Low Intensity Conflict, Special Operations, And The Employment Of Reconnaissance
CSC 1988
SUBJECT AREA Warfighting
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, SPECIAL OPERATIONS,
AND THE EMPLOYMENT OF RECONNAISSANCE
Susan J. Flores
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
March 1988
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Acknowledgements ii
Chapter 1 - Introduction 1
Chapter 2 - Reconnaissance Doctrine 7
Figure 2-1 Reconnaissance Organizations 15
Chapter 3 - Evolution 16
Figure 3-1 Special Operations 25
Capabilities Matrix
Chapter 4 - New MEU (SOC) Doctrine 26
Figure 4-1 Sample Chain of Command 38
Figure 4-2 Immediate Response 39
Capabilities
Chapter 5 - Maritime Special Purpose 42
Force (MSPF)
Figure 5-1 Notional MSPF Task 47
Organization
Chapter 6 - Impact 48
Figure 6-1 Support for Insurgencies 58
Chapter 7 - Short Term Solutions 60
Chapter 8 - Long Term Solutions 67
Figure 8-1 Spectrum of Conflict 76
Chapter 9 - Final Thoughts 77
Bibliography 81
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Since MEU (SOC) is so new to the Marine Corps, most of
the material gathered for this paper came from interviews
with people who are intrinsically involved in the
evolutionary process. To those fine people who consented
to interviews - Bob Aldrich, LtCol Denny Blankenship, Col
Patty Collins, Major "Gator" Duncan, Major Gordy Jackson,
BGen Keys, LtCol Ray McCormick, LtCol Bill Tehan, Capt Tom
Western, and Major G.I. Wilson - I wish to give you all my
special thanks. Without your candor and patience I could
not have completed this project.
Special thanks also goes to Major Jack Farmer and
Major Tom O'Leary for your encouragement and moral support.
The background information you provided was really helpful
in getting me started.
Finally, special, special thanks to Major Joe Flores,
Jr. who not only provided me with background information
and a list of recommended people to interview (interviewees
can blame him), but also for the days that you spent as a
single parent so I could complete this project. You're the
GREATEST!
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Today's Marine Corps is infused with a new sense of
meaning and determination. It is marching boldly forward,
preparing for, and participating in the low intensity
conflict and special operations arena. In 1985, General P.
X. Kelley, 28th Commandant of the Marine Corps, announced
that the Corps would prepare to conduct a new mission; that
is, the Marine Amphibious Unit (Special Operations Capable)
or MAU (SOC) mission. (This name has now been changed to
Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), or
MEU (SOC).)1
Ever since then, arguments have ensued concerning the
appropriateness of this mission; whether it fits in with
the other Marine Corps missions, or whether it
substantially changes our role in national defense.
Professional publications like the Marine Corps Gazette are
inundated with such articles, and the range of opinions is
as diverse as the range of people writing them.
This phenomenon is very curious when one considers
that the Marine Corps has traditionally, throughout its
history, participated in low intensity conflicts and
special operations. The Marine Corps' first amphibious
_______________________
1 On 3 February 1988, General A. M. Gray, the current
Commandant of the Marine Corps, published ALMAR 023/88,
which stated that effectuive 5 February 1988, the Marine Air
Ground Task Force designation would change to Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) viceMarine Amphibious Unit (MAU).
operation, conducted in Nassau, Bahamas in March 1776, was
a classic raid. Lieutenant Presley O'Bannon's activities
in Tripoli certainly fall under the category of special
operations. And Marine Corps operations, personified by
Chesty Puller's exploits in both Haiti and Nicaragua while
conducting counterinsurgency operations, can hardly be
considered mid intensity or high intensity conflict.
As a matter of fact, while the major wars are what
stand out the most in our national mind, they are but only
a part of the Marine Corps' history. Nobody forgets World
War I and World War II, but the Corps also participated in
many other campaigns in recent history. For example, from
1800 to 1934, Marines landed 180 times in 37 countries.2
Each landing was in support of some strategic goal in
behalf of the United States. .. .So it is ironic that there
would be so much ado concerning our new MEU (SOC) role.
How did this come about?
Two influences have created the environment in which
we operate today. First, since the advent of the nuclear
age, the conflict of choice has been low intensity. World
powers have carefully avoided conflict escalation that
would infringe upon the nuclear threshhold and embark them
in a war that Clausewitz calls, "pointless and devoid of
sense. They have been careful to weigh political goals
against the cost of the conflict, and so far, nuclear war
______________________
2R. Lynn Rylander, "The Future of the Marines in Small
Wars", a paper presented at the Center of Naval Analyses
1986 Sea Power Forum on the Marine Corps.
has not proven to be worth the cost
The second inf luence was the Vietnam War, and its
impact on the United States. Its prosecution without a
well defined strategic goal, and its subsequent
unpopularity with the people, have taken a toll in terms of
the health of the military in the years following the war.
American frustration over Vietnam created a national desire
to avoid conflict of any kind. This desire was translated
into fewer defense dollars for readiness during the
mid-to-late 1970's. It was even manifested within the
military itself. Following the Vietnam War, most special
forces outfits were dismantled or severely cut back. By
the end of that decade, the United States was left with
very little low intensity conflict capability.
The Marine Corps' capabilities suffered through these
years, along with the other branches of the armed forces.
Lack of qualified Marines, ancient equipment, and few
prospects for better resources sapped the Corps' ability to
accomplish even its most basic missions. Our
reconnaissance organizations suffered along with the rest
of the fighting force, victims of our own internal
ostracism. Just as we pride ourselves in being an elite
force; so do we resent any of our members who claim to be
even more elitist than we are.
Following Vietnam, there was a lot of internal
animosity against reconnaissance Marines for what the
infantry organizations felt were failures in reconnaissance
operations during the war.3 Many infantry commanders
felt that they were constantly putting their Marines at
risk to save some reconnaissance team that had gotten into
trouble (the inference being that the they were in trouble
unnecessarily). These inferences often showed a lack of
understanding about the roles the reconnaissance assets
were playing in the overall prosecution of the war. The
animosity carried over into the post-Vietnam era, and so
Marine Corps reconnaissance organizations were allowed to
deteriorate from benign neglect during a time when there
were too few resources to go around anyway. For example,
while serving with the 2d Marine Division from 1976 to
1978, the author witnessed assignment policies to 2d
Reconnaissance Battalion which were primarily "fair share"
with no consideration of requirements and capabilities.
Many problem Marines were assigned to 2d Reconnaissance
Battalion because it was away from the main part of the
base, and they were then "out of the way.
The nation's low intensity conflict capabilities and
assets were largely underemphasized for over a decade after
the Vietnam War, including force allocations, doctrine,
training, and equipment. By the early 1980's, we were
unprepared to fight in the one conflict most likely to
arise - the low intensity conflict. And along with this
erosion in our capabilities was the loss of our ability to
____________________
3LtCol Ray M. McCormick, USMC, interview conducted with
the author at Command and Staff College on 13 November 1987.
handle unconventional or special operations.
Since the warfighting environment of the `80s is full
of discussions about low intensity conflict and special
operations, we need to establish their meaning in relation
to this essay. As of this writing, there is no universally
accepted definition of low intensity conflict. Its meaning
is still being discussed at the Department of Defense
level. However, for the purpose of this paper, the reader
need only use the definition in JCS Publication 1:
"A limited politico-military struggle to
achieve political, social, economic, or
psychological objectives. It is of ten protracted
and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and
psychosocial pressures through terrorism and
insurgency. Low intensity conflict is generally
confined to a geographic area and is often
characterized by constraints on the weaponry,
tactics, and the level of violence."
... And the JCS Publication 1 definition for special
operations will also be used:
"Operations conducted by specially trained, equipped,
and organized DoD forces against strategic or
tactical targets in pursuit of national military,
political, economic, or psychological objectives.
These operations may be conducted during periods of
peace or hostilities. They may support conventional
forces or they may be prosecuted independently when
the use of conventional forces is either
inappropriate or infeasible.
The reader can tell, from reading these definitions,
that these two terms, low intensity conflict and special
operations," are not mutually inclusive. Low intensity
conflicts are a type of conflict, while special operations
are a capability to be used in conflict. While special
operations are a frequent part of low intensity conflicts,
they are also a part of mid and high intensity conflicts.
Low intensity conflict and special operations are not
new ideas; they are an inherent element of conflict. It is
their renaissance during this decade to which the Corps
owes a "thank you" for bringing it back to those basic
missions it is designed to perform. With the
reconsideration of its capabilities to ensure it can
accomplish these missions, it has reaffirmed that it is an
expeditionary strike force for our nation, and not another
NATO army designed to fight armored battles over the plains
of Europe.
CHAPTER 2
RECONNAISSANCE DOCTRINE
In order to understand the implications the new MEU
(SOC) mission has on the Marine Corps in general, and on
its reconnaissance organizations specifically, one must
first understand what it is that doctrine requires of
reconnaissance. This doctrine is stated in FMFM 2-2.
Amphibious Reconnaissance.
In the Marine Corps, there are two types of
reconnaissance organizations. These are the force
reconnaissance company, which is a Fleet Marine Force
Headquarters asset; and the reconnaissance battalion, which
belongs to the Marine division. Both operate in stealth to
collect intelligence information about the enemy. But
there is a difference in the level of their operations.
The force reconnaissance company conducts preassault
and deep postassault reconnaissance operations in support
of a landing force and its subordinate elements. The
company is made up of a headquarters section, a supply and
service platoon, and six reconnaissance platoons. (See
figure 2-1.) Each reconnaissance platoon contains three
four-man reconnaissance teams. All members of the
reconnaissance platoons are trained as surface and
underwater (SCUBA) swimmers, and as parachutists.
Employment capabilities specifically discussed in FMFM 2-2
are:
-Observe, identify, and report enemy activity and
collect other information of military significance.
-Engage the enemy in supporting arms, when so directed
or authorized by higher headquaarters.
-Implant sensors.
-Capture selected prisoners.
-Conduct specialized terrain reconnaissance including
beach, route, and helicopter landing zones/drop zones
reconnaissance missions.
-Conduct initial terminal guidance operations.
-Conduct special missions requiring the use of entry
capabilities unique to a force reconnaissance company.
The FMFM 2-2 specifically mentions a special mission
that can be assigned:
"A special mission requiring underwater or parachute
entry is occasionally assigned to a force reconnaissance
company. Missions of this type are not normally
reconnaissance oriented, and any commander who orders the
execution of such a mission must consider the impact of
diverting his reconnaissance capability to accomplish the
task. Additional preparation time will have to be allotted
before the task can be initiated. "1
Reconnaissance battalion conducts ground
reconnaissance and surveillance in support of a Marine
_______________
1Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 2-2. Amphibious
Reconnaissance (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing
Office, 19 March 1976), Para. 204.c(5), p. 8.
division or its subordinate elements. The battalion is
made up of a headquarters and service company and four
reconnaissance companies. (One of these companies has been
cadred for over a decade.) (See figure 2-1.) Each of
these companies is broken down into a company headquarters
and three reconnaissance platoons. Each platoon is then
further broken down into a headquarters and two
reconnaissance squads. And these are finally broken down
into two four-man scout teams. One platoon in each company
has a four-man team qualified in underwater swimming,
providing a limited underwater swimming entry capability to
the battalion.
The capabilities which the FMFM 2-2 identifies for
reconnaissance battalion include the following:
-Collect information on the enemy.
-Engage the enemy by supporting arms, when so directed
or authorized by the division commander.
-Implant sensors.
-Capture selected prisoners.
-Conduct specialized terrain reconnaissance including
beach, road, route, and helicopter landing zone/drop zone
reconnaissance missions.
-Conduct initial terminal guidance operations.
An analysis of both the force reconnaissance company
and the reconnaissance battalion missions reveals few
differences. The overall divergence is in scope. The use
of force reconnaissance company is more strategic in nature
than the use of reconnaissance battalion.
Force reconnaissance company is designed, trained, and
equipped to handle both pre- and postassault deep
reconnaissance for the entire Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF). Its personnel are intended to be inserted beyond
the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) in the commander
landing force's (CLF) area of interest, and are parachute
trained as one means of insertion. They are also
designated as the organization to handle the previously
defined "special missions" within the MAGTF.
