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THEATHER WARFARE: CAN THE AIRLAND BATTLE SUCCEED  WITHOUT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT?
AUTHOR MAJOR J. M. MEITERLE
CSC 1988
SUBJECT AREA AVIATION
                               EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: THEATER WARFARE: CAN THE AIRLAND BATTLE
       SUCCEED WITHOUT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT?
I.   Purpose:  To discuss the controversy surrounding close air
support (CAS) for U.S. Army maneuver units by pinpointing the
problem to be primarily embedded in the written service doctrine.
II.  Problem:  A general misperception exists that Air Force
tactical air will be deficient in providing CAS to engaged Army
combat units along the FEBA.  Much of this lack of confidence
stems from the combat history of USAF Tacair in support of the
Army and from how the Air Force allocates its resources on the
basis of mission priorities.
III. Data:  The U.S. Army focuses on fighting the next major land
war, doctrinally termed the AirLand Battle, by means of its
current interpretation of the operational art.  Because it
anticipates that it may be fighting outnumbered, the Army seeks
to employ forces by sequencing battles in a way that applies
military force against enemy weaknesses.  The key issue then
becomes how to optimize the use of airpower in this type of war
scenario.  The Air Force is assigned the missions of air superi-
ority, battlefield interdiction (BAI), and close air support by
JCS Pub 2 for its tactical air forces.  Relying principally on
airpower to attack the enemy as he approaches the FEBA would be
counter to the AirLand Battle doctrine.  The key to victory will
be via air interdiction of the enemy's follow-on forces where
significant kill ratios can be established and many of the
inherent problems of CAS can be avoided.  In spite of promoting
the BAI concept, the Air Force is not merely paying lip service
to the mission of CAS.  It now currently employs over ten fighter
wings and intends to fill up to twenty-six wings of CAS capable
aircraft.
IV.  Conclusion:  Through a build-up of its own organic firepower
and a judicious use of the Joint Air Attack Team, the Army can
effectively neutralize targets along the FEBA.  The Air Force
should and will remain very much involved in the CAS business,
but its main contribution will be to provide air superiority over
the FEBA and the destruction of enemy second and third echelon
forces.
V.   Recommendations:  The Army and Air Force can best serve each
other by expanding the written doctrine to distinctively separate
out the missions of CAS and BAI.  A redefinition of doctrinal
terms will also help organize and apply weapons systems for the
fight in the AirLand Battle.
          THEATER WARFARE: CAN THE AIRLAND BATTLE
             SUCCEED WITHOUT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT?
                        "Outline"
Thesis Statement:  To provide the required air support
necessary to achieve victory on the 1990's AirLand
battlefield, the Army/Air Force team must modernize its
warfighting doctrine by addressing the optimum use of fixed
wing air power to effect the movement of ground forces.
I.   Close Air Support Doctrine and Tasks
          A.  U.S. Army Mission
          B.  U.S. Air Force Mission(s)
          C.  Doctrinal Conflicts
              1.   Resolving Mission Priorities
II.  Historical Perspective of CAS
          A.  WWI through Vietnam
          B.  National Strategy (vs) Resource Allocation
III. Battlefield Tactical Problems
          A.  Artillery Deconfliction
          B.  Target Identification
          C.  Aircraft Performance (vs) Threat and Weather
          D.  Communications
          E.  CAS (vs) Warsaw Pact Ground/Air Threat
IV.  Air Response Alternatives to the Close-In Battle
          A.  Overview of Operational Art Concept
          B.  Army Maximizes use of Artillery and Armed
              Helicopters
          C.  Army Fixed Wing CAS Aircraft?
          D.  Developing a 1990's CAS Aircraft
              1.   Multi (vs) Single Mission
              2.   A-16: A Proven Airframe
          E.  USAF Upgrade of A-10/A-7
V.   Solutions for Close-In Fire Support
          A.  Increase Army Organic Firepower
          B.  Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT)
          C.  USAF FAC Support
          D.  USAF Concept of Air Defense and Battlefield
              Interdiction (BAI)
              1.   Training Army FACs
VI.  Recommendations
          A.  Redefinition of Doctrine
              1.   USAF Role (CAS (vs) BAI)
           THEATER WARFARE: CAN THE AIRLAND BATTLE
              SUCCEED WITHOUT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT?
