Employment Of The U.S. Armed Forces And The War On Drugs
CSC 1987
SUBJECT AREA National Military Strategy
ABSTRACT
Author: TRITCHLER, William K., Major, USMC
Title: Employment of the U.S. Armed Forces and the War On Drugs
Publisher: United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College
Date: May 1987
Examines issues concerning the use of the U.S. military in
the "war on drugs." Presents statistics on the size of America's
drug problem. Examines the link between terrorists and drug
traffickers, and the threat the drug trade poses to United States
national security. Traces the evolution of both the national
strategy to combat drug abuse, and the history of America's
multi-agency approach to stemming the flow of illegal drugs.
Several important drug-control agencies are discussed. Also
presents a discussion of the Posse Comitatus Act and its
implications with respect to military involvement in drug law
enforcement. Traces the history of DOD and Coast Guard
participation in the drug interdiction effort. Provides specific
examples of the types of DOD support provided. DOD support of
anti-drug operations in Bolivia and the Bahamas is discussed in
detail. Studies the development of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986. Presents the most often heard arguments for and against
military involvement in drug law enforcement. Offers comments
concerning the propriety of military involvement. Makes
observations for improving drug interdiction results. Concludes
with a prediction of future drug-related legislative activity in
the Congress.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
EMPLOYMENT OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES
AND
THE WAR ON DRUGS
BY
William K. Tritchler
Major USMC
A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED IN FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH
REQUIREMENT FOR THE WAR IN THE MODERN ERA SYMPOSIUM
Research Supervisor: LtCol Donald F. Bittner, USMCR
6 MAY 1987
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
William K. Tritchler, Major, United States Marine Corps; BS
in Geology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, 1975; MS in
Electrical Engineering, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
CA, 1983. Major Tritchler is a communications officer and has
served tours of duty in the Fleet Marine Force with both a Marine
Division and Marine Air Wing.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I INTRODUCTION 1
GENERAL 1
BACKGROUND 4
THE SIZE OF THE PROBLEM 6
II ILLEGAL DRUGS--A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY? 11
GENERAL 11
TERRORISTS AND TRAFFICKERS 12
III CONTROLLING THE FLOW--WHO'S IN CHARGE? 16
GENERAL 16
HISTORY OF MULTI-AGENCY INVOLVEMENT 16
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 18
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 19
Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section 20
Office of Drug Abuse Policy 21
National Institute on Drug Abuse 22
Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental
Health Administration 23
U.S. Customs Service 23
OTHER AGENCIES INVOLVED IN DRUG INTERDICTION 24
El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) 25
South Florida Task Force (SFTF) 25
National Narcotics Border Interdiction
System (NNBIS) 26
WHO'S IN CHARGE? 27
IV NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT ILLEGAL DRUGS 29
V DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INVOLVEMENT 32
POSSE COMITATUS ACT 32
DOD DIRECTIVE 5525.5 37
DOD ASSISTANCE PROVIDED 38
U.S. Marine Corps 39
U.S. Navy 40
U.S. Air Force 41
U.S. Army and National Guard 42
OPERATIONS ON FOREIGN SOIL 43
Operations in the Bahamas 44
Operations in Bolivia 45
U.S. COAST GUARD EXPERIENCES 48
VI RECENT ACTIONS IN CONGRESS--THE OMNIBUS DRUG BILL 52
BACKGROUND 52
H.R. 5484 53
S. 2787 55
HOUSE AND SENATE NEGOTIATIONS ON H.R. 5484 56
ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1986 58
PROS AND CONS OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT 59
Is Military Participation Proper? 59
Is Military Participation Necessary? 61
Does The Military Possess The Equipment To
Do The Job? 62
Does The Drug Interdiction Mission
Provide Good Training? 64
Will Using The Military For Drug
Interdiction Work? 65
Should The Military Be Used For Drug Law
Enforcement In Foreign Countries? 66
VII CONCLUSION 69
FOOTNOTES 74
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 85
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
"The war against drugs is as important as any this
Nation has ever fought, and who better to fight a war
than the U.S. military."
The Honorable Mario Biaggi
U.S. Representative from N.Y.
11 September 1986
GENERAL
Employment of the U.S. Armed Forces and the War on Drugs was
selected as a research topic for several reasons. The issue of
using the military to fight the "war" on drugs was in the news on
almost a daily basis in the autumn of 1986 when a research topic
was being sought, and the measures being proposed in the Congress
at that time would have had significant and far reaching
implications to all of the Department of Defense (DOD). The
subject was interesting and provided an opportunity to learn
about something previously unfamiliar to the author but
potentially useful. Also, this was a subject that had not been
studied before in the Marine Corps Command and Staff College's
"War in the Modern Era" research program. During several days of
preliminary research the author discovered that a significant
amount of material had been written about various aspects of this
subject; certainly enough source material could be obtained to
support a comprehensive study. After discussing the topic with
the program instructor/advisor, other possible topics were
discarded and research began in earnest.
Reference material was relatively easy to obtain. In
addition to recent newspaper reports and relevant articles that
had appeared in most of the professional military magazines and
journals during the last few years, several useful documents were
obtained from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) at
Cameron Station in Alexandria, Virginia. The Congressional
Research Service (CRS) provided many pertinent documents, and the
Marine Corps Liaison Officer at the White House supplied copies
of a few of President Reagan's most recent speeches on drug
abuse. Information was also obtained directly from the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), and telephone interviews were
conducted with Action Officers at Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps.
The research materials rarely contradicated one another.
For the most part, the references reinforced and complemented
each other. However, estimates of the size and dollar cost of
America's drug problem sometimes varied widely between sources.
Most of the source material presented an objective point of view;
however, a few of the references were written with an obvious
bias or presented information in a way that was somewhat
sensational. For example, some of the articles from professional
military periodicals projected a predictable "can do" attitude
with an enthusiastic "look at what a great job we're doing"
flavor, and the weekly news magazines (i.e. Time and Newsweek)
carried several articles that were loaded with information
calculated to elicit strong emotions from the reader.
THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY IS TO DETERMINE IF IT IS
PROPER, NECESSARY, DESIRABLE OR PRUDENT TO USE THE U.S. ARMED
FORCES FOR DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT.
The author sought answers to the following questions:
(1) What are the side effects and costs associated
with imposing the drug interdiction mission upon the
military?
(2) What does the military stand to gain or lose by
participating in the anti-drug effort?
(3) How could the overall drug interdiction effort be
improved?
Answers to these and other questions will be developed and
presented in later Chapters.
As the research progressed it became apparent that no
meaningful discussion of possible military roles and missions
would be possible without first presenting a rather broad review
of the size of America's drug problem and the history of the
nation's anti-drug efforts. The remainder of this Chapter
briefly traces how the U.S. became involved in the "war" on
drugs, and presents statistics on the size of the drug problem in
America. Chapter II is an analysis of the threat posed by
illegal drugs, while Chapter III contains descriptions of a few
of the more important government agencies used to control the
flow of illegal drugs. The "national strategy" against drug
abuse is discussed in Chapter IV, and the legal implications and
history of DOD involvement in the area of drug law enforcement
are examined in Chapter V. The legislative activity which led to
the development of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 is traced in
Chapter VI, along with a comprehensive discussion of the pros and
cons of military involvement in the anti-drug effort. Chapter
VII contains conclusions.
BACKGROUND
The United States is at "war," but a different type of
conflict than that connotated by the word "war." We are engaged
in a "war" against illegal drugs. President Reagan announced the
national war on drug abuse in October 1982.1 It has not been
uncommon for Presidents of the United States to refer to efforts
against domestic social and economic problems as "wars."
President Johnson declared "war on poverty," President Nixon
declared "war on street crime," and President Carter declared the
"moral equivalent of war" on oil dependency.2 What is new about
this "war" is the relatively recent and ever increasing
participation of the U.S. Armed Forces in the effort to control
the flow of illegal drugs. The employment of the military in
this area, which is viewed by many people as a law enforcement
function, would seem to violate the long-standing traditional
prohibition against using the Armed Forces for routine domestic
law enforcement. This issue affects all of the military services
and is a worthy topic for research.
The United States has long had a drug problem. A century
ago, on 23 February 1887, Congress passed the first federal law
explicitly intended to discourage the nontherapeutic use of a
dangerous, dependency-producing drug. This law prohibited the
importation of opium into the United States by subjects of the
emperor of China and made it a crime for U.S. citizens to traffic
in opium in China.3 Since that time, Congress has continued to
enact legislation to deter drug abuse by Americans. Drug abuse
is a recognized threat to both individual citizens and the
American society as a whole.
Public concern about drug abuse has resulted in laws and
initiatives at the state and local level. However, the federal
government has traditionally assumed a major part of the
responsibility for the control of illegal drugs by enforcing laws
created to control the importation, sale, use and possession of
illegal drugs. Federal efforts in this area have increased since
the early 1930's when the government stepped-up efforts to
control the use of illegal drugs, and began to both conduct
research into the nature of drug abuse and to provide treatment
and rehabilitation services.
Public alarm about increasing drug abuse during the past 25
years has been reflected in Congress by an ever increasing level
of drug-related legislative activity. During the last quarter
century, Congress has enacted more than 75 laws that, in one way
or another, are connected with the illicit drug problem.4
Congress has sought a variety of remedies to this problem,
primarily in the areas of treatment, education, primary
prevention, research, establishment of international accords,
increased punishments, law enforcement, and support of overseas
eradication and drug control efforts.
THE SIZE OF THE PROBLEM
During the last few decades, the United States has
experienced increased volumes of drug smuggling. Our drug
problem has continued to grow in spite of increased federal
efforts directed at controlling the supply of, and demand for,
illegal drugs. The effects of illicit drug use now touch every
segment of our society.
The available statistics regarding the size of the American
drug problem are controversial. The estimates of the size and
cost of the drug problem vary greatly.
A document called the Narcotics Intelligence Estimate
contains the most frequently cited statistics concerning the
production, distribution and use of illicit drugs. The Narcotics
Intelligence Estimate is the product of the National Narcotics
Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC), an organization
administered by the Drug Enforcement Administration. NNICC
membership consists of the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs
Service, Department of Defense, Drug Enforcement Administration,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Imigration and Naturalization
Service, Internal Revenue Service, National Institute on Drug
Abuse, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, and the
White House Drug Abuse Policy Office. The Deputy Assistant
Administrator for Intelligence of the Drug Enforcement
Administration serves as the Chairman of the NNICC, and the
Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency
participate as observers.5 The NNICC has a membership capable of
collecting statistics that should be fairly accurate.
The most recent (1984) Narcotics Intelligence Estimate is
the source for the figures presented in the discussion that
follows. The NNICC classifies drugs by four categories:
cannabis, cocaine, opiates, and dangerous drugs. Here then are
some of the significant 1984 statistics for each drug category.
CANNABIS -
Consumption:
The U.S. consumed between 7,800 and 9,200 metric
tons of marijuana. (1 metric ton - 2,205 lbs.)
Forty percent of high school seniors reported
using marijuana or hashish within the last
year, and 5% reported using it daily.
Sources for U.S. consumption:
12% produced in the U.S.
42% Colombia
20% Mexico
14% Jamaica
8% Belize
4% other (Indonesia, Nigeria, Costa Rica,
Panama, Venezuela, Brazil, Thailand)
Mode of transportation to the U.S.:
Most of the marijuana smuggled into the U.S.
arrived by sea.
Amount seized:
1,760 metric tons of marijuana were seized at
U.S. ports of entry.
U.S. seizures by mode of transport:
84% non-commercial vessels
7% general aviation aircraft
5% land transportation
3% commercial vessels
1% commercial aircraft
COCAINE -
Consumption:
The U.S. consumed between 55 and 76 metric
tons of cocaine, an 11% increase over 1983.
Cocaine-related deaths rose 77% over the same
period.
About 5.8% of high school seniors reported
using cocaine within the last 30 days.
Sources for U.S. consumption:
75% Colombia
15% Bolivia
5% Peru
5% Other (Ecuador, Venezuela, Brazil, Chile)
Mode of transportation to the U.S.:
The majority of the cocaine reaching the U.S.
was shipped by general aviation and commercial
aircraft. Significant quantities were also
smuggled by sea.
Amount seized:
39 metric tons of cocaine were seized
worldwide.
The U.S. seized 21 cocaine conversion
conversion laboratories in 1984, up from 11 in
1983. Eighteen of the 21 labs seized were
located in south Florida.
U.S. seizures by mode of transport:
62% general aviation aircraft
18% commercial aircraft
11% non-commercial vessels
8% commercial vessels
1% land transportation
OPIATES -
Consumption:
America's 490,000 heroin addicts consumed 6
metric tons of heroin in 1984.
Consumption has been relatively constant for
several years, but heroin-related deaths
increased 31% in 1984.
Sources for U.S. consumption:
51% Southwest Asia (SWA)
32% Mexico
17% Southeast Asia (SEA)
Mode of transportation to the U.S.:
Seventy-nine percent of the heroin from SWA
and SEA arrived in the U.S. by air, while
Mexican heroin reached the U.S. predominantly
by land transportation.
U.S. seizures by mode of transport:
79% commercial aircraft
18% land transportation
3% commercial vessels
DANGEROUS DRUGS -
This term refers to substances, both licit and
illicit, which include the following: stimulants other
than cocaine; narcotics/analgesics other than heroin and
opium; psychomimetics/hallucinogens other than cannabis
products; and all depressants and sedatives.
