The Largest Security-Cleared Career Network for Defense and Intelligence Jobs - JOIN NOW

Military

The MPS Reception--An Analysis
CSC 1985
SUBJECT AREA Logistics
            The MPS Reception--An Analysis
                          by
                 Major James N. Strock
                   U.S. Marine Corps
        Marine Corps Command and Staff College
                Quantico, Virginia 22134
                     1 April, 1985
               THE MPS RECEPTION--AN ANALYSIS
                          ABSTRACT
     The purpose of this study is to conduct a time and space
analysis of the MPS arrival and assembly process as it rel-
lates to container throughput, general space requirements,
and host nation support considerations.
     Basic assumptions are developed in order to create a
MPS offload scenario.  These assumptions include the employ-
ment of MPS-1, the use of a benign port/airfield complex
secured by host nation or combat force action, little or no
host nation support available during the equipment offload,
simultaneous port and beach offload operations, and a 50 mile
maximum distance between the port/beach area and the arrival
air field.
      Detailed analyses are provided for port operations,
beach operations, and combat service support area operations.
Port operations focus on the pierside discharge of contain-
erized cargo and linehaul transportation capacities.  Beach
operations center on in-stream container discharge, ship-to-
shore lighterage capacities, and beach offload capabilities.
Combat service support area operations discuss time and space
requirements relative to warehousing, ammunition storage,
bulk fuel and water facilities, health services operations,
and maintenance/administration/C3 operations.
     This study does not address arrival airfield operations.
Additional research into aircraft arrival rates, offload
rates, ramp space requirements, and associated support
activities is recommended.
     Two critical paths emerge during the analysis.  The
first is linehaul transportation capacities relative to
various distances between the port/beach complex and the
CSSA.  The second relates to over-the-beach throughput rates
for container offload operations.  The potential impact of
these paths is compared with the current MPS arrival and
assembly timeline.
     Based on the study's findings, recommendations are made
regarding modifications to organic MPS material handling
equipment and linehaul transportation assets in an effort to
minimize potential offload chokepoints.
               THE MPS RECEPTION--AN ANALYSIS
                      TABLE OF CONTENTS
                                                     Page
Introduction                                            1
Chapter 1, MPS Arrival and Assembly Concept
     of Operations                                      5
Chapter 2, Port Operations                              9
Chapter 3, Beach Operations                            23
Chapter 4, Combat Service Support Area
     Operations                                        39
Chapter 5, Conclusions                                 48
Notes                                                  54
Bibliography                                           57
Distribution                                           59
                       LIST OF TABLES
Table
                                                     Page
 2-1    Equipment Availability (MPS-1)                18
 2-2    MPS-1 Container Distribution                  19
 2-3    Container Hauler Transit Time                 20
 2-4    Trips Per Day Per Carrier                     20
 2-5    Containers Moved Per 20 Hour Day              21
 2-6    Days Required to Move Containers
         From Pier to CSSA                            22
 3-1    MPS-1 Lighterage                              37
 3-2    Lighterage Loading Times                      37
 3-3    Lighterage Mix                                37
 3-4    RTCH Offload Times                            37
 3-5    Lighterage Cycle Times                        38
 4-1    CSSA Space Requirements                       47
                        LIST OF FIGURES
Figure                                               Page
 1-1    Sample Security Area                            8
 2-1    Sample Port Area                               17
 3-1    Sample Beach Area                              36
 4-1    Sample Combat Service Support Area             46
 5-1    MPS Timeline                                   53
                       INTRODUCTION
     The ships, supplies, and equipment comprising the
Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) program are approaching
reality.  Designated Marine Amphibious Brigades will soon
possess the operational capability to link up with
prepositioned supplies and equipment at predetermined arrival
and assembly areas.  Operational Handbook (OH) 4-11 (Maritime
Prepositioned Deployment) provides a detailed outline of the
various arrival and assembly requirements, to include port
operations, beach operations, arrival airfield operations,
throughput control, and preparation for deployment.  More
recent publications by Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, units
address the detailed planning requirements relative to the
arrival and assembly of the Maritime Prepositioning Ships
Task Force (MPSTF) with prepositioned supplies and equip-
ment.1
     While the detailed policies and procedures for the
employment of MPS equipment are under development, a
requirement exists to examine certain aspects of the arrival
and assembly process.  Accordingly, this study examines the
arrival and assembly process and conducts time and space
analyses relative to port operations, beach operations, and
combat service support area operations.  Port operation
requirements center on total equipment square and cubic feet
dimensions, material handling equipment (MHE), personnel
support requirements, and throughput timeframes.  Beach
operations address the same areas as port operations plus the
capabilities, equipment, and throughput timeframes of the
Naval Support Element (NSE) relative to in-stream offloads.
The throughput of containerized supplies and equipment is the
primary focus of this study's analysis of port and beach
operations.  Combat Service Support Area (CSSA) operations
deal with the establishment of a CSSA to support the arrival
and assembly process as well as initial MPSTF combat
operations.  Specific CSS functions include water, POL, and
ammunition storage/issue as well as container marshalling and
health service operations.
     This study does not address arrival airfield operations.
Additional research is recommended in the areas of aircraft
arrival rates, offload rates, ramp space requirements for
aircraft and associated support activities, and personnel
support requirements.  Such research should focus on
throughput capacities of both personnel and materiel.  The
arrival airfield is addressed in those instances where it is
necessary to establish relationships between the arrival
airfield and port/beach/CSSA operations.
     Once appropriate analyses and conclusions are conducted
and drawn, the total port, beach, and CSSA arrival and
assembly time and space requirements are compared with
current Marine Corps projected offload timeframes to support
the employment of the MPS MAB.  The results of this
comparison can be used by MPS planners to anticipate suitable
locations that will realistically support the MPS MAB
concept, to determine the level of Host Nation Support (HNS)
required, and to validate current planning timeframes
associated with the arrival and assembly process.
                        ASSUMPTIONS
     While the general scope of MPS operations is well known
in Marine Corps circles ("benign" port and suitable
port/beach/airfield arrangements), certain specific
assumptions must be made so that the methodology and results
of this study are in proper perspective.  The underlying
premise in this study is that the MPSTF will conduct the
arrival and assembly process with little or no outside
assistance in the form of host nation support.  Although it
is recognized that some degree of HNS will be available in
almost any scenario, this study will address organic CSS
assets available to accomplish the arrival and assembly in a
self-contained environment.  In so doing, the study results
may be of value in determining HNS requirements above and
beyond organic MPSTF CSS capabilities, or determine HNS
needed if and when only partial organic combat service
support assets are available.
     The first assumption is that the ship and equipment mix
scheduled for MPS-1 is used in the conduct of this study.
The MPS-1 ship mix consists of four ships carrying
approximately 2170 containers.2
     The second assumption is that the arrival and assembly
area, to include the port(s), beach(es), and arrival
airfield(s), is already secured either by host nation action
or by the prior insertion of combat forces, e.g., a MAU or
MAB.3
     The third assumption is that a full MPS equipment
offload will be conducted to support a given scenario.  It is
understood that partial offloads may be conducted to support
the accomplishment of limited objectives; however, for the
purposes of this study, a complete offload is assumed in
order to examine the full scope of the arrival and assembly
process.
