Are U.S. -Soviet Relations Rational?
AUTHOR Major Larry W. Fivecoat, USMC
CSC 1988
SUBJECT AREA National Security
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: ARE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS RATIONAL?
I, Purpose: To better understand the foundations of irrational
U. S. -Soviet relationships during the preceding four decades. To
dispel popular "myths" concerning our views of conflict to preclude a
future of four more decades of irrational behavior.
II. Thesis: The U. S. has experienced distorted views creating four
decades of irrationality in U.S.-Soviet relations.
III. Data: The confrontationist view of U.S. policy toward the Soviet
Union is based, upon false original assumptions and is inapplicable to
the Soviet Union as it has changed over the years. International
conflict has gone past the first or "heroic" phase of good people
versus bad into the second "academic" phase where we seek to
understand the motives of the other side. Four decades ago there was
a massive turnaround in U.S. policy where the Soviet Union went from
being the "gallant ally" to the "evil empire." Truman's firing of
General MacArthur symbolized U.S. leadership's adoption of
Clausewitz' theory of war being a continuation of policy by other
means; breaking with the populace view of separate war and peace. In
July 1947, George F. Kennan, state department official, wrote under
the pseudonym "X" an article on containment. It was roundly adopted
by all U.S. policy makers and many irrational decisions of the Cold
War were drawn from it. The notion of containment became military in
practice and global in scope. It contributed to U.S. militarization
and forced the pace of military competition. Kennan rebuked the
application of his article on containment by parochial interests in
the spring of 1987 and expressed his displeasure and sorrow over the
misunderstanding that evolved from it. His article helped create a
military aspect to the problem of containment in 1987 which did not
exist four decades ago. The Soviet system has incorrectly been viewed
as a static entity. Understanding the nature of both the Soviet
system and its people is important to approaching international
solutions with the Soviet Union vice monolithic stereotyping. From
the political theories of conflict of Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Lenin,
and Mao Tse-tung emerges what could be called a universal truth. They
all shared the perception that war and politics exist as part of the
same process and thus are always interrelated.
IV. Conclusions: U.S. policy makers set the stage in 1947 for four
decades of irrational thought in U.S.-Soviet relations. The misuse of
Kennan's theory of containment and the selective use of Clausewitz'
theory on conflict created a disparity between U.S. leaders and the
U.S. people.
V. Summary: U.S. policy makers have abused the theories of
Clausewitz and applied certain ones at their convenience. If
statesmen and military leaders would educate the populace concerning
the theories of conflict, they can better serve both nations and
launch four decades of unparalleled rationality in U.S.-Soviet
relations.
TITLE: ARE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS RATIONAL?
OUTLINE
THESIS: The U.S has experienced distorted views creating four
decades of irrationality in U.S.-Soviet relations.
I. Trace current U.S.-Soviet relationship
A. "X" on containment theory of communism (1947)
B. "X" Kennan on containment (1987)
II. American attitude
A. History
B. Evolution
III. Soviet attitude
A. History
B. Evolution
IV. Comparison of political theories of conflict
A. Machiavelli
B. Clausewitz
C. Lenin
D. Mao Tse-tung
V. Tie in U.S. view/adoption of Clausewitz' theory of conflict
VI. Clausewitz' theory applied to U.S.-Soviet relations
ARE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS RATIONAL?
The U.S. has maintained distorted views of reality
through four decades of irrationality in U.S.-Soviet
relations. The confrontationist view that has dominated
U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union is based upon
assumptions that were questionable to start with, and are
increasingly inapplicable to the Soviet Union as it has
changed over the years.
International conflict has characteristically gone
through two phases. In the first or "heroic" phase,
historians portray a struggle of right against wrong, of
good people resisting bad. Then, as time passes and
emotions subside, historians enter the second "academic"
phase, when they seek to understand the motives of the other
side. Historically, we move from melodrama to tragedy.
Forty years ago the United States went through one of
the most remarkable transformations in American politics
It was a period when the matrix of the Cold War was
established--a period of heroic accomplishments and of
serious mistakes. Within the space of a few months there
was a massive turnaround in U.S. policy, from a period of
collaboration with the Soviet Union as the "gallant ally"
that had contributed heroically and with great loss of life
to the defeat of the Nazi armies, to an alarmed and belated
response to the problems of the postwar world--the emerging
Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe and a perceived Soviet
threat to the Balkans and to Western Europe.