     The business of close air support (CAS) is a unique
military operation which requires a high degree of inte-
gration between the air/ground combat elements.  In terms of
United States theater warfare doctrine, the process is one
in which the roles of the Army and Air Force must obviously
overlap.  Although the coordination and cooperation required
of the two services may inherently produce its own problems,
the underlying interservice conceptual disagreement on the
most effective use of airpower assets usually revolves
around the decision to employ air as either a strategic or a
tactical weapon.  Accordingly, one can look directly to the
JCS doctrinal publications to discover where this divergence
of philosophy has its roots.  Through an examination of
doctrine and national strategy and how resources are
allocated by virtue of each, much of the historical conflict
associated with the problems of Army/Air Force close air
support operations becomes apparent.  Therefore, to provide
the required air support necessary to achieve victory on the
1990's AirLand battlefield, the Army/Air Force team must
modernize its warfighting doctrine by addressing the optimum
use of fixed wing airpower to effect the movement of ground
forces.
     By paraphrasing from a number of official sources, a
reasonably good definition of close air support can be
constructed.  Specifically, it is those air attacks
requested by the ground commander against hostile targets
which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which
need the detailed integration of each air mission with the
fire and movement of those forces.  The direct support of
U.S. Army ground units by the Air Force by means of CAS is
specified in AFM 1-1.  Army FM 100-5 further enhances the
textbook use of airpower with specific examples for the
employment of CAS.  However, because the nature of close air
support falls into the joint operations arena, we must look
to the specific service priorities and mission assignments
that are made in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2 (JCS
Pub 2).
     The Army is assigned one distinct mission in Section 2
of the aforementioned publication.  That is, "the conduct of
prompt and sustained combat operations on land to defeat
enemy land forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas."
By contrast, JCS Pub 2 assigns the Air Force a number of
specific missions within its primary functions.  In broad
terms, the Air Force is directed to gain and maintain
general air supremacy, control vital areas, and establish
local air superiority.  Both services are given
"responsibilities" for determining CAS requirements and
employing CAS in theater warfare.  However, to put matters
in proper perspective, these responsibilities are placed
last in the Army's list of collateral functions and appear
only as the fifth priority role for the Air Force.
     Although the service responsibilities and functions
appear to be well defined in generic terms, a major problem
arises because of the absence of specific requirements to
develop joint procedures, tactics, etc. for close air
support.  Each service is only encouraged to develop a
"need" for coordination and cooperation in terms of CAS
requirements.  What becomes all too obvious is the dilemma
of trying to accommodate the primary mission statements of
the Army and Air Force in relation to the relative priority
of land combat.
     Prior to any historical discussion of close air
support, it must be understood that CAS is, in the eyes of
the USAF, only the third priority in the triad of Air Force
tactical air.  The other missions are air superiority and
battlefield interdiction (BAI).  Still, it is the allocation
and targeting of tactical air that remains one of the
biggest issues yet to be resolved for the successful
implementation of the AirLand Battle doctrine.2
     The first use of aircraft for the dropping of munitions
in support of ground troops began in World War I and was
conducted by the allied forces.  A modern doctrine of CAS
with a developed command and control system was not ready
for the battlefield until after the Germans had kicked off
World War II (around 1940).  Through detailed studies done
in the 1930's and from combat experience obtained in Spain
and Poland, they were able to produce a system of unified
control, collocated air-ground headquarters, air liaison
officers, and tactical air control parties at the main point
of attack.3
     The Army Air Force development of CAS doctrine began
with the publishing of FM 31-35 (Aviation in Support of
Ground Forces) in 1942.  The initial combat experience of
AAF units utilizing CAS was with U.S. Marine aviation units
engaged at Guadalcanal.  It was here that the Army employed
its first forward air controllers (FACs).  However, it was
the result of some failed operations during the course of
the war that resulted in the publication of FM 100-20, which
effectively organized the Air Forces into strategic and
tactical functions.  By the end of the war, lessons learned
were incorporated into new doctrinal publications, most
notably a revision to FM 31-35 (Air-Ground Operations).
     The intervening years between WWII and Korea bore
witness to various attempts by the Air Force Air University
and Tactical Air Command Headquarters to produce a suitable
document from which all users of CAS could operate with.
The Joint Training Directive (JTD) was formalized just after
the outbreak of hostilities in 1950 and became the genesis
of a CAS command and control system.  The doctrine was
successfully implemented during the Korean War by means of
an Air Force joint operations center (JOC) and by forming
tactical air control parties (TACPs) down to the regimental
level.  Ultimately, the air assets of the Fifth Air Force,
Seventh Fleet, and First MAW all came under the control of
the JOC for close air support operations in Korea.
