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The Merchant Fleet Is Sinking
CSC 1987
SUBJECT AREA Topical Issues
Author Major E. K. Reed, USMC
                             EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
I.   Purpose.  To discuss the critical relationships that exist between
the U.S. merchant fleet and the national security of the United States
to include the national requirements for sealift, the current condition
of the U.S. merchant fleet, and the sealift improvements planned for
the immediate future.
II.  Thesis.  By providing much needed sealift, the U.S. Merchant Fleet
plays a vital role in the sea power of the United States; however, the
current condition of the U.S. merchant fleet seriously threatens the
national security of the United States.
III. Discussion.  The U.S. is an insular nation, dependent on the free
use of the seas and oceans to transport the raw materials and products
necessary to fuel the domestics economy, to communicate with allies,
and to conduct overseas military operations.  The U.S. has historically
relied upon the merchant fleet to provide the bulk of the country's
sealift capacity during peacetime and national emergency.  The import-
ance of the merchant fleet in transporting the supplies and equipment
necessary to reinforce and sustain forward deployed military forces in
both the Korean and Viet Nam Wars indicates that merchant shipping,
because of its carrying capacity, will also play a vital role in future
conflicts that threaten the security or national interests of the U.S.
However, the size and capability of the U.S. merchant fleet has steadily
declined to the point where the U.S. has become dependent on foreign
flag shipping to provide the needed sealift capacity in war and peace.
IV.  Conclusion.  The deterioration of the merchant fleet, primarily
brought about by economic concerns, threatens the U.S. economy and
seriously impairs the ability of the U.S. to deploy, reinforce, and
resupply forward deployed military forces around the world.  The sea-
lift improvement programs that are being developed will help to resolve
the shipping shortfalls, but for the most part, the programs are not
adequate to substantially improve the sealift capability of the merchant
fleet.  Until the importance of the relationship between the merchant
fleet and national security is recognized by our national leaders, the
merchant fleet will continue to decline.
V.   Recommendation.  Action must be taken by the national leadership to
reverse the decline of the U.S. merchant fleet.  Failure to reverse the
decline places the U.S. economy at risk and impairs the ability of the
U.S. to protect its national interests around the world.
                      THE MERCHANT FLEET IS SINKING
Thesis Statement:  By providing much needed sealift, the U.S. Merchant
Fleet plays a vital role in the sea power of the United States; however,
the current condition of the U.S. merchant fleet seriously threatens the
national security of the United States.
I.   Dependence of U.S. on the Merchant Fleet
     A.  Sealift as a component of sea power
          1.  Sea control and power projection
          2.  U. S. Navy sealift mission
     B.  Transportation of raw materials and finished products
     C.  U.S. dependence on imports
          1.  Susceptability to transportation embargos
          2.  Growth of the Soviet merchant fleet
     D.  Merchant fleet as a Naval auxiliary
          1.  Korean War
          2.  Viet Nam War
     E.  Military shipping in future conflicts
          1.  Lack of amphibious shipping
          2.  Inadequacy of prepositioning
          3.  NATO wartime requirements
II.  Decline of the Merchant Fleet
     A.  Decline in number of ships
     B.  Government agency responsibility
          1.  Military Sealift Command
               a.   Responsibility
               b.   Fleet control
          2.  Maritime Administration
               a.   Responsibility
               b.   Fleet control
               c.   National Defense Readiness Fleet
               d.   Ready Reserve Fleet
     C.  American owned foreign registered ships
     D.  Manning for the Merchant Fleet
          1.  Decline in employment
          2.  Personnel qualifications
          3.  Future declines
     E.  Industrial capacity
          1.  Experiences prior to WWII
          2.  NATO scenario
          3.  Future shipbuilding outlook
     F.  Military usefulness of merchant ships
          1.  Cost considerations
          2.  Offloading capability
          3.  Transportation suitability
III. Shipping attrition
     A.  History of war against commerce
          1.  German U-Boat campaign
          2.  War against Japan
     B.  Soviet interdiction of U.S. shipping
IV.  Sealift improvement programs
     A.  Inadequacy of legislation
     B.  Prepositioning programs
     C.  Fast sealift program
     D.  Cargo handling
     E.  New legislative initiatives
V.   Future Outlook
     A.  600 Ship Navy
     B.  Funding
                       THE MERCHANT FLEET IS SINKING
    On May 14, 1915 a London Times' military correspondent saw a British
battalion shrink from 29 officers and 1045 men to 1 officer and 245 men
in a single days battle against the Germans near Lille, France.  To
record the battle he wrote, "The attacks were well planned.  The infantry
did splendidly, but the conditions were too hard.  The want of an
unlimited supply of high explosives was a fatal bar to our success."1
Not known to the correspondent, French forces to the right of the British
position had been able to carry the objective with only minimal losses.
