Marine Corps Roles And Missions A Case For Specialization CSC 1987 SUBJECT AREA General MARINE CORPS ROLES AND MISSIONS A CASE FOR SPECIALIZATION by Major Joseph A. Crookston Command and Staff College 6 May 1987 ABSTRACT Author: Crookston, Joseph A., Major, U.S. Marine Corps Title: Marine Corps Roles and Missions: A Case for Special- ization Date: 6 May 1987 This paper examines the nature of roles and missions assigned to the Marine Corps since 1975 and offers an argument favoring sufficient specialization by selected units to ensure that the members of those units have adequate training and expertise to carry out these assigned missions successfully. The paper will begin with a historical overview of the public pressures that may have been felt by the Marine Corps to seek new missions following the experience in Vietnam. Of particular note are the Brookings Institute and "Haynes Board" studies and the annual Defense Department reports to Congress. Subsequent sections address three areas in which the Marine Corps has been tasked with missions requiring a higher degree of expertise than should be expected of a general purpose force. The first of these, the Marine Amphibious Brigade reinforcement in Norway, will make tremendous demands on leadership skills at all levels during intense cold weather. Significantly, the Marine Corps has not been receptive to any suggestion that the severity of the foreseeable environment will necessitate dedicating units for the mission. This includes recommendations made by Northrop Services, an independent research group commissioned by the Marine Corps to examine the issue. Next, the potential problems associated with the Marine Corps' willingness to rely on its general purpose units to fight as a mechanized Marine Amphibious Brigade or Force that has married up with the equipment associated with the Maritime Prepositioning Ships is addressed. The "Haynes Board" report is an important element of this part of the study. The third area to be reviewed involves the Special Operations Capable Marine Amphibious Units. The list of tasks that each unit must demonstrate proficiency in prior to deployment requires demanding training preparation. Limitations on time and training opportunities indicate that the soundest approach would be to limit the number of units assigned that mission to allow a broader experience base to develop: This has not been the case for one of the two divisions providing units. When viewed together, these three missions would seem to justify the earmarking of forces to the indicated roles. That this can be done without impacting adversely is presented in the form of a notional deployment plan for the Marine Corps' infantry battalions. TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Chapter One: Introduction 1 2. Chapter Two: The Case For A Cold Weather Brigade 6 3. Chapter Three: The Case For Mechanized Brigades 37 4. Chapter Four: Unit Deployment Program 54 5. Chapter Five: Conclusions 73 6. Endnotes 79 7. Appendices A-1 8. Bibliography C-1 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION The Marine Corps should be tasked to operate on the "worldwide littoral of the oceans and seas with specific exclusion of the Arctic, Antarctic, and NATO's northern flank.... These exclusions are needed to ensure that no one really thinks that the Marine Corps, as a force-in-readiness, can be all things at once." Colonel B.G. Brown Marine Corps Gazette, 1981 "Suggestions that one or the other regiment or squadron be dedicated to the left or the right are fatal siren songs that would lure the Marine Corps into the rocks and shoals of untenable divisiveness in esprit and piecemeal decimation in the field." Major D. Maltese Marine Corps Gazette, 1985 Traditionally, the United States Marine Corps has been regarded as a light, general purpose force whose primary mission, as stated in the National Security Act of 1947 and amended in 1952, was (and still is) the "seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign..." Of the three other stated missions in the Act, the one which has had a major influence on commitments of the Marine Corps in the post-World War II era states "...and [the performance of] such other duties as the President may direct". Following the end of hostilities involving American ground forces in Vietnam in 1973, Martin Binkin and Jeffrey Record, analysts for the Brookings Institution, raised a new issue: changed political focus brought the continued need or justification for the Marine Corps into question. In the introduction to their study, Where Does The Marine Corps Go From Here?, they claimed that James R. Schlesinger, the Secretary of Defense, expressed an interest in resolving the question of a continued need for a distinct corps of Marines at least twice, once in 1974 in connection with force interdependence studies then underway, and again in 1975 when his defense budget request was submitted to the Congress.1 While their recording of the Secretary's feelings were taken somewhat out of context,2 the quoted statement justified their premise that the Marine Corps needed a change in force structure and orientation legitimacy. They concluded that, while the traditional role of the Marine Corps as an amphibious assault force may no longer be appropriate, its continued separate existence as a smaller (1-1/3 Marine Amphibious Force) force dedicated to amphibious warfare was justifiable.3 Their suggestion that the fiscal emphasis given to the aviation element was unwarranted struck at the legislative foundation (combined arms) of the Marine Corps' unique configuration. At the time, their published work received wide attention, both inside the Marine Corps and outside. The apparent coincidence between Binkin and Record's work and the so-called Haynes Board Study, an "in-house" effort published by the Marine Corps shortly after the Brookings study, provides a tempting opportunity to speculate on their apparent cause and effect relationship. For this, the Commandant of the Marine Corps commissioned a Force Structure Study Group, under the chairmanship of Major General F. Haynes, to examine future missions and force structures for the Marine Corps.4 Their charge was to examine alternative force structures, their disposition, and to give consideration to how these would be deployed and employed. What is striking is the parallel between the respective focuses of this study and the Brookings Institution effort, as well as the proximity of the date of their publication. The attention given to the findings and recommendations of the Haynes Board study will be pointed out in a subsequent section of this paper. Tangible indication of a new, or perhaps, more specific direction for Marine Corps roles and missions was provided in July 1978 in a Department of Defense Program Decision Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary for Defense, Charles Duncan, to the Secretary of the Navy, William Claytor. In this, the Marine Corps was to be directed to plan for "...rapid reinforcement of Norway with an airlifted, brigade-sized force." Mention was made of the intention to rely, at least in part, on equipment to be preposi- tioned in Norway.5 Presumably in response to this formally-assigned tasking, the Marine Corps contracted in November 1979 with Northrop Services, Incorporated, an independent research and analysis firm, to examine the Marine Corps' ability to conduct amphibious operations and subsequent operations ashore under cold weather conditions.6 As will be noted in greater detail in a subsequent section of this paper, the results indicated that significant philosophical changes were needed to effectively meet the demands of this new mission. With the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in March 1980, further evidence of a higher degree of specificity of mission for the Marine Corps became evident. In the 1980 annual report to the Congress by Harold Brown, then Secretary of Defense, the Secretary ..."went on record in this budget submission as indicating that the desire was to be able to lift the equipment for an armor-heavy Marine division-sized force." Additionally, use of the terms "substantially mechanized or armored elements" gave even clearer indication of the Department of Defense's intent to rely on the Marine Corps for "heavier" duty than it had here- tofore been planned to provide.7 Subsequent creation of the Near- Term Prepositioned Ships program, followed by three squadrons of Maritime Prepositioned Ships, each loaded with the equipment and supplies to sustain a "mech-heavy" Marine Amphibious Brigade, solidified the intent of the Secretary of Defense to be able to rapidly respond to a situation (wherein a mechanized or armored threat would be expected) with a force capable of meeting the threat. Several authors have commented on the perception that the Marine Corps was attempting to identify with specific roles and missions during this period. This has been particularly apparent with regard to the Marine Corps' apparent pursuit of a role in the defense of Norway. For example, R.D.M. Furlong, writing in International Defense Review in 1979, stated that the "...AFNORTH staff is hopeful that, with the USMC "looking for a job" since Vietnam, the whole of II MAF will be committed to the Northern Flank."8 One writer indicated that it would be naive and suggestive of a lack of understanding of the Nation's defense policies and strategy to think that the Marine Corps' existence could be threatened for lack of "specific" missions.9 More recently, J.H. Alexander interpreted the Marine Corps' actions in actively pursuing a role in Norway as a reflection of changing roles and missions which could be viewed as a consequence of declining amphibious lift and increasing emphasis on rapid deployment actions.10 Whichever viewpoint is taken, it is clear that considerable attention was given, both inside and outside of the Marine Corps during the late 1970's, to the future direction of the Service. It is in light of these "signals" that this study is presented. It would seem clear that the peculiarities of each of these potential roles demand a closer examination of the issue of dedicating units, to ensure that the Marine Corps is able to operate effectively and successfully in these unique settings. CHAPTER TWO THE CASE FOR A COLD WEATHER BRIGADE "Upon reaching the Koto-ri plateau the 7th Marines was first to meet a new enemy who would take a heavier toll in casual- ties than the Chinese. This was General Winter, who has won many a historic campaign. When the first cold blasts struck, our men were not conditioned for it. The doctors reported numerous cases where the men came down to the sickbay suffering from what appeared to be shock. Some of them came in crying; some were extremely nervous; and the doctors said it was simply the sudden shock of the terrific cold when they were not ready for it." Thus spoke Colonel H.L. Litzenberg, the first regimental comm ander to take Marines into battle for a prolonged time in an environ-ment of intense cold.1 History provides several examples of warfare carried out under conditions of cold weather in which the deciding factor was provided more by that cold weather than the combat capability of the enemy force. While it is not the purpose of this paper to review these historical lessons with a view to providing a convincing argument for change, their mention, at least, is supportive. Writers on cold weather warfare are generally quick to hold up the example of Napoleon and his failure in the Russian Campaign of 1812, although his campaign was also marred by poor logistics planning and faulty commander's judgment.2 Not as frequently stressed was his earlier experience in East Prussia and Poland, which culminated in the Battle at Eylau, and where his army's performance during this "Winter War" of 1806-1807 was influenced markedly by the weather conditions.3 In 1941, the Germans, with their well-trained and disciplined army, retraced the footsteps of Napoleon. In failing to take full advantage of the lessons available from the study of Napoleon's campaign, the Germans found themselves halted before Moscow and then torn apart by the unforgiving cold. Again, poor logistics planning and assumptions aggravated the problems associated with operating in the cold.4 Two years earlier, the Russians had had a similar experience in Finland, where the lack of preparation for cold weather operations contributed significantly to their losses.5 Conversely, the Finns' greater experience and ability to survive the arctic conditions provided them with the advantage needed by the smaller force. These experiences were not lost on the Soviets as they returned to Finland in 1944, this time much better equipped and prepared to operate in the intense cold.6 Similarly, the Germans' successful occupation of the Scandinavian region after 1941 attests to their attention to lessons of the past.7 Forces of the United States are not without recent cold weather experience. The 1943 assault on Attu, an island in the Aleutian chain, provides a clear example of the consequences of a force poorly equipped, led and inadequately trained for the mission, being expected to operate in cold weather.8 In 1950, the Korean conflict gave U.S. Marines and soldiers their most recent exposure to the unique environment of cold weather operations. Their success at the Chosin Reservoir has been attributed as much to the fact that the Chinese Communist Forces were even worse prepared than the Marines for combat under the conditions they were forced to endure as any other factor.9 A brief illustration of this is worthwhile. Marines from 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, while carrying out a patrol on 9 December 1950, crossed a ridge and found 50 Chinese Communist Force soldiers huddled in foxholes. "They were so badly frozen, that the men simply lifted them from the holes and sat them on the road [for movement to a prisoner of war collection point.]"10 In each of the cases cited, the commanders and their staffs had available to them historical lessons that, had they or could they have been heeded, might have contributed to altered results. in at least two instances, the forces involved had their own experience from which to learn. In the others, the lessons of history should have provided adequate forewarning. The Marine Corps is currently in the advantageous position of being able to benefit from its own experience as well as those of others. Additionally, it enjoys another factor not historically possessed by others historically; that is, the Marine Corps' intended role in the reinforcement of an ally, Norway, whose geographic position is characterized by cold weather conditions, has been directed and advertised. What remains, then, is to take advantage of this tremendous lead. In doing so, there are three things every Marine must appreciate: >Norway's strategic importance >Its vulnerability to soviet attack >The simultaneous presence of two threats The Strategic Importance of Norway John Berg, writing in Jane's Defense weekly, commented that "no other mission compares remotely in importance to the Soviet Union than the securing of the Norwegian coastline and air bases flanking the Northern Fleet's entrance to the North Atlantic."11 The value of Norway to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and, hence, to the free western world derives from its position relative to the Kola Penninsula. The latter is critically important to the Soviet Union for several reasons. It is there that the Soviets have based the majority of their strategic submarine force. As of 1983, over 60 percent of their most advanced fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) were home ported there. Additionally, 66 percent of their latest, i.e., post-1967, surface combatant ships currently operate from Kola bases. The reasons for this are fivefold: first, ports built in the area are icefree; second, ships and submarines operating from the Kola area are able to enter the Norwegian Sea and, hence, the North Atlantic Ocean throughout the year; next, in contrast to geographic features associated with other Soviet naval facil-ties, there are no critical chokepoints short of the Greenland-Iceland- United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap that could, if controlled by NATO forces, limit the transit of their ships and submarines.12 Fourth, Soviet vessels operating from Kola ports would be well- positioned to interdict the Atlantic sea