Find a Security Clearance Job!

Military

Marine Corps Roles And Missions A Case For Specialization
CSC 1987
SUBJECT AREA General
		MARINE CORPS ROLES AND MISSIONS
                   A CASE FOR SPECIALIZATION
                              by
                   Major Joseph A. Crookston
                   Command and Staff College
                           6  May 1987
                            ABSTRACT
Author:   Crookston, Joseph A., Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Title:    Marine Corps Roles and Missions:  A Case for Special-
          ization
Date:     6 May 1987
    This  paper examines the nature of roles and missions
assigned to the Marine Corps since 1975 and offers an argument
favoring sufficient specialization by selected units to ensure
that the members of those units have adequate training and
expertise to carry out these assigned missions successfully.
    The paper will begin with a historical overview of the public
pressures that may have been felt by the Marine Corps to seek new
missions following the experience in Vietnam.  Of particular note
are the Brookings Institute and "Haynes Board" studies and the
annual Defense Department reports to Congress.
    Subsequent sections address three areas in which the Marine
Corps has been tasked with missions requiring a higher degree of
expertise than should be expected of a general purpose force.  The
first of these, the Marine Amphibious Brigade reinforcement in
Norway, will make tremendous demands on leadership skills at all
levels during intense cold weather.  Significantly, the Marine
Corps has not been receptive to any suggestion that the severity
of the foreseeable environment will necessitate dedicating units
for the mission.  This includes recommendations made by Northrop
Services, an independent research group commissioned by the Marine
Corps to examine the issue.
    Next, the potential problems associated with the Marine
Corps' willingness to rely on its general purpose units to fight
as a mechanized Marine Amphibious Brigade or Force that has
married up with the equipment associated with the Maritime
Prepositioning Ships is addressed.  The "Haynes Board" report is
an important element of this part of the study.
    The third area to be reviewed involves the Special Operations
Capable Marine Amphibious Units.  The list of tasks that each unit
must demonstrate proficiency in prior to deployment requires
demanding training preparation.  Limitations on time and training
opportunities indicate that the soundest approach would be to
limit the number of units assigned that mission to allow a broader
experience base to develop:  This has not been the case for one of
the two divisions providing units.
    When viewed together, these three missions would seem to
justify the earmarking of forces to the indicated roles.  That
this can be done without impacting adversely is presented in the
form of a notional deployment plan for the Marine Corps' infantry
battalions.
                         TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.  Chapter  One:    Introduction                              1
2.  Chapter  Two:    The Case For A Cold Weather Brigade       6
3.  Chapter  Three:  The Case For Mechanized Brigades         37
4.  Chapter  Four:   Unit Deployment Program                  54
5.  Chapter  Five:   Conclusions                              73
6.  Endnotes                                                  79
7.  Appendices                                               A-1
8.  Bibliography                                             C-1
                             CHAPTER ONE
                             INTRODUCTION
         The Marine Corps should be tasked to operate
         on the "worldwide littoral of the oceans and
         seas with specific exclusion of the Arctic,
         Antarctic, and NATO's northern flank....
         These exclusions are needed to ensure that no
         one really thinks that the Marine Corps, as a
         force-in-readiness, can be all things at once."
                               Colonel B.G. Brown
                               Marine Corps Gazette, 1981
         "Suggestions that one or the other regiment or
         squadron be dedicated to the left or the right
         are fatal siren songs that would lure the Marine
         Corps into the rocks and shoals of untenable
         divisiveness in esprit and piecemeal decimation
         in the field."
                               Major D. Maltese
                               Marine Corps Gazette, 1985
    Traditionally, the United States Marine Corps has been
regarded as a light, general purpose force whose primary mission,
as stated in the National Security Act of 1947 and amended in
1952, was (and still is) the "seizure or defense of advanced naval
bases and the conduct of such land operations as may be essential
to the prosecution of a naval campaign..."  Of the three other
stated missions in the Act, the one which has had a major
influence on commitments of the Marine Corps in the post-World War
II era states "...and [the performance of] such other duties as
the President may direct".
    Following the end of hostilities involving American ground
forces in Vietnam in 1973, Martin Binkin and Jeffrey Record,
analysts for the Brookings Institution, raised a new issue:
changed political focus brought the continued need or
justification for the Marine Corps into question.  In the
introduction to their study, Where Does The Marine Corps Go From
Here?, they claimed that James R. Schlesinger, the Secretary of
Defense, expressed an interest in resolving the question of a
continued need for a distinct corps of Marines at least twice,
once in 1974 in connection with force interdependence studies then
underway, and again in 1975 when his defense budget request was
submitted to the Congress.1  While their recording of the
Secretary's feelings were taken somewhat out of context,2 the
quoted statement justified their premise that the Marine Corps
needed a change in force structure and orientation legitimacy.
They concluded that, while the traditional role of the Marine
Corps as an amphibious assault force may no longer be appropriate,
its continued separate existence as a smaller (1-1/3 Marine
Amphibious Force) force dedicated to amphibious warfare was
justifiable.3  Their suggestion that the fiscal emphasis given to
the aviation element was unwarranted struck at the legislative
foundation (combined arms) of the Marine Corps' unique
configuration.  At the time, their published work received wide
attention, both inside the Marine Corps and outside.
    The apparent coincidence between Binkin and Record's work and
the so-called Haynes Board Study, an "in-house" effort published
by the Marine Corps shortly after the Brookings study, provides a
tempting opportunity to speculate on their apparent cause and
effect relationship.  For this, the Commandant of the Marine Corps
commissioned a Force Structure Study Group, under the chairmanship
of Major General F. Haynes, to examine future missions and force
structures for the Marine Corps.4  Their charge was to examine
alternative force structures, their disposition, and to give
consideration to how these would be deployed and employed.  What
is striking is the parallel between the respective focuses of this
study and the Brookings Institution effort, as well as the
proximity of the date of their publication.  The attention given
to the findings and recommendations of the Haynes Board study will
be pointed out in a subsequent section of this paper.
    Tangible indication of a new, or perhaps, more specific
direction for Marine Corps roles and missions was provided in July
1978 in a Department of Defense Program Decision Memorandum from
the Deputy Secretary for Defense, Charles Duncan, to the Secretary
of the Navy, William Claytor.  In this, the Marine Corps was to be
directed to plan for "...rapid reinforcement of Norway with an
airlifted, brigade-sized force."  Mention was made of the
intention to rely, at least in part, on equipment to be preposi-
tioned in Norway.5
    Presumably in response to this formally-assigned tasking, the
Marine Corps contracted in November 1979 with Northrop Services,
Incorporated, an independent research and analysis firm, to
examine the Marine Corps' ability to conduct amphibious operations
and subsequent operations ashore under cold weather conditions.6
As will be noted in greater detail in a subsequent section of this
paper, the results indicated that significant philosophical
changes were needed to effectively meet the demands of this new
mission.
    With the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in
March 1980, further evidence of a higher degree of specificity of
mission for the Marine Corps became evident.  In the 1980 annual
report to the Congress by Harold Brown, then Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary ..."went on record in this budget submission as
indicating that the desire was to be able to lift the equipment
for an armor-heavy Marine division-sized force."  Additionally,
use of the terms "substantially mechanized or armored elements"
gave even clearer indication of the Department of Defense's intent
to rely on the Marine Corps for "heavier" duty than it had here-
tofore been planned to provide.7   Subsequent creation of the Near-
Term Prepositioned Ships program, followed by three squadrons of
Maritime Prepositioned Ships, each loaded with the equipment and
supplies to sustain a "mech-heavy" Marine Amphibious Brigade,
solidified the intent of the Secretary of Defense to be able to
rapidly respond to a situation (wherein a mechanized or armored
threat would be expected) with a force capable of meeting the
threat.
    Several authors have commented on the perception that the
Marine Corps was attempting to identify with specific roles and
missions during this period.  This has been particularly apparent
with regard to the Marine Corps' apparent pursuit of a role in the
defense of Norway.  For example, R.D.M. Furlong, writing in
International Defense Review in 1979, stated that the "...AFNORTH
staff is hopeful that, with the USMC "looking for a job" since
Vietnam, the whole of II MAF will be committed to the Northern
Flank."8  One writer indicated that it would be naive and
suggestive of a lack of understanding of the Nation's defense
policies and strategy to think that the Marine Corps' existence
could be threatened for lack of "specific" missions.9  More
recently, J.H. Alexander interpreted the Marine Corps' actions in
actively pursuing a role in Norway as a reflection of changing
roles and missions which could be viewed as a consequence of
declining amphibious lift and increasing emphasis on rapid
deployment actions.10  Whichever viewpoint is taken, it is clear
that considerable attention was given, both inside and outside of
the Marine Corps during the late 1970's, to the future direction
of the Service.
    It is in light of these "signals" that this study is
presented.  It would seem clear that the peculiarities of each of
these potential roles demand a closer examination of the issue of
dedicating units, to ensure that the Marine Corps is able to
operate effectively and successfully in these unique settings.
                            CHAPTER TWO
                 THE CASE FOR A COLD WEATHER BRIGADE
              "Upon reaching the Koto-ri plateau the
              7th Marines was first to meet a new enemy
              who would take a heavier toll in casual-
              ties than the Chinese.  This was General
              Winter, who has won many a historic campaign.
              When the first cold blasts struck, our men
              were not conditioned for it.  The doctors
              reported numerous cases where the men came
              down to the sickbay suffering from what
              appeared to be shock.  Some of them came
              in crying; some were extremely nervous;
              and the doctors said it was simply the
              sudden shock of the terrific cold when they
              were not ready for it."
    Thus spoke Colonel H.L. Litzenberg, the first regimental comm
ander to take Marines into battle for a prolonged time in an
environ-ment of intense cold.1  History provides several examples
of warfare carried out under conditions of cold weather in which
the deciding factor was provided more by that cold weather than
the combat capability of the enemy force.  While it is not the
purpose of this paper to review these historical lessons with a
view to providing a convincing argument for change, their mention,
at least, is supportive.
    Writers on cold weather warfare are generally quick to hold up
the example of Napoleon and his failure in the Russian Campaign of
1812, although his campaign was also marred by poor logistics
planning and faulty commander's judgment.2  Not as frequently
stressed was his earlier experience in East Prussia and Poland,
which culminated in the Battle at Eylau, and where his army's
performance during this "Winter War" of 1806-1807 was influenced
markedly by the weather conditions.3
    In 1941, the Germans, with their well-trained and disciplined
army, retraced the footsteps of Napoleon.  In failing to take full
advantage of the lessons available from the study of Napoleon's
campaign, the Germans found themselves halted before Moscow and
then torn apart by the unforgiving cold.  Again, poor logistics
planning and assumptions aggravated the problems associated with
operating in the cold.4  Two years earlier, the Russians had had a
similar experience in Finland, where the lack of preparation for
cold weather operations contributed significantly to their
losses.5  Conversely, the Finns' greater experience and ability to
survive the arctic conditions provided them with the advantage
needed by the smaller force.  These experiences were not lost on
the Soviets as they returned to Finland in 1944, this time much
better equipped and prepared to operate in the intense cold.6
Similarly, the Germans' successful occupation of the Scandinavian
region after 1941 attests to their attention to lessons of the
past.7
    Forces of the United States are not without recent cold
weather experience.  The 1943 assault on Attu, an island in the
Aleutian chain, provides a clear example of the consequences of a
force poorly equipped, led and inadequately trained for the
mission, being expected to operate in cold weather.8  In 1950, the
Korean conflict gave U.S. Marines and soldiers their most recent
exposure to the unique environment of cold weather operations.
Their success at the Chosin Reservoir has been attributed as much
to the fact that the Chinese Communist Forces were even worse
prepared than the Marines for combat under the conditions they
were forced to endure as any other factor.9  A brief illustration
of this is worthwhile.  Marines from 1st Battalion, 7th Marines,
while carrying out a patrol on 9 December 1950, crossed a ridge
and found 50 Chinese Communist Force soldiers huddled in foxholes.
"They were so badly frozen, that the men simply lifted them from
the holes and sat them on the road [for movement to a prisoner of
war collection point.]"10
    In each of the cases cited, the commanders and their staffs
had available to them historical lessons that, had they or could
they have been heeded, might have contributed to altered results.
in at least two instances, the forces involved had their own
experience from which to learn.  In the others, the lessons of
history should have provided adequate forewarning.  The Marine
Corps is currently in the advantageous position of being able to
benefit from its own experience as well as those of others.
Additionally, it enjoys another factor not historically possessed
by others historically; that is, the Marine Corps' intended role
in the reinforcement of an ally, Norway, whose geographic position
is characterized by cold weather conditions, has been directed and
advertised.  What remains, then, is to take advantage of this
tremendous lead.  In doing so, there are three things every Marine
must appreciate:
         >Norway's strategic importance
         >Its vulnerability to soviet attack
         >The simultaneous presence of two threats
The Strategic Importance of Norway
    John Berg, writing in Jane's Defense weekly, commented that
"no other mission compares remotely in importance to the Soviet
Union than the securing of the Norwegian coastline and air bases
flanking the Northern Fleet's entrance to the North Atlantic."11
The value of Norway to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and,
hence, to the free western world derives from its position
relative to the Kola Penninsula.   The latter is critically
important to the Soviet Union for several reasons.  It is there
that the Soviets have based the majority of their strategic
submarine force.  As of 1983, over 60 percent of their most
advanced fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) were home
ported there. Additionally, 66 percent of their latest, i.e.,
post-1967, surface combatant ships currently operate from Kola
bases.  The reasons for this are fivefold:  first, ports built in
the area are icefree; second, ships and submarines operating from
the Kola area are able to enter the Norwegian Sea and, hence, the
North Atlantic Ocean throughout the year; next, in contrast to
geographic features associated with other Soviet naval facil-ties,
there are no critical chokepoints short of the Greenland-Iceland-
United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap that could, if controlled by NATO
forces, limit the transit of their ships and submarines.12
Fourth, Soviet vessels operating from Kola ports would be well-
positioned to interdict the Atlantic sea lines of communication
(SLOC) that tie the United States and Canada to western Europe.