The difference between the success of the French and failure of the
British was the availability of artillery ammunition.  The French were
able to fire 1 round every minute for four hours, while the British could
only manage 40 minutes of artillery fire before running out of
    The failure of the British demonstrates that the availability or lack
of supplies and equipment at the right time and place can mean the
difference between battlefield success or failure.  Today, the ability of
the NATO alliance to blunt a Soviet attack in Central Europe is
immediately dependent upon the ability of the U.S. to reinforce and
resupply NATO's forward deployed military forces.  Prepositioning of
supplies and equipment, both on land and at sea, have reduced the time
required to deploy military forces to Central Europe and other areas of
the world to protect U.S. interests.  However, prepositioning does not
address the deployment of follow-on forces or the sustaining resupply
that is required to fight and win.  While airlift can provide rapid
resupply, the volume of supplies and equipment required to sustain a
large military force for longer than several weeks can only be supplied
from the sea.
    Historically, the U.S. has relied upon the commercial fleet to
provide the bulk of the country's sealift capability in a national
emergency.  The relationship between the merchant fleet and national
security is so close that the merchant marine is often referred to as
the fourth arm of defense.  Much less glamorous than transporting war
supplies, the merchant fleet also provides the vital link between the
U.S., foreign markets, and critically needed natural resources.  By
providing much needed sealift, the U.S. merchant fleet plays a vital
role in the sea power of the U.S.; however, the current condition of
the U.S. merchant fleet seriously threatens the national security of
the United States.
    The U.S. is an insular nation that is dependent on the free use of
the oceans and seas to transport the raw materials and products
necessary to fuel the economy, to communicate with allies and to conduct
overseas military operations.  The vital dependence of the U.S. on
waterborne communications has resulted in the U.S. placing primary
emphasis on protecting and controlling vital sea lines of communication
in both peace and war.  While naval forces are necessary for sea control
and power projection missions, sea power is not synonymous with the
strength and power of naval forces alone.  Mahan's thesis that sea power
consists of both naval strength and the peaceful commerce and shipping
of a nation remains true today.2  The importance that the U.S. Navy
places on sealift is evidenced by the fact that sea lift has been
established as the third primary mission of the Navy along with sea
control and power projection.3
    Certainly a strong and modern Navy is essential for a nation to
develop as a sea power and to control the use of the seas in peace and
war.  But a viable merchant fleet and a sound economics base are also
vital components of sea power.4   Without a viable merchant fleet, gain-
ing control of the oceans and seas would be meaningless because the
vital flow of raw materials and finished goods could not be maintained
between the U.S. and foreign sources, and the ability of the U.S. to
transport troops, equipment and supplies during a conflict would be
severely impaired.
