffusion of advanced
weapons (35), including nuclear weapons. This development is
likely to reduce the stability of the current international
system and to remove some of the inhibitions currently
preventing the escalation of LIC. For example, an
antagonistic Third World country may see the utility in
employing one tactical nuclear bomb against an enemy instead
of a long and debilitating border conflict or an expensive
conventional war which it can not afford. Furthermore, it
may well reason that an ally of the enemy, such as the USA
or the USSR, will not risk "mutually assured destruction"
over a country not vital to their survival. The same logic
will apply to the future use of chemical and biological
weapons. The increased likelihood of terrorism and the
probability that high-technology weapons will be acquired or
provided to subnational groups will be a destabilizing and
complicating factor in future conflict. (36) A terrorist act
may well precipitate not LIC but general war.
It appears that as the world plays "catch up" the lesser
powers will increasingly gain the ability to wage a higher
level of warfare outside of the constraints which prevent
such conflict today. Countries will move towards the military
power once only the domain of the developed states.
Conversely, the super-powers will move into technology, such
as "stealth" aircraft, directed energy, and space systems,
that allows them the option of more discriminating violence
(37) by precision conventional weapons as opposed to the
bludgeon of nuclear force.
It is in front of this backdrop that deterrence based on
"mutually assured destruction" must be re-evaluated as it has
global implications for all countries, particularly those who
perceive their interests entwined with an effective strategic
balance (38). It also effects the preparation of an army for
LIC as it cannot be undertaken oblivious to other threats.
Particularly as these threats may lurk beneath the surface of
a LIC scenario. It is likely that the threat of massive
nuclear retaliation will not alone deter the use of nuclear
or conventional forces in the future unless such use was
directed against the very survival of the countries that
possesses them. (39) It is unlikely that such a threat can be
translated into action in the case where tactical nuclear
weapons are employed in gaining a limited objective or where
the enemy cannot be clearly identified and isolated. The
threat of mutually assured destruction is now less
credible. (40) It is based on an extreme contingency and is
not cognizant of the need for discriminating responses to
other contingencies. A strategy must comprehensively counter
all the enemy's options. No longer is nuclear or general war
confined to the monolithic nature of previous perception.
LIC is to continue in the Third World where an imbalance
of conditions are such that an acceptable status quo has yet
to be achieved. But there are likely to be scenarios of LIC
within developed countries(41) as the complexity of these
societies balance new needs and challenges. Challenges such
as overpopulation, the assimilation of large ethnic groups,
resource shortages, and the threat of pollution or diseases
like AIDS. LIC will continue to be a tool of interstate
competition in much the same way as economics and diplomacy
are tools. It will be employed by those groups without
the power of statehood and those who seek to establish trans-
national influence.
There will continue to be peacetime contingencies that
arise unexpectedly and the need to employ military forces in
peacekeeping functions. The preparation of an army for these
scenarios must be integrated into the preparation of the army
for both mid and high level conflict. Both remain a greater
threat and only by being prepared to conduct both are they
kept as a less likely threat than LIC. In the rationale of
Discriminate Deterrence:
Our strategy must also be integrated. We should
not decide in isolation questions about new technology,
force structure, mobility and bases, conventional
and nuclear arms, extreme threats and Third World
conflicts. We need to fit together our plans and
forces for a wide range of conflicts, from the lowest
intensity and highest probability to the most
apocalyptic and least likely. (42)
CHAPTER FOUR
AN OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN TYPES OF LIC
INSURGENCY
A Definition
Insurgency is ... a struggle between a
non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which
the former consciously uses political resources and
violence to either destroy or regormulate the basis
of ligitimacy for aspects of politics that the non-
ruling group believes illigitimate under existing
conditions." (1)
Insurgency is a common basis for many of the LIC
Insurgency is a common basis for many of the LIC
scenarios in which the West will be involved. It requires a
qualitative fighting relevant to war in general which
warrants the study of all military professionals regardless
of background.
Insurgency is a revolt or rebellion against the
government of a state by elements of the state. It is
primarily conducted within a country, but it may also be
fought in dimensions outside of the state, such as in the
international media. While the root causes that give rise to
insurgency are nearly always domestic, they may be exploited
by an external state or inhibited by external force. Thus,
insurgency may have both interstate and intrastate factors.
The balance of power generally favours the government in the
intital stages of insurgency, thus forcing the insurgents to
utilize a strategy that reduces the advantage of the
government's superior military forces (2) and progressively
debilitates that advantage. The insurgent will undertake
concurrent and coordinated action in the dimensions of the
economic, political, psychological, and social fabric of a
society to redress the balance of power.
In a few cases, the active demonstration of insurgency
may be the catalyst to release pent-up oppression that
quickly redresses the balance of power. This is often the
vision and rhetoric of the idealist insurgent, who imbued
with a mixture of ideologies, sees a spontaneous uprising of
the masses under his leadership. It is generally harder to
overthrow an established status quo unless the "revolution"
springs from some major catasrophe to a society. A protracted
effort is normally required to effect a successful
insurgency.
Causes
The basis for the successful fostering or prevention of
insurgency lies in an understanding of the causes of revolt.
Some of the fundamental causes are: (3)
* social inequality;
* poverty;
* religious differences;
* ethnic, tribal and racial differences and rivalry;
* rapid change,e.g. from rural agricultural
* environment to the urbanization often associated
with industrialization;
* disruption of traditional customs and values;
* lack of progress and opportunity in economic,
* technological, educational and social aspects;
* overpopulation;
* a catastrophe;
* foreign threat or domination, and nationalism: and
* ideological beliefs, which can be ruled as secular,
* religious, ethnic, or cultural.
The presence of any or all of these conditions does not
necessarily precipitate revolt. There must be a belief that
a better condition is possible. This belief is a perception
of relative deprivation (4) or "rising expectations". If men
believe themselves deprived or want "more", then they will
look at the government or another society and decide whether
their condition is as a result of the government policies and
the social structure from which it comes. It is ironic that
men often fail to accept their condition as a result of their
own doing or that of fate/luck. It is not divine intervention
that some governments are so actively aligned with religion
stressing the inevitability of higher design in the state of
affairs.
For an insurgency to persist and grow there are normally
contributing weaknesses within the government, such as:
* corruption and discrimination,
* inertia or over-reaction,
* maladministration and incompetence,
* unstable political system, and
* foreign manipulation and exploitation.
If the country's problems are as a result of its former
history or paucity of resources, it may be beyond immediate
solution by even a well-meaning government. It is difficult
to redress problems that have built over centuries if the
state has nothing of material value. It is then reliant on
charity and foreign investment and in effect gives up
sovereign determination for survival. Any combination of
these causes may accelerate the swell of uprising, especially
if a precedent can be found to illustrate the successful
redress of similar problems by revolution.
Factors
Once a basis of insurgency exists then its success or
failure is dependent on the following factors;(5)
* organization and leadership,
* cohesion,
* environment,
* popular support,
* external support,
* government response, and
* time.
Organization and Leadership.
The basis for initiating and exploiting dissent is a
cohesive and adequate organization under the leadership of
politically and militarily astute leaders. Depending on the
ultimate goals and the environment, the organization may be
conspiratorial or mobilizational. Whatever the size it must
be adequate to conduct the battle and eventually capable of
running the state. Its size must be consistent with the need
to initially operate covertly and to maintain cohesion of
effort. It will undoubtedly grow with success and increasing
responsibility. It will need intelligence to retain
initiative and will need to infiltrate the government
infrastructure to gain both intelligence and fazmiliarity with
the running of government. Once within the governmental
organizations, it may act like a cancer. It may usurp the
functions of government from within or establish an
alternative and parallel government.
Cohesion
It will be a task for the insurgent leadership to
establish, maintain, and expand a unity of purpose within the
movement. The leadership will initially exploit the various
motives for revolt and weave them into a common goal and
strategy. The leadership will require flexibility in playing
up cohesive elements and playing down divisive ones. It will
be necessary to reconcile internal differences and in order
to attract wide popular support some dissimilar groups may
have to be courted. Of ten, membership may be conferred only
by a mutual hatred of the government. In the quest for group
unity the leadership will have to be careful not to
compromise the consistency of ideals, means, and goals.
Often the real goals of the leadership are camouflaged
beneath more palatable aims in order to win popular support
and to disguise the real threat the insurgency poses.
Environment
The insurgent needs both a favourable physical and
demographic environment in which to operate. It must be easy
for the insurgent to physically disappear into the terrain
to avoid decisive battle with the government. He must posses
and maintain an advantage of relative mobility over the
government. The environment must provide for the concealment
of bases and it must be suitable for guerrilla warfare. It
should provide an opportunity for progressive domination.
Jungle, mountains and cities provide such terrain, although
insurgency has also been effected in open and dessert
terrain.
Likewise the insurgent must blend in with the general
population so that the government will be forced to consider
all of its citizens as potential enemies. The government may
even be goaded into severe and draconian measures to control
the population which will exacerbate root causes and move the
popular support towards the insurgent. The insurgent will try
to exploit social cleavages within the society to break down
the existing homogeneity and cohesion of will to resist.
Popular Support.