     The fourth assumption is that simultaneous port and
beach operations will be conducted.  This assumption requires
the NSE to concurrently conduct port and beach off-
loads.4
     The fifth assumption is that the distance between the
port/beach area and the arrival airfield is no greater than
50 miles.  The establishment of a maximum distance between
these areas will assist the MPS planner in identifying
suitable port/airfield combinations and in computing transit
times for equipment transported from the offload areas to
assembly areas and CSSA's.  Additional assumptions designed
to establish a scenario for offload and CSS operations are
addressed in subsequent chapters.
                          CHAPTER 1
      MPS ARRIVAL AND ASSEMBLY CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
     The special measures necessary to coordinate the flow of
airlifted personnel and equipment with prepositioned
equipment provide the foundation for organizational and
technical differences between CSS designed for maritime
propositioning operations and traditional amphibious
operations.5
     Maritime prepositioning operations call for five
principal phases: planning, marshalling, movement, reception,
and employment.6  This study focuses on the reception phase
which includes the arrival and assembly process.  This phase
involves the initial preparation of the marriage site and the
coordinated arrival and offload of equipment and supplies
from the MPS and the fly-in echelon.  The final element of
the reception phase involves the integration of personnel,
equipment, and supplies into employable Marine Air Ground
Task Force elements.
     Combat service support for the arrival and assembly
process is provided by a Landing Force Support Party (LFSP)
drawn from the MPS MAB's Brigade Service Support Group
(BSSG).7  The LFSP is task organized to support reception and
to provide initial CSS to the MPSTF until the ship offload
and equipment issue phases are complete.
     The LFSP is organized into specific functional areas and
organizations: Logistics Operations Center (LOC), Offload
Preparation Party (OPP), Port/Beach Operations Groups
(POG/BOG), Arrival Airfield Control Group (AACG), Marriage
Traffic Control Group (MTCG), and the Combat Service Support
Area.8
     The area required for equipment arrival, offload,
issue, and preparation for employment is called the security
area and is comprised of the port/beach, arrival airfield,
CSSA, and unit assembly areas.  The security area may be
located in a geographical setting ranging from a heavily
populated urban environment with well developed commercial
port/airfield facilities to an austere remote facility in the
third world.  A sample security area is shown in Figure
1-1.9
     During the reception phase, the MPSTF's activities are
divided into the initial preparation, advance party arrival,
and offload/marriage.  Initial preparation consists of the
introduction of the Reconnaissance and Liaison Party (RLP)
into the security area to survey the port/beach/arrival
airfield capabilities and limitations, identify critical
CSS/facility-related shortfalls, and to negotiate appropriate
host nation support (HNS) agreements, when available.
Concurrently, the OPP moves to the ships and initiates
equipment preparation for offload.  Such preparation includes
depreservation, battery installation, fueling, and other
checks and services designed to ensure that debarked
equipment is combat ready.
     Shortly after the RLP and OPP commence assigned tasks,
the advance party arrives in the security area.  The advance
party's mission is to establish the CSS functional areas
discussed above and to prepare for the arrival of the MPSTF
main body at the port, beach, and arrival airfield.  Once the
advance party is in place and LFSP agencies are established
and functional, the offload and marriage phase begins.
     The successful completion of the offload and marriage
phase is the "bottom lined of the MPS concept.  A task force
of 16,500 men and equipment embarked in a 250 sortie fly-in-
echelon is linked up with prepositioned equipment and
supplies to provide a fully combat capable Marine Amphibious
Brigade.
Click here to view image
                         CHAPTER 2
                       PORT OPERATIONS
     Port operations center on the pierside offload
of the MPS equipment and supplies.  In this study, the
assumed port consists of two pierside berths capable of the
simultaneous offload of two ships with adequate staging
areas ashore.  A sample port area diagram is shown in figure
2-1.10  Ships service cranes and MPSTF organic MHE and
transportation equipment are required to conduct the offload.
     The pierside offload begins with critical, high priority
cargo necessary to permit the POG to establish itself ashore
and begin to move discharged cargo away from the pier area to
the nearby surge area, unit assembly areas, or to the CSSA.
Material handling and transportation equipment includes the
rough terrain container handler (RTCH), the 30 ton rough
terrain crane, the M-127 semi-trailer with prime mover, the
MK-14 logistics vehicle system container hauler, and the
towable container chassis.
     Various quantities of each of the above MHE/trans-
portation equipment items are scheduled for embarkation on
MPS.  Since this study's MPS offload consists of simultaneous
port and beach operations, only a portion of the net
available MHE/transportation equipment is available to
support port operations.
     The equipment discussed above can not be one hundred
percent dedicated to supporting ships' offloads since a
portion of the equipment is required to support combat
service support operations at the arrival airfield, the CSSA,
and unit assembly areas.  Moreover, normal equipment
maintenance downtime further reduces MHE/transportation
equipment availability during offload operations.
     The priority of equipment prepared by the OPP is ships
cargo handling systems, lighterage (boats, landing craft,
causeways, etc.), and MHE.11  Also, motor transport,
engineer, and tracked vehicle assets must be prepared in
order to ensure timely and orderly equipment offload in the
port area.
     The MPS equipment/supplies offload is divided into
the initial and general periods.  The initial offload period
includes equipment and unit sets that are critical to the
LFSP as well as Class I, III, and V supplies to support local
security and initial combat operations.  The general offload
period covers the offload of non-critical cargo and bulk
supplies.12
     Using ships service cranes, it is estimated that each
ship will require 54 working hours to discharge all of its
cargo (approximately 540 containers).  This estimate is based
on a sustained container discharge rate of 10 per hour for 20
hours per day.13  Since it is assumed that a simultaneous
offload is conducted (both pierside and in the stream), this
study further assumes that one half of the MPS containers are
offloaded at each location.
     Prior to any equipment offload, the ships and Naval
Support Element will require approximately 12 hours to
prepare for pierside operations and 24 hours for in-stream
operations.14
       With two pierside berths to conduct the offload, one
half of the containers on MPS-1 (1085) can be discharged from
the ships in 2.7 days.  The 1085 figure is based on the
assumption that the other half of the containers are
offloaded in the stream.  Provided that LFSP equipment is
readily available at the beginning of the offload, subsequent
offload operations should not be interrupted due to the lack
of LFSP assets.
     As noted in Figure 2-1, the port area includes a con-
tainer surge area.  This area is designed to absorb the over-
flow of supplies and equipment that are offloaded but not
transported out of the port area due to the lack of suitable
transportation.  This transportation deficiency can be caused
by either a paucity of MHE and transportation assets due to
overcommitment or equipment deadlines, or it can be caused by
extended distances or reduced container transportation speeds
between the port, unit assembly areas, and the CSSA.
     Prior to conducting any analyses of container trans-
portation capabilities, the types and quantities of container
handling and transportation equipment must be reviewed.  The
current mix of container handling and transportation equip-
ment for MPS-1 is shown in Table 2-1.15 As noted earlier, not
all of the listed assets will be available to support
pierside operations.  Certain equipment limitations must be
taken into account.