Consumption:
The U.S. consumed 3 billion dosage units, an
increase of 15% over 1983.
Sources for U.S. consumption:
All the PCP, almost all the methamphetamine,
and 8O% of the injectable methamphetamine
consumed in the U.S. is also produced here.
Amount seized:
About 4.8 million dosage units were
interdicted at U.S. borders.
A total of 291 domestic clandestine dangerous
drug processing labs were seized, up from 215
in 1983.
The figures indicate that America has a significant drug
problem that is getting worse. Cocaine and cocaine products have
seen the greatest increase in usage over the last few years.
Recent data compiled by the President's Commission on Organized
Crime showed that in 1985 there were five million regular cocaine
users in the U.S., and that between 20 and 24 million Americans
had tried cocaine.6 The 1986 statistics will undoubtedly
indicate that the drug problem is getting bigger. A new smokable
cocaine product called "crack" or "rock" hit the streets a couple
of years ago and its use has reached epidemic proportions. This
highly addictive form of cocaine is relatively inexpensive and is
easy to manufacture. The "crack" epidemic is partly responsible
for motivating the President to declare war on drugs.
The estimated cost of the drug habit of the United States is
staggering. The government estimates that Americans currently
spend an unbelievable $120 billion annually on illicit drugs.
That's more than Americans spend for food, clothing and shelter.7
Various current estimates put the total annual cost of drug abuse
to the nation, to the user, and to society at between $200 and
$230 billion.8 These are enormous sums that reflect an enormous
problem. Government efforts to deal with this problem are
discussed in Chapter III.
CHAPTER II
ILLEGAL DRUGS--A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY?
"Ninety percent of the drugs consumed in the United
States are produced abroad--this vicious white and green
and brown tide poses a clear and present national
security threat to America."
The Honorable Paula Hawkins
U.S. Senator from Florida
27 September 1986
"Drugs are a law enforcement problem, not a
national security problem."
The Honorable Don Edwards
U.S. Representative from N.Y.
11 September 1986
GENERAL
Does the illicit drug trade pose a serious threat to the
national security of the United States? Recent debate in
Congress indicates that our lawmakers cannot agree on this issue,
but the fact that drug abuse has had a debilitating effect on the
moral, social and economic well-being of the country is
undeniable.
But how is national security to be defined? The April 1984
issue of the JCS Pub 1 contains the following definition:
NATIONAL SECURITY - A collective term encompassing both
national defense and foreign relations of the United
States. Specifically, the condition provided by:
a. a military or defense advantage over any
foreign nation or group of nations, or
b. a favorable foreign relations position, or
c. a defense posture, capable of successfully
resisting hostile or destructive action from
within or without, overt or covert.
On 8 April 1986, President Reagan reportedly signed a secret
National Security Decision Directive that designated the
international drug trade as a threat to our national security
because of its ability to destabilize democratic institutions.1
Thus, a national security threat is not necessarily a military
threat in the conventional definition of that phrase. The
President's directive provided the policy framework for an
expanded role for U.S. military forces in combatting the illegal
drug trade abroad and opened the door for the expansion of
overseas operations to implement such a policy.
TERRORISTS AND DRUG TRAFFICKERS
The large amount of money to be made by trafficking in
illegal drugs has attracted the interest and participation of
terrorist and insurgent groups. The Drug Enforcement
Administration reports that several terrorist and insurgent
organizations have formed ties with the international drug trade
in recent years. Terrorists and traffickers operate together for
the mutual benefit of both, rather than because they share common
idealogies.
Terrorists have reportedly been used to protect coca fields
in Central and South America, and to produce heroin in Southeast
Asia. In return, the traffickers have provided the
terrorists/insurgents with money ("narco-dollars") and arms.2
In his FY88 Annual Report to the Congress, Secretary of
Defense Caspar W. Weinberger noted the connection between
terrorism and drug trafficking, and the threat these ambiguous
and non-traditional forms of aggression pose for the United
States. Speaking of terrorism and the flow of illegal drugs he
wrote:
We have come to recognize that these threats are not
merely isolated occurrences. Terrorism is increaingly
transnational and state-supported. Drug trafficking is
increasingly sophisticated and politically motivated.
In both cases, there is an element of exploitation by
the Soviets and their surrogates.3
The Drug Enforcement Administration has documented several
cases where terrorists or insurgents and drug traffickers have
cooperated. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration:
a. The Burmese Communist Party (BCP) and the legitimate
Burmese government have been fighting since Burma achieved
independence from British colonial rule in 1948. The BCP's
insurgency and drug operations are conducted largely in the Shan
State, which is the leading opium production region of what is
known in the narcotics trade as the "Golden Triangle." The BCP
funds its operations through several drug-related activities.
For example, they have collected "taxes" from opium poppy growing
farmers, supplied opium and morphine to refineries on the Burma-
Thailand border, and are now producing heroin in their own
refineries. 4
b. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have
developed a symbiotic relationship with drug traffickers. In
addition to cultivating some coca of its own, FARC guerrillas
collect protection money from other growers; and they have
arranged to protect drug traffickers' airfields in exchange for
arms. The insurgents and traffickers are also known to share
information about police activities and military patrols.5
Finally, Colombian trafficers support coca cultivation in Brazil,
Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela.6
c. The 19th of April Movement, also known as "M-19," is a
Colombian terrorist organization which partially funds its
operations by cultivating both coca and marijuana. The M-19 is
composed of leftist guerrillas who also extort money from
traffickers and other growers.7
It has also been reported that Colombian drug traffickers
have paid Cuba for protection and for refueling and safe haven in
Cuban ports as they smuggle drugs to the United States. Although
there is no hard evidence that cocaine is being produced or
refined in Cuba, there is evidence that Cuba regularly gives safe
passage to aircraft of Jamaican registry, and that drug runners
have used Cuban waters to avoid U.S. sea patrols.8 If true,
Castro has logically also reportedly used his connection with
drug smugglers to send hundreds of tons of weapons and supplies
to Marxist insurgents in Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala.9
It is clear that a link exists between drug trafficking and
terrorist/insurgent groups. The connection is well established.
Drug trafficking has been used to fund terrorist and insurgent
activities, and, therefore, is a threat to legitimate
governments. This, as the President has correctly concluded, is
a threat to our own national security.
CHAPTER III
CONTROLLING THE FLOW--WHO'S IN CHARGE?
GENERAL
While conducting the research for this report, it quickly
became apparent that many federal agencies are directly involved
in establishing policy, conducting research, gathering
intelligence, and trying to curb the flow and use of illegal
drugs. There are, in fact, 11 cabinet departments and not less
than 37 federal agencies/offices participating in one way or
another in the anti-drug effort.1
HISTORY OF MULTI-AGENCY INVOLVEMENT
Before providing a discussion of who is in charge of
America's anti-drug effort, a brief chronology of significant
anti-drug events would be useful. Most of the agencies/events
listed below will be discussed in greater detail later in this
report. This is a partial list, weighted toward events taking
place during the last five years.
1930 - Narcotics Division of the Bureau of Prohibition
became the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN)
under the Treasury Department.
1965 - Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (BDAC) established under
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
1968 - FBN and BDAC combined to form the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD).
July 1973 - BNDD and three other Federal agencies merged to
form the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
1977 - El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) established.
December 1981 - P.L. 97-86 added a new chapter to Title 10
U.S.C. clarifying the relationship between the
military and civilian law enforcement officials.
December 1981 - Executive Order 12333 authorized the use of
U.S. intelligence assets to produce intelligence on
drug trafficking.
January 1982 - Cabinet Council on Legal Policy established.
February 1982 - South Florida Task Force (SFTF)
established.
October 1982 - President Reagan officially announced his
war on drugs.
October 1982 - Twelve Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task
Forces (OCDETFs) established.
March 1983 - National Narcotics Border Interdiction System
(NNBIS) established.
May 1983 - Six NNBIS regional centers became operational.
July 1983 - President's Commission on Organized Crime
established.
January 1984 - 1984 National Strategy for the Prevention of
Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking promulgated.
October 1984 - P.L. 98-473, Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984 signed.
January 1985 - National Narcotics Drug Enforcement Policy
Board (NNDEPB) established.
July 1985 - DOD Task Force on Drug Law Enforcement
established.
April 1986 - President Reagan signed a National Security
Decision Directive making illegal drugs a
threat to national security.
October 1986 - P.L. 99-570, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
signed.
Following now are descriptions of the missions,
responsibilities and organization of seven major federal agencies
currently involved in combatting illegal drugs. The information
is quoted from offical publications.2
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is the lead
federal agency in enforcing narcotics and controlled substances
laws and regulations. DEA was created in July 1973, merging four
separate drug law enforcement agencies.
The primary responsibilities of DEA include: investigation
of major narcotic violators who operate at interstate and
international levels; enforcement of regulations governing the
legal manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of controlled
substances; management of a national narcotics intelligence
system; coordination with federal, state, and local law
enforcement authoritites and cooperation with counterpart
agencies aboroad; and training, scientific research, and
information exchange in support of drug traffic prevention and
control.
The DEA concentrates its efforts on high-level narcotics
smuggling and distribution organizations in the United States and
abroad. The DEA works closely with other agencies such as the
Customs Service, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Coast
Guard. DEA's priority mission is the long-term immobilization of
major trafficking organizations through the removal of the
leaders and assets upon which these organizations depend.
On 21 January 1982, the Attorney General announced a major
reorganization affecting DEA and the entire federal drug law
enforcement effort. The FBI was given concurrent jurisdiction
with DEA over drug offenses. DEA's Administrator now reports to
the Director of the FBI, who was given general supervision of
drug enforcement effort. A high-level Justice Department
committee was created to oversee the development of drug
enforcement policies and to attune the Department's other
components to DEA-FBI priorities. DEA agents work side by side
with FBI agents throughout the country in major drug cases--a
significant change in narcotics law enforcement.
In addition to narcotics enforcement, nearly 200 DEA
compliance investigators enforce regulation of the legal
manufacture and distribution of prescription drugs.
DEA also maintains an active training program for narcotics
officers in other federal, state, and local agencies--as well as
foreign police. In an average year, some 8,000 federal, state,
and local officers receive special DEA training--plus some 1,500
foreign law enforcement officers. DEA has offices throughout the
United States and in 37 foreign countries.
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the principal
investigative arm of the U.S. Department of Justice. It is
charged with gathering and reporting facts, locating witnesses,
and compiling evidence in matters in which the federal government
is, or may be, a party in interest.
The FBI was established in 1908 by the Attorney General who
directed that Department of Justice investigations be handled by
a group of special investigators. The FBI's jurisdiction
includes a wide range of responsibilities in the criminal, civil,
and security fields. Among these are espionage, sabotage, and
other domestic security matters; kidnapping, extortion, bank
robbery, interstate transportation of stolen property, civil
rights matters, interstate gambling violations, narcotics
violations, fraud against the government, and assault or killing
the President or a federal officer. In addition to FBI
headquarters, there are 60 field divisions that carry out the
investigative responsibility of the FBI.
Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section
The mission of the Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section of
the Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, is the
prosecution and conviction of high-level drug traffickers and
members of criminal organizations involved in the importation,
manufacture, shipment, and distribution of illicit narcotics and
dangerous drugs; the forfeiture of assets illegally obtained as a
result of illicit drug trafficking; the analysis and execution of
the Criminal Division's drug prosecution policies; the training
of agents and prosecutors in development of major drug
litigation; and the general support of narcotic litigation in the
United States attorneys' offices.
In carrying out its mission the Section maintains a
litigation staff to prosecute, nationwide, complex cases against
major drug trafficking organizations. It supports or maintains
task force operations in the Southern District of Florida and
Puerto Rico, for the purpose of investigating and prosecuting
money launderers who are facilitating the operations of major
drug trafficking organizations. It also conducts the litigating
needs concerning the regulatory functions of DEA.
In additon to litigation, the Section also drafts and
evaluates all drug-related proposed legislation and provides
legal support to the offices of the United States attorneys by
reviewing the feasibility of all electronic surveillance
requests, by securing witnesses from foreign jurisidictions, and
by coordinating and assisting in the prosecution of multidistrict
cases.
Office of Drug Abuse Policy
The Office of Drug Abuse Policy is a part of the Office of
Policy Development of the Executive Office of the President. The
Office assists the President in the formulation, coordination,
and implementation of economic and domestic policy.
National Institute on Drug Abuse
The National Institute on Drug Abuse, a part of the Public
Health Service of the Department of Health and Human Services,
provides a national focus for the federal effort to increase
knowledge and promote effective strategies to deal with health
problems and issues associated with drug abuse. In implementing
these responsibilities, the Institute conducts and supports
research on the biological, psychological, psychosocial, and
epidemiological aspects of narcotic addiction and drug abuse;
supports research training of individuals and institutions who
are training individuals in the biological and psychological
sciences and epidemiological aspects of narcotic addiction and
drug abuse to enable them to pursue careers in research;
collaborates with, and provides technical assistance to state
drug abuse authorities, and encourages state and community
efforts in planning, establishing, maintaining, coordinating, and
evaluating more effective narcotic addiction and drug abuse
programs; collaborates with other federal agencies, national,
foreign, state and local organizations, hospitals, and volunteer
groups to enable them to facilitate and extend programs for the
prevention of narcotic addiction and drug abuse, and for the
care, treatment, and rehabilitation of drug abusers; and carries
out administrative and financial management, policy and program
development, planning and evaluation, and public information
functions which are required to implement such programs.
Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Adminstration
The mission of the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health
Administration (ADAMHA) of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, is to provide a national focus for the federal
effort to increase knowledge and promote effective strategies to
deal with health problems and issues associated with the use and
abuse of alcohol and drugs, and with mental illness and mental
health. This includes federal programs to: expand knowledge of
etiology, diagnosis, treatment and prevention; train researchers
and other personnel; gather data on extent of, and national
response to, alcohol, drug abuse, and mental health problems;
provide assistance to other federal agencies, state and other
public and private organizations in their efforts to facilitate
and expand programs for prevention and treatment of these
problems; and provide information to the public and to scientists
and other professionals about alcohol, drug abuse, and mental
health problems.
U.S. Customs Service
The U.S. Customs Service collects the revenue from imports
and enforces customs and related laws. Some of the
responsibilities which Customs is specifically charged with are
interdicting and seizing contraband, including narcotics and
illegal drugs; and detecting and apprehending persons engaged in
fraudulent practices designed to circumvent customs and related
laws.
Customs cooperates with and assists numerous government
agencies in administering and enforcing over 400 statutory or
regulatory requirements relating to international trade. It
includes cooperation with the DEA and working with foreign
governments in suppressing the traffic in illegal narcotics
through training in tactical interdiction.
Customs is extensively involved with outside commercial and
policy organizations and trade associations, and with
international organizations and foreign customs services.
Customs is a member of the multinational Customs Cooperation
Council, the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, and the
International Narcotics Control Program. In addition, Customs
participates in and supports the activities and programs of
various international organizations and agreements.
Headquarters of the U.S. Customs Service is located in
Washington, D.C. The 50 states, plus the Virgin Islands and
Puerto Rico, are divided into seven customs regions. Contained
within these regions are 46 subordinate district or area offices
under which there are approximately 300 ports of entry.
OTHER AGENCIES INVOLVED IN DRUG INTERDICTION
In addition to the agencies listed above, several other
federally sponsored organizations have been created during the
last decade to help control the flow of illegal drugs into the
United States. The ever increasing participation of elements of
the Department of Defense should be apparent.
El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)
Established in 1977, the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)
integrates all drug information available from all agencies
involved in efforts against drug trafficking. EPIC shares the
intelligence it produces with all interested federal and state
agencies. EPIC is operated by the DEA and is staffed by several
agencies to include: DEA, FBI, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Coast
Guard, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
U.S. Marshalls and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.3
South Florida Task Force (SFTF)
The South Florida Task Force (SFTF) was created in February
1982 at the direction of President Reagan. It was established in
order to counter the activities of drug traffickers who had run
rampant in the Miami area for years. The SFTF membership was
comprised of representatives from 19 federal, state and local law
enforcement and drug control agencies.4 The President appointed
Vice President Bush as the Chairman of the SFTF. Support was
requested from the DOD, and the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine
Corps all provided assets.5 The SFTF was so successful that
during October 1982, 12 additional task forces were created
throughout the United States. These new Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) were similar to the SFTF except
for one major difference: their purpose was to investigate
rather than to interdict drug smugglers.6
National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS)
The National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS)
was also created at the direction of President Reagan.
Established in March 1983, Vice President Bush was also placed in
charge of the NNBIS. The purpose of the NNBIS is to interdict
the flow of illicit drugs entering the United States. Creation
of the NNBIS was precipitated by the success of the SFTF. It
seems that SFTF activities forced many of the drug traffickers to
move their operations to other states along the eastern seaboard
and gulf coast.7 The NNBIS became operational in June 1983 with
the establishment of six regional centers located in Miami, New
Orleans, El Paso, Long Beach, Chicago and New York. The DOD is
very active in the NNBIS. Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force and Army
personnel are assigned full time duty to each of the six regional
center "to provide expert advice on resources capable of
supporting civil law enforcement agencies incidental to normal
operations and training."8 The Marine Corps currently has four
staff sergeants permanently assigned to the NNBIS; one is
stationed at each of the following centers: Miami, New Orleans,
El Paso and Long Beach.9 The NNBIS has used a wide variety of
DOD capabilities and equipment. Too numerous to detail here, the
types of DOD support which has been provided is discussed in
Chapter V.
WHO'S IN CHARGE?
Thus several agencies share the responsibility and authority
for drug interdiction. The three primary agencies are located in
different federal departments: the Drug Enforcement
Administration is in the Justice Department, the U.S. Coast Guard
is in the Department of Transportation, and the U.S. Customs
Service is in the Treasury Department. All the agencies compete
for funding. They cite statistics on how well they have
performed their drug interdiction mission in order to justify
their budgets. This has, in the past, caused keen competition
and fostered a lack of cooperation between agencies that share a
common goal.10
Rivalries and "turf guarding" by both federal and state
agencies charged with drug law enforcement have sometimes
produced greater individual rather than coordinated effort, has
promoted secrecy rather than shared intelligence, and has fueled
petty inter-agency jealousies.11 The spirit of competition and
mistrust between agencies detracts from the total effort. It is
not clear whether this problem is getting batter or worse.
Several articles used during the research for this report
presented examples from actual interdiction operations that
indicate a high degree of inter-agency cooperation and
coordination.12 However, several authorities who have studied
this issue have also highlighted instances of bickering and petty
inter-agency squabbling. A 29 September 1986 article in The
Washington Post carried the headline "Turf Battle Escalates in
Antidrug War" and presented details on three current feuds (DEA
vs. Customs; Customs vs. Coast Guard; and the State Department
and DEA vs. Customs) precipitated by the scramble for increased
FY87 funds.13
Who is in charge of the United States' anti-drug effort? Is
it the DEA, Customs Service, or Coast Guard? The answer is that
nobody is in charge. There is no single person, or any one
agency, with the overall responsibility for managing all aspects
of either the drug interdiction or total national anti-drug
effort. There is no one person, office or agency responsible for
developing a comprehensive national policy on drugs. Vice
President Bush is the senior member and Chairman of both the SFTF
and NNBIS, but he is not in charge of the total national effort.
The notion of putting one person in charge is not new.
Creation or establishment of a "drug czar" to direct and control
all the anti-drug effort has been proposed by others.14 An early
version of H.R. 5484, the "Omnibus Drug Enforcement, Education,
and Control Act of 1986," contained a proposal for the
establishment of a drug-control "czar." However, this initiative
was not contained in the the final bill.15
CHAPTER IV
NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT ILLEGAL DRUGS
The first federal stategy to counter the threat posed by
illegal drugs was released in 1982. It was revised by the White
House Drug Abuse Policy Office in 1984. The revised federal
strategy was then adopted by the National Narcotics Drug
Enforcement Policy Board as the "1984 National Strategy for the
Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking."1
A passage in the 1984 strategy explained the difference
between it and the 1982 strategy. It stated:
The 1984 strategy goes beyond the Federal
responsibilities and established a comprehensive
national strategy where all individuals, and all
agencies, departments and activities within each level
of government are called upon to lead, direct, sponsor
and support efforts to eliminate drug abuse in families,
business and communities.2
Our "National Strategy" is composed of five principal
elements, each directed at one part of the overall drug problem.
The elements of the National Strategy call for actions aimed at:
1. Reducing the quantity of illegal drugs entering the
the U.S. by bringing political and economic pressure to
bear on drug producing countries.
2. Increasing the resources available to domestic law
enforcement agencies to improve coordination and
cooperation.
3. Increasing basic research concerning the nature of
drug abuse, and towards improving intelligence gathering
and drug eradication techniques.
4. Improving medical detoxification and treatment
programs.
5. Assisting in drug abuse prevention through greater
drug education efforts.3
The National Strategy remains the principal document guiding
the war on drugs. However, in August 1986 President Reagan
announced "six major goals of what we hope will be the final
stage in out national strategy to eradicate drug abuse."4 The
six goals in what he called "a national crusade against drugs"
included:
1. "...to seek a drug-free workplace for all
Americans."
2. "...drug-free schools from grade schools through
universities."
3. "...ensuring the public is protected and those
involved in drugs are treated."
4. "...international cooperation.... our goal is nothing
less than the full and active support and cooperation of
every country with which the United States must work to
defeat international drug trafficking."
5. "...strengthening law enforcement."
6. Efforts to "expand public awareness and
prevention."5
In elaborating upon the fourth goal listed above,
President Reagan said:
Earlier this year I raised the priority of drug abuse
by declaring it a threat to our national security.
... we can take additonal steps to expand our joint
efforts in affecting or attacking drug and narcotic
traffickers at the source; continue Vice President
Bush's initiatives to increase the support given by the
United States military to drug law enforcement
operations whenever it's appropriate....6
The goals and initiatives enunciated by the President during
1986 mesh closely with the existing 1984 National Strategy.
Therefore, a new or revised National Strategy on drug abuse is
not expected.
CHAPTER V
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INVOLVEMENT
POSSE COMITATUS ACT
The U.S. Armed Forces have traditionally and legally been
restricted from participating in civilian law enforcement by a
long-standing legal statute known as the Posse Comitatus Act.
The concept of posse comitatus, which literally means "power
of the country," is derived from English common law. It was a
concept whereby the sheriff could call upon all persons aged 15
years and older to assist him in the prevention of civil unrest.1
After the American Civil War, Army generals commanded the
five military districts into which the South had been divided. In
so doing, the occupying Federal troops assumed full
responsibility for maintaining law and order. The amount of
force used to enforce laws and suppress labor strife was
sometimes excessive. As soon as the southern states reacquired
representation in Congress, their representatives and senators
acted to prevent such practices in the future. In 1878 Congress
passed an amendment to an Army appropriations bill which
prohibited the use of the Army or other federal armed force as a
"posse comitatus" to enforce civilian laws. The Posse Comitatus
Act was subsequently codified into law, becoming Section 1385 of
Title 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedure) United States Code.
The Posse Comitatus Act has been amended only twice since
its enactment on 18 June 1878. In 1956 a reference to the Air
Force was added to reflect the separation of the Air Force from
the Army. The Act was again amended in 1959 to eliminate
provisions which made it inapplicable in Alaska. The Act is
brief and the wording is straightforward. It reads as follows:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances
expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of
Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air
Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the
laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than two years, or both.
Title 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1385
The Act makes no mention of the Navy or Marine Corps, and
the reason for their exclusion is unclear.2 Perhaps the fact
that the original Act was part of an Army appropriations bill,
and was primarily enacted as a result of Army abuses during
reconstruction, helps to explain the omission of refernce to the
naval service.
The Navy officially recognized the implicit applicability of
the Posse Comitatus Act to itself in 1974 when it promulgated
SECNAVINST 5820.7. This instruction contained a caveat stating
that the Act did not apply specifically to the Navy, which is, of
course, technically correct. It permitted the Navy to employ its
forces in civilian law enforcement actions subject to the
approval of the Secretary of the Navy. In so doing, the
principle of civilian control over the military was maintained
because the Secretary of the Navy, a civilian official, had to
authorize any such use.3
It is interesting to note that no one has ever been charged
or prosecuted under the Posse Comitatus Act.4 Note also that
under the phrase--"... except in cases and under circumstances
expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress..."
of the Act, the military may be used "to execute the laws."
Congress and the courts have generally recognized that the
military may be used for specific actions involving civil
disorders, disasters, and threats to federal property. The
military has also, at times, been used to enforce civil laws in
instances involving protection of federal and foreign officials,
enforcement of U.S. Customs and neutrality laws, and in executing
warrants relating to civil rights violations. In light of the
very few exceptions traditionally permitted under the Posse
Comitatus Act, it seemed that the military was clearly prohibited
by the Act from daily or routine involvment in matters of civil
law enforcement.
President Reagan entered office in 1981 and instituted a
"get tough" policy on drug law enforcement. National interest in
drug abuse was high and Congress mobilized to develop new
policies to fight the "war on drugs." The idea of using DOD
resources to interdict smugglers was proposed and quickly became
very popular with the politicians. The DOD objected to using
military forces for day-to-day drug interdiction and law
enforcement on grounds that use of military forces for that
purpose was a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. But Congress
responded to requests from civilian law enforcement agencies who
wanted more flexibility in the interpretation of the statute by
proposing legislation to clarify the Act.
In the end, and after considerable debate, the Posse
Comitatus Act under Title 18 was not changed. However, new
legislation was enacted under Title 10 (Armed Forces) U.S.C. to
clarify the DOD's relationship and responsibilities for civil law
enforcement. On 1 December 1981, President Reagan signed the
Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1982. This Act was
also known as Public Law 97-86 and has been frequently referred
to incorrectly as the Revised Posse Comitatus Act.
Section 908 of P.L. 97-86 did not change the Posse Comitatus
Act. Rather it added a new chapter to Part I (Organization and
General Military Powers) to Subtitle A (General Military Law) to
Title 10 U.S.C. The new chapter, Chapter 18, was titled
"Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials,"
and it clarified the restrictions concerning military assistance
to civilian law enforcement agencies imposed by the Posse
Comitatus Act.