lines of communication (SLOC) that tie the United States and Canada to western Europe. Where this was formerly assessed to be a low priority mission for their Northern Fleet, it has taken on an importance to the Soviets exceeded only by the mission to defend their SSBN's. In the judgment of some analysts, "...if such interdiction were achieved during an European war, fought at the conventional level, the USSR would be virtually assured of victory."13 This is, in part, due to the supposition that over 90 percent of all allied reinforce- ments destined for central Europe will travel via these sea lines of communication.14 Finally, Soviet air bases located on the Kola Penninsula provide auxil-ary airfields from which Soviet strategic bombers can be launched. In 1984, forward-basing of Backfire bombers on the Kola Penninsula was reported for the first time.15 These aircraft, with an unrefueled combat radius of 4000 kilometers, are capable of operating well into the North Atlantic Ocean, south and west of the GIUK Gap. The Kola Penninsula also lies in a direct, shortest-flight line between the United States and the industrial heartland of the Soviet Union, giving it added importance in terms of air defense. While the Kola Penninsula, per se, is of critical importance to the Soviets, it is the seas adjacent to that land area that must be available to the Soviet Northern Fleet to ensure that their goals, whether offensive or defensive, can be met. Analysts have only recently become aware that the Soviets operate their Kola-based Typhoon-class submarines, which carry submarine- launched ballistic missiles, extensively in the Arctic Ocean and associated iced-over sea areas. NATO's limited ability to detect Soviet submarines by accoustical means in this region allows them to operate with little interference.16 If the intended purpose of the basing of Soviet strategic submarine forces in the Kola Penninsula area is to provide "insurance", that is, deterrence, against nuclear attack by NATO, particularly the United States, then the import-ance of control of the Norwegian Sea becomes evident. The "buffer" thus created would prevent incursion by NATO surface or submarine vessels and would add depth to the defensive zone forward of the Kola facilities.17 In offensive terms, this would also increase the threat to the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap and, hence, the sea lines of communication in that area.18 Tomas Ries, an analyst with the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute, has indicated that the Soviet Northern Fleet's principal focus for the past 20 years has been on control of the Norwegian Sea in the event of war. This can only be possible with attack aircraft, so without appreciable numbers of carrier-based aircraft, seizure, occupation and use of Norwegian airfields is imperative.19 If the above is viewed as an inner defense area, a second concentric defensive zone can be envisioned around the Kola Penninsula if the capabilities of Soviet aviation assets are considered. The considerable combat radius of the strategic bombers forward-based on the Kola Penninsula can easily bring the United Kingdom under attack. If the Soviets were to seize the airfields located in northern Norway, their aircraft would be 750- 1000 kilometers closer to the North Atlantic Ocean, thereby extending dramatically the protection afforded to the submarine fleet. The strategic importance of Norway for NATO is also largely attributable to existing airfields there. Use of these facil- ties, located at Banak, Tromso, Bardufoss, Adoya, Evenes, Bodo, Vaernes and Orland would allow control of the North Cape. This, in turn, would make interdiction, surveillance and monitoring of Soviet movements into the Norwegian Sea and through the GIUK Gap possible. Besides putting the Soviet Northern Fleet at risk, these airfields in NATO hands mean the protection of the sea lines of communication and would give NATO forces improved options with respect to the defense of Norway. The Vulnerability of Norway To appreciate the importance of dedicating forces to the preparation for cold weather operations in Norway, one must be aware of the seriousness of the threat posed by Soviet forces in the region. Patrick Wall, the President of the North Atlantic Assembly and former chairman of that body's Defense Committee, has referred to the northern flank of NATO as "the most vulnerable of the alliance's many potential theaters of combat.20 Information available on the disposition of Soviet and Norwegian forces, including their level of preparedness, indicates that the balance favors the Soviets. Current estimates of Soviet ground forces permanently assigned to the northern region include eight or more motorized rifle divisions (MRD), an airborne division, an artillery division, a Spetsnaz brigade and a naval infantry brigade. The forces permanently based in the Leningrad Military District are in all likelihood organized as a front, designated as the Arctic Front to distinguish it from the Northern Front in central Europe. As such, it would be capable of independent operations within its assigned theater. While the latter would be expected to be involved in operations through Schleswig-Holstein, Denmark and into southern Norway and Sweden to secure the protection of its fleet movements through the Kattegat Straits, the Arctic Front would be oriented toward actions in northern Norway. This front, assumed by analysts to be independent for operations, is composed of the 6th Army, headquartered at Petrozavodsk, and the 27th and 30th Army Corps, headquartered at Arkhangelsk and Vyborg, respectively.21 The basing patterns of these units, particularly the 6th Army, suggest they have been positioned to ensure quick strikes toward critical objectives in Norway. In the northernmost region closest to the Norwegian province of Finnmark, the Soviets have permanently based the 45th Motorized Rifle Division, the 63rd Naval Infantry Brigade and 15 amphibious ships. Located at Murmansk and Pechenga, these readiness category A/B units are within 12 kilometers of the two countries' common border and 50 kilometers distant from the nearest Norwegian air facility at Kirkenes.22 It is interesting to note that the 45th Motorized Rilfe Division has conducted joint amphibious operations, training as the second assault wave behind the 63rd Naval Infantry Regiment.23 Also, the latter unit has considerable experience in cold weather amphibious operations. It was this command that was largely responsible for dislodging the German 19th Mountain Infantry Corps from its defensive positions near Pechenga in October 1944.24 Two hundred and seventy five kilometers south of Pechenga- Murmansk, near Alakurtti, two category A/B* Soviet motorized rifle divisions are assigned, the 54th and the 341st. Both are maintained in the highest state of readiness and are juxtaposed with an improved road network that runs east-west through Finland, along the so-called Finnish Wedge, and into the Skibotn Valley toward Tromso in northern Norway. The significance of this invasion corridor is underscored by the importance of the road network to the Soviets for logistic support of their attacking forces.25 Reinforcing these divisions, which are known to be specially equipped and trained for cold weather operations, are at least six, and possibly as many as eight, additional motorized rifle divisions, although each is maintained at a lower readiness level. The apparent permanence of assignment of these commands to the northern region, mostly inland where wintertime temperatures are much lower than along the relatively temperate coastal areas, *Category A and B commands are manned with the highest percentages of personnel and equipment, are trained extensively in peacetime, and could be committed to combat immediately. Commands in lower categories of readiness generally have 50 percent or less of required personnel and equipment and would require at least one week of preparation before being committed. The lowest category of readiness is applied to the inactive mobilization divisions; extensive training would be required before these units could be committed to offensive combat. implies a higher degree of acclimatization to, and hence preparedness for, the cold. At least two of these are mobil- ization divisions and would probably be adequate for local defense of the military facilities located on the Kola penninsula.26 A number of writers have described scenarios for a Soviet incursion into Norway. Despite numerous variants, they can be categorized into four groupings: > Attack into Norway's Finnmark region > Attack into Norway across a broad front, through Sweden and/or Finland > Attack into Norway in conjunction with attacks on other alliance members, e.g., central Europe > Attack into southern Norway Of particular interest to Marine Corps planners are those scen- arios involving attacks into northern Norway, although employment in southern Norway does not appear to have been precluded by any formal agreement. A description of a possible scenario is approp- riate to facilitate a clearer idea for the situation Marines could face if a Marine Amphibious Brigade were to be committed to the reinforcement of Norwegian or NATO forces in Norway. The best times of the year for operations in Norway are the two dry summer months (July and August) or the five winter months (October through February).27 In the "worst case" setting, the Soviets would conduct a wintertime surprise attack into northern Norway, without apparent provocation. This could occur if NATO members were to give the impression that the organization had become fragmented, that is, had lost solidarity or commitment to purpose. Given this condition, it is not implausible to imagine the Soviets "testing" the resolve of the Norwegians or, more importantly, their NATO allies.28 It could also derive from Soviet justification stemming from offensive activity in other regions, or as a preemptive move in anticipation of aggressive actions in other theaters of operation. The three category A/B motorized rifle divisions, located nearest the Norwegian border at Pechenga and further south near Alakurtti, could launch surprise attacks-without reinforcement or other significant disclosing activity-into Norway at Kirkenes and through the Finnish Wedge toward Tromso. A rapid strike along the latter would isolate the northernmost province of Norway and facilitate seizure of the airfields at Tromso, Alta and Banak. The level of these Soviet units' readiness and proximity to likely objectives mean minimal warning time, as few as two days, for the Norwegians. If one allows that the Soviets would be successful in cutting Norway in two at Tromso, they would then begin the process of reinforcement. Current assessments indicate that the Soviets are capable of increasing their invasion force by one motorized rifle division every 24 hours. Even if the conflict underway in this region is secondary to that being carried out in other theaters, the standing divisions, even though of lower readiness categories, could quickly increase the number of division-sized units in Norway by four to six. This has been made possible by the development of an improved road network and railway system from the southernmost areas of the Leningrad Military District into the upper reaches of the Kola.29 Forces for the Defense of Norway The intentions of the Norwegians, at least as can be discerned from unclassified sources, are to act as a tripwire and delaying force that will slow the Soviet's advance for up to three weeks.30 To accomplish this, they have permanently based one brigade (Brigade North) in the Troms province east of Skibotn, facing the approach through the Finnish Wedge, and two battalions in the Finnmark area. One of these units (South Varanger Garri- son) is of reduced size (450 soldiers) but includes one company of selected members who patrol the common border, covering a distance of 196 kilometers.31 This is Norway's regular force presence in the north. For success, the Norwegians are dependent on the ability to mobilize a substantial reserve and home guard to reinforce their standing force. Five to seven additional brigades can be activated within 48-72 hours. Presently, the equipment for two brigades has been prepositioned by the Norwegians in the Troms vicinity for use by activated brigades transported from the south.32 An assumption made by Norwegian planners is that the standing force is sufficient, given the difficulty presented by the terrain and weather, to require the Soviets to attack only after reinforcement. If valid, this requirement would provide the Norwegians with the needed time to mobilize and deploy. The Norwegians are extremely dependent on the forces of other nations for the successful containment of any Soviet invasion, but the sequence, composition, and timing of reinforcement is the determination of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR).33 If offensive action by Soviet forces in Norway represents a second front, the possibility exists that SACEUR will have committed potential Norwegian reinforcing elements to the pre-empting front. Also, deficiencies in strategic lift, whether due to quantitative limitations or competing priorities, could degrade inflow of these reinforcing units significantly. One other problem could impact adversely on the defense plans for Norway. Only one NATO country, Canada, has specifically dedicated a unit for the reinforcement of Norway, while three others have contingency plans that include its reinforcement. This notwithstanding, a potential gap exists between the time they would be needed and the time they might be able to arrive. Some NATO planners have expressed the judgment that reinforcements should be in place at least four days before Soviet military operations begin.34 It is quite possible that this is not feasible. In the case of the reinforcing Marine Amphibious Brigade, the force would have to be forward deployed, afloat, as a pre-conflict measure to be able to arrive in Norway before the Soviet offensive commences.35 The Canadian Air/Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade, a 4,000 member unit whose ground component consists of three infantry battalions, an artillery regiment and an armored reconnaissance squadron, is the only unit to have been specifically earmarked for deployment into Norway; however, it is dependent on Norwegian roll- on/roll-off shipping for its transport.36 Due to these ships' marshall-ing, transit and load times, introduction of the Canadian contingent is not expected for at least 30 days. As such, the CAST Brigade could be the last of the identified units to be placed into action. This commitment is in question as of this writing, as there are indications that Canada is conducting a review of its current commitment to the Norwegian reinforcement. The Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF), comprised of units from several nations and stationed permanently in Sechen- heim, Germany, would most likely be the first NATO force to arrive in Norway; however, this light, brigade-sized force has been identified to respond to other European contingencies as well.37 Its purpose is meant as much to demonstrate NATO resolve as it is to provide an effective fighting force. A third force, comprised of a British Commando brigade aug- mented by a Royal Netherlands Marine company, is highly regarded as the best-prepared unit for cold weather operations. Dedi-cated to cold weaather operations but not Norway, per se, the unit has trained in Norway annually since 1968.38 While this force is expected to be transported by air and, therefore be available within ten days, it is partially dependent on Norwegian shipping, specifically the commercial ferry system, for transport of its heavy equipment into the country. As a result, any competing priorities or interruption of the ferry system could slow their introduction. Finally, the United States is expected to provide one Marine Amphibious Brigade.39 While Marines could be introduced by means of forward-deployed amphibious shipping or by a marriage of a maritime prepositioned equipment and an air-landed brigade, it is more likely that a lightly armed and equipped, air-landed, brigade- size force will link up with the equipment now being prepositioned in Norway. In light of these prepositioning efforts, programmed for completion during 1989, an air-landed MAB could be the first reinforcing unit to arrive ready for