     The first limitation is equipment non-availability due
to maintenance deadlines.  Although the MK-14 container
hauler and M-127 semitrailer have virtually 100 percent
availability, their prime movers do not.  Accepting a 90
percent availability of prime movers, 54 of 60 MK-14's and 34
of 38 M-127's are available at any one time.  This limitation
also extends to the towed container chassis.
     The other equipment limitation is non-pierside
commitments.  Container transportation assets are also
required at the beach as well as the combat service support
area.  Accordingly, the net availability of pierside
container transportation assets is also shown in Table 2-1.
     After equipment availability has been determined, the
next area that must be explored is the final destinations of
all of the containers.  There are four primary container
destinations from either the port or the beach: the CSSA, the
arrival airfield, unit assembly areas, and the port/beach
area itself.  Table 2-2 provides an overview of MPS-1 con-
tainer distribution.16
     Since over 90 percent of all MPS-1 containers are slated
for delivery to the CSSA, the port/beach-CSSA line of
communication appears to be a critical path for container
throughput.  Out of the 1085 containers unloaded pierside,
approximately 980 containers are scheduled for delivery to
the CSSA.
     A transportation analysis of container movement from the
port to the CSSA requires the computation of several
factors: round trip transit time between the port and the
CSSA, the number of trips per day per container hauler, the
number of containers moved per day at a given average hauler
speed, and the number of days required to offload a given
number of containers.  All of these factors are affected by
the number of container haulers available, the average speeds
of the container haulers under various conditions, and round
trip distances between the port and the CSSA.
     The estimated round trip transit time of a container
hauler is computed by adding a 20 minute load/offload time to
the time required to transit a given round trip distance at a
given speed.  Table 2-3 shows estimated transit times for a
container hauler traveling between 20 and 50 kilometers per
hour (kmh) over round trip distances between 10 and 80
kilometers (km).  The 80 kilometer maximum distance is used
because it represents a 40 km (25 mile) one-way distance
between the port and the CSSA.  This maximum distance is used
based on the likelihood that the CSSA will be centrally
located between the port and the arrival airfield.  Since one
of the basic assumptions in this study is that the port and
airfield will be no more that 50 miles apart, the 25 mile
port-CSSA distance is considered a realistic maximum planning
distance.
     The number of trips per day per carrier is computed by
dividing the particular round trip time into a 20 hour
operating day.  The 20 hour day is used since approximately
four hours per day are required for carrier maintenance, crew
rest, etc..  Table 2-4 contains the estimated number of round
trips per day per carrier between the port and the CSSA.
These estimates are also based on average speeds between 20
and 50 kmh over round trip distances ranging from 10 to 80
km.  Additionally, these estimates are the same for all types
of carriers since the primary limiting factor of a carrier's
speed is related to terrain, trafficability, and/or traffic
congestion.  Accordingly, all types of carriers are rated the
same in this study.
     Table 2-5 shows the total number of containers that can
be moved per day based on 20 kmh and 40 kmh average speeds,
various distances, and different mixes of available container
haulers.  The various mixes of container haulers are taken
into account to show the linehaul capacities of the MHE items
currently programed for MPS-1.  The MK-14 LVS will not be
immediately available for MPS-1; however, the MK-14 is taken
into full consideration during this study so that its impact
on linehaul capacities can be determined.
     Once the total number of containers moved per day is
computed for various speeds and distances, then the number of
days required to offload all of the CSSA-bound containers can
be determined.  Table 2-7 shows the number of days required
to move containers at 20 kmh and 40 kmh average speeds.
These calculations do not include the 12 hour preparation
time required prior to the beginning of offload operations.
The numbers of containers moved per day at the various speeds
and distances are divided into the 980 containers that are
offloaded pierside and moved to the CSSA.  At the sustained
container discharge rate of 2000 containers per ship per day,
the pierside offloaded ships can discharge their CSSA-bound
containers in 2.45 days plus the 12 hour ship preparation
time.
     Using the calculations shown in Tables 2-5 and 2-6, the
planner can estimate offload throughput rates and determine
at what point the MPS organic MHE and linehaul transportation
capabilities will fall behind the ships' sustained discharge
rates.  Also, the planner can make estimates relative to
external support required to maintain container throughput
comparable to the sustained discharge rates.  In other words,
if the CSSA is a sizeable distance from the port or if the
average container hauler speed is low due to marginal
trafficability and/or traffic congestion, then additional MHE
and/or container hauler support may be required.
     An additional issue that can be addressed using the
calculations in Table 2-6 is the LFSP's organic ability to
meet the ship offload criteria of three days pierside once
the ships are alongside and have completed preparations for
offload.  These criteria were based on the sustained
container discharge rate discussed earlier.  Reviewing the
calculations shown in Table 2-6, it appears that all of the
LVS's, trailers, and container chassis are required to
complete the CSSA-bound container movement if the average
hauler speed is 20 kmh.  Such an average speed is not an
unreasonable assumption for equipment operating over
unimproved roads in a remote area.  Conversely, if the
average speed is 40 kmh, the three day offload requirement
can be met with relative ease using fewer MHE assets.
     The final item that can be considered is whether or not
a container surge area is required.  As shown in Figure 2-1,
the surge area is designed to absorb the overflow of
containers and rolling stock that cannot be moved away from
the pier area due to the lack of linehaul assets.  Table 2-5
provides an indication as to whether or not a surge area will
have to be established for containers and how many containers
will have to be stored there at any one time.  Judging from
the figures shown, it appears that if the average speed is 20
kmh, all af the available LVS's, trailers, and container
chassis will be hard pressed to keep up with the sustained
discharge of 400 containers per day unless the CSSA is less
that a 40 km round trip from the pier area.  In this case, if
the CSSA is greater than 40 km from the pier, MPSTF planners
may have to coordinate host nation support to compensate for
the shortfall in linehaul capacity and/or establish a
container purge area.
Click here to view image
                          CHAPTER 3
                      BEACH OPERATIONS
     Beach operations center on the in-stream offload of the
Maritime Prepositioning Ships.  The advantages that beach
operations afford over port operations are derived primarily
from the ability to disperse offload activities into small
working areas, thus reducing the overall vulnerability of
logistical support operations at the shoreline.  Conversely,
however, beach operations pose significant disadvantages as
well.  Such operations are hazardous when any of a number of
weather and/or terrain conditions become unfavorable.  Severe
weather and heavy seas may force the complete suspension of
operations.  Even under ideal climatic conditions, a beach
operation cannot attain the efficiency level of fixed port
operations due to additional materiel handling requirements
associated with across-the-beach operations.
     In this study, the notional beach consists of two ship
anchorages with adequate separation to permit the simul-
taneous offload of both ships, and three beach landing
points--two designed for causeway unloading and the other
designed for LCM offload--in order to permit the simultaneous
ship-to-shore movement via two modes of transportation.  The
distance between the anchorages and the beach is one nautical
mile (2000 yards).  A sample beach area diagram is shown in
Figure 3-1.17
     Ships service cranes, organic lighterage, and MPSTF MHE
are used to conduct the offload.  Direct lighterage to line-
haul transportation is the preferred throughput method;
however, trafficability and distance from the high water mark
to inland lines of communication may require surge storage
and staging areas larger than those needed at the port area.