Reconnaissance battalion, on the other hand, is
designed, trained, and equipped to handle reconnaissance
missions which are "closer in." They are the eyes and ears
of the ground combat element, and so their training is
primarily for surface and SCUBA insertion. Doctrinally,
they are not the parachutist; force reconnaissance company
reconnaissance platoon members are. Finally, their
missions do not include "special missions," as the force
reconnaissance missions do. They are intended for
reconnaissance tasks only.
Assignment to both force reconnaissance company and
reconnaissance battalion is not driven by any stringent,
centralized standards. There is a reconnaissance sponsor
in the Ground Combat Requirements Branch, Operations
Division at Headquarters, US Marine Corps who keeps track
of end strength, training quotas, and related issues. This
sponsor has only limited control over the assignment of
Marines to these units. He gives the assignment branch at
Headquarters information regarding the number of Marines
that need to be assigned, and then orders are issued to
send Marines to the major supporting command.
Marines do not normally receive reconnaissance
training until after they have joined a reconnaissance
organization, so the parent command receives basic Marines
with the appropriate infantry, communications, logistics,
etc., military occupational specialty (MOS). These Marines
are then further assigned within the large command based on
its needs. The number of qualified, trainable candidates
that actually join the reconnaissance organization is
dependent upon the priorities of the major command from
whom it derives its support. For example, the infantry
assignment monitor may assign orders to five additional
infantry Marines in a given month, and those Marines will
arrive at 2d Marine Division. The division will further
assign them based on its priorities. If it is building up
an infantry battalion for deployment and has had some
difficulty doing so, those additional five infantry Marines
could be assigned to that battalion in lieu of
Reconnaissance Battalion. The reconnaissance sponsor at
Headquarters does not have the authority to direct Marines
through that parent command into the reconnaissance
organization. He does, however, have the ability to
influence the action by close liaison with command manpower
staffs and personnel officers.
Command qualifications for assignment into the
reconnaissance organizations can also vary considerably,
depending once again on the supporting commanders'
priorities. One commander may feel that his reconnaissance
organization requires Marines with special qualifications,
in healthy numbers; while another may feel that
reconnaissance Marines are infantry Marines with some extra
training, and therefore do not need any special assignment
considerations, either in individual Marine qualifications
or in the reconnaissance organization's unit strengths.
Reconnaissance organizations generally have some kind
of screening process to determine whether the Marines they
receive can be successful reconnaissance Marines. The
screening process differs from one organization to another,
but usually includes a medical check to ensure the Marine
is physically qualified; some kind of physical fitness test
to determine how the Marine handles physical stress (it is
also important to ensure the Marine can swim); and finally,
some kind of interview process to determine whether the
Marine has the aptitude, attitude, and maturity to operate
self-sufficiently in the sometimes isolated circumstances
in which a reconnaissance Marine can find himself.
The reconnaissance organization's ability to fully
implement these standards is once again dependent on the
parent commander. The reassignment of a Marine who becomes
a disciplinary problem or who cannot master the training
is also dependent on the policy set by the parent
Command qualifications for assignment into the
reconnaissance organizations can also vary considerably,
depending once again on the supporting commanders'
priorities. One commander may feel that his reconnaissance
organization requires Marines with special qualifications,
in healthy numbers; while another may feel that
reconnaissance Marines are infantry Marines with some extra
training, and therefore do not need any special assignment
considerations, either in individual Marine qualifications
or in the reconnaissance organization's unit strengths.
Reconnaissance organizations generally have some kind
of screening process to determine whether the Marines they
receive can be successful reconnaissance Marines. The
screening process differs from one organization to another,
but usually includes a medical check to ensure the Marine
is physically qualified; some kind of physical fitness test
to determine how the Marine handles physical stress (it is
also important to ensure the Marine can swim); and finally,
some kind of interview process to determine whether the
Marine has the aptitude, attitude, and maturity to operate
self-sufficiently in the sometimes isolated circumstances
in which a reconnaissance Marine can find himself.
The reconnaissance organization's ability to fully
implement these standards is once again dependent on the
parent commander. The reassignment of a Marine who becomes
a disciplinary problem or who cannot master the training
is also dependent on the policy set by the parent
commander. Some parent commanders allow such reassignments
based solely on the request of the reconnaissance
organization's commander; others require the reconnaissance
organization to keep its ineffectives as the rest of the
command does.
Another way reconnaissance organizations get fresh
talent is from volunteers. Once again, the volunteer
program is dependent upon the priorities of the parent
commander. Some commanders, however, authorize the
transfer of Marines in their command to the reconnaissance
organization. The transfer can be a reward to a hard
charging young Marine for consistently outstanding
performance. Or it can be at the request of a young Marine
who is interested in reconnaissance skills, and who can
pass the screening test. This is a double edged sword.
While the reconnaissance organization commander is getting
a motivated young Marine with some infantry experience, he
is also acquiring a Marine who will receive orders sooner
than a new join would. ... And parent commanders have been
known to saddle their reconnaissance organizations in the
past with an occasional "hard core" recalcitrant, thinking
that the tough training would help straighten him out, or
would at least keep him so busy that he would stay out of
trouble.
Once the Marine has been accepted by the
reconnaissance organization, his training commences. For
Marines in the reconnaissance battalion, training usually
includes Amphibious Reconnaissance School, and in some
cases, SCUBA School. For force reconnaissance company
Marines, basic reconnaissance training usually includes the
two above schools, plus Airborne School. Additional
schools are also available to both organizations for their
more mature, experienced Marines to gain additional skills.
Once the Marine has had the "basic" reconnaisaance
training outlined above, he is ready to be assigned to a
reconnaissance team and begin training with them as an
effective member.
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CHAPTER 3
EVOLUTION
The first time the term "special operations forces"
was used in an official U.S. Government document was in the
Defense Guidance of 1981. This document directed all the
armed forces to develop a special operations forces (SOF)
capability.1 However, it wasn't until the Deputy
Secretary of Defense memorandum of 3 October 1983 that the
Marine Corps began to seriously review its special
operations capabilities. This memorandum tasked the
services to revitalize their special operations
capabilities "as a matter of national urgency."2 A
preliminary report was due back to the Secretary of Defense
by March 1984, after each service reviewed its existing SOF
capabilities. These reports would outline what steps
needed to be taken to create an effective level of special
operations capability to combat the current and future low
intensity conflict threat. They had a deadline to complete
any force structure expansion, enhancements in command and
control, and changes in personnel policies, training
programs, and equipment by the end of fiscal year 1990.
______________________
1John O. Marsh, Jr., Secretary of the Army, "Keynote
Address to Symposium on The Role of Special Operations in US
Strategy for the 1980s," and published in Barnett, Frank R.;
Tovar, B. Hugh; and Schultz, Richard H. Special Operations
in US Strategy, (Washington, D.C., National Defense
University Press, 1984), pp. 18.
2General Paul X. Kelley, USMC; "The Marine Corps and
Special Operations", Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 69, No. 10,
October 1985, pp. 22.
As a result of this memorandum, the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, General P. X. Kelley, directed the Commanding
General, Fleet Marine Forces, Atlantic (FMFLant) to conduct
a study and determine what would be required to bring the
Marine Corps in line with the special operations
requirements. The results of the study clearly indicated
that the framework for many special operations already
exists within the current MAGTF structure. Specifically,
the Marine Corps' forward deployed posture, its ability to
task organize and tailor its forces to fit special
missions, and its historical emphasis on such missions as
amphibious raids all lend credence to the solidity of that
framework.
Building on these areas, the Commandant announced the
new Marine Amphibious Unit (Special Operations Capable) or
MAU (SOC) (now Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special
Operations Capable) or MEU (SOC)). This unit is basically
the same as the former MAU, but with several enhancements
and some additional training that complement its unique
MAGTF structure and ability to task organize in order to
conduct a broad spectrum of specialized operations in the
low intensity conflict arena.3 It is now specifically
ready to tackle missions in the following low intensity
conflict areas: peacekeeping, contingency response, and
counterterrorism (depending on which definition of
_________________
3For further details on what these enhancements are, see
Major Harry M. Murdock, USMC, "MAU(SOC) A Powerful Maritime
Force", Marine Corps Gazette, August 1987, pp. 66-71.
counterterrorism is used). Figure 3-1 shows the
capabilities that the MEU (SOC) has in the low intensity
conflict arena.
Our current Commandant, General A. M. Gray, was the
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces, Atlantic when the
study was undertaken, and he is a firm believer in the MEU
(SOC) concept. In fact, he has been heard to call himself
the "AO" (Action Officer) on MEU (SOC)/special operations
issues. He strongly believes that we are the nation's
maritime direct action force - a traditional role which we
should continue to carry out. In his mind, every rifle
company in the Marine Corps should be trained in amphibious
raids,4 since that is our "bread and butter." Since
assuming the office of Commandant, General Gray has been
extremely active as the "AO", ensuring that this new
priority is understood and implemented.
...And what is the plan for implementing our MEU (SOC)
capability? The East Coast now has its Mediterranean
deployments designated as MEU (SOC). The West Coast is in
the process of following suit with its Western Pacific
deployments. First Force Reconnaissance Company was
activated on the West Coast last year, and is due to be
manned at full table of organization (T/O) strength
sometime this spring. In the meantime, elements of First
Reconnaissance Battalion are assuming its MEU (SOC) mission
_____________________
4LtCol Dennis R. Blankenship, USMC, Special Assistant to
the Commandant, interview conducted with the author at
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps on 16 December 1987.
in the Pacific Ocean. This will give the National Command
Authority (NCA) certain additional capabilities in both the
Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. While this has been
determined to be a good start, it leaves both the Caribbean
Sea and the Indian Ocean areas without coverage, The Navy
lacks sufficient shipping to routinely transport two
additional MEUs (SOC) to these areas. So how will the
coverage be effected?
There is a plan. The next step in enhancing our SOF
capabilities is the maritime special purpose force (MSPF).
This term applies both to the enhancement of our MEUs (SOC)
already operating, and to specially tailored contingency
forces which could cover the Caribbean Sea and Indian Ocean
areas. Liaison has been made with the Navy with regard to
the contingency force, and they have assured the Marine
Corps that they have the capability to support such a
force.5 The MSPF will be discussed further in a later
chapter.
To date, our MEU (SOC) capability has remained
uniquely Marine. That is, it has not become a national
asset for use by the Special Operations Command, as many
other special operations forces are. It remains a Marine
Corps asset, to be used through the normal operational
chain of command, by the commanders-in-chief of the various
theaters. A MEU is not even declared MEU (SOC) until it
passes a stringent special operations capable exercise, or
___________
5Ibid.
SOCEX, in the third and final phase of its training.
This is an important distinction from other special
operations capable units within the Department of Defense.
Other units are specialists, who spend all their time
preparing for intricately planned operations requiring
highly specialized skills and talents. MEU (SOC) has made
the distinction, however, that its special operations
capabilities are integral to its mission and role in
maritime strategy, and that its MEU (SOC) units are only
effective if they can react as an integral MAGTF team. To
pull out some portion of the MAGTF and turn its operational
control over to the Special Operations Command would be to
take from the operational commander some vital function
that he needs to perform all his missions. Thus far, the
Marine Corps has been successful in fostering this point of
view, and it appears that it will continue to keep its MEU
(SOC) amphibious units as an integral part of its
operational chain of command.
This has an important impact on the Marine Corps'
reconnaissance organizations. There is good news, and
there is bad news. The good news is that the
reconnaissance organizations remain with the MAGTF to
conduct reconnaissance missions in its behalf. Remember,
if they were pulled away to the Special Operations Command
control, the Marine Corps would lose this capability. The
bad news is that they have to improve on some rarely used
skills, and develop some new ones, to meet the requirements
of the MEU (SOC) missions. These are required in addition
to their routine reconnaissance skills, which they must
also maintain at a high proficiency level. What is the
impact, and how is the Marine Corps handling it? These
issues will be discussed in a later chapter. First, the
impact of the evolving MEU (SOC) role on national strategy
must be reviewed, as well as the Marine Corps' plan for
operations.
6The Marine Corps' former doctrine on special
operations is published in FMFM 8-1. Special Operations.