Chapter 18 contained eight sections. A feel for the focus
of the new chapter can be obtained by simply reviewing the eight
section headings. These are:
Sec. 371. Use of information collected during military
operations.
Sec. 372. Use of military equipment and facilities.
Sec. 373. Training and advising civilian law enforcement
officials.
Sec. 374. Assistance by Department of Defense personnel.
Sec. 375. Restriction on direct participation by military
personnel.
Sec. 376. Assistance not to affect adversely military
preparedness.
Sec. 377. Reimbursement.
Sec. 378. Nonpreemption of other law.
The new chapter filled a page and a half within Title 10 and
greatly expanded the permitted level of military involvement in
civil law enforcement activities. Without reproducing the entire
chapter here, or citing specific sections, the most important
provisions can be outlined as follows:
1. The Secretary of Defense:
a. may:
(1) provide to federal, state or local civilian
law enforcement officials any information
collected during the normal course of military
operations that may be relevant to a violation
of any federal or state law.
(2) make available any equipment, base facility,
or research facility of the Army, Navy, Air Force,
or Marine Corps to any federal, state, or local
civilian law enforcement official for law
enforcement purposes.
(3) assign members of the Army, Navy, Air Force
and Marine Corps to provide expert advice and to
train federal, state, and local civilian law
enforcement officials in the operation and
maintenance of the DOD equipment made available.
(4) assign personnel to operate and maintain the
DOD equipment made available only to the extent
the equipment is used to monitor and communicate
the movement of air and sea traffic.
b. shall issue regulations:
(1) to insure that the provision of any assistance
(including the provision of any equipment or
faciltiy or the assignment of any personnel) to
any civilian law enforcement official does not
include or permit direct participation by a member
of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in
an interdiction of a vessel or aircraft, a search
and seizure, arrest, or other similar activity.
(2) to insure that the provision of any assistance
does not adversely affect the military
preparedness of the United States.
(3) providing that reimbursement may be a
condition of assistance to civilain law
enforcement officials.
2. Nothing in the new chapter limits the authority of the
executive branch in the use of military personnel or
equipment for civilian law enforcement purposes beyond
that provided for by existing law.
It's clear that P.L. 97-86 put the DOD in the civilian law
enforcement business. Although it reaffirmed the traditional
prohibition against direct military involvement in law
enforcement (i.e. arrests, searches, seizures or similar
activity), it provided the Secretary of Defense with specific
authority to use the Armed Forces for a variety of indirect
assistance.
DOD DIRECTIVE 5525.5
After the passage of P.L. 97-86, the DOD began to plan and
formulate guidelines for increased military involvement in
civilian law enforcement. The guidelines were formalized by the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and
Logistics (ASD/MRA&L) and were issued by the Secretary of Defense
on 22 March 1982 in the form of a DOD Directive.5 DOD Directive
5525.5 explained the requirements for employing DOD resources in
support of law enforcement activity. The Directive stated that
DOD would "cooperate with" civilian law enforcement officials to
the "maximum extent possible."6 The Directive also required that
the Secretary of Defense give prior approval before any Navy or
Marine Corps personnel could participate in the interdiction of
vessels or aircraft involved in illegal activity.7
Thus by 1982 the DOD had received a tremendous amount of
legal and political pressure to increase its participation in
civilian law enforcement. P.L. 97-86 cleared the way for active
military involvement in the daily and routine enforcement of
civil law, and civil drug laws in particular. The nature of
support provided to civilian law enforcement agencies
is discussed in the next section.
DOD ASSISTANCE PROVIDED
Much has been written about the types of DOD support
provided in recent years to help stem the flow of illegal drugs
entering the U.S. Research by others, and many articles in
newspapers, magazines and professional military journals have
documented the types of military support provided so thoroughly
that much of this information is now common knowledge.
Accordingly, in the discussion that follows, only support which
is relatively recent or which has not been widely reported is
provided with a reference.
The purpose of this section is to highlight some of the
support provided to civilian agencies for drug law enforcement in
recent years. Though generally unclassified, details concerning
some of the DOD's activities in this area, as well as plans and
proposals for future anti-drug operations, are classified and
cannot be discussed here.
The U.S. Armed Forces' efforts have sometimes been
interservice in nature. However, for clarity and ease of
presentation, the following information is presented by service
component.
U.S. Marine Corps
Marine Corps OV-10D Bronco aircraft have been used to
identify, evaluate and track suspected drug smuggling aircraft
both visually during daylight hours and with the forward looking
infra-red (FLIR) detection system during hours of darkness. In
1984, OV-10s logged 1,354.6 hours on 391 sorties while performing
this mission.8 Additionally, RF-4B aircraft have been used to
provide aerial multisensor imagery of ground sites.9 It has been
proposed that Marine Corps helicopters from the 4th Marine Air
Wing could also be employed in the drug interdiction effort. 10
The Marine Corps has also provided ground radar surveillance
equipment and the personnel for its operation. SCAMP assets have
been used in southern California to detect smugglers crossing the
U.S.-Mexico border.11
All Marine Corps support provided thus far has been within
the continental United States.12
U.S. Navy
U.S. Navy P-3C Orion, S-3A Viking and E-2C Hawkeye aircraft
have all flown missions in support of the drug interdiction
effort. Navy aircraft have been employed since 1982 to provide
intelligence on suspected drug smuggling surface and aerial
targets which is then passed to the SFTF and/or the NNBIS. Navy
support has been considerable. In 1984, Navy E-2C and P-3C
aircraft logged more than 4,800 hours on more than 900 sorties to
search for smugglers.13 Surveillance flights have been flown off
the east coast of Florida, throughout the Caribbean and Gulf of
Mexico, and over the Pacific Ocean off the coasts of Mexico and
California.
Once seized by the Coast Guard, Navy ships have been used to
tow or escort seized drug vessels and to transport prisoners to
port, thus permitting Coast Guard cutters to remain on station
longer. Navy ships in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico have
frequently carried U.S. Coast Guard Tactical Law Enforcement
Teams (TACLETs) who have search, seizure and arresting authority
on the high seas. TACLETs are discussed later in the report.
A Navy hydrofoil squadron composed of six ships has been
particularly effective in interdiciting drug traffickers in the
waters around the Florida Keys.14 Patrolling and interdicting
smugglers' vessels is nearly a perfect match with the squadron's
wartime mission. This is an example of how military support of
the drug interdiction effort can sometimes present an opportunity
for realistic training.
U.S. Air Force
The Air Force has provided a variety of support to the drug
interdiction effort during the last several years. The Air Force
has loaned more than 120 communications encryption devices to the
Customs Service and has provided F-15 (AN/APG-63) radars to the
Navy for installation in P-3A aircraft used to detect drug
smugglers. Air Force E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS) aircraft have flown aerial surveillance missions with
Customs Service representatives on board. While training for
anti-surface warfare strike operations over the Gulf of Mexico,
B-52s have provided anti-drug maritime surveillance reports.
Crews in C-130 Hercules aircraft have overflown suspect vessels
for the Coast Guard during flights to and from Panama.
Air Force RF-4Cs have provided aerial imagery of ships in
the Gulf of Mexico, and the Military Airlift Command (MAC) has
used C-141 Starlifters and WC-130 Hurricane Hunter aircraft to
look for drug carrying aircraft. Air Force Civil Air Patrol
members have patrolled known air smuggling corridors and have
flown surveillance missions to look for possible drug smuggling
vessels and potential remote airfields. Rotary-wing support has
included the employment of UH-1N Huey helicopters in the Bahamas
to quickly transport Bahamian police teams to remote sites used
by traffickers.
The Air Force has linked balloon-borne radars at Cape
Canaveral and Cudjoe Key, Florida directly with the Customs
Service command center in Miami. Additionally, information from
45 long-range ground-based radars located throughout the U.S. has
been made available to other government agencies attempting to
interdict smugglers.
U.S. Army and National Guard
The Army has loaned the Customs Service and the DEA a
variety of both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. Loaned
aircraft types include AH-1 Cobra, UH-1N Huey, OV-1D Mohawk,
C-12D King Air and four of the Army's newest UH-60 Blackhawk
helicopters.
The Army has changed the way it trains some of its ground
and airborne sensor operators at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The new
training takes advantage of the realistic challenge presented in
trying to detect smugglers, and also provides valuable
information to drug law enforcement officials. For example,
aircrews training in the OV-1D Mohawk aircraft now make training
flights along the U.S.-Mexico border where target areas are
imaged with the Mohawk's sensor system. Information on possible
contacts is passed to the Customs Service for action. Soldiers
training at Fort Huachuca to become ground surveillance radar and
sensor operators now participate in exercises on the border near
Yuma, Arizona for a week at a time where they train in detecting
intruders. The information they collect is passed to U.S. Border
Patrol officers.
In 1976 Hawaii became the first state to use the National
Guard in the war on drugs. Since the National Guard comes under
state control (i.e. its commander-in-chief in peacetime is the
governor), the National Guard does not come under the
restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act and may be used to assist
local police for civilian law enforcement problems.14 Therefore,
during regular periods of state active duty for training, the
National Guard has provided support to domestic law enforcement
officials. The use of the National Guard for drug interdiction
has become very popular. During 1985 National Guard units in 20
states were used in this way.15 The Army and National Guard have
loaned civilian agencies night vision equipment, provided
specialized training in the employment of ground surveillance
radar, and given civilian drug enforcement personnel access to
rifle and pistol ranges.
Finally, and as a result of P.L. 97-86, the Army's Military
Police School at Fort McClellan, Alabama has provided support not
directly related to the anti-drug effort. The type of assistance
provided has generally involved training civilian officials in
polygraph operations, physical security and counter-terrorism
planning.16
OPERATIONS ON FOREIGN SOIL
There have been a few occasions when U.S. military forces
have provided direct support to anti-drug operations in foreign
countries, and such assistance has only been provided at the
request of the foreign government. Only two instances of U.S.
military support of foreign interdiction efforts have been widely
reported and well documented. Both operations, one in the
Bahamas and one in Bolivia, have been limited in scope or
duration.
Operations in the Bahamas
The U.S. Armed Forces began providing support to the
Bahamian police force in May 1983 after an agreement was reached
between the Bahamian government and the U.S. State Department.
Known as Operation BAT, unarmed U.S. Air Force helicopters and
aircrews have been used to carry DEA agents and SWAT-type teams
of the Royal Bahamian Police Strike Force to remote island sites
used by drug traffickers.17 The Air Force merely provided rapid
transportation, for it is the Bahamian authorities who do the
actual searching, seizing and arresting. Seemingly unimportant,
such assistance is in reality a major effort in the war on drugs.
BAT is an acronym which comes from Bahamas, Antilles and
Turks--three Caribbean island chains which are used by drug
traffickers as fueling and transshipment points. The U.S.
Government estimates that in 1983 and 1984 approximately 70% of
the cocaine entering the United States passed through the
Bahamas!18
The Air Force has provided two UH-1N Huey helicopters and 12
to 22 associated aircrew and maintenance personnel in support of
Operation BAT.19 The helicopters and crews are a special
detachment from the 20th Special Operations Squadron regularly
stationed at Hurlburt Field in Florida. The two Hueys supporting
Operation BAT are stationed at Nassau in the Bahamas, and are
reported to be specially equipped with long-range fuel tanks,
high-frequency radios, special navigation equipment, and radar
altimeters.20
The U.S. Army has also participated in Operation BAT. The
Army has occasionally provided two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters
and crews.21
Operation BAT has been moderately successful. By August
1984, it had accounted for the arrest of more than 80 drug
traffickers and for the seizure of 196,000 pounds of marijuana
and 2,600 pounds of cocaine. The estimated street value of the
seized drugs was about $1 billion.22 As of 31 October 1985, more
than 3,110 hours had been flown in support of Operation BAT, and
the operation had netted 260,687 pounds of marijuana and 9,012
pounds of cocaine, and 173 traffickers had been arrested.23
However, the success of the operation has not been without its
costs. In January 1984 one of the helicopters crashed at sea
killing three Air Force crew members, a DEA agent, and a Bahamian
policeman.24
Operations in Bolivia
On 14 July 1986 six U.S. Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters
and about 160 supporting troops arrived in Bolivia at the request
of the Bolivian government to help their police conduct raids on
cocaine processing facilities. The U.S. support was initially
expected to last between 60 and 90 days.25 In actuality, support
was provided for about six months.26
As in Operation BAT, the U.S. helicopters were used to
rapidly ferry specially trained Bolivian civilian anti-drug
strike force personnel to sites from which raids were launched on
suspected or known cocaine processing facilities. This was the
first time that U.S. forces had been used in a narcotics control
mission on foreign soil since President Reagan signed a National
Security Decision Directive in April 1986 which designated the
international drug trade as a threat to our national security.27
Known as Operation Blast Furnace, the Bolivian operation was
substantially different from Operation BAT. The U.S. troops sent
to Bolivia carried a full complement of weapons, including
machine guns. However, the rules of engagement agreed upon with
the Bolivian government only permitted the U.S. troops to use
their weapons if fired upon first.28 The troops were well armed
because the possibility of a hostile engagement was considered to
be much higher than in the Bahamas. This was because the target
of the Bolivian operation was cocaine processing labs rather than
transshipment facilities, and processing facilities tend to
require more personnel who may not have access to an immediate
means of escape.29 No Americans were reported killed during the
operation.
