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The AV-8 Harrier:  Two Meanings For Air Support
CSC 1986
SUBJECT AREA Aviation
		     EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE:   THE AV-8 HARRIER: TWO MEANINGS FOR AIR SUPPORT
I.   Purpose:  To provide information on the steps which
have been established to support the AV-8B Harrier in
the various sites it is likely to operate from in 
support of the ground combat troops.                        
II.  PROBLEM:  The Marine Corps has undertaken a
commitment in its selection of the AV-8B Harrier as its
light attack close air support aircraft.  Not only will
the AV-8B replace its predecessor, the AV-8A/C, it will
also replace the A-4 in five squadrons, an eventual
total of eight operational Harrier squadrons.  For the
logisticians responsible for the support of the AV-8,
this commitment also represents a challenge that they
be keenly aware of the role and mission of a V/STOL   
aircraft.  It will be necessary to adapt and devise
policies and practices to ensure that the support for
the Harrier will be continuous, regardless of the      
remoteness of the operating site.  Conventional means
of support are not alwas applicable when arranging for
support of an aircraft operating in close proximity to
the ground units.  The Harrier's ability to go anywhere
the infantry can go will require that support be 
available anywhere the Harrier can go.
III. DATA:   During its early years, the Harrier faced a
great deal of criticism, largely due to the limitations
which V/STOL brought forth.  However, the first 
Harriers were introduced to the Marine Corps largely
due to those unique characteristics of V/STOL.  The
flexibility in basing options, possible through the
V/STOL ability of the Harrier, presents the challenge
to the logisticians.  For close air support to be
responsive, timely, and effective, the support for the
Harrier must also be responsive, timely, and effective.
To ensure the aircraft are able to achieve their
maximum combat effectiveness in the most economical
manner, the support criteria for forward                        
deployed/employed Harriers has been defined for each of
the basing sites which may be established.  In an
amphibious assault, Harriers could be phased ashore as
the battle progressed and receive more than adequate
support from sea bases, forward sites, facilities, and
finally from the main base ashore.  Supply is but one
of the many elements which must be considered in the
support of various basing sites.  The initial source of
that supply support is a Contingency Support Package
(CSP).  A CSP could be used to support the Harriers in
any sized Marine Air  Ground Task Force operation.
IV.  Conclusion:  The success of the Harrier and the
future of V/STOL for all the services partially depends
upon how well the aircraft is supported  in the many 
possible forward deployed sites it may utilize in
performing its role of close air support.
V.   Recommendation:  That those responsible for support
of the Harrier become thoroughly knowledgeable in the
operational capabilities of the Harrier, as well as the
corresponding support required at each of the Harriers'
basing sites.  Conversely, the operations personnel who
are tasked with employment of the Harrier should know
that good logistic support does not just
happen--somebody must plan for that support well in
advance.
     THE AV-8B HARRIER:  TWO MEANINGS FOR AIR SUPPORT
			OUTLINE
Thesis statement:  The Harrier's ability to go anywhere
the infantry can go will require that support be
available anywhere the Harrier can go.
I.  Introduction of aircraft
     A. Critics
          1. High cost
          2. Non-US design and manufacture
          3. Long lead time
          4. Other services' criticisms
          5. Forward basing support difficulties
     B. Proponents
          1. Close proximity
          2. Detailed integration
          3. Flexible basing
II. Logistical support of bases
     A. Sea base
     B. Forward site
     C. Facility
     D. Main base
III. Phases of AV-8 employment
     A. Phase I
          1. CAS from sea base
          2. Forward sites established
     B. Phase II
          1. Facilities established
          2. New forward sites established
          3. Continued reliance on sea base
     C. Phase III
          1. Main base established ashore
          2. Continued use of forward sites/facilities
IV.  Contingency Support Package
     A. Marine Amphibious Unit
     B. Marine Amphibious Brigade
          1. MPS
          2. Amphibious
     C. Marine Amphibious Force
     THE AV-8 HARRIER:  TWO MEANINGS FOR AIR SUPPORT
     In its investment in the AV-8B Harrier II, the
Marine Corps has committed itself to a close air
support aircraft specifically designed "from the keel
up" with the ability to operate in close proximity to
the Marine rifleman.  It is an aircraft that can and
should be included in every type of exercise involving
a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), to include
operations with the forward deployed Marine Amphibious
Units (MAUs).  For various reasons, the Harrier has
attracted more than its share of critics.  However,
successes enjoyed by the Royal Air Force (RAF) in the
Falkland Islands Campaign are convincing more of those
critics that the Vertical Short Take-Off and Landing
(V/STOL) concept is a viable tactic.  It is not only
here to stay, but it will continue to evolve as it has
for the past 30 years.