    Since the earliest recorded times, the seas and oceans of the world
have been used to transport raw materials and finished products between
countries.  Merchant shipping is as important to the worlds economy in
1987 as merchant shipping was in earlier times, due  to the-great
volume that ships can carry and the relatively low cost of waterborne
transportation compared to other modes of transportation.  Moreover,
statistics show that the U.S. depends upon imports for numerous essential
materials needed to fuel the domestic economy and the defense industrial
base; imports that can only be economically transported by shipping.5
    The dependence of the U.S. on imports makes the nation extremely
vulnerable to the disruption of trade such as that experienced during
the 1974 oil embargo imposed by the OPEC nations.  Another type of trade
interference that has been made possible through the increasing reliance
of the U.S. on foreign flag shipping to transport both imports and
exports is the disruption of the transportation between the U.S. and
foreign markets through a foreign flag shipping boycott.  The U.S. must
remember that some countries may think that it is in their best interest
to disrupt U.S. trade, especially in a crisis situation.  A strong U.S.
merchant fleet would reduce the threat of a foreign flag shipping
boycott.  Current trends indicate that the Soviet Union and Warsaw pact
nations understand the importance of maintaining a strong merchant fleet.
The Soviet Union has built one of the largest and finest merchant fleets
in the world.  The Soviet fleet is currently ranked fifth in the world in
number of ships (1750 ships) and eighth in the world in carrying capacity
(20.7 million deadweight tons).6   The Soviets also clearly understand
the link between merchant ships and the military potential of those ships
by employing a large number of mid-size merchant ships that are readily
adaptable to military purposes.
    The U.S. has relied upon the merchant fleet to serve as a naval
auxiliary to provide logistics support in time of war or national
emergency.7   The importance of merchant shipping to the allied countries
in winning both the first and second world wars is well documented.
Although future wars or conflicts may be prolonged, the scale of the war
is likely to be smaller and the objectives less ambitious than those of
WWII.  Will merchant shipping play as important a role in future
conflicts as in WWI or WWII?  A brief look at the importance of the
merchant marine during the Korean and Viet Nam wars may provide some
insight into the future need for merchant shipping in war time.
    On 1 May 1957, Admiral Arleigh A. Burke talking about the Korean war
said, "...Control of the sea is a prerequisite to victory in modern war,
whatever its size, type or scope...."8    During the Korean war, U.S.
control of the sea was never seriously challenged; however, the U.S.
Navy was faced with the formidable task of transporting reinforcement
troops and equipment to the Korean peninsula  and resupplying American,
Korean, and other U.N. forces with the materials necessary to wage war.
During the period June 1950 to June 1953, the Military Sea Transportation
Service transported approximately 52 million measurement tons of cargo,
5 million passengers and 22 million tons of petroleum from the U.S. to
the Korean peninsula.9   Ground and air operations were completely
dependent on the steady flow of men, equipment and supplies that were
carried across the Pacific on merchant shipping.  Air transport which
could provide rapid response could not possibly have maintained the
necessary flow of men and materials.  For every ton of air freight,
there were 270 tons of  freight delivered by ships and 4 tons of
petroleum delivered by ships for the aircraft.10  It should be noted
that the large number of U.S. merchant ships left over from WWII made
mobilizing the 368 ships required for Korea a relatively easy task for
the U.S.  to accomplish.
    Much less has been written about the use of merchant ships to supply
U.S. and Viet Namese forces than in previous conflicts; however, it is
evident that the flow of war materials to Viet Nam was once again
dependent upon merchant ships.  (Personnel were transported to and from
Viet Nam almost exclusively by air craft.)  About 97.5% of all equipment
and supplies delivered to Viet Nam moved on ships.11  Unlike the Korean
conflict, the U.S. did not have a large supply of readily available
merchant ships or merchant marines to fall back on in 1965.  Fortunately,
the U.S. was able to control the escalation of war which meant that fewer
ships were required at the start of the war.