     As discussed in Chapter Two, one half of this study's
MPS ships are offloaded in the stream.  The factors discussed
below are considered to be the critical elements affecting
the throughput capacity of an in-stream offload.
     The first factor is the ships' over-the-side discharge
rate of containers and equipment.  Current MPS offload cri-
teria call for the ability to offload in the stream in five
days in a sea condition up to sea state three.18  Whereas
port operations enjoy a relatively stable environment that
facilitates optimum over-the-side discharge rates, in-stream
operations do not due to weather and lighterage performance
considerations.
     The second factor is the ship-to-shore transit time of
the various pieces of lighterage (primarily powered cause-
ways, unpowered causeways and landing craft)   The most
likely offload scenario consists of containers and other
cargo offloaded on to lighterage for subsequent movement to
the beach while rolling stock is offloaded by either lift
on/lift off (LO/LO) or roll on/roll off (RO/RO) operations.
     The third factor is the time required to remove a
container or equipment item from the lighterage, move it
across the beach to a loading area, and load it on to a
carrier as required for subsequent movement to an inland
destination.
     The final factor is the transit time between the beach
and inland destinations, principally the CSSA.  This factor
remains the same as discussed in Chapter Two.  Accordingly,
the calculations shown in Tables 2-3 through 2-6 should be
included while computing in-stream offload and transit times.
     Currently, the MPS-1 flotilla is slated to be equipped
with eight LCM-8 landing craft, 40 21x90 foot causeway
sections (16 powered and 24 unpowered), and four side-loading
warping tugs (SLWT).19  The most likely configuration of the
40 causeway sections is eight powered sections coupled to one
unpowered section each, and eight powered sections coupled to
two unpowered sections each.  The powered sections are
abbreviated as CSP (causeway section, powered).  Using that
abbreviation, the lighterage mixes for MPS-1 are shown in
Table 3-1.  The CSP + 1 amounts to a 21x180 foot powered
barge arrangement, and the CSP + 2 barge measures 21x270
feet.20
     As discussed above, this study's in-stream offload
operation assumes that containers as well as rolling stock
are offloaded simultaneously.  Accordingly, the total
lighterage mixes discussed above must be allocated to both
container and rolling stock offload operations.
     Although rolling stock and container over-the-side
discharge rates are similar, total throughput requirements
from the ship to the CSSA are likely to be longer for
containers since they, as opposed to rolling stock, require
different modes of transportation from start to finish; thus
the resulting changes in transportation modes increase
processing times.  Rolling stock, on the other hand, is
primarily self-propelled and/or towable all the way from the
beach to the CSSA.  Accordingly, this Chapter focuses on
container throughput timeframes in the examination of beach
operations.
     As noted at the beginning of this Chapter, the first
factor relative to beach operations is over-the-side
discharge rates for containers.  These rates vary depending
on the type of lighterage mix available alongside to receive
the containers.  Based on previous tests, estimated container
discharge rates per day for various lighterage mixes are
shown in Table 3-2.21
     The times cited in Table 3-2 relate only to discharge
operations alongside the ships.  In order to compute total
lighterage cycle times and associated container movement
rates, beach offload cycle times must also be addressed.
     Two primary MHE items are available for beach offloads--
the Rough Terrain Container Handler (RTCH) and the
Lightweight Amphibious Container Handler (LACH).  The RTCH is
used to transfer containers directly from beached causeway
ferries to container haulers.  Two RTCH's can service one
causeway ferry landing point on a full time basis.  The RTCH
is designed to handle standard commercial and military
containers weighing up to 50,000 pounds.  It is able to side
shift, forward and back tilt, and oscillate the carriage to
provide precise and efficient control of the container.  As a
result, the RTCH is well suited to a beach environment and is
able to ford up to five feet of water and traverse soft,
uneven terrain.  Additionally, it is able to stack containers
two high if required and has an effective turning radius of
50 feet.  Overall, the RTCH has considerable advantage over
other types of MHE in that it does not require any beach
preparation, equipment installation, or special surface
preparation to conduct operations.  However, the RTCH cannot
be used to offload LCU's or LCM-8's.22 The RTCH must approach
its container load in a direction perpendicular to the long
axis of the container.  Since a container is spotted on the
LCU or LCM-8 parallel to the craft's keel, the RTCH is unable
to approach the container and make necessary connections.
     The other over-the-beach container handler available
to MPS-1 is the LACH.  The LACH is a two-wheeled straddle
lifter device that is hydraulically operated and maneuvered
by a separate prime mover, normally a bulldozer.  The LACH
is capable of lifting and extracting 20 foot containers from
beached lighters.  Recent LACH testing has involved the
removal of containers from the LCU.  Maneuverability of the
LACH inside LCU's appeared to be very limited, requiring
containers to be specifically spotted in the landing
craft.23  Although not recently tested, the use of LACH's in
LCM-8's appears to be extremely limited for the reasons cited
above.
     Based on the RTCH's inability to unload containers from
LCM's and LCU's, and the LACH's limited maneuverability
inside landing craft, the MPS LCM-8's appear to be better
suited to support the offload of rolling stock and general
cargo.  Accordingly, the lighterage mix that appears to best
support this study's in-stream offload is shown in Table 3-3.
In addition, RTCH offload times for the causeway ferries dis-
cussed above are shown in Table 3-4.24
     Now that the lighterage mix and estimated ship and beach
offload times are determined, lighterage cycle times can be
computed.  Computations for the CSP + 1 and CSP + 2 ferries
are shown in Table 3-5 and are offered as a method to
determine lighterage cycle times for in-stream operations.
     At first glance, it seems reasonable to assume that by
dividing the lighterage cycle times into 1200 minute (20
hour) days, the total number of containers moved per day per
causeway ferry can be computed.  However, two limitations
must be taken into account when such calculations are made.
     The first limitation is the number of containers that
can be offloaded over the beach in a 20 hour day.  Since this
study's scenario calls for the simultaneous operation of two
beach landing points, the maximum number of containers
offloaded at the beach can be computed as follows:
     CSP + 1 offload time = 46 minutes
     CSP + 2 offload time = 74 minutes
     A 1200 minute day divided by the CSP + 1 offload time of
48 minutes equals 25 CSP + 1's offloaded over one beach in
one day.  A 1200 minute day divided by the CSP + 2 offload
time of 74 minutes equals 16 CSP + 2's offloaded over one
beach in one day.
     Twenty-five CSP + 1 loads times nine containers per load
equals 225 containers offloaded per day.  Sixteen CSP + 2
loads times 16 containers per load equals 256 containers
offloaded per day.  The total number of containers that can
be offloaded over two beaches per day is 481.  This figure
assumes that offload operations are continuous and that two
RTCH's per beach are used.
     Working seaward from the beach, the next limitation that
must be considered is the in-stream over-the-side discharge
capacities of the ships.  The number of containers discharged
over the side can be computed as follows:
     CSP + 1 load time = 68 minutes
     CSP + 2 load time = 82 minutes
     A 1200 minute day divided by the CSP + 1 load time of 68
minutes equals 17 loads per day.  A 1200 minute day divided
by the CSP + 2 load time of 82 minutes equals 14 loads per
day.  Seventeen CSP + 1 loads times nine containers per load
equals 153 containers loaded per day.  Fourteen CSP + 2 loads
times 16 containers per load equals 224 containers loaded per
day.  The total number of containers that can be loaded at
two discharge stations is 377.
