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The Internal Enemy: Insurgency In Brazil
CSC 1986
SUBJECT AREA History
                           ABSTRACT
Author:  Craig, Alan S. Major USMC
Title:   The Internal Enemy:  Insurgency in Brazil
Date:    8 March 1985
     Between 1965 and 1972, the Brazilian government faced a
violent communist insurgency.  This paper is a study of the
Brazilian insurgency, from its historical roots to the winning
tactics employed by the government.  The winning is important.
While there was never a period of time when there was any
question about the ability of the government to overcome the
revolt, that should not be taken as an indication that the
insurgents were not serious or capable.
     The insurgency in Brazil was unique, particularly in its
philosophy and tactical direction. In order to understand this
insurgency, it is necessary to understand some of the history of
Brazil and the special situation facing the military leaders that
were in power when the insurgency took place.  The first chapter
provides this background.
     The next sections look at the support for the insurgency,
the philosophy of the insurgents, and the actions taken by the
revolutionaries.  These three chapters are followed by a chapter
on government actions.  Included in this chapter are personal
observations on urban tactics in Porto Alegre in 1969.  These
four chapters are the why and the how of the insurgency and the
counterinsurgency.
     The question "Could it happen again?" takes up the next
chapter.   The current situation in Brazil is discussed to
determine if there is a serious threat of another insurgency.
The final chapter evaluates the the study of this insurgency, not
just as a historical event, but in the context of the Marine
Corps Command and Staff College.
     Research for this paper included a wide range of books and
articles on the insurgency.  Information on the government view
was much harder to find than on the insurgent viewpoint.  Much of
the information on the government side comes from interviews and
from manuals on the course on Internal Security from the
Brazilian Army Command and General Staff College.  In addition,
there are personal observation from the two years that I spent in
Brazil from 1967 to 1969.
                          TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction                                                ii
Chapter  1 --  Understanding the Background                  1
Chapter  2 --  Support for an Insurgency                    12
Chapter  3 --  Insurgent Philosophy and  Tactics            25
Chapter  4 --  The Insurgency                               36
Chapter  5 --  Government Actions                           47
Chapter  6 --  Could It Happen Again?                       64
Chapter  7 - -  Were the Brazilian Students Right?          74
Bibliography                                                82
                          INTRODUCTION
     As a part of the curriculum at the Marine Corps Command and
Staff College, students spend time studying insurgency.  There is
nothing out of the ordinary in that, but over the years it has
led to a repeated question by students from Brazil: "Why not
study insurgency in Brazil?"  The argument for studying this
particular insurgency is simple -- the Brazilians won.  That is
not often the case.  These students argued that winning was a
good reason to add their country's counterinsurgency to the list
of things studied at Quantico.  They approached the college
historian, LtCol Bittner, about the idea. For the first time this
year, the topic joins the list of possible topics for the "War
Since 1945" Seminar.
     I spent two years in Brazil from 1967 to 1969; I have a
continuing interest in the country.  Since a unique opportunity
existed to make a contribution to the seminar through personal
background, I began the research expecting that information about
the insurgency actions would mostly be found in untranslated
documents and that the desire of Brazilian students to have it
studied might be reflected in a comparable desire among other
Brazilians to write about the things that occurred.   I was
surprise to find that little has been written from the
government's point of view.  The information that I have been
able to find does not discuss the jungle actions that, because of
their similarity to actions in Vietnam, would be of greatest
interest to most students of this school.  At the time of these
actions, there was a period of heavy censorship in Brazil.  The
easing of restrictions over the last several years has not led to
an open  discussion of the jungle actions.  Those who have
written about the insurgency mostly have written in support of
the insurgents. For the most part, these writings have been
confined to urban situations.  All of the information that I can
obtain indicates that the urban action was the most important;
however, and that defeating the urban movement was the key
problem for Brazilian forces.
     This paper, therefore, is mostly about the urban insurgency
and  as much about the how of the insurgency as the how of the
counterinsurgency.  I have tried to include as much information
on tactics of counterinsurgency as I could, even though I have
slim information addressing successful tactics.  I am indebted to
two people for information on the Amazon actions: Captain Joao
Mauricio Tenorio of the Brazilian Navy, and Lieutenant Colonel
Licinio C. Dias of the Brazilian Marine Corps.  Their help and
views, even when in disagreement, have been most useful.
     I do not feel that this paper is what the Brazilian students
envisioned when they asked for a study of the topic, nor is it
what I had expected when I asked to undertake the project. None
the less, it makes a very interesting examination of the
situation leading up to an important insurgency and the solution
of that insurgency.  While the study provided no definitive
tactical lessons on counterinsurgency, it does provide for an
interesting comparison with other insurgencies and raise some
questions about how insurgencies must be approached if they are
to be overcome.
                         CHAPTER ONE
                Understanding the Background
     Brazil is different.   To understand the causes of the
insurgency there and to discover the reasons for the success of
the counter-insurgency operations, one must see the communist
threat as a Brazilian. One must view the military role in a
democracy from a new view point, and try to appreciate the
revolutionary from that unique vantage point.  To really
understand and learn from this situation, one thinks like a
Brazilian.
     As Americans,  we share enough common roots with many
European countries to make that shift of focus less difficult.
In many cases we have studied their history, and we understand
the impact of the past on current events.  For most Americans,
this is not true for Brazil.  This paper will start with
explaining the roots of the military institution as well as
communism in Brazil.  Peter Kellemen explains in his chapter on
politics that Brazil has a history of people switching from side
to side and from being on the "good" and then on the "bad" side.1
This chapter is history designed to explain the personalities
involved and also an introduction to some of the situations.
     Wilson Martin refers to these differences as "Brazilian
contradictions, specially designed to baffle foreigners."  He
goes on to explain his understanding of the need to try to shift
viewpoints:   "The explanation and a real understanding of
Brazilian politics cannot be drawn exclusively from the apparent
facts and from the declared motives; and they cannot be
interpreted either if we take not into account . . . Brazilian
historical time and space."2
     There is a traditional form to revolution in Brazil.  The
existence of this tradition had an impact on the latest series of
events.   Following this traditional form requires that the
insurgency starts in the cities, and that, when it becomes large
enough, or when the opposition becomes strong enough, the action
moves into the undeveloped hinterland areas.  This is in strong
contrast to the traditional form in many other countries where
the problems come from the undeveloped regions and move into the
cities only when the insurgent forces become strong enough to
take on the government forces.
     This traditional form can be seen in almost all of the
insurgent actions in Brazil.  It is important to understand that
there is another form of revolt in Brazil that does not follow
the form; that is a revolt from within the government. That type
of change fits the standard pattern of internal change seen
around the world, with those who desire to change the government
obtaining a military following and overthrowing those currently
in power.  Successful revolutions in Brazil have all been of the
second type, which may say something about the value of the other
traditional form or may indicate a truer picture of how a revolt
takes place in a country like Brazil.  Revolutionary attempts
without support of a major portion of the military must try to
find support in another manner.
     An alternate view of the tradition would be that a
revolution must start where people who are capable of supporting
it, and when pressed, it will move to isolate itself for
preservation.  Most of the revolutionaries would not like that
format and their views will be covered later.  However, for
Brazil, that may be the most accurate description of how a revolt
progresses.
     Early revolts in Brazil were typically slave revolts.  Some
of the Brazilian revolts were much more than just local actions
with a few slaves running away into the jungle.  These revolts
establish a pattern.  In order for there to be enough slaves to
be successful as an uprising, they had to start in populated
areas.   The unusual geography of Brazil,  with its coastal
escarpment and few navigable rivers, kept populated areas close
to the coast and allowed any revolutionary group a huge backlands
area to move into when a revolt became large enough to be self-
supporting.  Colonies of escaped slaves were established in the
jungle in 1632, 1636, 1646, 1650, 1731, 1758, and 1796.  Most of
these colonies, called quilombos, lasted for only a short time,
but several lasted much longer than the average two-year span.
One at Palmares, in Pernambuco, was established in 1597 and
lasted until 1694.  This was not a small group of slaves existing
as runaways hidden in the jungle, but a "state" of its own, with
a king, several towns and almost 10,000 men.  About 20 Brazilian
expeditions were sent against this quilombo from 1672 to 1694
before the insurgents were defeated.  The last of these
expeditions involved 6,000 troops.3
     It is difficult to separate the revolt in Baia, in 1896 and
1897, from the book, Os Sertoes, written by Euclides da Cunha.
Still read and studies as a literary classic, it presents strong
support of a revolution.  Da Cunha called it a "cry of protest,"
over the "major scandal in our history."4  Os Sertoes describes
in flowery terms another example of a revolt in the backlands and
gives a detailed description not only of the people, but the
area, and the manner in which they were destroyed by government
forces.  This description of the revolutionary forces seems to
continue the tradition about revolt.  Here is an impassioned
portrayal of a people fighting for a way of life.  The same kind
of writing shows up in the 1960's in descriptions of urban
guerrilla experiences. 
     The next historical example of a revolution that moves from
the cities into the jungle is perhaps the most important.  It is
important not just because of the pattern it follows, but because
of the people involved in the revolt, and because of the example
it gives of the differences that have gone on in Brazilian
politics.  As part of our cultural background, we have developed
a view of the "good guys" and the "bad guys."  While we would all
admit that such divisions are simplistic, we expect our
government to divide people into such groups.  Depending on the
year, and the current state of events, people do switch sides in
Brazil.  One of the best examples of this ability to be part of
the "good team" for a while and then shift to the "bad team" is
Luis Carlos Prestes.
     Luis Carlos Prestes was one of the early leaders in the
Communist Party in Brazil.  The communist party started in Brazil
in the 1920's, in much the same manner that it started in most
democratic countries of the day.   It did not start as a
revolutionary movement but as an intellectual movement.  Those
who believed in the doctrine felt that there was a change
underway leading inevitably to a communist state.  As in all
countries, and in all parts of the communist party, Brazil would
experience the conflict between those that wanted to wait for the
revolt to take place on its own and those that wanted to give it
a strong helping hand.  Prestes gained fame for his part in the
first attempt to help things along.
     In July of 1924 there was an abortive attempt at a coup in
Sao Paulo.  The coup itself was of little consequence.  It lasted
only a few weeks and collapsed.  But it led to one of the most
interesting retreats into the jungle.  Under the direction of
Juarez Tavora, 3,000 men retreated from Sao Paulo into the
interior of Parana.  After reaching the Iguacu Falls near the
Argentine-Paraguay border, Tavara left the men encamped and went
south to Rio Grande do Sul to help ignite an uprising there.
Both revolts might have had better success had they started
together.  But the second revolt gave the insurgents their new
leader, Luiz Carlos Prestes.5
     Prestes, with about 2,000 men, retreated toward Argentina,
and, in March of 1925, with just half the force he started with,
he joined the others in Parana.  For almost two years, covering a
distance of about 16,000 miles, this Prestes Column marched
across Paraguay, up Brazil as far as the north-east state of
Paraiba, and returned criss-crossing the whole interior of the
country.  The intent of the move was not just a retreat from
superior forces but an attempt to rouse the common people into a
general revolt.6
     While they raised a lot of sympathy and focused attention on
the situation in the interior, they did not find people there ready
for revolt.  They tried to spread the news of the uprising, and
even at times put out a news letter,  "O Libertador" (The
Liberator).   Their attempts to print a news-sheet were thwarted
as much by the illiteracy of the people as by the difficulties of
production while being chased by government troops or by the
Cangaceiros, hired gunmen who formed a counter-guerrilla force in
the north-east.7
     Prestes was never totally defeated.  In February of 1927 he
escaped into Bolivia with 620 of his men.  The importance of the
march is not as much what it did, but the impression that it made
on Prestes.  He returned during the Vargus years and had a solid
position in the government besides spending many years as the
secretary general of the communist party.  He is one of the main
forces in turning the focus of the revolution from the
countryside to the cities.6
     While it may be difficult to view him as a pivotal figure,
it is clear that Prestes at least is a good example of the
changeability of Brazilian politics.  He had a profound effect on
the communist party in Brazil.  As a direct result of the lack of
support that the column received,  Prestes seemed to have become
convinced that the masses of people in the country were not ready
for revolution.  Communist party members were warned to move
slowly in trying to get a revolt started.  He became a moderate
in a revolutionary party.
     The remainder of Prestes' life serves as a good example of
the complex nature of Brazilian political relationships.  After
escaping with the remainder of his column, Prestes stayed out of
the country for several years.  In 1930 he was approached to take
part in the revolt that led to Getulio Vargus' first try at
running the country.  He declined, but he returned in 1934, when
Vargus got the new constitution passed, to take part in the now
legal communist movement.  As president of the Alianca National
Libertadora (National Liberation Alliance), or ANL as it was
known, Prestes represented the Partido Comunista do Brasil
(Brazilian Communist Party), or PCdoB in a broad antifascist
movement.