employment. The Other Threat: Cold Weather In addition to the obvious threat posed by the Soviets, a second and more insidious danger is presented by the environment itself. There can be no question that operating in intense cold conditions provides commanders at every level with extremely difficult challenges. As Lynn Montross observed, chronicling the Marines' experiences in the cold during the Chosin Reservoir action, "Hot weather, however uncomfortable it may be, is fighting weather as compared to sub-zero cold, which seems to numb the spirit as well as flesh."40 Numerous studies and writers have warned that, in cold weather, an individual's first and controlling concern will be to look after his own survival. He will acknowledge the needs of the mission only after his own needs are met. As a consequence, the mission may take on a secondary importance, and could even be abandoned. In this regard, D.F. Bittner offered interesting insight into the British experience during World War II in attempting to resolve arguments over the need to dedicate a force to this demanding role.41 At the heart of the disagreement between Lieutenant Colonel J.F. Todhunter, the commandant of Britain's Winter Warfare School, and Major General H.O. Curtis, commandant of the British Iceland Force, was Lieutenant Colonel Todhunter'conviction that ordinary British citizens could not readily adapt to the rigors of arctic warfare. As Bittner pointed out, the issue was not one of surviving or enduring but adapting to the environment so the individual could "...live and fight effectively." Major General Curtis's assertion was that "...the British soldier regardless of background could accomplish any mission if given the proper amount of training." While this philosophy closely parallels that of the Marine Corps today, it is interesting to note that the British eventually concluded that it was necessary to create specially-trained units for cold weather contingencies. If success is expected, the unique conditions inherent to operating in cold weather must be anticipated beforehand. Three areas, physical conditioning, small unit leadership and mental attitude, are crucially important if the harshness of the weather and environment are to be dealt with successfully. Tactical principles are not affected by cold weather. Their implementa- tion, however, requires mental and physical stamina beyond that which are normally expected because of the stresses imposed by longer times needed to complete tasks and make movements; the encumbrance of heavy, bulky clothing and equipment; and mobility limitations. The small unit that loses its tentage or packs, has gotten wet through intense exertion or wet snow, and is facing falling temperatures as night approaches will present unprece- dented challenges for its leader. In turn, that junior leader's next higher commander will face additional challenges in this situation if he expects that unit to respond effectively to a tactical situation. Cold weather adds a dimension to operational planning and execution that cannot be matched by other environ- mental factors for its potential effect. Finally, the well-intended efforts of unit leaders during cold weather training to look after the welfare of their men can be dangerously counterproductive to the needs of those Marines and corpsmen under combat conditions. There is a clear need to be exposed to the hazards of cold weather. Hyndman42 coined the phrase "cold weather stress" to describe the unique condition resulting from the physical and mental demands made on individuals when exposed to survival-level situations in conjunction with combat in that environment. While this condition can be re- created (to a degree) in a training setting, the tendency of leaders to ensure that their unit members avoid or minimize discomfort or stress prevents the individuals from gaining needed appreciation of the conditions they will encounter during Arctic combat. To enhance operability and minimize the friction attributable to cold weather stress, Marines must be allowed to become familiar with its nature. This would be best accomplished by training for a longer period of time-more that six to ten days- so that all aspects of living and operating in the cold can be experienced. The Marine Corps in Norway Several writers have concluded that the Marine Corps actively sought a role on the Northern Flank after 1975, whether for reasons of protecting the service's future by providing it with a specific post-Vietnam mission,43 or because the Marine Corps' roles and missions were shifting as a consequence of reduced amphibious lift and increased emphasis on tasks involving rapid deployment.44 Nonetheless, the Mountain Warfare Training Center was reactivated for cold weather and mountain warfare training in 1976.45 In 1978, Robert Komer, then the senior advisor to the Secretary of Defense for NATO affairs, indicated that he felt that the Northern Flank was an ideal area for commitment of a Marine force.46 This was reaffirmed in July 1978 when the Secretary of the Navy, William Claytor, was directed by the Secretary of Defense (in a letter signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles Duncan) to prepare the Marine Corps for "...rapid reinforcement of Norway with an airlifted, brigade-sized force." The concept of prepositioning selected equipment and supplies was included in this document.47 Then in January 1981 a twelve point, bilateral Memorandum of understanding was signed between the United States and Norway; not only did the agreement make possible the pre- positioning of certain equipment and supplies associated with a Marine Amphibious Brigade, but it also identified host nation means for transporting Marine Corps personnel, equipment and supplies from reception and marriage sites to intended areas of employment.48 The first supplies, ammunition, were delivered in November 1982; the prepositioning process is scheduled for completion during 1989. Operationally, Marine Corps units have participated in exercises in Norway since 1976. While early involvement was limited to company-sized units and was frequently criticized for apparent lack of commitment or preparation, improvements have been steadily made. A milestone was reached with Anorak Express in 1980, when Marine units operated for the first time north of the Arctic Circle.49 In 1984, Marines who participated in the Teamwork exercise did so as part of a three battalion brigade (one a reserve battalion). During this exercise the validity of the prepositioning program was tested: selected items were withdrawn from their storage sites and were used by the exercise force.50 Since Teamwork 84, the annual exercises in Norway have witnessed continued improvements through the testing of new equipment, particularly clothing, and skills, such as those designed to enhance tactical mobility. The Northrop Services Study As the Marine Corps' possible role in the reinforcement and defense of Norway developed, the Commandant of the Marine Corps contracted with Northrop Services, Inc. in 1979 to conduct a review of the Marine Corps' capability to operate in cold weather.51 Five objectives were specified: >Determine and evaluate the capability of a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to conduct landing force operations during a cold weather amphibious assault and during subsequent operations ashore. >Identify landing force deficiencies in doctrine, tactics, techniques, training, and equipment during a cold weather amphibious assault... >Define the individual Marine and MAGTF system requirements necessary to overcome deficiencies. >Provide concepts of operations and techniques, along with concepts of training, which are technologically available. >Determine the financial impact of any force structure and equipment program changes. The study, completed in November 1980, concluded that the Marine Corps was capable of operating in intense cold conditions where the temperature might range between -5oF and -25oF and in which snow depths could exceed 20 inches. The author offered more than 50 recommendations, covering a wide range of concerns, that begged action to improve operability in the cold.52 Those that relate to training and manpower, summarized below, were developed from deficiencies identified during Northrop's analysis. >A brigade-sized force should be permanently assigned to the cold weather mission. Alternatively, component elements that could be constituted into a Marine Amphibious Brigade-sized cold weather force should be designated permanently. >Assigned units should be based in a cold region of the United States, preferably at a location where the climate and terrain approximate that of Norway. (A site on the east coast was suggested, in view of the lodgement of the mission with II Marine Amphibious Force.) >Units assigned to the cold weather mission should receive eight to nine weeks of winter environment field training each year. >Marine Corps formal schools at the career and intermediate levels should incorporate into their curricula map exercises specifically oriented toward cold weather planning and operations. >Other formal schools should include operation and mainten- ance problems and solutions in their programs of instruction, wherever time and other factors permit. >Codes should be established for use with the Manpower Management System that would allow identification of personnel with cold weather training and experience. Of these recommendations, the most pressing concerned the retention of experienced personnel in appropriate units and the development and maintenance of satisfactorily trained units whose repeated exposure to cold weather operations and training ensured their continuous readiness for operations under severe conditions.53 In 1982 54, the Commandant of the Marine Corps approved the Northrop Services study and its recommendations "as submitted", made a point of reiterating the specific objectives toward which Northrop's analysts worked, and stated that the "planning information contained in the study...will be incorporated in forthcoming Operational Handbooks and Fleet Marine Force Manuals as appropriate." To date, not all these recommendations have been adopted. An example that illustrates the length of time that has been required to accomplish even relatively noncontroversial, minimal cost recommendations may provide insight as to the difficulty more expensive, dramatic-impact recommendations face. Among the first recommendations made was a modification to the classification of cold weather stages. The system established by the U.S. Army and adopted by the Marine Corps included three ranges: Basic cold (-5oF to -25oF) Cold (-35oF to -50oF) Severe cold (-60oF) The Northrop study suggested, instead, a four-stage classifi- cation: Wet cold (+40oF to +20oF) Dry cold (+20oF to -5oF) Intense cold (-5oF to -25oF) Extreme cold (-25oF to -60oF) In view of the low probability that the Marine Corps would be tasked to operate in the few areas of the world where temperatures exceed -25oF, they recommended that all planning (equipment operability, clothing specifications, and so forth) emphasize sustained functioning in the intense cold range. In the event that extreme cold conditions are encountered, they would likely be transient, so Marine units should minimize or suspend operations and activities. This idea was presented by Marine representatives at a cold weather conference held in 1982 at the Norwegians' Skyte- OG Vinterskolen for Infanteriet and was agreed upon by the conferees.55 This issue did not receive the approval of the Commandant of the Marine Corps until September 1986, when a decision brief was submitted for his consideration.56 Of the training and manpower recommendations listed above, only those involving incorporation of map exercises into the curricula of indicated formal schools and adoption of an eight to nine week training syllabus have been realized. Draw case codes have not been established to identify personnel with cold weather experience; not all formal schools have added operation and maintenance problems to their programs of instruction; no action has been taken to permanently base units at a location amenable to effective cold weather training; and, finally, a brigade-sized unit has not been dedicated to the mission. The approach that has been taken by the Marine Corps is described in the following section. Cold Weather Experience Base in the Marine Corps One finding of the Northrop Services study was that the Marine Corps had made a practice of assigning different units to cold weather training and exercises each year. Because these units characteristically had few Marines or corpsman with cold weather experience, a foundation of basic information and techniques had to be provided to the entire unit each time. This need to repeat the same elementary material precludes the development of an experiential base within the Marine Corps. Stated another way, Marines always operate at a novice level. The study also called attention to the fact that personnel turnover within units completing either fundamental training or a cold weather exercise was such that the "institutional memory" was minimal.57 That the Marine Corps has worked to eliminate these problem areas is evident from the statements of recent participants. Alluding to the NATO exercise that occurred in Norway in March 1985, Brigadier General C.E. Mundy commented that as a result of advances made in the Marine Corps' ability to operate in the Arctic, critics could no longer point to deficiencies in training and preparedness for cold weather operations. These included the limited amount of time spent by Marine units preparing for and operating in cold weather; the fact that different units were sent to Norway each year; the reluctance of the Marine Corps to "fence" specific units; the bulky, Korean War-vintage clothing worn by Marines for protection from the cold; and maneuver units' limited mobility in snow.58 With regard to the counter-arguments concerning the same personnel and units not returning to Norway, too few Marines training each year, and too little training being received, several comments are germane. It was pointed out that the Marine Amphibious Brigade's last two commanding generals, their headquarters, and the last two Regimental Landing Team commanding officers and their headquarters had all accumulated breadth of experience by participation in more than a single year's exer- cise. This continues to be the case: The Fourth Marine Amphib- ious Brigade has formally been assigned responsibility for cold weather operations planning,59 while the Second Marine Regiment has become, de facto, the Second Marine Division's cold weather regiment. As such, the headquarters element has travelled to Norway yearly since at least 1982. It is important to note, however, that this has not been the situation at the infantry battalion level. First Battalion, Second Marines-the ground combat element during Cold Winter 85-was a participant in three of the five preceding NATO cold weather execises, while Second Battalion, Second Marines lagged in this record of performance by one year. A review (reproduced below) of the units that have been involved in Norway-oriented NATO annual exercises since 1982 indicates that another three battalions had not had experience in Norway in the four years preceding their respective participation. March, 1983 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines Cold Winter 83 March, 1984 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines Teamwork 84 March, 1984 3rd Battalion, 8th Marines Teamwork 84 March, 1985 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines Cold Winter 85 March, 1986 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines Anchor Express 86 March, 1987 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines Cold Winter 87 Clearly, battalions do not participate on a basis that is frequent enough to ensure any carryover of benefits derived from the experience. This irregular or infrequent involvement in cold weather training and/or exercises prevents a unit from developing an effective nucleus of members with current, useful experience: Personnel turnover exacerbates this limitation significantly. Tables 1 through 4 summarize the cold weather experience (derived from training at sites in the United States or participation in exercises in Norway) of the Second Marine Division units (infantry battalions only) alluded to above.60 Third Battalion, Second Marines, whose members trained and deployed for Cold Winter 87, entered the cold weather training cycle in January 1987 by conducting formal training at the Mountain Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport, California. Class- room instruction had been completed prior to this. Following additional training at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, the unit was transported to Norway for the exercise. Table 1 summarizes the status of the command prior to January 1987. As such, it may be indicative of the experiential baseline within infantry battalions Click here to view image throughout the Marine Corps, inasmuch as this command had not conducted significant cold weather activity in five years. Nota- bly, that level of experience was between three and five percent of the command, while less than half of one percent of the battalion's members had experience operating in cold weather over more that one winter season. Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, which provided the ground combat element for Anchor Express 86, completed pre-deployment training similar to that described for Third Battalion, Second Marines. Although this unit deployed to Norway, the scheduled exercise was interrupted and then terminated near the outset as a consequence of an avalanche in which a number of Norwegian soldiers were killed. This notwithstanding, the Marines carried out unit training while in country, thereby adding to their experience. While it might be assumed that the training received by this battalion would make them a logical choice for contingency purposes during the ensuing year, specifically during the following cold weather season, the tabulated data of Table 2 indicate otherwise. Twelve months after Anchor Express 86, that part of the battalion with any cold weather experience had declined to 36 percent. Not all of these individuals had gained their exposure as a result of the training undergone by the battalion during January, February, and March of 1986. Signifi- cantly, 522 new members reported to the command between March, 1986 and January, 1987. It is these new and untrained Marines and corpsmen that would present problems to a commander if they were to be introduced into an intense cold weather setting under combat conditions. First Battalion, Second Marines, the unit described as having gained three seasons of experience in the five years preceding March 1985, did not receive additional cold weather training during 1986 or 1987. As such, by March 1987 only 11 percent of the command remained with any experience in cold weather operations (Table 3). This battalion was the first to be trained as a whole to rely on skis for mobility. Assuming the same degree of personnnel turnover as that described for Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, this command could neither have been expected to operate on skis the following winter season, nor could they be relied upon (at the time of this writing) for effective operation in cold weather without significant, elementary training. Finally, by January 1987 Second Battalion, Second Marines, which was one of three battalions to participate in Teamwork 84 (First Battalion, Twenty-fifth Marines was the reserve component), had a cadre of 13-14 percent of its Marines and corpsman with cold weather experience (Table 4). Interestingly, of the eight officers shown, none received their experience as members of Second Battalion.* There can be no question about the importance of preparedness when considering the employment of a Marine force in a cold weather contingency, particularly along the northern flank. The strategic importance of Norway cannot be argued; it alone provides sufficient justification for the attention being paid to the issue. Conversely, the nature of the physical and climatic environment could present unparalleled challenges. If rapid reinforcement is essential to prevent collapse of Norwegian Click here to view image defenses, Marines could find themselves being rushed to hastily identified defensive positions without benefit of thorough preparation. They should be at least as prepared for that set of conditions as their Soviet counterparts, many of whom will have spent years in the environment in which they are now fighting. Because of the unforgiving character of the cold, every individual must be prepared to deal with its effects. Individuals with only introductory, controlled exposure to the cold will not be effective and can be expected to be liabilities to the unit. Only through extensive, dedicated training will they become physically and psychologically comfortable with the conditions in which they must operate. The policies being followed by the Marine Corps to prepare for an combat in Norway have relied on the annual training of one or more battalion-sized units. The expectation has been that sufficient Marines and corpsmen are trained each year so that the Marine Corps is able to maintain a satisfactory level of readiness to meet a contingency. The data presented herein indicate otherwise. Personnel instability, despite the impact of the Unit Deployment Program, is significant: within eight months of conducting cold weather training and participating in an exercise in Norway, a unit's turnover can exceed 60 percent. Additionally, * Third Battalion, Eighth Marines was not asked to provide figures. The Division staff concluded that the number of personnel remaining in the unit with cold weather experience would have been minimal. by the same unit not returning each year, a loss of 90 percent or more of its experienced members can be expected. These observations would seem to lend weight to proposals to dedicate units to the cold weather role. As will be presented in the following chapter, a similar argument can be advanced for mechanized units. CHAPTER THREE THE CASE FOR MECHANIZED BRIGADES The Brookings Institution Study As was pointed out in the Introduction, the Brookings Institution study in 1976 called into question the future viability of the Marine Corps if it were to adhere soley to past tenets of existence, that is, the amphibious assault from the sea. It was the judgment of the authors that the Marine Corps' focus on amphibious warfare was suitable only if the considerations were limited to third world countries. Because the prospects of military intervention over foreign shores by the United States appeared unlikely, given the climate of opinion in immediate post-Vietnam America, Binkin and Record concluded that the orientation of the Marine Corps should be on areas of the world where they were least prepared, in terms of firepower and mobility, to meet likely opponents, specifically Soviet or Soviet patterned forces. Put another way, the Marine Corps appeared to be looking back from where it had recently come, preparing itself for a war already fought, while U.S. policymakers were looking toware Europe and preparing against the day more sophisticated, technologically-advanced forces might have to be faced.1 Having stated their case, Binkin and Record provided four recommendations for the future of the Marine Corps: limit the size of the force dedicated to amphibious assault to four regiments and associated air units; modify deployments so that two battalion landing teams are assigned to the Mediterranean area and one each to the Pacific and Caribbean; sharply reduce investment in tactical aviation; and disband the majority of the Fourth Marine Amphibious Force. The authors also provided four alternatives for the disposition of the excess regiments: eliminate all five regiments; assume the mission of the U.S. Army in Asia; assume the quick reaction (airborne) role of the U.S. Army; or mechanize these units and colocate them alongside the U.S. Army in Europe.2 Only the first recommendation bears directly on the study at hand, that the size of the force should be reduced to 1-1/3 Marine Amphibious Forces, totally dedicated to the amphibious mission. Three of the alternatives would have resulted in a divergence of the Marine Corps into two distinct components and would have severely limited the Marine Corps' traditional utility as a light, rapid-deploying force-in- readiness. This could logically have been expected to renew inquiries into the continuing need or justification for a corps of Marines. The Marine Corps Mission and Force Structure Study The results of the 1976 Mission and Force Structure Study, that is, the Haynes Board, contained several parallels to the content of the Brookings study. At the outset of their report,3 the group offered its consensus that: >The Marine Corps should re-orient its operational plan- ning and outlook away from low intensity conflict, for example, Vietnam, and look instead toward the demands of mid-to-high intensity conflict, for example, central Europe. >The focus of planning should be expanded beyond the beach and encompass subsequent operations ashore, particularly against a mobile, technologically- sophisticated adversary. >The combined arms concept, while still seen to be valid, must be reviewed for the inherent compatability of its elements in the face of a more mobile threat and the growing imbalance between components, for example, its footmobile infantry on the one hand and sophisticated fighter aircraft on the other. Details of the long term direction that the study group concluded the Marine Corps should pursue were provided in the form of three alternative force structures. Force Structure C, preferred by the group, built on features of the other two alternatives that were presented.4 It provided for: >Battalions configured around three infantry companies. >Regiments configured around four battalions. >Two tank battalions in each of the two stateside divisions, configured to allow employment as distinct maneuver elements. >One regiment in each of the two stateside divisions configured as a mobile assault regiment, consisting of the two tank battalions and two infantry regiments (mechanized). >Reliance on amphibious assault vehicles as the means of enhancing infantry mobility. It was recommended that the number of these be increased in each battalion. >Artillery regiments containing, in addition to two direct support battalions of towed 105mm howitzers, one direct support battalion of four 155mm self-propelled batteries and one 203mm (8 inch) self-propelled battery, and two general support battalions, each with three batteries of 155mm towed howitzers. >Addition of low altitude air defense units to each Marine division. >An increase in the quantity of antitank weapons in each division, with each maneuver regiment having its own antitank company. >Elimination of Force Troops, with their assimilation into the divisions. >Enhancement of division reconnaissance capabilities, through greater firepower and mobility. In contrast to the drastic recommendations of Binkin and Record, the findings of the Haynes study offered continued flexi- bility within each division for responding to a wide range of contingencies, while orienting them to realistic roles in support of current national defense policy. Long term adoption of their alternative Force Structure C would have provided a light division(-) in the western Pacific region for response to conflicts anticipated to be low in intensity, for example Northeast Asia; and two divisions, one on the east coast and the other on the west coast, each capable of responding to mid-to-high intensity scenarios with a reinforced, mechanized regiment. Both divisions retained lighter, general purpose infantry forces (two regiments per division) that would allow the Marine Corps to continue to meet other commitments with flexibility in employment. Other related recommendations made by the group5 included: >Immediate adoption of their Force Structure A, which summarily increased the combat power of the divisions by incorporating Force Troops assets (tanks, amphibious assault vehicles, self-propelled artillery) into their structure. >Gradual adoption of proposed Force Structure B which, among other features, created a mobile assault element. >Use of Marine Corps Base, 29 Palms as the testing and training ground for the doctrine and tactics developed for the newly created mobile assault regiment. >Eventual use of Ft. Stewart, Georgia for the second mobile assault regiment created under the Force Structure C option. If Ft. Stewart was to prove to be unavailable, the mobile assault regiment assigned to the east coast would use the facilities of Ft. Pickett, Virginia and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. >Finally, the board recommended adoption of an equitable unit rotation system throughout the Marine Corps for required deployments. The Marine Corps stopped short of adoption of Force Structure C, but has incorporated the preponderance of the other recommend- ations. However, the need to reconsider the unadopted aspects of the study still exists. Department of Defense View To appreciate the orientation provided to the Congress by the Secretaries of Defense with respect to intended employment of Marine Corps assets, it is useful to review material impacting directly on the Marine Corps, as contained in the Secretaries' annual reports to the Congress, beginning with Fiscal Year 1976. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger provided public commentary on the future of the Marine Corps in his Fiscal Year 1976 report to the Congress. His remarks were prefaced by noting that continued investment in amphibious forces might be questioned because of the considerable costs to maintain them and the fact that no large scale amphibious operations had taken place in over 20 years. As previously mentioned, this idea was to provide a significant element of Binkin and Record's basis for pursuing the idea of altering the Marine Corps' roles, missions and structure. Interestingly, Secretary Schlesinger's following statement reinforced the justification for the continued existence of the Marine Corps: while he did not directly address a need to mechanize the service, he stated that amphibious forces-properly modernized-were valuable to the national defense, particularly in the missions of securing beachheads, conducting flanking operations from the sea, and presence.6 The following year, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld stated that the Marine Corps was not viewed as a force that would deploy for the defense of central Europe.7 Instead, it was seen to be of greater utility on the European flanks, especially through amphibious operations! While this might be interpreted as a signal that the Marine Corps would not become mechanized, the Secretary's subsequent comments suggested otherwise: "Once ashore, if reinforced with sufficient armor and anti-armor weapons, Marine divisions also would have capabilities analogous to those of Army infantry divisions. In short, they are one of our most flexible assets." Finally, Secretary Rumsfeld concluded by stating "additional options for improving the Marine Corps' capability to operate in an armored warfare environment are under study."8 In his next annual statement, the Secretary addressed critics of the then current defense strategy that gave the appearance of continuing to prepare the nation for a simultaneous two-front war. Pointing to "light" forces that still predom- inated, even in the face of the perceived Soviet threat toward central Europe, Secretary Rumsfeld informed Congress that the Defense Department was giving "consideration....to the problem of retaining the amphibious capability and, at the same time, making the Marine Corps more adaptable to the high-intensity wars of modern technology."9 In his report for Fiscal Year 1980, Secretary Harold Brown introduced the Congress to the concept of maritime prepositioning of supplies and equipment, while at the same time implying the intent to commit the Marine Corps to a greater degree of mechan- ization. His choice of wording underscored the emphasis being placed on this new direction: the Secretary "went on record in this budget submission as indicating that the desire was to be able to lift the equipment for an armor-heavy Marine division- sized force".10 This program goal was reiterated the following year with the announcement to Congress that equipment sets and supplies for 30 days for three Marine Amphibious Brigades had been budgetted for.11 In view of the use of the phrase "substantial mechanized or armored elements" to describe the nature of the Marine force the Defense Department planned