Where this was formerly assessed to be a low priority mission for
their Northern Fleet, it has taken on an importance to the Soviets
exceeded only by the mission to defend their SSBN's.  In the
judgment of some analysts, "...if such interdiction were achieved
during an European war, fought at the conventional level, the USSR
would be virtually assured of victory."13  This is, in part, due
to the supposition that over 90 percent of all allied reinforce-
ments destined for central Europe will travel via these sea lines
of communication.14  Finally, Soviet air bases located on the Kola
Penninsula provide auxil-ary airfields from which Soviet strategic
bombers can be launched.  In 1984, forward-basing of Backfire
bombers on the Kola Penninsula was reported for the first time.15
These aircraft, with an unrefueled combat radius of 4000
kilometers, are capable of operating well into the North Atlantic
Ocean, south and west of the GIUK Gap.  The Kola Penninsula also
lies in a direct, shortest-flight line between the United States
and the industrial heartland of the Soviet Union, giving it added
importance in terms of air defense.
    While the Kola Penninsula, per se, is of critical importance
to the Soviets, it is the seas adjacent to that land area that
must be available to the Soviet Northern Fleet to ensure that
their goals, whether offensive or defensive, can be met.  Analysts
have only recently become aware that the Soviets operate their
Kola-based Typhoon-class submarines, which carry  submarine-
launched ballistic missiles, extensively in the Arctic Ocean and
associated iced-over sea areas.  NATO's limited ability to detect
Soviet submarines by accoustical means in this region allows them
to operate with little interference.16
    If the intended purpose of the basing of Soviet strategic
submarine forces in the Kola Penninsula area is to provide
"insurance", that is, deterrence, against nuclear attack by NATO,
particularly the United States, then the import-ance of control of
the Norwegian Sea becomes evident.  The "buffer" thus created
would prevent incursion by NATO surface or submarine vessels and
would add depth to the defensive zone forward of the Kola
facilities.17  In offensive terms, this would also increase the
threat to the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap and, hence, the
sea lines of communication in that area.18  Tomas Ries, an analyst
with the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute, has indicated that
the Soviet Northern Fleet's principal focus for the past 20 years
has been on control of the Norwegian Sea in the event of war.
This can only be possible with attack aircraft, so without
appreciable numbers of carrier-based aircraft, seizure, occupation
and use of Norwegian airfields is imperative.19
    If the above is viewed as an inner defense area, a second
concentric defensive zone can be envisioned around the Kola
Penninsula if the capabilities of Soviet aviation assets are
considered.  The considerable combat radius of the strategic
bombers forward-based on the Kola Penninsula can easily bring the
United Kingdom under attack.  If the Soviets were to seize the
airfields located in northern Norway, their aircraft would be 750-
1000 kilometers closer to the North Atlantic Ocean, thereby
extending dramatically the protection afforded to the submarine
fleet.
    The strategic importance of Norway for NATO is also largely
attributable to existing airfields there.  Use of these facil-
ties, located at Banak, Tromso, Bardufoss, Adoya, Evenes, Bodo,
Vaernes and Orland would allow control of the North Cape. This, in
turn, would make interdiction, surveillance and monitoring of
Soviet movements into the Norwegian Sea and through the GIUK Gap
possible.  Besides putting the Soviet Northern Fleet at risk,
these airfields in NATO hands mean the protection of the sea lines
of communication and would give NATO forces improved options with
respect to the defense of Norway.
The Vulnerability of Norway
    To appreciate the importance of dedicating forces to the
preparation for cold weather operations in Norway, one must be
aware of the seriousness of the threat posed by Soviet forces in
the region.  Patrick Wall, the President of the North Atlantic
Assembly and former chairman of that body's Defense Committee, has
referred to the northern flank of NATO as "the most vulnerable of
the alliance's many potential theaters of combat.20  Information
available on the disposition of Soviet and Norwegian forces,
including their level of preparedness, indicates that the balance
favors the Soviets.  Current estimates of Soviet ground forces
permanently assigned to the northern region include eight or more
motorized rifle divisions (MRD), an airborne division, an
artillery division, a Spetsnaz brigade and a naval infantry
brigade.  The forces permanently based in the Leningrad Military
District are in all likelihood organized as a front, designated as
the Arctic Front to distinguish it from the Northern Front in
central Europe.  As such, it would be capable of independent
operations within its assigned theater.  While the latter would be
expected to be involved in operations through Schleswig-Holstein,
Denmark and into southern Norway and Sweden to secure the
protection of its fleet movements through the Kattegat Straits,
the Arctic Front would be oriented toward actions in northern
Norway.  This front, assumed by analysts to be independent for
operations, is composed of the 6th Army, headquartered at
Petrozavodsk, and the 27th and 30th Army Corps, headquartered at
Arkhangelsk and Vyborg, respectively.21  The basing patterns of
these units, particularly the 6th Army, suggest they have been
positioned to ensure quick strikes toward critical objectives in
Norway.
    In the northernmost region closest to the Norwegian province
of Finnmark, the Soviets have permanently based the 45th Motorized
Rifle Division, the 63rd Naval Infantry Brigade and 15 amphibious
ships.  Located at Murmansk and Pechenga, these readiness category
A/B units are within 12 kilometers of the two countries' common
border and 50 kilometers distant from the nearest Norwegian air
facility at Kirkenes.22  It is interesting to note that the 45th
Motorized Rilfe Division has conducted joint amphibious
operations, training as the second assault wave behind the 63rd
Naval Infantry Regiment.23   Also, the latter unit has considerable
experience in cold weather amphibious operations.  It was this
command that was largely responsible for dislodging the German
19th Mountain Infantry Corps from its defensive positions near
Pechenga in October 1944.24
    Two hundred and seventy five kilometers south of Pechenga-
Murmansk, near Alakurtti, two category A/B* Soviet motorized rifle
divisions are assigned, the 54th and the 341st.  Both are
maintained in the highest state of readiness and are juxtaposed
with an improved road network that runs east-west through Finland,
along the so-called Finnish Wedge, and into the Skibotn Valley
toward Tromso in northern Norway.  The significance of this
invasion corridor is underscored by the importance of the road
network to the Soviets for logistic support of their attacking
forces.25
    Reinforcing these divisions, which are known to be specially
equipped and trained for cold weather operations, are at least
six, and possibly as many as eight, additional motorized rifle
divisions, although each is maintained at a lower readiness
level.  The apparent permanence of assignment of these commands to
the northern region, mostly inland where wintertime temperatures
are much lower than along the relatively temperate coastal areas,
*Category A and B commands are manned with the highest percentages
of personnel and equipment, are trained extensively in peacetime,
and could be committed to combat immediately.  Commands in lower
categories of readiness generally have 50 percent or less of
required personnel and equipment and would require at least one
week of preparation before being committed.  The lowest category
of readiness is applied to the inactive mobilization divisions;
extensive training would be required before these units could be
committed to offensive combat.
implies a higher degree of acclimatization to, and hence
preparedness for, the cold.  At least two of these are mobil-
ization divisions and would probably be adequate for local defense
of the military facilities located on the Kola penninsula.26
    A  number of writers have described scenarios for a Soviet
incursion into Norway.  Despite numerous variants, they can be
categorized into four groupings:
       >  Attack into Norway's Finnmark region
       >  Attack into Norway across a broad front, through Sweden
          and/or Finland
       >  Attack into Norway in conjunction with attacks on other
          alliance members, e.g., central Europe
       >  Attack into southern Norway
Of particular interest to Marine Corps planners are those scen-
arios involving attacks into northern Norway, although employment
in southern Norway does not appear to have been precluded by any
formal agreement.  A description of a possible scenario is approp-
riate to facilitate a clearer idea for the situation Marines could
face if a Marine Amphibious Brigade were to be committed to the
reinforcement of Norwegian or NATO forces in Norway.
    The best times of the year for operations in Norway are the
two dry summer months (July and August) or the five winter months
(October through February).27  In the "worst case" setting, the
Soviets would conduct a wintertime surprise attack into northern
Norway, without apparent provocation.  This could occur if NATO
members were to give the impression that the organization had
become fragmented, that is, had lost solidarity or commitment to
purpose.  Given this condition, it is not implausible to imagine
the Soviets "testing" the resolve of the Norwegians or, more
importantly, their NATO allies.28  It could also derive from
Soviet justification stemming from offensive activity in other
regions, or as a preemptive move in anticipation of aggressive
actions in other theaters of operation.
    The three category A/B motorized rifle divisions, located
nearest the Norwegian border at Pechenga and further south near
Alakurtti, could launch surprise attacks-without reinforcement or
other significant disclosing activity-into Norway at Kirkenes and
through the Finnish Wedge toward Tromso.  A rapid strike along the
latter would isolate the northernmost province of Norway and
facilitate seizure of the airfields at Tromso, Alta and Banak.
The level of these Soviet units' readiness and proximity to likely
objectives mean minimal warning time, as few as two days, for the
Norwegians.
    If one allows that the Soviets would be successful in cutting
Norway in two at Tromso, they would then begin the process of
reinforcement.  Current assessments indicate that the Soviets are
capable of increasing their invasion force by one motorized rifle
division every 24 hours.  Even if the conflict underway in this
region is secondary to that being carried out in other theaters,
the standing divisions, even though of lower readiness categories,
could quickly increase the number of division-sized units in
Norway by four to six.  This has been made possible by the
development of an improved road network and railway system from
the southernmost areas of the Leningrad Military District into the
upper reaches of the Kola.29
Forces for the Defense of Norway
    The intentions of the Norwegians, at least as can be discerned
from unclassified sources, are to act as a tripwire and delaying
force that will slow the Soviet's advance for up to three
weeks.30  To accomplish this, they have permanently based one
brigade (Brigade North) in the Troms province east of Skibotn,
facing the approach through the Finnish Wedge, and two battalions
in the Finnmark area.  One of these units (South Varanger Garri-
son) is of reduced size (450 soldiers) but includes one company of
selected members who patrol the common border, covering a distance
of 196 kilometers.31  This is Norway's regular force presence in
the north.  For success, the Norwegians are dependent on the
ability to mobilize a substantial reserve and home guard to
reinforce their standing force.  Five to seven additional brigades
can be activated within 48-72 hours.  Presently, the equipment for
two brigades has been prepositioned by the Norwegians in the Troms
vicinity for use by activated brigades transported from the
south.32  An assumption made by Norwegian planners is that the
standing force is sufficient, given the difficulty presented by
the terrain and weather, to require the Soviets to attack only
after reinforcement.  If valid, this requirement would provide the
Norwegians with the needed time to mobilize and deploy.
    The Norwegians are extremely dependent on the forces of other
nations for the successful containment of any Soviet invasion, but
the sequence, composition, and timing of reinforcement is the
determination of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR).33
If offensive action by Soviet forces in Norway represents a second
front, the possibility exists that SACEUR will have committed
potential Norwegian reinforcing elements to the pre-empting
front.  Also, deficiencies in strategic lift, whether due to
quantitative limitations or competing priorities, could degrade
inflow of these reinforcing units significantly.
    One other problem could impact adversely on the defense plans
for Norway.  Only one NATO country, Canada, has specifically
dedicated a unit for the reinforcement of Norway, while three
others have contingency plans that include its reinforcement.
This notwithstanding, a potential gap exists between the time they
would be needed and the time they might be able to arrive.  Some
NATO planners have expressed the judgment that reinforcements
should be in place at least four days before Soviet military
operations begin.34  It is quite possible that this is not
feasible.  In the case of the reinforcing Marine Amphibious
Brigade, the force would have to be forward deployed, afloat, as a
pre-conflict measure to be able to arrive in Norway before the
Soviet offensive commences.35
    The Canadian Air/Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade, a 4,000
member unit whose ground component consists of three infantry
battalions, an artillery regiment and an armored reconnaissance
squadron, is the only unit to have been specifically earmarked for
deployment into Norway; however, it is dependent on Norwegian roll-
on/roll-off shipping for its transport.36  Due to these ships'
marshall-ing, transit and load times, introduction of the Canadian
contingent is not expected for at least 30 days.  As such, the
CAST Brigade could be the last of the identified units to be
placed into action.  This commitment is in question as of this
writing, as there are indications that Canada is conducting a
review of its current commitment to the Norwegian reinforcement.
    The Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF), comprised of
units from several nations and stationed permanently in Sechen-
heim, Germany, would most likely be the first NATO force to arrive
in Norway; however, this light, brigade-sized force has been
identified to respond to other European contingencies as well.37
Its purpose is meant as much to demonstrate NATO resolve as it is
to provide an effective fighting force.
    A third force, comprised of a British Commando brigade aug-
mented by a Royal Netherlands Marine company, is highly regarded
as the best-prepared unit for cold weather operations.  Dedi-cated
to cold weaather operations but not Norway, per se, the unit has
trained in Norway annually since 1968.38  While this force is
expected to be transported by air and, therefore be available
within ten days, it is partially dependent on Norwegian shipping,
specifically the commercial ferry system, for transport of its
heavy equipment into the country.  As a result, any competing
priorities or interruption of the ferry system could slow their
introduction.
    Finally, the United States is expected to provide one Marine
Amphibious Brigade.39  While Marines could be introduced by means
of forward-deployed amphibious shipping or by a marriage of a
maritime prepositioned equipment and an air-landed brigade, it is
more likely that a lightly armed and equipped, air-landed, brigade-
size force will link up with the equipment now being prepositioned
in Norway.  In light of these prepositioning efforts, programmed
for completion during 1989, an air-landed MAB could be the first
reinforcing unit to arrive ready for employment.
The Other Threat:  Cold Weather
    In addition to the obvious threat posed by the Soviets, a
second and more insidious danger is presented by the environment
itself.  There can be no question that operating in intense cold
conditions provides commanders at every level with extremely
difficult challenges.  As Lynn Montross observed, chronicling the
Marines' experiences in the cold during the Chosin Reservoir
action, "Hot weather, however uncomfortable it may be, is fighting
weather as compared to sub-zero cold, which seems to numb the
spirit as well as flesh."40
    Numerous studies and writers have warned that, in cold
weather, an individual's first and controlling concern will be to
look after his own survival.  He will acknowledge the needs of the
mission only after his own needs are met.  As a consequence, the
mission may take on a secondary importance, and could even be
abandoned.  In this regard, D.F. Bittner offered interesting
insight into the British experience during World War II in
attempting to resolve arguments over the need to dedicate a force
to this demanding role.41  At the heart of the disagreement
between Lieutenant Colonel J.F. Todhunter, the commandant of
Britain's Winter Warfare School, and Major General H.O. Curtis,
commandant of the British Iceland Force, was Lieutenant Colonel
Todhunter'conviction that ordinary British citizens could not
readily adapt to the rigors of arctic warfare.  As Bittner pointed
out, the issue was not one of surviving or enduring but adapting
to the environment so the individual could "...live and fight
effectively."  Major General Curtis's assertion was that "...the
British soldier regardless of background could accomplish any
mission if given the proper amount of training."  While this
philosophy closely parallels that of the Marine Corps today, it is
interesting to note that the British eventually concluded that it
was necessary to create specially-trained units for cold weather
contingencies.