     With three discharge stations used, 565 containers per
day can theoretically be discharged.  Again, these discharge
rates are mathematical and are dependent upon zero dead time
alongside the ships.
     Now that the beach offload capacities and ship discharge
capacities have been estimated, an analysis can be conducted
in order to make a comparison between beach offload
capacities, ships discharge capacities, and lighterage cycle
times.  Please note that the beach offload and ship discharge
computations shown above do not take into account lighterage
transit times or the numbers of lighters needed to ensure
simultaneous operations at the beach, the ships, and transit
legs between the two.  Therefore, a final comparison between
beach offload times, ship discharge times, and lighterage
cycle times can provide the MPS planner some indicators
relative to the critical path or paths associated with in-
stream offload operations.
     Causeway ferry throughput capacities can be determined
as follows:
     CSP + 1 cycle time = 156 minutes
     CSP + 2 cycle time = 198 minutes
     A 1200 minute day divided by the CSP + 1 cycle time of
156 minutes equals eight trips per day.  A 1200 minute day
divided by the CSP + 2 cycle time of 198 minutes equals six
trips per day.  Eight CSP + 1 trips times nine containers per
trip equals a 72 container throughput capacity for one CSP +
1.  Six CSP + 2 trips times 16 containers per trip equals a
96 container per day throughput capacity for one CSP + 2.
     Since each discharge station can handle at least two
causeway ferries (one at the ship and one at the beach), a
total of at least six causeway ferries can be used in
conjunction with three discharge stations for an in-stream
offload.  If three CSP + 1's and three CSP + 2's are used in
this study's scenario, the total throughput capacity can be
calculated by multiplying the number of ferries used by the
daily throughput capacity of each type, as follows:
     CSP + 1 daily throughput (three sets) = 216 containers
     CSP + 2 daily throughput (three sets) = 288 containers
                    Total daily throughput = 504 containers
     Up to this point, three sets of throughput computations
have been discussed as shown below:
Beach Offload Rate  Ship Discharge Rate  Causeway Cycle Rate
  (two beaches)       (three stations)      (six ferries)
  481 containers      565 containers        504 containers
     A review of the above rates suggests that the slowest
station in the ship-to-shore movement cycle is the beach.
This observation is further reinforced by the fact that the
RTCH allocation discussed in Chapter Two for beach operations
is a total of three.  The above beach offload rates assume
the use of four RTCH's with the possible requirement for a
fifth RTCH to handle containers in the surge storage area if
one is established.
     Moreover, the 481 containers per day over-the-beach
throughput rate is RTCH dependent since the addition of a
third or fourth landing beach would require additional RTCH's
at the expense of RTCH availability at the CSSA, arrival
airfield, and unit assembly areas.
     Additionally, the 481 containers per day rate is a
purely mathematical calculation that does not take into
account the myriad of environmental factors that tend to
reduce actual throughput, such as lighterage crew
proficiency, lighterage scheduling and traffic control,
queuing times, and weather.
     Based on recent container throughput tests, and given
the environmental factors discussed above, the CURRENT BEST
ESTIMATE of MPS in-stream container throughput is around 350
containers per day25 which represents nearly 73 percent of
the best theoretical throughput of 481 containers per day.  A
27 percent throughput reduction due to environmental factors
is not unreasonable.
     In comparison, the U.S. Army Transportation Terminal
Service Company (Container) is capable of discharging or
backloading 300 containers per day in a logistics over-the-
shore (LOTS) environment.26  This processing rate is based on
a 20 hour day and 75 percent equipment availability.  Major
equipment items include 12 50,000 pound container handlers,
four mobile cranes, eight low mast 2500/4000 pound forklifts,
and 28 34 ton semitrailers with prime movers.27  When
compared with the Transportation Terminal Service Company's
equipment mix and advertised container processing
capabilities, it appears that the current MPS MHE and
container hauler allowances may be overcommitted when
supporting a five day in-stream offload.
     While the above discussion centers on a two ship in-
stream offload, the container throughput capacity for a four
ship in-stream offload does not significantly increase due to
limited RTCH availability.  With the use of a third fully
operational (two RTCH) beach, the best estimate container
offload rate increases to 525 containers per day (350
containers per day times 1.5).  As well, the corresponding
ship discharge rate and lighterage cycle rates increase due
to the increased number of ship discharge stations.
     At this point, however, the MPS offload critical path
seems to shift to inland transportation capacities as
discussed in Chapter Two.  Even with the increased
availability of container hauler assets at the beach (due to
the absence of a pierside offload), lines of communication
between the beach and inland destinations may saturate
early due to all of the MPS assets moving over one offload
site.  As well, with six RTCH's dedicated to landing beaches
and a seventh used in the surge area, only two remain
available to support the arrival airfield and the CSSA.
     With RTCH availability surfacing as a potential
chokepoint within the in-stream offload cycle, some
alternative MHE uses should be considered.  First, the 30 ton
rough terrain crane can be used to assist in container
loading and marshalling, particularly in surge storage areas.
The use of the 30 ton crane in the surge storage area, CSSA,
and/or arrival airfield may release enough RTCH's to service
additional beaches during a four ship in-stream offload.
     Additionally, the LACH can be used to ferry containers
between the high water mark and the surge area and/or inland
transportation loading area.  Although the LACH is not
performing its primary role while in this mode, it can
provide some degree of assistance.
     In-stream offload throughput capacities have been
examined thus far in an attempt to determine potential
critical paths.  It appears that with the 350 container per
day throughput rate, a two ship in-stream offload (1085
containers) can be accomplished in just over three days, plus
the one day preparation time.  With a four ship offload, over
six days will be required to move 2170 containers ashore,
plus the one day preparation time.  With the addition of a
third fully operational landing beach, the four ship offload
time can be cut to four days plus preparation time.  At this
point, however, inland linehaul transportation and RTCH
capacities begin to become saturated.
     In any event, the total lighterage mix shown in Table 3-
1 appears to be sufficient to support in-stream offload
operations.  With beach offload throughput surfacing as the
slowest link in the in-stream offload operation, the 16
causeway sets appear able to support up to five discharge
stations and as many landing beaches, provided that one third
of the ferries are loading alongside, one third are unloading
at the beach, and one third are in transit.
Click here to view image
                          CHAPTER 4
           COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AREA OPERATIONS
     The Combat Service Support Area is task organized to
provide direct maintenance support, intermediate supply
support, and health services support to the LFSP as well as
the MPSTF.28  The composition of the MPSTF CSSA is temporary
in nature and remains established until all equipment and
supplies have been offloaded, transported to appropriate
destinations, and issued to respective combat, combat
support, and combat service support elements.29
     A sample MPSTF CSSA is shown in Figure 4-1.30   The
actual layout of a given CSSA naturally depends on the
geography of the security area, available lines of
communication to and from the port, beach, and airfield, and
anticipated subsequent operational requirements of the BSSG.