     After the reasonable successes attained in Korea, it
becomes somewhat distressing to look at the direction in
which the services went regarding air support doctrine in
the 1950's and early 60's.  The Army became preoccupied with
developing its own organic air, the helicopter, and
broadening its battlefield potential.   It also was in the
process of restructuring of its infantry divisions into
"Pentomic Divisions."  For the Air Force, what evolved from
the simple yet effective JOC in Korea was the Air Support
Operations Center;  a system that became the victim of both
technology and bureaucracy which, in effect, made the
control of air far too cumbersome.  The concept of air
support had now also become too centralized.
     The tactical situation in Vietnam drove air support
control measures back to a less structured environment.  A
FAC to DASC to aircraft arrangement, similar to one
developed in WWII and identical to the Marine Corps system,
was installed and was moderately successful.  The problem
was that although CAS employment doctrine had managed to
struggle through an evolutionary process from World War II
onward, U.S. National Strategy did not support the Air
Force's ability to provide optimum close air support to the
Army.  What appeared as a deficiency on the part of the Air
Force was the result of a force structure built on what the
service saw as its priorities as outlined by the National
Strategy. 4
     National Strategy inherently drives service priorities
and therefore allocating resources becomes a matter based on
a priority of assigned missions.  The United States post-
World War II National Strategy was one of pure emphasis on
strategic weapons, which drove the Air Force structure
heavily toward the missions of counter air and nuclear
delivery.  The Army, rather than challenge the national
priorities, began to acquire a missile capability of its own
and began the transformation of its infantry divisions.
Unfortunately, this legacy began to reveal its true down
side as we entered the Vietnam conflict with little or no
capability for air support and many lessons forgotten in the
art of conventional warfare.  Only after the National
Strategy began to reflect the reality of a non-nuclear
confrontation did resources and force structure begin a
movement back toward joint combined arms warfare.
     Tactically, the surgical precision required to
successfully conduct close air support operations near the
FEBA has been wrought with difficulties almost since the
Army was issued its first flying machine.  Today, the
complexities and technology associated with the modern
battlefield more than exacerbate the problem of air support.
The "age-old" argument always begins with the realization
that airspace overhead engaged forces will, most likely,
require artillery deconfliction for the conduct of CAS.  The
dilemma here evolves as a two-fold problem.  First, the
ground commander may lose valuable and timely fire support
and defense suppression capability while awaiting the
arrival of his air sorties.  Additionally, an adjustment to
either may decrease overall fire support effectiveness and
possibly increase the supporting aircraft's exposure to
enemy air defenses.
     Close air support specifically requires directly
attacking enemy forces engaged with supported ground units.
Thus, target identification close to friendly lines has
become dramatically more difficult as aircraft performance
characteristics have increased.  These high performance
aspects of maneuvering fixed wing aircraft may also become a
handicap in terms of airspace requirements to perform CAS
under conditions of low ceiling or poor visibility.  Today,
one cannot help but consider that as the cost and complexity
of CAS aircraft increase, the protection of the aircraft
rather than the destruction of the enemy becomes more the
area of concern.6
     Whether or not the armchair tacticians can agree on an
absolute definition of the fire support coordination line
(FSCL) and how it interrelates to close air support and
battlefield interdiction, the requirement remains that for
any indirect fire support to be conducted within its
boundaries coordination must exist with the ground
commander.  For coordination to exist, support must either
be scheduled or requested and there must be communications
up to the point where munitions are being directed against a
target.  In essence, the ground commander chooses CAS
targets, desired munitions effects, and attack timing.  A
TACP performs detailed planning to integrate the requested
attacks with the ground scheme of maneuver.  Forward air
controllers communicate with air and ground mission
commanders while weapons delivery is being performed.7
Indeed, a large chain of necessary tasks must be performed
for the outcome of one single event.  However, it is this
last element of a communications link which, if broken,
whether through enemy jamming, prohibitive terrain, or
equipment failure, will totally negate the employment of
CAS.