    If success is expected, the unique conditions inherent to
operating in cold weather must be anticipated beforehand.  Three
areas, physical conditioning, small unit leadership and mental
attitude, are crucially important if the harshness of the weather
and environment are to be dealt with successfully.  Tactical
principles are not affected by cold weather.  Their implementa-
tion, however, requires mental and physical stamina beyond that
which are normally expected because of the stresses imposed by
longer times needed to complete tasks and make movements; the
encumbrance of heavy, bulky clothing and equipment; and mobility
limitations.  The small unit that loses its tentage or packs, has
gotten wet through intense exertion or wet snow, and is facing
falling temperatures as night approaches will present unprece-
dented challenges for its leader.  In turn, that junior leader's
next higher commander will face additional challenges in this
situation if he expects that unit to respond effectively to a
tactical situation.  Cold weather adds a dimension to operational
planning and execution that cannot be matched by other environ-
mental factors for its potential effect.
    Finally, the well-intended efforts of unit leaders during cold
weather training to look after the welfare of their men can be
dangerously counterproductive to the needs of those Marines and
corpsmen under combat conditions.  There is a clear need to be
exposed to the hazards of cold weather.  Hyndman42 coined the
phrase "cold weather stress" to describe the unique condition
resulting from the physical and mental demands made on individuals
when exposed to survival-level situations in conjunction with
combat in that environment.  While this condition can be re-
created (to a degree) in a training setting, the tendency of
leaders to ensure that their unit members avoid or minimize
discomfort or stress prevents the individuals from gaining needed
appreciation of the conditions they will encounter during Arctic
combat.  To enhance operability and minimize the friction
attributable to cold weather stress, Marines must be allowed to
become familiar with its nature.  This would be best accomplished
by training for a longer period of time-more that six to ten days-
so that all aspects of living and operating in the cold can be
experienced.
The Marine Corps in Norway
    Several writers have concluded that the Marine Corps actively
sought a role on the Northern Flank after 1975, whether for
reasons of protecting the service's future by providing it with a
specific post-Vietnam mission,43 or because the Marine Corps'
roles and missions were shifting as a consequence of reduced
amphibious lift and increased emphasis on tasks involving rapid
deployment.44  Nonetheless, the Mountain Warfare Training Center
was reactivated for cold weather and mountain warfare training in
1976.45  In 1978, Robert Komer, then the senior advisor to the
Secretary of Defense for NATO affairs, indicated that he felt that
the Northern Flank was an ideal area for commitment of a Marine
force.46  This was reaffirmed in July 1978 when the Secretary of
the Navy, William Claytor, was directed by the Secretary of
Defense (in a letter signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles
Duncan) to prepare the Marine Corps for "...rapid reinforcement of
Norway with an airlifted, brigade-sized force."  The concept of
prepositioning selected equipment and supplies was included in
this document.47  Then in January 1981 a twelve point, bilateral
Memorandum of understanding was signed between the United States
and Norway; not only did the agreement make possible the pre-
positioning of certain equipment and supplies associated with a
Marine Amphibious Brigade, but it also identified host nation
means for transporting Marine Corps personnel, equipment and
supplies from reception and marriage sites to intended areas of
employment.48  The first supplies, ammunition, were delivered in
November 1982; the prepositioning process is scheduled for
completion during 1989.
    Operationally, Marine Corps units have participated in
exercises in Norway since 1976.  While early involvement was
limited to company-sized units and was frequently criticized for
apparent lack of commitment or preparation, improvements have been
steadily made.  A milestone was reached with Anorak Express in
1980, when Marine units operated for the first time north of the
Arctic Circle.49  In 1984, Marines who participated in the
Teamwork exercise did so as part of a three battalion brigade (one
a reserve battalion).  During this exercise the validity of the
prepositioning program was tested:  selected items were withdrawn
from their storage sites and were used by the exercise force.50
Since Teamwork 84, the annual exercises in Norway have witnessed
continued improvements through the testing of new equipment,
particularly clothing, and skills, such as those designed to
enhance tactical mobility.
The Northrop Services Study
    As the Marine Corps' possible role in the reinforcement and
defense of Norway developed, the Commandant of the Marine Corps
contracted with Northrop Services, Inc. in 1979 to conduct a
review of the Marine Corps' capability to operate in cold
weather.51  Five objectives were specified:
    >Determine and evaluate the capability of a Marine Air Ground
Task Force (MAGTF) to conduct landing force operations during a
cold weather amphibious assault and during subsequent operations
ashore.
    >Identify landing force deficiencies in doctrine, tactics,
techniques, training, and equipment during a cold weather
amphibious assault...
    >Define the individual Marine and MAGTF system requirements
necessary to overcome deficiencies.
    >Provide concepts of operations and techniques, along with
concepts of training, which are technologically available.
    >Determine the financial impact of any force structure and
equipment program changes.
     The study, completed in November 1980, concluded that the
Marine Corps was capable of operating in intense cold conditions
where the temperature might range between -5oF and -25oF and in
which snow depths could exceed 20 inches.  The author offered more
than 50 recommendations, covering a wide range of concerns, that
begged action to improve operability in the cold.52  Those that
relate to training and manpower, summarized below, were developed
from deficiencies identified during Northrop's analysis.
    >A brigade-sized force should be permanently assigned to the
cold weather mission.  Alternatively, component elements that
could be constituted into a Marine Amphibious Brigade-sized cold
weather force should be designated permanently.
    >Assigned units should be based in a cold region of the
United States, preferably at a location where the climate and
terrain approximate that of Norway.  (A site on the east coast was
suggested, in view of the lodgement of the mission with II Marine
Amphibious Force.)
   >Units assigned to the cold weather mission should receive
eight to nine weeks of winter environment field training each
year.
    >Marine Corps formal schools at the career and intermediate
levels should incorporate into their curricula map exercises
specifically oriented toward cold weather planning and operations.
    >Other formal schools should include operation and mainten-
ance problems and solutions in their programs of instruction,
wherever time and other factors permit.
     >Codes should be established for use with the Manpower
Management System that would allow identification of personnel
with cold weather training and experience.
    Of these recommendations, the most pressing concerned the
retention of experienced personnel in appropriate units and the
development and maintenance of satisfactorily trained units whose
repeated exposure to cold weather operations and training ensured
their continuous readiness for operations under severe
conditions.53
    In 1982 54, the Commandant of the Marine Corps approved the
Northrop Services study and its recommendations "as submitted",
made a point of reiterating the specific objectives toward which
Northrop's analysts worked, and stated that the "planning
information contained in the study...will be incorporated in
forthcoming Operational Handbooks and Fleet Marine Force Manuals
as appropriate."   To date, not all these recommendations have
been adopted.  An example that illustrates the length of time that
has been required to accomplish even relatively noncontroversial,
minimal cost recommendations may provide insight as to the
difficulty more expensive, dramatic-impact recommendations face.
    Among the first recommendations made was a modification to the
classification of cold weather stages.  The system established by
the U.S. Army and adopted by the Marine Corps included three
ranges:  Basic cold (-5oF to -25oF)
         Cold (-35oF to -50oF)
         Severe cold (-60oF)
The Northrop study suggested, instead, a four-stage classifi-
cation:  Wet cold (+40oF to +20oF)
         Dry cold (+20oF to -5oF)
         Intense cold (-5oF to -25oF)
         Extreme cold (-25oF to -60oF)
In view of the low probability that the Marine Corps would be
tasked to operate in the few areas of the world where temperatures
exceed -25oF, they recommended that all planning (equipment
operability, clothing specifications, and so forth) emphasize
sustained functioning in the intense cold range.  In the event
that extreme cold conditions are encountered, they would likely be
transient, so Marine units should minimize or suspend operations
and activities.  This idea was presented by Marine representatives
at a cold weather conference held in 1982 at the Norwegians' Skyte-
OG Vinterskolen for Infanteriet and was agreed upon by the
conferees.55  This issue did not receive the approval of the
Commandant of the Marine Corps until September 1986, when a
decision brief was submitted for his consideration.56
    Of the training and manpower recommendations listed above,
only those involving incorporation of map exercises into the
curricula of indicated formal schools and adoption of an eight to
nine week training syllabus have been realized.  Draw case codes
have not been established to identify personnel with cold weather
experience; not all formal schools have added operation and
maintenance problems to their programs of instruction; no action
has been taken to permanently base units at a location amenable to
effective cold weather training; and, finally, a brigade-sized
unit has not been dedicated to the mission.  The approach that has
been taken by the Marine Corps is described in the following
section.
Cold Weather Experience Base in the Marine Corps
    One finding of the Northrop Services study was that the Marine
Corps had made a practice of assigning different units to cold
weather training and exercises each year.  Because these units
characteristically had few Marines or corpsman with cold weather
experience, a foundation of basic information and techniques had
to be provided to the entire unit each time.  This need to repeat
the same elementary material precludes the development of an
experiential base within the Marine Corps.  Stated another way,
Marines always operate at a novice level.  The study also called
attention to the fact that personnel turnover within units
completing either fundamental training or a cold weather exercise
was such that the "institutional memory" was minimal.57  That the
Marine Corps has worked to eliminate these problem areas is
evident from the statements of recent participants.
    Alluding to the NATO exercise that occurred in Norway in March
1985, Brigadier General C.E. Mundy commented that as a result of
advances made in the Marine Corps' ability to operate in the
Arctic, critics could no longer point to deficiencies in training
and preparedness for cold weather operations.  These included the
limited amount of time spent by Marine units preparing for and
operating in cold weather; the fact that different units were sent
to Norway each year; the reluctance of the Marine Corps to "fence"
specific units; the bulky, Korean War-vintage clothing worn by
Marines for protection from the cold; and maneuver units' limited
mobility in snow.58
    With regard to the counter-arguments concerning the same
personnel and units not returning to Norway, too few Marines
training each year, and too little training being received,
several comments are germane.  It was pointed out that the Marine
Amphibious Brigade's last two commanding generals, their
headquarters, and the last two Regimental Landing Team commanding
officers and their headquarters had all accumulated breadth of
experience by participation in more than a single year's exer-
cise.  This continues to be the case:  The Fourth Marine Amphib-
ious Brigade has formally been assigned responsibility for cold
weather operations planning,59 while the Second Marine Regiment
has become, de facto, the Second Marine Division's cold weather
regiment.  As such, the headquarters element has travelled to
Norway yearly since at least 1982.  It is important to note,
however, that this has not been the situation at the infantry
battalion level.
    First Battalion, Second Marines-the ground combat element
during Cold Winter 85-was a participant in three of the five
preceding NATO cold weather execises, while Second Battalion,
Second Marines lagged in this record of performance by one year.
A review (reproduced below) of the units that have been involved
in Norway-oriented NATO annual exercises since 1982 indicates that
another three battalions had not had experience in Norway in the
four years preceding their respective participation.
    March, 1983     1st Battalion, 2nd Marines    Cold Winter  83
    March, 1984     2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines    Teamwork 84
    March, 1984     3rd Battalion, 8th Marines    Teamwork 84
    March, 1985     1st Battalion, 2nd Marines    Cold Winter  85
    March, 1986     2nd Battalion, 4th Marines    Anchor Express 86
    March, 1987     3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines    Cold Winter  87
Clearly, battalions do not participate on a basis that is frequent
enough to ensure any carryover of benefits derived from the
experience.  This irregular or infrequent involvement in cold
weather training and/or exercises prevents a unit from developing
an effective nucleus of members with current, useful experience:
Personnel turnover exacerbates this limitation significantly.
Tables 1 through 4 summarize the cold weather experience (derived
from training at sites in the United States or participation in
exercises in Norway) of the Second Marine Division units (infantry
battalions only) alluded to above.60
    Third Battalion, Second Marines, whose members trained and
deployed for Cold Winter 87, entered the cold weather training
cycle in January 1987 by conducting formal training at the
Mountain Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport, California.  Class-
room instruction had been completed prior to this.  Following
additional training at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, the unit was
transported to Norway for the exercise.  Table 1 summarizes the
status of the command prior to January 1987.  As such, it may be
indicative of the experiential baseline within infantry battalions
Click here to view image
throughout the Marine Corps, inasmuch as this command had not
conducted significant cold weather activity in five years.  Nota-
bly, that level of experience was between three and five percent
of the command, while less than half of one percent of the
battalion's members had experience operating in cold weather over
more that one winter season.
    Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, which provided the ground
combat element for Anchor Express 86, completed pre-deployment
training similar to that described for Third Battalion, Second
Marines.  Although this unit deployed to Norway, the scheduled
exercise was interrupted and then terminated near the outset as a
consequence of an avalanche in which a number of Norwegian
soldiers were killed.  This notwithstanding, the Marines carried
out unit training while in country, thereby adding to their
experience.  While it might be assumed that the training received
by this battalion would make them a logical choice for contingency
purposes during the ensuing year, specifically during the
following cold weather season, the tabulated data of Table 2
indicate otherwise.  Twelve months after Anchor Express 86, that
part of the battalion with any cold weather experience had
declined to 36 percent.  Not all of these individuals had gained
their exposure as a result of the training undergone by the
battalion during January, February, and March of 1986.  Signifi-
cantly, 522 new members reported to the command between March,
1986 and January, 1987.  It is these new and untrained Marines and
corpsmen that would present problems to a commander if they were
to be introduced into an intense cold weather setting under combat
conditions.