     No matter how good the Harrier is at providing
close air support, if it does not receive the necessary
logistic support, those critics might as well be right
about the limitations of V/STOL.  "'...[N]othing cuts
the effectiveness of...aircraft by 100 percent except
being unable to take off.'"1  Although that statement
obviously holds true for any aircraft, the rules have
been changed somewhat for the support concept of the
Harrier.  While Conventional Take-Off and Landing
(CTOL) aircraft are being supported by conventional
means, the V/STOL aircraft needs a new set of
guidelines to allow continued support of the Harrier as
it continues its support to the forward ground
elements.  The Harrier's ability to go anywhere the
infantry can go requires support to be available
anywhere the Harrier can go.
     In 1956 a French engineer, Michel Wibault,
proposed the idea of a gyropter, essentially a short
take off and landing aircraft in which the thrust could
be moved through a ninety degree arc.2  Although
Wibault's gyropter was unusable, the British found the
idea of vectored thrust exciting.  One year later the
first drawings of an aircraft appeared that would later
be recognizable as today's Harrier.  However, it was
not for ten more years that the name Harrier was given
to the aircraft, before it entered service with the
Royal Air Force.3  Even in 1967, little was known about
the capabilities and limitations of a V/STOL aircraft
such as the Harrier.
     The AV-8 was the first U. S. military employment
of a non-helo V/STOL aircraft.  Acceptance of the AV-8
was not easy, but neither was that of the first
helicopter introduced by the Marine Corps in the
1940's. The AV-8's acceptance was met with both the
criticism of many and the enthusiasm of a few.  Early
critics of the AV-8A centered their arguments on the
high cost of research and development inherent in such
a bold step.  The high initial costs of developing a
V/STOL aircraft suited for a close air support role
would, of course, raise the cost of each aircraft
delivered to the fleet.
     The initial procurement of AV-8As for the Marine
Corps was further thwarted by the non-U.S. design and
manufacture.4  Also of concern to many was the higher
acquisition cost and longer procurement lead time than
existed for CTOL aircraft.  Those costs were high
because of the small quantity of aircraft under
consideration, a result of limited application to the
Marines and lack of acceptance by either the air force
or the Navy.5  The MAGTF concept of employment, unique
to the Marines, allowed considerable independence in
the employment of weapon systems.  Operating
differently than the air force and the Navy, the Marine
Corps required a different weapon system to accomplish
its mission.  This is one reason for the other
services' criticism of the Harrier and for the Marines'
insistence on it.
     However, no matter what advantages the Marine
Corps saw in the Harrier, there were many who would
view forward basing itself as a disadvantage and not an
advantage.  The aircraft's ability to be forward based
because of its V/STOL characteristic might possibly
create a resupply problem significant enough to hamper
acceptance of the aircraft.  A study was conducted by
two researchers which utilized mathematical
calculations to determine the optimum choice between
V/STOL and CTOL.6  The model yielded the expected
results:
     V/STOL aicraft show a relative advantage in
     effectiveness when there is a high probability
     that a main airbase will be destroyed as in a
     total nuclear war.  ..However, VSTOLs show a
     relative disadvantage when there are large numbers
     of main airbases....7
The model penalized V/STOL with an added cost of
logistics support by charging them a fleet of
helicopters for refueling aircraft, providing ordnance,
and conducting repairs.  "VSTOL aircraft which operate
from a remote forward site were assumed to have a
decreasing ability that would naturally be attained by
conventional fighter aircraft."8
     The introduction of V/STOL for military missions
would depend on mission needs that placed a great deal
of emphasis and high operational value on the special
capabilities of V/STOL.  The Harrier was an
undistinguished aircraft in all respects except for its
ability to land vertically.9  That was the one
distinguishing characteristic which provided the
emphasis and value great enough to offset its high cost
and long development.