The support of the people is the singular most important
factor in determining the success of the insurgency. This
support is either active or passive. (6) If the population is
actively in support of the cause then it will provide
material, intelligence, medical aid, shelter and recruits for
the cause. In this manner, the initial advantage the
government enjoyed by possessing the police, army and
institutionalized resources will be balanced. Passive
supporters are also important as they do not betray the
insurgents and aid the government. The means by which an
insurgency might gain popular support are: (7)
* charismatic attraction;
* ideological appeal;
* focus attention on real problems;
* terrorism for coercion, fragmentation of
social rifts, and alienation of impotent
government;
* provoking oppressive and indiscriminate government
responses; and
* demonstrating possession of the initiative by
providing for the peoples' needs and military
success.
External Support
External support to an insurgency is critical to help
offset the advantage of the government. This is usually in
the form of moral and political support, material,
sanctuaries, and in some cases the provision of covert
operations. The insurgent is particularly vulnerable to
manipulation by external forces through the provision of this
support.
Government Response
The correct government response will be the conduct of
counter-insurgency operations, which will be addressed in the
following section. It should be noted that despite the
ambiguity of the enemy, he does not automatically possess the
initiative within insurgency. After all, the government
possesses the balance of power and if it acts with a cohesive
and responsive strategy it may undermine or destroy the
revolt in its infancy. Quite often it is not the insurgents
that win power but the government that gives it up. A
government should not give up its option of coercive violence
to eliminate insurgency. Within democracies, this option
normally carries the restriction that the application of
force will be discriminating and surgical.
Insurgent intention is to develop power covertly until
it is capable of standing on its own. Then the use of that
power is to destroy the government in a time, place, and
manner favourable to the insurgent. Therefore, the government
must be kept in reactive and over-reactive modes. It must be
forced to defend everywhere and to undertake policies that
not only eat up vigor but magnify the root causes of the
conflict. It must be made to look inept and not deserving of
legitimacy. Wherever possible it must be alienated from
external support.
Time.
In most cases, insurgency is a strategy of protracted
effort. It requires time to insinuate an infrastructure and
to develop a cohesive and comprehensive strategy and
organization. It takes time to debilitate the government and
to change the balance of power unless the government is
already on the verge of collapse. It is during this time that
the government may seize the initiative or the very root
causes of the dissension may be resolved by evolutionary
change. Timing for the insurgent is critical. He cannot
afford to show his hand before he is able to move events in
the direction of his goals. It is debatable that rebellion is
spontaneous unless the root causes are already present and
smouldering, awaiting the fan of some traumatic event to
substantially remove the inbibiting factors. Rarely can an
insurgent bring to bear that traumatic event in the initial
phase of insurgency.
Types of Insurgency
An examination of the varying types of insurgency
reveals that western democracy need not always be defensive
in this area of conflict. There are opportunities for the
fostering of insurgency within an illegitimate regime. The
types of insurgency as defined by bard E. O'Neill in
"The Analysis of Insurgency", are:
* Secessionist - to withdraw from one state and
establish a new state.
* Democratic - to establish a democratic state.
* Revolutionary - to impose a new governmental and
social structure based on egalitarian values and
central control. It is designed to mobilize the
people.
* Restorational - to re-impose a recent traditional
order. e.g. often based on elitism and
oligarchies.
* Reactionary - to re-institute an historical order
from the distant past which is deemed responsible
[UNABLE TO READ ORGINAL TEXT]
* Conservative - to maintain the status quo in the
face of an impending change.
* Reformist - to change elements of the status quo
in order to remove discrimination.
* Anarchistic - to eliminate all institutionalized
government.
Insurgent Strategy.
Each insurgency is unique to the time, place and
circumstances and must be appreciated as such. However, there
are four broad strategic models (9) that insurgents generally
adopt and vary for their purposes, often combining;
* Leninist,
* Maoist,
* Foco (Cuban), and
* Urban.
Leninist.
In this strategy, a small and well-disciplined
conspiratorial group form a party to exploit grievances that
have largely alienated elements of the population from the
government. The insurgent purpose is normally revolutionary,
and it is not incompatible with other goals. The party will
seek support from discontented groups, such as the working
class or even the military itself. It does not seek to bring
the general population into the running of the government,
but it will mobilize segments for mass support in riots and
demonstrations. This strategy is normally effected in the
vicinity of the economic and political power bases in the
urban centres.
Leninist strategy assumes large scale disaffection from
a government which can no longer be assured of military and
police loyalty. It requires a government that will collapse
in the face of strong opposition, such as terrorism and mass
demonstrations, and no longer holds a balance of power. This
condition can occur as a result of the actions of the
movement or by other factors which it exploits. Most states
are not particularly susceptible to this strategy unless
inherently weak or at a debilitated stage. Debilitation may
follow a catastrophe or the prolonged application of another
insurgent strategy such as the Maoist strategy. It is not
surprising therefore that some revolutions are touted as
Marxist-Leninist-Maoist. This is an expression that an elite
leadership hope to overthrow the government by mobilizing the
populace but not to the extent that the general populace will
share in the governing process. That function is to be
effected on its behalf by a self-perpetuating elitist party,
which, by its own definition, knows what is best for society.
Maoist
Maoist strategy is by far the most practical and
developed insurgent strategy, and it has been the most
successful in application. China and Vietnam are the shining
examples of its success. It is the most likely and perhaps
dangerous strategy that the West will confront in the Third
World.
The Maoist strategy assumes that the government is in a
superior position of power and that it is well entrenched and
unlikely to fall without a protracted and significant effort.
It is a strategy to fight "out-numbered and win". It effects
this victory by a phased battle in which the government is
debilitated by degrees through conflict in areas and means
in which it is not strong. Each phase precipitates the next
as the battle is logically extended. The strategy may
escalate or diminish, the conflict depending on the
conditions. The strategy is heavily reliant on the factors of
organization and leadership, popular support, suitable
environment, and time.
The strategy is conducted in three main phases;
* Phase One-Passive Phase: (also referred to as
"political organization-terrorist" or "latent and incipient
insurgency" phase,) In this phase the insurgent organization
and infrastructure is emplaced. Within a democracy this phase
may go unnoticed, appearing as the normal friction that
occurs during peaceful competition. A communist regime
regularly purges itself of dissension. (10)) The phase is
characterized by Political and social action designed to
exploit the seeds of discontent and isolate the people from
the government The phase concludes with increased violence
in the form of sabotage, small scale raids and terrorism.
* Phase Two-Active Phase: ("guerrilla warfare"
phase.) In the active phase the utilization of violence is
increased to the extent of guerrilla warfare. The battle is
continued in all dimensions to make the government defend
everywhere (11) and disperse its efforts. The guerrilla stage
establishes the basis of a more substantial military
organization and effort. The establishment of this base is
dependent upon how much of the military resources belonging
to the government can be usurped and captured, or how much
can be provided by external support. In Third World countries
where neither government nor insurgent initially possesses
significant military resources, then the provision of
external support to one or the other may have a decisive
affect on the outcome of the conflict.
* Phase Three-Counter-Offensive Phase: ("mobile-
conventional warfare" or "war of movement" phase.) When it is
evident that the military balance has swung in favour of the
insurgent, the guerrilla warfare is supplemented with mobile
warfare. Towards the end of the insurgency the military
dimension may resemble limited war. The multi-dimensional
and multi-level strategy, as applied in the Vietnam war, will
be maintained throughout the struggle: "Not only does the
counter insurgent have to defend everywhere he must fight in
two types of conflict." (12) When the government is facing
conventional warfare then it is close to defeat. It is in
this condition of desperation that the government may seek
the intervention of substantial outside support, such as
combat forces, from the Western block. It is this situation
that the West needs to avoid by the earlier provision of
support commensurate with preventing the escalation of
conflict. The alternate strategy is to allow deterioration of
the situation and the formation of visible insurgent forces
against which the superior conventional force of the
government and the supporting Western country can be brought
to bear. This form of brinkmanship may have application
within the overall strategy of counter-insurgency, but it is
a risk. It will still require fighting the insurgency back
through the phases as it withdraws to a level of conflict in
which it can survive and recuperate for the next bout. It may
be an enforced strategy by a public opinion that requires
crisis motivation.
The three phases can be identified in most insurgent's
strategy, Maoist or otherwise. In many cases the insurgent's
strategy and appeal is such that it fails to move past the
first phase and remains a permanent aggravation within the
society, oscillating from peaceful competition to acts of
subversion and terrorism. In other cases, what commences as
insurgency escalates quickly to civil war, foreign
intervention and war. It should be noted that the concluding
stage of Maoist insurgency is not confined to LIC but more in
the realm of mid-intensity conflict.
Foco (Cuban)
A variation of the Maoist strategy is that provided by
the Cuban model and Che Guevara (13). Instead of relying on a
revolutionary condition to arise, this strategy is based on
accelerating the process by giving whatever grievances that
exist a catalyst. That catalyst is not a political party but
the existence of armed revolt by a core of guerrillas. The
party and leadership is to spring from this core, the
guerrilla foco. Like a rolling snowball the conduct of
guerrilla warfare is to stimulate the conditions and progress
of revolution.