     Providing CAS to ground units under the high anti-air
threat umbrella employed by a Warsaw Pact aggressor requires
defeating an integrated air defense system (IADS) which will
utilize ground based air defense systems (SAM/AAA) at the
very least.  By using tactics and a myriad of "combined arms
suppression techniques" (artillery, infantry, electronic
countermeasures, smoke, antiradiation missiles, communica-
tions jamming, etc.), it may be possible to neutralize the
air defense for those critical minutes that the CAS strike
requires.   In addition to achieving local air superiority
and defeating the arsenal of ground systems in the IADS, the
supporting arms must defeat another Soviet concept which
integrates electronic warfare and physical destruction as
part of an ECM/ECCM package in order to allow the CAS
mission aircraft to put bombs on target.  Thus it is not
only the lethality of the modern aggressor that must concern
the pilot in support of ground troops, but also the fact
that his friendly supporting cast must be carefully and
meticulously orchestrated.
     Ensuring timely, effective, all-weather, day/night,
close-in fire support on the FEBA under degraded communica-
tions on the high threat battlefield will also require more
than the Advanced Tactical Attack (ATA) aircraft envisioned
for the future.  Overcoming all the threat variables will
obviously mean a strong emphasis on the joint combined arms
effort, especially internal Army organic weaponry.
     It first must be understood how U.S. Army doctrine
focuses on fighting the AirLand Battle against a potentially
numerically superior and highly mobile enemy.  The current
operational art uses a campaign to sequence battles in a way
that applies military force against an enemy weakness,
rather than strength, to achieve strategic objectives.  In
theater conflict this often consists of moving large,
powerful ground forces to a position where they can destroy,
or at least threaten, an enemy's communications and support
capabilities that he requires to control and sustain his
forces.9  Consequently, the greatest impact that can be
provided by the Air Force in relation to the movement of
U.S. Army forces under this concept would be to provide
counter air and deep air interdiction.
     The Army's integral weapons systems are immediate,
responsive, and continuous and would seem best suited for
attacking targets along the FEBA.  Perhaps an increase in
assets or a massing of artillery fire would, along with the
attack helicopter, provide enough suppressive firepower in
the event that CAS could not be provided to combat a large
scale enemy attack.  For its part, the AH-64 is highly
formidable and can operate in certain environments where
high performance fixed wing aircraft cannot.  It has the
ability to rapidly relocate on the battlefield and can carry
over 15,000 lbs. of ordnance employing the TOW, cannon, and
hellfire weapons.
     There are many in uniform who favor an integrated
organic combined arms concept and have even suggested that
the Army, having a vested interest in supporting itself,
should be the service assigned the responsibility for
deploying a new fixed wing CAS aircraft.  The major
drawbacks of this idea, to name a few, would be that the
aircraft would most likely be limited to a single mission
capability and therefore not enhance the AirLand Battle
concept.  Additionally, command and control of joint air
assets would be further complicated.
     With a compliment of over ten tactical fighter wings
presently dedicated to the CAS mission, currently in the
form of A-7s and A-10s, it is generally considered by both
services that this package will not be enough to fulfill
mission requirements into the 1990's.  The Air Force has
been seeking cost effectiveness and design studies from
major airframe contractors on alternative options, including
building new and modifying existing aircraft.10  Although
the Air Force should be applauded for devoting the time,
energy, and potential resources to broadening and improving
its CAS assets, the basis for the problem of effective
support may still be unresolved.  Nevertheless, the proposed
acquisition plan for the 90's and beyond is well thought out
and merits discussion.
     The path that the Air Force wishes to take on the CAS
issue is pragmatic and one which must get the most "bang for
the buck."  Additionally, it seems to fall in line with the
AirLand Battle doctrine in its strictest sense.
     The generals are looking to an existing fighter for
conversion to the CAS mission and also to do the battlefield
air interdiction (BAI) mission based on it's speed, agility,
and weapons delivery.11  The foremost candidate is the F-16.
Modifying existing A-7s has also been widely supported by
some Air Force officials who have balked at the idea of
starting a new aircraft program in light of newly tightened
budget constraints.  Further, as the A-10s are phased out of
the CAS role, it is anticipated that they will be converted
to the forward air controller (FAC) airborne role.  The end
result is designed to both satisfy the Air Force's keen
interest in BAI requirements and to increase support for the
Army in an amount totaling twenty-six wings.
     The conceptual A-16 is thought to have built-in
survivability by virtue of its speed and maneuverability in
spite of its high vulnerability to AAA weapons.  Its multi-
mission capability, combined with an array of air-to-ground
attack enhancements, represents a common sense approach to
acquisition.  The A-16 would capitalize on the economy of
scale in the F-16 buy as well as on stable known costs by
obviating developmental risk and long term contractor
investments.14   The Air force is going as far to say that
even though the A-16 will be flown by the Air Force , it
would be an Army airplane with Army communications links.