    The importance of merchant shipping in the Korean and Viet Nam Wars
to reinforce and resupply forward deployed military forces indicates
that merchant shipping will play a vital role in future conflicts where
a large military force must be sustained on foreign shores. The Navy's
amphibious shipping does not possess sufficient capacity to provide
adequate reinforcement or sustaining resupply, and the expansion of the
amphibious fleet to lift the assault echelons of a MAF and MAB has
slipped to the late 1990's.  Various prepositioning programs such as
the Army's POCMUS in Europe, geographic prepositioning in Norway and
MPS have reduced the amount of shipping required for initial deployment;
however, prepositioned supplies and equipment will only last 30-60 days
before resupply is needed.  Resupply at the volume required can only be
provided by merchant ships.  The Navy, for example, estimates that over
90% of the supplies and equipment needed to sustain a war effort would
have to be carried by ships; a mechanized division requires more than
1,000 tons a day to sustain operations.12
    Without adequate sealift U.S. and allied forces will not be able to
fight a conventional war longer than several weeks.  During the first
180 days of a conflict between the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact,
1700 ships will be required to transport 40 million tons of supplies
and equipment to reinforce and resupply U.S. and non-U.S. military
forces; an additional 1400 ships transporting approximately 1300 million
tons will be required to transport the material to sustain the wartime
economies of the U.S. and other NATO countries.13    The requirement for
merchant shipping becomes even greater if the war is not limited to a
NATO only scenario.  In a global conflict even greater quantities of
equipment and supplies will be required to be transported over longer
distances than in a NATO only conflict.
    While merchant shipping both in peace and wartime has remained
vital to the national security of the U.S., the U.S. merchant fleet
has steadily declined to the point where the foreign trade of the U.S.
is effectively controlled by the merchant fleets of foreign nations.
The number of U.S. merchant ships has declined from 4500 in 1945 to
approximately 736 commercial and government owned ships at the end of
1986, and these ships only carry 8.5% of the U.S. imports and exports
that are transported by ship.14  It is also interesting to note that
the decline of the U.S. merchant fleet occurred at a time when both
the number of ships and dead weight tons of world-wide merchant shipping
were increasing.  Two government agencies discussed below, the Military
Sealift Command and the Maritime Administration, are responsible for
administering the various strategic sealift programs.
    The Military Sealift Command (MSC) has the responsibility of
providing common user ocean transportation support to the Department of
Defense.  Since privately-owned merchant ships provide the bulk of the
strategic sealift, MSC also serves as DoD's link with the U.S. merchant
fleet.  MSC controls a fleet of approximately 140 government owned and
chartered ships to carry out a variety of defence related duties around
the world including maritime prepositioning ships, resupply of military
forces around the world, special missions, and miscellaneous services.
    The Maritime Administration (MARAD) within the Department of
Transportation administers programs related to ocean and Great Lakes
shipping during peacetime.15    MARAD is also the federal agency that
would requisition U.S. merchant shipping under the Merchant Marine Act
of 1936 upon declaration by the President that the security of the nation
is in jeopardy or that a national emergency exists.  MARAD also manages
the National Defence Readiness Fleet (NDRF) and the Ready Reserve Fleet
(RRF).  Both the NDRF and the RRF provide a source of emergency shipping
(approximately 230 ships) to augment shipping assets in an emergency.
The 170 ships in the NDRF have an average age of 35 years and are capable
of being activated in 30-45 days.  The 60 ships in the RRF are maintained
in a high state of readiness and can be activated in 5-10 days.  The Navy
periodically activates the ships in the RRF to participate in fleet
operations and conducts no-notice test activation drills to test the
readiness of the RRF.  In 1950 and 1965, the NDRF had 2277 ships and 1594
ships respectively which explains why the U.S. was able to mobilize the
needed shipping to support the Korean and Viet Nam Wars.  If a crisis
were to arise today, the U.S. does not have a large fleet of reserve
ships that can be rapidly mobilized to support the war effort.
    In addition to the U.S. merchant and government owned ships, ships
that are owned by Americans but registered in foreign countries provide
a source ot shipping that may be available to provide strategic sealift
in a crisis situation.  Due to the expense of operating U.S. merchant
ships, American owners have increasingly registered ships in foreign
countries.  U.S. owned foreign flag shipping is considered to effec-
tively be under U.S. control as all American owned ships can be
requisitioned in time of war and national emergency regardless of the
country where the ship is registered.  The owners of these ships have
maintained that their ships would be available in a national emergency;
however, the response of the crew, most of which are foreigners, cannot
be determined in advance, especially since the threat against merchant
shipping will be high in a major conflict with the Soviets.16
    Along with the decline in the U.S. merchant fleet, there has been
a corresponding reduction in the pool of manpower available to man the
fleet.  The seafaring employment on U.S. flag ships has declined from
168,000 in 1945 to 11,000 in 1986.17  The declining number of merchant
marines indicates that manning the ships in the NDRF and RRF may be the
biggest challenge facing the timely activation of the reserve fleets.