The appeal of this strategy is that it is easier to
initiate and requires less organizational groundwork, time
and external support. The revolution can be highly visible
from the start, where the populace are disenchanted and the
government weak: such action may be enough to quickly force
capitulation or concessions. It is easy to start an
insurgency with this strategy in undeveloped countries, among
simple rural populations, in countries with difficult terrain
and where the population is susceptible to emotional appeal.
It is harder to bring it to a success against a government
that holds centralized control of the economy, military and
politics, unless the groups that hold that sway defect to the
insurgent cause. Equally, an insurgent would have difficulty
in establishing the organization and infrastructure of Maoist
strategy under these conditions. Insurgents that lack the
patience, sophistication and opportunity required for Maoist
strategy are likely to attempt the Cuban model with
significant external support. This strategy is unlikely to be
successful without this support.
Urban
The urban model is really the employment of terrorism
within the urban areas to destabilize society and government.
The object is to create crises in which the inactivity or
over-reaction of the government alienates the population. Due
to the complexity of cities and the freedom and anonymity
possible within Western democratic cities in particular, it
is relatively easy to create chaos. It is debatable whether
this action alone is sufficient to carry insurgency to
victory. It is more an adjunct to other strategy; tying
forces to urban protection and creating paranoia and fear
that inhibits the logical and cohesive response of the
government in other areas. Since it uses terror, a double
edged tactic, it is also subject to alienating the
population. It may focus attention on matters and indirectly
bring about change, but it is not a comprehensive strategy as
yet. If, however, urban insurgents were to acquire nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons then they might constitute the
most serious threat to both society and the government This
is true for any insurgent acquiring an NBC capability.
Conclusion
As in all areas of conflict, the methods by which an
insurgent may attempt to overthrow a government are only
limited by imagination and resources. Insurgency can be
defeated by the West, but more importantly prevented, both at
home and abroad as long as it is acknowledged as a potential
threat. Most insurgency that is serious enough to warrant
military action will be in one of the Maoist classic phases
when action is undertaken. But it should be noted that
insurgency can rapidly escalate or diminish depending on the
fortunes of the struggle. It can retreat to a state of
peaceful competition and is unlikely to be definitively
destroyed while the root causes exist.
It is not the intention of the West to expand its
interests by global of non-democratic states. But it must
look seriously at supporting revolt against illegitimate
governments imposed against the will of their people by
external forces. The conduct of insurgency in this case is a
matter of foreign policy and will include Unconventional
Warfare, which may be conducted as LIC or in conjunction with
a higher level of war. It is not the scope of this paper to
examine the specialized aspects of UW.
COUNTER-INSURGENCY
The doctrine of counter-insurgency is both well
developed and documented. (14) Now that insurgency is
recognized as a more creditable threat then the doctrine is
increasingly read and studied. Most nations have underway
serious programmes to translate this doctrine into
preparedness. The second half of this paper will largely deal
with the problem of appropriate preparedness and the
practical application of doctrine. Much of the doctrine of
counter-insurgency is only an adaptation of basic
war-fighting. It is therefore relevant to not only the whole
spectrum of LIC, but not dissimilar to war-fighting in
general. This point is not always understood or accepted by
those who lean towards specialization in all ventures.
For Western nations counter-insurgency is conducted
within two theatres: at home and abroad. The likelihood of
nation is minimal, although should not be discounted. For
example, a small scale foreign incursion, resembling
insurgency, has been for many years touted as the most likely
threat to Australia. (15) While the USA possesses the National
Guard as the basis of military aid to local government (16)
other nations utilize the army as Aid-to-the-Civil-Power.
The conduct of these operations is similar to counter-
insurgency in principle and doctrine. An indigenous force may
be aiding the police force in the conduct of limited
counter-insurgency and also receive economic aid to redress
the root causes of the problem. In an escalated situation
security forces may be assisted by forces from a neighbouring
country conducting counter-guerrilla warfare in a border
region. The problem is not one of semantics but of objective
The goal of all participants must be one and the same; defeat
the counter-insurgency and restore stability to the stage.
Along the way the interests of nation building and national
interest may be achieved.
Basis of Success.
The basis of success in counter-insurgency is found in
the follow principles; (17)
* Prevention of counter-insurgency is the ultimate
objective Prevention lies in monitoring all facets of the
state to address problejns before they emerge or being
responsive to them as they are identified. This objective is
achieved by balanced nation building and the institution of
responsive government
* Mobilization of the entire national resources must
be undertaken in a co-ordinated manner once insurgency is
identified to prevent the escalation of the conflict.
* The support of the population must be obtained.
* Control over all areas untouched by the insurgent
must be consolidated or established.
* The insurgent must be isolated, physically and
psychologically
* The insurgent must be destroyed or brought to
iustice in a systematic manner.
* The conduct of the operation must be in accordance
with the constitution, laws and culture of the country. In
most cases this will be in accordance with the primacy of
civil power, unless special legislation has been enacted.
If foreign assistance is to be required, then it
must be complementary to the local strategy and be aimed at
building self-sufficiency and not dependency. Such aid,
however, is better requested before the onset of crisis.
During and after the insurgency, efforts must be
undertaken to remove the root causes of the insurgency.
Strategic Principles
The following principles should guide the conduct of
military operations without inhibiting the application of
sound military tactics: (18)
* Unity of Effort. The strategy must encompass a
cohesive and well co-ordinated response across all dimensions
of the state and throughout the organizations responsible for
effecting it. The effort will be a joint military-civil
action and may include combined forces. Responsibilities must
be understood from the beginning and the appropriate
integration of commands and liaison established. The
military effort must always be seen to reflect the national
goals and be supportive of the government. All participants
must thoroughly understand the national, strategic and
tactical objectives to be achieved.
* Maximize Intelligence. The acquisition and timely
response to intelligence is vital in counter-insurgency. An
integrated and centrally controlled system must be
established, but it must be efficient and allow for tactical
initiative. Intelligence includes the thorough appreciation
of the enemy, the allied forces and the environment, both
geography and demography. This appreciation must pass to the
lowest level in the chain of command.
* Minimize Violence. This principle is probably the
least understood of not only counter-insurgency, but LIC in
general. It is best explained to the conventional military
mind as an extension of using an "economy of force". where
ever possible, only that amount of force necessary to achieve
the objective should be used. In some LIC doctrine this is
expressed a "minimal force". However, when translated to the
tactical level this often imposes a dangerous and inhibiting
perception. Both in war and LIC the military must understand
the advantages and disadvantages employing maximum force or
minimum force. Western armies must be imbued with the ethos
that the use and level of violence must be justified by the
circumstances. Both in LIC, and war in general, the object
must be the application of force in the appropriate quantity
against the target of choosing when and where decided. The
nature of the LIC environment normally dictates the surgical
application of force. The requirement to prevent escalation
and to protect non-combatants from injury must be stressed
and enforced throughout the organization. In some cases the
principle of "minimum force" may be incorporated in Rules of
Engagement, while in other cases it may be appropriate to
established a free fire zone.
* Security. All operations must be conducted in the
realization that the enemy may strike anywhere and anytime
and with considerable imagination. It is difficult for this
security consciousness not to be manifest by a paranoia. It
must be balanced with the circumstances of the threat and not
prevent the normal functioning of the state and life in
general. Security of information, personnel, and material is
vital to avoid attrition of resources and to seize initiative
from the enemy and in turn surprise him. Security must cover
both overt and covert enemy activity.
* Systematic Approach. The counter-insurgency must be
undertaken systematically. Unless the insurgent is inept or
over-confident, then the government is unlikely to be
presented with the opportunity for a coup de main or grace.
While the government must seize the initiate where ever
possible, this should be within the "framework" (19) of a
systematic plan of prevention, identification, isolation,
destruction, and consolidation. The insurgent will tempt the
government to over-react in a haphazard and uncoordinated
manner. The biggest problem for the government will be a
shortage of resources to effect a systematic programme
simultaneously throughout the state. The government will be
forced to consolidate positions of strength and expand from
this base while conducting operations in depth in other
areas. Operations in depth are designed to remove the
initiative from the enemy and prepare the area for the
introduction of a more systematic approach when increased
resources become available.
* Seize and Retain the Initiative. This principle is
a tenet of all conflict. Government action must contain
an effective offensive plan. Initiative is retained in this
level of conflict by well trained and mature soldiers in the
field who have a thorough understanding of their
responsibility and what is to be achieved. Centralized
control and co-ordination of effort must not inhibit the
initiative of those in the field. This point must be stressed
in the utilization of intelligence. The West has not always
been effective in the timely dissemination of appropriate
intelligence to the right level. Intelligence overload has
been a common problem. This can be addressed with data
processing systems and advanced communications that links the
man in the field with central banks of collated information
almost instantaneously. These systems are employed daily by
modern police forces.
* Quality of Force. The government forces must be
able to outlast, outfight and outmove the insurgents. The
forces must be trained and conditioned to beat the insurgents
man for man in the insurgents' environment and with the same
equipment if necessary. If a force can achieve this then it
will understand what is required to give it a true advantage.