     The Air Force currently has a $600 million program
underway for the enhancement of the A-7D, now flown
exclusively by the Air National Guard.  The improvements are
in the form of upgraded state of the art communications,
navigation, weapons delivery computers, and wide angle head-
up displays.  Further, the Air Force is considering a
modernization proposal, termed the A-7 Plus, which would add
an afterburning turbofan engine and an enhanced aerodynamics
package.  The combination of the current upgrade with these
potential future improvements will result in a highly
survivable and maneuverable lethal weapons system capable of
operating in the supersonic regime.
     Although the A-10 has been praised by many as the best
available CAS aircraft due to its ability to withstand 23-
mm. AAA attacks and because of its renown GAU-8 (30-mm) gun,
it retains the alleged deficiencies of an inability to
operate at night and penetration of enemy defenses to
perform deep strike operations.  The Air Force has basically
concluded that an upgrade of the A-10 would only produce
marginal results because of its big wing and high drag
profile.  Still it is felt that it will be ideally suited
for the role of a forward air control aircraft once its
usefulness as a CAS aircraft is over.
     To this point, this study has presented a broad
introspective into a small yet significant aspect of the
Army/Air Force relationship in the conduct of the theater
warfare.  The central issue in the qualitative fire support
of ground combat units by airpower has been presented as a
conflict or misperception of the written service doctrine.
Background material has been provided to draw a perspective
of CAS from history, understanding the multitude of con-
straints of CAS on the modern battlefield, and to view how
the Air Force is seeking to fulfill future CAS requirements
with a sober and pragmatic approach to acquiring modern
equipment.  The remainder of the discussion will develop
suggestions for improving close-in fire support measures and
will wind up by answering the doctrinal problem of how the
AirLand Battle can succeed without close air support.
     The Air Force acquisition strategy for air-to-ground
support aircraft is a positive step in the direction of
timely and accurate aviation close-in fire support.
However, if the Army's concept of operations relies on CAS
to supplement shortfalls in organic firepower, then the
doctrine assumes a large amount of risk based on the
weather, threat, and other factors beyond its control.
Therefore, the Army should develop a doctrine and commit the
resources necessary to carry out a campaign or defensive
plan unilaterally. 15
     A renewed emphasis on the Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT)
concept, developed in the late 1970's, with some revisions
to allow for greater flexibility, will provide a responsive,
survivable, and lethal combined arms team.  This tandem of
weapons platforms, the AH-64 and A-10, combined with massed
and well coordinated artillery fire, offers a significant
alternative to the problems inherent in high performance
aircraft.
     The problematical issues relating to close air support
have also some additional aspects that the services have
chosen to ignore over the years.  These include poor career
opportunities for USAF officers serving with Army units,
insufficient numbers of Air Force officers to fill liaison
billets with Army maneuver battalions, and lack of suitable
airborne forward air control aircraft.  A favorable
solution would be to use elements of the JAAT, particularly
the AH-64, to perform the FAC(A) mission as well as CAS.
This could enable the control and coordination of CAS to be
turned over the section or platoon leaders of AH companies
or battalions.17    Another option is to employ Army FACs in
OH-58 scout helos.  These suggestions may not only alleviate
a stagnant personnel problem, but also may solve many of the
nagging issues regarding degraded communications.  Addition-
ally, the Tactical Air Force commanders have concluded that
although there still exists a strong need for FAC aircraft,
mission constraints dictate against acquiring a one of a
kind FAC aircraft for all theaters.  The shortfall among the
Air force inventory of OT-37's, OV-10's, and 0-2's will be
more or less eliminated by the A-10 upon its conversion to
FAC(A) from the attack force.
     Before any final conclusions and recommendations are
made, it is imperative to review how battlefield air
interdiction (BAI) fits in so well with the Army's concept
of the operational art and the waging of the AirLand Battle.
BAI, which is designed to attack targets in the follow-on
echelons, offers the following advantages:  It can be
sustained in a confused situation where communications have
broken down, also eliminating the need for a FAC.  It does
not need to be integrated with the fire and movement of
ground forces, thus simplifying battlefield airspace
management.18  And, although specific targeting identifica-
tion is not required, the influence of the ground commander
and his selection and prioritization of desired targets
makes BAI the single most effective use of airpower for
direct support of ground operations.  For it is in this
target-rich second echelon that Tacair can make its most
significant contribution, providing that the aircraft is
responsive, accurate, survivable, and fulfills the
requirements of the ground commander.