     In 1957, the year the British first came up with a
design of the future "Harrier', the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, General Randolph Pate, wrote the Chief of
Naval Operations that "'vertical takeoff and landing
characteristics are an ultimate requirement for all
Marine aviation in support of amphibious operations in
the future.'"10  The Marine Corps' proponents of
V/STOL, responsible for the eventual formation of its
first squadron in 1971, were Marines with combat
experience who convinced the Congress that the AV-8 was
the right close air support aircraft for the Marine
Corps, despite the critics and the analysts.  Close air
support (CAS) is defined as the air action against
hostile targets which are in close proximity to
friendly forces and which require detailed integration
of each air mission with the fire and movement of those
forces.11  "Close proximity" and "detailed interaction"
are the key elements providing that emphasis and high
operational value needed to offset the high costs and
long lead time.  It is close air support which
distinguishes Marine air from that of the Air Force and
Navy.  Dr. George Salamon, senior editor of Defense
Systems Review, stated, "CAS is the core of Marine
aviation, the reason for its existence."12
     In spite of continued arguments against the AV-8
relative to its cost and the other services'
institutional interests, the persistence of a few
individuals was able to gain final approval in 1970 for
an initial purchase of 12 Harriers.13  That approval
was linked directly to the unique characteristics of
the AV-8 and the resultant enhancement in CAS that
would be provided to the Marines' lightly equipped
amphibious forces.  The AV-8's continued importance to
the Marine Corps hinges on the flexible basing that
V/STOL provides.  Quick reaction air support remains
the primary factor behind the Marine Corps' commitment
to the follow-on AV-8B.  Based just outside of opposing
forces' artillery range, the AV-8B can operate at
forward sites located anywhere the supported infantry
can go.  At these forward sites, the AV-8B can operate
free of concrete runways, catapults, arresting gear,
and precious carried deck space.  CTOL will normally
operate from approximately 200 miles distance outside
of the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA), dependent upon
the availability of prepared fields and/or carrier
space.14  Both in 1970 with the AV-8A, and again in
1977 with the AV-8B, the Marine Corps has shown its
commitment to V/STOL.  This has been due to the
potential to combine the speed and firepower of a jet
aircraft with the unique basing flexibility of a V/STOL
aircraft.  As expressed by Frank Uhlig,Jr., editor of
Naval Institute Proceedings, in a 1976 article
appearing in the Marine Corps Gazette:
     The scarcity of carriers, the heavy demand for
     their services, and the small likelihood of having
     friendly air based near where Marines would wish
     to make an assault landing suggest how important
     it would be to have VSTOL attack and fighter
     planes in the assault force.  Such aircraft could
     be based on amphibious ships, many of which have
     small flight decks.15
Too often in planning it is merely assumed that an
airfield is going to be available from which to
initiate the CAS required during the assault.  Often,
however, it is the airfield itself which is designated
as one of the early objectives of an amphibious
assault.
     The flexibility in basing options which the AV-8
gives to the Marine Corps does present a significant
challenge for those responsible for supporting the
Harrier in those varied and remotely located sites
throughout the AOA.  Indeed, all areas of support must
be carefully analyzed for each potential location from
which it may be necessary to support the Harrier.  In
order for the close air support to be responsive,
timely, and effective -- the vital elements in success
of V/STOL -- then the support of those CAS aircraft
must be responsive, timely, and effective.
Preparations for that support must always be directed
toward ensuring the aircraft are able to achieve their
maximum combat effectiveness in the most economical
manner.16  Toward that end, the plans for the
establishment of a sea base, forward site, facility, or
main base should consider the following criteria:
          (a) Meet day-to-day requirements continually.