     It should be noted that the MPSTF CSSA is not designed
to provide a significant amount of supply point distribution
of table of equipment ready for issue equipment.  As noted in
Chapter Two, the primary types of supplies and equipment that
are to be transported to the CSSA are ammunition and general
supplies, to include medical equipment/supplies as well as
bulk fuel and water.  Accordingly, all MPS containers that
have not been previously issued to the various functional
areas (Naval Support Element equipment, aviation equipment,
and habitability sets) are delivered to the CSSA.
     The CSSA is divided into two areas for storage.  The
first area is general storage.  This area is designed to
accomodate general supplies and it should allow sufficient
space for approximately 700 containers that are slated to be
processed during the offload period.  Colocated with the
general storage area is the field warehouse site and the
empty container storage area.  The field warehouse site is
designed to hold container contents arranged by classes of
supply for future issue to operational units.  The empty
container storage area is a temporary holding site for
containers slated for return to parent ships.
     The second area is the ammunition storage site.  This
site is situated well away from other CSSA storage areas--
particularly bulk fuel and health services areas.  The
ammunition storage site is organized by ammunition
compatability groups, with separate compatability group
storage points dispersed over a wide area to permit adequate
safety separation.  As in the general storage area, the
ammunition storage site has an empty container storage area.
Additionally, a helicopter landing zone is situated nearby to
facilitate rapid ammunition resupply.
     In addition to the general storage area and the
ammunition storage site is the health services area.  The
health services area consists of a hospital company, a
medical company, a headquarters and service company, a dental
company, and a medical logistics comapny.  Associated with
the health services area is a helicopter landing zone
designed for medical evacuations.
     Rounding out the MPSTF CSSA are the maintenance area,
the command and control center, and the bulk fuel and water
storage sites.  The maintenance area is organized along
normal commodity lines (engineer, motor transport,
electronics maintenance, ordnance, and general support), to
include holding areas for incoming and outgoing equipment.
The command and control center provides internal
communications within the CSSA, traffic control, and
operational oversight of all CSSA functions.  The bulk fuel
and water sites are designed to provide supply point
distribution for refuelers and water tankers tasked with unit
distribution responsibilities.  The bulk fuel site is estab-
lished with up to eight 600,000 gallon Amphibious Assault
Fuel Sytems (AAFS's) and the water site has the Reverse
Osmosis Water Purification Unit (ROWPU) along with 16 50,000
gallon storage containers.31
     The primary focus of this study relative to CSSA
operations is on spatial requirements of the CSSA itself and
time requirements associated with container unstuffing
operations.  Spatial requirements for the CSSA are important
to the MPS planner in that advance party personnel need to
know how much acreage is required to establish the CSSA.
Additionally, planners can negotiate for adequate CSSA space
while keeping in mind container movement capacities between
the port/beach area and the CSSA.
     Chapters Two and Three identify and quantify container
discharge rates and transit times to the CSSA.  Given that
information, particularly the anticipated arrival rate of
containers at the storage sites and estimated times required
to unstuff various containerized classes of supplies,
reasonable estimates of times required to unload a container
and prepare its contents for issue can be made.
     Moreover, the total time required to receive, unstuff,
and warehouse all MPSTF containers designated for the CSSA
can be established.  In so doing, the anticipated container
delivery rates discussed in Chapters Two and Three can be
compared with estimated container processing rates within the
CSSA to identify potential shortfalls in meeting the current
MPSTF operationally ready timeline criteria.
     Table 4-1 contains estimated acreage requirements for
the various CSSA storage areas discussed above.  The
estimates are for the individual functional areas only and do
not take into account additional acreage needed to provide
minimum administrative dispersion and routes of ingress and
egress.
     Given the initial space estimates shown in Table 4-1,
additional acreage must be added to these estimates in order
to provide a realistic picture of how large a fully deployed
MPSTF CSSA may be.  One of this study's basic assumptions is
that the MPSTF will arrive and assemble in an area secured by
either host nation action or by prior insertion of combat
forced.  The MPSTF CSSA is thus temporary in nature and
remains established only until all equipment and supplies
have been offloaded and delivered to appropriate users and/or
destinations.  Accordingly, some form of administrative vice
tactical layout of the CSSA may be considered.
     Given the raw space requirement of nearly 1200 acres, it
is estimated that an ADDITIONAL 600 ACRES will be needed to
provide adequate room for ingress/egress routes, helicopter
landing zones, associated safety zones, and dispersion areas
between ammunition sites, bulk fuel sites, and other CSSA
functional areas.  Adding 600 acres to the 1200 acre initial
requirement reveals that a fully deployed MPSTF CSSA will
require approximately 1800 acres.  Given such a large
requirement, the MPS planner may consider splitting the CSSA
into two or three geographically separated areas for the
ammunition storage area, the general storage/maintenance/
health services areas, and the bulk fuel storage area.  This
arrangement may eliminate the requirement for large amounts
of clear land (a premium in built up areas) and may
facilitate ship-to-shore offload systems, especially bulk
fuel and water.
     Once pierside and in-stream offload operations have
commenced, the CSSA begins to receive containers at rates
discussed in Chapters Two and Three.  The CSSA container
reception rate can be computed by examining pierside and in-
stream throughput rates as they relate to time-distance
factors between the port/beach area and the CSSA.
     In this study, it is assumed that the CSSA is located 40
km round trip from the port/beach area and that container
haulers are capable of a 20 kmh average speed.  This distance
and speed combination is used so that the maximum throughput
rates for container transportation closely match pierside
ship discharge capabilities.  Likewise, the 350 container per
day over-the-beach throughput rate also approximates inland
transportation capacities.
     Given the above conditions, the pierside discharged
container reception rate at the CSSA is 388 containers per
day for 2.5 days.  Concurrently, the in-stream reception rate
is 350 containers per day for 2.8 days.  At these rates, the
CSSA can potentially receive a total of up to 738 containers
per day for nearly three days.
     As noted in Table 2-1, the MPSTF has a total of 39 4000
pound rough terrain forklifts (RT 4000) available to support
all facets of the MPSTF offload.  Current container
unstuffing estimates using the RT 4000 are one container
unstuffed per hour per forklift.32 Container unstuffing
includes container unloading, content depreservation, and
movement to a colocated field warehouse site.
     In order to process a maximum of 738 containers per 20
hour day, up to 37 forklifts are required in the CSSA alone.
Certainly, this maximum requirement decreases if only a
portion of the containers require immediate unstuffing.
     Using the container processing rates discussed above,
the MPS planner can estimate CSSA MHE and container handler
requirements.  In the event that a 100 percent in-stream
offload is conducted, the total daily CSSA container
reception rate drops to 350 containers per day, the maximum
over-the-beach throughput rate.  In that case, container
unstuffing operations do not appear to be hindered due to
overworked forklift assets.
     In any event, however, CSSA container processing
operations require continuous RTCH availability.  Since there
are simultaneous container deliveries to both the general
storage and ammunition storage areas, at least two RTCH's are
required within the CSSA to service inbound container
haulers.  Additionally, at least one RTCH or rough terrain
crane is required to support the empty container storage
area.  The MPS planner may wish to consider additional RTCH's
or rough terrain cranes within the CSSA so that inbound and
outbound container haulers do not queue up.