Another manpower problem facing the activation of the reserve fleets is
the qualifications of the merchant marines.  Modern merchant ships are
moving away from steam driven engines to more economical diesel engines
which will result in the number of people qualified on steam driven
ships becoming smaller each year; however, the reserve fleet consists
primarily of steam driven ships.18    Without merchant marines to man the
reserve fleet the capability of the U.S. to rapidly activate the reserve
fleet in the event of a national emergency is severely impaired.  If the
downward spiral experienced in the recent past continues for merchant
ships, the number of merchant marines can also be expected to continue
to decline further aggravating the problem of manning the reserve fleets.
    The industrial capacity of the U.S. to produce merchant ships has
also declined substantially since the end of WWII.  In testimony before
the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1984, Secretary of the Navy John
Lehman said, "In 1941, the U.S. was building 1 merchant ship per day...
In 1984, we had one merchant ship under construction."19  Just because
the U.S. industrial base was able to respond in WWII and Korea to the
increased demands caused by those wars is no indication that it will be
able to do so again.  In WWII, the U.S. sat on the sidelines for two
years expanding industry in response to orders from the British and
other allied countries before entering the war.  In a NATO scenario the
U.S. will be immediately involved and unless the industrial capacity is
immediately available it may be of little use.  Unfortunately,
industrial trends are not encouraging for an improvement in U.S.
shipbuilding.  The lack of industrial capacity means that the size of
the fleet at the beginning of the war takes on an added importance as
additional ships cannot be built fast enough to meet demand or replace
     Since the U.S. has let commercial concerns drive the size of the
U.S. merchant fleet it should not be surprising to learn that newer U.S.
merchant ships are not as militarily useful as their predecessors.  Cost
considerations have driven new ship construction resulting in the
construction of ships that are not self-sustaining or too large to be
used at unimproved ports.  Most of these ships can only be offloaded at
a limited number of ports around the world.  In a war or other crisis it
is reasonable to expect the enemy to attempt to deny the use of the port
facilities to the allies through a variety of means such as mining,
destruction, or sabotage.  Without adequate port facilities the ability
to offload merchant ships becomes extremely difficult under the best
conditions and next to impossible in some conditions.  Increasingly
popular container ships are also less suitable for transporting mili-
tary cargo than either break bulk ships or roll-on/roll-off ships
(RO-RO).  The fact that the U.S. requires all U.S. built merchant
ships to possess certain national defence features that are required
for military service is of little value when no commercial ships are
being built in U.S. shipyards.  Ship construction is orientated towards
reducing construction cost and enchancing operational efficiency which
means that many features required for military operations are not
included in new ship construction.
    Another factor which must be considered when discussing the employ-
ment of merchant shipping during war time is the shipping losses that
can be expected due to the enemy action.  Guerre de course or commerce
raiding has a long history in wars between nations because the
destruction of the enemies sea borne commerce effectively destroys his
ability to wage a protracted war.  The German U Boat campaign in WWII
resulted in a total of 5150 allied ships sunk during the period 1939-
1945 with the majority of losses occurring between 1940-1942; Churchill
writing about the U Boat campaign said, "The only thing that frightened
me during the war was the U-Boat peril."20  The success of the U.S. in
destroying the Japanese merchant fleet effectively isolated Japan and
the Japanese outposts from the rest of the world.  If the Germans could
have continued to sink allied shipping in the North Atlantic or the
Japanese could have countered the U.S. attacks on Japanese merchant
ships, the outcome of WWII could have been different.