For example, a helicopter may not give an advantage of
relative mobility in primary jungle where as a better boot
may. To this nature of force is added the necessary
equipment, weapons, mobility, administration, communications,
and command, and, if required, superior quantity. The
insurgent may then retain only one hope, a greater will to
fight. As in all conflict, the will to fight is a critical
variable. The indigenous and allied forces of the government
must possess at least a will to fight equal to the
insurgents. Wherever possible, indigenous forces should
engage the insurgents in combat as the fight is for the
survival of their state and they should have a better
understanding of the situation. This principle is reinforced
by other considerations such as external public support and
the laws of supporting states. The philosophy that "more is
better" should not be the maxim of counter-insurgency. The
state will win if it fields a superior quantity and quality
of forces in conjunction with an equal and co-ordinated
effort in the other areas of government.
* Surprise. Offensive action alone will not gain the
government initiative. The insurgent must be constantly
surprised to reduce his illusiveness and his options.
Strategic surprise may be difficult to achieve in a
systematic approach, but it should guide all tactical and
framework operations. Surprise is achieved by out-thinking
the insurgent. The mental activity of the military and police
will be equally as important, if not more so, than physical
activity in counter-insurgency
Considerations for Supporting States
The principles of strategy listed above are relevant to
the conduct of counter-insurgency at home and abroad.
However, there are additional considerations that are
applicable to Western states supporting counter-insurgency
abroad. These considerations should be appreciated in the
light of earlier observations made on LIC and the West's
vulnerabilities in this environment:
* The conduct of counter-insurgency at home is in the
defence of the state and related to national survival. The
conduct of counter-insurgency abroad is in the pursuit of
national interest and part of foreign policy.
* counter-insurgency at home is likely to be a goal
within itself, or at least an intermediate goal within nation
building. The goals of counter-insurgency and nation building
are likely to be intermediate goals for the supporting state
whose ultimate aim may be increased political or economic
power in the region.
* The supporting state has the choice to enter the
conflict or not, and may withdraw at will or in accordance
with other priorities. The besieged state must fight or
acquiesce.
* The insurgency may be entirely instigated and
controlled by an outside force and be in reality a foreign
incursion. The insurgency may in effect be a LIC between
external powers utilizing a third state as a battle ground.
* The local state may need external support to
survive but exacerbate the root causes of the conflict by
obtaining that support.
* The supporting state is accountable to a different
public perception and law than that applicable to the
conflict.
* By accepting support, the beleagured state is
vulnerable and in effect gives up sole measure of sovereignty
while the supporting state gains a right of leverage in
sovereign affairs. The troubled state may therefore request
support only when a crisis is reached and the condition
requires a large amount of support or is beyond help. Such a
condition may embroil a state in a protracted effort beyond
its capabilities.
* Unless it is the object to maintain a puppet state,
which is not the acknowledged aim of Western foreign policy,
then support must not create dependency.
* Unless the introduction of support is in the form of
foreign intervention and neo-colonialism, then the conflict
will be waged in accordance with the local environment and
determined largely by the local state. This may not be the
method acceptable to the supporting state.
* The insurgency may not only possess the ability to
escalate to a regionally limited war, but it may precipitate
a high intensity war world-wide.
Additional Guidelines for Supporting States.
The provision of Western support to counter-insurgency
abroad should be in accordance with those already listed and
these additional guidelines:
* The counter-insurgency will be conducted as part of
foreign policy and part of Foreign Internal Defence
Operations (20). Foreign policy, the Foreign Defence
Operations and the conduct of counter-insurgency must be
consistent in objective and method with national policy and
capabilities. The approach must be co-ordinated and cohesive
throughout the agencies of the supporting state.
* Despite what ever else the supporting power hopes
to achieve, it must be committed to a team effort with the
local country to defeat the insurgency.
* The commitment to win must be a commitment to a
protracted effort. There are few "quick fix" solutions to
insurgency. The commitment should not be broken easily by
whim, public emotionalism, battlefield setbacks or the change
of political parties unless the original rationale has been
largely invalidated. The West will certainly lose allies if
unable to keep foreign commitments.
* Both states must reach a treaty or agreement before
combined action is undertaken to reconcile fundamental
differences of interest, responsibility, laws and
operations. Ideally this should be achieved in time of peace
as a contingency plan and be subject to periodic review,
especially at the time of activation. The absence of such a
plan should not preclude the provision of emergency support
in time of crisis, but arrangements must be finalized soon
after a commitment. A team effort cannot be effected unless
all the players know and agree to the rules.
* The supporting state must recognize and respect the
sovereignty of the local state and be prepared to work within
rules that foster self-determination. That is, help the
legitimate government re-establish control, undertake
remedial action, and replace external support with domestic
resources, as soon as possible.
* Both the supporting and supported states must be
aware of the implications of "cultural arrogance" and ensure
that all elements of both their countries, especially the
public, are presented a balanced and factual appreciation of
the other's country, its situation, and the rationale for
support. This must especially include those who are
responsible for dispensing the Support.
* Western states must monitor their allies to
identify potential internal problems and provide advice and
support to prevent insurgency. This is a diplomatic mission.
An environment must be created in which aid, if it is likely
to be needed, will be sought in a timely manner rather than
in a crisis.
* A Western democratic state possesses many non-
violent resources that may be provided to an ally to prevent
insurgency or to defeat it in its infancy. These include:
political support, economic aid, high technology, and non-
combatant material and advisers. Often the beleaguered state
only requires military training and material to redress any
external support being provided to the insurgents. The
provision of combat forces to a foreign state should be as a
last resort, and then within the type of bounds expressed by
the former US Secretary of State, Weinberger:(21)
o The provision of foreign combat forces must be
vital to the interests of the supporting state or its allies.
o Combat forces are committed with a clear
intention of winning.
o There must be clearly defined political and
military objectives.
o The forces must be consistent with the
objectives ( In particular, the goals must be achievable by
combat forces.)
o The commitment must have the sustained support
of the public and the politicians.
Western democratic states must be committed to
resolving conflict at the lowest level and understand the
danger of allowing insurgency to escalate. Supporting states
must expose the role of external states, if any, in the
insurgency. Western states that are subjected to insurgency
at home or supporting counter-insurgency abroad must retain
the option of waging a higher level of conflict on other
states that support insurgency against legitimate
governments. The West must be prepared to wage war on those
states or sub-national groups that interpret a commitment to
peace as a lack of resolve to defend national interest by war
where necessary.
Military Operations Peculiar to Counter-Insurgency
There are few military operations that are peculiar to
the conduct of counter-insurgency. Rather, it requires the
employment of basic military skills and tactics to a high
level of proficiency so as to avoid the necessity of the
bludgeon approach to war-fighting by attrition or mass of
force. It is often qualitative fighting rather than
quantitative. However, it generally involves a significant
size force in relation to the number of enemy and combat
engagements. The philosophy of manoeuvre warfare is
applicable to the conduct of counter-insurgency. There may
be the necessity to utilize mass force. This will be
difficult to avoid in the later stages of a Maoist-type
insurgency as it escalates from guerrilla war to mobile war.
There is a need for those responsible for translating the
strategy into achievable tactics to be proficient in
operational art and appreciating a complex and inter-related
array of factors and resources. This same skill is required
on the modern battle field where ever increasingly a
multitude of complex factors will impact on the conduct of
war.
There will be less need for the means of mass
destruction in the initial phases of insurgency. The
employment of air and naval forces are more likely to be
service support functions rather than direct combat. The
the early stages of the "war" will be conducted on the
ground. However, counter-insurgency is both a joint servive
and combined arms task. While the emphasis is on infantry
work, all the elements of a conventional force may be called
upon. Some corps may be used in secondary or different
roles, such as the use of static armour and the use of
engineers in civil affairs construction. Indirect fire
weapons must be available, but direct fire weapons, such as
helicopter gunships, will often provide a more flexible and
surgical option of fire. The increased precision of modern
weapon systems will allow more fire power options. Those
weapon systems not initially required must be available at
short notice to be integrated into the effort in the event of
escalation. In some cases where a supporting force comes to
the rescue of a nation facing defeat, then a conventional
army, complete with armour and air, may be introduced and
then gradually withdrawn as the conflict regresses to LIC.
Some LIC operations that incorporate basic tactics but are
more commonly used in war by security forces, or rear area
security, are:
* cordon and search,
* cordon and clear,
* key point and installation security,
* personnel security operations,
* border protection, and
* route and movement protection.
Operations in Death. (22) These operations are conducted
in areas not yet under the control of the government. They
are designed to disrupt and destroy insurgents, to remove
their initiative until a more comprehensive and systematic
effort can be made in the area. They do not aim to capture or
hold territory, and employ similar tactics to operations in
enemy or neutral territory during a war. A force is inserted
and may or may not establish a base. A search, based on prior
intelligence, is conducted to locate objectives or the force
may be inserted near a known objective. The objective is
destroyed or the enemy are captured, and the force withdrawn
to a secure base or government controlled area. The most
common operation within this type is the search and clear
operation.
Special and Supporting Operations.
The following operations have particular relevance to
counter-insurgency but are employed in all warfare. All
armies must maintain a module of specialists in these fields
for integration into a task force as required:
* psychological operations;
* civil affairs;
* explosive ordinance disposal;
* public relations operations;
* water-borne operations;
* special action force operations:
o reconnaissance and surveillance,
o ambush and harassing of insurgents,
o sabotage and demolition,
o training indigenous forces and Unconventional
Warfare,
o covert operations, and
o counter-terrorist operations;
* specialized communications, electronic warfare,
and intelligence support;
* liaison and language support; and
* country and area specialists.