          (b) Expand readily and rapidly to satisfy
          requirements during peak operating
          periods.
          (c) Be economical.
          (d) Be deployable with the landing force.
          (e) Not adversely effect landing force
          operations or AV-8 effectiveness.
          (f) Be compatible with Marine Corps logistics
          doctrine.17
     The sea base concept encompasses 86 current and
planned naval vessels to include aviation ships (CV),
amphibious aviation ships (LPH, LHA, LHD), and air
capable ships.18  The majority of vessels to operate as
a sea base would be capable of providing both
organizational maintenance activity (OMA) and
intermediate maintenance activity (IMA) level support
to the AV-8.  The work at the organizational level is
mostly centered around work to be done directly on the
aircraft.  Intermediate level work generally consists
of the repair of the components that have previously
been removed and replaced by the organizational level
maintenance personnel.  On a sea base, a squadron or a
detachment of a squadron will augment the ship's IMA
with squadron personnel, providing the skills unique
for repair of AV-8 components.  The squadron will
retain its own maintenance personnel for OMA level
work.  Air capable ships are in actuality only sea
platforms for the AV-8 and would not have an OMA or an
IMA on board.  However, as demonstrated during the
Falklands campaign, the Harrier can, if necessary,
transit to the objective area on the back of a
container ship.
     A forward site is any location ashore which is
suitable for take-off and landing operations.  A
minimum 72 foot by 72 foot pad is required if a
satisfactory surface is not available.19  It is planned
that no maintenance will be done at a forward site,
although under certain situations it may be warranted
to assign a minimum number of personnel to perform
tasks crucial to the mission.  Therefore, the   degree
of support to be placed at a forward site is very
limited; it may be totally acceptable to have no
external support placed at a forward site.  Any
maintenance which must be accomplished will require
sending forward the necessary personnel, support
equipment, and repair parts from either the sea base or
the main base.  If necessary and practical, any damaged
aircraft could be heli-lifted out of the forward site
for requisite repairs at a more suitable and better
prepared location.  A forward site is a highly mobile,
readily established, and quickly redeployed basing
option.20
     A facility will provide limited support for a
number of Harriers, requiring considerable augmentation
beyond that organic to an AV-8 squadron.  Detachments
of both the Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron
(H&MS) and the Marine Air Base Squadron (MABS) will be
providing support in many functional areas to include
administration, ordnance, refueling, utilities,
messing, base maintenance, communication, and supply
requisitioning, stowage, issue and accounting.  This is
by no means a complete list of the support areas
required in basing aircraft at a facility.21  Limited
OMA, or squadron level maintenance, is to be performed
at a facility, including tasks such as changing tires,
replacing Line Replacement Units (LRU), performing
system checks, conducting quick engine changes, making
adjustments and minor repairs.22  Extensive  OMA and all
IMA level repair for the aircraft located at a facility
will be accomplished either at a sea base or a main
base.  A facility requires approximately 248 short tons
of materials and equipment and 100 personnel to
establish.23  From this estimation, it becomes apparent
that the build-up of a facility would only be
undertaken if the tactical situation envisioned Harrier
operations to be conducted for more than a few days at
the minimum.
     A main base is a location ashore which can provide
all of the support required for extended operations.
This support includes both OMA and IMA level
maintenance for those aircraft operating from the main
base, in addition to those aircraft operating from the
facilities and forward sites which had previously been
established.  Because of its critical role in the
conduct of all AV-8 operations ashore, the main base
should be located in an area that can be supported
readily via surface means.  Fuel and ordnance
requirements represent the bulk of supplies which must
be transported into the Beach Support area for transfer
to the main base.  Equipment and vehicle support
required to build a main base would be approximately
779 short tons.24
     To further explain Harrier support requirements
when forward deployed, discussion follows concerning
the establishment of sea bases, forward sites,
facilities, and main bases as part of the three phases
of AV-8 employment during an amphibious assault.  In
Phase I, the Harriers conduct CAS operations from a sea
base such as an LHA.  The LHA is capable of providing.
the Harrier with both OMA and IMA assistance, as well
as the needed fuel and ordnance support.  As the
beachhead expands, multiple forward sites may be
established ashore to provide increased fexibility,
dispersion, and responsiveness to the landing force
commander.  Normally situated some 20 miles from the
forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), the Harriers at
a forward site are on call for immediate CAS when
needed.25  Following completion of a mission from a
forward site, the aircraft would return to the sea base
for rearming, refueling, and any necessary maintenance.