    First Battalion, Second Marines, the unit described as having
gained three seasons of experience in the five years preceding
March 1985, did not receive additional cold weather training
during 1986 or 1987.  As such, by March 1987 only 11 percent of
the command remained with any experience in cold weather
operations (Table 3).  This battalion was the first to be trained
as a whole to rely on skis for mobility.  Assuming the same degree
of personnnel turnover as that described for Second Battalion,
Fourth Marines, this command could neither have been expected to
operate on skis the following winter season, nor could they be
relied upon (at the time of this writing) for effective operation
in cold weather without significant, elementary training.
    Finally, by January 1987 Second Battalion, Second Marines,
which was one of three battalions to participate in Teamwork 84
(First Battalion, Twenty-fifth Marines was the reserve component),
had a cadre of 13-14 percent of its Marines and corpsman with cold
weather experience (Table 4).  Interestingly, of the eight
officers shown, none received their experience as members of
Second Battalion.*
    There can be no question about the importance of preparedness
when considering the employment of a Marine force in a cold
weather contingency, particularly along the northern flank.  The
strategic importance of Norway cannot be argued; it alone provides
sufficient justification for the attention being paid to the
issue.  Conversely, the nature of the physical and climatic
environment could present unparalleled challenges.  If rapid
reinforcement is essential to prevent collapse of Norwegian
Click here to view image
defenses, Marines could find themselves being rushed to hastily
identified defensive positions without benefit of thorough
preparation.  They should be at least as prepared for that set of
conditions as their Soviet counterparts, many of whom will have
spent years in the environment in which they are now fighting.
Because of the unforgiving character of the cold, every individual
must be prepared to deal with its effects.  Individuals with only
introductory, controlled exposure to the cold will not be
effective and can be expected to be liabilities to the unit.
Only through extensive, dedicated training will they become
physically and psychologically comfortable with the conditions in
which they must operate.
    The policies being followed by the Marine Corps to prepare for
an combat in Norway have relied on the annual training of one or
more battalion-sized units.  The expectation has been that
sufficient Marines and corpsmen are trained each year so that the
Marine Corps is able to maintain a satisfactory level of readiness
to meet a contingency.  The data presented herein indicate
otherwise.  Personnel instability, despite the impact of the Unit
Deployment Program, is significant:  within eight months of
conducting cold weather training and participating in an exercise
in Norway, a unit's turnover can exceed 60 percent.  Additionally,
* Third Battalion, Eighth Marines was not asked to provide
figures.  The Division staff concluded that the number of
personnel remaining in the unit with cold weather experience would
have been minimal.
by the same unit not returning each year, a loss of 90 percent or
more of its experienced members can be expected.  These
observations would seem to lend weight to proposals to dedicate
units to the cold weather role.  As will be presented in the
following chapter, a similar argument can be advanced for
mechanized units.
                           CHAPTER THREE
                  THE CASE FOR MECHANIZED BRIGADES
The Brookings Institution Study
    As was pointed out in the Introduction, the Brookings
Institution study in 1976 called into question the future
viability of the Marine Corps if it were to adhere soley to past
tenets of existence, that is, the amphibious assault from the
sea.  It was the judgment of the authors that the Marine Corps'
focus on amphibious warfare was suitable only if the
considerations were limited to third world countries.  Because the
prospects of military intervention over foreign shores by the
United States appeared unlikely, given the climate of opinion in
immediate post-Vietnam America, Binkin and Record concluded that
the orientation of the Marine Corps should be on areas of the
world where they were least prepared, in terms of firepower and
mobility, to meet likely opponents, specifically Soviet or Soviet
patterned forces.  Put another way, the Marine Corps appeared to
be looking back from where it had recently come, preparing itself
for a war already fought, while U.S. policymakers were looking
toware Europe and preparing against the day more sophisticated,
technologically-advanced forces might have to be faced.1
    Having stated their case, Binkin and Record provided four
recommendations for the future of the Marine Corps:  limit the
size of the force dedicated to amphibious assault to four
regiments and associated air units; modify deployments so that two
battalion landing teams are assigned to the Mediterranean area and
one each to the Pacific and Caribbean; sharply reduce investment
in tactical aviation; and disband the majority of the Fourth
Marine Amphibious Force.  The authors also provided four
alternatives for the disposition of the excess regiments:
eliminate all five regiments; assume the mission of the U.S. Army
in Asia; assume the quick reaction (airborne) role of the U.S.
Army; or mechanize these units and colocate them alongside the
U.S. Army in Europe.2  Only the first recommendation bears
directly on the study at hand, that the size of the force should
be reduced to 1-1/3 Marine Amphibious Forces, totally dedicated to
the amphibious mission.  Three of the alternatives would have
resulted in a divergence of the Marine Corps into two distinct
components and would have severely limited the Marine Corps'
traditional utility as a light, rapid-deploying force-in-
readiness.  This could logically have been expected to renew
inquiries into the continuing need or justification for a corps of
Marines.
The Marine Corps Mission and Force Structure Study
    The results of the 1976 Mission and Force Structure Study,
that is, the Haynes Board, contained several parallels to the
content of the Brookings study.  At the outset of their report,3
the group offered its consensus that:
          >The Marine Corps should re-orient its operational plan-
          ning and outlook away from low intensity conflict, for
          example, Vietnam, and look instead toward the demands of
          mid-to-high intensity conflict, for example, central
          Europe.
          >The focus of planning should be expanded beyond the
          beach and encompass subsequent operations ashore,
          particularly against a mobile, technologically-
          sophisticated adversary.
          >The combined arms concept, while still seen to be valid,
          must be reviewed for the inherent compatability of its
          elements in the face of a more mobile threat and the
          growing imbalance between components, for example, its
          footmobile infantry on the one hand and sophisticated
          fighter aircraft on the other.
    Details of the long term direction that the study group
concluded the Marine Corps should pursue were provided in the form
of three alternative force structures.  Force Structure C,
preferred by the group, built on features of the other two
alternatives that were presented.4  It provided for:
          >Battalions configured around three infantry companies.
          >Regiments configured around four battalions.
          >Two tank battalions in each of the two stateside
          divisions, configured to allow employment as distinct
          maneuver elements.
          >One regiment in each of the two stateside divisions
          configured as a mobile assault regiment, consisting of
          the two tank battalions and two infantry regiments
          (mechanized).
          >Reliance on amphibious assault vehicles as the means of
          enhancing infantry mobility.  It was recommended that
          the number of these be increased in each battalion.
          >Artillery regiments containing, in addition to two
          direct support battalions of towed 105mm howitzers, one
          direct support battalion of four 155mm self-propelled
          batteries and one 203mm (8 inch) self-propelled battery,
          and two general support battalions, each with three
          batteries of 155mm towed howitzers.
          >Addition of low altitude air defense units to each
          Marine division.
          >An increase in the quantity of antitank weapons in each
          division, with each maneuver regiment having its own
          antitank company.
          >Elimination of Force Troops, with their assimilation
          into the divisions.
          >Enhancement of division reconnaissance capabilities,
          through greater firepower and mobility.
    In contrast to the drastic recommendations of Binkin and
Record, the findings of the Haynes study offered continued flexi-
bility within each division for responding to a wide range of
contingencies, while orienting them to realistic roles in support
of current national defense policy.  Long term adoption of their
alternative Force Structure C would have provided a light
division(-) in the western Pacific region for response to
conflicts anticipated to be low in intensity, for example
Northeast Asia; and two divisions, one on the east coast and the
other on the west coast, each capable of responding to mid-to-high
intensity scenarios with a reinforced, mechanized regiment.  Both
divisions retained lighter, general purpose infantry forces (two
regiments per division) that would allow the Marine Corps to
continue to meet other commitments with flexibility in employment.
    Other related recommendations made by the group5 included:
          >Immediate adoption of their Force Structure A, which
          summarily increased the combat power of the divisions
          by incorporating Force Troops assets (tanks, amphibious
          assault vehicles, self-propelled artillery) into their
          structure.
          >Gradual adoption of proposed Force Structure B which,
          among other features, created a mobile assault element.
          >Use of Marine Corps Base, 29 Palms as the testing and
          training ground for the doctrine and tactics developed
          for the newly created mobile assault regiment.
          >Eventual use of Ft. Stewart, Georgia for the second
          mobile assault regiment created under the Force
          Structure C option.  If Ft. Stewart was to prove to be
          unavailable, the mobile assault regiment assigned to the
          east coast would use the facilities of Ft. Pickett,
          Virginia and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
          >Finally, the board recommended adoption of an equitable
          unit rotation system throughout the Marine Corps for
          required deployments.
    The Marine Corps stopped short of adoption of Force Structure
C, but has incorporated the preponderance of the other recommend-
ations.  However, the need to reconsider the unadopted aspects of
the study still exists.
Department of Defense View
    To appreciate the orientation provided to the Congress by the
Secretaries of Defense with respect to intended employment of
Marine Corps assets, it is useful to review material impacting
directly on the Marine Corps, as contained in the Secretaries'
annual reports to the Congress, beginning with Fiscal Year 1976.
    Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger provided public
commentary on the future of the Marine Corps in his Fiscal Year
1976 report to the Congress.  His remarks were prefaced by noting
that continued investment in amphibious forces might be questioned
because of the considerable costs to maintain them and the fact
that no large scale amphibious operations had taken place in over
20 years.  As previously mentioned, this idea was to provide a
significant element of Binkin and Record's basis for pursuing the
idea of altering the Marine Corps' roles, missions and structure.
Interestingly, Secretary Schlesinger's following statement
reinforced the justification for the continued existence of the
Marine Corps:  while he did not directly address a need to
mechanize the service, he stated that amphibious forces-properly
modernized-were valuable to the national defense, particularly in
the missions of securing beachheads, conducting flanking
operations from the sea, and presence.6
    The following year, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld
stated that the Marine Corps was not viewed as a force that would
deploy for the defense of central Europe.7  Instead, it was seen
to be of greater utility on the European flanks, especially
through amphibious operations!  While this might be interpreted as
a signal that the Marine Corps would not become mechanized, the
Secretary's subsequent comments suggested otherwise:  "Once
ashore, if reinforced with sufficient armor and anti-armor
weapons, Marine divisions also would have capabilities analogous
to those of Army infantry divisions.  In short, they are one of
our most flexible assets."  Finally, Secretary Rumsfeld concluded
by stating "additional options for improving the Marine Corps'
capability to operate in an armored warfare environment are under
study."8  In his next annual statement, the Secretary addressed
critics of the then current defense strategy that gave the
appearance of continuing to prepare the nation for a simultaneous
two-front war.  Pointing to "light" forces that still predom-
inated, even in the face of the perceived Soviet threat toward
central Europe, Secretary Rumsfeld informed Congress that the
Defense Department was giving "consideration....to the problem of
retaining the amphibious capability and, at the same time, making
the Marine Corps more adaptable to the high-intensity wars of
modern technology."9
    In his report for Fiscal Year 1980, Secretary Harold Brown
introduced the Congress to the concept of maritime prepositioning
of supplies and equipment, while at the same time implying the
intent to commit the Marine Corps to a greater degree of mechan-
ization.  His choice of wording underscored the emphasis being
placed on this new direction:  the Secretary "went on record in
this budget submission as indicating that the desire was to be
able to lift the equipment for an armor-heavy Marine division-
sized force".10  This program goal was reiterated the following
year with the announcement to Congress that equipment sets and
supplies for 30 days for three Marine Amphibious Brigades had been
budgetted for.11  In view of the use of the phrase "substantial
mechanized or armored elements" to describe the nature of the
Marine force the Defense Department planned to prepare for
possible employment, it seems clear that the Secretary of Defense
was providing Congress with notification that the Marine Corps
could be expected to be tasked to respond in those areas of the
world where the likely adversary would also be mechanized and/or
armored.12
    Secretary Brown's Fiscal Year 1982 report to the Congress was
somewhat of a watershed for the intended move of the Marine Corps
toward a greater degree of mechanization.  In conjunction with
statements concerning the United States Army's newly established
National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, the Secretary
relayed to the Congress that all Marine battalions were scheduled
to train on a periodic basis at the Marine Corps Air-Ground combat
Center at 29 Palms, California.  He lauded the unique training
opportunities available and noted the recently created 7th Marine
Amphibious Brigade, permanently assigned there and "earmarked" as
the "Rapid Deployment Force reservoir of forces".13  In expanding
comments on its intended role, the report indicated that the Rapid
Deployment Force must be trained, equipped and provided with a
doctrine suitable for mountain and desert warfare.14  Further, the
report noted that the growing sophistication of Soviet-patterned
forces in non-NATO area countries dictated that light infantry
divisions, including the Marine Corps, be prepared with "more
firepower and ground mobility".  Finally, the Secretary concluded
that the Marine Corps would be capable of "protracted operations
ashore if provided with logistics support by the Army and the
Navy".15
    The light armored vehicle was first announced to the Congress
in Caspar W. Weinberger's Fiscal Year 1983 budget report.  In his
view, this vehicle was intended to partially meet the Marine
Corps' need to increase its infantry units' battlefield firepower
and mobility.16  In the Secretary's view, this was seen as a
critical need if the threat in non-NATO regions, for example
Southwest Asia, was to be successfully met.  He envisioned up to
two Marine Amphibious Force-sized commands being made available to
the Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force for employment.17
    In his Fiscal Year 1984 address to the Congress, Secretary
Weinberger clarified the Marine Corps' commitment to the Commander-
in-Chief, Central Command (formerly the Rapid Deployment Joint
Task Force), by stating that 1-1/3 Marine Amphibious Forces would
be made available in the event of a contingency.18  Referring to
"heavily-mechanized Marine Amphibious Brigades", Mr. Weinberger
informed the Congress that additional tanks and amphibious assault
vehicles were being purchased to give Marine forces "a greater
capability against enemy armored forces".19
    The following year, Defense Secretary Weinberger reminded
members of Congress that the nature of the threat associated with
Third World nations had changed drastically since 1960.  In that
year, 38 of these countries possessed armored vehicles; in 1983,
the number had expanded to 104.20
    The Defense Department reports to the Congress for Fiscal
Years 1986 and 1987 continued the emphasis on mechanization of at
least a portion of the Marine Corps, without demonstrating
indications of any change to the direction taken in preceding
years.