In March 1947 the Truman Doctrine announced the
commitment to resist Soviet expansionism anywhere.
President Truman declared that it must be the policy of the
United States to support free peoples who were resisting
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside
pressures (8:831) In June the Marshall Plan was launched
to restore the economic vitality and political confidence of
Western Europe. In July George Kennan published an article
in Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym "X," since he was a
state department employee at the time.
"X" on containment (1947):
It must invariably be assumed in Moscow that the aims
of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet
regime, and therefore to the interests of the people it
controls.... In these circumstances it is clear that the
main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet
Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and
vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.
(5:852)
Stalin perceived the Marshall Plan as part of a U.S.
effort to undermine Soviet efforts to establish a cordon in
Eastern Europe against a revival of a German threat. (2:76)
The notion of containment became increasingly military
and global. By overemphasizing the military aspect of
containment the United States contributed to the
militarization of its own economy and also forced the pace
of military competition In extending containment to the
Third World, the United States became preoccupied with the
military and East-West aspects of local conflicts, obscuring
its understanding of the local causes of conflict
situations.
In the effort to loosen congressional purse strings to
fund military programs and the Maryshall Plan, U.S. officials
exaggerated and over-simplified the Soviet challenge as an
ideologically driven effort to conquer the world.
Anticommunism became the American ideology--the central
principle of U.S. foreign policy. Primitive stereotypes of
the Soviet Union, which took form at that time, have
continued to dominate U.S. thinking and discussion of the
complex reality of the Soviet Union.
It is inevitable that democratic leader ships are
impelled to resort to hyperbole in alerting their publics to
the dangers they face. The consequences of these hyperboles
also inevitably become counterproductive and difficult to
control.
George Kennan has written recently that when he
published the "X" article he did not see the Soviet Union as
a military threat, and thought the fears that the Soviet
Union might overrun Western Europe were exaggerated
What I was trying to say in the Foreign Affairs article
was simply this: "Don't make any more unnecessary
concessions to these people. Make it clear to them that
they are not going to be allowed to establish any dominant
influence in Western Europe and in Japan if there is
anything we can do to prevent it. When we have stabilized
the situation in this way, then perhaps we will be able to
talk with them about some sort of a general political and
military disengagement in Europe and the Far East--not
before." This to my mind, was what was meant by the thought
of "containing communism" in 1947. (4:885)
"X" Kennan on containment (1987):
I saw at that time...an ideological-political threat
emanating from Moscow. I see no comparable ideological-
political threat emanating from Moscow at the present time.
The Leninist-Stalinist ideology has almost totally lost
appeal everywhere outside the Soviet orbit, and partially
within that orbit as well.... They are selling arms and
sending military advisers--procedures not too different from
many of our own. They cannot translate these operations
into ideological enthusiasm or political loyalty on the part
of the recipient Third World no more, in my opinion, than we
can....
On the other hand, whereas in 1947 the military aspect
of our relationship with the Soviet Union hardly seemed to
come into question at all, today that aspect is obviously of
prime importance. It is not because I see the Soviet Union
as threatening the United States or its allies with armed
force. I see the weapons race in which we are and they are
now involved as a serious threat in its own right, not
because of aggressive intentions on either side but because
of the compulsions, the suspicions, the anxieties such a
competition engenders, and because of the very serious
dangers it carries with it of unintended complications by
error, by computer failure, by misread signals, or by
mischief deliberately perpetrated by third parties. For all
these reasons, there is now indeed a military aspect to the
problem of containment as there was not in 1947; but what
most needs to be contained, as I see it, is not so much the
Soviet Union as the weapons race itself. (3:23)
Whatever Kennan's intentions may have been, then or
later, the American people interpreted the "X" article as
demonstrating the necessity for the military containment of
a Soviet Union ideologically driven to seek unlimited
expansion. Here we see the "heroic" phase of the conflict.
Americans were seeing the world in terms of good versus
evil; and although some--including Kennan--have since made
the transition to a more analytical and differentiated
understanding of the conflict, the dichotomy has had a
persistent life, re-emerging in our own day with
considerable political force as the "evil empire" theme,
making for primitive analysis and irrational responses. In
fact, over the four decades since the end of World War II,
this view has dominated U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union.
