Armored Vehicle Identification: The Key To Survival
AUTHOR Major Charles R. Sherrill, USMC
CSC 1985
SUBJECT AREA Warfighting
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: ARMORED VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION: THE KEY TO SURVIVAL
I. Purpose: To determine training measures and evaluation
procedures that will enable individual Marines and anti-armor
crews to correctly differentiate between friendly and hostile
armored vehicles.
II. Problem: Although the Marine Corps possesses modern armor
and anti-armor weapons, Marines are not properly trained in
armored vehicle identification. The Marine Corps' training and
evaluation program for armored vehicle identification is grossly
deficient and virtually non-existent.
III. Data: With the world-wide proliferation of armored
vehicles, identification of friend or foe will be exceedingly
difficult. The lethality or today's tank and anti-armor weapons
make it essential that Marines be formally and frequently
evaluated in the employment of these weapons and their ability
to distinguish between friendly and enemy vehicles. The US Army
has conducted extensive research on the organization and
equipment of both friendly and hostile forces throughout the
world. As a result, the US Army has developed an excellent and
comprehensive program for armored vehicle identification that is
available to the Marine Corps. Guidance and instructional
assistance must be provided to institute this program within the
Marine Divisions and in our MOS producing schools. MCI courses
dealing with tanks and anti-armor weapons must be updated and
expanded to reflect current data found in the Army's program.
TAVSCs must be able to readily support the training needs of
requesting units. In turn, officers must be aware of the
services available from these centers. MCCRES must emphasize
armored vehicle identification by integrating training standards
and evaluation procedures into pertinent sections of Volume II
and V. This would allow commanders to use MCCRES as both a
formal and informal evaluation tool and as a means of selecting
meaningful training objectives for inclusion into unit training
plans.
IV. Conclusion: A requirement exists for a comprehensive
armored vehicle identification training and evaluation program
to improve the individual's and crew's ability to rapidly
distinguish between who is friend or foe, maximize survivability
of friendly forces, and produce long range distructive fire on
the enemy.
V. Recommendations: The US Army's armored vehicle
identification program should be incorporated into the training
plans of Marine units and into the course curriculms of all
Marine Corps MOS producing schools. Volume's II and V of
MCCRES, that address tanks and anti-armor weapons, should be
revised to provide commanders with a valid evaluation program
and a means to select meaning training objectives for inclusion
into unit training plans. MCI programs concerning this subject
must be up-dated and expanded. Officers and staff
noncommissioned officers must be made aware of existing training
aid materials and services available to them through their local
TAVSC.
ARMORED VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION: THE KEY TO SURVIVAL
OUTLINE
Thesis: The Marine Corps must increase the individual's and crew's
ability to rapidly distinguish between friend or foe by
adopting or developing a comprehensive training and evaluation
program for armored vehicle identification.
I. Modern Armor Warfare
A. High velocity guns and missiles
1. Dominate the battlefield
2. Destroy both enemy and friendly
B. Mixed-Breed vehicles
1. Possessed by nations throughout world
2. Possessed by both enemy and friendly
C. Modernization by U.S.M.C.
1. M1A1 Abrams tank
2. TOW II
3. Dragon
4. AT-4
II. Armored Vehicle Identification
A. Little emphasis
1. Low priority item
2. No specific requirement
3. No program
B. Schools
1. Lack of emphasis
2. No instructional guidance
3. Lack of training aids and materials
C. Marine Corps Institute(MCI)
1. Deficient program
2. Outdated materials
3. Incomplete data
D. MCCRES
1. Vehicle identification unaddressed
2. Lack of training goals
3. Lack of evaluation standards
III. Courses Of Action
A. U.S. Army Program
1. U.S. armor warfare expert
2. Program readily available to U.S.M.C.
3. Numerous instructional materials/references
4. ARTEP/Soldier's Manual emphasize vehicle I.D.
5. ARTEP is Army's version of MCCRES
B. U.S.M.C. Program
1. Duplication of Army's program
2. Requires development
3. Continuous updating required
4. Costly
IV. Solution
A. U.S. Army's vehicle identification program
1. Established
2. Inexpensive
B. Schools
1. Incorporate Army's program
2. Provide initial training
3. TAVSC support
C. Marine Corps Institute (MCI)
1. Update vehicle identification course
2. Expand tank and anti-armor courses
D. MCCRES
1. Revise tank and anti-armor courses
2. Incorporate ARTEP
3. Incorporate Soldier's Manual of Tasks-Skills
ARMORED VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION: THE KEY TO SURVIVAL
The Soviet Union, all Soviet surrogate armies, and most
third world countries have continued to build large armored
forces. Additionally, vast technical improvements in armor and
anti-armor weapons have been made over the last twenty years.