    As can be seen from the Secretaries points (summarized in
Table 5), it seems clear that each Secretary of Defense since
James R. Schlesinger has imparted to Congress the clear impression
that the Marine Corps would be equipped and trained in a manner
that would allow it to operate effectively in a conflict involving
a mechanized opponent.  The willingness of Congress to accept the
Department of Defense plan to increase the mechanized assets of
the Marine Corps for the stated reason, specifically, of potential
deployment to Southwest Asia, underscores the importance placed on
this role.  If this assumption is accepted, then the next step is
to examine the manner in which the Marine Corps has responded to
this new direction.
The Marine Corps and Mechanization
    The Marine Corps' response to the Haynes Board study has been
gradual.  Indeed, one writer in the Marine Corps Gazette in 1979
noted that little had been said publicly about the study and
claimed that it had been hurried along as a reaction to the
Brookings study and that it was badly flawed. He accused the
authors of "...making [the Marine Corps] something other than what
it was intended to be."21  Not all of this is entirely accurate.
In October 1976, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Louis
H. Wilson, addressed in an interview the Haynes Board.  He stated
Click here to view image
that the Marine Corps would probably move in the direction of
mechanized regiments, either one, two or three, but that their
activation would take several years.22
    In November 1977, First Battalion, Fourth Marines relocated
from Okinawa to 29 Palms, where it was homebased and designated to
provide the test base for a task organized, mechanized unit
operations.  This also marked the execution of the first phase of
a revised unit deployment plan that would eventually encompass all
infantry battalions.23  The initial live fire, combined arms
exercise by this mechanized task force was carried out in February
and March 1979.24  Additional emphasis was given to this concept
in May 1980 when a combined arms command was activated at 29
Palms.  This served to unite all Fleet Marine Force elements
assigned to the base under one command, the 7th Marine Amphibious
Brigade.25   Concomitantly, this command was detailed to provide
the combat force that would respond to the requirements of the
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.  As such, it was to marry up
with equipment and supplies staged on near-term prepositioned
shipping.26
    Since 1979, combined arms exercises at the Marine Corps Air-
Ground Combat Center have evolved into thoroughly prepared, well-
orchestrated tests of a unit's ability to carry out diverse
supporting arms fire support coordination, primarily in a mech-
anized environment.  The training experiences are unparalleled,
both in use of combined arms and in movement and maneuver by
mechanized means.  Because the 29 Palms facility offers the only
comprehensive opportunity for a unit to conduct this type of
exercise (a claim which is supported by the fact that First
Battalion, Fourth Marines has been maintained as the cadre of the
ground combat element of the Marine Amphibious Brigade earmarked
for deployment into Southwest Asia), it will be assumed that
combined arms exercise experience can be used as an indication of
relative competency in mechanized operations.
    Table 6 identifies the infantry battalions that have carried
out combined arms exercises since October 1984.  The battalions
scheduled to conduct these exercises during the second half of
fiscal year 1987 are also shown.  Not portrayed are the two yearly
exercises in which Marine Corps reserve units participated.  For
the First Marine Division, seven of twelve battalions have not had
combined arms exercise experience since September 1984; eight will
not have had this exposure during the year preceding publication
Click here to view image
of this paper.  For the Second Marine Division, which would
provide infantry battalions to the 6th Marine Amphibious Brigade
for any contingency involving the Maritime Prepositioned Force,
the situation is similar.  While only three of the eleven
homebased battalions had not conducted a combined arms exercise at
29 Palms since September 1984, only four battalions will have
completed one of these exercises in the 12 month period preceding
this paper's submission.
     The unit deployment status tables published periodically in
the Marine Corps Gazette offer the opportunity to postulate the
potential makeup of the Marine Amphibious Brigades operating in
conjunction with their corresponding Maritime Prepositioned Force
squadrons.  The magazine's April 1987 issue provides a recap-
itulation of each battalion's whereabouts as of 5 March 1987.27
Comparing that information with the contents of Table 6, the 7th
Marine Amphibious Brigade could be assigned four battalions
(including First Battalion, Fourth Marines) from the First Marine
Division with combined arms exercise background.  Viewed another
way, there is a one-in-three chance that only one of the assigned
battalions would have had recent (preceding 12 months) mechanized
experience.  Worse, three of these units, Second Battalion, First
Marines; Third Battalion, Fifth Marines; and Third Battalion,
Seventh Marines were deployed during the eight months preceding
the 5 March date, and so would likely have experienced consider-
able turnover of personnel.28
     Sixth Marine Amphibious Brigade, operating with units from the
Second Marine Division, could fare better under similar circum-
stances.  Six of the eight available battalions would have had
combined arms exercise experience, but only two in the preceding
12 months.  Of these six, however, two, Second Battalion, Sixth
Marines and First Battalion, Eighth Marines would have completed
deployments during the preceding eight months, and so would be in
a build-up phase with limited experience operating as a unit.
     Finally, another example can be provided by considering the
ground combat element portion  of the force list used in the 1987
Joint Middle East Exercise, an annual computer-assisted wargame
played by students attending the four services' respective command
and staff college courses.  It represents an unclassified exercise
of U.S. Central Command operation plan facsimiles.  As such, it
offers a specific scenario against which Marine Corps readiness
can be examined.
    For the exercise, the infantry battalions that comprised the
ground combat element were as follows:
Click here to view image
Comparing these units to those listed in the table of infantry
battalions with recent combined arms exercise experience, five of
the 12 involved units possessed Combined Arms Exercise-derived 
mechanized experience.  This might appear adequate; however, a
closer examination of each brigade-sized unit suggests otherwise.
In the scenario, Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade was created by
compositing three deployed Marine Amphibious Units.  One of the
battalions (1/9) had not executed a Combined Arms Exercise in the
previous three years; the other two completed one of these
exercises between January and June, 1986.  The two brigades with
designated Maritime Prepositioned Force roles, Sixth and Seventh
Marine Amphibious Brigades, deployed with homogeneous regiments,
Sixth Marines and Fifth Marines, respectively, for the exercise.
During a real world crisis, this would be unlikely, in large part
due to the demands of the Unit Deployment Program schedule.  This
aside, both brigades deployed with only one ground unit each that
had undergone a Combined Arms Exercise in the preceding two and
one-half years.  In both cases, the exercises were completed
between October 1985 and January 1986.  The point is that these
two brigades are meant to be employed as "mech-heavy" forces after
marrying up with the maritime prepositioned equipment sets, which
contain a greater number of tanks and assault amphibious vehicles
than would normally be found in a regimental landing team.
    As was demonstrated to be the case with the cold weather
contingency, mechanized operations demand unique and extensive
preparations for successful execution.  The efforts made to date
have relied on the Marine Corps' traditional approach, task
organizing from within its structure to implement assigned
missions.  The limitations inherent to this practice would be
especially undermining in mechanized warfare, particularly when
almost any opponent the Marine Corps could expect to face has
dedicated mechanized forces.  If the Marine Corps expects to be
successful in this setting, its policies and philosophy must
change; a program that will influence any proposals for change is
the Unit Deployment Program.
                            CHAPTER FOUR
                      UNIT DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM
    Any attempt to designate units for specific missions, thereby
allowing a prioritization of training effort and the development
of a higher degree of competency in a particular area, must take
into account the needs of the Unit Deployment Program.  This plan,
in effect since 1977, is essentially a manpower management program
and was enacted in order to reduce lengthy family separations,
stabilize units, and in the process, reduce spending.  As it is
currently executed, the Unit Deployment Program draws from 22 of
the 27 infantry battalions.  Features of the present schedule of
deployment for all the battalions are as follows:
    >One battalion is permanently exempted from deployments.
    >Four battalions source the western Pacific-deploying special
    operations-capable Marine Amphibious Units.
    >The First Marine Division provides its remaining eight
    battalions for unit deployments to Okinawa on a rotational
    basis.
    >The Second Marine Division sources its commitment from its 11
    battalions on a "last in, last out" basis.  Units are as
    equally apt to deploy into the Mediterranean as a special
    operations-capable Marine Amphibious Unit as spend six months
    in Okinawa.   Units designated to participate in cold weather
    exercises are also assigned from the 11 battalions.
    >The homebase period can be as long as 18 months.
Disadvantages of this system include:
     >Opportunities for extensive experience in mechanized
     operations are concentrated in a single battalion, while the
     need for that experience is much greater.
     >The deployment policy exercised in the Second Marine Division
     precludes any opportunity to take advantage of personal,
     prior experience in preparing a unit between two deployments
     because no unit executes two deployments into the same region
     consecutively.  This is a particularly significant drawbqack
     for the ship-deploying battalion landing teams.
     >Consecutive returns by a battalion for cold weather training
     and exercises are unlikely for Second Marine Division units
     due to the rotational deployment policies.  This impacts
     adversely on accumulation of experience or the development of
     expertise.
     >The homebase period for each of the battalions of the Third
     Marines is 12 months.
    Several modifications to this schedule are possible.  As a
first step, sourcing of the Marine Amphibious Units could be
limited to a four battalion base on each coast.  In this regard,
it is interesting to note the different practices being followed
by the two divisions involved.  When the First Marine Division was
assigned responsibility for providing western Pacific-deploying
units in 1985 1, it opted for a four battalion sourcing base.  In
contrast, the Second Marine Division, which provides the
battalions for the deployments into the Mediterranean area, has
attempted several sourcing bases.  It drew from nine battalions in
the mid-1970's but reduced that number to only three before 1980.
This was expanded to a four battalion base for a short period, but
was changed again to three battalions in 1983.  Since 1984, the
deploying battalions have been drawn from all eleven units
resident at Camp Lejeune.
    Deployments based on a four battalion base allow a 14 month
homebase period for each unit.  This assumes six month deployments
with a one month overlap between these to meet turnover
requirements (Table 7).  Limiting the sourcing pool to a smaller
number of units offers the most in terms of continuity of
experience (both within the units and in dealings with host
nations along the Mediterranean littoral), focus of training
effort, and in the control and coordination by a higher
headquarters.  The advent of special operations-capable Marine
Amphibious Units places even greater demands on the limited
training time available to units preparing for a deployment than
was formerly the case2.
    A second recommended change involves the cold weather mission:
the de facto responsibility of the Second Marine Regiment for this
type of operation could be formalized.  Earmarking three
battalions would be adequate, although inclusion of a fourth would
add significant depth to the regiment's capabilities and flexi-
bility.  Also, these units could still participate in the Unit
Deployment Program (Table 8).  Doing so would allow a homebase
period for each battalion of 14 to 18 months.  Another advantage
to this would be the opportunity for these dedicated units to
execute cold weather exercises in areas other than Norway.  This
option would not be without cost to these units' continued cold
weather readiness because of the periodic interruption of training
Click here to view image
opportunities.  For example, a battalion that returns from a six
month deployment in December or January may not be prepared for a
cold weather exercise in February or March.  Besides being a time
when these units normally lose considerable experience through
transfers, the competing interests of the deployment plan may
preclude effective preparation.  Loss of one year's participation
would markedly degrade a battalion's readiness for cold weather
operations (as has been presented)  and force the unit to undergo
initial, basic cold weather training before it could again be
expected to be proficient to any degree.  This fact leads to a 
third possible adjustment to unit deployments.
     If eight battalions are "fenced" for the scheduled Marine
Amphibious Unit deployments, another three for cold weather
training, and one battalion for the continuing test base for
mechanized operations at 29 Palms, 15 infantry battalions are
still available to meet the needs of the Unit Deployment Program,
preparation for deployment in conjunction with the maritime
prepositioned equipment sets, and the general amphibious missions
that have been assigned to three of the Marine Amphibious Brigades
(Appendix A).  Without giving any consideration to the specific
nature of the training required for mechanized operations, and
abiding by the continuing requirement to maintain five infantry
battalions in Okinawa, the 15 battalions would experience
recurring six-month deployments separated by homebase periods of
12 months (Table 9).  This can be extended several ways.  For
example, setting aside the requirement for the presence of five
battalions on Okinawa at any one time and/or the policy of
Click here to view image
following a six-month deployment period offers alternatives that
affect homebase periods, that is, frequency of deployment which,
presumably, would result in considerable cost savings.  By
extending the length of deployment one month, units would be able
to train for 14 or 15 months at home between deployments (Table
10).  Increasing this one more month to eight months results in a 
homebase period of 16 months (Table 11).  A less likely option,
reducing the number of battalions required to be present on
Okinawa at any time to four, creates homebase periods of 18 months
(Table 12).  Presumably, the need for additional combat units in
this situation could be met by relying on rapid deployment of
units from one of the major stateside installations.  In each
case, the stability of units with more specific, mission-oriented
roles, that is, cold weather and special operations-capability, is
enhanced.
     An area of concern that does not appear to have been effect-
ively dealt with by Marine Corps planners involves the potential
deployment of battalions to Southwest Asia or to a marriage with
one of three Maritime Prepositioned Ship squadrons and the
latter's associated equipment and supplies.  In either case, the
intent is to provide a heavily-mechanized, reinforced amphibious
force or brigade for a contingency.  A unit lacking at least the
experience gained from a live fire, combined arms exercise, for
example, those associated with the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat
Center, will face monumental problems attempting to operate as a 
mechanized force.  That role demands much more than introductory
familiarity with the equipment.  The components (infantry, tanks
Click here to view image
amphibious assault vehicles, and the fire support element) of the
maneuvering force must know each other and be able to anticipate
how each will respond to rapidly-changing situations.  Inertia
must be quickly overcome.  On the other end, once moving a mech-
anized unit can be difficult to control.  The increased speed of
mechanized movements necessitates experience making decisions much
more quickly than is necessary at footmobile speeds:  the ground
represented on a map in a 1:50,000 scale can be traversed
rapidly.  Finally, the embarked troops can present challenges for
the experienced that result from ride-induced disorientation and
sluggishness.
    In the absence of dedication of units to mobile assault
regiments, as was recommended by the Mission and Force Structure
Study,3 a pointed effort could be made to develop a relationship
between the units designated to carry out combined arms exercises
and any force list that might be developed for deployment as part
of the Maritime Prepositioned Forces.  At any given time, the
three battalions in each division (or the Brigade) with the most
recent 29 Palms-derived experience could comprise the ground
combat element for the corresponding brigade's contingencies.