     The ALN did not last long as a legal organization.  In July
of 1935, Vargus used newly passed national security laws to raid
the headquarters of the ALN and obtain documents showing that the
organization was supported by the international communist
movement.  Arrests from this raid led to a revolt in November by
the more extreme members of the movement.  Though he was not
personally involved, as head of the organization Prestes was
sentenced to 17 years in prison.
     Prestes did not serve the entire time.  At the end of the
Second World War he was released by Vargus and, in 1945, was
elected to the Senate as a representative of the now again legal
PCdoB.  (Those desiring another example of how people can shift
in Brazilian politics should read about Vargus, who was both a
dictator for 15 years and the elected president later.)  Prestes
was removed from the government in 1948 along with the other
communists and, during the military takeover in 1964,  was
finally deported.
     The Prestes revolution is important in another way; it is
the first problem of the military with the communists.  The
revolt started in the military; however, it did not start at the
typical level.  The whole movement is called "tenentismo" for the
lieutenants that started the process.  Though it is hard for us
to understand, this was a very serious attack on the military
structure in Brazil and was the start of a very strong abhorance
of communism by the military.
     Distrust became hatred in 1935.  As a part of the revolt
that led to Prestes imprisonment,  several senior military
officers were killed.  While it might seem unreasonable to get so
upset about the death of some military officers, this is very
much in keeping with the Brazilian view of the position of the
military in the society.  For an organization that had itself
started so many revolts to be so uneasy when it was impacted in a
revolt seems out of character, but it fits in Brazil.
     The Brazilian military views its role in the democratic
process quite differently from traditional roles for the military
in democratic countries.  Rather than seeing the public as the
group with the ultimate responsibility for insuring that the
government performs as it should, the military in Brazil has
traditionally seen that role as their own.  The willingness of
the military to step into the political sphere and adjust things
to where they think they should be, is clearly visible throughout
most of Brazil's history.
     If it were only the military that saw this as appropriate,
then it might lead to serious fighting whenever the military
stepped in to correct the situation; however, the view that the
military holds that ultimate responsibility is as firmly fixed in
the general political view, and even was written into the
constitution in 1891, 1934, and 1946.9
     The political crisis that led up to the removal of Vargas as
president in 1954 is a good example of how the general population
felt about the military's position in getting the government back
on track.  For example, the "Diario de Noticias," a moderate
newspaper, editorialized:  "The armed forces are invited to
mediate as the sentinels of law and the guardians of the
constitution, of tranquility and the progress of the country."10
     While understanding that the power to remove a government
did not imply power to govern, the military saw revolts as
their proper role.  That others would take over that role and
kill senior officers in the process was unforgivable.
                     NOTES FOR CHAPTER 1
     1  Peter Kellemen,    BRASIL Para Principiantes,  (Rio de
Janeiro: Editora Civilizacao Brasileira S. A., 1962), pp. 98-112
     2  Wilson Martins,  "The Incompetence of the Left," in
Political Power in Latin America: Seven Confrontations, ed.
Richard R. Fagen and Wayne A Cornelius, Jr., (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice - Hall, Inc. 1970), pp. 211-212
     3  John Ellis, A Short History of Guerrilla Warfare, (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), p. 48
     4  Euclides da Cunha, Rebellion in the Backlands, trans.
Samuel Putnam, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1944), p. v
     5  Peter Flynn, Brazil: a Political Analysis,  (London:
Ernest Benn Limited, 1978), pp. 46-47
     6  Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla: a historical and critical
study, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), p. 194
     7  Ibid.
     8  Flynn, p. 47
     9  See for example, Article 14 in the Constitution of 1891;
Article 162 in the Constitution of 1934; and Articles 176 through
178 in the 1946 one.  For a detailed discussion of the issues
involved in this military view, see the chapter on Traditional
Roles and Self-Images in Einaudi and Stepan.
     10  Dirio di Noticias, 20 August 1954, quoted in Einaudi and
Stepan Latin American Institutional Development,  (Santa Monica:
Rand, 1971), p. 74
                          CHAPTER TWO
                   Support for an Insurgency
     There were several things that supported insurgency in
Brazil.  The first was communism; the feelings and motivations of
the communists are primary guides to their actions.  The
Brazilian government was another.  Its actions and positions had
a great impact on those that might consider radical action.  A
third was groups outside of Brazil that might strengthen or
support a move to violent revolution.  The final one was the
social and economic situation in Brazil.  In each of these things
one would expect to find indications of why there was an
insurgency in Brazil.
     It is much easier to explain where the insurgency comes from
if one takes the point of view of the insurgents.  To them,
Marxism is clear -- revolution springs from the relentless
"progressive" march of history.  The rising of masses to
overthrow oppression warrants no explanation.  Though, perhaps
for them, there is as much difficulty in explaining why a revolt
has not yet taken place, as there is for non-Marxists in
explaining why one has started.
     As the primary movers in the Brazilian insurgency, the
Brazilian communists present a strange picture.  One would expect
to find a highly organized communist structure, perhaps without
obvious linkage due to the need for protection from compromised
individuals, but with a carefully developed control system and a
strong central command.  That is far from what exists in Brazil
when the insurgency starts.
     Perhaps one can blame part of the situation on Prestes.
Along with the others that followed him, he preached the need to
wait for the inevitable uprising of the masses.  This pure
version of Marxism was not being taught for purely political
reasons, but was also the product of the years in the jungle
without creating a following, and the few years working in the
government trying to act as part of a legitimate force for
change.
     Certainly there is support for the view that things were
afoot that could be taken for non-violent revolt during the time
that Janio Quadros and Joao Goulart were ruling in Brazil.  This
was not the first time that the legal government had tilted
strongly to the left, but it was perhaps the strongest movement
ever.  As Wilson Martins puts it, "The truth is that the Left, or
something very close to it, was in power in Brazil at least from
1960, from the Quadros administration up to the overthrow of
Goulart in 1964."1  This type of real political power certainly
supported a position within the communist party for just waiting
for things to swing back.  Progress toward the communist goal was
possible without violence;  current history supported that
position.
     Regardless of the reason, the history of the communist party
in Brazil is not the history of a monolithic group.  The first
group organized was the Partido Communista Brasileiro , the
Brazilian Communist Party, or PCB.2  This party was headed by
Luis Carlos Prestes.  It was the conservative faction of the
party.  In 1934 the Alianca National Libertadora, or ANL, was
formed as the legal arm of the party for support of antifascism.
(It is mentioned here to try to prevent confusion with the later
ALN.)  The first of the splinter groups, and the most important
one historically, was the Partido Comiunista do Brazil, the
Communist Party of Brazil, or PCdoB.  This was a Maoist group
organized in 1962 by those in the PCB that felt the need for
action to push forward the revolution.  This then was the action
group of the communist party.
     If those were the only groups, then there would still be the
single organization in control of revolutionary violence, the
PCdoB, but it was not that way.  There were five other major
groups dedicated to armed action: The Acao Livertadora Nacional,
National Liberation Action, or ALN, was the most important of the
five and the only one of the groups closely tied to Cuba.  The
Vanguarda Popular Revolucionara, Popular Revolutionary Vanguard,
or VPR, was a second revolutionary group active in Sao Paulo.
The Movimento Revolucionario Tiradentes, Tiradentes Revolutionary
Movement, or MRT, was the action team of the Red Wing of the
PCdoB.  It was named for a national hero of Brazil.  The
Movimento Revolucionario do Outubro 8, Revolutionary Movement of
October 8, or MR-8, named in commemoration of Che Guevara's
death, was the only group that started with rural action.  The
last of these groups was the Partido Communista Brasileiro
Revolcionario, Revolutionary Brazilian Communist Party, or PCBR,
this group started the armed struggle in Rio.3
     While those with strong Marxist views take the position that
nothing more is required to start a revolution than a party
itself, there are other things that will be considered here.  One
of the strong forces toward an insurgency in Brazil was the
military rule of the country.  As has been previously noted, the
overthrow of the government by the military was part of an
accepted military role. What was not expected or accepted was
the long,   continued control of the government by military
personnel.  Even among those that were happy with the overthrow
of Joao Goulart in 1964 there were many who did not want the
continued military rule.  Also the government of General Costelo
Branco was clearly anti-communist, perhaps even more strongly
than the government of Goulart was pro-communist.
     While it was not difficult for the military to justify the
steps that it took to overthrow the government, due to the
historical precedence, it did feel a need to justify its
continued rule.  One of the ways that it justified staying was by
pointing out how communist the previous government had been.
"Truely, in no other country of the planet did the Communist
promoters of an assault on power enjoy such advantages as were
peacefully given to them by the government of Goulart."4  This
statement,  made by a military apologist as part of a
justification for staying in power, is a good example of the type
of change that the new government undertook.
     Obviously this change was a powerful force in favor of those
that wished to push the revolution.  Waiting for a non-violent
social change had suddenly taken a back seat, because anyone who
looked at the status of the passive movement could see that it
had not only stopped progressing, it had just suffered a massive
setback.
     As expressed by Ladislaw Dobor, "In the first years after
the coup, we had many discussions and splits.  By 1967 only a few
small groups had taken up arms....But then in 1968...the mass
movements practically disappeared...Since the government had
closed off the peaceful forms, they came into the armed
organizations."5  Though the government would not agree with the
way this is stated, in the minds of many people, the continued
military government had cut off one peaceful method of change.
     The military government also used political power to create
laws  preventing opposition.   The first of these,  The
Institutional Act of April 9, 1964 is a good example of the kind
of broad powers involved in this legalization of the coup.  This
act gave military personnel the right to run for both president
and vice president, and set the election for the 11th.  It also
provided the government with the right to revoke the political
rights of an individual  (cassation) for 10 years.   This
formalized the purges of the government and even the military
that were occurring.   Within two months the government had
"cassated" 378 people. Included were the last two presidents and
six state governors.  With people at this level being denied any
participation in politics, it is no wonder that the members of
the communist party did not expect their quick return to legal
access to the political system.
     The student unrest and political activism that were common
in the United States during the 1960's were not confined just to
this country.  The same situation existed in Brazil, just as it
did in many other countries.  These students were coming into
political awareness just at the time that their options were
being removed.  Student unrest, whether it was with the political
situation or not, caused many to become bitter about the
political situation and the move into the activist communist
groups continued.
     "Students were, of course, the strongest element in most
guerrilla movements but guerrilla strategists usually felt self-
conscious about his fact and preferred not to mention it."6  This
statement of Walter Laqueur fits in with the response by Fernando
Nagle Gabeira (of MR-8) when asked about recruits, "With few
exceptions, the members are under 30, some as young as 16.  There
are many students from sociology, the letters and arts, and law,
fields with few prospects on the job market."7  It is interesting
that the reason given by a guerrilla for recruiting others is not
ideology, but lack of job prospects.
     Another force  in Brazil during the late 1960s was the
Catholic Church.  The vast majority of Brazilians are Catholic.
Even among the youth, that are famous for inactivity, the church
was still a powerful force.  It is not the purpose of this paper
to go into the doctrinal conflict within the Catholic faith, but
it is important to point out that during this period many priests
were active in the communist movement.  This makes for an odd
factor, but, it is part of the South American equation.  Father
Gustava Gutierrez of Peru later wrote the book that gave this
aberrant theology its name -- Liberation Theology, but in Brazil
as early as 1960 there were others teaching the same variant
ideas that bolstered the concept.
     The idea of Liberation Theology grew out of the desire of
those in the Catholic Church to improve the lives of the people
aroung them.  Concerned with the poverty and inequality that they
saw in Brazil, many priests and nuns decided that there was no
lawful way to provide for the needs of the poor.  They became
revolutionists not because they wanted to overthrow the
government and replace it with a communist one, but because they
wanted to change the government and saw no way short of revolt to
do that.  Here then was another large group of people
dissatisfied with the current govenment policies, providing
another source of support for the revolution.
    What about external support for the revolution?  Clearly
there was ideological support from Cuba.  Members of the
communist party had been part of various meetings in Cuba, and
there was a tie to parties in both Russia and China, but there is
no indication in any of the writings that there was anything
other than training and indoctrination available.  None of the
Brazilian insurgents seemed to expect arms or money from Cuba or
any other communist group external to the country.  At least in
the Brazilian situation, the plan seems to have been to produce
the insurrection totally within the country with the exception of
a few who would be sent elsewhere for training.
     It is unclear what type of coordination took place or was
planned, but it seems to be clear that the Bolivian foco was
planned as only one piece of a total continental insurrection.
Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Chile were all to rise up in mass.
While there is no indication that any direct support was planned
between these actions, the intent was at least to limit the
ability of the governments to assist each other in putting down a
revolution.  "On the premise that no country could carry forward
a successful revolution without outside aid, Che based political
support for the guerrillas on the common anti-imperialist
struggle of the Latin American peoples.   Since the
internationalization of the struggle was the best chance of a
revolution in any single country, he hoped that the struggle
would spill over national boundaries."8  Even if there was no
plan for direct support, there was support for the radicals that
wanted to press forward.  Others willing to sustain direct action
were ready to move forward in their own countries.