Founded on an old definition of special operations, the
Marine Corps historically interpretted such operations to
be environmentally oriented. Hence, FMFM 8-1 is full of
doctrinal information on how to operate in a jungle
environment or an arctic environment. It also includes
some information on variations of amphibious operations,
like noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), or
amphibious raids. But it does not cover the spectrum and
embodiment of special operations as they are now perceived
and defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The new definition, previously quoted in Chapter 1,
includes some specific changes in thought. First, the new
definition identifies "specially trained, equipped, and
organized DoD forces, emphasizing the requirement for
______________________
6The information provided in the rest of this chapter is
derived from the Department of the Navy; Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps, "Operational Concept for Marine Amphibious
Units being Special Operations Capable", unpublished draft
at the date of this writing.
interoperability between services. It also changes the
emphasis on employment of special operations missions.
Instead of being secondary or supporting operations to a
conventional operation, it is recognized that they can now
be conducted independently in support of national
strategy. And although they can be prosecuted in any level
of conflict, they are now oriented toward the lower
spectrum of conflict intensity. Finally, special
operations may now be used against strategic targets to
meet national objectives.
The Marine Corps has evaluated these new guidelines,
and determined that it needs to be prepared to accomplish
the following special operations missions:7
-A clandestine raid into an objective area in all
types of weather and terrain, particularly during periods
of poor visibility or at night over difficult routes under
EMCON.
-Strike operations such as interdiction of key areas,
and acts of sabotage.
-Pre-emptive seizure operations in support of a MAGTF
operation (e.g., seizing and securing an airfield,
communications centers, command and control facilities, and
key bridges, etc.).
-Selected operations in support of conventional
_________________________
7The following missions are copied verbatim from the
Department of the Navy; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
"Operational Concept for Marine Amphibious Units being
Special Operations Capable", unpublished draft at the date
of this writing.
counterinsurgency/counter-guerrilla operations to interdict
elusive guerrilla forces or to neutralize their
sanctuaries.
-Diversionary action to disrupt enemy activities.
-Operations in support of or to complement national
special operations forces (SOF).
And, as stated earlier, the Marine Corps determined
that these special capabilities are complementary to its
current maritime role in support of national strategy
without the addition of "special" or "unique" units to its
organization. In fact, they fit rather neatly into
current missions if some specialized training is included
for the deploying units.
The MEU (SOC) missions were broken down into two
categories: direct action missions and intelligence
gathering missions. The direct action missions which MEUs
(SOC) can perform according to the evolving doctrine are as
follows:
-Offensive operations. These can include, but are not
limited to, amphibious raids, special assault tasks (such
as demolition of beach obstacles or securing some key
terrain), and harrassing operations.
-Strike operations to provide rapid penetration
against selected "deep" targets to inflict casualties,
destroy an objective, or interdict the enemy.
-Recovery operations. These include freeing prisoners
of war, rescuing hostages in an in-extremis situation, and
recovering or extracting personnel or sensitive items from
enemy controlled areas.
-Special warfare tasks. Generally speaking, this
means providing support and assistance to other services or
to allies. One example would be to provide military
training teams to allies for limited periods of time.
The intelligence gathering missions fall into two
categories:
-Surveillance over a period of time. This is used to
determine patterns in enemy movement, and to develop long
term information collection.
-Reconnaissance to obtain specific information. This
differs from surveillance in that the time element is
usually severely reduced and the patrols are likely to be
more mobile. The information collected in this mode is
usually specific in nature.
In summary, figure 3-1 graphically displays the
special operations capabilities that the MEU (SOC) is
designed to handle, as well as those that are currently
beyond its scope. It also identifies generally which units
will accomplish these tasks. .. .And don't discount the
capabilities beyond the MEU (SOC) scope, because some of
them will be revisited later in this paper.
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CHAPTER 4
NEW MEU (SOC) DOCTRINE
The development of MEU (SOC) doctrine is a dynamic
process that is still underway, and will continue for
several years to come. What began as an experiment with
the 26th MAU in the summer of 1985 is now spreading to both
coasts, and will eventually be available for any worldwide
contingency which requires our unique maritime skills.
How is the Marine Corps developing this doctrine? It
is not operating in a vaccuum. The Commandant has
assembled a bevy of experts both from within and outside
the Corps. Members of various Army special forces units
have shared their doctrine, and so has the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI). In fact, the FBI has provided the
Marine Corps with certain "consultant" services, where
their agents assist with various types of training such as
operating in an urban environment and various types of
hostage rescue scenarios. Within the Marine Corps, the
major Fleet Marine Force (FMF) commands are now including
Special Operations Training Groups (SOTG) within their
tables of organization (T/O) to coordinate special
operations training and disseminate the newest in
information and techniques. Their job is to keep each
special operations capable unit within the Marine Corps at
a high level of readiness and expertise. They do this
by ensuring that training is as realistic and as thorough
as possible, and that each new development is provided to
those units quickly.
Nor is the Marine Corps operating in a vaccuum when it
comes to actually working with other services and
agencies. Some of the Corps' special operations billets
are located at commands like the Special Operations
Command, Europe and the Netherlands Counterterrorism Unit.
The intent is to bring the Marine Corps back into the
mainstream of military special operations. In the past,
there has been a tendency to operate in isolation. The
Marine Corps was either not aware that other service,
agency, and country assets were available, or did not know
how to ask for them. And occasionally, the isolation is
fostered because Marines are determined that the mission
can be accomplished without help from "outsiders," as
though it were some admission of weakness to request
outside assistance. In this new special operations arena,
it is imperative to work better with others, and the key
word is now "interoperability." These billets are a key
step in starting such dialogues.
All these billets will receive guidance from a new
directorate under formation at Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps - the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict
(SO/LIC) Directorate. This directorate will plan, develop,
and coordinate all aspects of Marine Corps activities in
the SO/LIC arena - both within the Corps, and with external
services, agencies, and nationalities.1
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps2 is also preparing
the operational concept for the employment of MEU (SOC),
which will describe the mission, concept of operation, and
command and control. This concept, once approved, will be
used to develop training, organization, doctrine, and
material programs. It is the cornerstone upon which the
future of MEU (SOC) and its employment rest.
Since the MEU (SOC) concept is still in its infancy,
the future holds many changes and adjustments in its
evolutionary growth. From the first experimental MEU (SOC)
to leave Camp Lejeune in 1985, through the future
development of the MSPF contingency forces, there will be
significant impact in all areas of Marine Corps
organization and management. The MEU's (SOC) growth and
development will depend largely on the inventiveness and
ingenuity of those Headquarters sponsors in charge of the
affected areas.
For example, the manpower sponsors work within
limitations with regard to how many billets they can
_____________________
1 Information derived from the Special Operations/Low
Intensity Conflict Directorate brief and recommended table
of organization currently under staffing at Headquarters,
U.S. Marine Corps. Copy maintained by author.
2Department of the Navy; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
"Operational Concept for Marine Amphibious Units being
Special Operations Capable", unpublished draft at the date
of this writing.
create. They cannot create more billets than Congress has
allowed them to maintain. The compilation of all these
billets is known as "structure," and it is a finite
resource. These sponsors must find the structure to adjust
tables of organization (T/O), create additional billets,
and possibly change the whole base from which some of our
organizations have traditionally operated. They have to be
able to do this in the face of more structure cuts mandated
by Congress in the next several years, and without
negatively impacting on the health of other important
functions within the Marine Corps. After all, growth in
the operational units must signal compensatory reductions
elsewhere in the Marine Corps' structure. As the reader
will see later in this paper, this area alone could have
significant impact on the way reconnaissance organizations
have traditionally operated in the past.
Another example of the impact this concept will have
is in the training area. The addition of several new
missions to the MEU's repertoire signals the requirement
for new training. In fact, the emphasis on the maritime
direct action role changes the Corps' whole way of thinking
about how it prepares to operate. Instead of spending
time training in mechanized operations or combined arms
operations, it will now have to prioritize its time to
ensure it can conduct its maritime direct action missions -
those missions which have always been its area of
expertise, but which have suffered during the past decade.
The MEU (SOC) units commence training six months prior to
deployment, and build to the level of expertise required to
be declared MEU (SOC) following their SOCEX. The
Commandant has also signaled the desire to see more raid
training within each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and
in courses like The Basic School, the Infantry Officers'
Course, Amphibious Warfare School, and Command and Staff
College.3 The ripple effect of the MEU (SOC) concept
will thus create many new requirements that the training
sponsors will need to find the dollars and the training
time to support. Once again, support for these initiatives
will probably mean that the time and money will have to be
pulled from some other areas, both resources being finite
in nature.
And finally, the changes in equipment and logistical
support will also be impacted by the new concept. As the
doctrine continues to develop, new equipment and logistical
needs will continue to be identified, and once again, the
logistic sponsors will search for creative ways to fill
those needs within our fiscal and shipping space
constraints.
__________________________
3LtCol Dennis R. Blankenship, USMC, Special Assistant to
the Commandant, interview conducted with the author at
Headquarters, U.S. Marihne Corps on 16 December 1987.
What does the operational concept say?4 It breaks
MEU (SOC) operations down into two classes: conventional
operations and special operations. Conventional operations
include the traditional Marine Corps direct action or
intelligence gathering missions. They can be conducted
during any level of conflict, whether it is low, mid, or
high intensity. An example of a conventional operation
would be an amphibious assault of a limited duration.
Special operations are also direct action or
intelligence gathering, but they are prosecuted against
tactical or strategic targets in pursuit of national
military, political, economic, or psychological
objectives. They can be conducted either during wartime or
peacetime, either in conjunction with other operations or
independently. They will often use specially trained and
equipped MAGTF forces, and when the operations are
sensitive, they will be authorized by the NCA.
In either type of operation, the MAGTF will have two
methods of carrying out the mission. The first method is
the deliberate operation. This one has been assigned in
advance, and allows time for detailed staff planning and
rehearsal prior to implementation. This method of
operation is more likely to succeed against targets that
4Remainder of chapter derived from the Department of the
Navy; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, "Operational Concept
for Marine Amphibious Units being Special Operations
Capable", unpublished draft at the date of this writing.
are either highly protected or have strong natural defenses
surrounding them; or which require a lengthy process to
accomplish.
The second method is the rapid response operation. In
this operation, the goal of the MEU (SOC) doctrine is for
the prosecuting MAGTF to carry out the mission within six
hours of receipt. The idea is for the MAGTF to carry out
the mission before the enemy has a chance to react. It
requires a high level of training and proficiency, both at
the individual level and at the unit level, and the
operational concept calls it the "STRONGEST trait of the
entire MEU (SOC) Concept."
It is this rapid response operation that also has the
greatest effect on the changing doctrine's impact on
deploying units. Not only are the MEU (SOC) units training
to meet new variations of missions, but they must also be
able to accomplish them quickly. There will be no time to
rehearse and reacquire forgotten skills. The units and the
individuals in them must be ready to carry out any mission
at any time. And not only must they be competent in all
their skills, but they must be able to work together as a
team. There will be no time for coordination of the finer
details. It will be incumbent on each member of a mission
to know his part and be able to carry it out in consonance
with the others, knowing instinctively what they will do,
in turn.
MEU (SOC) units are designed by doctrine to be
employed in a variety of rapidly changing, complex
situations. They are to be trained to operate in any
environment or weather condition, and actually prefer to
carry out special operations in periods of reduced
visibility. Training is to be geared toward realistic
scenarios, and units should include operating in urban
terrain, specializing in entry and clearing techniques, and
using quick-fire methods, especially during periods of
limited visibility.
MEU (SOC) units are designed to be light infantry by
nature, in keeping with the Marine Corps' expeditionary
role. This limits them with regard to logistical
capabilities, indirect fire support, and heavy weapons
systems. For these reasons, the battalion landing teams'
(BLT) infantry companies are capable of conducting only
limited independent strike operations. They are intended
primarily for use in conducting amphibious operations, with
emphasis on variations of the amphibious raid. For heavier
operations, the MEU (SOC) may require, and should be able
to request, external support.
MEU (SOC) units are also capable of carrying out
conventional offensive operations, when required. Close
combat for prolonged periods of time against
armor/motorized forces is limited by the MEU's limitations
in antitank and indirect fire support. However, the
conventional offensive capability increases significantly
in terrain and/or weather that favors the defender.