     While there appears to be sufficient container linehaul
assets to support the MPS offload in any form, the CSSA may
be in strong competition with the port and beach areas over
limited container handling assets.  Once container queuing
starts at any point between the port, beach, and CSSA, the
throughput rates discussed in Chapter Two decrease and cause
corresponding increases in offload time requirements.
Click here to view image
                          CHAPTER 5
                         CONCLUSIONS
     Prior to discussing any conclusions associated with this
study, some qualifications are in order.  The basic
assumptions listed in the introduction provide a foundation
upon which to build a specific MPS employment scenario.
Obviously, many different scenarios are possible in the
employment of the MPSTF.  This study isolates one possible
scenario, develops statistical offload and movement
capabilities, and offers considerations for planning the
MPSTF arrival and assembly.
     This study's efforts gravitate to two issues--
methodologies for developing planning information, and the
planning information itself.  The particular planning
information developed in this study is based on the scenario
set in the introduction.  Clearly, the scenario used in this
study may never happen and, therefore, the planning infor-
mation may not be directly applicable to any actual MPSTF
employment.  However, the methodologies used in the develop-
pment of this study's planning information are probably valid
in any MPSTF-related employment scenario, and they may prove
to be useful tools for MPS planners to determine MPSTF
closure capabilities and timeframes.
     During the course of this study's research, the term
"partial offload" was often encountered.  The general
consensus is that the MPSTF equipment and supplies may not be
entirely offloaded if only a partial or initial combat
capability is needed in a particular situation.  In the event
that a partial offload is conducted, the data contained in
this study again may not be directly applicable to such a
scenario.  Although such information may not be directly
applicable, it can still be used as a baseline to estimate
comparable reductions of offload requirements.  As well, the
methodologies used to determine the baseline data remain
valid in developing time and space requirements for any
degree of partial offload.
     As a matter of caution, however, partial offloads may
require that a significantly greater amount of equipment than
is actually required will need to be offloaded.  Since the
MPSTF is essentially administratively loaded, it is possible
that some critical cargo may be stowed in hard-to-access
locations.  This situation is particularly likely relative to
ammunition which is normally stowed in accordance with U.S.
Coast Guard regulation compatability groups.  As a result, a
certain portion of each type of the MPSTF's ammunition may be
located at or near the bottom of each ship.  Assuming that a
portion of each type of ammunition is required for any size
MPSTF, the offload will have to be extensive enough to
uncover all types of ammunition to include that stowed in
lower cargo holds.  This same situation most likely holds
true for other types of cargo as well.
     During the course of this study, certain MPSTF offload
critical paths emerge.  The first is the ship-to-shore
movement during in-stream offloads.  The time required to
conduct this movement is very sensitive to available
container MHE as well as sea conditions.  The computations
developed in Chapter Three indicate that even with all
available MHE, a four ship in-stream offload may not be able
to meet the five day offload criteria due to the potential
throughput chokepoint at the beach during container unloading
operations.
     The second critical path is the movement of cargo
between the port/beach and the CSSA.  The time requirements
to conduct such movements are dependent on container hauler
availability and speed, and the distance to the CSSA.  It
seems that a paradox surfaces at this juncture.  At a highly
urbanized and well-developed port facility, host nation
support may be readily available to assist in the offload;
however, sufficient acreage to house the CSSA will most
likely be situated a considerable distance away from the
port, and linehaul transit times through urbanized areas will
be restricted and slow.  Conversely, remote ports with
austere offload facilities may have plenty of space for a
nearby CSSA; however, host nation support may be limited, and
the arrival airfield may be situated at the outer limits of
acceptable linehaul distances.
     The final issue is the MPS "timeline."  As illustrated
in Figure 5-1, each significant MPSTF arrival and assembly
event is assigned a position on the timeline.  This timeline
incorporates the pierside and in-stream time constraints of
three and five days, respectively.39
     While this study has addressed the MPSTF's organic
ability to meet the timeline constraints under varying
conditions, it is not the study's purpose to support or
refute the validity of any timeline or the MPSTF's designed
capability to meet such time constraints.
     Rather, this study is designed to illustrate under what
conditions the organically supported MPSTF can meet desired
planning timeframes in an austere environment.  Moreover,
it is designed to provide MPSTF planners a set of indicators
that will assist in determining the range and depth of host
nation support required to augment MPSTF capabilities in the
event that desired time constraints cannot be met using
organic equipment.  Conversely, if no host nation support is
available, MPS planners may be able to develop estimates
regarding additional time required to complete a given degree
of MPSTF offload.
     While certain critical paths have emerged during this
study, the impact of such paths can be reduced.  The current
mix of MPS MHE, container haulers, and lighterage is based on
sound planning and judgement, particularly in view of the
fact that the Navy-Marine Corps team skillfully navigated
through uncharted waters during the development of the MPS
program.  With minor modifications, the MPS MHE mix can
better minimize the impact of potential offload chokepoints.
     Accordingly, the following recommendations are offered
as possible methods to reduce critical path impact during MPS
offload operations.
     First, retain on a permanent basis the M-127 trailers
and the towable container chassis (or similar container
transport equipment) on all MPS T/E's in order to provide the
capacity to move containers throughout the security area
within desired timeframes.  Judging from the throughput
capacities calculated in Chapter Two, all container haulers
presently shown on the MPS T/E, to include the container
chassis, appear necessary to meet linehaul transportation
timeline requirements.
     Second, delete the Lightweight Amphibious Container
Handler from the MPS T/E.  While the LACH is capable of
limited container movement throughout the security area, it
is unable to adequately perform its primary designed mission
while in support of MPS offload operations due to its
cumbersome causeway offload characteristics and the lack of
LCU's in the MPS lighterage mix.
     Third, replace the deleted LACH's with a like number of
RTCH's.  Four additional RTCH's can provide the necessary
flexibility to support multiple beach offload points,
container surge storage areas, and/or dispersed CSSA's.  With
their high degree of mobility and flexibility, additional
RTCH's can significantly enhance MPS offload operations.
Click here to view image
                            Notes
     1Brigade Service Support Group-6 USMC, Maritime
Prepositioning Ships Reception Standing Operating Procedures
(Draft II), (Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, February, 1985).
     2Personal interview with LtCol A.A.  Wood USMC, G-4
PlansO, 6th MAB, Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, December,
1984.
     3Commandant of the Marine Corps Message 300131Z June
1984, "Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) Marine Amphibious
Brigade (MAB) Fly in Echelon (FIE) and Table of Equipment
(T/E) Refinement Conference.
     4Ibid
     5BSSG-6 Reception SOP (Draft II), para 7000.
     6Ibid, para 1000.2.
     7Ibid, para 1002.1.
     8Ibid, para 1002.2.
     9Ibid, figure 1-2.
     10Ibid, figure 4-5.
     11Ibid, para 3003.2.
     12Ibid, para 3010.1.
     13CMC Msg 300131Z June 1984.
     14Ibid
     15MPS Table of Equipment (T/E), 13 November, 1984.