     The economic and social conditions existing in Brazil during
this period of time would seem to be a classic case of the
downtrodden masses.  There was a small middle class, though it
was growing, and a large group of lower class people.  In some
areas, such as the Northeast, there still existed a situation
close to the type of conditions that existed under slavery, when
one compared those that had and those that did not.
     The fifth largest country in the world, Brazil then ranked
number eight in population with eighty two million people.  Large
portions of the country had population densities under one person
per square kilometer.  While over fifty percent of the people
were literate, only one hundred and ten per thousand finished
grade school, and only fifteen per thousand finished a secondary
school.9  While I came into contact with Brazilians that were
very well educated, the vast majority had stopped before
finishing a secondary school.  Many children could be found on
the streets all the time, even during school hours.  There were
always boys in any park ready to shine your shoes, and in many
cities young boys (12 to 14) worked on every bus taking fares.
     The population was moving into the cities, and by the end of
the 1960's the rural population would be smaller than the urban
one.  Industrial production had doubled in the period from 1954
to 1962,10 but the availability of jobs in the cities had not
kept up with the number of people wanting them.  Many of the
cities developed slum areas, with the most famous one in Rio, the
Favela, giving its name to shantytowms.
     While I certainly understand that Brazil had no special
corner on poverty at this time, I first saw real poverty in
Brazil.  I had seen some situations among indians in the American
southwest that I had always considered poverty, but I will never
forget wandering off a main road in Ponta Grossa to take a
shortcut to another road and finding a hut.  When I first saw it,
I thought it was something that a group of kids had made. It was
about three feet high and eight feet on a side.  It was
constructed of cardboard, a few boards, and some flattened tin
cans.  It was the type of thing that I and my friends had built
in the field behind our homes many times in our youth.  This one
had a family of at least five living in it, five being the number
that came out to see why the dog was barking.  That was only the
first example of many, but it gave a new meaning to poverty.
     Brazil also had some of the easiest places for the have-nots
to see what they were missing.  Rio then had some of the worst
slums in the world right next to some of the most expensive
hotels.  Television was expensive in this period, but I remember
several places with no internal plumbing where people watched
what others had.  Not only did they see what people had in
Brazil, but they saw what was available in the United States.  I
know that they did not always understand, but it was a source of
unrest I am sure.  People could never understand that the picture
I had of my parents home did not make me rich.  With a car in the
driveway and two parked out front it was obvious that I came from
a very rich family.  How do you explain to someone that having a
1950 Ford and a 1952 Studebaker parked in front of your house in
1967 did not make you one of the American rich?
     High inflation was one of the causes for the 1964 coup, and
the actions taken by the Castelo Branco government to try to
bring prices under control have resulted in declining real wages
and a law against cost of living increases.  With buying power
down twenty two percent in 1966, the number of poor was growing
rather than shrinking.
     These social and political factors would seem to provide the
necessary mass support for the overthrow of the government.  As
becomes clear, the economic and social pressures do not provide
the eighty percent support from the population that communist
leaders felt was needed for a revolution.11  However, it is
clearly understandable that the more action oriented portion of
the communist party thought that all of the ingredients for a
successful revolt were in place:  The government was oppressive
and not representative.  The church was becoming active in anti-
government ways.  Students were clearly ready for and seeking
change.  Economic conditions were bad.  The necessary oppressed
masses were available.  And lastly, all one had to do was follow
the example of the Cubans, and the revolution would sweep out of
the hills to establish a communist state.  The only thing left to
do was to make a plan that fit the Brazilian situation and then
start the revolution.
                      NOTES TO CHAPTER 2
     1  All of the sources except one agree on the PCB as being
the first communist party organized in Brazil.  That source is
the Area Handbook on Brazil. Because of the high reliability of
this series, I point out that other sources do not agree.  In
particular the paper on Atualizacao do MCB clearly notes the PCB
as the first party and the PCdoB as the offshoot.  The Area
Handbook gives the first party the name of the PCdoB and on page
268 talks about a pre-1960 and a post-1962 PCdoB.
     2  While many sources exist for a history of the communist
movement in Brazil, I recommend Kohl and Litt's summary, pp. 167-
170, for anyone wishing further information.
     3  James Kohl and John Litt, Urban Guerrilla Warfare in
Latin America, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974), p. 168
     4  Colonel Ferdinando De Carvalho,  "The Communist
Revolutionary War in Brazil," in Fagen and Cornelius, p. 197
     5  Andy Truskier, "The Politics of Violence: The Urban
Guerrilla in Brazil," in Kohl and Litt, pp 141-142
     6  Laqueur, p. 345
     7  Truskier, p. 143
     8  Donald C. Hodges, The Latin American Revolution, (New
York: William Morrow and Company, Inc. 1974), p. 186
     9  Antonio Perdo de Souza Campos, Atlas Historico e
Geografico Brasileiro, (Rio: Campanha Nacional de Material de
Ensino, 1966), p. 57
    10  Ibid, p. 61
    11  Laqueur, p. 345
                        CHAPTER THREE
              Insurgent Philosophy and Tactics
     Much of the philosophy and tactics seen in other South
American countries share common roots, but in Brazil there is a
twist to them that makes them uniquely different.  Not that all
of the other ideas were rejected, just that Brazilians often
changed them to fit what they saw as a unique environment.
     Che Gevera is largely responsible for the name given to the
standard plan for starting a revolt in South America.  The
concept of a foco grows out of his writings, and those of Regis
Debray.  This codification of the Cuban experience stresses
starting a revolution through a small band of guerrillas acting
in the countryside.  This band, or focus, would be a "small motor
which moves the large motor of revolution."1
     While this theory seems applicable to what happened in Cuba,
there are problems in applying this idea to other places.  As is
often the case, a generalization made from a single experience
seems to be wrong.2  It was tried; at least four are identified
in Brazil from 1962 to 1969 -- all failures.3  These four are
only a few of the seventeen listed for South America by Kohl and
Litt; a fact which is important in understanding what was going
on in the communist party in Brazil during this period.  Luiz
Carlos Prestes was the living example for all of the old guard
that the concept of a foco had not worked in the past.  For the
young, Guevara was a hero whose ideas needed only to be followed
carefully to obtain success.  When the PCB would not support such
actions, splinter groups were formed to establish that focus of
revolt.
     Many of these groups rejected the idea of centralized
control.  Action was considered more important than structure.
This rejection of the basic principle of unity of command seems
strange to the student of military history, but it clearly was
the driving force in starting many of the small groups in Brazil.
Carlos Marighella pushed this same idea when he said
"coordination must cease when it obstructs action."4
     Marighella is the most important Brazilian communist
theorist, not so much for the success of his theories, but for
the number of people whom he influenced.  His major impact was
made through writings.  His short work, Minimanual of the Urban
Guerrilla, on what a urban guerrilla needs to be is still one of
the models for development of an urban revolution.
     And yet, Marighella did not always follow such a direct
line, and demand action before anything else.  He was a realist
that had worked within the government as well as outside.  He
knew that at times he should wait.  This earlier statement shows
that different view:
         Brazil is a country occupied by the present military
     entreguista5  dictatorship and United States ruling circles,
     in whose service are the traitors that have seized power.
         In these siege conditions, the Brazilian guerrilla
     band, with its clearly political significance can do no more
than register a protest, act as an instigatory force behind
     the popular struggle.  It would be unpardonable if it were
     to be deprived of its continuity, of its necessary life
     span, through exposure to risks of a superior concentration
     of enemy forces, through being allowed to venture into
     battle or take part in crucial engagements with the forces
     of reaction.
         No one expects guerrilla warfare to be the signal for a
     popular uprising or the immediate proliferation of
     insurrectional bases.  Nothing of the kind.  Guerrilla
     warfare will stimulate the resistance struggle everywhere.6
     Much like Prestes, Marighella's history needs to be
studied to understand the basis for his doctrine.  He follows a
typical Brazilian mold, having been considered both "good" and
"bad" as conditions changed.  Born in Bahia in 1911, he was a
member of the PCB from 1927 to 1967.  His involvement with the
ANL in 1935 resulted in his imprisonment, as it did for Prestes.
He was a member of the Central Committee of the PCB in 1943, and
also a federal deputy for Bahia during the 1945 period when
Prestes was a senator.   Thrown out of Congress in 1947 when the
communists were made illegal again, he worked as editor of the
communist journal Problemas (Problems) in Sao Paulo and served as
a member of the PCB Executive Committee and Secretariat.7
     He spent a year in China from 1953 to 1954, but remained a
Stalinist rather than following Mao.  In 1964 while still a
member of the PCB Central Committee he was wounded in an early
clash with military forces.  He remained in the PCB until 1967.
He was an agitator for more forceful action, and in 1966 resigned
from the Executive Committee with strong feelings that the party
was not doing enough.  In his letter of resignation he said:
"All its [the Executive Committee's] activities consist in
organizing meetings and publishing policies and information.  No
action is planned, the struggle has been abandoned.  And in
moments of crisis, the party has no grasp on reality. . ."8
Even though the PCB had decided to to send no delegation to the
conference of the Organization of Latin American Solidarity in
1967, Marighella went to Havana for the meetings.  For this
action, and his continued complaints about the PCB, he was
expelled from the PCB in December of 1967.
     Marighella is one of the few critics of Guevara's theories
during this period that offered another possible way to start the
revolution.  He is the major supporter of an urban movement.
"The Organizational Role in Revolutionary Violence" establishes
the urban movement and its logistical base as the starting point
for the insurgency rather than the foco working in isolation in
the rural area.
     This is not to imply that Marighella was convinced that
urban action would win the revolt, he saw it as only the first
step in the revolution.  He expected to win through an alliance
of workers, peasants, students and clergy, all taking part in the
armed struggle against the government.  In the first stage of the
revolt the action would be concentrated in the cities.  There the
preparation would take place with training and appropriation of
materiel.  The revolt would then move to the countryside as the
principal effort.  This would be the critical stage of the revolt
and would lead to the final stage where a people's army would
rise up and overthrow the regime.
     While the second stage is clearly the foco idea returning,
and while Marighella was clear that the second stage was the
decisive one, there is a first phase, starting in the city, added
on to the standard theory of the day.  While his strategy is
important and was accepted by most of the urban groups, his
organizational ideas were not so sound.  He was obsessed with the
idea of producing action.   Better action that produced no
movement towards the organizational goal than a lack of action.
     His most famous work is the short  Minimanual of the Urban
Guerrilla.  Much of it reads like a military training manual,
though the list of personal qualities reads like a wish list for
the ideal soldier.  The urban guerrilla is brave, decisive, a
good tactician, a good shot, of great astuteness, imaginative,
creative,  must possess initiative,  mobility,  flexibility,
versatility and command of any situation.  Other important
qualities include being a good walker,  being resistant to
fatigue, hunger, rain and heat, know how to hide, never to fear,
and always be vigilant.  Acting the same both day and night he
never leaves a trail, gets discouraged, acts impetuously, and
never loses his patience or his vigilance.9
     Perhaps it is being unfair, but it seems that someone with
all of those abilities directly conflicts with his statement that
this person "must be careful not to appear strange and separated
from ordinary city life."10  Under technical preparation he
includes a long list of things this guerrilla is to learn to do:
         The urban guerrilla can have strong physical resistance
     only if he trains systematically.  He cannot be a good
     fighter if he has not learned the art of fighting.  For that
     reason the urban guerrilla must learn and practice various
     kinds of fighting, of attack, and of personal defense.
         Other useful forms of physical preparation are hiking,
     camping, the practice in survival in the woods, mountain
     climbing, rowing, swimming, skin diving, training as a
     frogman, fishing, harpooning, and the hunting of birds and
     of small and big game.
         It is very important to learn how to drive, pilot a
     plane, handle a motor boat and a sail boat, understand
     mechanics, radio telephone, electricity, and have some
     knowledge of electronic techniques.
         It is also important to have a knowledge of
     topographical information,  to be able to locate one's
     position by instruments or other available resources, to
     calculate distances, make maps and plans, draw to scale,
     make timings, work with an angle protractor, a compass, etc.
         A knowledge of chemistry, of color combination, and of
     stamp-making,  the domination of the techniques of
     calligraphy and the copying of letters, and other skills are
     part of the technical preparation of the urban guerrilla,
     who is obliged to falsify documents in order to live within
     a society that he seeks to destroy.
         In the area of auxiliary medicine he has the special
     role of being a doctor or understanding medicine, nursing,
     pharmacology, drugs, elemental surgery, and emergency first
     aid.
         The basic question in the technical preparation of the
     urban guerrilla is nevertheless to know how to handle arms
     such as the machine gun, revolver, automatic, FAL, various
     types of shotguns, carbines, mortars, bazookas, etc.
         A knowledge of various types of ammunition and
     explosives is another aspect to consider.  Among the
     explosives, dynamite must be well understood.  The use of
     incendiary bombs, smoke bombs, and other types are also
     indispensable prior knowledge.