The central theme of our dominant view is that Soviet
expansionistic behavior is inherent to the nature of the
Soviet system. We further believe that the problems of the
Soviet regime are of such magnitude that external pressure
could precipitate a collapse or compel the leadership to
accept fundamental changes that would weaken it. In its
formative period 40 years ago, this view was shaped by
arguments drawn from the "X" article that Soviet power bears
within itself the seeds of its own decay; that the U.S. has
in its power the ability to place pressure upon the Kremlin
with a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection
than is realistic. We expect this pressure to break up or
eventually mellow Soviet power. Throughout the following
years the dominant view retained its fixation upon Stalinism
as the unchanging and unchangeable model of Soviet behavior,
intractably hostile and unlimited in its aspirations for
world dominance.
Logically, the policy that derived from this view has
been directed toward forcing the Soviet system to change its
fundamental character. Since the Soviet Union only
understands the language of force, we could compel the
Soviet leadership to capitulate, to make concessions, to
contract from extended positions, or, ultimately collapse.
It followed from this view that U.S. security could
only be assured by military superiority; that productive
arms control agreements were not possible with a country of
such character. The result has been intensification of
military competition in pursuit of military superiority.
Given these policies, there could not be expected any
other outcome than a continuation of the conflict
relationship and the intensification in military
competition. These underlying assumptions have dominated
American policy since the end of World War II.
The American policy toward the Soviet Union has tended
to be less than rational. The conflict appears below the
conscious level "we--they" perceptions of good--bad, tending
to make conflicts of interests between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union seem absolute and therefore intractable. The
conflict is intensified by the conservative swing in
political thought and the rise in nationalism in developing
foreign policy. Its main theme is anticommunism, which
becomes the main organizing principle for foreign policy.
The military-industrial complex has its own parochial
interests at heart.
The Soviets have also been far from rational in
managing relations with the United States. Many
misperceptions of the U.S and the outside world generally
stem from the same psychological mechanism operating in the
U.S. These misperceptions are magnified by ideological
rigidities and a strong sense of history. They have been
compounded in the past by unfamiliarity with the outside
world.
It is, however, misleading to assign such weight to
historical continuity that it obscures significant elements
of change in the Soviet experience. The Soviet Union is not
a static society. In its own way, it has followed the
normative life cycle of all revolutionary movements, and the
Soviet political culture is significantly different from
what it was during earlier periods.
Stalin helped transform the country from an
agricultural society into an industrial society--a process
which had actually begun in the middle of the nineteeth
century. He forced the pace of industrialization and
created a powerful military machine which enabled the
country to survive the war with Nazi Germany. He did so at
terrible human cost; and his rigid, ruthless totalitarianism
and police-state methods became increasingly
counterproductive, stifling initiative and innovation.
Krushchev must be credited with a bold effort to break
the Stalinist mold and to begin a process of reform.
Kosygin and Andropov both sought to implement domestic
modernization, and Brezhnev attempted to continue the
rationalization of foreign policy begun by Krushchev.
This background information is necessary to point out
that there is a Soviet evolution and that Gorbachev's
reforms did not spring into existence suddenly, as if by
some form of immaculate conception. This continuation and
maturation of a process reflects a growing awareness that
the system developed by Stalin had become increasingly
dysfunctional.
The heart of Gorbachev's program is designed to
modernize the Soviet economy. The economy he inherited was
marked by declining growth rates approaching stagnation, low
productivity, and widespread corruption.
More directly relevant is the political side of
Gorbachev's program. His widening of the limits for
criticism, easing of censorship, release of some dissidents,
reform of legal institutions, discussion of forbidden
subjects in Soviet history (including crimes of the Stalin
era) have pronounced reverberations in the outside world.
Perhaps this is a sign of the "mellowing" to which Kennan
referred. If these changes should continue and not be
reversed by some upheaval in Soviet politics, they will have
a bearing on one of the central elements in the American
debates on the fundamental nature of the Soviet system.