to prepare for possible employment, it seems clear that the Secretary of Defense was providing Congress with notification that the Marine Corps could be expected to be tasked to respond in those areas of the world where the likely adversary would also be mechanized and/or armored.12 Secretary Brown's Fiscal Year 1982 report to the Congress was somewhat of a watershed for the intended move of the Marine Corps toward a greater degree of mechanization. In conjunction with statements concerning the United States Army's newly established National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, the Secretary relayed to the Congress that all Marine battalions were scheduled to train on a periodic basis at the Marine Corps Air-Ground combat Center at 29 Palms, California. He lauded the unique training opportunities available and noted the recently created 7th Marine Amphibious Brigade, permanently assigned there and "earmarked" as the "Rapid Deployment Force reservoir of forces".13 In expanding comments on its intended role, the report indicated that the Rapid Deployment Force must be trained, equipped and provided with a doctrine suitable for mountain and desert warfare.14 Further, the report noted that the growing sophistication of Soviet-patterned forces in non-NATO area countries dictated that light infantry divisions, including the Marine Corps, be prepared with "more firepower and ground mobility". Finally, the Secretary concluded that the Marine Corps would be capable of "protracted operations ashore if provided with logistics support by the Army and the Navy".15 The light armored vehicle was first announced to the Congress in Caspar W. Weinberger's Fiscal Year 1983 budget report. In his view, this vehicle was intended to partially meet the Marine Corps' need to increase its infantry units' battlefield firepower and mobility.16 In the Secretary's view, this was seen as a critical need if the threat in non-NATO regions, for example Southwest Asia, was to be successfully met. He envisioned up to two Marine Amphibious Force-sized commands being made available to the Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force for employment.17 In his Fiscal Year 1984 address to the Congress, Secretary Weinberger clarified the Marine Corps' commitment to the Commander- in-Chief, Central Command (formerly the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force), by stating that 1-1/3 Marine Amphibious Forces would be made available in the event of a contingency.18 Referring to "heavily-mechanized Marine Amphibious Brigades", Mr. Weinberger informed the Congress that additional tanks and amphibious assault vehicles were being purchased to give Marine forces "a greater capability against enemy armored forces".19 The following year, Defense Secretary Weinberger reminded members of Congress that the nature of the threat associated with Third World nations had changed drastically since 1960. In that year, 38 of these countries possessed armored vehicles; in 1983, the number had expanded to 104.20 The Defense Department reports to the Congress for Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987 continued the emphasis on mechanization of at least a portion of the Marine Corps, without demonstrating indications of any change to the direction taken in preceding years. As can be seen from the Secretaries points (summarized in Table 5), it seems clear that each Secretary of Defense since James R. Schlesinger has imparted to Congress the clear impression that the Marine Corps would be equipped and trained in a manner that would allow it to operate effectively in a conflict involving a mechanized opponent. The willingness of Congress to accept the Department of Defense plan to increase the mechanized assets of the Marine Corps for the stated reason, specifically, of potential deployment to Southwest Asia, underscores the importance placed on this role. If this assumption is accepted, then the next step is to examine the manner in which the Marine Corps has responded to this new direction. The Marine Corps and Mechanization The Marine Corps' response to the Haynes Board study has been gradual. Indeed, one writer in the Marine Corps Gazette in 1979 noted that little had been said publicly about the study and claimed that it had been hurried along as a reaction to the Brookings study and that it was badly flawed. He accused the authors of "...making [the Marine Corps] something other than what it was intended to be."21 Not all of this is entirely accurate. In October 1976, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Louis H. Wilson, addressed in an interview the Haynes Board. He stated Click here to view image that the Marine Corps would probably move in the direction of mechanized regiments, either one, two or three, but that their activation would take several years.22 In November 1977, First Battalion, Fourth Marines relocated from Okinawa to 29 Palms, where it was homebased and designated to provide the test base for a task organized, mechanized unit operations. This also marked the execution of the first phase of a revised unit deployment plan that would eventually encompass all infantry battalions.23 The initial live fire, combined arms exercise by this mechanized task force was carried out in February and March 1979.24 Additional emphasis was given to this concept in May 1980 when a combined arms command was activated at 29 Palms. This served to unite all Fleet Marine Force elements assigned to the base under one command, the 7th Marine Amphibious Brigade.25 Concomitantly, this command was detailed to provide the combat force that would respond to the requirements of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. As such, it was to marry up with equipment and supplies staged on near-term prepositioned shipping.26 Since 1979, combined arms exercises at the Marine Corps Air- Ground Combat Center have evolved into thoroughly prepared, well- orchestrated tests of a unit's ability to carry out diverse supporting arms fire support coordination, primarily in a mech- anized environment. The training experiences are unparalleled, both in use of combined arms and in movement and maneuver by mechanized means. Because the 29 Palms facility offers the only comprehensive opportunity for a unit to conduct this type of exercise (a claim which is supported by the fact that First Battalion, Fourth Marines has been maintained as the cadre of the ground combat element of the Marine Amphibious Brigade earmarked for deployment into Southwest Asia), it will be assumed that combined arms exercise experience can be used as an indication of relative competency in mechanized operations. Table 6 identifies the infantry battalions that have carried out combined arms exercises since October 1984. The battalions scheduled to conduct these exercises during the second half of fiscal year 1987 are also shown. Not portrayed are the two yearly exercises in which Marine Corps reserve units participated. For the First Marine Division, seven of twelve battalions have not had combined arms exercise experience since September 1984; eight will not have had this exposure during the year preceding publication Click here to view image of this paper. For the Second Marine Division, which would provide infantry battalions to the 6th Marine Amphibious Brigade for any contingency involving the Maritime Prepositioned Force, the situation is similar. While only three of the eleven homebased battalions had not conducted a combined arms exercise at 29 Palms since September 1984, only four battalions will have completed one of these exercises in the 12 month period preceding this paper's submission. The unit deployment status tables published periodically in the Marine Corps Gazette offer the opportunity to postulate the potential makeup of the Marine Amphibious Brigades operating in conjunction with their corresponding Maritime Prepositioned Force squadrons. The magazine's April 1987 issue provides a recap- itulation of each battalion's whereabouts as of 5 March 1987.27 Comparing that information with the contents of Table 6, the 7th Marine Amphibious Brigade could be assigned four battalions (including First Battalion, Fourth Marines) from the First Marine Division with combined arms exercise background. Viewed another way, there is a one-in-three chance that only one of the assigned battalions would have had recent (preceding 12 months) mechanized experience. Worse, three of these units, Second Battalion, First Marines; Third Battalion, Fifth Marines; and Third Battalion, Seventh Marines were deployed during the eight months preceding the 5 March date, and so would likely have experienced consider- able turnover of personnel.28 Sixth Marine Amphibious Brigade, operating with units from the Second Marine Division, could fare better under similar circum- stances. Six of the eight available battalions would have had combined arms exercise experience, but only two in the preceding 12 months. Of these six, however, two, Second Battalion, Sixth Marines and First Battalion, Eighth Marines would have completed deployments during the preceding eight months, and so would be in a build-up phase with limited experience operating as a unit. Finally, another example can be provided by considering the ground combat element portion of the force list used in the 1987 Joint Middle East Exercise, an annual computer-assisted wargame played by students attending the four services' respective command and staff college courses. It represents an unclassified exercise of U.S. Central Command operation plan facsimiles. As such, it offers a specific scenario against which Marine Corps readiness can be examined. For the exercise, the infantry battalions that comprised the ground combat element were as follows: Click here to view image Comparing these units to those listed in the table of infantry battalions with recent combined arms exercise experience, five of the 12 involved units possessed Combined Arms Exercise-derived mechanized experience. This might appear adequate; however, a closer examination of each brigade-sized unit suggests otherwise. In the scenario, Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade was created by compositing three deployed Marine Amphibious Units. One of the battalions (1/9) had not executed a Combined Arms Exercise in the previous three years; the other two completed one of these exercises between January and June, 1986. The two brigades with designated Maritime Prepositioned Force roles, Sixth and Seventh Marine Amphibious Brigades, deployed with homogeneous regiments, Sixth Marines and Fifth Marines, respectively, for the exercise. During a real world crisis, this would be unlikely, in large part due to the demands of the Unit Deployment Program schedule. This aside, both brigades deployed with only one ground unit each that had undergone a Combined Arms Exercise in the preceding two and one-half years. In both cases, the exercises were completed between October 1985 and January 1986. The point is that these two brigades are meant to be employed as "mech-heavy" forces after marrying up with the maritime prepositioned equipment sets, which contain a greater number of tanks and assault amphibious vehicles than would normally be found in a regimental landing team. As was demonstrated to be the case with the cold weather contingency, mechanized operations demand unique and extensive preparations for successful execution. The efforts made to date have relied on the Marine Corps' traditional approach, task organizing from within its structure to implement assigned missions. The limitations inherent to this practice would be especially undermining in mechanized warfare, particularly when almost any opponent the Marine Corps could expect to face has dedicated mechanized forces. If the Marine Corps expects to be successful in this setting, its policies and philosophy must change; a program that will influence any proposals for change is the Unit Deployment Program. CHAPTER FOUR UNIT DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM Any attempt to designate units for specific missions, thereby allowing a prioritization of training effort and the development of a higher degree of competency in a particular area, must take into account the needs of the Unit Deployment Program. This plan, in effect since 1977, is essentially a manpower management program and was enacted in order to reduce lengthy family separations, stabilize units, and in the process, reduce spending. As it is currently executed, the Unit Deployment Program draws from 22 of the 27 infantry battalions. Features of the present schedule of deployment for all the battalions are as follows: >One battalion is permanently exempted from deployments. >Four battalions source the western Pacific-deploying special operations-capable Marine Amphibious Units. >The First Marine Division provides its remaining eight battalions for unit deployments to Okinawa on a rotational basis. >The Second Marine Division sources its commitment from its 11 battalions on a "last in, last out" basis. Units are as equally apt to deploy into the Mediterranean as a special operations-capable Marine Amphibious Unit as spend six months in Okinawa. Units designated to participate in cold weather exercises are also assigned from the 11 battalions. >The homebase period can be as long as 18 months. Disadvantages of this system include: >Opportunities for extensive experience in mechanized operations are concentrated in a single battalion, while the need for that experience is much greater. >The deployment policy exercised in the Second Marine Division precludes any opportunity to take advantage of personal, prior experience in preparing a unit between two deployments because no unit executes two deployments into the same region consecutively. This is a particularly significant drawbqack for the ship-deploying battalion landing teams. >Consecutive returns by a battalion for cold weather training and exercises are unlikely for Second Marine Division units due to the rotational deployment policies. This impacts adversely on accumulation of experience or the development of expertise. >The homebase period for each of the battalions of the Third Marines is 12 months. Several modifications to this schedule are possible. As a first step, sourcing of the Marine Amphibious Units could be limited to a four battalion base on each coast. In this regard, it is interesting to note the different practices being followed by the two divisions involved. When the First Marine Division was assigned responsibility for providing western Pacific-deploying units in 1985 1, it opted for a four battalion sourcing base. In contrast, the Second Marine Division, which provides the battalions for the deployments into the Mediterranean area, has attempted several sourcing bases. It drew from nine battalions in the mid-1970's but reduced that number to only three before 1980. This was expanded to a four battalion base for a short period, but was changed again to three battalions in 1983. Since 1984, the deploying battalions have been drawn from all eleven units resident at Camp Lejeune. Deployments based on a four battalion base allow a 14 month homebase period for each unit. This assumes six month deployments with a one month overlap between these to meet turnover requirements (Table 7). Limiting the sourcing pool to a smaller number of units offers the most in terms of continuity of experience (both within the units and in dealings with host nations along the Mediterranean littoral), focus of training effort, and in the control and coordination by a higher headquarters. The advent of special operations-capable Marine Amphibious Units places even greater demands on the limited training time available to units preparing for a deployment than was formerly the case2. A second recommended change involves the cold weather mission: the de facto responsibility of the Second Marine Regiment for this type of operation could be formalized. Earmarking three battalions would be adequate, although inclusion of a fourth would add significant depth to the regiment's capabilities and flexi- bility. Also, these units could still participate in the Unit Deployment Program (Table 8). Doing so would allow a homebase period for each battalion of 14 to 18 months. Another advantage to this would be the opportunity for these dedicated units to execute cold weather exercises in areas other than Norway. This option would not be without cost to these units' continued cold weather