         To know how to make and repair arms, prepare Molotov
     cocktails, grenades, mines, homemade destructive devices,
     how to blow up bridges, tear up and put out of service rails
     and sleepers, there are requisites in the technical
     preparation for the urban guerrilla that can never be
     considered unimportant.11
If such a person ever completes his training program, James Bond
would certainly be out of a job!
     All of the manual is not at that level.  Much of the rest of
the manual is exactly what one would expect in something that has
been dubbed "must reading for any aspiring terrorist."12  The
very next section of the manual discusses arms that are to be
used, and contains a rational discussion of the use of various
weapons.  (It does get a little carried away in discussing the
guerrilla's role as a gunsmith.)  The next section is titled "The
Shot: the urban guerrilla's reason for existence."  Thus
demonstrating that Marighella had clearly in mind what was to be
done with the weapons.
     The sections on logistics even contain some mnemonics to
help remember the difference between traditional logistics, CCEM
(C-comida {food}, C-combustivel  {fuel}, E-equipment, and M-
municoes {ammunition} ) and guerrilla logistics, MDAME, (M-
mechanization, D-dinheiro {money}, A-arms, M-municoes, and E-
explosives).13
     As an example of the value of the manual, he lists and
explains the following actions that could be carried out:
     1.  assaults;
     2.  raids and penetration;
     3.  occupations;
     4.  ambush;
     5.  street tactics;
     6.  strikes and work interruptions;
     7.  desertions, diversions, seizures, expropriations of
         arms, ammunition, explosives:
     8.  liberation of prisoners;
     9.  executions;
     10. kidnappings;
     11. sabotage;
     12. terrorism;
     13. armed propaganda;
     14. war of nerves.14
     There are clear instructions about how to carry out each of
these fourteen items.  What is meant by assault is explained, for
example, followed by a discussion of when to assault at night and
what things require assaults during the day.  Nine groups of
targets are listed, and special considerations are listed for
moving vehicles.  That is followed by a long discussion of the
special situation involved in assaulting a bank.
     With some of the manual so clearly overstated, it is easy to
dismiss the good portions of the document along with the bad.
From the point of view of those that would use it, the manual
served a very important purpose.  It in effect was the doctrine
of the urban revolution as well as the tactics.  Much like a
doctrinal publication of the U. S. Armed Forces, it had some
explanations that could not be made to fit current needs;
however, it also contained significant information of a general
nature that was helpful in training people.  One of the great
problems of the Brazilian insurgency was its inability to train
people.  It would seem clear from the existence of the Mini-
manual that some of those involved in the insurgency knew the
importance of training, but there is also clear evidence that
there were many who did not understand the need to train.
Undoubtedly this problem was compounded by the large numbers
involved in the insurgency. Not having firm central control made
training more difficult.  The impact on operations is therefor
seen to considerably amplified.
     As a final note on the value of the manual, it should be
pointed out that the Marine Corps published a large section of it
in an Operational Overview devoted to terrorism,  and gave
instructions to units on how to get a copy of the entire work.
The stated reason being, "To develop viable countermeasures
against any terrorist attacks, we must know their tactics."15
     It is very hard to determine if the losing side had good
tactics, particularly in a revolt.  In the case of a revolt there
seems to be little that is consistent from one example to
another, and this fact makes it difficult to know if the tactics
were good even when they follow exactly the pattern of a
previously successful revolution.  In the case of new tactics
like those tried in Brazil, the only course available is to try
to look at alternatives that might have been used and try to
determine if they might have done better.
     Even those that support insurgencies can not agree on the
tactics that should be used.  Abraham Guillen, another early
urban warfare strategist, agreed with Marighella at first.  Later
he was to revise his position and take exception with the idea of
the rural guerrillas being the strategic force.  Laqueur points
out the rapid urbanization of South America, and would seem to
agree with Guillen that Carlos Lamarca (another important
Brazilian urban terrorist) failed only when he left the city of
Sao Paulo.  He got killed in the countryside.16
     The question would then seem not to be should the push have
been to start somewhere other than in the cities, but, rather,
should there have been any attempt to leave the city at all?
This does not seem to have an answer.  Moving to the countryside
did not work, but staying in the cities was not working either.
Remember, Marighella was killed in the city.
                       NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3
     1  Kohl and Litt, p. 6
     2  For those interested in a discussion of the problems
involved in exporting the Cuban experience I recommend the
section in Kohl and Litt on "Foquismo and the Continental
Revolution" pages 5 through 8.
     3  Kohl and Litt, pp. 6-7
     4  Ibid, p. 22
     5  Entrequista -- someone who gives everything away.  (In
this case to foreign interests.)
     6  Carlos Marighella, "A Crise Brasileira," in The
Technique of the Counter-State, ed. Luis Mercier Vega, trTns.
Daniel Weissbort, (London: Pall Mall Press), p. 61
     7  Flynn, pp. 414-415
     8  Ibid, p. 416
     9  Marighella, p. 21
     10  Ibid
     11  Ibid, p. 22
     12  LtCol T. E. Kline, "The Trouble with Terrorism," in
Operational Overview, April - June 1984, (Quantico: MCDEC), p. 13
In fairness to LtCol Kline, the implication is that this is "must
reading for counterterrorists" as well.
    13  Marighella, p. 25
    14  Ibid, p. 30.
    15  Operational Overview, p. 26
    16  Laqueur, p. 345
                      CHAPTER FOUR
                     The Insurgency
     For the purposes of this paper, the insurgency can be
thought of as starting in 1964 with the overthrow of the
government that year.   Clearly there had been previous
activities, but, for the most part, these had been things that
firmed the insurgency, and provided impetus for political
indoctrination and training.  It is perhaps best to start the
reporting with Marighella's first direct action.  On 9 May 1964,
he led a mob assault on an officer's club in Sao Paulo.  He was
shot by police and seriously wounded, but later managed to escape
from the hospital.  The first blood of the insurgency had been
drawn.
     In March 1965 a military barracks was raided in Rio Grande do
Sul for the purpose of getting arms.  A bomb found in the U. S.
Embassy concluded the only direct insurgent actions for 1965.
Neither produced much interest.  Real action would start in the
south.  This is in keeping with the region's reputation for
violent political acts. Over 200 people were arrested the year
before for plotting insurection in conjunction with ousted
political leaders.  Porto Alegre, the capital of Rio Grande do
Sul, continued that tradition in 1966 with the first of many
bombings.
     1966 was the year of the bomb.  A U. S. consul's home; the
USIS building; the Recife airport; and three ministers' homes
were bombed that year.  Bombings were popular and easy for the
insurgents.  In 1973 there were still insurgents setting off
bombs, though this time in the north.  This would seem to be in
conflict with the statements of Dobor in response to a question
on bombs. His claim is that the insurgents did not use bombs for
fear that the government will blow up a movie house full of
children and blame it on the insurgents.  However, his statement
that "We choose very selective targets...."2 seems to be true
for most of the insurection.
     It must be remembered that this was an insurgency and not
simply terrorists actions.  In marked contrast to the kind of
problems that occur in Northern Ireland, the insurgents seem to
clearly understand that they need to get and keep the support of
the general population.  Symbolic acts were of great importance
to the guerrillas, so much so that at times the symbolism was
hidden from everyone except themselves.
     The first of the rural foco failed in April of 1967.3  More
information than that is not available, but it indicates how
fractionalized the communists were during this period.  While no
information is available on how many were involved, this was the
one action of the Movilento Nacionalista Revolucionario (National
Revolutionary Movement).  Two other foco attempts were aborted
before they really got started.  170 people were arrested in Mato
Grosso, and the band in Amazonas only grew to five before they
were arrested.
     Money became the critical issue for the insurgents in 1968.
Four robberies each netted over 100,000 NCr$.4  Money was not
stolen;  it was expropriated for financing the revolution.
Marighella was convinced that this issue marks one of the key
factors of any urban movement.  The rural movement would need to
be financed, or it would end up having to take what it needed
from those that it was trying to get to join the cause.  One of
the responsibilities of the urban guerrilla was to provide money.
     As Hodges states:
         With respect to expropriations, he [Marighella]
     diverged from the practice subsequently followed by the
     Argentine ERP by advising against direct distributions to
     the people.  Such distributions, he contended, create the
     false impression that the liberation of the exploited
     depends on the enterprise and exploits of the guerrillas
     alone, thereby reinforcing the passivity of the masses when
     their active participation is most needed.  Thus, bank
     expropriations should be used mainly for tactical or
     logistical purposes such as providing arms, ammunition,
     etc.
     The best example of the problem with symbolic acts occurred
on October 27, 1968:  Bombing the Sears store in Sao Paulo.  (It
is tempting, though unfair, to leave the explanation of the
symbolism of this attack for a note, and let the reader try to
figure out for himself what the reasoning was.)  The attack on
the store was a protest against United States involvement in
Vietnam and the presence in Brazil of the U. S. Secretary of
Defense.  To understand the symbolism, it is necessary to know
that Robert McNamara owned shares in Sears.  This rather obscure
fact was the subject of a manifesto left at the site of the
bombing, but its contents were never really published.6
     The first action of 1969 was more important for who it
involves rather than for what it accomplished.  The VPR organizes
an attack on the IV Army Quitauna barracks in an attempt to gain
several hundred weapons.  The items were to include heavier
weapons such as machines guns and flame throwers as well as
smaller automatic weapons and grenades.  The rational for the
attack was based on the existence of a VPR cell within the Fourth
Infantry Regiment.  If for no other reason than the number of
weapons involved, it was a complex operation with detailed
logistical requirements.7
     It is unclear exactly how the authorities first heard of the
plan, but one cell was discovered painting a truck to resemble an
army vehicle, and the remainder of the plan fell apart.8  The
cell in the Fourth Regiment did escape, taking 70 automatic
weapons with them.  This cell was led by Captain Carlos Lamarca.
     In many ways, the defection of Captain Lamarca was more
serious than the loss of the weapons.  Indications are that he
did not leave the army for ideological reasons, but because of a
lover.9  He was a superb shot, and a knowledgeable tactical
leader.  He represented all that was bad in the armed forces, and
caused considerable problems due to his understanding of
counterguerrilla tactics.  Under his leadership VPR became one of
the two major Insurgent groups.
     The attack on the Fourth Infantry Regiment was a tactical
disaster.  The four arrested painting the truck were questioned
and many others were arrested.  Joao Quartim, a member of the
group, claims that there was savage torture and that one member
of the cell even collaborated with officials.  Regardless of the
exact tactics used, they led to another group of conspirators.
The final results included arrests of thirty more militants.10
     Kidnapping was the next step in the escalation of the urban
action.  On September 4, 1969 the U. S. Ambassador, Burke
Elbrick, was kidnapped.  This kidnapping is very important
because it demonstrates the true state of the insurection.  The
immediate value to the insurgents was huge.  The action put the
insurgency on front pages all around the world.  The release of
fifteen prisoners was important to the morale of those fighting,
and demonstrated that the government could be forced to release
those it held.  In addition, the safe release of the ambassador
kept world opinion from turning totally against the insurgents.
     On the other hand, the net result of the kidnapping was a
major blow by the counterinsurgent forces.  MR-8 first developed
the idea for the kidnapping, but had to go to the ALN and
Marighella for armed support.  The kidnapping was smoothly done,
but the house where they held Elbrick was rented in the real name
of one of the insurgents.11  As a direct result of the
kidnapping, between 1800 and 2000 people were arrested.  One set
of those arrests led to the locating of Marighella.  He was
killed in a police trap on November 4, 1969.  "On balance, the
Elbrick kidnapping had provoked brutal repression against a
movement insufficiently developed to withstand it;  the
revolutionaries lost control over the level of violence as the
regime escalated to a level they were unable to match."12
     There were three more diplomatic kidnappings in 1970.  The
symbolic nature of these attacks was again much too subtle for
most of the Brazilians.  The four major kidnappings were done in
order of the amount of money that the foreign government had
invested in Brazil. Following the United States came Japan,
Germany and Switzerland.  It is interesting to note that not even
the police figured out the significance of the order of the
kidnappings until the insurgents pointed it out.
     The overall effect of these kidnappings was much the same as
it had been in the case of the kidnapping of  Ambassador Elbrick,
they were initial successes for the insurgents, but the end
result was the loss of more people than were released, and those
released were exiled outside the country and not able to directly
support the insurgency.  None of these actions were leading to
the type of mass uprising that the guerrillas needed.
     Urban actions continued into 1974, but the effect continues
to be much the same.  It was easy to rob banks, kidnappings drop
off, and bombs continued to be used.  Kohl and Litt have a long
list of actions covering eleven pages.  But most of these were of
little consequence at the national level.13
     Rural actions continued to be tried throughout the entire
insurgency.  None of them had the desired effect of bringing
about the involvement of the masses, and most of them were small
and relatively easy for the army to locate and overcome.  Two
notable exceptions are worth mentioning as separate items; one at
the VPR training camp in Sao Paulo; another at the Xambia
enclaves.