There is a general recognition in the Soviet Union that
the activism of the 1970s under Brezhnev proved costly,
damaging relations with the U.S. Gorbachev's "new thinking"
has placed emphasis on tranquility abroad in order to foster
domestic programs at home. As he colorfully put it, we
should not be like "two dinosaurs circling each other in the
sands of nuclear confrontation." (13:75) Emphasis is placed
upon mutual security, and the breaking with the concept of
capitalist encirclement to justify military programs
suggest: a beginning of logic creeping into U.S.-Soviet
relations. We could be experiencing a potential return to
the bipartisan spirit of internationalism that characterized
the immediate postwar years.
It is indeed ironic that two of the bitter enemies of
World War II are now friends, and an ally is the menacing
threat in the war of perceptions.
Each nation approaches solutions to its perceived
security requirements differently. This is not surprising
since many terms designed to convey fundamental ethical
concepts--"God," "democracy," "the people"--carry different
connotations in the opposing culture.
The American attitude toward war and the military
profession is heavily colored by the nation's history as a
young developing society, far from the perennial conflicts
of 18th and 19th-century Europe. While Carl von Clausewitz
enjoys great esteem within the narrow readership of American
military journals, and while his bust occupies a hallowed
niche at the U.S Army War College, his notion that war is
basically the pursuit of politics by other means has little
coincidence with American public opinion. War and peace are
mutually exclusive conditions by most American standards;
the former is something which occurs at the initiation of
others when all efforts to preserve the latter break down.
War is popularly viewed as a chaotic condition resulting
from failed policy, not as an alternative of equal
legitimacy with the normal stresses and strains of
international diplomacy or of domestic political give and
take.
This view was, ironically, portrayed by General Douglas
MacArthur in his farewell address to Congress in 1951, "Once
war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to
apply every available means to bring it to a swift end.
War's very object is victory--not prolonged indecision. In
war, indeed there can be no substitute for victory." (1:78)
Soviet views are not only different, but differently
derived. In 1915 Lenin spelled out the orthodox view in his
main thesis that war is simply the continuation of politics
by other (i.e. violent) means. (1:79) This formula belongs
to Clausewitz. (11:30)
Although 11 April, 1951 is not a bell-ringing day for
the average American it should well be. When Harry S.
Truman fired General Douglas MacArthur on that day, he not
only discarded the General but more importantly, he
discarded the public's view on war. (6:149) It was at this
point some four decades ago that our public officials
embraced the doctrinal normalization of conflict. Our
leaders had come intellectually of age; the naivity of the
American public could no longer be tolerated and the new
thinking embraced Clausewitz. War...is an act of policy...a
continuation of political activity by other means.... War
is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the
addition of other means. (11:30)
Our leaders had reached a level of sophistication in
the allocation of both intellectual and material resources
to conflict and theoretical conflict development. Securely
wrapped in his Clausewitzian blanket of conflict, Truman
fired MacArthur, and left a legacy for Johnson's approach to
the Vietnam War. While we had adopted the enemy's creed at
our leader level, however, the American public held fast to
its basic war and peace concept. What followed was four
decades of irrational political behavior to compromise
between the two views.
The causes of conflict have long been studied. Many
different viewpoints have been presented, and diametrically
opposing positions have been taken. Some argue that
conflict is basic to man's nature, since man is by his very
instinct an aggressive, warlike being. Others argue that
the organizational or structural defects of the main social
groups or states are the cause of conflict in the
international arena. It is these defects which often find
violent expression in warfare. A third viewpoint is that
the anarchy of the international system is an irresistible
invitation to conflict among the state actors, each seeking
to maximize his own benefits and achieve his own objectives,
often at the expense of the other states. (12:28)
Whatever position one chooses to take on the cause of
conflict, the relationship between politics and the resort
to warfare is so closely interwoven that it is nearly
impossible to separate the two.
Machiavelli believed in the doctrine of imitation--that
man's nature is unchangeable. Since men are alike, they
tend to imitate each other, and thus history simply repeats
itself. History is a storehouse and man needs only to study
and follow the proper example (especially Rome).
Machiavelli was the forerunner of Clausewitz; he realized
the intimate connection between military techniques and
political methods; between military organizations and
political institutions. (11:413)
Clausewitz' theories are most often misunderstood,
abused, or applied incorrectly. (11:547) The political
system of Carl von Clausewitz is derived from his belief in
the efficacy of human reason and in the state as a living
entity which is the sole actor in international poitics.