During normal peacetime deployments, the MEU (SOC)
will serve as a U.S. military presence, to display a
readiness to immediately commit forces in the national
interest, if so directed. Typical activities the MEU (SOC)
would undertake include staging operations, rehearsing
combat operations, securing base areas for use and
deployment of other forces, and any other significant
activity that would send a signal of U.S. resolve in that
part of the world where it is operating. Although not
trained for such missions, the MEU (SOC) could provide
limited mobile training team (MTT) support for a finite
period of time. Such training would be characterized by
distinct training for a short duration, vice long range
advisory type training.
The new doctrine cautions that MEU (SOC) units are not
normally to be used as a rear area protection force.
The MEU (SOC) is also capable of conducting strike and
recovery operations. In the concept, these operations are
described as "characterized by surprise to gain proximity
to the target, rapid violent assault to seize the
objective, short defensive/security actions to protect the
force, and quick extraction before reaction by the threat
forces."
Finally, MEU (SOC) units may be deployed to
participate in combined training exercises, to accomplish
some important training, while at the same time conveying
our national resolve and capabilities to foreign nations.
The newly written concept also discusses command and
control issues. It gives responsibility for commanding all
USMC special operations capabilities; i.e., the MEU (SOC),
to the appropriate FMF commander. All deployed MEU (SOC)
units will then fall under the operational control of the
Naval fleet under the Navy component of the appropriate
unified command. The MEU (SOC) units are intended to be
used by the NCA to successfully conclude a contingency
operation without having to resort to a higher level of
conflict.
This is how the responsibilities break down. U.S. or
allied commands may request the MEU (SOC) units by going
through the normal command channels to the appropriate
unified command. That unified command is responsible for
the employment of all forces within its theater, including
the MEU (SOC) unit. By using the normal contingency chain
of command, the MEU (SOC) unit's proper employment can be
most reasonably assured.
The unified commander, through the Navy component
commander, gives the needed support to the MEU (SOC) force
in a contingency operation. The Fleet commander is
responsible for transporting the MEU (SOC) force to the
theater area. It is then up to the MEU (SOC) commander to
provide the intelligence, communications, long range
insertion and extraction assets, and a staff that can carry
out rapid response operations. (See figure 4-1 for a
sample chain of command.5)
How far does the MEU (SOC) commander's authority and
control go? According to the concept, he controls all
components of the MEU, to include any assigned special
operations forces. Whether the entire MEU (SOC) is
committed to an operation, or only an element is required
for a smaller operation, the MEU (SOC) commander retains
operational control. While the MEU (SOC) commander will
normally operate within the chain of command of an
amphibious task force (ATF), he must also remain flexible
enough to orient his command and control procedures to work
with, or in support of, other special operations forces; or
under other joint or Naval task forces, if required.
Communications requirements are more stringent than in
the past. The MEU (SOC) must now always have sufficient
communications support to ensure the availability of
all-source intelligence. The ATF should normally provide
the MEU (SOC) with entry into the Defense Communications
System; but the unit should also have its own FMF mobile
command circuits. The MEU (SOC) is provided with
________________
5Line diagram shown in figure 4-1 taken from Class Student
Outline, "Planning Considerations for Noncombatant
Operations," MEU (SOC) Staff Planning Workshop, Landing
Force Training Command, Atlantic LFTCLant), Norfolk, VA.
specialized and dedicated equipment that is organized
within the force and deploys with the MEU (SOC).
MEU (SOC) communications assets are to be capable of
providing secure links to the unified commander, as well as
to the Special Operations Command Element (SOCSE) and Joint
Command Support Element (JCSE) nets. These nets provide a
direct link with the NCA. And the concept states that
secure satellite communications (SATCOM) and radios with
AM/FM capability are to be the primary means of
communications within the MEU (SOC).
Now that some of the doctrinal concepts under
development at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps have been
discussed, specifically with regard to the employment
considerations, it is time to revisit those missions that
the MEU (SOC) should be able to accomplish. Figure 4-2
provides a concise description of the missions that a MEU
(SOC) should be qualified to carry out. MEUs (SOC) that
are deployed should be capable of conducting all these
operations, either by themselves, or with other special
purpose forces, when the needs of the mission so dictate.
click here to view image
IMMEDIATE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES1
Amphibious Raids. The ability to conduct an amphibious
raid, on short notice, at night under EMCON conditions via
helicopter and/or surface means from extended ranges in
order to inflict loss or damage upon opposing forces;
create diversions; and to capture or evacuate individuals
and material by swift incursion into an objective followed
by a planned withdrawal.
Limited Objective Attacks for a spoiling or delaying
operation.
Protection or Evacuation of Noncombatants or Installations
in a non-permissive or permissive environment. The units
involved should be able to provide riot control, a
screening force, a security force, a rescue force, and
evacuation control center, medical support, and
transportation of evacuees.
Show-of -Force Operations to demonstrate the capability of
the US military to rapidly support the political resolve of
the United States.
Reinforcement Operations, particularly at night by
helicopter and/or surface means to reinforce both
international and national military forces, that are
normally external to the MAU (SOC). This is to include the
capability to conduct a doctrinal relief-in-place or a
passage of lines.
Security Operations. The units involved must be able to
conduct a security operation in a hostile or non-hostile
foreign environment in order to protect U.S. property and
non-combatants, develop an integrated local security
perimeter, screen for explosive devices, and provide
personal protection to designated individuals.
Mobile Training Teams that are able to provide instruction
to non-U.S. units using approved programs of instruction
concerning weapons, equipment, basic skills, limited
maintenance training and other organic capabilities
including appropriate operational training in concert with
the U.S. Navy regarding the use of amphibious platforms or
other related capabilities.
Civic Action Operations, to include limited medical and
dental care, minor construction repair of civilian
facilities, briefings to local government authorities,
Figure 4-2
1Copied verbatim from the Department of the Navy;
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, "Operational Concept for
Marine Amphibious Units being Special Operations Capable"
unpublished draft at the date of this writing.
support to local charitable and religious organizations,
and prompt adjudication of foreign national legal claims.
Military Tactical Deception Operations. The MAU (SOC) must
be able to design and conduct missions which mislead
opposing forces by feints, ruses, demonstrations, or
portrayals which cause the adversary to react or fail to
react in a manner that assists in accomplishment of the
mission.
Fire Support Control. The MAU (SOC) must be able to
conduct and coordinate close positive control of all
available fire support assets and provide and coordinate
fire support under MAU/Amphibious Task Force (ATF) control
for other services, including those of allied nations.
Counter-intelligence Operations. The MAU (SOC) must have
the ability to work with allied and national networks,
while also providing continuing educational instruction and
training to the MAU.
Initial Terminal Guidance (ITG). By providing ITG to
support the various missions conducted by helicopter,
surface, or fixed wing assets, or a combination thereof.
Signal Intelligence (SIGINT)/Electronic Warfare (EW)
Operations. The MAU (SOC) must be prepared to tactically
rescue or extract downed aircraft, equipment and personnel
in a hostile environment.
Recovery Operations. The MAU (SOC) must be able to enter
an objective area by helicopter or surface means in a
clandestine manner to recover or extract personnel or
equipment while remaining undetected.
Specialized Demolition Operations. The MAU (SOC) must be
prepared to employ specialized demolitions, as required, in
support of other special operations. This includes an
explosive entry capability to support close quarters
combat, and dynamic assault tactics/techniques.
Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT). Conduct
military operations in a built-up area by employing the
appropriate tactics, equipment, and supporting arms.
In-extremis Hostage Rescue. The MAU (SOC) must be able in
an in-extremis situation to conduct an emergency hostage
rescue mission from extended ranges, at night, under EMCON
conditions to rescue hostages and expeditiously withdraw
and transport them to amphibious shipping or another safe
haven. The emergency nature of this capability must be
emphasized. The intent is expressly not to assume hostage
rescue missions/tasks that are appropriately assigned to
other special purpose forces.
Figure 4-2 (cont'd)
Other Missions which include:
-Amphibious operations in support of U.S. and allied
forces in support of various contingency plans.
-Operations ashore in support of various contingency
plans.
-Contingency requirements in support of a unified
command.
Figure 4-2 (cont'd)
CHAPTER 5
MARITIME SPECIAL PURPOSE FORCE (MSPF)
From the first mention of SOF, the Marine Corps has
emphatically stated that it does not have, nor does it
intend to develop, any unique special operations forces.
Instead, it has steadfastly maintained that the Marine
Corps mission requires it to perform certain special
operations as a part of its general role in national
strategy. Amphibious doctrine, in itself, holds certain
"special" operations which the Marine Corps has
traditionally carried out. The amphibious raid is a
classic example.
When the Secretary of Defense required the services to
review their special operations capabilities and improve
them to be effective in the low intensity conflict
environment in which the world now finds itself, the Marine
Corps started with the traditional MAGTF as the basic
foundation.
First, planners determined what were realistic special
operations missions to assign the Marine Corps as the
nation's amphibious force. Then they took a pyramid
approach, starting with the basic MAGTF concept, and
gradually building on that foundation to a point whereby
all "maritime" special operations missions could be
covered.
Once they had analyzed what missions a MAGTF could
perform without any enhancements, they then proceeded to
the next step. With a few enhancements, they could perform
22 of those missions. (See figure 3-1.) That next
enhancement is the MEU (SOC) formula now being implemented
throughout the Marine Corps. Now the planners are working
on the next step up the pyramid - a more enhanced
capability. That capability is called the maritime special
purpose force (MSPF), and it is currently in the
development stages.
This MSPF force is designed around the Corps' unique
ability to task organize to perform a variety of missions.
It takes that concept, and builds on it for special
operations missions. The MSPF is designed to be an
enhanced special purpose raid force that can be employed in
situations requiring an extra amount of surgical skills
beyond the MEU (SOC) level. These additional special
operations are clandestine recovery, specialized
demolitions, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel
(TRAP), and in-extremis hostage rescue.
The MSPF operational concept also allows commanders to
tailor their force to meet other situational requirements,
like:
-Reinforcement for, or capture of diplomatic posts or
associated activities.
-Emergency actions to prevent loss of life.
-Reinforcement for, or support of recapture of US
flagged vessels (not underway).
-Recovery or destruction of sensitive US documents or
equipment to prevent exploitation by an adversary.
-Support of other special operations forces.
-Other special operations missions, as directed.
The MSPF, like the entire MEU (SOC), remains under the
control of the MEU (SOC) commander. Its nucleus is
comprised of a command section, a covering unit, and a
strike unit. The commander of the MSPF is an officer from
within the MEU (SOC), who makes recommendations to the MEU
(SOC) commander regarding the MSPF's task organization for
a specific mission, and is responsible for the planning and
execution of the mission. The covering unit is composed of
one reinforced rifle company that has been trained with
emphasis on amphibious raid techniques, small boat
infiltration/exfiltration, helicopter assault, and
clandestine entry techniques. And the strike unit performs
assault, support, security, and reconnaissance functions.
The concept tasks the force reconnaissance detachment
with carrying out the assault function. Additional
capability may be drawn from the division reconnaissance
platoon attached to the battalion landing team (BLT). Any
further mission specific requirements are then covered by
drawing from the other assets within the MEU (SOC), or
other embarked special operations forces.
The air combat element (ACE) is not forgotten in this
force. The ACE maintains a task organized element that
provides assault support, close in fire support, and close
air support. They are required to do tasks like deliver
elements of the MSPF from extended ranges, at low level,
and at night. They need to be proficient in night vision
flying, various insertion/extraction techniques, and
forward area rearming and refueling techniques. Figure 5-1
shows what a notional MSPF would look like.
The MSPF is intended to have complete interoperability
with other special operations forces embarked aboard
amphibious shipping and who may be committed with the MSPF,
like the Naval Special Warfare Forces (SEALs). That
includes other services, as well. The MSPF can operate as
the supporting force, or the supported force, in such
instances.1
The MSPF can operate in two ways. First, it can
operate as the nucleus special operations element of a
deployed MEU (SOC). In this case, the forces that would be
tasked with the more surgical missions form the basic
organization from which these missions are planned and
executed. To some degree, this type of planning and
operation is already occuring within the MEU (SOC). And as
the doctrine is developed, it will become more finely tuned
and capable.
But an MSPF can also be activated stateside as a
contingency force to be sent to a crisis area requiring the
___________________________
1Information in this chapter to this point provided from
Department of the Navy; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
"Operational Concept for Marine Amphibious Units being
Special Operations Capable", unpublished draft at the date
of this writing.