    Just as Guerre de course was employed by both sides in WWII, the
U.S. can expect the Soviets to interdict the Sea Lines of Communication
between the U.S. and Europe and other overseas locations using both
submarines and Soviet naval aviation.  Losses of 20% of all allied
shipping are not unreasonable given Soviet capabilities, and losses will
be the heaviest at the start of the war.  As the war progresses,
American naval superiority especially in the area of Anti-submarine
Warfare will greatly reduce the Soviet threat to merchant ships, but
whether or not the tide can be turned soon enough is a matter of debate.
Given the deterioration of the U.S. merchant fleet losses will have a
larger impact on the war effort than anytime in U.S. history, and the war
in Central Europe could be lost on the North Atlantic.
    The U.S. has enacted a number of laws that were intended to
preserve the U.S. merchant fleet and shipbuilding industry through
various subsidies and incentives.  As evidenced by the deterioration of
the merchant fleet these laws have not been successful in preserving the
U.S. merchant fleet.  Naval leaders, recognizing that the national
security of the U.S. is vitally dependent on maintaining an adequate
sealift capability and that the U.S. merchant fleet will probably
continue to decline, have developed a number of programs to expand the
availability of and enhance the usability of merchant ships for military
operations.  These programs will not solve all of the problems, but they
do provide a means for improving the strategic sealift capability of the
U.S.  Some of those programs are outlined in the following paragraphs.
    Prepositioning of equipment and supplies both ashore and aboard MSC
chartered ships have greatly enhanced the ability of the U.S. to rapidly
deploy forces to potential crisis spots around the world.  Currently the
Marine Corps has the equipment and supplies needed to sustain a 16,000
man MAB for 30 days prepositioned aboard 13 MPS ships.  The 13 MPS ships
have been grouped into 3 MPS squadrons that are positioned in the
Atlantic Ocean, Indian Ocean, and Western Pacific.  The Marine Corps is
also prepositioning the equipment and supplies needed to sustain a MAB
for 30 days in the country of Norway under a bilateral agreement between
the governments of the U.S. and Norway.  Finally, the U.S. Army, under
its POCMUS program has prepositioned 4 division sets of equipment in
Europe and has plans to preposition 2 additional sets of equipment in
    To further enhance the strategic sealift, the Navy acquired eight
SL-7 container ships, with a cargo capacity of 255,000 square feet from
Sea-Land Corporation.  The ships were converted into vehicle and cargo
carriers capable of cruising at 33 knots.  Three to five of these ships
could deliver all the supplies and equipment for a mechanized division
to Southwest Asia in 11 to 12 days or to Europe in 3 to 5 days.  The
purchase of the SL-7 container ships which were no longer economical to
operate appears to fit the pattern that has emerged whereby the Navy
purchases ships that are being discarded from the merchant fleet for
strategic sealift.  The purchased ships will also be used to increase
the size of the RRF from 60 ships to 116 ships by 1991.21
    Since newer merchant ships are less militarily useful than their
predecessors the Navy is outfitting 12 existing containerships with
heavy duty cranes that can be used to off load non-selfsustaining
merchant ships.  Two of these ships have been delivered and 3 are
undergoing conversion.  To permit containerships to carry outsize
military cargo, 600 of a planned 2000 sea sheds, a collapsible frame
or shed, have been built.  Furthermore, the ability of the U.S. to move
supplies and equipment over the shore has been steadily improving;
however, unloading a large merchant ship outside of an established port
or harbor is challenging and requires ideal weather and sea conditions.
     Several legislative initiatives, such as the build and charter
program where the government would fund ship construction and then
charter the operations of the ship to a shipping company, have the
possibility of increasing the number of available ships and improving
the state of the U.S. shipbuilding industry.  However, funding
constraints will probably preclude the enactment of any legislation for
the build and charter program.  Other legislation to counter restrictive
practices by other countries or to increase subsidies to American ship
owners will probably not be successful in the foreseeable future.
The strategic sealift improvements are a step in the right direction,
but DoD budget cuts in future years may preclude additional improvements.