Summary
The overview of counter-insurgency points to the conduct
of a conflict in a manner not dissimilar to that required for
war. The complexity and demands of national strategy, foreign
policy, military strategy and operational art are the same
even though the level of violence may be less overall. The
requirement far tactical and individual military proficiency
is a high standard. A standard that befits an army in any
war. The tactics of offense and defence are required, with
particular emphasis on the type of operations undertaken for
rear area security or to dominate a "no-man's land" beyond
the FEBA. Not all of the equipment and weapons maintained by
a conventional force will be needed unless the conflict
escalates. The conflict is a land conflict although there is
a large requirement for air support, and in some cases naval
support. The basic force for the conduct of counter-
insurgency is an infantry force, in this age of
specialization and equipment overloading, it is often called
a light infantry force. This force requires the add on
modules of specialization as in any other type of task force.
The training of a force suitable for the conduct of
counter-insurgency will be addressed as part of a later
chapter on the training of forces for LIC in general. It is
worth reflecting that the allied forces in Vietnam were not
militarily defeated in the field in either LIC, guerrilla
warfare or limited war. (23) Whatever military setbacks were
suffered were not due to the nature of the war but due to the
same factors and level of competence that would have affected
performance in a higher level of war, perhaps more so and
with worse consequences.
CHAPTER FIVE
AN OVERVIEW OF OTHER LIC
AID-TO-THE-CIVIL-POWER
Aid-to-the-Civil-Power (1) are those operations that an
army performs to assist the civil police maintain law and
order. It is an operation by the state's defence force and
normally precedes a declaration of defence emergency in which
increased power may be given to the military. Aid-to-the-
Civil-Power is normally conducted under the auspices of
domestic law. However, the extent of the military power and
responsibility will also be determined by any special laws or
legislation pertaining to the particular situation at hand.
These operations are conducted in accordance with the
principle of "primacy of the civil power", and support police
operations. They include such support as:
* the provision of equipment and logistics,
* explosive ordinance disposal,
* crowd and riot control, and
* counter-terrorism operations. (2)
The laws and constitution of the state govern how a
problem of internal security is classified and handled. It is
necessary for allies in support of the internal security of a
foreign state to understand, before a crisis, that state's
laws and their impact on operations, before a crisis.
In some countries, Aid-to-the-Civil-Power operations may
be termed "Security Force Operations" and effected by
paramilitary forces. It should be noted that not all
countries that may require Western aid in LIC contain a
separate military and police force. Where the police force is
a sub-entity of the military then security force operations
may be considered the normal role of the military. In this
case it will be difficult to achieve responsive actions to
the government unless the military has instituted some
decentralized responsibility to each level of civil
government,i.e. the military functions more like a civil
police force than an army. However, in some of the Third
World states likely to require foreign assistance, not only
is the police controlled by the military but the government
may be controlled directly or indirectly by the military.
This is generally a root cause or aggravation of the problem
within itself. The close inter-relationship of the civil
police and military in domestic security may cause
complications for a supporting power such as the USA, where
the military is removed from this function by law. (3)
It is not inconceivable that a government may choose to
defeat an insurgency in its infancy with an Aid-to-the-
Civil-Power operation rather than a declaration of defence
emergency and the publicizing of counter-insurgency
operations. Aid-to-the-Civil-Power plays down the threat and
stresses that the military is acting in support of the
police, under the control of the civil government, and in
accordance with the normal laws of the land. In democratic
states all war is conducted under the primacy of civil power.
In a crisis situation more of that civil power may be
passed temporarily to War Councils or regional military
commanders so that all resources, both civil and military,
can be mobilized in a co-ordinated plan. In the extremes of
counter-insurgency or security force operations, martial law
may be declared in various regions. A state facing the final
phase of insurgency may be forced to declare martial law as a
condition to all out war. The laws and constitution of
democratic states generally cater for a "state of emergency"
rather than martial rule. When faced with insurgency, the
imposition of martial rule implies that the government is
unable to govern and that the political status quo is no
longer legitimate.
FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENCE
Foreign Internal Defence is a US term (4) that covers
those assistance programmes that are designed to strengthen
the defence of a friendly foreign country by enhancing
defence capabilities to meet likely threats. It is an
extension of foreign policy in the pursuit of national
interests and is integrated with other programmes, such as
those that provide developmental and economic assistance to
promote stable nation building. All Western states possess
such programmes. They are based on a belief that the
interest of the West is entwined with the need for world
stability and peace, national self determination, freedom and
democracy, free trade, and the defeat of those who would
enforce opposing ideals. (5) The programmes of Foreign
Internal Defence are generally executed during peace but may
include elements conducted to prevent or conduct LIC: (6)
Security assistance is through the provision of military:
o training,
o equipment funding,
o equipment,
o advisers,
o intelligence,
o combat forces,
o non-combat support,
o special operations forces,
o peacekeeping forces, and
o econoinic aid to redress social and economic
problems
The conduct of LIC within this category of foreign
policy is as for the type of conflict, e.g.
counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, or peacekeeping.
TERRORISM AND TERRORISM COUNTER-ACTION
Terrorism.
Terrorism is a tactic of employing or threatening
violence to achieve goals and is utilized within all levels
of conflict from a state of peaceful competition to general
war. It may achieve a goal directly, such as gaining the
release of political prisoners, or support the achievement of
goals indirectly, such as creating an environment of fear in
which the release of political prisoners can be negotiated.
It has more impact in an environment that is relatively
peaceful and so it is an important feature of the LIC
environment. It may be employed by states and sub-national
groups that do not have the resources or opportunity to
pursue political, social or economic goals by other means.
It may be employed as a low cost, low risk weapon in support
of either specific or general goals. (7) Terrorism alone
cannot effect change or overthrow the status quo unless the
state which is the focus of the terrorism is prepared to
react as the terrorist proposes. However, it is a two-sided
weapon that may be detrimental to a cause. The motives for
terrorism are many and varied, and at times it may be
difficult to determine both the perpetrator and the motive.
However, terrorist objectives fall into five categories: (8)
* recognition,
* coercion,
* provocation,
* intimidation, and
* insurgency support.
The terrorist techniques are well known and only limited
by imagination and resources. A new dimension will be given
to terrorism if high-technology and nuclear and biological
weapons are added to the stock techniques. At present these
techniques include:
* bombings,
* assassination,
* kidnapping,
* hijacking or hostage barricades,
* covert operations concealed as the normal pattern
of domestic crime or unreported operations.
Terrorism is normally treated as a criminal activity (9)
by subject states, despite its origin and motive. The
complication to this perspective is that terrorism is
increasingly a tool of individuals, sub-national groups and
external states that sponsor both individuals and sub-
national groups in terrorism. How to deal with those who
carry out terrorism is straight forward in theory but
difficult to in practice. But how to deal with those behind
terrorism is a problem of appropriate response and delivery,
which may range from diplomatic and economic sanctions to
covert operations abroad or a declaration of war.
The West is particularly vulnerable to terrorism due to
the internal freedom of action afforded by its society and
the complexity of that society. There is freedom of movement
between such countries and often the ability to legally
acquire the tools of terrorism. The profile of the terrorist
organization is that of a secret society in which unity of
purpose and the maintenance of security is paramount.
External support is generally filtered to avoid a direct link
to the source and a compromise of security. It is a covert
organization much like a spy ring.
The West does not doctrinally sponsor terrorism although
its enemies may argue otherwise. What is considered terrorism
and what is considered a legitimate tactic is a matter of
perception. The adage "one man's terrorist is another man's
hero" is especially true.
Terrorism Counter-Action.
Terrorism is fought with the same approach as
insurgency: with a cohesive and co-ordinated policy that
mobilizes a spectrum of resources with the following
intention:
* prevent an environment conducive to terrorism
* prevention by early identification and pre-emptive
action;
* possession of effective defence and security
against terrorism; and
* possession of a competent and appropriate response
to terrorism.
The sustained acquisition of timely intelligence is
vital in both counter-insurgency and terrorism counter-
action. Specialist military action will be undertaken in
conjunction with, or in support of, other government agencies
to implement these measures. The role of the military, in
general, will be to appreciate the threat and undertake
appropriate security measures. An appropriate and competent
response requires that the military be able to undertake the
normal range of tactical operations with equal
professionalism as that required in war. Such responses could
range from the provision of a cordon, to a pre-emptive raid
on foreign soil, to an attack on a fortified building. Quite
often the military or police response will require the
surgical application of violence in close proximity to non-
combatants. In order to reduce casualties to the non-
combatants, this type of counter-terrorist operation requires
the highly developed natural abilities and skills fostered in
a specialized organization. However, there is only a
requirement for a small such organization. It is a tendency
of armies to develope elite units at the expense of raising
the average proficiency of conventional forces as this
appears to be an easier solution to needs. Such elitism can
be divisive and destroy the cohesion of the team effort, not
to mention removing the flexibility of the force as a whole.
PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING.
Peacekeeing.