Marine Corps' maritime capabilities. The MSPF was touched
on in Chapter 3 as an option to cover the two geographic
areas to which we do not routinely and continuously
deploy. Those areas are the Caribbean Sea and the Indian
Ocean, and the contingency MSPF is the solution. Policy
makers are now looking at the impact of implementing one of
these MSPFs on each coast in the near future. With the
requisite Naval shipping and transportation assured by the
Navy, the contingency MSPF can expect quick movement to the
theater in which it must participate.2
___________________________
2LtCol Dennis R. Blankenship, USMC, Special Assistant to
the Commandant, interview conducted with the author at
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps on 16 December 1987.
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_____________________
1Information taken from Department of the Navy;
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, "Operational Concept for
Marine Amphibious Units being Special Operations Capable",
unpublished draft at the date of this writing.
CHAPTER 6
IMPACT
The traditional roles of both the force reconnaissance
company and the reconnaissance battalion have now been
examined. The evolution of the new MEU (SOC) role in the
Marine Corps, as well as the more surgical MSPF role, has
also been discussed. But what do these new roles mean to
the reconnaissance field - what is their impact?
One aspect of the MEU (SOC) role is readily apparent -
the special operations missions, particularly the direct
action missions, require extensive skills in some
nontraditional areas of reconnaissance. And the
implementation of these new special operations direct
action missions is changing the face of reconnaissance as
it is now known.
Not only is reconnaissance responsible for clandestine
information gathering missions, but it must also be
eminently capable at missions like tactical recovery of
aircraft and personnel (TRAP), tactical recovery in an
urban environment (TRUE), hostile ship takeovers, and
in-extremis hostage rescues. Such missions require skills
that are training intensive and that need constant use to
prevent atrophy. They are high risk operations that could
have a significant impact on national interests and on
American public opinion.
One thing must be candidly acknowledged: it is the
will of the American people that drives many of our
government's foreign policies. Just as the aftermath of
Vietnam created a decade of benign neglect of the military
and a penchant for noninvolvement in international issues
that required American show-of-force; so will the failure
of many highly publicized hostage recovery missions,
particularly with an unfortunate loss of both hostage and
rescuer lives, create similar outcries and result in
further isolation and lack of involvement by the U.S.
government.
In the meantime, unemcumbered by such considerations,
Soviet and Soviet surrogate support for insurgencies,
terrorism, etc. continues to be highly successful. Since
World War II, the U.S. and U.S. "surrogate" support for
insurgencies totals 8, while Soviet and Soviet surrogate
support for insurgencies totals 32.1 See figure 6-1 for
a listing.
This is not to say that national will rests solely on
the shoulders of the MEU (SOC); in fact, special operations
missions are carried out by a variety of agencies, from the
Central Intelligence Agency to the U.S. Army's Delta
Force. However, the aggregate success or failure of the
publicized missions of any of these agencies will have an
impact on future employment of any specialized forces in
_________________________
1John M. Collins, Green Berets, SEALs & Spetznaz: U.S. &
Soviet Special Military Operations. (Washington, D.C.,
Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc.,
1987), pp. 44-49.
the national interest, so it behooves all of them to be as
professional and well trained as possible. In this sense,
it is important that the training and employment of Marine
Corps reconnaissance assets in direct action special
operations be accomplished with all the finesse of true
professionals.
The biggest burden rests on the shoulders of the force
reconnaissance company. As the unit with the already
enhanced insertion/extraction capabilities and the
expertise in deep reconnaissance, it is the closest to the
level of accelerated training required to handle the new
missions. Its doctrine also acknowledges that it may
occasionally be used for special missions which are not
reconnaissance oriented. This imposes a heavy
responsibility on it. Not only must it be prepared to
perform its reconnaissnce role, but is must also be
prepared to perform highly technical and delicate
operations requiring skill, intelligence, maturity,
judgement, and audacity.
Nor is the impact isolated to the force reconnaissance
company. The MSPF concept written at Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps acknowledges that the division reconnaissance
platoon will act as an additional capability for the force
reconnaissance detachment in carrying out the assault
portion of the mission. So reconnaissance battalion must
spend some time training new skills, as well.
Most experts within the Marine Corps agree that there
will be an inevitable degradation of the deep
reconnaissance skills within the force reconnaissance
company while it trains for the special missions. In the
interim, some of the deep reconnaissance missions may, of
necessity, go to the division reconnaissance platoon to
carry out while the force reconnaissance detachment
concentrates on its new skills.
Until now, the new skills to support special
operations have been discussed in general terms, but with
no specific examples. Here is what one authority, John M.
Collins, has to say about the hostage rescue skills a unit
needs:
Hostage rescue units that expect the unexpected
must maintain a mind-boggling array of special skills
on standby, because they cannot predict the nature of
any future emergency. Samples include electronic
eavesdropping, secure communications, and negotiating
techniques, ... along with abilities to break into
buildings or board public conveyances of all kinds--
cellars, skyscrapers, aircraft, trains, buses, cars,
subways, and boats are among them. Procedures to
scale walls, rappel, pick locks, handle delicate
demolitions, and bypass booby traps are essential.
Rescuers also must excel at sharpshooting in crowds
and hand-to-hand combat, be proficient at first aid,
handle hysterical hostages, jump start and drive
strange vehicles,... and work well at night. The
list is almost endless.2
Force reconnaissance company Marines are undergoing
additional training to cover some of these skills In
addition to Sniper School, they are participating in Combat
in Close Quarters training, which teaches them how to
operate in various "tight" environments and to rapidly
identify and shoot the enemy - not the hostage. They are
also taking courses in offensive/defensive driving, and in
technical services, such as picking locks, etc. They are
conducting training in an urban environment, facilitated by
the FBI, to learn the differences of operating in an inner
city environment when performing tactical recovery and
in-extremis hostage rescue missions. They are learning
special parachute skills from High-Altitude-Low-Opening
(HALO) School. And finally, they are undergoing training
to learn how to use a variety of new equipment, from fast
ropes, to the potentially dangerous Draeger self-contained
SCUBA equipment.3
This training is not provided solely to the force
reconnaissance company. The reconnaissance battalion is
also sending Marines to some of this training, schedules
permitting, to provide some depth and backup capability.
__________________
2Ibid, pp. 87.
3Training information derived from several sources:
Major W. G. Duncan, Jr., USMC, interview conducted on 17
December 1987;
Major Gordon R. Jackson, USMC, interview conducted on 3
December 1987; and
Captain Thomas F. Western, USMC, interview conducted on 30
December 1987.
In fact, the impact is probably worse on the reconnaissance
battalion, because in addition to their primary tasks, they
are assuming more of the force reconnaissance company's
deep reconnaissance missions as well as preparing for the
backup role for special operations missions.
The MEU (SOC) mission is here to stay. So is the
MSPF. The impact on our reconnaissance organizations is
significant. It affects their manpower requirements,
training needs, equipment needs - even the foundation of
how they are organized. Does the Marine Corps intend to
leave them in largely the same form from which they now
operate, or are there some changes planned?
The Marine Corps is a dynamic organization, always
changing. But complex changes occur in increments, and it
takes time for all the related parts to develop and be
implemented. The MEU (SOC) mission has created some
elemental shifts in the way the Marine Corps has looked at
its capabilities over the past decade. In the late `70s
and early `80s it was interested in the M-198 and the M-1
tank as weapon systems of choice, and tactical thinking
centered around mechanized/anti-mechanized operations.
Priorities were not with light infantry/quick reaction type
roles. Now Headquarters is orienting in a new direction,
and that takes time and a willingness by the various staff
agencies to change.
..And some change is definitely needed. For the
short term, while MEU (SOC) skills are still under
development, the Marine Corps can afford some
inconsistencies in its doctrine. It is a very adaptable
organization, and can be flexible. But in the long range,
these inconsistencies are bound to eventually catch up with
the Corps and degrade its ability to accomplish an
important mission. They must be addressed.
The changes fall into two categories, based on ease of
implementation: short and long term.
Some of the short term solutions that can be addressed
include:
-Tighter controls on the quality of Marines entering
the reconnaissance field.
-Stability and retention of expertise within the
reconnaissance organization and field.
-Temporary reassignment of some missions to
reconnaissance battalion. (This will assist force
reconnaissance company, but will compound the problem for
reconnaissance battalion.)
-Streamlined training pipeline.
-Continued equipment enhancements to facilitate
accomplishment of missions.
The long term solutions, which are more in-depth, lie
with a realignment of reconnaissance organizational
structure and doctrine to meet new roles and requirements,
and a complete reevaluation and revamping of the training
requirements and procedures. The structural realignment
would be a major undertaking that would impact upon the
entire Marine Corps, because it requires extensive
realignment of a finite structure base. Such a change
would have to be accomplished using the existing number of
billets within the reconnaissance organizations, or by
using billets "found" or "taken" from another
organization's manpower assets. It could also mean a basic
change in the way reconnaissance does business, including
ownership of the particular reconnaissance asset, in some
cases.
In April 1987, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps hosted
an Amphibious Reconnaissance Conference at Landing Force
Training Command, Atlantic (LFTCLANT) to discuss some of
these problems and issues.4 Commanding officers and
operations officers from active duty reconnaissance
organizations attended. So did Inspector-Instructors from
Reserve reconnaissance units, and action officers from
various reconnaissance schools and support billets. A
number of issues were discussed, and a consensus of opinion
was sought on them. Among the issues discussed were:
-The development of a light armored reconnaissance
battalion, incorporating the assets of reconnaissance
battalion and light armored vehicle battalion (LAVB).
-Creation of a third force reconnaissance company; and
a growth from six operational platoons to eight in each
company.
___________________
4Department of the Navy; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
after action report, "Amphibious Reconnaissance Conference;
Report of", CMC ltr POG-13 1655C of 19 June 1987.
-Eventual development of a reconnaissance organization
containing all the MAGTF's ground reconnaissance assets and
intelligence gathering capabilities; i.e., remote piloted
vehicle (RPV) company, sensor control and management
platoon (SCAMP), and radio battalion.
-Evaluation and subsequent adjustment of
reconnaissance roles and missions: first, with regard to
the light armored reconnaissance battalion; and second,
with regard to force reconnaissance company's expanded MEU
(SOC) role.
-The development of military occupational specialty
(MOS) 0321 for privates first class (PFC) through staff
sergeants (SSGT). This MOS would be a "feeder" into MOS
0369 commencing in the staff noncommissioned officer (SNCO)
ranks, giving the reconnaissance MOS some progressive
structure for a career pattern.
-The selection of some universal evaluation standards
for use in screening reconnaissance Marines. There is a
wide divergence throughout the Marine Corps on what
standards are being used. Conferees agreed to the
following standards:
.Prior FMF experience
.First class physical fitness test (PFT)
.First class swimmer
.Pass essential subjects test (EST)
.Pass land navigation examination
.Commanding officer's evaluation
-Finally, the conferees discussed the establishment of
a reconnaissance officer's billet at the Doctrine Center
(now renamed the Warfighting Center) to act as a single
point of contact for doctrine formulation and revision.
Operations Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
took these recommendations for action, and in most cases,
agreed to staff proposals through Headquarters for
concurrence and implementation. As will be seen in later
chapters, all of these recommendations (or variations
thereof) are still under active consideration.
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______________________
1Information on this page and the next taken from John M.
Collins, Green Berets. SEALs and Spetsnaz: U.S. & Soviet
Special Military Operations, (Washington, D.C.,
Fergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc.,
1987), pp.45 and 48.
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CHAPTER 7
SHORT TERM SOLUTIONS
Any commander of a reconnaissance organization today
will state that it is a challenge to ensure his deploying
units are ready to go. In a force reconnaissance company,
there is usually one platoon where the Marines are still
attending schools, one platoon that is finally conducting
preliminary training of its reconnaissance teams, one
platoon with additional Marines (since a MEU (SOC)
detachment is usually slightly larger than a platoon) that
is stabilized and in the six month predeployment training
cycle, and one detachment (a platoon plus) that is actually
deployed. This prevents the commander from having a lot of
flexibility to absorb additional missions from his parent
command; nor does it leave him with much depth in the event
he has a large turnover of personnel and/or some training
shortfalls, He is constantly struggling to ensure that the
detachment being deployed is trained, seasoned, and ready.