     16Commandant of the Marine Corps Letter 3000/3 LPP-4/5
of 25 January, 1985, "Container Plan in Support of the MPS
Ships Loadout."
     17BSSG-6 Reception SOP (Draft II), figure 4-6.
     18CMC Msg 300131Z June 1984.
     19Telephonic interview with Cdr R.O.  Worthington, USN,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-422C), 27
February, 1985.
     20Personal interviews with LtCol D.E. Mears, USMC and
Capt R.L. Walker, USMC, Joint Logistics Over The Shore II
(JLOTS II) Test Directorate, Naval Amphibious Base, Little
Creek, Virginia, February, 1985.
     21Ibid
     22Ibid
     23Ibid
     24Ibid
     25Ibid
     26U.S. Army, Army Transportation Container Operations.
FM 55-70, (Washington, D.C., May, 1977), pp.  5-1 - 5-4.
     27Ibid
     28BSSG-6 Reception SOP (Draft II), para 7000.
     29Ibid
     30Ibid, figure 7-1.
     31Personal interview with Maj J.R.  Daymude, USMC,
Combat Service Support Instruction Division, Amphibious
Instruction Department, Education Center, Marine Corps
Development and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia,
February, 1985.
     32Telephonic interview with LtCol W.H. Harris, USMC,
Head, Prepositioning Programs Branch, Marine Corps Logistics
Base, Albany, Georgia, 22 March, 1985.
     33P. S. Springston and C. I.  Skaalen, "Container
Marshalling within a Combat Service Support Area," Report by
the Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory (Port Hueneme,
California, November, 1983), p. 36.
     34Personal interview with Maj J.R.  Westbrook, USMC,
Plans Officer, BSSG-6, Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, December
1984.
     35Personal interview with LCdr P.J.  Bauer, USN, Combat
Service Support Instruction Division, Amphibious Instruction
Department, Education Center, Marine Corps Development and
Education Command, Quantico, Virginia, February, 1985.
     36Springston and Skaalen, p. 36.
     37Maj Daymude interviews, February, 1985.
     38Ibid
     39CMC Msg 300113Z June 1984.
                                 Bibliography
Bauer, P.J. LCdr, USN, Medical Operations Instructor, Combat
     Service Support Instruction Division, Amphibious
     Instruction Department, Education Center, Marine Corps
     Development and Education Command.  Personal interviews
     about health services operations.  Quantico, Virginia,
     February, 1985.
Daymude, J.R. Maj, USMC, Engineer Operations Instructor,
     Combat Service Support Instruction Division, Amphibious
     Instruction Department, Education Center, Marine Corps
     Development and Education Command.  Personal interviews
     about bulk fuel and water operations.  Quantico,
     Virginia, February, 1985.
Harris, W.H. LtCol, USMC, Head, Prepositioning Programs
     Branch, Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Georgia.
     Telephonic interview about container processing
     operations.  Albany, Georgia, 22 March, 1985.
Looney Jr., E.P. BGen, USMC, Commanding General, 6th Marine
     Amphibious Brigade.  Personal interviews about MPS
     operations.  Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, 18 December,
     1984.
Marks, D.E. Col, USMC, Head, Joint Matters/Strategic Mobility
     Branch (LPJ), Installations and Logistics Department,
     Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.  Personal interviews
     about MPS operations.  Washington, D.C., December 1984 -
     March 1985.
Mears, D.E. LtCol, USMC, Deputy Director, U.S. Marine Corps,
     Joint Logistics Over the Shore II Test Directorate.
     Personal interviews about MPS ship-to-shore offload
     operations.  Little Creek, Virginia, February - March,
     1985.
Pankey, P.A. LtCol, USMC, Head, Plans Section, Logistics
     Plans and Policies Branch (LPP), Installations and
     Logistics Department, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
     Personal interviews about MPS operations.  Washington,
     D.C., December 1984 - March 1985.
Springston, P.S. and Skaalen, C.I., "Container Marshalling
     Within a Combat Service Support Area," Report by the
     Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory.  Port Hueneme,
     California, November, 1983.
Toth, J.E. Col, USMC, Deputy Commander for Doctrine, Marine
     Corps Development and Education Command.  Personal
     interviews about MPS operations.  Quantico, Virginia,
     September 1984 - March 1985.
U.S. Army.  Headquarters, Department of the Army.  Army
     Transportation Container Operations, FM 55-70.
     Washington, D.C., May, 1977.
U.S. Marine Corps.  Brigade Service Support Group-Six,
     Maritime Prepositioning Ships Reception Standing
     Operating Procedures (Draft II). Camp LeJeune, North
     Carolina, February, 1985.
U.S. Marine Corps.  Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
     Commandant of the Marine Corps Letter 3000/3 LPP-4/5 of
     25 January, 1985, "Container Plan in Support of the MPS
     Ships Loadout."
U.S. Marine Corps.  Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps.
     Commandant of the Marine Corps Message 300131Z June
     1984, "Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) Marine
     Amphibious Brigade (MAB) Fly in Echelon (FIE) and Table
     of Equipment (T/E) Refinement Conference."
U.S. Marine Corps.  Marine Corps Development and Education
     Command.  Operational Handbook (OH) 4-11, Maritime Pre-
     positioned Deployment.  Quantico, Virginia, June, 1984.
U.S. Marine Corps.  Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
     Maritime Prepositioning Ships Table of Equipment.
     Washington, D.C., 13 November, 1984.
U.S. Marine Corps.  Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps.  Motor
     Transport, Engineer, and General Supply Branch (LME),
     Materiel Division, Installations and Logistics
     Department, Memorandum for the Record LME-1/RKR/edb/m
     4120 of 30 November, 1983, "MPS Container Offload."
Walker, R.L. Capt, USMC, Operations Officer, U.S. Marine
     Corps, Joint Logistics Over the Shore II Test
     Directorate.  Personal interviews about MPS ship-to-
     shore offload operations.  Little Creek, Virginia,
     February-March, 1985.
Westbrook, J.R. Maj, USMC, Plans Officer, Brigade Service
     Support Group-6.  Personal interviews about MPS
     operations.  Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, 18-19
     December, 1984.
Wood, A.A. LtCol, USMC, G-4 Plans Officer, 6th Marine
     Amphibious Brigade.  Personal interviews about MPS
     operations.  Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, 18-19
     December, 1984.
Worthington, R.O. Cdr, USN, Office of the Chief of Naval
     Operations (OP-422C).  Telephonic interview about MPS
     lighterage allowances.  Washington, D.C., 27 February,
     1985.
                      Distribution
Organization                                    Copies
CMC
  DC/S, PP&O (SAAPM)                              3
  DC/S, I&L
     LPJ                                          3
     LPP                                          1
     LME                                          1
     LMM                                          1
CG, FMFLANT                                       3
CG, FMFPAC                                        3
CG, MCDEC
  DepCdr, Doctrine                                1
  EdCtr (CSSID)                                   1
  DevCtr (M&L Div)                                1
  AASG                                            1
  C&SC                                          200
CG, MCLB, ALBANY, GA                              3
JLOTS II Test Directorate                         1
CG, 6TH MAB                                       3
CG, 7TH MAB                                       3
BSSG-6                                            1



NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list