     Phase II is characterized by movement of the
battle inland.  Facilities are established about 40
miles from the FEBA, possibly through the expansion of
one or more forward sites.26  The facilities allow for
rearming, refueling, and squadron level maintenance of
the aircraft, negating the requirement to return to the
sea base.  In this phase, new forward sites are
established to ensure CAS remains responsive to the
ground combat element.  Harriers are staged to forward
sites from a facility, not strictly from the sea base
as was done in Phase I.  The sea base would, however,
continue to provide full IMA level support as required
to maintain continued AV-8 operations.
     Phase III commences if the tactical situation and
the mission dictate that a main base be established
ashore to support subsequent land operations.
Otherwise, the necessary support will continue from the
sea base, or it will be provided from a nearby friendly
airfield.  The establishment of a main base, ideally
100 miles from the FEBA, could either be through
expansion of a facility previously formed, or through
the development of a captured airfield.27  Phase III is
completed when the sea base has been fully transitioned
to the main base.28  Timely and responsive CAS will
require continued reliance on the establishment of new
facilities and forward sites as the battle continues
inland.  Although logistically difficult, it is
desirable to conduct rearming and refueling at the
forward site.  "Sorties cannot be expended returning to
facility/main base for anything but essential
maintenance repairs."29  Conversely, for support to be
economical , one of the stated criteria, dispersion of
aircraft should be limited only to the extent needed to
meet operational requirements.  It will be necessary to
fully consider all the factors in order to make the
logistic support plan best fit the operational
requirement.
     Supply support is one element of the logistic
challenge crucial in providing the necessary level of
support to the AV-8 which will enable it to conduct the
close air support for which it was designed.  The means
whereby supply support for the AV-8 is to be
accomplished is the Contingency Support Package
(CSP).30  The CSP is a collection of aviation supply
and maintenance related parts and equipment which
provide or satisfy the AV-8's peculiar support
requirements.  The common support requirements are not
to be contained in the CSP; they are to be provided by
a designated host IMA during the time that the AV-8 is
away from its parent Marine aircraft Group (MAG).  The
CSP concept requires that an IMA be available to
provide the common support.  The idea of a CSP is not
unique to the AV-8; it applies to many of the aircraft
within the Marine Corps which have a contingency to
operate away from their parent organization.  Neither
was the CSP initially designed for support of AV-8
detachments and deployed squadrons.  The program
originally devised to support Harrier detachments was
the Independently Deployable Unit Detachment (IDUD).31
The Harrier II, or AV-8B, first used the name
Detachment Support Package (DSP); the term CSP was
reserved for the support of an entire squadron.  The
exact term to be used is of little significance.  What
really matters is how the aircraft are supported when
they are away from home base.  A CSP is applicable to
all kinds of MAGTF operations, and in all the various
phases of the AV-8 scenario of an amphibious assault.
Because a CSP contains the repair parts to support
maintenance at both OMA and IMA sites, the entire CSP
or portions of it may be used either at a sea base,
forward site, facility, or at a main base.32
     The most common use of the CSP for the AV-8 is in
support of the six-aircraft detachment operating with a
composite helicopter squadron in a MAU.  In that
situation, the CSP is provided from the parent MAG to
the LHA.  It contains the peculiar supply and
maintenance support that is not contained with the
common support materials organic to the ship.  The
common support is contained on the LHA almost entirely
for the support of the squadron's helicopters.  Due to
limited commonality with helocopters, the CSP by
necessity will be relatively large in relation to the
small number of AV-8s involved.  A MAU-sized unit would
ordinarilly maintain all of its operations from the sea
base provided by the LHA.  Under some circumstances a
MAU may be required to establish a forward site on a
temporary basis. A MAU would not ordinarily have the
capability to set up either a facility or a main base.