One of the greatest causes of turmoil within
reconnaissance organizations is the receipt of young
Marines to become reconnaissance men, none of whom are yet
reconnaissance trained. It takes several schools and
months of on-the-job training to become proficient in
reconnaissance skills, and the commander has to be creative
in determining ways to get them all trained without
degrading his other missions and tasks.
The greatest difficulty is the retention of seasoned
team leaders from the noncommissioned officer (NCO) ranks.
With two years on station, these Marines become eligible
for special duty assignments like recruiting duty and drill
instructor duty, and when their name is identified, they
usually receive orders and are gone within several months.
These young Marines are difficult to replace, because
replacements have to be "built" from the ranks.
It takes time and training to season a young
reconnaissance Marine, and a young reconnaissance officer,
as well. Just because a reconnaissance organization's end
strength looks healthy is no indication that its
capabilities have matured. Manpower instability further
degrades the reconnaissance organization's ability to
produce special operations capable reconnaissance Marines.
The Commandant has already taken several first steps
toward easing the personnel turmoil and training crunch.
First, he has mandated that the force reconnaissance
company will become an "excepted" command; that is, that
the manpower pool will not drive its end strength. It will
be manned at 100%. Second, at the General Officers'
Symposium, he discussed with his commanders the importance
of supporting the reconnaissance organizations' personnel
needs, including keeping them at 100% strength, ensuring
they are being assigned quality personnel, and weeding out
the nonperformers.
The parent commanders have the ability to set some
beneficial local policies with regard to their
reconnaissance organizations By strengthening their
support for the screening process, and by prioritizing the
other missions they give their reconnaissance
organizations, they can have an impact on their health.
One of the common reconnaissance complaints has been that
they are not utilized properly by the organizations they
support. The parent commander has the capability to either
make the reconnaissance organization a general support
asset, and allow his G-2 Intelligence staff to control its
missions and employment; or at the very least, he can set
some policies that would preclude misuse of reconnaissance
assets and lessen the propensity for overcommitment that
seems to always occur.
Manpower sponsors at Headquarters, Marine Corps are
also looking at the identification/stabilization issue,
with an eye toward lessening some of the turmoil. But
here, once again, the "elitist versus generalist" argument
arises. While there is genuine interest in fixing some of
the problems that hamper mission capabilities, many of the
sponsors are hesitant to create an "elite" force that is
specially identified and trained. A common view would thus
be stated: "These guys are just infantry Marines with a
few extra skills. Any infantry rifleman can do this
mission with the extra training..."
The same goes for designation of a separate
occupational field for reconnaissance. The fear of
creating an "elite" force, along with some inherent
problems in establishing fair career patterns for
reconnaissance Marines, has created a predisposition not to
separate them from the infantry MOS.
At any rate, as a result of the Amphibious
Reconnaissance Conference recommendations, and after some
prodding by reconnaissance and MEU (SOC) experts,
Headquarters is looking at better identifiers of
reconnaissance skills than the current MOS structure. They
are also studying the MOS Manual and are considering
publication of tighter requirements for attainment of the
reconnaissance MOS.
Since the Commandant has a real interest in developing
the most professional MEU (SOC) capability consistent with
Marine Corps missions and goals, there is the possibility
that some priority will be placed on the stability of
Marines within the operating forces, especially those with
highly developed, perishable skills. To continue to be
effective with these skills, Marines need some assurance of
continued employment in the reconnaissance field, either in
their own organization, or at least within reconnaissance
organizations, in general.
By spring 1988, the manpower officials will have some
courses of action identified, along with their impact
(advantages and disadvantages). Some definite decisions
will be made concerning the best ways to stabilize the
reconnaissance field and keep it healthy.1
For the short term, there are no moves afoot to
streamline the training pipeline. All training has been
locally driven in the past, and will continue in that mode
for the near future. Short term fixes have been foregone
in favor of a more extensive, all-encompassing long term
solution. From time to time, reconnaissance organizations
have been able to make trips to the Infantry Training
Schools to screen possible candidates for reconnaissance
duties, and have been able to identify young candidates
with excellent potential for success in the field.
However, there is a tradeoff which comes from taking
Marines so inexperienced, in that they have not served any
time learning basic rifleman skills outside of their
schooling, and so they join the reconnaissance outfit
behind from the start. It takes longer to develop these
young Marines.
With Department of Defense emphasis on the development
of special operations skills has come funding to modernize
the affected organizations. Within the Marine Corps, there
has already been a spate of new, state-of-the-art equipment
included in the MEU (SOC) Table of Equipment (T/E), and
__________________
1BGen William M. Keys, USMC, Director, Personnel
Management Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps,
interview held with the author on 21 December 1987.
there is continued development of still more.
Communications were a significant problem, with the
requirement to have an all-source intelligence capability,
and the need for interoperability among the various
deployed elements. For example, force reconnaissance
detachment radios were not compatible with the CH-46s that
inserted/extracted them. Limited satellite communications
equipment was purchased for those helicopters working with
the reconnaissance teams, and the reconnaissance teams
changed to radios that were compatible with the
helicopters.2 Moreover, during the past several years,
the Navy has spent 38 million dollars upgrading their
intelligence/communications systems.3
Other items to facilitate mission accomplishment, such
as fast ropes, HNK MP5 SD German made 9mm "suppressed"
submachine guns, and Draeger self-contained SCUBA equipment
have been obtained. Also, the Marine Corps is now looking
at a new small unit navigation system that can tell a
Marine where he is, within 6 meters.4
Continued development and use of such equipment
benefits mission accomplishment, but it also has a price in
____________________
2Major W. G. Duncan, Jr., USMC, former Operations Officer
for 22d MAU Composite Squadron, interview conducted with the
author at Command and Staff College on 17 December 1987.
3LtCol Dennis R. Blankenship, USMC, Special Assistant to
the Commandant, interview conducted with the author at
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps on 16 December 1987.
4Western, T. F., Capt, USMC, Reconnaissance Officer,
Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command
(MCRDAC), interview conducted with the author at the
Development Center on 30 December 1987.
terms of the increased need for Marines to be trained in
its use. And training time is one of the big problems in
the readiness equation.
These are the short term "tweaks" that are being
applied to the reconnaissance organization problems. They
are creating relief, but they will not create permanent
solutions. The solutions required are more long range and
complex in nature. But even the hard, long range solutions
are being worked, as the next chapter will delineate.
CHAPTER 8
LONG TERM SOLUTIONS
The possible changes discussed in this chapter are
called long term because they are the "big ticket items."
They could cost the Marine Corps significantly in terms of
manpower structure, training time, making a permanent
change to the way reconnaissance operates, and the cost
that some other facet of the Marine Corps may pay in
sacrifice to support these changes.
Marine Corps specialists in the area of amphibious and
special operations are looking at the reconnaissance
function to determine how it can best be employed to
accomplish the goals that have been set for it. Other
staff officers are looking at ways to identify structure
(manpower spaces that could be converted to reconnaissance
billets) to support any possible changes. Some structure
has been identified, and its identification appears
consistent with a rational plan.
Before discussing this plan, it is necessary to become
familiar with the spectrum of conflict chart shown at
Figure 8-1. Note that while the greatest potential damage
can be done at the higher levels of conflict, it is the
lower levels of conflict that are most likely to occur.
Until the early to mid 1980s, the United States has spent a
large preponderance of its military resources preparing for
and/or deterring mid and high intensity conflicts. With
the Secretary of Defense's memorandum in 1983, the military
began reviewing its capabilities to deal with low intensity
conflict and found itself sadly deficient.
As a part of the defense establishment for our
country, the Marine Corps spent the `70s looking at mid to
high intensity conflicts. It spent a lot of time working
on mechanized/anti-mechanized battles and heavier fighting
equipment. With the birth of MEU (SOC), its priorities are
beginning to change.
Now the Marine Corps finds itself in need of some
structural and manpower changes to put its priorities back
where the amphibious rubber meets the road. The Commandant
has made the Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) a staffing priority
to ensure their health. He has directed that rifle
companies, reconnaissance organizations, radio battalions,
communications battalions, and air and naval gunfire
companies (ANGLICO) be manned at 100% of their tables of
organization (T/O).
If the Marine Corps reviews the most likely conflicts
in which it will find itself in the next decade, they will
probably be low intensity. Yet, it has acquired a healthy
capability to deal in mid intensity conflicts with its
M-198s and emphasis on mechanized operations.
Planners are looking at those units that have
developed a largely mid intensity conflict capability with
an eye toward taking those manpower spaces for the more
immediate low intensity needs1. For example, they are
looking at reverting the 4th artillery battalion in each
division to the Reserves. That battalion is a general
support battalion, whose function would be put to best use
in a conflict in which a larger MAGTF is committed. It has
little applicability in the low intensity conflict arena
If it were placed in the Reserves, the capability would
still be available during a conflict that would be serious
enough to call up the Reserves - exactly the type of
conflict for which it is best suited. In the meantime,
those billets could be reallocated to ensure enough
manpower is "purchased" in the budget each year to cover
the additional billets to be filled in the infantry,
reconnaissance, communications, etc., outfits, with some
billets left over.
The large majority of those billets will be used to
fill out the table of organization of the light armored
vehicle battalion (LAVB). A concept has been approved that
will make the LAVB a "scout infantry" outfit, with light
infantry Marines assigned to the LAVs. They will handle
the "mobile/mechanized reconnaissance" role within the
ground combat element, freeing reconnaissance assets from
___________________
1The following plans were conveyed to the author by Major
Gordon R. Jackson, USMC, Ground Combat Requirements Branch,
Operations Division, HQMC, interview held at HQMC on 3
December 1987.
having to accomplish this mission.
The extra few billets are being looked at to augment
the structure of the force reconnaissance company.
Planners are looking at increasing the officer strength of
the company by 5 officers, and the enlisted strength by
about 30 to 36 Marines. There are two plans. The first is
to create 6 headquarters elements for the detachments with
these additional Marines. The second plan, espoused by the
West Coast reconnaissance community, is to turn the
reconnaissance teams into 6 man teams vice 4 man teams.
There aren't enough manpower resources to accomplish both
plans, so only one could be chosen for implementation. In
either case, it is hoped that the additional manpower will
help alleviate some of the pressure the company is now
feeling in keeping abreast of all its missions.
But there are even bigger plans afoot; more
all-encompassing plans that address some of the larger
issues facing our reconnaissance organizations today.
Reconnaissance has traditionally been a function of the
cavalry's role in an army. Some experts feel that this
cavalry role should also be cultivated within the Marine
Corps; that without a well rounded cavalry capability, the
Marine Corps has a deficiency in the way it operates. A
healthy cavalry role is characterized by not only a
reconnaissance capability, but also economy of force and
screening. Cavalry is designed to be highly mobile,
allowing it to seek out the enemy,2
One of the shortcomings of our reconnaissance
organizations is their lack of mobility. Although they can
move well strategically, they are reduced mainly to foot
movement at the tactical level, once they have been
inserted. This is particularly true of the reconnaissance
battalion with its mission in support of the ground combat
element (GCE).
In addition to reviewing reconnaissance organizational
structure to determine the best configuration to handle
both reconnaissance and special operations functions, the
experts are also looking at the issue of our deficient
cavalry capability and lack of mobility. The
configurations they are discussing address all these
issues.
Taking a different approach to such a study, on 5
January 1988, the Commandant convened a "think tank" at
Marine CorpsCombat Development Center (MCCDC) to discuss
reconnaissance and other fleet structure issues, and create
a new Fleet Marine Force (FMF) structure to more closely
match the Marine Corps' missions. This Force Structure
Study Group was composed of 29 officers from throughout the
Marine Corps. Their ranks ranged from captain to colonel,
and they represented all facets of the Fleet Marine Force
____________________
2Col Patrick G. Collins, USMC, Special Assistant to the
Commandant, interview conducted with the author at the
Education Center on 2 November 1987.
(FMF), including air, ground, combat service support, and
Marine Corps Base personnel.
When the Commandant convened this group, he gave them
some guidelines.3 He wanted an active force with
greater capabilities while reducing the number of Marines.
The active force should focus on constant readiness for low
to mid intensity conflict capabilities, and should not
exceed 134,000 Marines. All elements of the active force
should be capable of deploying anyhere worldwide within 90
days. It should not depend on the mobilization of the
Reserves to be effective.