     In summary, this paper sought an answer to the
question, "can the AirLand Battle succeed without close air
support?"  The answer is yes, only if there is an under-
standing that CAS is a mission designed to supplement the
organic firepower of the Army in those rare circumstances
where individual units are in jeopardy of being overrun. 19
The employment of CAS assets may be costly and may only
produce nominal results and will rarely produce victories
for ground units attempting to wage war outnumbered and
outgunned.  The extensive use of BAI will optimize on the
vulnerability of the enemy's second echelon forces and will
allow the Army's organic forces, along with the A-10 partner
in the JAAT, to prey upon those units engaged with
friendlies along the FEBA.
     Lastly, the Army and Air Force can best serve each
other by expanding the written doctrine to distinctively
separate out the missions of CAS and BAI.  This redefinition
of doctrinal terms, within the service manuals and the joint
and NATO publications, will also help organize and apply
weapons systems for the fight in the AirLand Battle.20  And,
although CAS must still remain an Air Force commitment, BAI
will come to the forefront, both in the written word and in
practice as the most effective and efficient use of airpower
in the theater warfare.
                        FOOTNOTES
     1 Maj Gene N. Patton, USAF, "Close Air Support - Just
Facts," U.S. Army Aviation Digest, Sept 1979, p. 18
     2 LtCol Joseph J. Redden, USAF, "AirLand Battle - The
Global Doctrine?", U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
PA, May 1983, p. 19.
     3 Ibid, p. 20.
     4 Patton, p. 20.
     5 LtCol Price T. Bingham, USAF, "Dedicated, Fixed-Wing
Close Air Support - A Bad Idea," Armed Forces Journal
International, Sept 1987, p. 62.
     6 BGen E. M. Lynch, USA, "Close Air Support: Its Failed
Form and Its Failing Function," Armed Forces Journal
International, Aug 86, p. 76.
     7 LtGen Merrill A. McPeak, USA, "TACAIR Missions and
the Fire Support Coordination Line," Air University Review,
Spring-Summer 1987, p. 67.
     8 Maj B. B. Knutson, USMC, and Maj R. D. Stearns, USMC,
"Comments on the CAS Problem,: Marine Corps Gazette, p. 72.
     9 Bingham, p. 58.
     10 "Battle Brews Over Follow-On Close Air Support
Aircraft," Aviation Week & Space Technology, Feb 2 1987, p.
19.
     11 James W. Canan, "More Flak in the AirLand Battle,"
Air Force Magazine, Feb 1988, Pp 76.
     l2 "Battle Brews...," p. 19.
     13 Edgar Ulsamer, "A New Roadmap for AirLand Battle,"
Air  Force Magazine, March 1987, p. 112.
     14 Ibid, p. 112.
     15 Maj Ross L. Smith, USAF, "Close Air Support - Can it
Survive in the 80s?"  U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College, Ft Leavenworth, KA, June 1979, p. 91.
     16 Brendan M. Greeley, Jr., "USAF, Army Grapple with Key
Issues of Close Air Support Mission," Aviation Week & Space
Technology, March 23, 1987, p. 50.
     17 Ross, p. 73.
     18 WG CDR Jermy G. Saye, RAF, "Close Air Support in
Modern Warfare, Air University Review, January-February
1980, p. 20.
     19 Smith, p. 95.
     20 Ibid, p. 94.
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16.  Patton, Gene N. , Maj, USAF, "Close Air Support - Just
     Facts," U.S. Army Aviation Digest, September 1979,
     Pp 42-44.
17.  Redden, Joseph J., LtCol, USAF, "AirLand Battle - The
     Global Doctrine?," U.S. Army War College, Carlisle
     Barracks, PA, May 1983.
18.  Saye, Jeremy G., Wing Commander, RAF, "Close Air
     Support in Modern Warfare," Air University Review,
     January-February 1980, Pp 2-22.
19.  Smith, Ross L., Maj, USAF, "Close Air Support - Can it
     Survive the 80's?," U.S. Army Command and General Staff
     College, Ft Leavenworth, KA, June 1979.
20.  Ulsamer, Edgar, "New Roadmap for Airland Battle," Air
     Force Magazine, March 1987, Pp 108-113.
21.  U.S. Army FM 100-5: Operations, August 1986



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One Billion Americans: The Case for Thinking Bigger - by Matthew Yglesias