     The VPR had established a training area in the southern part
of the state of Sao Paulo known as the Vale de Rebeira.  This is
a poor region, relatively hilly, and covered with trees.  It was
mostly inhabited by immigrants from Japan.  In this region the
VPR had set up a support network and was conducting training.
Information about the area came to light as a result of arrests
following the kidnapping of the Japanese consul.  The military
reaction was swift and massive.   Thousands of troops were
involved in a cordon around the area, and air support was used,
to include the dropping of napalm.
     The reaction of the government upset the guerrilla leaders
because of what it meant for their future plans.  Joao Quartim
comments:
         The rapidity and ferocity of the armed forces'
     intervention shows yet again that present conditions in
     Brazil do not permit the survival of isolated bases of "red
     power" in the countryside and that consequently the
     formation of mobile strategic detachments is more than ever
     dependent on the overall situation of class struggle and
     revolutionary war.  Second the claim that a foco will serve
     as a tactical instrument inspiring the urban masses to
     struggle has also been disproved.14
     In April 1972, the government located a large guerrilla base
at Xambia in the region near the Araguaia River.  Unlike the VPR
base that was only 300 kilometers from the city of Sao Paulo,
this was a true jungle base, in an area near the border of the
states of Goias, Mato Grosso, and Para.  There are indications
that the guerrillas had come the closest they would ever come to
establishing a foco.  This area is very poor and there were
powerful landlords whose actions could easily be exploited to
gain support.  The "Command of the Partisan Forces of Araguaia"
was of great concern to the government because of the possibility
of attacks on the Trans-Amazon highway.15
     The government used over 5,000 troops in their actions
against the guerrilla force.  What few details are available will
be discussed in the following chapter on government actions, but
from the insurgent point of view, the government again was able
to easily raise the level of violent response well above anything
that the guerrillas were able to match. Even in this place where
they had had time to build a support structure and where there
was some local support, the insurgents could not gain enough
support to hold against the government forces.
     One of the most difficult questions to answer is how many
were really involved in the insurection.  Raymond Estep gives a
number of four hundred active guerrillas during the height of
actions during 1969 and 1970.16  However, Kohl and Litt indicate
that in Operation Birdcage, launched to preempt actions in
commemoration of Marighella's death, that between five and ten
thousand people were detained.17  Even taking the smaller number
and allowing for only one in ten as really involved in active
support of the insurgency, still gives five hundred arrests of
valid insurgents.  Regardless of how many there were, the one
thing that is sure is that there were never anywhere close to
enough.
     Professor Bard O'Neil has done a large amount of work on the
analysis of insurgencies.18  As a final comment on the nature of
the insurgent actions in Brazil, I would like to apply his
framework to the insurgency there and show how it falls in the
various categories.  First as to type, this insurgency is clearly
revolutionary.  As to form, it is guerrilla warfare.  In a few
cases it is only terrorism, but for the most part it is guerrilla
actions.  It never becomes conventional warfare.
     Looking at O'Neil's major analytical variables, one sees a
lack of popular support, a lack of organization, and a great lack
of cohesion.  External support is lacking in anything other than
moral support.  If there is political support in the form that
O'Neil defines it, it is only from Cuba, and is rather limited
and non-specific.  (Cuban support is mostly general support for
all actions in Latin America.)  There is no indication of
material assistance.  Looking at the physical environment, the
insurgents have large areas of rural populations in which to base
themselves, but they never really control any portion of the land
in such a way as to provide a safe haven for themselves.  The
social environment would seem to provide the necessary division
between the haves and the have-nots to allow for a rebellion, but
the Brazilian insurgents cannot seem to exploit it.  Lastly, the
strength of the government falls clearly in favor of the status
quo.
     It is interesting to note that the Brazilians development of
strategy is listed by O'Neil as a wholly separate category.  If
they did nothing else, the Brazilians effected another way to
approach development of an insurgency.
                       NOTES FOR CHAPTER 4
     1  Kohl and Litt, p. 46 and 62, and also Flynn, p. 412
     2  Truskier, p. 140
     3  Kohl and Litt, p. 63
     4  Ibid, pp. 64-65
     5  Hodges, p. 192
     6  Joao Quartim, "Leninism or Militarism," in Kohl and Litt,
p. 151
     7  Ibid, p. 158
     8  Ibid, p. 159
     9  This was reported by LtCol Dias during a conversation at
Quantico on 1 Feb. 1985.  His indicated that Lamarca left a wife
and family behind when he defected.
    10  Quartim, p. 159
    11  Kohl and Litt, p. 49
    12  Ibid
    13  Ibid, pp. 62 - 72.  This Chronology includes not only
the actions by the insurgents, but includes key events in the
government and key political changes.  It is a valuable quick
reference on the actions of both sides.  The only problem with
the list is the lack of references to further information.  In
many cases, a one line entry in this list was the only
information on an action that I could locate.
    14  Quartim, pp. 164-165
    15  Kohl and Litt, p. 51
    16  Raymond Estep, Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America 1963-
1975, Air University Documentary Research Study (AU-202-75-IPD),
1975, p. 51  (no reference is given for the number sited)
    17  Kohl and Litt, pp. 50 and 69
    18  Bard E. O'Neil, "The Analysis of Insurgency," in The Art
and Practice of Military Strategy, ed. George Thibault,
(Washington: National Defense University, 1984), pp. 800-827.
                          CHAPTER FIVE
                       Government Actions
     One of the more difficult things to resolve in the insurgent
actions in Brazil is who escalated things from a given level
first.  The government could not be expected to agree with
Ferdanado Nagle Gabeira of MR-8 who said, "We did not choose this
way of fighting; it was chosen by the dictatorship and by its
ally, the United States."1  However, it is clear that the coup by
the military did change the rules for those that did not agree.
It was not just a change in government, but also a change in the
attitude of the government toward all kinds of dissent.
     If one looks at the first three Institutional Acts as a form
of escalation, then it is clear that the government was moving
against those that disagreed with its policies in increasing
levels.  As previously noted, the first of these acts allowed for
the removal of the rights of an individual to participate in the
political process for ten years, and gave the president rights
that had previously been the purview of the judiciary and
legislature.   The second dissolved all political parties,
instituted indirect elections for the president and vice-
president, and allowed the military courts to try people accused
of subverting the state.  The third act ruled out direct
elections for governors and mayors of the capital cities. This
was obviously a continuing reduction in democratic rights.2
     It is clear that the military did two things to insure
power:  First, it changed the rules.  Second, it got rid of the
players that did not like the new rules.  While there is an
argument for stating that these actions forced those who
disagreed to become revolutionaries, it must also be seen as a
clear case of getting the government into a position where it
could combat an insurgency.  These acts gave the government such
strong powers that there were few if any restraints on their
actions against the guerrilla forces.
     Later when the government wanted stronger powers, there were
more Institutional Acts.  Number five and number fourteen were
both very important.   Five gave dictatorial powers to the
president, at the time Costa e Silva, and fourteen brought back
the death penalty for subversive acts.
     Brian M. Jenkins contends that,  "In almost all cases,
government forces have resorted to extra-legal methods to deal
with urban guerrillas."3  He also notes that in most cases they
get away with doing it.4  He is referring to the ability of the
repressive acts of the government to influence the masses to
revolt, not the legal ability to do whatever the government
officials wish, but in the case of Brazil there were laws passed
that insure that the government could call almost anything it
wished legal.
     It is interesting that this position seems to be the exact
opposite of what he states in his article on urban strategy where
he talks about repression as a goal of the insurgent.  "Violence
generated by guerrillas is aimed at compelling the government to
assume dictatorial powers, declare martial law, suspend civil
liberties, resort to mass arrests."5  Clearly the Brazilian
government did all of these; many even before the guerrillas got
started.  However, the government managed to keep most of the
repression localized and did not generate mass revolt.  Of
course, not all of the actions taken by the government were
repressive even when they were not what might be expected in the
United States.
     Different systems of police organization allow other options
to the government than do those currently in use in the United
States.  With its ability to bring all of the police actions
within a state under the control of the military commander for
the state, without declaring a state of martial law, Brazil has a
very useful mid-line reaction to urban problems.6  There is a
certain level of escalation in the United States when the
National Guard is called on to contain a riot or to prevent a
situation, that is not felt in Brazil when the police forces in
an area mass together to prevent the same type of problem.  In
some of our states, the state highway patrol can be used in that
manner, but even that involves using forces that would not
normally be assigned in a town.
     Brazil has made good use of its ability to control multiple
police units.  These units have been trained in riot control and
prevention, and can be quickly combined to provide a large  force
if required.  They all wear the same uniforms, and so in a large
town, unless you watched them arrive, you would have no way to
know that it was not just the local police.
     Of all of the tactics and actions that this paper discusses,
this is the only area where I can claim to have personal
experience.  In June of 1968 I was involved in a student protest
in Porto Alegre.  My involvement was not as a participant, but as
an observer.  Going back to my journal, I can not imagine what
precipitated the protest.  I had known a few of the students
involved.  We ate at the same boarding house.  But I really was
not too concerned with their expressed grievances.   I can
only reconstruct.  What it came down to was wanting to hold a
rally at the university and then marching into the center of town
to present the governor with a protest.  For one reason or
another their request for a permit to hold the march was turned
down.  They resolved to hold it anyway, and the government acted
to stop them.
     I realize now that my description may not mesh with the way
that either the students or the city government might recollect
events, but as best I can determine it really had little more
significance than that.  What was important for me at the time,
and what I think is significant for this paper, was the way that
the march was stopped.
     I first became aware of the government actions while
returning to where I lived after lunch one day.  While we waited
to cross a busy street leading into the city, we saw dozens of
trucks and busses from neighboring towns arriving with loads of
"Guarda Civil."  These civil guards were the standard police that
directed traffic, and patrolled the city.  At the time I did not
understand what legal actions that had brought them together, and
was very surprised at how many there were.
     I rode a bus all the way back to the main depot that
evening, and as I got ready to leave the area, I noted that it
was cordoned off.  Enough police were in the area to prevent
anyone starting anything by riding in on buses.  The whole area
was cordoned by a ring of police.  They were standing in line
with sufficient strength that their batons touched end to end.
They had a tight ring around a four block square area where the
governor's office stood.   Then they closed off the two main
streets that someone might march upon from the university to the
main square.
     Looking back, I am not sure why we went home the way we did,
nor am I sure why it was allowed, but I ended up walking back
along the two closed off streets rather than trying to get
through the police lines and get home the shortest way.  At the
intersection of Borges and Rua da Pria, there was a strong point,
a group of mounted police, and a small armored car.  Rather than
have a show of force, the choice had been to display only minimal
weapons and capabilities around the perimeter.   Support
capabilities were available in the center where they could move
quickly if needed.
     One of the most interesting things about the police lines
was the manner in which they were keeping the students from a
direct confrontation.  Rather than have the situation that seemed
to be normal, where the police were on a line with shouting
students directly in front of them, these police had closed off a
street.  Students could only approach by coming down a cross-
street, and they were not being allowed to do so.  As the student
crowds started to move down one of the side streets, the police
would only allow them to come about two thirds of the way down
the side street.  At that point, the police would leave their
position, and rush quickly up the side street, swinging clubs as
they went, and force the students back to the end of the block.
Then the police would retreat back to the main street that they
were holding.  For the most part, the students were kept a block
away from the police, and were never allowed to get close enough
to work up courage, or even push forward into an accidental
confrontation.
     I have taken the time to include all of this information
because I feel that it demonstrates a very important point.  It
was not just the passage of a public law that allowed uniformity
of control for police in such a situation,  it was planned
tactics, and practice.  Having seen some riot control tactics and
training since that time, I am more impressed now than I was then
with the capabilities of the Brazilians.  We often have a
tendency to assume that government forces in other countries are
not particularly well trained, or that they do not produce good
planning in the face of violent insurgent attacks.  My personal
observation is limited to a single example,  but it was a
convincing one.  The problem in Brazil was clearly not a result
of poorly trained police, or a lack of preparation.
     It would be unfair to imply that every action taken by the
government matched the excellence of this police action.  Many of
the actions of the government directly conflicted with the ideas
and standards that our own government would be expected to
uphold.  A most compelling instance is censorship.
     In marked contrast to the kind of information that was
available to the public about Vietnam, one of the deliberate
actions of the Brazilian government was to censor the reporting
of both insurgent and counterinsurgent activities.  As with the
other actions taken by government that seem in conflict with our
country's principles,  I offer no justification or value
judgement.  The censorship is very interesting because of the two
different views I have been given as to why it was done.  The
government has made no attempt that I could find to justify the
censorship, nor may it feel that such justification is necessary.
Obviously, a censored press does not spend much time protesting
that censorship if it wishes to remain in existence.