Peacekeeping is a misnomer for that collection of
operations undertaken to promote peace as an extension of a
state of truce. It provides a catalyst for the continuation
of such "peace" in the hope that the conflict can be resolved
during this time by peaceful means. It is a prelude to a
permanent peace or the resumption of hostilities. The
operation of peacekeeping is dependent upon the creation of a
situation in which the resumption of hostilities would
involve a diplomatic or political loss for the combatants.
It is either a self-imposed condition or a result of the
external influence of other states, particularly the super-
powers. Peacekeeping does not enforce peace, for it relies
on moral suasion and mutually perceived interest. It is not
analogous to a police operation, and the imposition of peace
by force is peacemaking.
Peacekeeping is a militarily unsound operation in that
force is circumscribed to self-defence and the peacekeeping
force is normally out-gunned by the antagonists. Peacekeeping
should not be undertaken lightly. Western armies are not
founded on the ideal of martyrdom. Gaining a proficiency in
peacekeeping may debilitate the war fighting ethos and skills
of the participants unless they are frequently engaged in
skirmishes, in which case the operation is hardly successful.
The combat virtues of aggression, offensive action,
initiative, and maximizing violence are discouraged in a
peacekeeping force. Yet while it is a risky operation it is
certainly less so than an involvement in any war that might
occur for want of a peacekeeping effort.
There should be at least four preconditions t6 the
implementation of a peacekeeping mission: (10)
* The parties in conflict must consent to the
operation, the presence and composition of the force, and
the terms of the mandate. They must support the operation
and give it unqualified cooperation.
* The operation must have substantial support of the
international community, and in particular the two super-
powers. It is preferable that the United Nations support the
operation, but at a minimum the US must it.
* The operation must have a clear, defined and
realistic mandate.
* The force must be allowed the freedom of movement
to execute the mandate and supervise the conditions of the
peace agreement.
A further expression of these principles is contained in
the US doctrine for involvement in peacekeeping, which
requires: (11)
* consent * neutrality
* balance * single chain of command
* concurrent action * unqualified sponsor support
* force integrity * freedom of movement
* self-defence
The US doctrine is somewhat idealistic and reflects
experiences gained in Multinational Force I (August to
September 1982, Beirut) and Multinational Force II (September
1982 to February 1984, Beirut). (12) Unfortunately, often
peacekeeping is formulated in a crisis situation in which all
these preconditions will not exist. One could argue that if
the antagonists could agree to the creation of such a farce
then the ideal conditions of peacekeeping might arise;
however, real world politics and issues do not support such
an idealistic view. Even the United Nations Interim Force In
Lebanon (UNIFIL), with its poor conception and record of
achievement, has helped in reducing the violence in Southern
Lebanon to a lower level than if it had not been instituted.
(13)
Despite the problems of U.N. sponsored peacekeeping
operations, (14) given the equal precondition of the four
factors they are preferable to non-U.N. sponsored operations.
It is arguable that the principle of neutrality and balance
should dictate that organizations such as the United Nations
Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), (15) consist of
integrated teams of both US and USSR members rather than the
current segregation. Under these conditions, less problems
and a speedier resolution might have been possible in areas
such as South Lebanon and Beirut.
It is important to realize that the failure of the
MNF II was in the posturing of that operation as peacekeeping
without the necessary pre-conditions. Certainly the force
could not be viewed as neutral by all of the combatants in
the theatre as it was directed to support one of the
antagonists, the Lebanese Armed Forces. Despite the best of
intentions, the mandate was akin to foreign internal defence
assistance rather than peacekeeping. The Lebanonese problem
was, and still is, complex,and required more than a "show of
gunboats".
Operational Methods.
The operational methods of peacekeeping are limited.
They are similar to those applicable to border defence,
but generally do not allow any offensive action. It is
unacceptable, however, for a peacekeeping force to be placed
in a position where its soldiers are unable to adequately
protect themselves from kidnap and murder. Like all
soldiering, peacekeeping requires a high standard of
individual training in the military fundamentals, a
proficiency in small unit tactics, and self-discipline. It
requires responsive management in the form of operational
art. Examples of basic methods are:
* key point defence,
* patrolling,
* observation, reconnaissance, and surveillance,
* information gathering,
* mine clearing,
* movement control, and
* police, humanitarian and mediator duties.
Training. (16)
Peacekeeping tasks can be executed by conventionally
trained and mature soldiers after supplementary instruction
on the mission and peculiarities of the theatre. In the
absence of war, peacekeeping duties may provide the stimulus
and experiences associated with proximity to combat. It can
reinforce basic lessons of soldiering but it can be a
debilitating experience over a prolonged period of
inactivity as it does not require the full range of offensive
skills and tactics. It reduces the aggressive spirit, the
initiative, and consequently the morale of troops.
Headquarters and leaders are concerned more with the
management of their units rather than the command and
manoevre of tactical forces. It may impart & sense of
invincibility and lethargy as personnel come to view the
threat with detachment. All these factors prove lethal in
combat.
Peacemaking.
Peacemaking is an operation in which law and order
within a state, or peace between waring states, is enforced
largely by military force or the threat of military force. It
can be either the prelude to peacekeeping operations or a
consequence of failed peacekeeping operations. It may be
undertaken as a result of insurgency or civil war and is
generally formulated and implanted in the environment of a
crisis. As the objective of peacemaking is to enforce a state
of peace, then it may require a significant force and level
of violence to disengage the antagonists or to disarm the
lawless. It is unlikely that a peacemaking force will be
perceived as neutral, as one or more of the antagonists are
likely to receive an advantage or benefit from the operation
over other antagonists who will perceive this advantage. A
peacemaking operation should avoid aggravating the causes of
the conflict if possible.
Peacemaking is most commonly imposed when the
continuation of the conflict threatens international
stability or for humanitarian reasons. Peacemaking should
not be confused with foreign intervention in an environment
of insurgency or civil war, in which the intervening power is
aiding or opposing a government. A peacemaking operation is
theoretically neutral.
It will be difficult for a peacekeeping force to evolve
from a peacemaking role since the use of force in the latter
function involves it as a player or antagonist in the
conflict. It is equally difficult for a peacekeeping force
to be employed as a peacemaking force if it has been
structured for peacekeeping, as it will normally be without
sufficient combat power.
Peacemaking is undertaken in conjunction with actions in
other dimensions, such as diplomatic pressure and economic
sanctions. However, despite the desirability of using minimal
violence, the peacemaking force must have sufficient combat
power available to achieve its mission. It is better to
coerce the antagonists with the threat of force rather than
action, but the threat must be creditable and backed by will
Peacemaking enforced with minimal violence generally has a
better prospect of developing into a lasting peace.
Training.
There is nothing peculiar to peacemaking that is not
peculiar to war in general and counter-insurgency, security
force, or peacekeeping, in particular. It is a difficult and
delicate operation requiring considerable maturity and a
sound appreciation of the environment.
PEACETIME CONTINGENCIES
General.
The US Army definition of these operations is:
Peacetime contingency operations are
politically sensitive military operations normally
characterized by the short term rapid projection or
employment of forces in conditions short of
conventional war." (17)
Contingency operations consist of:
* strike and raid,
* rescue,
* demonstrations and show of force,
* peacemaking,
* unconventional warfare,
* intelligence operations.
Such operations may be effected during higher levels of
conflict and may precipitate war unless some other inhibiting
factor is present, such as diplomacy or the inability of the
target state or group to adequately respond. As such these
operations must be accompanied by initiatives in other
dimensions. Clearly, the military power that is relatively
more powerful possesses a greater number of contingency
options, although some of these may be circumscribed by other
factors, such as the risk of escalating the conflict.
Generally these operations are implemented in a
situation when the time is short and the objective valuable.
The exact circumstances of the threat may not have been
foreseen, but a general contingency plan for such a situation
should have been formulated during peace. For this reason,
most Western armies maintain forces for rapid deployment,
consisting of air and seaborne forces, including special
action forces or commandoes. By virtue of the variety of
tasks and the need for precision these forces must be well
trained and flexible.
Insurgency and counter-insurgency have hitherto
dominated the West's interest at the low end of the conflict
spectrum. The proliferation of terrorism, peacekeeping
missions and international skirmihes illustrates the
likelihood of Western forces being involved with little
warning and the need for proficiency in these types of LIC.
CHAPTER SIX
GUIDING PHILOSOPHY AND STRATEGY
NATIONAL PHILOSOPHY
The first necessity for the successful prosecution of
LIC is an appropriate national philosophy on the prosecution
of conflict as a whole. Such a philosophy should reflect the
values of the state and the Western community in general and
provide a common understanding by which a unity of purpose
may be engendered within a state and among states. The nature
of democracy and of state sovereignty make this a difficult
task, but one that must be addressed by each nation of the
Western alliance individually and collectively. The USSR, and
other totalitarian states and ideologically based movements
outside the state system, likely to challenge the West, are
less impeded in formulating a cohesive approach to conflict.
The West lives in the hope that mankind can achieve a
state of natural peace and harmony. Western democracy
fosters that hope and generally now tries to adhere to peace.