Long-range planning could ensure that a "mechanized" unit's
availability is maximized before it is lost to a unit deployment
turn.  Providing these units with priority for training
opportunities with the parent division's mechanized assets would
enhance each battalion's readiness and expand its experience
level.  The next logical adjustment would be to permit these units
to repeat the combined arms training each year, although this step
is tantamount to "earmarking".  As this would impact adversely on
the Unit Deployment Program, it is more likely that trained
battalions would rotate into and out of any force list, keyed to
their turn for deployment to Okinawa.  The obvious disadvantage of
this is that few units will ever develop beyond an elementary
level of experience in mechanized operations.
    The current status of First Battalion, Fourth Marines should
also be reviewed.  That unit's role as the test base for studies
in task organizing units for mechanized operations is no longer
germane, while its position as the sole "earmarked" base element
of the Seventh Marine Amphibious Brigade's mechanized ground
combat element understates the need.  That designation provides it
with critical experience beyond that available to other
battalions.  This is especially so for corresponding elements of
the other Maritime Prepositioned Force brigades.  This reliance on
a single battalion, when the equipment for three mechanized
battalions will be available from the corresponding Maritime
Prepositioned Ship Squadron's cargo, is limiting.  Returning this
battalion to the Unit Deployment Program would provide additional
relief from the frequency of deployment for other units (see
Tables 13 and 14).  Specifically, the homebase period could be
extended in the instance of six month deployments to 13 or 14
months and 15 to 17 months for seven month deployments.  It would
also create opportunities for the other battalions, presumably
those assigned to the force list of the Maritime Prepositioned
Force brigades or the component battalions of the reinforced
Marine Amphibious Force, to expand their training and experience
Click here to view image
by giving each more time to train at 29 Palms.  Another benefit
from this change would accrue from the opportunity for 27th
Marines (or any other designated higher headquarters) to supervise
the training conducted by potentially subordinate units.
    As a final point, the Commandant of the Marine Corps has
indicated that dedication of units is not a closed issue for the
Marine Corps.  During July 1986, General P.X. Kelley challenged a
group of Marine students at the Marine Corps Command and Staff
College to create a utilization plan for the infantry battalions
that would encompass dedication of units.4  His one condition was
that any plan presented must preserve the Unit Deployment
Program.  General Kelley's comments imply that, even at his level
of concern, there is reason to consider specialized units in order
to meet the demands of the cold weather role.  By consolidating
the various options presented in this chapter, a schedule can be
organized that accomplishes the Commandant's request.  This
schedule, notionally organized in Table 15, features the
following:
    >Three battalions dedicated to the cold weather role.
    >Twenty-four battalions for deployment needs.  Of these:
         >Four battalions are dedicated to Pacific Ocean-oriented
          Marine Amphibious Unit deployments.
         >Four battalions are dedicated to Mediterranean Sea-
          oriented Marine Amphibious Unit deployments.
          >Sixteen battalions constitute the sourcing base for the
          Unit Deployment Program.
    >The homebase period for every deploying battalion is 13 or 14
    months.
Click here to view image
Salient advantages of this option include:
    >Development of broader expertise in cold weather operations
     through an experience base that transcends the existing,
     persistent novice level.
    >Greater stability, resulting from a limited rotation base of
     units sourcing special operations-capable Marine Amphibious
     Units.
    >Equity in deployment frequency and homebase periods for the
     majority of the infantry battalions.
    >Improved availability and readiness of trained units for
     mechanized operations through combined arms exercise
     scheduling.
    >More effective prioritization of limited training opportuni-
     ties and equipment.
The disadvantages are few:
    >Movement away from the tradition of "any time, any place, any
     mission," by allowing the specialization of three battalions
     in cold weather operations.
    >Perceived infringement on commanders' prerogatives.
    >Homebase periods of less than 18 months.
    >Perceived differences in significance of assigned missions.
     In summary, the emphasis placed on the Unit Deployment Program
by Marine Corps planners is the limiting factor that must be
contended with when searching for ways to improve the readiness of
units expected to conduct operations in cold weather or in a
mechanized situation.  Currently, there is considerable variation
among the contributing commands in the way deployment requirements
are met.  This has resulted in marked differences in homebase
periods, the degree to which units can concentrate their training
efforts and the level of expertise any command can be expected to
attain.  The demands of three types of missions-cold
weather,mechanized operations and special operations-dictate
special handling.  To dedicate adequate numbers of units to each
of these would invalidate the Unit Deployment Program:  thirteen
or fewer battalions would be available to meet its requirements.
Conversely, if the program's restrictions, for example, the six
month deployment length and the requirement for five battalions,
were modified, there would be considerably greater flexibility to
accommodate each mission's needs.  In the absence of this a
schedule can be developed that would permit the earmarking of
battalions for the cold weather and special operations roles while
retaining a sufficient number of units to fulfill unit deployment
requirements.  Finally, careful husbanding of training
opportunities in mechanized operations for these units would
improve readiness for that type of combat role.
                            CHAPTER FIVE
                            CONCLUSIONS
    The resolution of the problem of satisfactorily meeting the
needs of the two roles under study demands solutions that will be
valid in the long term.  Adjustments to unit deployment cycles
provide immediate repair but do nothing to resolve the underlying
causes of the problems, such as personnel instability and the lack
of sufficient accumulated experience.  To date, Marine Corps
planners have been disinclined to take the necessary actions that
will ensure that units which are called upon to execute out
missions in cold weather or in a mechanized environment will be
adequately prepared.  The likelihood is great that whoever is
available at the time a contingency arises will get the order to
execute.  This may be in keeping with the philosophy of a light,
responsive, general purpose force, but it defies of sound judgment
where such specialized or demanding missions are concerned.
Imagination, improvisation and a tradition of firm discipline will
not be enough to successfully counter an adversary's better
preparation for cold weather warfare or his greater experience in
a mechanized mode.
    A significant body of Marines feel strongly that the Marine
Corps should avoid specialization at all costs.  The term, in
addition to dedication, fencing and earmarking, is anathema to
many and, in fact, may have reflected an acceptable attitude or
tradition in the past.  The common arguments against the idea are
generally two-fold:  first, any move that can be viewed as a
duplication of the missions of the U.S. Army will be interpreted
as a shift toward an unwanted "second land army".  An example is
the interest that has been expressed over the years, as evidenced
in the pages of the Marine Corps Gazette, in creating mechanized
units, variously identified as mobile assault regiments,
mechanized combined arms task forces, and even armor-heavy
regiments or divisions.  The second argument derives from the
tradition that Marines must be prepared to respond at any time and
in any place to whatever challenge we are directed to meet ("every
clime and place").  One hears or reads that if the Marine Corps is
unable or is no longer needed to execute amphibious assaults, it
will no longer be justifiable as a separate entity and, as a
consequence, will likely be absorbed into the U.S. Army.
    The United States Congress has reaffirmed its favorable view
of the Marine Corps on numerous occasions, legislatively and less
formally.  It must be regarded as a demonstration of that support
that the Marine Corps is repeatedly looked to for execution of new
and demanding roles and missions.  Two cases in point:
preparation of a Marine Amphibious Brigade for reinforcement of
the Northern Flank (northern Norway); and inclusion of a
reinforced, "mech-heavy" Marine Amphibious Force in the Commander-
in-Chief, Central Command's force list.
    These two roles clearly signal missions for which the Marine
Corps must be prepared.  By virtue of its designation as a
contributor to the Central Command's rapid deployment force as
well as a likely component of the Commander, North Norway's
forces, we can no longer regard the Marine Corps as a general
purpose, light infantry force in the strictest sense of the
terms.  This is not to say that the Marine Corps is not expected
to operate across the spectrum of conflict.  But, it does not have
to be interpreted to mean that every Marine, every unit has the
capability.  There just aren't enough training opportunities,
while time and equipment limitations contribute additional
critical restrictions.  Given these constraints, it is not
possible to train every Marine to a level of proficiency that will
ensure his effectiveness in all settings.  This is especially so
in the area of mechanized operations, where more technical
expertise or unique experience is required, and in cold weather
operations, where survival is the first priority and will make
unique demands on small unit leadership.
    We, as Marines, have a tremendous advantage over our
predecessors who fought in Korea at the Chosin Reservoir.  Where
they could not anticipate that they would be fighting in that
environment, thereby affording the opportunity to prepare for it
through training and logistics buildup, Marines of the 1980's have
been forewarned that they may be called upon to reinforce north
Norway.  What greater impetus could we seek?
    Saying that the Marine Corps is prepared for northern Norway
based on short term annual exercises is dangerous.  The experience
gained by six to eight days on the ground, where the problem is
interrupted for bivouac, and where troops tend to tolerate the
conditions (rather than learning to live with them) because there
is a foreseeable end to their discomfort, is of marginal value.
Commitment to northern Norway may well mean interrupted resupply
and extended exposure to the cold.  There is no reliable guage to
indicate how the troops will perform under drawn-out conditions of
indefinite duration.  We must expand our experience to include
existence and prolonged operation under less carefully controlled
conditions.
     Marines participating in cold weather exercises for the first
time lack an appreciation for the demands inherent to cold
weather.  Comments made by instructors and points available in
training manuals are likely to be overlooked or their value
misjudged as innocuous:  cold weather must be experienced.  The
first cycle of experience serves to "make a believer" of the
novice.  Subsequent cycles are imperative in expanding that
appreciation and experience.  Expertise follows.  Besides greater
personnel stability, the advantage of dedicated units is that
basic, introductory training must be provided only to new members
of the unit; the starting point for returning members can be more
advanced so as to build on previous experience.  Currently, the
only units in the Marine Coorps capable of this are the two 
associated headquarters elements.
     The precarious situation that exists with the Fourth Marine
Amphibious Brigade must be resolved.  It is the only permanently
staffed brigade assigned two missions (amphibious  operations and
cold weather planning).  If this brigade is deployed as a 
consequence of its amphibious mission, any cold weather 
contingency will become the responsibility of another brigade
headquarters, one that will likely lack experience in and, more
importantly, an appreciation of the demands of cold weather.  If
each of the seven missions currently assigned to the six standing
Marine Amphibious Brigades carry equal importance, a seventh
headquarters is warranted.  In view of given manpower constraints,
a practical solution might be to assign the Fourth Marine
Amphibious Brigade's mission to one of the contingency
("suitcase") brigade headquarters.
    Finally, mechanized combined arms operations require intense
familiarity with the equipment and each other.  An exposure to the
potential of this type of combat, for example, by a combined arms
exercise or a combined arms operation, equates only to the most
basic level of experience.  If we steadfastly refuse to orient on
mechanization-even without becoming mechanized-we are overlooking
the direction provided by the Secretary of Defense and the
materiel preparedness represented by Maritime Prepositioning.
    Given a likely role in a high threat area such as the Middle
East, the Marine Corps must compare its weapons capabilities,
mobility, and so forth to those of likely adversaries.  In the
case of Southwest Asia, the equippage of potential opponents
indicates a more mobile, tank-heavy threat.  The Marine Corps must
be prepared for this.  A "scratch team" comprised of available
units will not survive.  The experience afforded by a higher
degree of dedication to the mission than is currently practiced is
imperative.
    A solution to the problems mentioned above involves changes to
the Unit Deployment Program.  The system in operation does not pay
sufficient attention to readiness for these specific roles.  By
altering the schedule and participation, it would be possible to
dedicate battalions to the cold weather and special operations
contingencies while offering a greater degree of equity in
deployment frequencies to the majority of the battalions.
Dedication of units to mechanized warfare preparation will not be
possible so long as the requirement exists to deploy battalions to
Okinawa:  there are insufficient units to handle both.  An
accommodation can be made by "earmarking" the units that are to
receive combined arms exercise or mechanized tactics experience.
These battalions would be much better prepared to operate in a
mechanized scenario than units lacking that exposure.  The Marine
Corps must take into consideration the peculiarities of these
roles.  If we respond to a contingency involving any one of these,
we must not place ourselves in a situation in which we are made to
explain why we were not prepared.  Too many critics will be able
to say "We told you so!"
                               ENDNOTES
                     Chapter One: Introduction
    1M. Binkin and J. Record, Where Does The Marine Corps Go
From Here? (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1976), 1.
    2United States, Department of Defense, Report of the Secre-
tary of Defenser James R. Schlesinger  to the Congress on the FY
1976 and Transition Budgets. FY 1977 Authorization Request and FY
1976-1980 Defense Programs (Washington, D.C., Department of
Defense, 1975), III-26.  Hereafter referred to as Schlesinger
(1975).
    3Binkin and Record, 67.
    4Mission and Force Structure Study (Washington, D.C.,
Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1976)
    5R.D.M. Furlong, "The Strategic Situation in Northern Europe-
Improvements Vital to NATO." International Defense Review
10(1979): 899-910.
    6J. Hyndman, Impact of Cold Weather on MAGTF Amphibious
Operations During the Mid-Range Study (Arlington, VA, Northrop
Services, Inc., 1980)
    7United States, Department of Defense, Report of the Secre-
tary of Defense, Harold Brown, to the Congress on the FY 1980
Budgets FY 1981 Authorization Request and FY 1980-1984 Defense
Programs (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 1979), 211.
Hereafter referred to as Brown (1980).
    8Furlong, 906.
    9J.C. Scharfen, "Cold Weather Training:   The Absolute
Necessity." Marine Corps Gazette 65.2(1981): 34-41.
    10Alexander, 109.
          Chapter Two: The Case for a Cold Weather Brigade
    1L. Montross and R.A. Canzona, U.S.  Marine Operations in Korea
1950-1953, Volume III, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign (Washington,
D.C., Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1957), 121.
    2D.G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York,
Macmillan, 1966), 739-852.
    3Ibid., 509-555.
    4E.F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin:  The German Defeat in the
East, (Washington, D.C., 1968).
    5E.F.  Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940-
1945 (Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, 1959), 188.
    6Ibid., 286.
    7Ibid., 304.
    8J.A. Waldrum (Major, Canadian Forces) A Study in Cold Weather
Survival, (Quantico, VA, 1977).
    9S. Leach, "Can-Do Won't Do in Norway." Marine Corps Gazette
62.9(1978):52-56.
   10Montross and Canzona, 321.
   11J. Berg, "Soviet Front-Level Threat to Northern Norway." Int-
ernational Defense Review 18(1985): 178-179.