     As a researcher of historical information, I have been
frustrated in determining that information about the insurgency
that was of most initial interest to me by this censorship.  I
would like to know the details of the actions that took place in
the jungle, and know that the majority of my readers would find
that information interesting.  My research has shown me that the
consequence of the actions in the interior are small, and that
the lack of information is not critical to the study of the
situation; however, the lack of information has made me think
about, and question the worth to the government of not having the
information made public.
     The first answer I received was from LtCol Licinio Dias, who
stated that the government kept people from talking about the
fighting in an attempt to heal the internal rift that the
insurgency caused.  The use of this type of diplomatic forgetting
fits much better with the nature of the Brazilian people than it
does with what one could expect in the United States.  Perhaps,
it is a better reason for continued censorship than it is for
imposing the ban in the first place.
     Taking that into account, then Capt. Joao Tenorio's reason
is perhaps the initial rational.  He states that the censorship
was done to isolate the action.  Without the information flow,
there was no way for those involved in the urban movement to
provide significant support to the rural fight.  The government
removes by censorship the propaganda value of the fight.  Rather
than dying as a symbol of the fight to overthrow the government
and establish a socialist state, the people in the jungle just
die.
     It clearly gave the government the advantage of hiding any
problems that they were experiencing.  In contrast to this
situation in Brazil, think of the situation in the United States
when the Tet Offensive took place in Vietnam.  Many writers feel
that the way in which that offensive was reported in the United
States was most critical to the war effort. The reporting of the
problem was more important than the problem.  In the reporting, a
military failure was turned into a propaganda success.7
     It also seems clear that the inability of the communist
forces in Brazil to start any kind of a major coordinated action,
in support of the dying insurgents, was partly a result of
limited information about the situation.  Particularly when their
forces had no common leadership and no formal communications
capabilities, the communists suffered with the loss of
information.  When one thinks of the difficulty in providing
effective censorship of a large battle in the interior of the
country, it must be remembered that this is in Brazil, not in the
center of the United States.  No phone connections would be
available, and few TV news crews would have been on site even if
allowed.  These actions took place in remote areas where little
or no contact would be expected as a part of the normal course of
events.
     While this might seem like a simple thing, it foils one of
the main desires of the insurgents.
          Publicity for the guerrillas is the objective of the
     first stage.  the whole world is watching.  Urban Guerrillas
     can make them watch.  Cities are centers of communication.
     They have radio stations, television studios, newspapers,
     reporters, and an audience.  Who cares about a guerrilla
     movement in some remote highlands?  Who even knows?  few pay
     attention to what the government does about it.  But a
     single guerrilla attack in a major city captures headlines
     immediately.8
These comments of Brian Jenkins should be compared with those of
Donald  Hodges, who said, "In functioning as a detonator or
catalyst, the foco must frequently act at a distance; failing to
organize the masses directly, it must instruct by example and
rely heavily on the news media to make its actions known."9
While the press in this country would certainly find it totally
unacceptable, censorship certainly solves the problem pointed out
by Lt Col Jake Hensman RM of the terrorist getting the best
press.10
     Even in the cities, censorship prevented the guerrillas from
getting their point of view to the people.  As cited in chapter
4, there was an explanation about the bombing of the Sears store,
but it never really got to the people.  Think about the situation
in the United States, it would have been a matter of discussion
for days, and various people would have been interviewed for
their feelings on the validity of the action.  In Brazil it just
did not get reported.
     This does lead to a unique type of guerrilla action.
Several times during the fighting, small groups take over radio
stations to transmit a message that they wish to reach the
people.  Somehow the thing that would seem more likely in this
country is a "secret interview" with one of the guerrillas, with
reporters ready to go to jail to protect their sources.
     Of all of the tactics used in Brazil, the one that is
most often condemned by both internal guerrillas and interested
external groups is torture.  Methods of torture are not the
subject of this paper.  Anyone wishing to find out what had been
done can easily research the situation and get all of the details
wanted.12  For purposes of this paper, it is important to note
that it worked.  While the most crude form of intelligence
gathering, it did provide the government with the information
needed to strike decisive blows against the guerrillas.
     As an example consider the situation with Marighella.  There
is disagreement between the revolutionists and the government as
to who really gave the government the information that led to
him, but it seems clear that torture was involved in getting the
information.13  This is a tactic that the guerrillas can do
little about, when the level of conflict is as low as it was in
Brazil, there is nothing that the government knows that the
guerrillas can find out through torture of officials, and so
again there is a situation where the government can apply force
at a level the guerrilla finds difficult to match.
         The efforts of the government to destroy the guerrilla
     movement (which peaked in 1970) really began to bear fruit
     when it was able to strike at the "brains" of the terrorist
     groups.  The decline of guerrilla effectiveness began on 4
November 1969 when Marighella, the ALN chief, was killed in
     a shootout with police in Sao Paulo.  Ten months later
     (October 1970), Marighella's successor, Joaquim Camara
     Ferreira, died of a "heart attack" after his capture in Sa
     Paulo.14
If Estep is correct, then the turning point for the government is
a direct result of torture.
     Not all of the actions taken by the government to overcome
the guerrillas are things that our government would not be able
to do.  One of the most impressive areas is in the training of
the army for operations in a city.  The manual on Urban
Operations written in 1969 is as good a manual as I have seen.
It contains general principles and specific guidance.   It
describes urban operations as "a large political operation whose
objectives are:  1) population control.  2)  Isolation of the
population from the guerrillas.  3)  Elimination of the irregular
forces through offensive action.15   It provides for "centralized
command and decentralized execution"16 of an operation, and
establishes who will be in control.
     It also contains specific information about how to divide
the city up into sectors, how to establish patrol routes, how to
man checkpoints, and special instructions on employment of
weapons.  It sets the city up into colored zones based on the
probability of guerrilla action, and "determines the dosage of
the methods" employed.17
     There is little information about specific tactics used in
the jungle.  There is a companion manual on jungle operations
that goes with the one on urban actions, but I was not able to
obtain a copy.  What information I do have has come from LtCol
Dias.  In particular he described two methods of working in the
jungle.  The first is a mass force method, and the second is a
long term intelligence gathering operation.18
     The first tactic has as its basis the necessity for the
guerrillas to get food.  Moving into an area, the army takes
possession of all of the villages.  In a densely populated area,
this would not be possible, but in the Amazon basin this could
easily be done for a huge area by taking only two or three towns.
Each village would be occupied by a force larger than the total
number of guerrillas suspected in the area.  The units provide
security for the towns, though the towns were never really a
target.  More importantly they provide civic action programs to
support the people in the villages.  Not only do the soldiers
gain intelligence, but at some point the guerrillas will find it
necessary to attack to get supplies.  Having superior numbers,
and supporting artillery and air support, the army has little
difficulty in overcoming the insurgents.
     The other type of operation is the long term assignment of a
small team to an area to gather intelligence.  Often these
operations are what we would call undercover operations.  Knowing
that these are long term assignments, the government has learned
to wait until the team has positive information prior to moving
troops into the area.  The most important one of these was the
assignment of two people to find Lamarca.  It took three months,
but it concluded with a simple ambush and a single shot.
     Early jungle operations were not as successful as those
described above.  Operations were often attempted without good
intelligence, and resulted in many casualties for the army.
Early operations assumed that things would not be very difficult,
and turned out to be serious problems. Again, the government was
able to raise the level of violence above that available to the
insurgents.  At the time that the government started "Operation
Banderante" in June of 1969, the word went out to the troops to
take no prisoners.19
     One of the other things that the Brazilians did to support
their jungle operations was to move some of the military.
Since military service in Brazil is mandatory for all youth,
there are ways to excape service, nevertheless, most part all
serve.   That service is in many cases different than that
experienced in the United States.  In Brazil, many youth in the
larger towns do not leave their home town to perform all of their
training.  In many ways service resembles an extended reserve
drill, or spending two years in a National Guard unit at one
time.  This means that there are local troops in many areas, but
there were no local troops in the jungle areas where the problems
were occurring.  The establishment of jungle battalions that were
assigned on a permanent basis into some of the less populated
areas caused the involvement of the troops with the local
population to become fixed.   Not only were the sources of
information available at all times, but insurgent operation could
not grow to a significant size before being noticed as had
occurred in the past.
     As Jenkins notes, "Technology has played a very minor role
in campaigns against urban guerrillas.  It appears even less
important than it is in contests with rural insurgents."20  It
would seem that this is an area where Brazil is not too
different.  While there are some things done to get intelligence
that are not in keeping with normal democratic ideals, the battle
is really won over intelligence.  It is easy to say that the
government over-reacted, and that its harsh reactions caused some
of the problems, but it is also hard to argue with success.
                       NOTES FOR CHAPTER 5
     1  Kohl and Litt, p. 141
     2  More information on the contents of the various
Institutional acts can be found in Bradford's History pp. 508,
514-515, and 519-520.
     3  Brian M. Jenkins, Soldiers Versus Gunman, (P-5182) March
1972, p. 5
     4  Ibid
     5  Brian M. Jenkins, An Urban Strategy for Guerrillas and
Governments, (P-4670/1) August 1972, p. 6
     6  The use of the police is authorised by the constitution.
Specific articles are:  Article 8, XVII,v,e, and article 13,
section 4.  Further information can be found in Concepcao Geral
da Seguranca Interna, page 3.
     7  Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam, (New York: Oxford
University Press), p. 76
     8  Jenkins, Strategy, p. 4
     9  Hodges, p. 190
     10  This comment was made by Lt. Col. Jake Henseman, the
Royal Marine Representative to the Education Center, in a class
given at the Command and Staff College on the situation in
Northern Ireland on 30 January 1985.
     11  Kohl and Litt, p. 66
     12  Those desiring a starting point could see Flynn, p. 435
or Kohl and Litt, p. 51.  There are also articles in both New
Republic (July 25) and Commenwealth (August 2) for 1969.  Another
point of view is in The Revolution That Never Was where the
author,  Joseph Page,  talks about personal experiences and
contacts.
     13  Kohl and Litt have references to Marighella's death both
from the point of view of the government and from the point of
view of the terrorists.  For the second view see the questions in
the article by Truskier.
     14  Estep, p. 52
     15  Operacoes Urbanas de Defesa Interna,  IP 31-17,
Ministerio do Execito, 1969, pp. 1-2             
     16  Ibid, p. 4
     17  Ibid, p. 3
     18  From a conversation with Lt. Col. Dias on 1 February
1985 at Quantico.
     19  From a conversation with Capt. Tenorio, at the Inter-
American Defense Board on 2 November 1984.
     20  Jenkins, Soldiers, p. 5
                        CHAPTER SIX
                   Could It Happen Again?
     This chapter will consider the situation currently existing
in Brazil and will weigh the forces that might act to precipitate
a new insurrection. Obviously, another insurrection could happen
at any time.  The real question is can an insurrection start and
will it have sufficient backing to cause the government of Brazil
of collapse, or radically change?
     The order of this analysis will be the same as that used to
look at the earlier problems.  This chapter will cover the party
situation, the external support for an insurgency, the social and
economic conditions, the current Catholic Church position, and
the political situation as it currently exists.  The final point
to be covered will be the military situation.  The question of
success would seem to ultimately rest on the ability to overcome
the military forces.
     The current situation of the communist party is one of fewer
splinter groups, and a more common focus.  There are really only
four groups left, the PCB, the PCdoB, MR-8, and the Organization
of Trotskites.  However, the only group with the requisite
numbers to have any effect is the PCB.  MR-8 and the PCdoB
continue to be the revolutionary party groups, but there is no
real agreement between them and the PCB.  It must be noted that
"the final objective of the Brazilian Communist Movement
continues to be taking power and overthrowing the current
government with the intent of first implementing a "popular
dictatorship,' and then achieving communism."1
     The current actions of the communist movement are mostly at
the infiltration level.  The union movement in Brazil has always
had a strong communist element, and attempts are being made to
increase their influence.  Actions within the church and within
student groups continue to involve communist infiltration.  At
present, there seems to be a primary push towards mass support
actions, along with psychological operations.  But it must also
be remembered that they "would return to armed conflict, if the
conditions for it turned favorable."2
     There is little change in the revolutionary support that
Brazil received from outside.  As noted previously, there is
little evidence of anything other than training.  Certainly Cuba
and Nicaragua would recognize an insurrection and provide
ideological and perhaps even political support, but it seems
unlikely at this point in time that either country would be able
to provide active support.  The revolution has failed in all of
the countries that border on Brazil, so at least for the present
there is no significant danger of some group attacking over a
border.
     At present, the rhetoric is even quiet.  Castro is now
quoted as saying:
         It is impossible to export a revolution because
     revolutions are the results of a set of economic, social,
     historic, cultural factors that no one can export.  Nor can
     they be avoided.  We can't export revolutions in Latin
     America nor can the United States prevent social changes if
     the problems continue to pile up in Latin America.3
     Political interviews given to foreign newspapers are always
suspect, but this would not seem to be the strongly bombastic
revolutionary doctrine that Castro has been famous for in the
past.  Admitting the United States ability to invade Grenada, he
specifically mentions Brazil as a country that the United States
could not really consider invading.4  It is possible to infer
from this that there would be no way that Cuba could invade
Brazil either.  However, it does seem clear that Castro has not
given up hope of there being a revolt in Brazil.