readiness because of the periodic interruption of training Click here to view image opportunities. For example, a battalion that returns from a six month deployment in December or January may not be prepared for a cold weather exercise in February or March. Besides being a time when these units normally lose considerable experience through transfers, the competing interests of the deployment plan may preclude effective preparation. Loss of one year's participation would markedly degrade a battalion's readiness for cold weather operations (as has been presented) and force the unit to undergo initial, basic cold weather training before it could again be expected to be proficient to any degree. This fact leads to a third possible adjustment to unit deployments. If eight battalions are "fenced" for the scheduled Marine Amphibious Unit deployments, another three for cold weather training, and one battalion for the continuing test base for mechanized operations at 29 Palms, 15 infantry battalions are still available to meet the needs of the Unit Deployment Program, preparation for deployment in conjunction with the maritime prepositioned equipment sets, and the general amphibious missions that have been assigned to three of the Marine Amphibious Brigades (Appendix A). Without giving any consideration to the specific nature of the training required for mechanized operations, and abiding by the continuing requirement to maintain five infantry battalions in Okinawa, the 15 battalions would experience recurring six-month deployments separated by homebase periods of 12 months (Table 9). This can be extended several ways. For example, setting aside the requirement for the presence of five battalions on Okinawa at any one time and/or the policy of Click here to view image following a six-month deployment period offers alternatives that affect homebase periods, that is, frequency of deployment which, presumably, would result in considerable cost savings. By extending the length of deployment one month, units would be able to train for 14 or 15 months at home between deployments (Table 10). Increasing this one more month to eight months results in a homebase period of 16 months (Table 11). A less likely option, reducing the number of battalions required to be present on Okinawa at any time to four, creates homebase periods of 18 months (Table 12). Presumably, the need for additional combat units in this situation could be met by relying on rapid deployment of units from one of the major stateside installations. In each case, the stability of units with more specific, mission-oriented roles, that is, cold weather and special operations-capability, is enhanced. An area of concern that does not appear to have been effect- ively dealt with by Marine Corps planners involves the potential deployment of battalions to Southwest Asia or to a marriage with one of three Maritime Prepositioned Ship squadrons and the latter's associated equipment and supplies. In either case, the intent is to provide a heavily-mechanized, reinforced amphibious force or brigade for a contingency. A unit lacking at least the experience gained from a live fire, combined arms exercise, for example, those associated with the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center, will face monumental problems attempting to operate as a mechanized force. That role demands much more than introductory familiarity with the equipment. The components (infantry, tanks Click here to view image amphibious assault vehicles, and the fire support element) of the maneuvering force must know each other and be able to anticipate how each will respond to rapidly-changing situations. Inertia must be quickly overcome. On the other end, once moving a mech- anized unit can be difficult to control. The increased speed of mechanized movements necessitates experience making decisions much more quickly than is necessary at footmobile speeds: the ground represented on a map in a 1:50,000 scale can be traversed rapidly. Finally, the embarked troops can present challenges for the experienced that result from ride-induced disorientation and sluggishness. In the absence of dedication of units to mobile assault regiments, as was recommended by the Mission and Force Structure Study,3 a pointed effort could be made to develop a relationship between the units designated to carry out combined arms exercises and any force list that might be developed for deployment as part of the Maritime Prepositioned Forces. At any given time, the three battalions in each division (or the Brigade) with the most recent 29 Palms-derived experience could comprise the ground combat element for the corresponding brigade's contingencies. Long-range planning could ensure that a "mechanized" unit's availability is maximized before it is lost to a unit deployment turn. Providing these units with priority for training opportunities with the parent division's mechanized assets would enhance each battalion's readiness and expand its experience level. The next logical adjustment would be to permit these units to repeat the combined arms training each year, although this step is tantamount to "earmarking". As this would impact adversely on the Unit Deployment Program, it is more likely that trained battalions would rotate into and out of any force list, keyed to their turn for deployment to Okinawa. The obvious disadvantage of this is that few units will ever develop beyond an elementary level of experience in mechanized operations. The current status of First Battalion, Fourth Marines should also be reviewed. That unit's role as the test base for studies in task organizing units for mechanized operations is no longer germane, while its position as the sole "earmarked" base element of the Seventh Marine Amphibious Brigade's mechanized ground combat element understates the need. That designation provides it with critical experience beyond that available to other battalions. This is especially so for corresponding elements of the other Maritime Prepositioned Force brigades. This reliance on a single battalion, when the equipment for three mechanized battalions will be available from the corresponding Maritime Prepositioned Ship Squadron's cargo, is limiting. Returning this battalion to the Unit Deployment Program would provide additional relief from the frequency of deployment for other units (see Tables 13 and 14). Specifically, the homebase period could be extended in the instance of six month deployments to 13 or 14 months and 15 to 17 months for seven month deployments. It would also create opportunities for the other battalions, presumably those assigned to the force list of the Maritime Prepositioned Force brigades or the component battalions of the reinforced Marine Amphibious Force, to expand their training and experience Click here to view image by giving each more time to train at 29 Palms. Another benefit from this change would accrue from the opportunity for 27th Marines (or any other designated higher headquarters) to supervise the training conducted by potentially subordinate units. As a final point, the Commandant of the Marine Corps has indicated that dedication of units is not a closed issue for the Marine Corps. During July 1986, General P.X. Kelley challenged a group of Marine students at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College to create a utilization plan for the infantry battalions that would encompass dedication of units.4 His one condition was that any plan presented must preserve the Unit Deployment Program. General Kelley's comments imply that, even at his level of concern, there is reason to consider specialized units in order to meet the demands of the cold weather role. By consolidating the various options presented in this chapter, a schedule can be organized that accomplishes the Commandant's request. This schedule, notionally organized in Table 15, features the following: >Three battalions dedicated to the cold weather role. >Twenty-four battalions for deployment needs. Of these: >Four battalions are dedicated to Pacific Ocean-oriented Marine Amphibious Unit deployments. >Four battalions are dedicated to Mediterranean Sea- oriented Marine Amphibious Unit deployments. >Sixteen battalions constitute the sourcing base for the Unit Deployment Program. >The homebase period for every deploying battalion is 13 or 14 months. Click here to view image Salient advantages of this option include: >Development of broader expertise in cold weather operations through an experience base that transcends the existing, persistent novice level. >Greater stability, resulting from a limited rotation base of units sourcing special operations-capable Marine Amphibious Units. >Equity in deployment frequency and homebase periods for the majority of the infantry battalions. >Improved availability and readiness of trained units for mechanized operations through combined arms exercise scheduling. >More effective prioritization of limited training opportuni- ties and equipment. The disadvantages are few: >Movement away from the tradition of "any time, any place, any mission," by allowing the specialization of three battalions in cold weather operations. >Perceived infringement on commanders' prerogatives. >Homebase periods of less than 18 months. >Perceived differences in significance of assigned missions. In summary, the emphasis placed on the Unit Deployment Program by Marine Corps planners is the limiting factor that must be contended with when searching for ways to improve the readiness of units expected to conduct operations in cold weather or in a mechanized situation. Currently, there is considerable variation among the contributing commands in the way deployment requirements are met. This has resulted in marked differences in homebase periods, the degree to which units can concentrate their training efforts and the level of expertise any command can be expected to attain. The demands of three types of missions-cold weather,mechanized operations and special operations-dictate special handling. To dedicate adequate numbers of units to each of these would invalidate the Unit Deployment Program: thirteen or fewer battalions would be available to meet its requirements. Conversely, if the program's restrictions, for example, the six month deployment length and the requirement for five battalions, were modified, there would be considerably greater flexibility to accommodate each mission's needs. In the absence of this a schedule can be developed that would permit the earmarking of battalions for the cold weather and special operations roles while retaining a sufficient number of units to fulfill unit deployment requirements. Finally, careful husbanding of training opportunities in mechanized operations for these units would improve readiness for that type of combat role. CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSIONS The resolution of the problem of satisfactorily meeting the needs of the two roles under study demands solutions that will be valid in the long term. Adjustments to unit deployment cycles provide immediate repair but do nothing to resolve the underlying causes of the problems, such as personnel instability and the lack of sufficient accumulated experience. To date, Marine Corps planners have been disinclined to take the necessary actions that will ensure that units which are called upon to execute out missions in cold weather or in a mechanized environment will be adequately prepared. The likelihood is great that whoever is available at the time a contingency arises will get the order to execute. This may be in keeping with the philosophy of a light, responsive, general purpose force, but it defies of sound judgment where such specialized or demanding missions are concerned. Imagination, improvisation and a tradition of firm discipline will not be enough to successfully counter an adversary's better preparation for cold weather warfare or his greater experience in a mechanized mode. A significant body of Marines feel strongly that the Marine Corps should avoid specialization at all costs. The term, in addition to dedication, fencing and earmarking, is anathema to many and, in fact, may have reflected an acceptable attitude or tradition in the past. The common arguments against the idea are generally two-fold: first, any move that can be viewed as a duplication of the missions of the U.S. Army will be interpreted as a shift toward an unwanted "second land army". An example is the interest that has been expressed over the years, as evidenced in the pages of the Marine Corps Gazette, in creating mechanized units, variously identified as mobile assault regiments, mechanized combined arms task forces, and even armor-heavy regiments or divisions. The second argument derives from the tradition that Marines must be prepared to respond at any time and in any place to whatever challenge we are directed to meet ("every clime and place"). One hears or reads that if the Marine Corps is unable or is no longer needed to execute amphibious assaults, it will no longer be justifiable as a separate entity and, as a consequence, will likely be absorbed into the U.S. Army. The United States Congress has reaffirmed its favorable view of the Marine Corps on numerous occasions, legislatively and less formally. It must be regarded as a demonstration of that support that the Marine Corps is repeatedly looked to for execution of new and demanding roles and missions. Two cases in point: preparation of a Marine Amphibious Brigade for reinforcement of the Northern Flank (northern Norway); and inclusion of a reinforced, "mech-heavy" Marine Amphibious Force in the Commander- in-Chief, Central Command's force list. These two roles clearly signal missions for which the Marine Corps must be prepared. By virtue of its designation as a contributor to the Central Command's rapid deployment force as well as a likely component of the Commander, North Norway's forces, we can no longer regard the Marine Corps as a general purpose, light infantry force in the strictest sense of the terms. This is not to say that the Marine Corps is not expected to operate across the spectrum of conflict. But, it does not have to be interpreted to mean that every Marine, every unit has the capability. There just aren't enough training opportunities, while time and equipment limitations contribute additional critical restrictions. Given these constraints, it is not possible to train every Marine to a level of proficiency that will ensure his effectiveness in all settings. This is especially so in the area of mechanized operations, where more technical expertise or unique experience is required, and in cold weather operations, where survival is the first priority and will make unique demands on small unit leadership. We, as Marines, have a tremendous advantage over our predecessors who fought in Korea at the Chosin Reservoir. Where they could not anticipate that they would be fighting in that environment, thereby affording the opportunity to prepare for it through training and logistics buildup, Marines of the 1980's have been forewarned that they may be called upon to reinforce north Norway. What greater impetus could we seek? Saying that the Marine Corps is prepared for northern Norway based on short term annual exercises is dangerous. The experience gained by six to eight days on the ground, where the problem is interrupted for bivouac, and where troops tend to tolerate the conditions (rather than learning to live with them) because there is a foreseeable end to their discomfort, is of marginal value. Commitment to northern Norway may well mean interrupted resupply and extended exposure to the cold. There is no reliable guage to indicate how the troops will perform under drawn-out conditions of indefinite duration. We must expand our experience to include existence and prolonged operation under less carefully controlled conditions. Marines participating in cold weather exercises for the first time lack an appreciation for the demands inherent to cold weather. Comments made by instructors and points available in training manuals are likely to be overlooked or their value misjudged as innocuous: cold weather must be experienced. The first cycle of experience serves to "make a believer" of the novice. Subsequent cycles are imperative in expanding that appreciation and experience. Expertise follows. Besides greater personnel stability, the advantage of dedicated units is that basic, introductory training must be provided only to new members of