Operation Blast Furnace also differed from the Bahamian
operation in the quantity of support provided. The Bolivian
operation involved three times as many helicopters and about ten
times as many U.S. servicemen.
Two processing labs had been seized by 28 July 1986.30 A
total of 21 labs were seized before Operation Blast Furnace wound
down in December 1986. There were so few processing labs in
operation during the height of the operation that the coca
growers' asking price dropped from $100 to about $15 per 100
pounds of coca leaf. The estimated cost of producing 100 pounds
of leaf is $40.31 So the operation demonstrated that long-term
interdiction of cocaine processing can make the price of coca
leaf drop drastically to the point where its cultivation is no
longer economical.
The Blast Furnace effort was effective only as long as it
was in operation. A 5 February 1987 article in The Washington
Post carried the headline, "Bolivia's Coca Output Restored,
Officials Say--Impact of U.S.-Aided Raids Found Fleeting." The
article quoted a source identified only as "a drug intelligence
specialist" who said that despite "180 days of seven-days-a-week
work, everything is back to where it was the day we started."32
Some have suggested that cocaine production in Bolivia will
only be reduced by the widespread eradication of coca crops, by
continuing the raids on cocaine processing labs, and by using
government sponsored incentives to encourage coca farmers to
cultivate other crops.33 But this is a big task. The Bolivian
coca crop is estimated to be approximately 50,000 metric tons
annually. It generates about $450 million in revenue each year.
That figure is approximately equal to the sum of Bolivia's legal
exports.34
U.S. COAST GUARD EXPERIENCES
The U.S. Coast Guard is organized under the Department of
Transportation. It is not normally a military service under the
Department of Defense in time of peace. However, this is an
appropriate place to discuss the role of the Coast Guard in the
overall drug interdiction effort.
The Coast Guard has become the primary agency responsible
for enforcing federal law at sea because the Armed Forces are
prohibited from performing law enforcement functions by the Posse
Comitatus Act. Section 2 of Title 14 U.S.C. outlines the Coast
Guard's primary duties by stating in part:
The Coast Guard shall enforce or assist in the
enforcement of all applicable Federal laws on and under the
high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.
The Coast Guard is also tasked with promoting safety of life and
property at sea, rescue, maritime navigation, icebreaking and
maintaining a state of readiness so as to funciton in times of
war as a specialized service of the U.S. Navy.
Section 84 of Title 14 U.S.C. outlines the Coast Guard's law
enforcement jurisdiction by stating in part:
The Coast Guard may make inquires, examinations,
inspections, searches, seizures and arrests upon the
high seas and water over which the U.S. has
jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection and
suppression, of violations of laws of the United States.
For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty
officers may at any time go on board any vessel subject
to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law, of
the United States, address inquiries to those on board,
examine the ship's documents and papers, and examine,
inspect, and search the vessel and use all necessary
force to compel compliance.
The Coast Guard began active drug interdiction effort in
1973. The quantity of drugs seized and arrests made was
relatively small during the period from 1973 to 1975. Seizures
took a dramatic jump in 1977 and have generally increased every
year since.35 Increased Coast Guard effectiveness is due in part
to the better combined effort and cooperation between all of the
agencies working on the drug problem. In 1973, very little
intelligence was shared by agencies responsible for drug law
enforcement. These federal and state agencies frequently acted
more like rivals rather than allies in the effort to stop the
flow of illicit drugs.
An October 1980 article in the United States Naval Institute
Proceedings pointed out that the Coast Guard was poorly equipped
to deal effectively with drug smuggling. They had insufficient
personnel, inadequate resources, and much of their equipment was
out of date. The article concluded that the obvious solution to
improving Coast Guard effectiveness in the area of drug
interdiction was to use the Navy to augment the Coast Guard's
forces.36
In response to an April 1982 letter from Secretary of
Transportation Drew Lewis, Jr., and a July 1982 memorandum from
Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger authorized the Navy to support the Coast Guard in four
specific areas: (1) air and surface surveillance, (2) towing or
escort of seized vessels and transportation of prisoners, (3)
logistic support to Coast Guard units, and (4) embarkation of
Coast Guard personnel on Navy ships to conduct law enforcement
boardings of U.S.-flag and stateless vessels.37 A weakness in
Coast Guard operations is that in order for the Coast Guard to
board ships sailing under a foreign flag in international waters,
the U.S. Government must first contact and obtain permission from
the foreign government, a procedure that can take days.
The last provision listed above resulted in the almost
immediate creation of Tactical Law Enforcement Teams (TACLETs).
The TACLETs are specially trained and heavily armed boarding
parties composed of two officers and about 12 enlisted personnel.
They are embarked on some Navy surface ships in the Caribbean and
Gulf of Mexico for about 30 days at a time. Suspect vessels are
approached and stopped by the Navy ship. The TACLET then boards
and conducts a search. If drugs are found, the vessel is seized
and the crew is arrested. The use of TACLETs has been a success.
Now drug traffickers must be wary of any and all Navy vessels
they encounter.
The drug interdiction mission has been expensive for the
Coast Guard. More than twenty percent of the Coast Guard's
operating budget for FY81 was spent on drug interdiction, and the
percentage has undoubtedly increased since then.38 P.L. 99-570
(discussed in the next Chapter) contains a hefty $188 million
increased appropriation authorization in FY87 for direct and
indirect support of Coast Guard drug interdiction efforts.39
CHAPTER VI
RECENT ACTIONS IN CONGRESS--THE OMNIBUS DRUG BILL
BACKGROUND
The cocaine-related deaths of Len Bias, a University of
Maryland basketball star, on 19 June 1986, and Don Rogers, a free
safety for the Cleveland Browns football team, one week later
touched off a national outpouring of concern about drug abuse.
The deaths of these two star athletes became the catalyst for a
flurry of legislative activity. In a few short weeks the issue
of drug abuse had captured public attention. Aware of the
pressure for a new drug law, politicians rushed to produce
legislation in plenty of time to use it as a campaign issue
during the fall 1986 general elections.
House Speaker Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill, Jr., announced that
the House would, in his words, "wage a legislative war against
drugs that is equal to the devastating battle being waged by
those who make a living injecting poison into the bloodstream of
our country."1 The Speaker directed the House committee chairmen
to produce a package of anti-drug legislation for House action by
10 September 1986.
H.R. 5484
On 8 September 1986, House Majority Leader Jim Wright
introduced H.R. 5484 titled the "Omnibus Drug Enforcement,
Education, and Control Act of 1936." The title page of the 365-
page Act gives as its purpose:
To strengthen Federal efforts to encourage foreign
cooperation in eradicating illicit drug crops and in halting
international drug traffic, to improve enforcement of
Federal drug laws and enhance interdiction of illicit drug
shipments, to provide strong Federal leadership in
establishing effective drug abuse prevention and education
programs, to expand Federal support for drug abuse
treatment and rehabilitation efforts, and for other
purposes.
The Act was divided into 12 sections and then referred to
following committees, according to their jurisdiction:
1. Foreign Affairs
2. Armed Services
3. Ways and Means
4. Merchant Marine and Fisheries
5. Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs
6. Judiciary
7. Public Works and Transportation
8. Education and Labor
9. Energy and Commerce
10. Post Office and Civil Service
11. Interior and Insular Affairs
12. Government Operations
A quick glance at the large number of House committees that
had a hand in drafting H.R. 5484 gives some indication as to just
how broad based and far-reaching this legislation was. The
provisions contained in this draft version of the Act would have
had the most significant impact on drug law enforcement since the
clarification of the Posse Comitatus statute in 1981, and,
therefore, warrants additional analysis and discussion.
H.R. 5484 was debated on the floor of the House on 10 and 11
September 1986. During the debates some 50 amendments were
considered. Two controversial proposed amendments drew the most
discussion and press coverage. Representative George W. Gekas
(R-Pa.) offered an amendment to permit imposition of the death
penalty in drug related murder cases. The amendment was approved
by the House by a vote of 296 to 112.2 This amendment, however,
fused the drug problem with the issue of capital punishment, thus
further complicating an already complex issue.
The other amendment was known as the "Hunter Amendment."
Named after its author, Representative Duncan L. Hunter (R-
Calif.), it would have authorized "the President to deploy
sufficient military and National Guard personnel and equipment to
halt the entry of vessels and aircraft carrying drugs." The
amendment would have also authorized military personnel to make
arrests.3 The amendment required the military to provide
"continuous aerial radar coverage of the southern border of the
United States" and to "pursue and seize intruding aircraft
thought to be carrying illegal drugs." In the anything goes
atmosphere of anti-drug excitement that swept the House, this
proposal was also adopted, though by the somewhat narrower margin
of 237 to 177.4
The final House vote on H.R. 5484, as amended, came on 11
September 1986 and it passed by the overwhelming vote of 392 to
16. Cost was apparently no object. The projected cost of
implementing the House proposal was $1.7 billion in FY87 alone,
and about $3 billion more over the next three years.
S. 2787
Shortly after the House began drafting H.R. 5484, the Senate
began work on their own equivalent version of H.R. 5484. The
Senate bill, S. 2787, was introduced by Senate Majority Leader
Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.) and Senate Minority Leader Robert C. Byrd
(D-W.Va.) on 25 September 1986. At 250 pages, the Senate bill
was a scaled-down version of the House anti-drug resolution. As
drafted, S. 2787 did not contain a death penalty provision, and
it provided only limited authority for military forces to assist
civilian law enforcement agencies in drug interdiction
activities.
The section of the Senate bill that addressed DOD assistance
permitted the DOD to loan personnel to civilian law enforcement
agencies to operate and maintain equipment used by those
agencies, and to assist foreign governments in drug interdiction
activities. The bill also allowed military personnel to
intercept vessels and aircraft for the purpose of identifying,
monitoring, and communicating the location and movement of the
vessel or aircraft until such time as federal, state, and local
law enforcement officials could assume responsibility.5
The Senate reduced or eliminated many of the House supported
provisions contained in H.R. 5484. A death penalty proposal was
introduced but was not included in the Senate bill. Senator Alan
J. Dixon (D-Ill.) introduced a military employment proposal,
which he characterized as a scaled-back version of the proposal
approved by the House. His proposal would have required the
President to deploy military equipment and personnel to locate,
pursue and seize drug-carrying vessels and aircraft, and to
arrest suspected offenders in cases of hot pursuit. As an aside,
the President was opposed to any bill which would mandate
military involvement in drug interdiction. The Senate defeated
the proposal to use the military directly in drug interdiction by
a vote of 72 to 14.6
After three days of debate, during which time 47 amendments
were considered, the Senate adopted, by voice vote, S. 2787 as a
substitute amendment to H.R. 5484. H.R. 5484 was then adopted by
a vote of 97 to 2. The FY87 cost of the Senate package was
projected to be $1.4 billion (i.e. $300 million less than the
bill passed by the House on 11 September 1986).
HOUSE AND SENATE NEGOTIATIONS ON H.R. 5484
As the second session of the 99th Congress was coming to a
close, the House and Senate spent much of their time working out
the details of the anti-drug legislation. The Senate and House
each insisted on their amendments and met in conference to
negotiate a compromise bill. The death penalty provision was the
main sticking point which held up Senate and House agreement on a
final version of the bill. Here is what was happening--the House
would put the death penalty provision back into H.R. 5484 and
pass the bill as amended; then the Senate would take the death
penalty provision out and pass the bill as amended, etc. The
bill was finally agreed to by both Houses on 17 October 1987
after the Senate approved a provision for a mandatory life
sentence without parole in the same type of drug related murder
cases in which the House version of the bill had permitted the
death penalty. The House approved the final version of the bill
by a vote of 378 to 16. The Senate approved the measure by voice
vote.7
Here then is a summary of the legislative activity which led
to passage of H.R. 5484:
8 Sept 1986 - H.R. 5484 introduced.
11 Sept 1986 - Passed House, amended.
26 Sept 1986 - H.R. 5484 contents replaced by S. 2787.
30 Sept 1986 - Passed Senate, amended.
8 Oct 1986 - Senate amendment accepted by House, with
an amendment.
15 Oct 1986 - Senate concurred in House amendment to the
Senate amendment with another amendment.
17 Oct 1986 - House concurred in Senate amendments to House
amendments, with amendments. Then the Senate
agreed to the House amendment to the Senate
amendment to the House amendments to the
Senate amendments.8
In the end, the role of the military in drug interdiction
efforts, as specified in the final version of the bill, was not
significantly different from what was stated in the original
version of S. 2787.
ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1986
After passage by both Houses, H.R. 5484 became P.L. 99-570--
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. President Reagan signed it into
law on 27 October 1986. He called the Act a "major victory" in
the war against drugs. P.L. 99-570 is 480 pages long and
contains 15 titles. It also contains several amendments which
are totally unrelated to drug control. Among them are provisions
for determining elegibility of the homeless for welfare benefits,
a national truck and bus driver licensing system, and
establishment of new quality and purity safeguards for infant
formula.9
P.L. 99-570 authorizes $1.7 billion for drug control in
FY87. When this figure is added to the amount previously
appropriated under other acts containing drug control
legislation, federal drug control spending for FY87 now
approaches a total of nearly $4 billion.10
PROs AND CONs OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT
As the flow of illegal drugs has continued to increase, and
America's drug problem has gotten worse, our lawmakers have
sought ways to improve the effectiveness of the anti-drug effort.