     One of the purposes of the Papal visit to Latin America in
January and February of 1985 was to strongly teach against the
doctrine of Liberation Theology.  It is unclear at this time how
much control the Pope continues to have over the views of the
church in Latin America, but the strong position that he has
taken on the matter will surely reduce the number of priests that
openly teach the doctrine.  Perhaps even more importantly for a
country like Brazil, those that do continue to teach these
doctrines will be classed as radicals.  This will insure that the
teaching of the liberation ideas will at least be offset by other
church authorities speaking out against the ideas.
     Speaking in Ayacucho Peru on 3 February 1985, Pope John Paul
II stated that "violence is not a means of construction" and
declared that "Christianity recognizes the nobel and just fight
for justice at all levels but invites its promotion through
comprehension, dialogue, [and] generous and effective work. . .
[while] excluding solutions by roads of hatred and death."  He
also continued his attacks on pro-Marxist portions of Liberation
Theology saying, "A commitment to liberation that is not inspired
in the aim of truth, justice and love without exclusions, that is
not accompanied by action in favor of reconciliation and peace,
is not Christian."5
     The political change in Brazil is much like the change in
the teaching of the Catholic Church.  The difference will not
matter to the hard-core communist, but the change in position
will certainly make it more difficult to persuade people on the
fringes to join the active revolt.  On 16 January 1985, Tancredo
de Alimeda Neves was elected as Brazil's first civilian president
in 21 years.  While the election was not a direct election by the
people of the country, it had huge significance for democratic
action in Brazil.  Neves was not the candidate chosen by the
outgoing military rulers.  Clearly he was acceptable to them, or
they would not have stepped aside, but he was not their speific
choice.
     He quickly set a theme for his presidency, by stating, "I
come in the name of conciliation.  I came to promote change --
political change, economic change, social change . . . real,
effective, courageous,  irreversible change."6  He has also
pledged that this will be the last indirect election in Brazil.7
     The mood of the people is perhaps best expressed by a huge
green and gold banner stretched outside Brasilia's Congress
building that said: Bon Dia Deiocracia -- Good Morning
Democracy.8  Many recognize that Neves will have a very hard time
fulfilling all expectations, but there is an aroused hope for the
first time in years.  A political moderate, Neves served as prime
minister under President Joao Goulart, but was not removed from
politics during the military years, and served as governor of
Minas Gerais.  As an indication of his desire to continue a good
relationship with the military, he has indicated he will not
investigate corruption and human rights complaints about the
military rulers.9
     While the economic and social problems have not been solved
in the last ten years, there have been major gains.  For an
example of the changing economic conditions, consider the total
exports for the last few years:
Click here to view image
Not only has there been steady growth for the last three years,
the comparison with 1972 shows almost four hundred percent growth
over the seven years.10
     Inflation continues to be a serious problem for Brazil.
Though the period from 1968 to 1974 has often been referred to as
Brazil's economic miracle, the sudden increases in oil prices
caused its end.  Inflation for 1981 was down fifteen percent over
the year before to only ninety five percent.  Discounting
inflation on the dollar over the same period, Brazil has had a
change in exchange rate from 1967 at $Cr2.27 to the dollar to the
present rate of $Cr3,800.00 to the dollar.  This works out to be
a 167,400 percent change in 18 years.  Twice in this century
Brazil has needed to delete the trailing three zeroes from their
currency to keep bookkeeping reasonable.  They may well be close
to doing it again, less than 20 years from the last time it was
done.
     Education has undergone a major reform and restructuring.
The results are not yet anywhere close to those desired, but the
percentage of youth attending secondary schools has increased to
twenty percent of the population.  The literacy levels have
also climbed to over seventy five percent, partly as a result of
the efforts to keep children in school longer, and partly due to
adult education efforts.11
     Brazil's foreign debt, much as a result of the increased
energy costs of the last few years, has the potential of stopping
all of the economic progress.  Whether it does is more dependent
on the condition of the rest of the world financial state than it
is on Brazil.  The twelve billion owed in interest each year is
almost more than the country can handle, let alone pay any on the
one hundred billion owed.12  Current new articles on the
international banking situation seem to agree, however, that
there is no way that the international community could hold
things together if Brazil, or any other major debtor, were forced
into default.
     Brazil will continue to have economic problems.  Half of the
population that lives in poverty will continue to suffer as the
inflation rate of two hundred and twenty percent continues to
climb.13  The situation in the Northeast is so bad that Neves has
stated that "the first, the most important and the most absolute
of all the priorities" of his government would be to try to solve
that region's problems.14
     If these economic problems were to lead to another
insurrection, what about the forces that would be available to
stop it?  The military forces of Brazil are not going to be easy
to overcome.  In 1982, the armed forces totaled about 273,000 --
army, 183,000; navy, 47,000; and air force, 43,000.  In addition,
there are about 185,000 federal police.   These forces are
undergoing modernization, and the local weapons industry is
producing fine weapons and other equipment.  Obviously, the
capability to overcome anything other than a major revolt
continues to exist.15
     In early 1959, General Golbery do Couto e Silva, the
"father" of the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG),  the highest
military school in Brazil, stated:
         What is certain is that the greater probability today
     is limited warfare,  localized conflict,  and above all
     indirect Communist aggression, which capitalizes on local
     discontents, the frustrations of misery and hunger, and just
     nationalist anxieties. . . Latin America now faces threats
     more real than at any other time, threats which could result
     in insurrection, outbursts attempting (though not openly) to
     implant . . . a government favorable to the Communist
     ideology, and constituting a grave a urgent danger to
     unity and security of the Americas and the Western world.
     At this school, high-level civilians and military leaders
studied such things as inflation, agrarian reform, banking
reform, and education as well as traditional subjects such as
conventional and guerrilla warfare.  The impact of this on the
next lower level of schooling was most impressive.  The need to
have a strategy to combat internal problems led to the addition
of 222 hours on internal security,  129 hours on irregular
warfare, and a reduction of the topic of territorial defense to
21 hours.17  These figures are for the 1968 curriculum at the
Escola do Coiando e Estado Naio do Exercito, the Army Command and
General Staff School.  While I do not have exact figures for the
current amount of time spent on these studies, the amount of time
is relatively close.
     Current studies include work on urban and  jungle operations
and a careful study of the motivation and methods of the
communist party.  These are not just lectures, but include
practical exercises in laying out an urban operation in a major
Brazilian city, and the writing of operation plans for both urban
and jungle operations.  Included with the practical exercises are
extensive study of the operations and battles that both succeeded
and failed in combating previous insurrections.
     Forces have also been moved to insure that the entire
country is well covered.   There are currently three jungle
battalions assigned to the interior on a permanent basis with the
single primary mission of counterguerrilla operations.   In
keeping with previous practice, there are large military units in
close proximity to the major cities.  In some cases, there have
been major roads built to allow easy access to the cities from
military bases.  The country has trained and deployed its forces
to insure that it is ready to fight the next insurgency.
     It is my opinion that the Brazilian government is in
position to resist any communist insurrection in the near future.
Obviously there are problems that may cause serious unrest in
their country, but the ability of the communist party to cause a
strong enough revolt to overcome the military strength of the
country seems slim.  The movement of the government away from its
current democratic position toward a strong leftist government
would only cause the military to take over the government again.
As long as the military stays strongly anti-communist, the future
success of an insurgency seems very doubtful.
                       NOTES FOR CHAPTER 6
     1  Atualizacao do MCB, (Rio:ECEME),p. 31
[Translation by author]
     2  Ibid
     3  Leonard Downie Jr. and Karen DeYoung, "Castro After Hours
(And Hours): Exhaustion and Economics," Washington Post,  3
February 1985, Sec. A, p.1
     4  Ibid, Sec. A, pp. 1 & 24
     5  Jackson Diehl,  "Pope Exhorts Both Sides in Peru --
Injustices Invite Revolution, He Warns in Visit to Rebel Area,"
Washington Post, 4 February 1985, Sec. A, pp. 1 & 15
     6  Jackson Diehl,  "Civilian Is Elected in Brazil,"
Washington Post, 16 January 1985, Sec. A, p. 1
     7  Anastasia  Toufexis,  "Victory  for  the 'Great
Conciliator," Time, 28 January 1985, p. 52
     8  Angus Deming et al., "The Generals Step Aside," Newsweek,
28 January 1985, p. 36
     9  Toufexis, p. 52
     10  Richard F. Nyrop, Brazil a country study, (Washington,
D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office), p. 354
     11  Ibid, pp. 149-151
     12  Deming et al., p. 36
     13  Ibid
     14  Toufexis, p. 52
     15  Nyrop, p. xvii
     16  Einaudi and Stepan, p. 83
     17  Ibid, p. 84
                         CHAPTER SEEEN
              Were the Brazilian Students Right?
     This topic was added to the list of possible subjects for
the "War Since 1945" Seminar because of a question raised by
Brazilian students; "Why not include Brazil in your study of
insurgencies?"  This final chapter will try to address the
question of whether there is value for others in studying this
particular insurgency, and make some comparisons with other more
commonly studied actions.  Obviously,  this area is mostly
opinion, and in this case, mostly the opinion of the author.  The
question of value, however, cannot be left unanswered if this
paper is to serve as anything more than a summary of historical
events.
     First, it would seem that the question of the importance of
the insurgency itself needs to be raised.  Is this an important
insurgency?  The answer seems clearly no.  Any insurgency is
important for the insurgents, and there is no question that this
was the attempted start of an important insurgency, but from all
the information that is available there seems to be nothing that
would indicate that there was any chance of long term success by
the insurgents.  If one looks at the planned pattern for the
insurgency, they quickly realize that the hoped for support of
the masses did not exist.  In the same way that Prestes' Column
never was able to get the people to rally to their cause, this
insurgency never enjoyed any widespread support.
     Raymond Estep takes a very strong position on the impact of
the insurgency:
         Regardless of the measurement one uses to estimate
     their significance (whether it is numbers involved, scope of
     operations,  or threat to the established government),
     Brazilian guerrilla groups have exercised a minimal
     influence on national politics and have not been in the same
     league with their counterparts in Guatemala,  Uruguay,
     Argentina, Colombia, or Venezuela.  Although various
     guerrilla bands from time to time have captured
     international headlines with bank robberies and kidnappings
     of diplomats, they have never won the support of significant
     numbers of followers and have never constituted more than
     minor irritations to tee military governments that have
     ruled Brazil since 1964.1
     Though this position may be too strong, it does point out
the relative lack of effectiveness of the insurgency in Brazil.
A good case can be made that the government reactions to the
insurgent movement had national influence, but it is difficult to
determine if the insurgents or those in power should get credit
for the extremely harsh measures employed by the government.
     If the insurgency is not important as an insurgency, are
there counterinsurgency answers that make this study valuable, or
is the value an internal one, and should the study be left to the
Brazilian officers, rather than this school?  If there are no
answers, are there perhaps questions?  Questions may be as
important as answers to students.  Or is this insurgency unique
in some way that prevents us from seeing something of universal
value from it?
     Perhaps a place to start is with what the Brazilians I have
talked to feel that their armed forces learned about insurgency
from this set of actions.  The sample is small, and so there may
be major disagreement with these points by others. There would
seem to be one major idea: intelligence is of utmost importance;
and a corollary: to gain intelligence, the forces need to be part
of the community.
     There is a great deal of stress in the Brazilian manuals on
the need for intelligence.2  It is also clear from the historical
record that many of the major successes of the counterinsurgency
were driven by intelligence.  The methods used to gather that
information were not always those that our forces might use, but
one can clearly see the value of the information.  Koll and Litt
discuss the importance of the information gained by the
government in pointing out that all of the most spectacular
kidnappings were really failures.3  The loss of the prisoners who
were set free was in no way equivalent to the information that
was gained from the capture of some of the people involved in the
kidnappings.
     While there is no question of the value of infiltration of
the organization in defeating the urban guerrilla, the corollary
mentioned above becomes most important when the action moves from
the city to the country.  In a rural environment, the guerrilla
maintains control through a combination of presence, fear of
repressive action, and mistrust of the central government forces.
The Brazilians learned that in order to overcome the insurgents
they needed to be a part of the local structure.
     This led to a situation that is very familiar to those who
have studied actions in Vietnam.  Brazilian forces were broken
down into small units and sent into the communities to live as a
part of the villages. They provided protection against attack,
and also performed community action services.  Only after
sufficient integration with the local populace had been
accomplished did they gain the information necessary to defeat
the insurgents.  While there were large forces involved in some
of the operations, they were only employed successfully after
intelligence gathering operations by small units.