Currently, the Navy is well on its way to achieving the 600 ship Navy.
However, Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman has stated that the
sustaining ship construction rate for the 600 ship Navy is an average of
20 ships per year in new construction.  To achieve the 20 ship per year
construction rate requires a 3% real growth in the Navy's budget; a
growth rate of less than 3% cannot sustain the 600 ship Navy. 22  Given
the current political climate and the increased emphasis being placed in
reducing the federal deficit, a sustained growth rate of 3% may not be
achievable, and the future of the sealift improvement programs will be
    Can the deterioration of the merchant fleet be reversed?  The decline
of the U.S. merchant fleet has occurred over a long period of time, and
the reasons for the decline are varied and complicated.  The basic reason
for the decline of the U.S. merchant fleet is that U.S. merchant ships
are too expensive to operate in comparison with the ships registered in
other countries.  The cost of building ships in U.S. shipyards has also
led to the decline in the shipbuilding industry.  Economic concerns have
driven the size and configuration of the U.S. merchant fleet to the
detriment of the country's national security considerations.  The U.S.,
an insular nation dependent on the free use of the seas and oceans, has
failed to understand the linkage between economic and defense security to
its maritime independence.  Unless that linkage is clearly understood and
action is taken to reverse the trends of the past, the U.S. merchant
fleet will continue to decline, and the U.S. will remain dependent on
foreign flag shipping for both commerce and defense needs.
    1Robert Greenhalgh and Jennie Barnes Pope, Sea Lanes in Time of
War (Boston:  W. W. Norton Company, 1942), p. 207.
     2William E. Livezy, Mahan on Sea Power (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1947), P. 41.
     3Admiral James Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," The Maritime
Strategy Supplement, (January 1986), 11.
     4Robert J. Hanks, American Sea Power and Global Strategy
(Washington:  Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985), p. 22.
     5"Seapower Facts and Figures: Maritime," Seapower, 30 (January
1987), 207.
     6U.S. Department of the Navy, Understanding Soviet Naval
Developments, pp. 35-60.
     7Clinton H. Whitehurst, The U. S. Merchant Marine (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1983), p. 5.
     8Malcom W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea
(Annapolis:  Naval Institute Press, 1957), p. vi.
     9Cagle and Manson, p. 532.
     10Cagle and Manson, p. 493.
     11Frank Uhlig, ed., Viet Nam: The Naval Strategy (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1986), p. 498.
     12Seth Cropsey, "Forward Defense or Maginot Line", Policy Review,
38 (Fall 1986), 41.
     13Whitehurst, pp. 130-133.
     14"Sea Power Facts and Figures: Maritime," Seapower, 30 (January
1987), 207.
     15U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mobility System Policies, Procedures
and Considerations (Washington, 1983), p. II-12.
     16Whitehurst, p. 223.
     17"Seapower Facts and Figures, Maritime," Seapower, 30 (January
1987), 208.
     18VADM Thomas J. Hughes, "Logistics Becomes Legitimate" Seapower,
29 (May 1986), 20.
     19U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Sea Power
and Force Projection, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services
on the Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY
1985 S.2414, 98th Congress, Second session, 1984.
     20Greenhalgh and Pope, p. 343.
     21Paula Pettavino, "The Fourth Arm of Defense: That Sinking
Feeling,"  Seapower, 29 (June 1986), 52.
     22John H. Lehman, "The 600 Ship Navy," The Maritime Strategy
Supplement, (January 1986), 38.
Cagle, Malcom and Frank Mansom.  The Sea War In Korea. Annapolis: Naval
     Institute Press, 1957.
Cropsey, Seth.  "Forward Defense or Maginot Line."  Policy Review, 38
     (Fall 1986), 40-46.
Gill, Timothy.  Industrial Preparedness.  Washington:  National Defense
     University Press, 1984.
Greenhalgh, Robert and Jennie Barnes Pope.  Sea Lanes in Time of War.
     Boston: W. W. Norton Co., 1942.
Hanks, Robert.  American Sea Power and Global Strategy.  Washington:
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