the unit; the starting point for returning members can be more advanced so as to build on previous experience. Currently, the only units in the Marine Coorps capable of this are the two associated headquarters elements. The precarious situation that exists with the Fourth Marine Amphibious Brigade must be resolved. It is the only permanently staffed brigade assigned two missions (amphibious operations and cold weather planning). If this brigade is deployed as a consequence of its amphibious mission, any cold weather contingency will become the responsibility of another brigade headquarters, one that will likely lack experience in and, more importantly, an appreciation of the demands of cold weather. If each of the seven missions currently assigned to the six standing Marine Amphibious Brigades carry equal importance, a seventh headquarters is warranted. In view of given manpower constraints, a practical solution might be to assign the Fourth Marine Amphibious Brigade's mission to one of the contingency ("suitcase") brigade headquarters. Finally, mechanized combined arms operations require intense familiarity with the equipment and each other. An exposure to the potential of this type of combat, for example, by a combined arms exercise or a combined arms operation, equates only to the most basic level of experience. If we steadfastly refuse to orient on mechanization-even without becoming mechanized-we are overlooking the direction provided by the Secretary of Defense and the materiel preparedness represented by Maritime Prepositioning. Given a likely role in a high threat area such as the Middle East, the Marine Corps must compare its weapons capabilities, mobility, and so forth to those of likely adversaries. In the case of Southwest Asia, the equippage of potential opponents indicates a more mobile, tank-heavy threat. The Marine Corps must be prepared for this. A "scratch team" comprised of available units will not survive. The experience afforded by a higher degree of dedication to the mission than is currently practiced is imperative. A solution to the problems mentioned above involves changes to the Unit Deployment Program. The system in operation does not pay sufficient attention to readiness for these specific roles. By altering the schedule and participation, it would be possible to dedicate battalions to the cold weather and special operations contingencies while offering a greater degree of equity in deployment frequencies to the majority of the battalions. Dedication of units to mechanized warfare preparation will not be possible so long as the requirement exists to deploy battalions to Okinawa: there are insufficient units to handle both. An accommodation can be made by "earmarking" the units that are to receive combined arms exercise or mechanized tactics experience. These battalions would be much better prepared to operate in a mechanized scenario than units lacking that exposure. The Marine Corps must take into consideration the peculiarities of these roles. If we respond to a contingency involving any one of these, we must not place ourselves in a situation in which we are made to explain why we were not prepared. Too many critics will be able to say "We told you so!" ENDNOTES Chapter One: Introduction 1M. Binkin and J. Record, Where Does The Marine Corps Go From Here? (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1976), 1. 2United States, Department of Defense, Report of the Secre- tary of Defenser James R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets. FY 1977 Authorization Request and FY 1976-1980 Defense Programs (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 1975), III-26. Hereafter referred to as Schlesinger (1975). 3Binkin and Record, 67. 4Mission and Force Structure Study (Washington, D.C., Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1976) 5R.D.M. Furlong, "The Strategic Situation in Northern Europe- Improvements Vital to NATO." International Defense Review 10(1979): 899-910. 6J. Hyndman, Impact of Cold Weather on MAGTF Amphibious Operations During the Mid-Range Study (Arlington, VA, Northrop Services, Inc., 1980) 7United States, Department of Defense, Report of the Secre- tary of Defense, Harold Brown, to the Congress on the FY 1980 Budgets FY 1981 Authorization Request and FY 1980-1984 Defense Programs (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 1979), 211. Hereafter referred to as Brown (1980). 8Furlong, 906. 9J.C. Scharfen, "Cold Weather Training: The Absolute Necessity." Marine Corps Gazette 65.2(1981): 34-41. 10Alexander, 109. Chapter Two: The Case for a Cold Weather Brigade 1L. Montross and R.A. Canzona, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953, Volume III, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign (Washington, D.C., Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1957), 121. 2D.G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York, Macmillan, 1966), 739-852. 3Ibid., 509-555. 4E.F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East, (Washington, D.C., 1968). 5E.F. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940- 1945 (Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, 1959), 188. 6Ibid., 286. 7Ibid., 304. 8J.A. Waldrum (Major, Canadian Forces) A Study in Cold Weather Survival, (Quantico, VA, 1977). 9S. Leach, "Can-Do Won't Do in Norway." Marine Corps Gazette 62.9(1978):52-56. 10Montross and Canzona, 321. 11J. Berg, "Soviet Front-Level Threat to Northern Norway." Int- ernational Defense Review 18(1985): 178-179. 12T. Ries, "Defending the Far North." International Defense Review 17(1984): 873-880. 13Ries, 875. 14J.H. Alexander, "The Role of Marines in the Defense of North Norway." US Naval Institute Proceedings 110(1984): 180-193. 15Ries, 874. 16W.H. Schopfel, "The MAB in Norway." US Naval Institute Proceedings 112(1986): 33-39. 17H.K. O'Donnell, "Northern Flank Maritime Offensive." US Naval Institute Proceedings 111(1985): 42-57. 18Ibid., 44. 19Ries, 876. 20P. Wall, "NATO's Vulnerable Flank." Seapower 28(1984): 34-38. 21Berg, 178. 22O'Donnell, 45. 23Berg, 179. 24N. Ivanov, "Liberation of North Norway." Soviet Military Review 10(1984): 49-50. 250'Donnell, 45. 26Alexander, 183. 27Scharfen, 34. 28Wall, 12. 29Ries, 878. 30See R.C. Bowman, "Soviet Options on NATO's Northern Flank." Armed Forces Journal 121(1984):88-93. 31Furlong, 900. 32Ries, 879. 33Alexander, 185. 34Wall,36. 35Alexander, 186. 36G.R. Hofmann, "Reinforcing North Norway: The Marine Amphibious Brigade's Contribution." (Newport,RI, Naval War College, 1984). 37Alexander, 185. 38Ries, 879. 39"Memorandum of Understanding Governing Prestockage and Reinforcement of Norway." (Washington, D.C., January 16, 1981). 40Montross and Canzona, 121. 41D.F. Bittner, "British Army's WWII Experience CAsts Doubt on Corps' Ability to Fight." Marine Corps Gazette 61.7(1977): 28-34. 42Hyndman, 4-8. 43Furlong, 906. 44Alexander, 189. 45M.D.Cerreta, "Cold Weather Conference in Norway." Marine Corps Gazette 66.7(1982): 19-21. 46Furlong, 906. 47Ibid., 907. 48See note 46. 49Alexander, 192. 50Ibid., 180. 51Hyndman, xvii. 52Ibid., Section 9. 53"Present facilities and training programs are inadequate to keep Marines fully trained, conditioned, and acclimatized to function effectively under the most severe conditions of weather, terrain, and enemy action." Hyndman, xviii. 54CMC ltr RDS-40-1-10-dmb dated 12 Feb 1982. 55Cerreta, 20. 56CMC ltr POG-36 0746B dated 15 Sep 1986. 57Hyndman, 4-6. 58C.E. Mundy, "Training in Arctic Warfare." Marine Corps Gazette 69.9(1985): 71-72. 59"Prepositioning in Norway." Marine Corps Gazette 70.7(1986): 4. 60Data gathered between January and March, 1987 by questionnaire sent through the Chief of Staff, 2nd Marine Divison. Each company in the indicated battalions was asked to complete a form. Questions asked included (by rank) total number personnel, formal school (cold weather) training, and degree of experience (one, two or three or more years; CONUS or Norway). See Appendix B for sample. Chapter Three: The Case for Mechanized Brigades 1Binkin and Record, 66. 2Ibid., 82. 3Mission and Force Structure Study, i. 4Ibid., xiv. 5Ibid., 411-12. 6Schlesinger (1975), III-26. 7United States, Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumafeld, to the Congress on the FY 1977 Budget. FY 1978 Authorization Request and FY 1977-1981 Defense Programs. (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 1976), 104. 8Ibid., 107. 9United States, Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, to the Congress on the FY 1978 Budget, FY 1979 Authorization Request and FY 1978-1982 Defense Programs. (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 1977), 99. 10Brown (1980), 211. 11United States, Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, to the Congress on the FY 1981 Budget, FY 1982 Authorization Request and FY 1981-1985 Defense Programs. (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 1980), 153. 12Ibid., 211. 13United States, Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, to the Congress on the FY 1982 Budget, 1983 Authorization Request and FY 1982-1986 Defense Programs. (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 1981), 97. 14Ibid., 191. 15Ibid., 131. 16United States, Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary of Defense, Caspar W. Weinherger, to the Congress on the FY 1983 Budgets FY 1984 Authorization Request and FY 1983-1987 Defense Programs. (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 1982), III-7. 17Ibid., III-103. 18United States, Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary of Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, to the Congress on the FY 1984 Budget, FY 1985 Authorization Request and FY 1984-1988 Defense Programs. (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 1983), 198. 19Ibid., 200, 204. 20United States, Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary of Defense, Caspar W. Weinbergers, to the Congress on the FY 1985 Budget, FY 1986 Authorization Request and FY 1985-1989 Defense Programs. (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 1984), 19. 21P. E. Wilson, "U.S. Marine Corps: Separate But Not Equal." Marine Corps Gazette 63.1(1979): 22 22R.W.Smith, Interview with General L.H. Wilson, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Marine Corps Gazette 60.12(1976): 5. In November, 1978, General Wilson stated that the Marine Corps did not need to mechanize its forces, as it had no mission, specifically in central Europe, that necessitated such a change. Marine Corps Gazette 62.11(1978): 7. 23O.L. North, "Unit Rotation: Making Unaccompanied Tours Easier on People." Marine Corps Gazette 61.11(1977): 70-76. 24"Mechanized Combined Arms Task Force Test Exercise Concluded." Marine Corps Gazette 63.5(1979): 10. 25"New Commands Are Activated." Marine Corps Gazette 64.7(1980): 4. 26"7th MAB: The NTPS Brigade." Marine Corps Gazette 65.2(1981): 26-27. 27"Battalion/Squadron Unit Deployment Status-5 March 1987." Marine Corps Gazette 71.4(1987): 7. The Status of infantry units is summarized below: Hawaii: 2/3, 1/3 Camp Pendleton: 1/1, 2/1, 2/5, 3/5, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, 1/9, 2/9 29 Palms: 1/4 Camp Lejeune: 1/2, 2/2, 3/2, 3/4, 1/6, 2/6, 1/8, 3/8 Mediterranean: 3/6 Western Pacific: 3/1 Okinawa: 3/3, 2/4, 1/5, 2/8, 3/9 28"Battalion/Squadron Unit Deployment Status-1 July 1986." Marine Corps Gazette 70.7(1986): 8. Chapter 4: Unit Deployment Program 1"Adjustments Made in Unit Deployment." Marine Corps Gazette 69.7(1985): 6. 2Kelly, P.X. "The Marine Corps and Special Operations." Marine Corps Gazette 69.10(1985): 22-23. 3Mission and Force Study, 411. 4Reserve Command and Staff College Phase II Working Group ltr 1500 HHP dated 25 Jul 86. Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, VA. Click here to view image ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY Adshead, Robin. "Exercise 'Anchor Express' 1986". Armed Forces 5 (1986): 297-8. Brief account of the intensity of training in preparation for the exercise and the decision to cancel same following a fatal avalanche. Alexander, Joseph H. "The Role of Marines in the Defense of North Norway". US Naval Institute Proceedings 110 (1984): 180- 193. Comprehensive article that provides overviews of Norway's strategic significance, the regional balance, the status of pre-positioning of USMC equipment and the preparations by the MAB for combat in cold weather. Allen, Steve N. "Cold Weather Contradictions." Marine Corps Gazette 69.7(1985): 28. Commentary on statements made in previous Marine Corps Gazette articles regarding cold weather. Counterpoint is offered to letters to the editor on the use of Gortex equipment and skis for Marines and reinforced another author's position that the demands of cold weather require that trained personnel be stabilized in units. Berg, John. "Soviet Front-Level Threat to Northern Norway." Jane's Defense Weekly 3 (1985): 178-79. Berry, F. Clinton. "Broader Scope for US Marines." International Defense Review 18 (1985): 1127-8. Short summation of current posture of the Marine Corps as a full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as an independent determinant of equipment needs and peacetime player internationally, e.g., MPS and Norway prepositioning. Binkin, M. and Jeffrey Record. Where Does the Marine Corps Go From Here? Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976. A post-Vietnam study on the future of the Marine Corps. The authors concluded that the emphasis given to Marine aviation is inordinate and detracts from modernization and equippage of the ground combat forces; that the Marine Corps' "fixation on an amphibious mission is unwarranted"; that the Marine Corps will face difficulty, in a declining population of eligibles, to recruit acceptable members; and, that the reserve wing/division should be eliminated. In a final chapter, alternatives to the then-present Marine Corps, ranging from mechanization to reduction in size, were pro- posed. Bittner, Donald F. "British Army's WWII Experience Casts Doubt on Corps' Ability to Fight in the Arctic." Marine Corps Gazette 61.7 (1977): 28-34. The arguments contrasting viewpoints within the British military toward creation of specialized units for cold weather operations during World are presented, thus drawing an interesting parallel with the current arguments that can be found taking place in the Marine Corps today. Bowman, Richard C. "Soviet Options on NATO's Northern Flank." Armed Forces Journal International 121(April):88-93 (1984): Brown, Bruce G. "Tally Ho-Pounce or Heads Up? Planning the Corps' Future." Marine Corps Gazette 65.3 (1981): 31-39. Comments on future force structure and mission orientation options available to the Marine Corps as presented in a 1980 Congressional Budget Office issue paper. Chandler, David G. Cerreta, M.D. "Cold Weather Conference in Norway." Marine Corps Gazette 66.7(1982):19-20. Brief commentary on the first cold weather conference held with Norwegians to discuss probelems associated with training, infantry mobility, cold injuries, a cold weather classification system, and air support. Chandler, David G. The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York: Mac- millan, 1966. A classic, this lengthy volume provides details of Napoleon's campaigns with analysis and criticism of his style of warfare. Clocquet, J.B.G. "Forces for the Northern Flank." Marine Corps Gazette 65.3 (1981): 20. Letter from the Commander, 1 ACG in response to the February, 1981 issue of Marine Corps Gazette. Author made the point that, while he and his men are regarded as cold weather specialists, they do not lack in diversity of skills or ability to carry out other missions. Clough, M.F. "'Good to Go' Arctic Warriors." Marine Corps Gazette 69.9 (1985):65-70. A positive assessment of the US Marine Corps' participation in the 1985 NATO cold weather exercise in Norway. Commenting on the value of ski-borne troops, the author pointed to the drawback of not stabilizing the unit so the experience gained could be expanded upon. Eiseman, Ben, and Carl F. Tidemann. "Cold: Friend or Foe." Marine Corps Gazette 64.2 (1980): 39-44. As pointed out by the authors (a US Navy rear admiral and a Norwegian lieutenant colonel, both assigned to their respective service's medical corps), the Norwegians, with their greater experience in cold weather, can offer the Marine Corps many lessons that will save valuable time in the preparation of a force for arctic warfare. These include prevention of cold weather injuries, personal and unit equipment needs, and training. Foster, Nigel. "North Norway-A Partisan Project." Defense Attache 2 (1986):15-22. Furlong, R.D.M. "The Strategic Situation in Northern Europe- Improvements Vital for NATO." International Defense Review 10 (1979): 899-910. Ganley, Michael. "Are Soldiers Headed for 'Hot' Spots Doomed to Train at Frigid Fort Drum?" Armed Forces Journal Inter- national 122 (1985): 78-84. Statements are made about the danger of committing light infantry units to Southwest Asia (unnamed House Armed Services Committee member quoted) and the value of Fort Drum an an unsurpassed training site for cold weather operations are made. Green, Eric J. "Continuity in Arctic Units." Marine Corps Gazette 70.2 (1986) 36-38. The benefits derived from assigning a cold weather mission to a Marine Corps Reserve MAB are discussed. Grinalds, John S. "The Corps 20 Years from Now." Marine Corps Gazette 64.2 (1980): 16-18. An argument is presented regarding the nature of the Marine Corps' likely adversaries in the future and steps that could or should be taken to best meet and counter these. This commentary was condensed from the author's recently published National Security Affairs Monograph. Haynes, S.E. "Now is the Time for a Marine Corps Cold Weather Brigade." Marine Corps Gazette 64.2 (1980): 19-20. Article promoting creation of a old weather brigade from east and west coast battalions plus reserve units with a headquarters from the 2d Marine Division. Hofmann, George R. "Reinforcing North Norway: The Marine Amphibious Brigade's Contribution." N420F95 1984 no.24. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1984. Paper submitted as student at Naval War College; contains copy of the Memorandum of Understanding for prepositioning between U.S. and Norway. Author concluded that the MAB is the most significant reinforcing element in NATO's commitment to Norway, chiefly due to the air component. Hyndman, Jerry. Impact of Cold Weather on MAGTF Amphibious Operations During the Mid-Range Study. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. Contract No. M00027-80-C- 0021, Report No. (SCN) 70-80-03. Independent analysis of Marine Corps capabilities and limitations in cold weather operations. Commissioned in 1979, the study provided numerous recommendations designed to improve operability in intense cold. Although approved by HQMC, significant features of the study have not been acted upon, for example, permanently assigning units to the cold weather mission and basing these in cold regions. Iungerich, Raphael. "US Rapid Deployment Forces-USCENTCOM-What Is It? Can It Do the Job?" Armed Forces Journal International 121 (1984): 88-106. Comprehensive article reviewing the status as of 1984 of the U.S. Central Command. "How Real is the Soviet Threat to the Gulf Region?" Armed Forces Journal International 121 (1984): 110-111. A discussion of the Soviet and U.S. capabilities and limitations with respect to intervention in the Gulf region. "USCENTCOM Is Not Alone." Armed Forces Journal International 121 (1984) 106-7, 134. Brief article providing tabulated comparison of manpower, tanks, AFV's, artillery, aircraft, helicopters, paramilitary forces and reserves of 11 of the 19 nations in USCENTCOM's region. Ivanov, Nikolai. "Liberation of Northern Norway." Soviet Military Review 10 (1984): 49-50. Historical note describing Soviet operations on the Kola Penninsula during October 1944 against German forces. Jones, Thomas S. "Cold Weather Takes Priority." Marine Corps Gazette 68.12 (1984): 38-52. Article providing arguments favoring dedication of specific units to the brigade-size mission for northern Norway. Kelley, Paul X. "Commandant of the Marine Corps FY 87 Posture Statement. Statement on Posture, Plans, and Programs for Fiscal Years 1987 through 1991." Department of the Navy: Washington, D.C., 1986. The prepositioning program will reduce the response time from weeks to days for the critical Northern Flank. A weakness of past policy has been the marriage for exercises of experienced maneuver elements with ad hoc MAGTF staffs. "A Report by General Paul X. Kelley. U.S. Marine Corps, Commandant of the Marine Corps, On the Posture, Plans and Programs for Fiscal Years 1986 through 1990". Department of the Navy: Washington, D.C., 1986. CMC acknowledged the "unique requirements of the Norway mission". Leach, Sean. "'Can-Do' Won't Do in Norway." Marine Corps Gazette 62.9 (1978): 52-56. Article recalling difficulties Marines had in Korea in 1950 as a means of forewarning the Marine Corps that, to properly prepare for combat in Norway, it should permanently designate a cold weather MAB. Lederer, P.R. "Cold Weather Training." Marine Corps Gazette 69.6 (1985): 31. MacCaskill, Douglas C. "Norway's Strategic Importance." Marine Corps Gazette 65.2 (1981): 28-33. Article addressing likely Soviet attack scenarios in Norway and recommendations for its defense. Among proposals is the permanent but rotating basing of a Marine Corps MAB in the United Kingdom with forward elements in Norway. Maltese, Dewey. "Cold Weather Experts." Marine Corps Gazette 69.7 (1985): 18. A letter to the editor, the author suggested that "every clime, every place" is valid for all Marines despite climatic extremes reflected in missions. Martin, Owen C. "NATO's Northern Flank and Bilateral Agreements." Newport, R.I.: Naval War College 49-85, March, 1985. Technical report detailing the history of .bilateral agreements between the U.S. and Norway. Limited usefulness. McKenzie, Scott W. "C 2 Issues in Amphibious Operations in North Norway." Akershus, Norway: Norwegian Command and Staff College, 1986. Discussion of command and control issues confronting a MAB and other NATO forces in Norway. Includes comments on problems associated with the MAB's AOA, command of Marine forces, USMC command of NATO forces, control of the air element, IFF air defense problems, capabilities and limitations (operational) of MAB and other NATO forces. Miller, Stephen W. "It's time to Mechanize Amphibious Forces." Marine Corps Gazette 62.6 (1978): 39-42. Author favors mechanization to improve success liklihood in a reinforcing role in Europe as well as any "limited war" outside of Europe. The author points out the limited usefulness of the helicopter in situations where SAM employment is experienced. Montross, Lynn, and Nicholas A. Canzona. U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953. Volume III, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign. Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1957. Official account of Marine Corps operations and participation in the Korean conflict. Mundy, Carl F. "Training in Arctic Warfare." Marine Corps Gazette 69.9 (1985) 71-2. Based on his observations as Commanding General, 4th MAB, the author offers counterpoints to criticisms directed at the Marine Corps in its preparation for combat in cold weather. North, Oliver L. "Unit Rotation: Making Unaccompanied Tours Easier on People." Marine Corps Gazette 61.11 (1977): 70- 76. Article providing details of the unit deployment six phase program, which was initiated to alleviate turnover, retention and availability problems of the manpower system. O'Donnell, Hugh K. "Northern Flank Maritime Offensive." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 111 (1985): 42-57. Comprehensive article applying aspects of the Maritime Strategy to the Northern Flank. Author touches on employment of the MAGTF, possibly through amphibious assault behind Soviet lines along the Norwegian coast. Quist, Burton C. "The Northern Flank." Marine Corps Gazette 65.5 (1981): 18-19. Letter to the editor commenting on an earlier issue. The author provides insight into the Norwegian political situation that impacts on location of prepositioned gear and lack of permanently stationed NATO forces in Norway. He suggests that the Marine Corps' initial combat action will be closer to Trondelag than the Finnmark area. Finally, he supports the idea of dedicating units. Ries, Tomas. "Defending the Far North." International Defense Review 17 (1984): 873-880. Excellent article by an analyst from the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute that provides a good overview of the nature of the Soviet threat in the northern region, the strategic significance of the area (both for the Soviets and NATO), the balance of forces and the status of NATO forces the Norwegians look to for rein- forcement. A strong point is made of the Marine Corps' limited efforts to effectively prepare for cold weather operations. Scharfen, John C. "Cold Weather Training: The Absolute Necessity." Marine Corps Gazette 65.2 (1981) 34-41. Following a brief review of the Norwegian situation with respect to its defense, the author provides commentary on the Marine Corps' most effective employment-not as a highly mobile ski-borne force, but in a manner suited to its current organization. "Interview with General George B. Crist, Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central Command." Marine Corps Gazette 70.12 (1986): 30- 37. A description of the state of CENTCOM, its role, accomplishments, challenges and problems. Schopfel, William H. "The MAB in Norway." US Naval Institute Proceedings 112 (1986): 33-39. General article reviewing Soviet threat and anticipated NATO plans for response. Smelcer, Charles B. "Sustainability of the Marine Corps MAGTF in Norway." AD-B094 589. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1985. Listing and review of the Norway prepositioned equipment and supplies. Smith, Norman H. "Arctic Maneuvers 1984." Marine Corps Gazette 68.12 (1984) 30-37. Summary of Teamwork 84, the MAB-sized cold weather NATO exercise in northern Norway. Uhlig, Frank. "The Marine Corps' Future May Lie North of the Arctic Circle." Marine Corps Gazette 64.2 (1980): 32-38. Forward-looking admonishment for the Marine Corps to prepare for future combat not past, looking particularly to areas of extreme cold. United States. Department of Defense. Report of the Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, to the Congress on the FY 1976 and Transition Budgets, FY 1977 Authorization Request and FY 1976-1980 Defense Programs. February 5, 1975. United States. Department of Defense. Report of the Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, to the Congress on the FY 1977 Budget FY 1978 Authorization Request and FY 1977-1981 Defense Programs. January 27, 1976. United States. Department of Defense. Report of the Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, to the Congress on the FY 1978 Budget, FY 1979 Authorization Request and FY 1978-1982 Defense Program. January 17, 1977. United States. Department of Defense. Report of the Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, to the Congress on the FY 1980 Budget, FY 1981 Authorization Request and FY 1980-1984 Defense Programs. January 25, 1979. United States. Department of Defense Report of the Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, to the Congress on the FY 1981 Budget, FY 1982 Authorization Request and FY 1981-1985 Defense Programs. January 29, 1980 United States. Department of Defense. Report of the Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown to the Congress on the FY 1982 Budget. FY 1983 Authorization Request and FY 1982-1986 Defense Programs. January 19, 1981. United States. Department of Defense. Report of the Secretary of Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, to the Congress on the FY 1983 Budget, FY 1984 Authorization Request and FY 1983-1987 Defense Programs. February 8, 1982. United States. Department of Defense. Report of the Secretary of Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, to the Congress on the FY 1984 Budget, FY 1985 Authorization Request and FY 1984-1988 Defense Programs. February 1, 1983. United States. Department of Defense. Report of the Secretary of Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, to the Congress on the FY 1985 Budget, FY 1986 Authorization Request and FY 1985-1989 Defense Programs. February 1, 1984. Waldrum, J.A. The Aleutian Campaign: A Study in Cold Weather Survival. Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, VA. 1977. Student research paper. The author is a Canadian Armed Forces member. The work provides excellent detail of the U.S. campaign in the Aleutian Islands during World War II. Good bibliograghic resource. Wall, Patrick. "A Net Naval Assessment." Seapower 27.11 (1984): 6-12. "NATO's Vulnerable Northern Flank." Seapower 28.13 (1984): 34-38. An interesting article in which the author, speaking from the viewpoint of a Soviet briefer, describes an attack on the Northern Flank and then discusses NATO's likely response. He concludes that the Northern Flank is very vulnerable. Wells, Anthony R. "The Soviet Navy in the Arctic and North Atlant- ic." National Defense 70 (1986): 38-44. Article focuses on Soviet submarine warfare and the growing significance of the Northern Fleet, polar icecap (marginal ice-sea zone, MIZ)), Denmark and iceland, especially in terms of interference with their operations in NATO's Central Front. Wilson, Paul E. "U.S. Marine Corps: Separate But Not Equal." Marine Corps Gazette 63.1(1979): 20-27. Author advocates resistance to any overtures or efforts to move the Marine Corps toward mechanization because it would be "making itself something other than what it is intended to be." Comments are also made about the Brookings and Haynes studies. Ziemke, Earl F. The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940- 1945. Department of the Army Pamphlet No.20-271. Washington, D.C., 1959. Government-sponsored post-war study of German military operations throughout the Scandinavian countries. Stalinqrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East. Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army. Washington, D.C., 1968. "A Special Report from CMC." Marine Corps Gazette 60.10(1976): 2- 5. News section transcript of interview held with General Wilson upon the completion of his first year as CMC. He responded to a question about the "Haines force structure study" by indicating that the Marine Corps would probably move in the direction of the board's recommendations (1,2 or 3 mobile assault/mechanized regiments but that it would take years to accomplish. Lack of adequate training facilities was sited as the greatest problem faced. "Adjustments Made in Unit Deployment." Marine Corps Gazette 69.7 (1985): 6. News section summary of responsibilities of each regiment in the Marine Corps for the support of the unit deployment program. "Marine Corps' Mechanized Task Force." Marine Corps Gazette 62.9 (1978): 2. News section commentary on the first attempt to exercise a mechanized force, using 29 Palms as the training/exercise area. "Mechanized Combined Arms Task Force Test Exercise Concluded." Marine Corps Gazette 63.5(1979): 10. News section summary of the first test of the Marine Corps' ability to task organized units into effective, mechanized, combined arms task forces. "New Commands Are Activated." Marine Corps Gazette 64.7(1980): 4. News section commentary announcing the establishment of the Combined Arms Command at 29 Palms, the forerunner of 7th MAB. "Permanent MAGTF's Established." Marine Corps Gazette 69.6 (1985): 5. News section summary of assignment of active MAF, MAB, MAU headquarters; T/O's; and MPS/amphibious assault mission responsibilities. "Phibstrike 95-Blueprint for USMC Operations in the 1990's." International Defense Review 18 (1985): 1124. A preview of the Advanced Amphibious Study Group's report on the anticipated impact and interrelationships of new equipment on the conduct of amphibious assaults. This short article outlines the roles of the MV-22 and LCAC on over-the-horizon assaults; the utility of the LHD and LSD-41 class ships; and the enhancement a variety of items will bring to the battlefield. "Prepositioning in Norway." Marine Corps Gazette 70.7 (1986):4. The program to preposition equipment in Norway is proceeding on schedule; exercise results have been positive. "USMC: A Public Institution." Marine Corps Gazette 62.11 (1978): 2-9. Interview with General Wilson concerning state of the Marine Corps. Comments included CMC's feeling that the Marine Corps did not have to mechanize to continue its existence and the role of the Marine Corps as the strategic reserve for CINC Europe. "7th MAB: The NTPS Brigade." Marine Corps Gazette 65.2(1981): 26- 27. Update on the activities of the newly designated predecessor of the Maritime Pre-positioned Forces.
|Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list|