     This easily seen similarity with the actions in Vietnam
gives one reason for the study of the urban insurgency and raises
an interesting question for United States forces.  There are
still many questions as to how the United States should have
acted in Vietnam.  The Brazilian lesson seems to indicate that
the proper course was the small unit course.  The protection of
individual villages, and the integration of the troops into the
local structure would seem to be supported by the Brazilian
success.  However, there is a very important and unanswerable
question that arises from this study. Can a force from another
nation, hindered by language barrier, philosophical differences,
and differing racial appearance,  ever integrate itself
sufficiently at the small community level to accomplish its
desires?
     One of the most difficult questions for the United States is
the question of what actions can be justified to obtain
information.  The Brazilian experience with torture points out
the difficulty of keeping extreme measures for extreme
situations, but also points out the effectiveness of the process
for the gathering of information.  Perhaps the important thing to
learn from this is:  under pressure to do a job they feel is
important, people are willing to relax standards that they would
normally uphold,  and once a country makes the relaxing of
standards an official  policy,  it will have difficulty
controlling how far some people slip.
     The clear difficulty in fighting a group that does not
choose to abide by the norms of the community, and the extreme
pressure of fighting an internal enemy are clearly pointed out by
this insurgency.  The Brazilian reaction to the problem, both
legally, and militarily, is not necessarily the reaction that the
United States would hope to have in a similar situation; however,
it is of value to study the pressures involved and plan how to
insure different reactions.
     Brazil is different.  That is critical to the study of this
insurgency.  The reasons for the insurgency, the way the
insurgency developed, the tactics chosen by the insurgents, and
the methods used to stop it are all different.  That is the most
important lesson of this study.  There will never be another Viet
Nam for the United States because those conditions will never
exist again.  The next time will be different.  Some basic
principles will be the same.  Each student must learn to see
through the differences to learn basic concepts, and to look at
different ways that these concepts can be applied.
     If it teaches nothing else, the Brazilian experience should
teach the importance of training.  Having figured out a way to
defeat the uprising was not sufficient for the Brazilian forces.
They continue to train officers on the control and conduct of
urban operations in the non-conventional mode.  Is the Marine
Corps ready to fight in New York, or San Francisco?  Perhaps here
is the lesson we should learn?
     There is no single reason, nor even a set of military
reasons that tell why Brazil defeated the insurgent movement.
Factors not only inside Brazil, but in the world economy,
effected the progress of the insurgency and led to its defeat.
But it was defeated, indicating that there is hope for all of
those other countries that are, or will be, the subject of an
insurgent movement.  For those who would look, there are also
guides to the military steps that need to be part of the total
plan to defeat an insurgency.  Even in Brazil there will never be
another one quite like this one, but there will clearly be
others.  As an example of the complex nature of insurgency, and
of the convoluted actions needed for solving one, this study has
its place along with the study of many similar problems.
Perhaps, if we pay attention, it may make the next one easier to
solve.
                      NOTES FOR CHAPTER 7
     1  Estep, p. 50
     2  The following are given as examples of the concern for
gathering intelligence:  (all are from "Urban Operations of
Internal Defense")
         a.   A section on the use of movie and still cameras.
p. 22
         b.   "The search for informers" given as one of the
four principal reasons for "Political Operations." p. 24
         c.   "Equally meticulous must be the information about
agents, supporters, and propagators of revolutionary movements."
p.30
     3  Kohl and Litt, p. 50
                          BIBLIOGRAPHY
Atualizacao do MCB. Rio: ECEME, 1983
     This document is a part of the internal enemy subcourse at
     the Brazilian Army Command and Staff College.  It discusses
     the history and current status of the communist movement in
     Brazil.
Burns, E. Bradford, A History of Brazil.  Second Edition, New
     York: Columbia University Press, 1980
     A general history of Brazil.  It covers well the political
     situation  during  the  time  covered  in  this  paper.
     Recommended for general information on Brazilian History.
     579 pages with suggestions for additional reading and an
     index.
Campos, Antonio Perdo de Souza, Atlas Historico e Geografico
     Brasileiro.  Rio: Campanha Nacional de Material de Ensino,
     1966
     A school text book on geography and history published
     through the Ministerio da Educacao e Cultura (Ministry of
     Education and Culture) for secondary school use.  63 pages.
Chaliand,  Gerard ed.    Guerrilla Strategies:  An Historical
     Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan. Berkeley:
     University of California Press, 1982
     Contains Abraham Guillen's article on "Urban Guerrilla
     Strategy.
Concepcao Geral da Seguranca Interna.  Rio: ECEME, 1983
     This is a lesson plan outline and text for the "General
     Concept of Internal Security" as taught at ECEME.
Costa, Jose Luiz Savio, Movimentos Revolucionarios.  Rio: ECEME,
     1983
     This book on revolutionary movements is used in the internal
     security subcourse at ECEME.
da Cunha, Euclides, Rebellion in the Backlands. trans, Samuel
     Putman, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1944
Deming, Angus et al. "The Generals Step Aside." Newsweek, 28 Jan
     85, pp. 36-37
Dias, Licinio C. Lieutentant Colonel, Brazilian Marine Corps.
     As a fellow student at the Command and Staff College, LtCol
     Dias has spoken to me several times about the situations
     reported in this paper.  His information has been most
     valuable.
Diehl, Jackson, "Civilian is Elected in Brazil."  Washington
     Post, 16 Jan 85, p. Al
_______. "Pope Exhorts Both Sides in Peru -- Injustices Invite
     Revolution, He Warns in Visit to Rebel Area."  Washington
     Post, 4 Feb 85, p. Al
Downie, Leonard Jr. and Karen DeYoung, "Castro After Hours (And
     Hours):  Exhaustion and Economics."  Washington Post, 3 Feb
     85, p. Al
Einaudi, Luigi R. and Alfred C. Stepan III, Latin American
     Institutional Development:  Changing Military Perspectives
     in Peru and Brazil.  Santa Monica:  Rand (R-586-DOS), 1971
     A good report on the military activity and issues that led
     up to the takeover in 1964.
Ellis, John, A Short History of Guerrilla Warfare.  New York: St
     Martin's Press, 1976
     This history does not have any information on the modern
     problems in Brazil, but it did contain good information on
     the slave revolts.
Estep, Raymond, Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America 1963 - 1975.
     Air University Documentary Reasearch Study (AU-202-75-IPD)
     Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1975
     This study contain a short article (4 pages) on Brazil and a
     list of readings.
Fagen, Richard R. and Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr.  ed. Political
     Power in Latin America: Seven Confrontations.  Englewood
     Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970
     This volume contains two articles about the situation in
     Brazil that are very good:  "The Incompetence of the Left"
     by wilson Martins and "The Communist Revolutionary War in
     Brazil" by Colonel Ferdinando De Carvalho.
Fitzsimmons, James M.   A Case Study of Militarism in Brazil
     Professional Study No. 5905, Maxwell AFB: Air War College,
     1976
     A shorter paper than the Rand Study by Einaudi and Stepan on
     the same topic.  It does give a good of the problems with
     Goulart as seen from the military point of view.
Flynn, Peter, Brazil: a Political Analysis.  London:  Ernest Benn
     Limited, 1978
     This work contains an extensive amount of information on
     Carlos Marighella, as well as a good discussion of the
     political situation in Brazil during its entire history.
Hensman, J. R. LtCol Royal Marine Corps
     As the Royal Marine Advisor to the Education Center, LtCol
     Hensman gives classes on Counterterrorism Actions in
     Northern Ireland.  The quoted information whas from his
     class.  He also has served as the Chairman for the MCDEC
     Academic Committee for Combatting Terrorism.
Hodges, Donald C.  The Latin American Revolution.  New York:
     William Morrow and Company, Inc.  1974
     This book has a large amount of information about the
     communist movement and strategy in Latin America.  Its
     dedication to "President Salvador Allende and the other
     martyrs of the Chilean Revolution" is a good indication of
     the position of the author.
Inimigo Interno. Rio: ECEME, 1980
     This is an outline for the subcourse on the "Internal Enemy"
     at the Brazilian Army Command and Staff College.
Jenkins, Brian M.  Soldiers Versus Gunmen: The Challenge of Urban
     Guerrilla Warefare.  (P-5182)  March 1974
     This short report discusses the way that governments have
     reacted to urban movements, and tries to draw some
     conclusions about why urban movements have not been
     successful.
_______.  An Urban Strategy for Guerrillas and Governments.  (P-
     4670/1) August 1972
     This report gives a five-stage aproach for an urban
     uprising.  It attempts to give the tactics needed to succeed
     from the viewpoint of the guerrillas, and in so doing show
     the government forces where the insurgents can be stopped.
Kelleman, Peter, Brasil Para Principiantes.  Rio:   Editora
     Civilizacao Brasilileira S. A. 1962
     This book on "Brazil for Beginners" is a fun, witty book
     about the differences that exist in Brazil.  As pointed out
     by the author, it is not really for beginners because it is
     not translated, but those that can read it will find it well
     worth the time.   (It has little to do with politics and
     nothing to do with terrorism, but I highly recommend it.)
Kohl, James and John Litt,  Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin
     America.  Cambridge:  MIT Press, 1974
     While clearly written from the point of view of the
     guerrillas, it is the best single book I found.  It includes
     three  long articles by Marighella:   "Questions of
     Organization," "Problems and Principles of Strategy," and
     "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrila."  In addition it contains
     "The Politics of Violence: The Urban Guerrilla in Brazil" by
     Truskier, an interview with three guerrillas, and "Leninism
     or Militarism?" by Quartim, himself a guerrilla.
Laqueur, Walter, Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study.
     Boston: Little, Brown, 1976
     This book has information on the Prestes column and on urban
     guerrilla doctrine.
Lewy, Guenter, America in Vietnam.  New York:  Oxford University
     Press, 1978
     One of the standard histories of the war in Vietnam.  540
     pages with glossary, index, and notes.
Marighella, Carlos, Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla.
     Both of the copies of this work held at the Breckinridge
     Library have no indication of dates or place of publication.
     The pages are also oddly numbered, starting with 20.  Other
     sources indicate that the Joint Publications reasearch
     service in Washington published it in 1970, also in that
     same year a version was published by the New World
     Liberation Front U. S. A.  The text is included in Kohl and
     Litt as noted above.
Nyrop, Richard F. ed. Brazil, a Country Study.  Washington:
     American University, 1983
     This is the latest issue of the area handbook series on
     Brazil prepared by the Foreign Area Studies Division of the
     university.  410 pages with an extensive bibliography (357 -
     389) and index.
Operacoes Urbanas de Defesa Interna, Estabelecimento General
     Gustavo Cordeiro de Farias for the Ministerio do Exercito,
     IP 31-17, 1969
     This is the manual on Urban Operations for the Brazilian
     Army.  The copy I used is the 5th printing of 1976.
Operational Overview, Quantico: MCDEC, Apr-Jun 84
     This issue of the MCDEC newsletter published by the
     Education Center was devoted to terrorism and insurgency.
Page, Joseph A. The Revolution That Never Was -- Northeast Brazil
     1955-1964, New York: Grossman Publishers, 1972
     While it does not discuss the major insurgent actions, it
     does give an interesting view of the impact of being on the
     edge of the revolt, and what happened when the author got
     arrested.
Paret, Peter and John W. Shy, Guerrillas in the 1960's.  New
     York: Frederick A. Prager (for The Center of International
     Studies, Princeton University) 1962
     This short work (82 pages) does not really fit its title.
     It was published in 1962 and really covers actions leading
     up to the period.
Tenorio, Joao Mauricio, Captain Brazilian Navy.
     My conversation with Captain Tenorio in November of 1984 set
     the tone for the rest of the reasearch for this paper and
     also gave a general outline for the presentation.  As the
     Brazilian representative to the Inter-American Defense
     Board, and also as a student of the communist movement in
     Brazil, he provided several hours of information on the
     general situation, history, and future projections.  Without
     his information and insight, the paper would not have taken
     its present form.
Thibault, George, ed. The Art and Practice of Military Strategy,
     Washington: National Defense University, 1984
     This contains the excellent article "The Analysis of
     Insurgency" by Bard E. O'Neil.
Toufexis, Anastasia, "Victory for the "Great Conciliator.'" Time
     28 Jan 85, p. 52
Vega, Luis Mercier, The Techniques of the Counter State.  trans.
     Daniel Weissbort, London:  Pall Mall Press, 1969
     This volume contains general information on communist
     movements.  246 pages with index and notes.
Wolf, Charles Jr.  Insurgency and Counterinsurgency:  New Myths
     and Old Realities.  (P-3132-1)  July 1965
     This report presents a method of looking at an insurgency as
     a system with certain fixed inputs and outputs, in an
     attempt to find a counterinsurgency solution.
Weil, Thomas E. et al. Area Handbook for Brazil. Washington D. C.
     American University (Foreign Area Studies Division)
     A good general reference on Brazil, it has been superseeded
     by BRAZIL, A Country Study.  It was checked only for its
     closer proximity to the events under study in this paper.
     No additional information was found about the insurgent
     activities.   482 pages with bibliography (405-453) and
     index.



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