     A Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB), capable of
amphibious operations and subsequent operations ashore,
has a Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) as its aviation
combat element.  The MAG's AV-8s are capable of
operating afloat, from sea bases and ashore, or from
adjacent airfields.  The deployment of a MAB could
require that an AV-8 CSP be transferred from the parent
MAG to the MAG designated as the aviation combat
element (ACE) of that MAB.  This scenario would mostly
involve a MAB designated as one of the Maritime
Prepositioning Ships (MPS) brigades.  A CSP for an MPS
MAB would have to be of sufficient range and depth to
adequately support the requisite number of Harriers to
be included in the composition of the ACE.  Notionally,
there is a single squadron of 20 AV-8s in a MAB-sized
unit, the actual number assigned dependent upon a
careful analysis of the mission and the need for close
air support.  The contents of the CSP would be
determined by the number of AV-8s to be supported, and
also by the particular MAG selected to act as the host
IMA providing the common support.  Because of the
varied MAGs which could potentially act as the host in
an MPS MAB, a baseline level of support has been
determined which defines "common" as those systems
which are supported by each of those MAGs.  Although
this has simplified the process of composing the common
supported systems, it does require continual updating
as new systems come on line.   Once the common support
has been defined, it is a much simpler process to
determine the peculiar support required for the AV-8.
The only tailoring necessary should be in adjusting the
depth of materials to be in the CSP.  The quantity, or
depth of an item, is largely dependent upon the number
of aircraft to be supported and the duration of that
support.
     When deployed with a MAB, present planning calls
for the AV-8B to receive its common support through the
MAG of the appropriate fixed-wing IMA.33  In such a
situation the CSP provided by the AV-8's parent MAG
would be transferred to that fixed-wing IMA.  The
actual employment of the AV-8 might be more closely
related to that of the MAB's helicopter assets,
operating in closer proximity to the ground manuever
units.  To tie the AV-8 support to the host IMA of a
fixed-wing vice rotary-wing aircraft group requires
staging the Harriers' main base with the other
fixed-wing aircraft.  Of course, the Harriers could,
and most likely would, operate from the rotary-wing IMA
site, capitalizing on their basing flexibility.
However, development of a CSP based on commonality with
fixed-wing aircraft would mean that some of the support
for common systems exists with the fixed-wing and not
necessarily with the rotary-wing aircraft.
     The deployment of Harriers with an amphibious MAB
would by definition be on amphibious shipping, although
the AV-8Bs would not necessarily be restricted to
movement via amphibious shipping.  A more likely method
might be as part of the fly-in echelon with other
fixed-wing aircraft.  The support en route would be
through a pre-identified ten-day pack-up kit.  The
remainder of OMA and IMA support would arrive in the
AOA at the end of the ten-day period, possibly on one
of the new aviation logistics support ships (T-AVB).  A
T-AVB will transport an IMA to the AOA, and it will
permit partial repair processing during the transit.34
This program allows the aircraft to get to the AOA
quickly and to commence operations with a degree of
support on hand while the bulk of the assets are on the
way.  The procedure is identical to that which would be
used by the Harriers and other fixed-wing aircraft of
an MPS MAB.  The AV-8 squadron could, however, deploy
all or part of the aircraft to the AOA on board
amphibious shipping, maximizing the flexibility which
sea basing offers.  The Marine Amphibious Force (MAF)
is the largest and most powerful of the MAGTFs.  It is
generally said that Marines will deploy as a MAB but
will fight as a MAF.  This is true because the MAF is
capable of a full range of amphibious operations and
subsequent operations ashore.  However, because of its
size, a MAF may be forward based but it is not intended
to be forward deployed.  Notionally, a MAF would
include 40 AV-8Bs, keeping in mind that, like any other
MAGTF, a MAF is task organized to accomplish a specific
mission.  The concept of logistic support of the
Harriers in a MAF is basically that of supporting them
in a MAB, but on a much larger scale.  The CSP concept
is still appropriate, however, in a MAF-sized operation
there may be more than one parent MAG involved.