Such idealism is enunciated in our constitutions and national
strategies. However, an idealistic hope should not blind us
to reality. Reality is that men and states have competing
interests which they have been hitherto reluctant to
surrender for a state of peace. Conflict is likely to be a
permanent feature of relationships among men and between
states. The democratic state and its citizens are cognizant
of this reality in everyday life, and the competing interests
of men are institutionalized to as low a level of conflict as
possible. What the democratic population does not
universally understand is that conflict is a continuum
entwined with all facets of life and that it requires a
cohesive management along its entire length and breadth. The
democratic population does not understand that the penalty of
democracy is that the citizen has a role in that management
over and above his responsibility to his immediate neighbour.
Democratic states face a danger as they become increasingly
complex and attempt to be democratically responsive: the
people will get exactly what they want. And in a complex
society, what they want may be based on ignorance and hope
rather than reality. If a state were to become truly
democratic, then each citizen might try to influence
influence each decision of state. It is arguable whether the
majority has the wisdom to govern in such circumstances.
It is the role of the government, no matter what the
party, to try and educate the citizenry with the same
realization that every Politician, diplomat and professional
soldier should already Possess regarding the prosecution of
conflict:
* A level of conflict, not harmony, is at present the
natural state of affairs.
* Conflict does not disappear by its own accord, but
is managed by men.
* Conflict is not Just a state of war but a pervasive
continuum of violence levels that is also waged during
relative peace.
* The inter-relationship of sovereign states is not
analogous with domestic conditions or personal morality.
* A vital deduction from the hope of peace and the
reality of conflict is the need to keep conflict at the
lowest possible level. This is only possible by an effective
counter that negates the viability of violence in the pursuit
of survival and interest, and replaces it with an
alternative. In the international sense, the perfect
alternative has yet to be found, but the viability of
violence is reduced, if not removed, by a balance of power.
* The dimensions of politics, society, and economics
etc. have always been entwined with conflict and force. The
increasing complexity of the world and inter-relationships,
coupled with an access to infinite force, makes it almost
impossible to isolate and deal with aspects of life in a
microcosm. This is true of LIC.
* The West possesses some inherent vulnerabilities to
LIC and in the management of conflict in general.
* The management of conflict in the future must be
total in approach to be successful. It must address all
conflict levels, their inter-relationship, and their
development throughout time.
* A total management-approach requires the type of
stability and consistency of government achieved by some
totalitarian states or by responsible democracy. It is
unlikely to be achieved by those who advocate laissez-faire
or anarchy.
* Responsible democracy requires governmental
leadership and institutions that ensure the public are
educated with fact rather than manipulated. It requires a
competent government with a mandate to govern.
* Every element of a democratic society-has a role in
the management of conflict, not just the politicians, the
military or police. This is a vital understanding for the
prosecution of LIC.
* The maintenance of security requires a will and
commitment to fight and sacrifice.
The purpose and need for a philosophy in conflict
management is well articulated by the following US statement
on the conduct of LIC:
The foundation for a successful US effort
in LIC lies in the simple principle of unity of
effort. The cardinal lesson of counter-insurgency
and insurgency is that the disparate elements that
compose the effort must contribute to a common
purpose, and there must be a clear, consistent
guidance and focus on the ultimate objective. This
requires an articulated philosophy or set of
principles: a policy that turns principles into
operational goals, and a set of means available to
translate intentions into effort. Moreover,
a system is required to continually review the
effort in relation to goals. A capacity to adjust
to changing circumstances, a commitment to
understanding the true nature of the effort and a
sustained approach to the problem are also necessary.(1)
The final reality that national Philosophy and the
public must recognize, is the inability of a state to
construct a risk free security strategy within finite
resources. The difference between the optimum security
strategy and the strategy that the state can afford or is
prepared to finance, is the level of risk. Many Western
countries are living beyond the means of their productivity,
and increasingly, defence expenditure is under scrutiny to
reduce costs. This is an attractive logic in a "seemingly"
benign and peaceful environment. It is attractive if the
Soviet Union proffers a a peaceful hand. It is attractive, if
in the foreseeable future, conflicts are likely to be less
devastating and threatening and conducted in a LIC
environment. It is attractive to over-cater for the low end
of the-conflict spectrum in the belief that time and
motivation will allow a rapid and adequate defence expansion
when and if a "real", war emerges. This is a fundamental flaw
of logic; to over-cater for the LIC environment results in a
"police force", not an army, and does not provide military
competence in any level of conflict, including LIC. The
initiation and escalation of future conflict is likely to
preclude adequate warning.
Beware the West!
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
If the proposition of this paper, and that of more
distinguished men such as the US commission on Discriminate
Deterrence, (2) is accepted then the national approach to
LIC should not be in isolation but integrated into the
national strategy for conflict management as a whole.
National security requires an effective counter to a spectrum
of threats that may be employed "individually,
interchangeably, sequentially, or simultaneously." (3) A
balance of power must be maintained along the entire conflict
spectrum.
Contingency planning should look at each possible
scenario of LIC, each region in which LIC may embroil the
nation, and the relationship of these scenarios to other
conflict levels and type. Hopefully, this process is already
undertaken within Western state and defence departments for
all possible conflict scenarios. What must be ensured is that
the planning and conduct of LIC, like war itself, is not just
a function of the military or state department. It requires a
strategy that has access to all state resources. Where the
military has a role in LIC within the state, then the
strategy should cover the co-operative efforts of all
internal agencies, especially the police. This is important
where criminal activities such as terrorism and drug
trafficking pose a significant threat to law and order. An
integrated and comprehensive strategy will require a lateral
co-ordination of these resources at each level of initiative
to ensure cohesion from theory to practice and all elements
working in concert.
An integrated strategy means correctly identifying
commonalities and differences within the threat scenarios and
adjusting forces and training accordingly. This adjustment is
the simple answer to ensuring that a Western state can
conduct LIC without denigrating its defence capabilities
elsewhere. Like all good strategies it should have the
following characteristics:
* Consistent-with national philosophy and goals.
* Comprehensive-includes all aspects and resources.
* Integrated-with other strategies such as foreign
policy and economic strategy, and can be
co-ordinated in effect. It promotes commonality of
efforts and caters for differences.
* Enduring-it caters for the long term as well
as tomorrow. It is based on vision.
* Flexible-review is inherent and initiative is
allowed to achieve goals, which themselves may be
reviewed.
* Cohesive-logically formulated.
* Realistic-it is achievable.
The main areas of disconnect in Western nations in the
chain of translating philosophy to strategy to action are;
* a fundamental national disunity of philosophy,
* government and people;
* a lack of capacity within government agencies
to formulate or execute an integrated strategy; and
* incompetence and corruption.
MILITARY DOCTRINE
Strategy.
The military strategy is a continuation of security
strategy and complementary to other state strategies such as
economic policy. The principle difference between the
military strategy for tic and that for higher level conflict
is that the resolution by force is not normally the decisive
element. The military must be cognizant of the other aspects
of the conflict to a greater degree than would be the case in
modern conventional wars. The current perception of separate
civil and military functions within a state of warfare has
not always been the norm. In 1940 the USMC Small Wars Manual
contained as much guidance on the running of a state as on
military strategy and tactics.(4) The US Marines had learnt
from bitter experience in the Carribean that success in
"small wars" required tee co-ordination of both civil and
military affairs under one leadership and strategy. In LIC
today, the military is used as much for its organizational
aspects and its efficiency in action as for its ability to
deliver violence. (5) However, the military's ability to
deliver violence is the very factor that may inhibit the
violence of the conflict. This ability should never be
surrendered or taken for granted.
LIC is conducted primarily on land, but it generally
requires a significant amount of strategic and tactical, air
and naval support. In the case of strike missions this
support may be akin to the air and sea battle to be found in
conventional war. However, the maintenance of sea and air
Power must be based on a higher threat level than LIC, as
well as supporting LIC. The maintenance of sea and air power
inhibits the lines of communication by which LIC could other
wise be freely exported and Supported throughout the world.
The LIC spectrum is a range of conflicts that each
contains situations to be found in war. The doctrine and
strategy for the conduct of LIC was reviewed in Chapters Four
and Five. The doctrine is well developed and theoretically
sound. The basic military skills and tactics for LIC are the
same as those for any conflict, and its commonality with the
tactics for war-fighting has been stressed and its
differences highlighted. This is not a revelation to the
experienced soldier, but it may not be so self-evident in a
"peacetime army".(6) If the doctrine of LIC has a weakness,
then it may be, that one could be lead to believe from the
detailed analysis in some writings that LIC is a "special"
form of warfare. A warfare that can only be waged by special
troops, tactics and organizations.
It is emphasized that LIC is a manoeuvre warfare
philosophy rather than attrition philosophy. If the
philosophy of an army is tied to a quantitative approach,
then the LIC environment may be seen as particularly special.
The second weakness of the current LIC doctrine is that
it may template by over-analysis the strategy and tactics to
be employed in a given situation. This is a condition equally
disastrous in preparing for war, when to reduce reaction time
a situation is fitted into one of our contingency plans and
as a consequence the vital differences are missed. This is a
difficult problem to overcome in prolonged peace. As
battlefield experience declines we try to preserve it in
detailed writings. It must be remembered that the experience
is now historical and can only provide a guide for the next
conflict. Experienced is an advantage but not a guarantee of
future performance, particularly in war.