The provisions of the Posse Comitatus statute were "clarified" to
permit the employment of DOD resources for anti-drug operations.
Various types of military support have been provided in this
area, and recent events have led to a resurgence of interest in
this issue during the last year.
Last fall the time was right for lawmakers to try again to
increase the role of the military in drug law enforcement. The
employment of the Armed Forces in the anti-drug effort has always
been a controversial issue, and feelings have run high among
those who support or oppose it. Most of the pros and cons of
military involvement in drug law enforcement were first
enunciated during the debates concerning the revision of the
Posse Comitatus statute in 1981 and have changed little since
then.
The following arguments, pro and con, have been grouped into
general categories representing the aspects most frequently
debated (e.g. Is military pariticpation proper? Is military
participation necessary? etc.). Many of the specific pro and con
arguments presented below have been drawn from the comments of
our lawmakers as they debated the measures contained in H.R. 5484
last fall. However, the basic arguments have remained largely
unchanged since 1981.
Is Military Participation Proper?
Pro -
Yes, it is a proper role for the military. As former
Senator Paula Hawkins (R-Fla.) has said, "The Congress did not go
to the trouble of amending the Posse Comitatus just to have our
wishes ignored."11 Indeed, a new chapter was added to Title 10
U.S.C. in 1981 specifically to permit the military to be used to
support civilian law enforcement agencies for the purpose of
reducing the flow of drugs.
Con -
Others have maintained that while it is legally permissible
to use the military to support drug law enforcement, it may still
not be a proper use of DOD assets. They point out that an
identified but vague and indirect national security threat does
not necessarily translate directly into a military mission.12
Some believe that from any perspective, using the military
in what they believe is a civilian law enforcement matter
violates the Posse Comitatus safeguard. Those that oppose
military involvement in drug law enforcement maintain that it
puts us on the road to becoming a "police state," or of turning
us into a country with a form of government similar to that of a
"banana republic."
But the most common argument against military involvement in
the war on drugs centers around the issue of military readiness
or preparedness. In speaking against the Hunter Amendment to
H.R. 5484, which would have greatly increased military
participation in drug law enforcement and permitted the military
to make searches, seizures and arrests within the United States,
former Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) said that expanded
military involvement "would be devastating to military readiness
. . . . "13 Echoing these sentiments, Representative Don Edwards
(D-Calif.) said that "The impact on military preparedness has to
be catastrophic. "14 Representative G. William Whitehurst (R-
Va. ) , among others, has pointed out that as servicemen become
more active in law enforcement there is an increased likelihood
that military members could be called as witnesses in civilian
courts, thus rendering them unavailable for training or
deployments, and thereby hurting unit personnel readiness.15
In summary, it is generally argued that assigning the
military a drug law enforcement mission would impose additional
training requirements and would tie up DOD assets, all to the
detriment of training and preparedness for the military's primary
war-fighting missions.
Is Military Participation Necessary?
Pro -
Many argue that the sheer size of the drug problem mandates
drastic action. They say that tough times require tough
measures, and that the nation should use every means available to
interdict the traffickers. The vast amounts of money being made
by the smugglers has allowed them to buy quantities of high-tech
equipment that is no match for much of the Coast Guard or Customs
Service equipment. The smugglers now have speed boats, many
airplanes, automatic weapons, night vision devices, and
sophisticated radars, navigation and communications equipment.16
Even with accurate intelligence, the Customs Service and
Coast Guard lack the equipment necessary to detect, identify and
track many of the drug-carrying ships and aircraft. The military
has this capability, and proponents of greater military
involvement argue that there is no reason why those assets should
not be used for that purpose.
Con -
Many lawmakers feel that the other provisions added to the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 make changes in the role of the
military unnecessary.17 The increased funding provided in the
Act will do much to alleviate the chronic shortage of resources
with which the civilian agencies have had to operate.
Additionally, it is argued that civilian agencies (e.g. SFTF
and NNBIS) are in place and all that is needed is to do a better
job of organizing and coordinating their activities. Finally,
they maintain that the NNBIS has been in operation about five
years and already takes advantage of military capabilities.
Does The Military Possess The Equipment To Do The Job?
Pro -
It is a fact that the DOD has the sophisticated equipment
necessary to make a meaningful contribution to the drug
interdiction effort.
Proponents of increased military involvement are quick to
point out that the military equipment that could be used is
already paid for, in place, and, for the most part, readily
available. The development and procurement costs have already
been paid, and large quantities of state-of-the-art equipment and
trained operators are available.
Using the military for drug interdiction, they argue, is
preferable to providing additional funding or new equipment to
civilian agencies to upgrade their capabilities because the
results of military participation would be immediate. Mr. John
Lawn, the Administrator of the DEA, has estimated that he would
need an additional 40,000 agents to effectively combat the
current level of drug trafficking!18 Considering the $1 billion
and amount of time required to recruit and train a large number
of DEA agents, the immediate and less expensive results offered
by greater military involvement make this option very attractive.
Con -
Most lawmakers agree that the military has the personnel and
equipment necessary to essentially close our southern border to
drug smugglers for some period of time. It would not be easy.
It would require the commitment of a large amount of resources,
but closing the border to smugglers is probably possible.
Arguments against employing these assets fall into three general
areas, each discussed in separate paragraphs below.
It would be too expensive. Senator Goldwater estimates that
using the military to close our southern border to drug
traffickers would cost about $40 million a day.19 This action
would require the dedicated support of a considerable amount of
our military assets at a time when the DOD is being faced with
budget cuts.
A comprehensive plan is nonexistent for effectively
employing the assets that would be required. It would be
wasteful to use military resources without first developing a
coherent plan for their employment.
Some people doubt that even the DOD has enough personnel and
equipment, not already committed elsewhere, to halt the flow of
drugs into the United States. Again Senator Goldwater estimates
that it would require more AWACS and E-2C Hawkeye aircraft than
presently exist.20 Many of the AWACS and approximately thirty
percent of the E-2C aircraft are deployed at any one time. Along
this line, it is argued that increased military involvement would
be a hardship for some military families. Many servicemen would
spend more time deployed, and this, in turn, would hurt
retention.
Does The Drug Interdiction Mission Provide Good Training?
Pro -
Pilots must fly and aircrews must train. Proponents argue
that searching for drug traffickers provides meaningful real-
world training while also providing a valuable public service.
Army initiatives in Arizona (discussed in Chapter V) show
how slight modifications to existing training programs have
served to both enhance training and assist law enforcement
authorities.
Con -
Opponents argue that using the military for the direct
interdiction, search, seizure and arrest of drug smugglers is not
very good military training. Representative Whitehurst has
pointed out that,"... persuing a drug aircraft gets a military
pilot in the cockpit and provides very limited flight training,
but in no way does it provide the kind of training in
maneuverability, attack, and defense techniques that our pilots
need to counter the Soviet threat."21
Will Using The Military For Drug Interdiction Work?
Pro -
Everyone agrees that the flow of illegal drugs can never be
completely halted. However, many hold the opinion that
committing the U.S. military to the effort is the single most
powerful action that could be taken, and that military
involvement is certain to produce results.
Con -
Opinions and arguments concerning the effectiveness of a
military response is expressed no better than in the following
quotes.
We have found that throwing military resources at the
problem by themselves results in no long-term benefit, and
eventually does nothing but destroy the military
readiness of the units without halting the drug flow.
In essence, we have learned that we can use some of
the capabilities of some military systems and units some
of the time, to profitably support law enforcement
operations. But if we try to substitute the military
for adequate law enforcement, then it results in two
negative effects. Military readiness to perform its
wartime missions immediately suffers, and what we get is
very expensive and not-very-successful interdiction for
a short period of time.22
The Honorable Dan Daniels
U.S. Representative From Va.
11 September 1986
Congress is now talking in terms of interdiction,
of putting all of this money to blockade the borders.
No. 1, that is impossible. And, No. 2, if we
miraculously could put military people arm-to-arm to
surround the United States to keep out cocaine and
heroin, we would continue to have a substantial drug
problem.23
Mr. John Lawn
Administrator of the DEA
September 1986
Should The Military Be Used For Drug Law Enforcement In
Foreign Countries?
Pro -
Proponents of the employment of U.S. Armed Forces to aid
civilian law enforcement authorities in foreign countries offer
several arguments to support their position.
They contend that the U.S. military is the only organization
capable of countering powerful and well equipped multinational
drug trafficking groups, many of whom have links with terrorist
or insurgent organizations. The drug traffickers pose a threat
to friendly foreign governments and, therefore, the drug
interdiction mission on foreign soil is an appropriate U.S.
military response, if invited by foreign governments.
Drug interdiction operations could provide useful
operational training. They argue that a U.S. military presence
would add stability and an aura of incorruptability to drug law
enforcement operations in a way that loaning equipment and
supporting from a distance would not. They point out that
corrupt foreign officials could misuse or hinder the
effectiveness of loaned equipment.
Finally, they believe that U.S. military support makes the
host nation government stronger in the eyes of the people, and
demonstrates America's commitment to drug control. It lets the
traffickers know that the United States is serious and means
business.
Con -
In addition to the arguments stated above (i.e. it detracts
from readiness, violates Posse Comitatus provisions, and that
it's really a civilian law enforcement function), critics of the
employment of U.S. Armed Forces to aid civilian law enforcement
authorities in foreign countries offer several additional reasons
why this should not be done.
Drug traffickers are known to be armed and dangerous. DEA
agents and their families, and honest foreign judges, policemen
and government leaders have been frequent targets of traffickers.
U.S. servicemen participating in anti-drug operations would also
become targets of the smugglers' violence. Some number of
American servicemen would likely be killed or wounded.
The presence of U.S. troops might help insurgents stir up
anti-American sentiment among the people. U.S. support of host
nation law enforcement agencies involved in human rights abuses
would provide additional ammunition to the insurgents. It could
also show the existing government as weak in having to request
outside support.
Critics point out that an active and successful U.S.
military supported anti-drug offensive in one country would just
cause the traffickers to relocate their operation in another
country until such time as it was safe to return. Short-term
efforts would be costly and ineffective.
Finally, they argue that as U.S. military activity against
the international drug trade is increased, some of the
trafficking organizations might try to retaliate. U.S.
servicemen or American citizens worldwide could become targets of
"narco-terrorism."
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
America's drug problem developed over many years and it will
require much time and sustained effort to substantially reduce
this country's drug habit. Some progress is being made,
particularly in the areas of improving coordination and
intelligence sharing among the many federal, state, and local
agencies participating in the drug interdiction effort. However,
there is still room for improvement.
There have been many anti-drug laws enacted in the United
States in recent years. However the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
is the most comprehensive piece of legislation on drug control
that the Congress has ever produced. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986 starts us on a new long-term effort to conquer drug abuse in
America.
This study has intentionally focused largely on a small part
of the Act, that is, the provisions regarding U.S. military
involvement in drug interdiction. However, the Act contains many
other provisions which, when taken together, provide a
comprehensive plan for combatting drug abuse. Interdiction is
now recognized as but one aspect of drug control. The Act puts
together, in one package, a collection of measures aimed at the
three aspects of drug control necessary for effective treatment
of the problem.
Interdiction may be thought of as being in the middle of the
problem, with foreign country illegal drug production and the
American demand for illicit drugs being on either end. The Act
contains measures designed to reduce both foreign production and
American demand for drugs. Provisions in the Act will encourage
foreign countries to increase their efforts against drug
producers and traffickers. The Act provides funding for foreign
narcotics control programs, and threatens the cut-off of U.S.
assistance or denial of trade benefits for countries that do not
make satisfactory progress in controlling their illicit drug
problem. Provisions of the Act intended to reduce American
demand include measures aimed at drug education, prevention,
treatment and rehabilitation.
The Act's three phase approach of:
(1) eliminating drugs at the source,
(2) interdicting drugs during shipment, and
(3) reducing the American appetite for illegal drugs,
establishes a plan which may eventually lead to effective drug
control in America. But the plan will succeed only if the
Congress continues to fund, and the President supports the
provisions contained in the Act--a critical condition which may
not be possible when one considers the serious budget deficit
problem facing this nation.
Actually, the nation needs a "drug czar." The author
believes that someone should be placed in charge of the nation's
overall anti-drug effort. Although inter-agency coordination and
cooperation are improving, efforts are still sometimes
duplicative and fragmented. What the interdiction effort needs
now is better command, control, communications and intelligence
(C3I). The "czar" should have a formal charter, and independent
staff, and a separate budget. Vice President Bush is currently
the senior member and Chairman of both the SFTF and NNBIS. He is
very well informed on all aspects of current drug control
activities and therefore would, in the author's opinion, make a
fine "drug czar." But such a "czar" must have the authority to
establish priorities and direct the effort.
The "czar" would need three assistants. He would require
someone:
(1) from the State Department to coordinate and
oversee efforts to reduce foreign drug production;
(2) from either the DEA or Customs Service to
control the interdiction efforts; and someone
(3) with a Health and Human Services Administration
background to coordinate domestic drug demand
reduction efforts.
Putting one person in charge of the interdiction mission would
reduce inter-agency bickering, increase cooperation, and provide
better overall results.