     A MAB, whether it be an MPS MAB or an amphibious
MAB, would be capable of establishing a forward site,
Facility, or a main base if the operational requirement
so dictated.  A MAF, however, would be more likely to
establish a main base ashore in order to adequately
support a land campaign which its presence would
probably signify.
     The responsiveness of the AV-8 is due mainly to
its basing flexibility, giving it the ability to go
anywhere the infantry can go.  Responsiveness in
providing close air support is the mission or role of
the Harrier.  It is the role of the logistician to
support the mission of the Harrier, and to ensure its
readiness while minimizing the use of support assets.
Providing the means to do that is not a simple matter.
It requires a great deal of planning and forethought to
support an aircraft that, by its definition as a V/STOL
aircraft, cannot be restricted to large concrete
runways and sophisticated support facilities.  A member
of Julius Caeser's legion is alleged to have remarked,
"Logisticians are a sad and embittered race of men who
are very much in demand in war and who sink resentfully
into obscurity in peace."35  If today's logisticians
allow themselves to "sink resentfully into obscurity",
then a challenge like that of supporting the forward
deployed Harrier in war will never be possible.
			ENDNOTES
     1George Salamon, "From Pilot to Grunt:  The AV-8B
Bridges the Gap in Marine Corps Close Air Support,"
Defense Systems Review, (April 1984), p. 18.
     2John Godden, ed., Harrier: Ski Jump to Victory
(Oxford Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1983), p. 109.
     3Ibid., p. 114.
     4Bruce Myles, Jump Jet, (London Bassey's
Publishers Limited, 1978), p. 127.
     5Frank Uhlig, Jr., "Assault by Sea," Marine Corps
Gazette, 60 (June 1976), p. 20.
     6Seymour Horowitz and Robert Shishko, A Model for
Evaluating VSTOL Versus CTOL Combat Aircraft Systems
(Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1971), p. 3.
     7Ibid., p. 15.
     6Ibid., p. 13.
     9Russell Murray 2nd, "Rising Vertically Through
the Air, Invulnerable to Runway Cuts," Armed Forces
Journal International, 118 (April 1981), p. 50.
     10Salamon, p. 13.
     11IP 5-7 Fleet Marine Force Aviation (Education
Center, MCDEC, Quantico, VA, 1984), p. 1.
     12Salamon, p. 14.
     13Godden, p. 116.
     14Col. R. A. Gustafson, "The Marine Corps View,"
Armed Forces Journal Internatioal, 118 (April 1981),
p. 58.
     15Salamon, p. 20.
     16U.S. Marine Corps, AV-8A Concept of Operations
Study, May 1974, p. F-1.
     17Ibid.
     19Salamon, p. 15.
     19AV-8A Concept of Operations Study, p. F-7.
     20Ibid.
     21Ibid., p. F-25.
     22Ibid., p. F-14.
     23Ibid., p. F-20.
     24Ibid., p. F-7.
     25MCDEC, USMC, Offensive Air Support. FMFM 5-4
(Quantico, 1979), p. 109.
     26Ibid.
     27Ibid.
     28Salamon, p. 15.
     29Ibid.
     30Col. Donald Davis, ASL-31 HQMC, personal
interview about Contingency Support Package, HQMC
Washington, D.C., 2 Jan 1986.
     31Col. Stanley P. Lewis, "V/STOL Close Air Support
in the U.S. Marine Corps," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, 102 (October 1976), p. 115.
     32Davis.
     33Davis.
     34Gen Paul X. Kelley, "One Telephone Call Gets it
All," Sea Power, 27 (November 1984), p. 31.
     35Thomas V. Jones, "Logistics and the Military End
Game," Defense Management Journal, 19 (4Q1983), p. 13.
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     January 2, 1986.
Gebman, J. R. and J. R. Nelson. Office of the Assistant
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