   12T. Ries, "Defending the Far North." International Defense
Review 17(1984): 873-880.
   13Ries, 875.
   14J.H. Alexander, "The Role of Marines in the Defense of North
Norway." US Naval Institute Proceedings 110(1984): 180-193.
   15Ries, 874.
   16W.H. Schopfel, "The MAB in Norway." US Naval Institute
Proceedings 112(1986): 33-39.
   17H.K. O'Donnell, "Northern Flank Maritime Offensive." US Naval
Institute Proceedings 111(1985): 42-57.
   18Ibid., 44.
   19Ries, 876.
   20P. Wall, "NATO's Vulnerable Flank." Seapower 28(1984): 34-38.
   21Berg, 178.
   22O'Donnell, 45.
   23Berg, 179.
   24N. Ivanov, "Liberation of North Norway." Soviet Military
Review 10(1984): 49-50.
   250'Donnell, 45.
   26Alexander, 183.
   27Scharfen, 34.
   28Wall, 12.
   29Ries, 878.
   30See R.C. Bowman, "Soviet Options on NATO's Northern Flank."
Armed Forces Journal 121(1984):88-93.
   31Furlong, 900.
   32Ries, 879.
   33Alexander, 185.
   34Wall,36.
   35Alexander, 186.
   36G.R. Hofmann, "Reinforcing North Norway:   The Marine
Amphibious Brigade's Contribution." (Newport,RI, Naval War
College, 1984).
   37Alexander, 185.
   38Ries, 879.
   39"Memorandum of Understanding Governing Prestockage and
Reinforcement of Norway." (Washington, D.C., January 16, 1981).
   40Montross and Canzona, 121.
   41D.F. Bittner, "British Army's WWII Experience CAsts Doubt on
Corps' Ability to Fight."  Marine Corps Gazette 61.7(1977): 28-34.
   42Hyndman, 4-8.
   43Furlong, 906.
   44Alexander, 189.
   45M.D.Cerreta, "Cold Weather Conference in Norway." Marine
Corps Gazette 66.7(1982): 19-21.
   46Furlong, 906.
   47Ibid., 907.
   48See note 46.
   49Alexander, 192.
   50Ibid., 180.
   51Hyndman, xvii.
   52Ibid., Section 9.
   53"Present facilities and training programs are inadequate to
keep Marines fully trained, conditioned, and acclimatized to
function effectively under the most severe conditions of weather,
terrain, and enemy action." Hyndman, xviii.
   54CMC ltr RDS-40-1-10-dmb dated 12 Feb 1982.
   55Cerreta, 20.
   56CMC ltr POG-36 0746B dated 15 Sep 1986.
   57Hyndman, 4-6.
   58C.E. Mundy, "Training in Arctic Warfare." Marine Corps
Gazette 69.9(1985): 71-72.
   59"Prepositioning in Norway." Marine Corps Gazette 70.7(1986):
4.
   60Data gathered between January and March, 1987 by
questionnaire sent through the Chief of Staff, 2nd Marine
Divison.  Each company in the indicated battalions was asked to
complete a form.  Questions asked included (by rank) total number
personnel, formal school (cold weather) training, and degree of
experience (one, two or three or more years; CONUS or Norway).
See Appendix B for sample.
          Chapter Three: The Case for Mechanized Brigades
   1Binkin and Record, 66.
   2Ibid., 82.
   3Mission and Force Structure Study, i.
   4Ibid., xiv.
   5Ibid., 411-12.
   6Schlesinger (1975), III-26.
   7United States, Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary
of Defense, Donald H. Rumafeld, to the Congress on the FY 1977
Budget. FY 1978 Authorization Request and FY 1977-1981 Defense
Programs. (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 1976), 104.
   8Ibid., 107.
   9United States, Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary
of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, to the Congress on the FY 1978
Budget, FY 1979 Authorization Request and FY 1978-1982 Defense
Programs. (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 1977), 99.
   10Brown (1980), 211.
   11United States, Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary
of Defense, Harold Brown, to the Congress on the FY 1981 Budget,
FY 1982 Authorization Request and FY 1981-1985 Defense Programs.
(Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 1980), 153.
   12Ibid., 211.
   13United States, Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary
of Defense, Harold Brown, to the Congress on the FY 1982 Budget,
1983 Authorization Request and FY 1982-1986 Defense Programs.
(Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 1981), 97.
   14Ibid., 191.
   15Ibid., 131.
   16United States, Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary
of Defense, Caspar W. Weinherger, to the Congress on the FY 1983
Budgets FY 1984 Authorization Request and FY 1983-1987 Defense
Programs.  (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 1982), III-7.
   17Ibid., III-103.
   18United States, Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary
of Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, to the Congress on the FY 1984
Budget, FY 1985 Authorization Request and FY 1984-1988 Defense
Programs.  (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 1983), 198.
   19Ibid., 200, 204.
   20United States, Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary
of Defense, Caspar W. Weinbergers, to the Congress on the FY 1985
Budget, FY 1986 Authorization Request and FY 1985-1989 Defense
Programs.  (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 1984), 19.
   21P. E. Wilson, "U.S. Marine Corps:  Separate But Not Equal."
Marine Corps Gazette 63.1(1979): 22
   22R.W.Smith, Interview with General L.H. Wilson, Commandant of
the Marine Corps, Marine Corps Gazette 60.12(1976): 5.  In
November, 1978, General Wilson stated that the Marine Corps did
not need to mechanize its forces, as it had no mission,
specifically in central Europe, that necessitated such a change.
Marine Corps Gazette 62.11(1978): 7.
   23O.L. North, "Unit Rotation:  Making Unaccompanied Tours
Easier on People." Marine Corps Gazette 61.11(1977): 70-76.
   24"Mechanized Combined Arms Task Force Test Exercise
Concluded."  Marine Corps Gazette 63.5(1979): 10.
   25"New Commands Are Activated."  Marine Corps Gazette
64.7(1980): 4.
   26"7th MAB: The NTPS Brigade."  Marine Corps Gazette
65.2(1981): 26-27.
   27"Battalion/Squadron Unit Deployment Status-5 March 1987."
Marine Corps Gazette 71.4(1987): 7.  The Status of infantry  units
is summarized below:
   Hawaii:          2/3, 1/3
   Camp Pendleton:  1/1, 2/1, 2/5, 3/5, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, 1/9, 2/9
   29 Palms:        1/4
   Camp Lejeune:    1/2, 2/2, 3/2, 3/4, 1/6, 2/6, 1/8, 3/8
   Mediterranean:   3/6
   Western Pacific: 3/1
   Okinawa:         3/3, 2/4, 1/5, 2/8, 3/9
   28"Battalion/Squadron Unit Deployment Status-1 July 1986."
Marine Corps Gazette 70.7(1986): 8.
                 Chapter 4: Unit Deployment Program
   1"Adjustments Made in Unit Deployment." Marine Corps Gazette
69.7(1985): 6.
   2Kelly, P.X. "The Marine Corps and Special Operations." Marine
Corps Gazette 69.10(1985): 22-23.
   3Mission and Force Study, 411.
   4Reserve Command and Staff College Phase II Working Group ltr
1500 HHP dated 25 Jul 86.  Marine Corps Development and Education
Command, Quantico, VA.
Click here to view image
                       ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adshead, Robin.  "Exercise 'Anchor Express' 1986".  Armed Forces 5
     (1986): 297-8.  Brief account of the intensity of training in
     preparation for the exercise and the decision to cancel same
     following a fatal avalanche.
Alexander, Joseph H.  "The Role of Marines in the Defense of North
     Norway".  US Naval Institute Proceedings 110 (1984): 180-
     193.  Comprehensive article that provides overviews of
     Norway's strategic significance, the regional balance, the
     status of pre-positioning of USMC equipment and the
     preparations by the MAB for combat in cold weather.
Allen, Steve N.  "Cold Weather Contradictions."  Marine Corps
     Gazette 69.7(1985): 28.  Commentary on statements made in
     previous Marine Corps Gazette articles regarding cold
     weather.  Counterpoint is offered to letters to the editor on
     the use of Gortex equipment and skis for Marines and
     reinforced another author's position that the demands of cold
     weather require that trained personnel be stabilized in
     units.
Berg, John.  "Soviet Front-Level Threat to Northern Norway."
     Jane's Defense Weekly 3 (1985): 178-79.
Berry, F. Clinton.  "Broader Scope for US Marines."  International
     Defense Review 18 (1985): 1127-8.  Short summation of current
     posture of the Marine Corps as a full member of the Joint
     Chiefs of Staff, as an independent determinant of equipment
     needs and peacetime player internationally, e.g., MPS and
     Norway prepositioning.
Binkin, M. and Jeffrey Record.  Where Does the Marine Corps Go
     From Here?  Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
     1976.  A post-Vietnam  study on the future of the Marine
     Corps.  The authors concluded that the emphasis given to
     Marine aviation is inordinate and detracts from modernization
     and equippage of the ground combat forces; that the Marine
     Corps' "fixation on an amphibious mission is unwarranted";
     that the Marine Corps will face difficulty, in a declining
     population of eligibles, to recruit acceptable members; and,
     that the reserve wing/division should be eliminated.  In a
     final chapter, alternatives to the then-present Marine Corps,
     ranging from mechanization to reduction in size, were pro-
     posed.
Bittner, Donald F.  "British Army's WWII Experience Casts Doubt on
     Corps' Ability to Fight in the Arctic."  Marine Corps
     Gazette  61.7 (1977): 28-34.  The arguments contrasting
     viewpoints within the British military toward creation of
     specialized units for cold weather operations during World
     are presented, thus drawing an interesting parallel with the
     current arguments that can be found taking place in the
     Marine Corps today.
Bowman, Richard C.  "Soviet Options on NATO's Northern Flank."
     Armed Forces Journal International  121(April):88-93 (1984):
Brown, Bruce G.  "Tally Ho-Pounce or Heads Up?  Planning the
     Corps' Future."  Marine Corps Gazette  65.3 (1981): 31-39.
     Comments on future force structure and mission orientation
     options available to the Marine Corps as presented in a 1980
     Congressional Budget Office issue paper. Chandler, David G.
Cerreta, M.D.  "Cold Weather Conference in Norway."  Marine Corps
     Gazette 66.7(1982):19-20.  Brief commentary on the first cold
     weather conference held with Norwegians to discuss probelems
     associated with training, infantry mobility, cold injuries, a
     cold weather classification system, and air support.
Chandler, David G. The Campaigns of Napoleon.  New York:   Mac-
     millan, 1966.  A classic, this lengthy volume provides
     details of Napoleon's campaigns with analysis and criticism
     of his style of warfare.
Clocquet, J.B.G.  "Forces for the Northern Flank."  Marine Corps
     Gazette 65.3 (1981): 20.  Letter from the Commander, 1 ACG in
     response to the February, 1981 issue of Marine Corps
     Gazette.  Author made the point that, while he and his men
     are regarded as cold weather specialists, they do not lack in
     diversity of skills or ability to carry out other missions.
Clough, M.F.  "'Good to Go' Arctic Warriors."  Marine Corps
     Gazette 69.9 (1985):65-70.  A positive assessment of the US
     Marine Corps' participation in the 1985 NATO cold weather
     exercise in Norway.  Commenting on the value of ski-borne
     troops, the author pointed to the drawback of not stabilizing
     the unit so the experience gained could be expanded upon.
Eiseman, Ben, and Carl F. Tidemann.  "Cold: Friend or Foe."
     Marine Corps Gazette  64.2 (1980): 39-44.  As pointed out by
     the authors (a US Navy rear admiral and a Norwegian
     lieutenant colonel, both assigned to their respective
     service's medical corps), the Norwegians, with their greater
     experience in cold weather, can offer the Marine Corps many
     lessons that will save valuable time in the preparation of a
     force for arctic warfare.  These include prevention of cold
     weather injuries, personal and unit equipment needs, and
     training.
Foster, Nigel.  "North Norway-A Partisan Project."  Defense
     Attache 2 (1986):15-22.
Furlong, R.D.M.  "The Strategic Situation in Northern Europe-
     Improvements Vital for NATO."  International Defense Review
     10 (1979): 899-910.
Ganley, Michael.  "Are Soldiers Headed for 'Hot' Spots Doomed to
     Train at Frigid Fort Drum?"  Armed Forces Journal Inter-
     national 122 (1985): 78-84.  Statements are made about the
     danger of committing light infantry units to Southwest Asia
     (unnamed House Armed Services Committee member quoted) and
     the value of Fort Drum an an unsurpassed training site for
     cold weather operations are made.
Green, Eric J.  "Continuity in Arctic Units."  Marine Corps
     Gazette 70.2 (1986) 36-38.  The benefits derived from
     assigning a cold weather mission to a Marine Corps Reserve
     MAB are discussed. Grinalds, John S.  "The Corps 20 Years
     from Now."  Marine Corps Gazette 64.2 (1980): 16-18.  An
     argument is presented regarding the nature of the Marine
     Corps' likely adversaries in the future and steps that could
     or should be taken to best meet and counter these.  This
     commentary was condensed from the author's recently published
     National Security Affairs Monograph.
Haynes, S.E.  "Now is the Time for a Marine Corps Cold Weather
     Brigade."   Marine Corps Gazette 64.2 (1980): 19-20.  Article
     promoting creation of a old weather brigade from east and
     west coast battalions plus reserve units with a headquarters
     from the 2d Marine Division.
Hofmann, George R.  "Reinforcing North Norway:  The Marine
     Amphibious Brigade's Contribution."  N420F95 1984 no.24.
     Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1984.  Paper submitted as
     student at Naval War College; contains copy of the Memorandum
     of Understanding for prepositioning between U.S. and Norway.
     Author concluded that the MAB is the most significant
     reinforcing element in NATO's commitment to Norway, chiefly
     due to the air component.
Hyndman, Jerry.  Impact of Cold Weather on MAGTF Amphibious
     Operations During the Mid-Range Study. Headquarters, U.S.
     Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.  Contract No. M00027-80-C-
     0021, Report No. (SCN) 70-80-03.  Independent analysis of
     Marine Corps capabilities and limitations in cold weather
     operations. Commissioned in 1979, the study provided numerous
     recommendations designed to improve operability in intense
     cold.  Although approved by HQMC, significant features of the
     study have not been acted upon, for example, permanently
     assigning units to the cold weather mission and basing these
     in cold regions.