The group was to also review the Reserve forces, and
tailor their structure to around 43,600. This would bring
the total Marine Corps structure to around 177,000 - a very
cost effective end strength. The total force should then
be capable of general war against fully modern enemies.
The group was to cut the air and combat service
support elements by 2 percent each, and increase the ground
element by about 4 percent. They could do away with mirror
imaging between major commands. But the Commandant
specifically wanted surveillance, reconnaissance, and
intelligence capabilities maximized. ...And they had about
45 days to do all this so the results could be included in
the fiscal year `90 POM process.
___________
3Information concerning the Force Structure Study Group
guidelines provided by G. I. Wilson, Major, USMC, Special
Operations/Low Intensity Conflict Unit, Warfighting Center,
MCCDC, and member of the Study Group.
The group concluded its work in late February,
providing the Commandant with options to meet his
requirements. Although the results of the study are still
under review and have not yet been widely published, the
Commandant has made a decision to pursue the
recommendations concerning the reconnaissance
structure.4 Some of those recommendations include the
following:
First, the fourth company within the division
reconnaissance battalion is to be reactivated. This will
give the division a stronger, more flexible reconnaissance
capability, with plenty of depth in expertise,
Second, a surveillance, reconnaissance, and
intelligence group is to be formed within each of the three
Marine Expeditionary Forces, to work for the force
commander. This group will contain a headquarters and
service company which will include structure for a special
operations training group (SOTG), radio battalion with
enhanced structure to include two radio reconnaissance
platoons and an aerial reconnaissance platoon,
communications battalion, force reconnaissance company
expanded to include direct action platoons, remote piloted
vehicle (RPV) company, air and naval gunfire company
(ANGLICO) with enhanced structure, and an intelligence
_________________
4Department of the Navy; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff Memorandum 5000 SPD/PAT of 9 March 1988.
company. The intelligence company will bring under one
colander a force imagery interpretation unit, topographic
platoon, a counterintelligence team, an
interrogator-translator team, a sensor control and
management platoon (SCAMP), a tactical deception platoon,
and the personnel and equipment of the intelligence
analysis center. "5
These units will be coordinated to provide a combined,
well integrated intelligence gathering capability for the
force. They will be utilized through the use of
taskorganized detachments provided to deploying Marine
Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs).
Several structural options for the force
reconnaissance company were provided to the Commandant.
The configuration that has been subsequently briefed and
that is most likely to be implemented in some form is shown
in figure 8-2. It shows a total of 11 platoons, broken
down into 6 traditional long range reconnaissance platoons
that will carry out the traditional reconnaissance
missions, and 5 direct action platoons that will be
specially configured and trained to carry out special
operations missions in support of the MEU (SOC) concept.
In the final configuration, these numbers may vary.
But whatever the breakdown ultimately decided, it is
___________________
5Quote comes from Creation of a Surveillance/Reconnais-
sance/Intelligence Group, a working paper prepared during
the conference.
important to note that the overlap in missions at the force
reconnaissance company level is solved by the creation of
these new platoons. Now the reconnaissance platoons can
maintain their long range reconnaissance skills, and the
direct action platoons can focus on those special skills
required to carry out direct action missions. Highly
perishable skills on both sides can get the time and
attention they deserve to be viable.
As with the structure issues, the Commandant has a
small pocket of duty experts working on a reconnaissance
training program.6 The approach here is to completely
restructure the training, using a building block approach.
The training for the reconnaissance Marine is closely tied
to the new Basic Warrior Training. The potential
reconnaissance Marine, like all Marines, will begin with a
12 week recruit training course which will dwell primarily
on individual Marine Corps skills and knowledge. Recruit
training will be followed by a 4 week School of Infantry,
which will emphasize more collective skills, such as basic
fire team tactics, where the Marine learns to operate as an
integrated member of a unit. From the School of Infantry,
the Marines assigned combat service support military
occupational specialties (MOS) will go to their MOS
________________
6Training information provided by Col Patrick G. Collins,
USMC, Special Assistant to the Commandant, interview
conducted with the author at Command and Staff College on 19
February 1988.
schools. The combat and combat support Marines then go
through several more weeks learning MOS 0311 skills in more
depth. Finally, the combat support Marines are sent to
their respective MOS schools, and the infantry Marines
reach the final basic building block, a short course
designed to polish the 0311 skills and teach crew served
weapons skills. After this course, they will be assigned
to their fleet infantry unit.
Note that none of these Marines are assigned to
reconnaissance organizations. There is a strong conviction
that to be good at reconnaissance, a Marine must first be
skilled and seasoned in basic infantry skills. There is
also a quality that has thus far eluded identification and
measurement. Because of the reconnaissance Marine's
mission to conduct deep, long range reconnaissance, often
behind enemy lines, but always in isolation from friendly
forces, it takes a strong degree of maturity and a special
independence of character to withstand the unique stress
that isolation and "present danger" create. The additional
requirements of the MEU (SOC) direct action type missions
especially require this quality, And the Commandant's
planners are trying to find a way to screen for this
quality in the reconnaissance training process.
While they are brainstorming ways to identify and
measure such special qualities, the planners are moving
forward with the next step in evaluating the more basic
reconnaissance skills. Armed with a completed task
analysis, they are now starting from the beginning in
analyzing exactly what a reconnaissance Marine should be
able to do, and what is the best way to train him. When
they have completed this analysis, they will begin to build
an all new training program tailored to meet those needs.
In their search for more streamlined, tailored
training, these planners intend to coordinate with the Navy
Special Warfare Training Center to explore interfaces in
their training requirements. They plan to also review what
training is to be shared from Army resources. Then they
will build a program that the reconnaissance Marine will go
through before he becomes qualified in MOS 0321,
reconnaissance man. This training will result in his
qualification in MOS 0321 as a primary MOS, vice its
current secondary MOS status. The primary status will
require some changes in the enlisted infantry occupational
field structure, but they, too, have been mapped out for
consideration.
The planners anticipate that the major portion of this
work can be completed within the next 6 months. By that
time, they will have a definite idea where they intend to
take the reconnaissance training. Implementation times
will then be dependent upon how long the intra-Marine Corps
and interservice coordinations will take.
One thing is certain: the approach to solving the
training problems is an all-encompassing one, starting from
the ground up. It will not be a piecemeal efforts The end
result will be that the potential reconnaissance Marine
will undergo comprehensive screening and training prior to
his utilization within the reconnaissance organization.
The reconnaissance commander will be able to delete the
scheduling problems created by the current decentralized
training methods from his list of challenges, and can deal
more completely with the missions he must accomplish.
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CHAPTER 9
FINAL THOUGHTS
The MEU (SOC) mission is a solid, integral part of
contemporary Marine Corps operations. Although still in
its infancy, with special attention and nurturing, it is
maturing in relatively good health.
In researching this paper, the author expected to find
disparities between-the theoretical concept of MEU (SOC)
and its practical application in real life; particularly
with regard to its impact on reconnaissance. As the
previous chapters attest, there are numerous "mismatches"
between what is expected of reconnaissance organizations,
and for what they can realistically train and prepare to
carry out. The additional direct action missions carry a
heavy burden in specialized skills and equipment that can
only impact adversely on the maintenance of their
traditional reconnaissance and surveillance skills. This
conclusion was no surprise.
What is surprising, is that not only does an intimate
knowledge of those disparities exist within the command
structure; but that there are definite ideas - and plans -
to correct many of them at the higher levels within
Headquarters. Specifically, those individuals who are
developing the final changes in the MEU (SOC) doctrine are
in positions of influence that will help them overcome the
bureaucracy that normally resists change in any form.
Under General Grays these planners have been given
full rein to move as quickly as possible to complete the
planning and implementation process to bring the MEU (SOC)
mission to its full fruition. These planners are often
working independently of the staffs that would normally
handle various aspects of these changes. Although the
routine use of this tactic would eventually cause chaos
within a large organization, in this case it is cutting
through a lot of red tape.
As a result, all the issues identified in previous
chapters are under discussion, and moving toward
solutions. The issue of personnel turbulence within the
reconnaissance organizations has been addressed to all
commanding generals at the General Officers' Symposium. It
was also a topic in General Gray's first report to
Congress, where he emphasized the need to "create cohesive,
stable units by eliminating-personnel turbulence." And his
Manpower Division has been tasked to provide a plan of
action to lessen the turbulence, with a milestone schedule
for completion.1
The problems created by the locally driven training
programs, where young Marines often report to
reconnaissance organizations with no prior experience, are
__________________
1Department of the Navy; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff Memorandum 5000 SPD/PAT of 9 March 1988.
moving toward resolution. The inception of the basic
warrior training, and the planned follow-on training
tailored for reconnaissance Marines, will develop a young
Marine who has been screened, trained in reconnaissance
skills, and is ready to perform his mission when he joins
the organization.
And the biggest problem - the mismatch between the
size and capabilities of the reconnaissance organizations
and the numbers of specialized missions they are required
to perform - that, too, is now being resolved. The Force
Structure Study Group developed a reconnaissance structure
that can capably handle all the missions it is tasked to
perform. The direct action platoons developed within the
surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence groups'
force reconnaissance companies will handle those special
missions created as part of the MEU (SOC) concept.
Meanwhile, the long range reconnaissance mission remains in
tact with the traditional force reconnaissance platoons
once again available to undertake it. And the division's
reconnaissance capability is increased by the reactivation
of the fourth reconnaissance company.
Through the interviews held to obtain information for
this paper, the author learned that there are as many
opinions concerning what constitutes the health of the MEU
(SOC) mission and reconnaissance organizations as there are
staffers working the issues. Not everyone shares the
Commandant's perceptions, views, and sense of urgency
concerning the MEU (SOC) mission.
For example, there is still considerable discussion
about the "elitism issue." Many staffers hesitate to
manipulate the structure, training process, or assignment
policies. Some are in fear of creating an "elite force"
within the Marine Corps. Others don't believe that there
is anything innately special or different in the direct
action missions that a well trained infantry rifleman
couldn't perform.
From the beginning of the planning process for the MEU
(SOC) doctrine, planners have been careful to choose only
those special operations missions that fit into the Marine
Corps role in supporting national security. The whole
development of the MEU (SOC) concept has been based on
increasing levels of expertise within the Fleet Marine
Force structure - a building block approach.
The Commandant is adamant in his belief that the
Marine Corps is responsible for carrying out national
security policies within the amphibious environment,
especially where they relate to any island nations.2 If
the Corps is to carry out special operations missions like
the in-extremis hostage rescue in such locales, it must be
well trained, tested, and able to carry them out at a
_______________
2Source who provided this information identified in
author's personal notes.
moment's notice. Mistakes would mean failure by the Marine
Corps to carry out advertised capabilities, And as
discussed earlier, many of these capabilities and skills
are highly perishable.
Motor transport mechanics go to school to learn
mechanic skills. Marines in aviation supply administration
attend schools to learn these special skills. However,
there is no connotation of "elitism" simply because they
have skills that the infantry rifleman lacks. It seems
only logical that the Marine Corps should also cultivate
those special skills the reconnaissance Marines need to
successfully complete the MEU (SOC) missions. That is not
encouraging elitism; it is training an identified group of
Marines to accomplish a specific mission, and it makes
sense.
It is only with well trained, qualified Marines that
the Marine Corps can creditably carry out MEU (SOC)
capabilities. To accept - intentionally develop - a
structure and training program that offers inferior skills
is to also ensure inferior results.
Nonetheless, the elitism issue continues to impact on
the speed and completeness with which the reconnaissance
issues are being dealt. And so, in this case, it is
probably just as well that the Commandant has some special
staff officers assigned to continue the implementation of
the MEU (SOC) program within the Marine Corps. He has been
very vocal in remonstrating the Headquarters for its
bureaucratic red tape, and he will certainly continue to
press to keep this new mission from bogging down.
The next three years promise to be full of change and
growth; not only for the reconnaissance organizations, but
for the Marine Corps as a whole. The creative thinkers
within the ranks now have an opportunity to impact on the
relative health of the Corps as they never have before. It
is in this environment that MEU (SOC) will grow to
fruition, as will the more specialized maritime special
purpose force (MSPF). And it is in this environment that
reconnaissance organizations will finally reemerge as
professionally trained forces with mature skills whose
employment is vital to the prosecution of the Marine Corps'
missions.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources
Interviews
Aldrich, Robert, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Inter-
view conducted with the author at Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps on 9 December 1987.