Control could be improved through better inter-agency
coordination, and by implementing standardized reporting and
tracking procedures. Communications requires more discussion
because there have been many problems in this area. Briefly
stated, many of the agencies involved in interdiction do not have
enough communications equipment, and much of the equipment found
in one agency is frequently not compatible or interoperable with
the equipment used by other agencies. When the equipment is
compatible, radio discipline and security consciousness among the
users is lacking and information is easily compromised.
Communications security (i.e. encryption) equipment should be
used on the voice radio nets used for interdiction. The
traffickers have radios and know what frequencies are used for
interdiction. For example, it has been reported that on four
occasions, Operation BAT forces captured traffickers who had
radios tuned to the primary drug interdiction frequencies. On
two occasions, captured traffickers were found to have in their
possession complete frequancy lists for radio nets of the SFTF.1
Intelligence offers great potential for increasing
interdiction effectiveness. Human intelligence (HUMINT), defined
by JCS Pub 1 as "A category of intelligence derived from
information collected and provided by human sources," could be
used both in foreign countries and here in the United States to
determine who, when, where and how the traffickers are planning
to transport a load of drugs. For obvious reasons, very little
has been reported about how much drug-related HUMINT is being
collected. This is a dangerous mission for the agents/informants
providing this type of valuable information. It is certainly
easier to catch a trafficker if you know when, where, and how he
is going to enter the United States.
After a careful consideration of all aspects of the issue,
the author has concluded that it is proper for the military to
play a supporting role in the drug interdiction effort. However,
we must avoid overtaxing scarce DOD resources, and must ensure
that the level of effort provided does not damage operational
readiness.
The U.S. military has provided a significant amount of
support to the drug interdiction effort. Military assistance
during the last few years has continued to increase and has made
a difference. Seizures are up. Arrests are up. Yet American
demand for drugs has continued to rise! Interdiction alone, even
when supported by the military, cannot solve the problem. Our
lawmakers must resist the temptation to mandate increased
military involvement in the mistaken belief that increased use of
the Armed Forces will either entirely solve the drug problem or
seal off our borders to the impotation of drugs.
In the author's opinion, the DOD will continue to receive
pressure to increase its level of support to drug law enforcement
agencies. The idea of giving the military a direct (rather than
supporting) drug interdiction mission, with the power to search,
seize and arrest, remains very popular with many of our
lawmakers. The author predicts that the 100th Congress will
revisit this issue. The same old arguments, pro and con, will be
debated again, but it seems unlikely to the author that the
military will be formally assigned a direct drug interdiction
mission anytime soon. Congress will want to wait and see if
their Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 works, and the military should,
for its own sake, hope that it does.
NOTES ON CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1 Joseph F. Mudd, Colonel, USAF, Assigning DOD a Narcotics
Interdiction Mission (National War College, Feb. 1986), 1.
2 Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., "We Know Who Will Lose The Drug War,"
The Washington Post, 18 Sept. 1986.
3 "Drug Control," Congressional Research Service Review,
Jan. 1987, 29.
4 Harry L. Hogan, Federal Laws Relating to the Control of
Narcotics and Other Dangerous Drugs, Enacted 1961-1985: Brief
Summaries (Congressional Research Service, Rev. 15 Jan. 1986),
pp. CRS-v to CRS-40.
5 National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee
(NNICC). Narcotics Intelligence Estimate 1984 (Drug Enforcement
Administration, 1985), p. i.
6 Larry Martz, et al. "Trying to Say 'No,'" Newsweek, 11
Aug. 1986, 15.
7 Haynes Johnson, "Quick Fixes for the Drug Crisis," The
Washington Post, 17 Sept. 1986.
8 John A. Barbour, "Drug Prevention Could Save U.S. $230
Billion Annually," Potomac News, 7 Jan 1987, 1.
NOTES ON CHAPTER II
ILLEGAL DRUGS--A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY?
1 Raphael Perl, Policy Alert--Narcotics Control and the Use
of U.S. Military Personnel: Operations in Bolivia and Issues for
Congress (Congressional Research Service, 29 July 1986),
p. CRS-3.
2 Norman G. Cooper, Colonel, USA, et al. The Pros and Cons
of Military Intervention Into Drug Trafficking (Industrial
College of the Armed Forces, Mar. 1986), 15.
3 Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress for
Fiscal Year 1988 [Executive Summary] (Department of Defense,
1987), 16.
4 Cooper, 16; National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers
Committee (NNICC). Narcotics Intelligence Estimate 1984 (Drug
Enforcement Administration, 1985), 58.
5 Cooper, 16.
6 NNICC, 9.
7 Cooper, 16.
8 Harry Anderson, et al. "The Evil Empire," Newsweek, 25
Feb. 1985, 18.
9 G. Thomas Morgan, Commander, USCG, The Search for a
Successful Maritime Drug Interdiction Strategy (Air War College,
May 1984), 12.
NOTES ON CHAPTER III
CONTROLLING THE FLOW--WHO'S IN CHARGE?
1 Joseph. T. Zadareky, Colonel, USAF, National Drug Policy:
Fact or Fiction (National War College, Feb. 1986), 19.
2 "Federal Agencies Involved." The Congressional Digest,
Nov. 1986, 261-2.
3 G. Thomas Morgan, Commander, USCG, The Search for a
Successful Maritime Drug Interdiction Strategy (Air Command and
Staff College, May 1984), 17.
4 Richard Ward Shurtleff, Major, USAF, The Air Force
Involvement in Drug Interdiction--An Analysis (Air Command and
Staff College, Apr. 1986), 13.
5 Joseph F. Mudd, Colonel, USAF, Assigning DOD a Narcotics
Interdiction Mission (National War College, Feb. 1986), 3.
6 Morgan, 18.
7 Zadareky, 15.
8 Tony L. Wiggins, Major, USAF, U.S. Air Force Role in Drug
Interdiction December 1981 to October 1985 (Air Command and Staff
College, Apr. 1986), 13.
9 Rod Hughes, Major, USMC. Action Officer, Plans Division,
Code PP&O, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Telephone interview.
6 Feb. 1987.
10 Thomas R. Friers, Major, USAF, DOD Involvement in the
Interdiction of Illegal Drugs--A Staff Study (Air Command and
Staff College, Apr. 1986), 17.
11 Morgan, 15.
12 R. Dean Tice, "Fighting the Drug Flow," Defense 86, May-
June 1986, 14-17; Lawrence J. Korb, "Drug War Front," Defense 85,
Feb. 1985, 17-20; Brian Hoey, "Fighting the Drug War," Airman,
Aug. 1984, 8-11; Michael R. Adams, "Navy Narcs," Proceedings,
U.S. Naval Institute, Sept. 1984, 35-37; Deborah G. Meyer, "The
Scourge of Modern Pirates--The Military Battles a New Foe: The
Drug Runner," Armed Forces Journal International, Apr. 1983,
pp. 86, 88-89; William H. Taft, IV, "The Role of DOD in Civilian
Law Enforcement," Defense 83, Mar. 1983, 6-9; and Charles N.
Dragonette, "The Coast Guard and Drug Interdiction--A Kind of
War," Sea Power, Aug. 1979, 16-18.
13 Jack Anderson, and Dale Van Atta, "Turf Battle Escalates
in Antidrug War," The Washington Post, 29 Sept. 1986.
14 Norman G. Cooper, Colonel, USA, et al. The Pros and Cons
of Military Intervention Into Drug Trafficking (Industrial
College of the Armed Forces, Mar. 1986), 40.
15 Helen Dewar, "Senate Supports Antidrug Plan," The
Washington Post, 19 Sept. 1986, p. A16.
NOTES ON CHAPTER IV
NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT ILLEGAL DRUGS
1 Joseph T. Zadareky, Colonel, USAF, National Drug Policy:
Fact or Fiction (National War College, Feb. 1986), 18.
2 Ibid., 19.
3 Joseph F. Mudd, Colonel, USAF, Assigning DOD a Narcotics
Interdiction Mission (National War College, Feb. 1986), 17.
4 United States. President. Administration of Ronald
Reagan. (Washington, Aug. 1986), 1041.
5 Ibid., 1041-2.
6 Ibid.
NOTES ON CHAPTER V
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INVOLVEMENT
1 Richard Ward Shurtleff, Major, USAF, The Air Force
Involvement in Drug Interdiction--An Analysis (Air Command and
Staff College, Apr. 1986), 3.
2 Michael R. Adams, "Navy Narcs," Proceedings, U.S. Naval
Institute, Sept. 1984, 35.
3 Ibid.
4 Tony L. Wiggins, Major, USAF, U.S. Air Force Role in Drug
Interdiction December 1981 to October 1983 (Air Command and Staff
College, Apr. 1986), 3.
5 Shurtleff, 6.
6 Joseph F. Mudd, Colonel, USAF, Assigning DOD a Narcotics
Interdiction Mission (National War College, Feb. 1986), 12.
7 Adams, 36.
8 Thomas R. Friers, Major, USAF, DOD Involvement in the
Interdiction of Illegal Drugs--A Staff Analysis (Air Command and
Staff College, Apr. 1986), 7.
9 Rod Hughes, Major, USMC. Action Officer, Plans Division,
Code PP&O, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Telephone interview.
6 Feb. 1987.
10 R. Dean Tice, "Fighting the Drug Flow," Defense 86, May-
June 1986, 17.
11 Hughes. Telephone interview. 6 Feb. 1987.
12 Ibid.
13 Friers, 7.
14 Jean Marie Brawders, "National Guard Fights War on
Drugs," National Guard, June 1986, 25.
15 Ibid.
16 William H. Taft, IV, "The Role of DOD in Civilian Law
Enforcement," Defense 83, Mar. 1983, 8.
17 Brian Hoey, "Fighting the Drug War," Airman, Aug. 1984,
10.
18 Ibid., pp. 10, 12.
19 Raphael Perl, Policy Alert--Narcotics Control and the Use
of U.S. Military Personnel: Operations in Bolivia and Issues for
Congress (Congressional Research Service, 29 July 1986),
p. CRS-3; and Shurtleff, 16.
20 Hoey, 10.
21 Tice, 15.
22 Hoey, 13.
23 Friers, 11.
24 Hoey, 12.
25 Harry Hogan, Drug Traffic Control: Federal Efforts
(Congressional Research Service, Updated 1 Feb. 1987),
p. CRS-17.
26 Jay Mathews, "Bolivia's Coca Output Restored, Officials
Say," The Washington Post, 6 Feb. 1987, p. A14.
27 Perl, p. CRS-3.
28 Ibid., p. CRS-1.
29 Ibid., p. CRS-3.
30 Ibid., p. CRS-2.
31 Mathews, p. A14.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 G. Thomas Morgan, Commander, USCG, The Search for a
Successful Maritime Drug Interdiction Strategy (Air Command and
Staff College, May 1984), 23.
36 Adams, 35-36.
37 Ibid., 36.
38 Morgan, 24.
39 Harry Hogan, et al. Drug Control: Highlights of
P.L. 99-570. Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (Congressional Research
Service, 31 Oct. 1986), p. CRS-9.
NOTES ON CHAPTER VI
RECENT ACTIONS IN CONGRESS--THE OMNIBUS DRUG BILL
1 Micheal Putzel, "Bias' Death Touches Off Stampede,"
Potomac News, 18 Sept. 1986.
2 Edward Walsh, "House Votes Antidrug Legislation," The
Washington Post, 12 Sept. 1986, p. A8.
3 "Recent Action in the Congress." The Congressional
Digest, Nov. 1986, 263.
4 Walsh, p. A8.
5 "Highlights of the Senate Bill." The Congressional
Digest, Nov. 1986, 288.
6 Helen Dewar, "Senate Supports Antidrug Plan," The
Washington Post, 29 Sept. 1986, p. A16.
7 Edward Walsh, "$1.7 Billion Drug Bill Sweeps House,
Senate," The Washington Post, 18 Oct. 1986, p. A4.
8 Harry Hogan, Drug Traffic Control: Federal Efforts
(Congressional Research Service, Updated 1 Feb. 1987), p. CRS-4.
9 Judith Havemann, "Reagan Signs Antidrug Bill," The
Washington Post, 28 Oct. 1986, A3.
10 "Drug Control," Congressional Research Service Review,
Jan. 1987, 29.
11 "Should U.S. Armed Forces Play A Major Role In
Interdicting Drug Traffic Into The United States?" Transcripts of
comments made by U.S. Senators and U.S. Representatives during
the debates in the Senate on 27 Sept. 1986 and in the House on 11
Sept. 1986. The Congressional Digest, Nov. 1986, 272.
12 Norman G. Cooper, Colonel, USA, et al. The Pros and Cons
of Military Intervention Into Drug Trafficking (Industrial
College of the Armed Forces, Mar. 1986), 39-40.
13 The Congressional Digest, Nov. 1986, 267.
14 Ibid., 271.
15 Ibid., 277; and Cooper, 39.
16 Brian Hoey, "Fighting the Drug War," Airman, Aug. 1984,
13.
17 The Congressional Digest, Nov. 1986, 269, and 277.
18 Ibid., 276.
19 Ibid., 267.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 277.
22 Ibid., 274.
23 "Senate Republicans Add Their $1.3 Billion Plan to Anti-
Drug Campaign." Milwaukee Journal, 21 Sept. 1986, p. 2J.