One of the greatest advantages a strategy or doctrine
can posses is its implementation by competent thinkers. It is
currently fashionable to term this ability as operational
art, but it is the matrix by which a goal is carried from
strategy to bayonet. It is called the military appreciation,
the estimate of the situation, or problem solving. It is in
this process of logical thinking that all who make decisions
must be competent. It is not stressed in the LIC doctrine,
but vital in all conflict and especially so in LIC, where the
situation is likely to be less stereotyped and often complex.
Specialization and drills may increase efficiency but often
at the expense of flexibility.
Military doctrine in general must ensure that the
commonality of force structure, strategy and tactics across
the conflict spectrum is stressed and maximizes the advantage
that this commonality provides. The doctrine should address
LIC problems where ever possible within the framework of
fundamental organizations and tactics. The doctrine must also
cater for areas of the conflict that are fundamentally
different in techniques and must address the application of
new technology.
The West cannot afford a LIC army or a "peacetime army".
The philosophy, forces, strategy and tactics of a Western
army should be applicable across the conflict spectrum, from
"peaceful competition" to war.
CHAPTER SEVEN
FORCE STRUCTURE
GENERAL
Each nation must structure a force in accordance with
its circumstances. It is therefore difficult to provide a
universal model of a force for LIC. Therefore, the force
models in Figures 2 and 3 represent an over-all conceptual
basis in which forces suitable for the conduct of LIC are
integrated into a larger army in accordance with the deduced
strategy. The models have been designed to accommodate the
strategic needs of a nation across a spectrum of conflicts
and regions. They have been constructed within the framework
of tactics utilized in both LIC and higher conflict. The
tactical needs of LIC have been compared in Figure 4 with the
basic requirements of higher level conflict to illustrate
commonalities and differences.
NATIONAL AND STRATEGIC
The force structure has been modelled on strategic needs
by region, including a home region as the most important. It
is appreciated that not all Western powers have the need or
ability to project power beyond their region unless working
in concert with an ally. Therefore, the extent of the threat
and the extent of regional forces may be considerably less
for some countries than the model portrays.
Each region is considered to consist of three mediums in
which conflict may occur or threaten to occur throughout the
conflict spectrum.
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The force is task organized by threat in each medium and
region. In a region of high level threat then the force will
be conventional and possibly nuclear based on the likely
enemy and the nature of the environment. If a LIC is likely
then the task force will be an infantry oriented group rather
than a mechanized force. A mix of capabilities can be
structured to counter a mix of likely threats in the one
region. A force Postured for a higher level is capable of
conducting LIC. However, the heavier fire power assets will
be of less use than personnel acting as infantry. On the
other hand, an infantry force employed in LIC will need
additional fire power if the conflict escalates to
conventional war.
The conduct of the air and sea battle should be
considered on a global basis as well as region by region.
A defence department must also contain the organization
capable of conducting a multi-regional or global conflict.
Due to the many state resources required to prosecute LIC
outside the legislation of "war", a LIC/Special Operations
Command may have to be established within the defence
department, as in the USA (1), and a like office within the
department of foreign affairs and state. A war or security
council commands both and should dictate who is in command of
an operation, but until the military effort over-rides all
other considerations then the department of foreign affairs
should command. In the latter case, all other departments,
including the defence department, are in direct support of
the department of foreign affairs. In most cases the military
aspects of LIC operations in support of countries within a
region will be commanded by the regional commander and not
directly by the LIC/SO Command or anyone else. The principle
of a single chain-of-command is still relevant at this level.
The LIC/SO Command responsibilities should include the
following: to co-ordinate LIC/SO missions on command for SAF
actions with global rather than regional significance, to
provide Special Operations and Special Action Forces in
support of regional and contingency forces, to be responsible
for SAF training and doctrine, and to liaise with other
forces involved in LIC duties.
Contingency forces and reserves form the basis of adding
or subtracting to the regional task force and are constructed
on a basis of two overlapping forces: one predominantly
mechanized and the other predominantly infantry. A module of
heavy support that could be required by either is maintained
as an add-on element and consists of additional armour,
vehicles, aircraft, and artillery, etc. The contingency force
must contain sufficient aircraft to allow a component of each
type of task force to be airmobile, with a follow on
contingency force by air or sea lift. In the event of a
contingency required to force an entry into a region, then
the overall force should also contain an amphibious
capability.
The basis of the land army is infantry. To this may be
added of nuclear forces, tanks, and mechanized forces, if the
predominant and global needs dictate a larger core force.
Even so, the first commonality is infantry training. The air
and naval forces are based predominantly on a high level
threat and the need win any air or sea battle in order to
support the land forces. This basis does not preclude the
vital need to concurrently support the core land force in all
levels of conflict, nor the need to deploy and support
contingency forces to the battlefield.
The overall force consists of a regular component and a
reserve component which may be partially activated for
operational service at the onset of LIC, if required The
reserve should concentrate on maintaining high technical
skills in areas in which an expertise can be better
maintained in peacetime, e.g. engineering, medicine, etc.
Some of these personnel should be available to undertake
their commitments during LIC without the necessity of large
scale mobilization, e.g. CA and medical personnel.
The internal security function of the military should
acknowledge the possibility of conflict being conducted on
home soil and provide for the integration of police forces,
civil emergency agencies and the defence force in time of
Aid-to-the-Civil-Power or defence emergency. Reserve forces
should contain the substantial outline of a "home guard" with
peacetime operational duties. The meaningful employment of
the citizen-soldier is a healthy practice within a democracy.
TACTICAL
As Previously stated, LIC is primarily conducted on the
medium of land, although the current provision of US and
Western naval escorts in the Persian Gulf illustrates a sea
and air LIC. The tactical model for LIC is simply a task
force made up of otherwise conventional forces. On land the
basis is an infantry unit of an appropriate size, with its
integrated organization and reinforced within the principle
of task grouping. In most cases this grouping consists of an
all arms and combined service representation. The table at
Figure 4 provides a comparison of tactical requirements
for a LIC force with those for a conventional force.
The infantry basis need not be referred to as light
infantry, or conventional infantry as that term has come to
mean infantry with or without other forms of mobility and
firepower. Mechanized infantry may conduct LIC tasks with its
vehicles, such as convoy escort and key point security, or
alight and act as what they are first and foremost, infantry.
The basic tactical principles of land fighting are
represented in all armies by infantry. All soldiers must
acquire these basic war-fighting skills as infantry before
branching into additional weaponry and methods of fighting.
Training for conventional war is the basis for LIC. (2) The
organization, skills and tactics may be adapted as required.
As a principle, all forces must be logistically
supportable to achieve their mission in an economic fashion.
While forces must be capable of operating with a minimal of
logistic support in many of the LIC scenarios, this is not to
say that forces for LIC must eschew anything but that which
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they can carry on their back. Soldiers must fight in any
conflict as physically unimpaired a possible, i.e. equipped
as lightly as required to be effective and survive on the
battlefield. The logistical problem is to help this happen by
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provide him with the equipment and supplies he needs without
denigrating his tactical ability. In some cases LIC forces
must be self-sufficient and in others they will require as
sighnificant logistical support as a conventional force.
The forces that must be structured, trained and
maintained in addition to those elements common to LIC are
listed in Figure 4. They include mechanized formations,
nuclear forces, forces for air and sea battles, and
associated groupings of combat support, such as heavy
artillery and air defence, and logistics support. These
forces are maintained according to the threat and may be
brigaded in some cases or placed as an add-on module to a
basic infantry force or kept in the reserves for activation
in time of escalation. Whatever, all troops must rotate
through combined arms training in at least mid-intesity
conflict with the full inventory of weapons, corps, and
service. Especially those involved in LIC. Such rotation can
be interspersed with primary missions but adds flixibility and
experience to the army.
Forces should be structured as complete tactical
entities with a full complement of men and material rather
than skeleton units designed to be fleshed out at the time of
requirement. This is true for LIC and conventional forces.
Only complete forces can train as such and develope all their
capabilities to maximize usefulness. Skeleton forces are a
means of maintaining equipment and facilities but not
expertise. It is better to clone two new units by the
division of one healthy unit, than to build up two
mediocre units. A nation that elects the concept of
maintaining a cadre army for wartime expansion requires units
for immediate fighting and units for cloning.
A very important element of the LIC task force is the
Special Action Forces attachments as outlined in Chapters 4
and 5. These units contain the reservoir of additional
capabilities required in LIC and other warfare in which it is
impractical to train all units. However, the danger of over-
specialization and empire-building must be avoided. Where
ever possible the existing organizations and capabilities of
state and defence should be employed for simplicity. At least
the defence organization should be inherently flexible while
retaining professionalism.
Whatever the force structure, it must flow from a
consideration of national philosophy and strategy, resources,
the enemy and threat, and a thorough knowledge of what is
militarily sound and achieveable. Once established, the
structure should be allowed to develop efficiency without the
turmoil of continual re-organization. The organization's aim
is to dispense controlled violence when and where necessary.
CHAPTER EIGHT
PREPARATION AND TRAINING
GENERAL
Even with the appropriate strategy and force structure,
the West may not win in LIC, or at any other level of