Provided information concerning assistance generally
provided by the FBI as training "consultants,"
especially in the area of urban reconnaissance and
operations. The FBI has access to urban training
facilities which the Marine Corps would otherwise
have to do without.
Blankenship, Dennis R., LtCol, USMC, Special Assistant
to the Commandant. Interview conducted with the
author at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps on 16
December 1987.
Provided a wealth of information regarding the
background and development of MEU (SOC), its
current status, and future plans. Discussed
philosophy behind pursuit of greater special
operations capabilities within the Marine Corps,
and where that philosophy is leading us.
Collins, Patrick G., Col, USMC, Special Assistant to the
Commandant. Interviews conducted with the author at
Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Combat
Development Command on 2 November 1987, and 19 and 22
February 1988.
Gave specific background information on the philosophy
behind the development of MEU (SOC), along with infor-
mation and ideas concerning what the future holds for
reconnaissance in the MEU (SOC)/MSPF environment.
Special emphasis was placed on the future training
requirements under development for reconnaissance
Marines
Duncan, Jr., W. G., Major, USMC, former Squadron Operations
Officer, 22d MEU (SOC). Interview conducted with the
author at Command and Staff College, Marine Corps
Combat Development Command, on 17 December 1987.
Gave insight into into operational training aspects
of standing up a MEU (SOC). Discussed comparisons
of theory versus practice. Major Duncan helped
develop tactics for carrying out the new MEU (SOC)
missions.
Jackson, Gordon R., Major, USMC, Ground Combat Requirements
Branch, Operations Division, Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps. Interview conducted with the author
at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps on 3 December 1987.
Discussed impact of MEU (SOC) on reconnaissance,
especially force reconnaissance company, with regard
to training and operations. Explained plans for
adjusting force structure within the Marine Corps to
accomodate the needs of reconnaissance. Discussed
new equipment, and possibly, new structure.
Keys, William M., BGEN, USMC, Director, Personnel
Management Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps. Interview conducted with the author at
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps on 21 December
1987.
BGen Keys acknowledged that there were some
changes under discussion with regard to
reconnaissance; but was reluctant to discuss them
before research and review were completed and a
course of action decided. He indicated that
Congressionally mandated strength cuts may have
further adverse impact on any plans/proposals, and
that by Spring, all these factors should be molded
into a course of action.
McCormick, Ray M., LtCol, USMC, Low Intensity Conflict
Instructor, Command and Staff College and former
Commanding Officer, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion.
Interview conducted with the author at Command
and Staff College, Marine Corps Combat Development
Command on 13 November 1987.
Good start on background of LIC and Special Opera-
tions. Also provided some personal insights from a
reconnaissance battalion commander' s perspective.
Finally, gave some thoughts on the "ideal' recon-
naissance organization - what would work, and what
would not work.
Tehan, William J., LtCol, USMC, former Commanding
Officer of 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, and member of
other reconnaissance units. Interview conducted
with the author at Marine Corps Combat Development
Command on 27 January 1988.
Discussed background and changes within the recon-
naissance community. He was especially helpful in
helping me solidify thoughts concerning training
requirements and streamlining of the "pipeline."
Western, T. F., Capt, USMC, Reconnaissance Officer, Marine
Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command
(MCRDAC), and former Executive Officer, 2d Force
Reconnaissance Company. Interview conducted with the
author at Marine Corps Research, Development, and
Acquisition Command (MCRDAC) on 30 December 1987.
Provided a wealth of information, both as Reconnais-
sance Officer at MCRDAC, and as a force reconnais-
sance company executive officer. Showed author
samples of many new equipment items being tested
and/or fielded. Discussed training/readiness
problems, schools, etc.
Wilson, G. I., Major, USMC, Special Operations/Low
Intensity Conflict Unit, Warfighting Center, Marine
Corps Combat Development Center. Interview conducted
with the author at the Warfighting Center on 18 March
1988.
Provided valuable information and insight into the
results of the Force Structure Study Group's recom-
mendations concerning the surveillance, reconnais-
sance, and intelligence group development.
Doctrinal Publications. etc.
Commandant of the Marine Corps. "ALMAR 023/88 Change of
Marine Corps Task Unit Designations." Washington,
D.C., msg 031956Z Feb 88.
Changed Marine Amphibious Unit (Special Operations
Capable) to Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special
Operations Capable).
Department of the Navy; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff Memorandum 5000 SPD/PAT of 9 March
1988.
Document that assigned responsibility to various staff
agencies within the headquarters to create plans of
action and milestones (POAM) to implement those
portions of the Force Structure Study Group recom-
mendations that have been approved by the Commandant.
Department of the Navy; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 2-2. Amphibious
Reconnaissance. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1981.
Provided the doctrinal base for reconnaissance
organizational structures, missions, and capabilities.
Used as the basis for comparison with the new opera-
tional concept which provides the MEU (SOC) missions.
Department of the Navy; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMI'M) 8-1. Special
Operations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1984.
Provided USMC doctrine on special operations.
Department of the Navy; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 8-2. Counterinsur-
gency Operations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1980.
Provided USMC doctrine on counterinsurgency opera
tions.
Department of the Navy; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
"Operational Concept for Marine Amphibious Units
Being Special Operations Capable." Unpublished draft
as of this writing.
Used as the basis for determining changes in the role
of reconnaissance as a result of the new MEU (SOC)
mission. Contained in-depth information on the expec-
tations for MEU (SOC) capabilities.
Department of the Navy; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict Directorate
brief and recommended table of organization currently
under staffing at Headquarters, U.S Marine Corps.
Provided information on the structural foundation that
will support new MEU (SOC) and other special opera-
tions efforts within the Corps.
Force Structure Study Group. Creation of a Surveillance/
Reconnaissance/Intelligence Group. Working paper
prepared during the study.
Provided background concerning the development of the
surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence group.
Headquarters, Department of the Army. Field Manual (FM
100-20) Low Intensity Conflict. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982.
Provided background information on low intensity
conflict in general.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Department of Defense Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms (JCS Pub 1).
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Governemnt Printing Office,
1987.
Provided several key definitions on low intensity
conflict and special operations.
Secondary Sources
Books
Barnett, Frank R.; B. Hugh Tovar; and Richard H. Shultz.
Special Operations in U.S. Strategy. Washington,
D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1984.
This was the book which aroused my curiosity on how
the Marine Corps is dealing with its reconnaissance
assets in conducting special operations and handling
low intensity conflict. It is a summary of the
discussions held at the symposium sponsored in March
1983 sponsored by the National Strategy Information
Center, the National Securities Study Program at
Georgetown University, and the National Defense
University. The symposium was entitled, "The Role
of Special Operations in U.S. Strategy for the
1980's."
Beckwith, Charlie A., Col., USA(Ret). Delta Force.
New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983.
Book provided information on the development of the
Army's counterterrorism unit. Of particular interest
were the descriptions of the selection process they
developed, and the types of training they conducted.
Collins, John M. Green Berets. SEALs & Spetsnaz: U.S.
& Soviet Military Operations. Washington, D.C.:
Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers,
1987.
Outstanding reference for comparison of low intensity
conflict participation/sponsorship, and special
operations capabilities, both U.S. and Soviet.
Davis, Burke. Marine! The Life of LtGen Lewis B. (Chesty)
Puller. USMC (Ret). Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1962.
Gave examples of campaigns in which Chesty Puller
participated, in both Nicaragua and Haiti, which were
counterinsurgency operations in nature.
U.S. Air Force, Air University. Low-Intensity Conflict.
The Hidden Challenge. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air
Command and Staff College, 1986.
Contained articles of interest concerning many
aspects of low intensity conflict. Also had
spectrum of conflict chart, which tied in to my
discussion in Chapter 8.
Smith, Charles R. Marines in the Revolution: A History of
the Continental Marines in the American Revolution
1775-1783. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1975.
Had history of first amphibious raid, which I used as
background in my paper.
Magazine Articles, Papers
Anderson, Jr., A. E., LtCol, USMC(Ret). "The Corps and
Special Operations." Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.
69, Iss. 12, December 1985, pp. 16-17.
Author argued that conventional MAGTF is designed
to handle special operations missions. Showed
examples from Vietnam, Iran, Beirut, etc.
Coates, Robert J., Capt., USMC. "Does Reconnaissance
Need Fixing?" Marine Corps Gazette. Vol. 72, Iss. 1,
January 1988, pp. 47-48.
Discussed requirement for reconnaissance Marines to
1) get entry level training, 2) better screening, and
3) a special MOS. Good logic.
Fox, Wesley J., Col.1 USMC. "Fixing the Reconnaissance
Problem." Marine Corps Gazette. Vol. 72, Iss. 1,
January 1988, pp. 44-47.
Good article. Followed thinking to reconf igure
reconnaissance organizations to better handle MEU
(SOC) roles.
Hensman, Jonathan R., LtCol, Royal Marines. "Taking
Terrorism, Low-Intensity Conflict, and Special
Operations in Context." Marine Corps Gazette.
Vol. 71, Iss. 2, February 1987, pp. 44-50.
Good analysis of low intensity conflict and its
relevance for the Marine Corps. It contained
discussion on the need for more training at all
levels within the Marine Corps.
Kelley, F. X., General, USMC. "The Marine Corps and
Special Operations." Marine Corps Gazette. Vol.
69, Iss. 10, October 1985, pp. 22-23.
Excellent article for developing a foundation in my
paper. Expressed the Commandant's logic for why and
how he intends to expand the MEU's role to MEU (SOC).
Leeper, Arthur J., Capt, USMC. "Armored Reconnaissance
Battalion." Marine Corps Gazette. Vol. 72, Iss. 1,
January 1988, pp. 49-52.
Interesting discussion of marriage between light
armored vehicle battalion and reconnaissance. Fits
into the idea of "expanded cavalry" capability -
better tactical mobility, etc.
Melshen, Paul, Major, USMCR. "Taking on Low-Intensity
Conflicts." Marine Corps Gazette. Vol. 71, Iss, 1,
January 1987, pp. 44-50.
Good philosophical discussion of the Marine Corps'
place in carrying out low intensity conflict in
behalf of the U.S., however, it had no specific
thoughts or recommendations regarding the employment
of reconnaissance.
Murdock, Harry M., Major, USMC. "MAU (SOC) - A Powerful
Maritime Force." Marine Corps Gazette. Vol. 71,
Iss. 8, August 1987, pp. 66-71.
Good discussion of "MAGTF" aspect of MEU (SOC),
especially each element's part in the functioning
of the whole.
Rylander, R. Lynn. "The Future of Marines in Small Wars.
Paper presented at the Center for Naval Analyses 1986
Sea Power Forum on the Marine Corps.
Provided good information about the MEU (SOC) capabil-
ities. Discussed the threat, U.S. strategy, and then
fit the Marines' role into that picture.
Tomka, Thomas G., WO, USMC. "The Future MAU (SOC)."
Marine Corps Gazette. Vol. 70, Iss. 3, March 1986,
pp. 41-42.
Made some recommendations on how to make MEU (SOC)
more effective in its counterterrorism role. Gave
many historic examples of special operations missions
the Corps has performed.
Trainor, B. E., LtGen, USMC(Ret). "Recon Operations
in Southeast Asia 1970-1971." Marine Corps Gazette.
Vol. 70, Iss. 5, May 1988, pp. 54-59.
Good historical perspective on how reconnaissance
teams were employed in Vietnam.
Walker, Anthony, Col., USMC(Ret). "Reconnaissance and
Light Armor." Marine Corps Gazette. Vol. 72, Iss. 1,
January 1988, pp. 52-54.
Discussed "marriage" between reconnaissance and light
armored vehicle organizations in terms of increased
mobility, cavalry functions, etc.
Western, T. F., Capt, USMC. "Countering Terrorism
with the MAU." Marine Corps Gazette. Vol. 70, Iss.
3, March 1986, pp. 40-41.
Advised caution in deploying MEUs in some special
operations. They are not highly trained enough to
handle some missions. Discussed weaknesses in in-
serting reconnaissance assets with current aviation
capabilities. Concluded that doctrine must be dev-
eloped to cover MEU roles in countering terrorism.
-END-
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