NOTES ON CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
1 Richard Ward Shurtleff, Major, USAF, The Air Force
Involvement in Drug Interdiction--An Analysis (Air Command and
Staff College, Apr. 1986), 29.
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources
"Controversy Over Omnibus Drug Legislation." Congressional
Digest. Nov. 1986.
A very useful reference. Contains a discussion of the
evolution of current drug legislation, the Federal agencies
involved, recent actions in the Congress, highlights of the
House and Senate bills, and comments of lawmakers concerning
the use of the U.S. military to interdict drug traffickers.
"Drug Control." Congressional Research Service Review. Jan.
1987.
Briefly summarizes the important measures contained in the
legislation produced by the 99th Congress and offers
predictions about other actions the 100th Congress might
take.
Hogan, Harry L., Federal Laws Relating to the Control of
Narcotics and Other Dangerous Drugs Enacted 1961-1985:
Brief Summaries, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research
Service, 1986.
This is a recent report which contains summaries of laws,
treaties, and reorganization plans that all have something
to do with drug control.
---. et al. Highlights of P.L. 99-570, Anti Drug Abuse Act of
1986, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service,
1986.
A very useful source. Lists the drug-related provisions of
the Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1986.
---. Drug Traffic Control: Federal Efforts. Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Research Service, 1987.
A comprehensive summary of the 1986 House and Senate anti-
drug bills. Lists hearings that were conducted and provides
a chronology of drug-related events for the period 1968 to
1986.
Hughes, Rod, Major, USMC. Action Officer, Plans Division, Code
PP&O, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Telephone interview.
6 Feb. 1987.
The Marine Corps support to the drug interdiction effort was
discussed. Major Hughes provided much useful information.
Narcotics Trafficking and U.S. Law Enforcement Policies:
Bibliography-in-Brief, 1984-1986, Washington D.C.:
Congressional Research Service, 1986.
A very useful listing of 33 anti-drug publications available
directly from the Congressional Research Service or other
government agencies.
National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC).
Narcotics Intelligence Estimate 1984, Washington, D.C.:
Drug Enforcement Administration, 1985.
The single most important and reliable source of statistics
available on the supply of illicit drugs available in the
U.S. from foreign and domestic sources in 1984. An
essential reference.
Perl, Raphael. Policy Alert--Narcotics Control and the Use of
U.S. Military Personnel: Operations in Bolivia and Issues
for Congress, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research
Service, 1986.
An unbiased presentation of the facts and issues concerning
the employment of U.S. military forces in Bolivia in support
of Bolivian anti-drug operations.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff. Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms, JCS Pub 1. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office (GPO), 1986.
Always a useful reference.
Titles 10, 14 and 18 U.S. Code. 1982.
Legal statutes governing the employment of the U.S. military
forces (Title 10) and the Coast Guard (Title 14). The Posse
Comitatus Act is contained in Title 18.
United States. Cong. Omnibus Drug Enforcement, Education. and
Control Act of 1986. 99th Cong., 2d sess. H.R. 5484.
Washington: GPO, 1986.
This is the original 1986 omnibus drug bill passed by the
House on 15 Sept. 1986. It is the primary reference for
information concerning the content of the original House
bill.
United States. President. Administration of Ronald Reagan,
Washington: GPO, 1986.
Transcripts of the President's comments made: (1) during an
interview with Johanna Neuman and Karen de Witt of USA Today
on 2 July 1986, (2) during a news conference announcing the
goals and objectives of his National Campaign Against Drug
Abuse on 4 Aug. 1986, and (3) at the National Conference on
Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention on 6 Aug. 1986.
Weinberger, Caspar W. Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal
Year 1988 [Executive Summary], Washington, D.C.: Department
of Defense, 1987.
Contains a section that addresses the link between
terrorism, insurgent low intensity conflicts (LIC) and the
illegal drug trade.
Secondary Sources
Adams, Michael R. "Navy Narcs." U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings Sept. 1984: 35-37.
An excellent article providing valuable information on the
Posse Comitatus Act and Coast Guard TACLETs.
Anderson, Harry, et al. "The Evil Empire." Newsweek 25 Feb.
1985: 14-18.
Contains interesting and useful background information on
the wealth and power of the Latin American drug lords. The
article reports details on several acts of violence recently
sponsored by wealthy traffickers.
Beck, Melinda. "Feeding America's Habit." Newsweek 25 Feb.
1985: 22-23.
Provides statistics on the size of America's drug problem.
An article worth reading.
Brawders, Jean Maris. "National Guard Fights War On Drugs."
National Guard June 1986: 24-28.
An article highlighting past and present National Guard
involvement in the anti-drug effort.
Brokenik, James Alan, Lieutenant, USCG. An Analysis Of The
Effectiveness Evaluation Measurements For Coast Guard
General Law Enforcement Helicopters. Monterey, CA: Naval
Postgraduate School, 1979.
Contains a good history of the Coast Guard's role in law
enforcement, but otherwise, this reference was not very
useful.
Brown, Cynthia, Ed. "Peru" and "Colombia." With Friends Like
These--The Americas Watch On Human Rights & U.S. Policy In
Latin America. New York: Pantheon, 1985. pp. 208-209,
226-227, 230-231.
Discusses briefly the connection between drug traffickers
and Latin American terrorist/insurgent groups.
Cooper, Norman G., Colonel, USA, et al. The Pros And Cons Of
Military Intervention Into Drug Trafficking. Washington,
D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1986.
A very good reference presenting information on a wide range
of drug-related topics. Discusses such things as the threat
posed by illegal drugs, the need for a "drug czar," military
support provided, the National Narcotics Border Interdiction
System, U.S. Coast Guard Tactical Law Enforcement Teams, and
the connection between drug traffickers and terrorists.
Dragonette, Charles N. "The Coast Guard and Drug Interdiction--A
Kind of War." Sea Power Aug. 1979: 16-18.
Traces the increasing involvement of the Coast Guard in the
1970's in the interdiction effort. Explains the Coast
Guard's interdiction mission and provides some statistics on
quantities of drugs seized.
Friers, Thomas R., Major, USAF. DOD Involvement In The
Interdiction Of Illegal Drugs--A Staff Study. Maxwell AFB,
AL: Air Command and Staff College, 1986.
This is an unclassified study of the type of support the DOD
was providing (as of early 1986) to the national anti-drug
effort. The study contains facts and figures.
Hoey, Brian. "Fighting the Drug War." Airman Aug. 1984: 8-16.
Summarizes the support that the DOD has provided to the drug
interdiction effort, with special emphasis on Air Force
operations. Contains a thorough discussion of Operation
BAT.
Korb, Lawrence J. "DOD on the Drug War Front." Defense 85 Feb.
1985: 17-20.
Summarizes the support that the DOD has provided to the drug
interdiction effort. Operation BAT and Tactical Law
Enforcement Teams are discussed.
Lamar, Jr., Jacob V. "Crack" Time 2 June 1986: 16-18.
An article about the surging popularity of the highly
addictive form of cocaine known as "crack."
Lang, Richard Ernest, Lieutenant, USCG. Measuring And Enhancing
The Effectiveness Of Coast Guard Law Enforcement. Monterey,
CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1980.
A statistical analysis of Coast Guard effectiveness in the
area of drug law enforcement. The material is dated and not
very useful.
Martz, Larry, et al. "Trying to Say 'No.'" Newsweek 11 Aug.
1986: 14-19.
An interesting article about America's drug problem.
Contains recent statistics and provides good background
information. "Crack" is discussed. There is no mention of
military support of interdiction efforts but this article is
still valuable for the general information it contains.
Mitchell, Thaddeus R., and Robert S. Bell. Drug Interdiction
Operations By The Coast Guard: Summary. Alexandria, VA:
Center For Naval Analyses, 1980.
This reference was not very useful. The information and
statistics presented therein were old and of little value.
Meyer, Deborah G. "The Military Battles a New Foe: The Drug
Runner." Armed Forces Journal International Apr. 1983: 86-
89.
Explains how the military got involved in the drug war.
Lists the types of DOD support being provided in 1983. A
good article.
Morgan, G. Thomas, Commander, USCG. The Search For A Successful
Maritime Drug Interdiction Strategy. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air
War College, 1984.
Useful for the information it contains on Coast Guard drug
interdiction activities. The Posse Comitatus Act, National
Narcotics Border Interdiction System, and inter-agency
rivalries are also discussed.
Morganthau, Tom, et al. "Crack and Crimes." Newsweek 16 June
1986: 16-22.
The title of the article is self-explanatory. DEA
interdiction efforts are discussed. The article cites many
statistics. Not of much use for this report, but an
interesting article nonetheless.
Mudd, Joseph F., Colonel, USAF. Assigning DOD A Narcotics
Interdiction Mission. Washington, D.C.: National War
College, 1986.
Another fine reference for information on the National
Narcotics Border Interdiction System, the South Florida Task
Force, and the national strategy against drug abuse.
Provides an interesting discussion of the political and
legal realities of why the DOD is involved in the anti-drug
effort.
Newspapers.
Approximately 50 drug-related articles were clipped from The
Washington Post during the period from Sept. 1986 to date.
Similarly, about 10 useful articles were taken from the
Potomac News, and about 10 more from the Milwaukee Journal.
Norland, Rod, Mark Miller, and David G. Gonzales. "Snaring the
King of Coke." Newsweek 16 Feb. 1987: 16-18.
An interesting article detailing how a major drug
trafficker, Carlos Lehder Rivas, was captured in Colombia
and extradited to the United States. The article also
provides useful information about corruption in the
Colombian government and police force.
Philpott, Robert J., Commander, USCG. C3 in Joint Interdiction
Operations. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1986.
The author discusses his personal experiences with regard to
communications compatibility and interoperability of
equipment used by the agencies involved in the drug
interdiction effort. Severe communications problems and
shortfalls are highlighted and recommended solutions are
offered. It is an interesting report, but it was of little
value to this paper.
Reagan, Senate Republicans Join Drug War. Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., vol. 44, no. 38, 20 Sept.
1986.
Presents a thorough description of the provisions contained
in the Senate's 1986 anti-drug bill.
Seidenman, Paul. "SES Joins the Search." National Defense Dec.
1983: 44-46.
An article about the Coast Guard's new surface effect ships
(SES). Contains much more information about the SES's
characteristics than about drug interdiction. Not useful
for this research.
Shurtleff, Richard Ward, Major, USAF. The Air Force Involvement
In Drug Interdiction--An Analysis. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air
Command and Staff College, 1986.
Contains an excellent history of the Posse Comitatus Act.
It is also a good source of information on the El Paso
Information Center, South Florida Task Force, and the
National Narcotics Border Interdiction System.
Smith, Richard M. "The Plague Among Us." Newsweek 16 June 1986:
15.
An editorial by the Editor-In-Chief of Newsweek.
Interesting comments but of no use to this study.
Straub, Alice, and Jon A. Wiant. "Burma." 1985 Yearbook on
International Communist Affairs. Ed. Richard F. Staar.
Area Ed. Ramon H. Meyers. Stanford, CA: Hoover
Institution Press, 1985. 161-164.
Details the Burmese Communist Party's drug trafficking
activities in 1983 and 1984.
Taft, IV; William H. "The Role of DOD in Civilian Law
Enforcement." Defense 83 Mar. 1983: 6-10.
Provides good information on the history and legal
implications of the Posse Comitatus Act. Lists the types of
support the DOD has provided to civilian law enforcement
agencies.
Tegtmeyer, Glenn H., Major, USAF. Call For A Posse--The Air
Force Response. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff
College, 1984.
Provides a summary of Air Force support provided to civilian
law enforcement agencies during 1982 and 1983. Also
discusses the Posse Comitatus Act, the National Narcotics
Border Interdiction System, and the South Florida Task
Force.
Tice, R. Dean. "Fighting The Drug Flow." Defense 86 May-June
1986: 14-17.
Summarizes the support that DOD has provided to the drug
interdiction effort during the last few years. Operation
BAT is discussed.
Vail, W.A., et al. Threat Assessment: Methodology And Analysis.
Menlo Park, CA: SRI International, 1980.
A report of research sponsored by the U.S. Customs Service.
This is a 1980 report based on data collected during 1976 to
1978. The report contains many statistics and only studies
drugs entering the U.S. across the southern border. The
information is old and of little use.
Whitaker, Mark, Elaine Shannon, and Ron Moreau. "Colombia's King
of Coke." Newsweek 25 Feb. 1985: 19-22.
Intentifies Colombia's drug kingpins. The article is good
background reading.
Wiggins, Tony L., Major, USAF. U.S. Air Force Role In Drug
Interdiction December 1981 To October 1985. Maxwell AFB,
AL: Air Command and Staff College, 1986.
Summarizes Air Force involvement in drug interdiction
activites. Also discusses the Posse Comitatus Act and the
organization and functioning of the El Paso Intelligence
Center, the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System,
and the South Florida Task Force.
Zadareky, Joseph T., Colonel, USAF. National Drug Policy: Fact
or Fiction. Washington, D.C.: National War College, 1986.
Provides an interesting analysis of the threat illicit drugs
pose to national security. Provides information on narco-
terrorists, and discusses the 1984 National Strategy to
combat drug abuse. The history and activities of many
government agencies are also discussed. This is a good
reference.
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