Iungerich, Raphael.  "US Rapid Deployment Forces-USCENTCOM-What Is
     It?  Can It Do the Job?"  Armed Forces Journal International
     121 (1984): 88-106.  Comprehensive article reviewing the
     status as of 1984 of the U.S. Central Command.
      "How Real is the Soviet Threat to the Gulf Region?" Armed
     Forces Journal International 121 (1984): 110-111.  A
     discussion of the Soviet and U.S. capabilities and
     limitations with respect to intervention in the Gulf
     region.
      "USCENTCOM Is Not Alone."  Armed Forces Journal
     International 121 (1984) 106-7, 134.  Brief article providing
     tabulated comparison of manpower, tanks, AFV's, artillery,
     aircraft, helicopters, paramilitary forces and reserves of 11
     of the 19 nations in USCENTCOM's region.
Ivanov, Nikolai.  "Liberation of Northern Norway."  Soviet
     Military Review 10 (1984): 49-50.  Historical note describing
     Soviet operations on the Kola Penninsula during October 1944
     against German forces.
Jones, Thomas S.  "Cold Weather Takes Priority."  Marine Corps
     Gazette 68.12 (1984): 38-52.  Article providing arguments
     favoring dedication of specific units to the brigade-size
     mission for northern Norway.
Kelley, Paul X.  "Commandant of the Marine Corps FY 87 Posture
     Statement.  Statement on Posture, Plans, and Programs for
     Fiscal Years 1987 through 1991."  Department of the Navy:
     Washington, D.C., 1986.  The prepositioning program will
     reduce the response time from weeks to days for the critical
     Northern Flank.  A weakness of past policy has been the
     marriage for exercises of experienced maneuver elements with
     ad hoc MAGTF staffs.
      "A Report by General Paul X. Kelley. U.S. Marine Corps,
     Commandant of the Marine Corps, On the Posture, Plans and
     Programs for Fiscal Years 1986 through 1990".  Department of
     the Navy:  Washington, D.C., 1986.  CMC acknowledged the
     "unique requirements of the Norway mission".
Leach, Sean.  "'Can-Do' Won't Do in Norway."  Marine Corps Gazette
     62.9 (1978): 52-56.  Article recalling difficulties Marines
     had in Korea in 1950 as a means of forewarning the Marine
     Corps that, to properly prepare for combat in Norway, it
     should permanently designate a cold weather MAB.
Lederer, P.R.  "Cold Weather Training."  Marine Corps Gazette 69.6
     (1985): 31.
MacCaskill, Douglas C.  "Norway's Strategic Importance."  Marine
     Corps Gazette 65.2 (1981): 28-33.  Article addressing likely
     Soviet attack scenarios in Norway and recommendations for its
     defense.  Among proposals is the permanent but rotating
     basing of a Marine Corps MAB in the United Kingdom with
     forward elements in Norway.
Maltese, Dewey.  "Cold Weather Experts."  Marine Corps Gazette
     69.7 (1985): 18.  A letter to the editor, the author
     suggested that "every clime, every place" is valid for all
     Marines despite climatic extremes reflected in missions.
Martin, Owen C.  "NATO's Northern Flank and Bilateral
     Agreements."  Newport, R.I.:  Naval War College 49-85, March,
     1985.  Technical report detailing the history of .bilateral
     agreements between the U.S. and Norway.  Limited usefulness.
McKenzie, Scott W.  "C 2 Issues in Amphibious Operations in North
     Norway."  Akershus, Norway:  Norwegian Command and Staff
     College, 1986.  Discussion of command and control issues
     confronting a MAB and other NATO forces in Norway.  Includes
     comments on problems associated with the MAB's AOA, command
     of Marine forces, USMC command of NATO forces, control of the
     air element, IFF air defense problems, capabilities and
     limitations (operational) of MAB and other NATO forces.
Miller, Stephen W.  "It's time to Mechanize Amphibious Forces."
     Marine Corps Gazette 62.6 (1978): 39-42.  Author favors
     mechanization to improve success liklihood in a reinforcing
     role in Europe as well as any "limited war" outside of
     Europe.  The author points out the limited usefulness of
     the helicopter in situations where SAM employment is
     experienced.
Montross, Lynn, and Nicholas A. Canzona.  U.S. Marine Operations
     in Korea 1950-1953.  Volume III, The Chosin Reservoir
     Campaign.  Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3,
     Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1957.  Official account of
     Marine Corps operations and participation in the Korean
     conflict.
Mundy, Carl F.  "Training in Arctic Warfare."  Marine Corps
     Gazette 69.9 (1985) 71-2.  Based on his observations as
     Commanding General, 4th MAB, the author offers counterpoints
     to criticisms directed at the Marine Corps in its preparation
     for combat in cold weather.
North, Oliver L.  "Unit Rotation:  Making Unaccompanied Tours
     Easier on People."  Marine Corps Gazette 61.11 (1977): 70-
     76.  Article providing details of the unit deployment six
     phase program, which was initiated to alleviate turnover,
     retention and availability problems of the manpower system.
O'Donnell, Hugh K.  "Northern Flank Maritime Offensive."  U.S.
     Naval Institute Proceedings 111 (1985): 42-57.  Comprehensive
     article applying aspects of the Maritime Strategy to the
     Northern Flank.  Author touches on employment of the MAGTF,
     possibly through amphibious assault behind Soviet lines along
     the Norwegian coast.
Quist, Burton C.  "The Northern Flank."  Marine Corps Gazette 65.5
     (1981): 18-19.  Letter to the editor commenting on an earlier
     issue.  The author provides insight into the Norwegian
     political situation that impacts on location of prepositioned
     gear and lack of permanently stationed NATO forces in
     Norway.  He suggests that the Marine Corps' initial combat
     action will be closer to Trondelag than the Finnmark area.
     Finally, he supports the idea of dedicating units.
Ries, Tomas.  "Defending the Far North."  International Defense
     Review 17 (1984): 873-880.  Excellent article by an analyst
     from the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute that provides a
     good overview of the nature of the Soviet threat in the
     northern region, the strategic significance of the area
     (both for the Soviets and NATO), the balance of forces and
     the status of NATO forces the Norwegians look to for rein-
     forcement.  A strong point is made of the Marine Corps'
     limited efforts to effectively prepare for cold weather
     operations.
Scharfen, John C. "Cold Weather Training: The Absolute
     Necessity."  Marine Corps Gazette 65.2 (1981) 34-41.
     Following a brief review of the Norwegian situation with
     respect to its defense, the author provides commentary on the
     Marine Corps' most effective employment-not as a highly
     mobile ski-borne force, but in a manner suited to its current
     organization.
      "Interview with General George B. Crist, Commander-in-Chief
     U.S. Central Command."  Marine Corps Gazette 70.12 (1986): 30-
     37.  A description of the state of CENTCOM, its role,
     accomplishments, challenges and problems.
Schopfel, William H.  "The MAB in Norway."  US Naval Institute
     Proceedings 112 (1986): 33-39.  General article reviewing
     Soviet threat and anticipated NATO plans for response.
Smelcer, Charles B.  "Sustainability of the Marine Corps MAGTF in
     Norway."  AD-B094 589.  Newport, R.I.:  Naval War College,
     1985.  Listing and review of the Norway prepositioned
     equipment and supplies.
Smith, Norman H.  "Arctic Maneuvers 1984."  Marine Corps Gazette
     68.12 (1984) 30-37.  Summary of Teamwork 84, the MAB-sized
     cold weather NATO exercise in northern Norway.
Uhlig, Frank.  "The Marine Corps' Future May Lie North of the
     Arctic Circle."  Marine Corps Gazette 64.2 (1980): 32-38.
     Forward-looking admonishment for the Marine Corps to prepare
     for future combat not past, looking particularly to areas of
     extreme cold.
United States.  Department of Defense.  Report of the Secretary of
     Defense, James R. Schlesinger, to the Congress on the FY 1976
     and Transition Budgets, FY 1977 Authorization Request and FY
     1976-1980 Defense Programs.  February 5, 1975.
United States.  Department of Defense.  Report of the Secretary of
      Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, to the Congress on the FY 1977
      Budget  FY 1978 Authorization Request and FY 1977-1981
      Defense Programs.  January 27, 1976.
United States.  Department of Defense.  Report of the Secretary of
     Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, to the Congress on the FY 1978
     Budget, FY 1979 Authorization Request and FY 1978-1982
     Defense Program.  January 17, 1977.
United States.  Department of Defense.  Report of the Secretary of
     Defense, Harold Brown, to the Congress on the FY 1980 Budget,
     FY 1981 Authorization Request and FY 1980-1984 Defense
     Programs.  January 25, 1979.
United States.  Department of Defense   Report of the Secretary of
     Defense, Harold Brown, to the Congress on the FY 1981 Budget,
     FY 1982 Authorization Request and FY 1981-1985 Defense
     Programs.  January 29, 1980
United States.  Department of Defense.  Report of the Secretary of
     Defense, Harold Brown  to the Congress on the FY 1982 Budget.
     FY 1983 Authorization Request and FY 1982-1986 Defense
     Programs.  January 19, 1981.
United States.  Department of Defense.  Report of the Secretary of
     Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, to the Congress on the FY 1983
     Budget, FY 1984 Authorization Request and FY 1983-1987
     Defense Programs.  February 8, 1982.
United States.  Department of Defense.  Report of the Secretary of
     Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, to the Congress on the FY 1984
     Budget, FY 1985 Authorization Request and FY 1984-1988
     Defense Programs.  February 1, 1983.
United States.  Department of Defense.  Report of the Secretary of
     Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, to the Congress on the FY 1985
     Budget, FY 1986 Authorization Request and FY 1985-1989
     Defense Programs.  February 1, 1984.
Waldrum, J.A.  The Aleutian Campaign:  A Study in Cold Weather
     Survival.  Marine Corps Development and Education Command,
     Quantico, VA.  1977.  Student research paper.  The author is
     a Canadian Armed Forces member.  The work provides excellent
     detail of the U.S. campaign in the Aleutian Islands during
     World War II.  Good bibliograghic resource.
Wall, Patrick.  "A Net Naval Assessment."  Seapower 27.11 (1984):
     6-12.
      "NATO's Vulnerable Northern Flank."  Seapower 28.13 (1984):
     34-38.  An interesting article in which the author, speaking
     from the viewpoint of a Soviet briefer, describes an attack
     on the Northern Flank and then discusses NATO's likely
     response.  He concludes that the Northern Flank is very
     vulnerable.
Wells, Anthony R.  "The Soviet Navy in the Arctic and North Atlant-
     ic."  National Defense 70 (1986): 38-44.  Article focuses on
     Soviet submarine warfare and the growing significance of the
     Northern Fleet, polar icecap (marginal ice-sea zone, MIZ)),
     Denmark and iceland, especially in terms of interference with
     their operations in NATO's Central Front.
Wilson, Paul E.  "U.S. Marine Corps:   Separate But Not Equal."
     Marine Corps Gazette 63.1(1979): 20-27.  Author advocates
     resistance to any overtures or efforts to move the Marine
     Corps toward mechanization because it would be "making itself
     something other than what it is intended to be."  Comments
     are also made about the Brookings and Haynes studies.
Ziemke, Earl F.  The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940-
     1945.  Department of the Army Pamphlet No.20-271.
     Washington, D.C., 1959.  Government-sponsored post-war study
     of German military operations throughout the Scandinavian
     countries.
       Stalinqrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East.
     Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army.
     Washington, D.C., 1968.
"A Special Report from CMC."  Marine Corps Gazette 60.10(1976): 2-
     5.  News section transcript of interview held with General
     Wilson upon the completion of his first year as CMC.  He
     responded to a question about the "Haines force structure
     study" by indicating that the Marine Corps would probably
     move in the direction of the board's recommendations (1,2 or
     3 mobile assault/mechanized regiments but that it would take
     years to accomplish.  Lack of adequate training facilities
     was sited as the greatest problem faced.
"Adjustments Made in Unit Deployment."  Marine Corps Gazette 69.7
     (1985): 6.  News section summary of responsibilities of each
     regiment in the Marine Corps for the support of the unit
     deployment program.
"Marine Corps' Mechanized Task Force."  Marine Corps Gazette 62.9
     (1978): 2. News section commentary on the first attempt to
     exercise a mechanized force, using 29 Palms as the
     training/exercise area.
"Mechanized Combined Arms Task Force Test Exercise Concluded."
     Marine Corps Gazette 63.5(1979): 10.  News section summary of
     the first test of the Marine Corps' ability to task organized
     units into effective, mechanized, combined arms task forces.
"New Commands Are Activated." Marine Corps Gazette 64.7(1980): 4.
     News section commentary announcing the establishment of the
     Combined Arms Command at 29 Palms, the forerunner of 7th MAB.
"Permanent MAGTF's Established."  Marine Corps Gazette 69.6
     (1985): 5.  News section summary of assignment of active MAF,
     MAB, MAU headquarters; T/O's; and MPS/amphibious assault
     mission responsibilities.
"Phibstrike 95-Blueprint for USMC Operations in the 1990's."
     International Defense Review 18 (1985): 1124.  A preview of
     the Advanced Amphibious Study Group's report on the
     anticipated impact and interrelationships of new equipment on
     the conduct of amphibious assaults.  This short article
     outlines the roles of the MV-22 and LCAC on over-the-horizon
     assaults; the utility of the LHD and LSD-41 class ships; and
     the enhancement a variety of items will bring to the
     battlefield.
"Prepositioning in Norway."  Marine Corps Gazette 70.7 (1986):4.
     The program to preposition equipment in Norway is proceeding
     on schedule; exercise results have been positive.
"USMC: A Public Institution."  Marine Corps Gazette 62.11 (1978):
     2-9.  Interview with General Wilson concerning state of the
     Marine Corps.  Comments included CMC's feeling that the
     Marine Corps did not have to mechanize to continue its
     existence and the role of the Marine Corps as the strategic
     reserve for CINC Europe.
"7th MAB:  The NTPS Brigade."  Marine Corps Gazette 65.2(1981): 26-
     27.  Update on the activities of the newly designated
     predecessor of the Maritime Pre-positioned Forces.



NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list