War is neither good nor evil; it is either necessary or
unnecessary. "If you want to overcome your enemy you must
match your effort against his power of resistance, which be
expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz.
the total means at his disposal and the strengths of his
will." (11:57)
Lenin believed that the course of history is
predetermined by changes in the economic mode of production
and in the class structure. Competition and conflict
between classes are the motives that generate change in
society. War and conflict find their roots in society
before the establishment of socialism. Man is the pawn of
social forces, not the master of them. Political conflict
is a vital ingredient of the struggle to bring society to
its utopian end. His theory of conflict is based upon his
belief that the struggle between classes was necessary.
Force exerted in any form to further progress toward the
Marxist goal of a classless society is legitimate and just.
"Politics is the reason, and war is only the tool, not the
other way around. Consequently, it remains only to
subordinate the military point of view to the political."
(11:44)
Mao Tse-tung believed that conflict is necessary, and
violent conflict is creative. Conflict is a disintegrative
force of the international environment because it is aimed
at the destruction of the existing system and its
transformation into a new system; first with a powerful
influential China, and finally into a utopia of world
communism. "The richest source of power to wage war lies in
the masses of the people." (11:803)
There emerges from the analysis of the theories of
conflict what could be called a universal truth. This is
the shared perception that war and politics exist as part of
the same process and thus are always interrelated. The
separation of the study of war and politics is almost
impossible. War is the upper spectrum of politics, but it
is politics nevertheless. Among the four theorists there is
agreement that considerations of force remain ever present
in the formulation of political goals by the main actors in
the international political system. Conflict is integral to
political interaction; if there is interaction, there is
conflict, and some conflict could turn into warfare all too
easily. Even though the nuclear age makes the unlimited
application of force an unviable policy, Clausewitz is still
not outmoded. The essence of Clausewitz' view on total war,
is that unrestrained conflict, with no object other than the
complete annihilation of the enemy, is not a viable policy
either. He developed the abstract of total war, but he did
not suggest that such a war should be fought. Wars should
be fought only if there is a political purpose; the means
must be matched to the ends. If nuclear war has no rational
purpose and no goal can be achieved through total nuclear
means, Clausewitz' philosophy would not embrace it. Other
forms of war that achieve the desired goal must be
considered as possible alternatives to attain political
goals.
Perhaps our leadership will embrace Clausewitz more
completely and better understand his abstract model of total
war. Some goals are believed vital to the survival of the
community--a common perception of shared ends. The
leadership should share the same sense of ends as the
general populace and act in their behalf. Since the sense
of community in different societies varies, their goals are
different and there is competition and conflict over
incompatible or overlapping goals. Competition and conflict
in international politics over these goals are the substance
of international politics. War is not the inevitable result
of this conflict; it is only one possible outcome. Not all
state decision makers act according to the beliefs of their
populace. War must have a purpose that goes beyond military
victory. Political goals delineate a desired state or
condition to be achieved in the international environment.
If war does not contribute to the achievement or
preservation of these goals, it is not a viable political
strategy and should not become the selected policy. At the
same time, if the assessed costs of waging war to achieve a
vital goal are so high that they were inconsistent or in
conflict with the sense of community, then the goals must be
re-evaluated and reformulated. The theorists agreed that
there is no line that one can draw to separate war and
politics; to attempt to study each in isolation is to miss
the most important element of their inescapable
interrelationship. Hopefully, future statesmen and military
leaders will understand this and attempt to set their goals
and to formulate their politics accordingly.
The theories of Clausewitz have been misunderstood and
abused by U.S. leaders, who have chosen to apply to the
Soviets only those principles expounded by Clausewitz that
serve their interests. The general populace still separates
the theories of war and peace. The misapplication of
Clausewitz' theories of politics and war has increased
military buildups and misperceptions of both U.S. and Soviet
populaces.
Both the U.S. and Soviet leaderships have expounded the
theories and wisdom of Clausewitz. Perhaps sharing the
proper applications of Clausewitz' theories with the
populace will better serve both nations in stabilizing U.S.-
Soviet relations; launching four decades of rationality.
When the theories of conflict applied by U.S. policy
makers are more in synchronization with the populace, and
vice versa, a more rational U.S.-Soviet relationship will
result.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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13. Watson, Russell. "Gorbachev: Going Slow." Newsweek
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