As our nation's foremost "force-in-readiness", capable of
immediate deployment throughout the world, Marines must be
prepared to fight a highly mobile and technically skilled enemy.
With the worldwide proliferation of armored vehicles,
identification of friend or foe will be extremely difficult. As
seen from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and noting the current
state-of-the-art of armor and anti-armor weapons, the armored
battlefield of the future will be extremely violent, rapid, and
engagements will be conducted at long ranges. The acquisition
of additional anti-armor assets and advances in the organization
and employment of armor and anti-armor weapons have
significantly improved the Marine Corps' capability to fight
armored forces.2 Although the Marine Corps possesses modern
armor and anti-armor weapons, Marines are not properly trained
in armored vehicle identification. The Marine Corps must
increase the indiviual's and crew's ability to rapidly
distinguish between friend or foe by adopting or developing a
comprehensive training and evaluation program for armored
vehicle identification.
Our high velocity guns and missiles are capable of
destroying the enemy, yet can just as easily destroy friendly
forces because of improper vehicle identification. This was
illustrated during the 1982 Israeli invasion into Lebanon.
Despite the professional abilities of the Israeli armored
forces, two Israeli tank battalions mistakenly engaged each
other in the Baka Valley. A three hour tank battle was fought,
in which, the Israeli's lost six tanks and had a number of
crewmen killed or wounded.3
Today litterly hundreds of different types and models of
tanks and armored personnel carriers comprise armored vehicle
assets of forces throughout the world. These numerous,
"mixed-breed" forces, possessed by both friendly and hostile
countries, make armored vehicle identification even more
difficult and complex. Vehicle sales to developing nations
between 1974-1982 totaled over 12,000 tanks and nearly 20,000
armored personnel carriers. The leading exporters were the
Soviet Union, other Warsaw Pact countries, the United States,
France, the United Kingdom, other NATO countries, and China.4
Over the last several years the sale and build-up of armored
assets have continued to grow.5 Two clear examples of countries
possessing a "mixed-breed" of armored vehicles are Israel and
Yugoslavia. The small state of Israel possesses over 2,000
tanks. These tanks are the American built M-48 and M-60, the
Soviet built T-54, T-55, T-62 and PT-76, the French built
AMX-13, the British built Centurion, and the Israeli built
Makava. Yugoslavia, a Soviet ally, possesses over 1,500 tanks.
These are the Soviet built T-34, T-54 and PT-76, the American
built M-24 and M-47, and the French built AMX-13.6
The Marine Corps' modernization program is placing current
state-of-the-art anti-armor weaponry within the Marine
Division. This is essential to engage and defeat armored
forces, yet it also places the implied requirement on the Marine
Corps of ensuring that individual Marines can correctly
distinguish between friend and foe. A recent Headquarters
Marine Corps decision will soon place the new M1A1 Abrams tank
in the tank battalion.7 Under testing and development for over
ten years, the M1A1 is the most modern tank in the world. Its
120mm fin-stabilized kinetic energy round will destroy any known
tank, to include, the Soviet T-80. The M1A1 can fire accurately
on the move at speeds in excess of 20 miles per hour. This is
due to its stabilized gun system and a technically advanced
track suspension. Its thermal sight permits target acquisition
and engagement at night, through fog, smoke, and dust.8 The
Marine Corps is in the process of up-grading all 144 TOW
launchers within each division with the new TOW II.9 The TOW II
has a six inch warhead and is capable of destroying any known
tank. It is equipped with a thermal sight that allows target
engagement at ranges up to 3,750 meters under day, night, and
inclimate weather conditions. The 10836 infantry T/O places
288 Dragons within the Marine Division.11 Organic to the
infantry battalion, the Dragon can effectively engage and
destroy most armored targets out to 1000 meters. The Dragon is
undergoing an extensive product improvement and testing program
that will increase warhead penetration and permit day and night
tracking.12 A new light anti-tank weapon, the Swedish AT-4, is
being tested as a replacement for the M-72 LAW.13 Theoretically,
every infantryman can carry one or two of these weapons into
combat. The point is that a Marine Division will soon have a
combined total of 430 tanks and medium-to-heavy anti-armor
weapons with ranges varying from 1,000 to 3,750 meters.
Additionally, if each member of a 150 man infantry company
carried a LAW or AT-4, a Marine Division could easily have over
4,000 men carrying this light anti-armor weapon. These
capabilities are encouraging if one could be assured that all
weapons would be fired at hostile forces, but the ability of our
Marines to correctly distinguish between friendly and enemy
armored vehicles is questionable.
There is little emphasis in the Marine Corps concerning
armored vehicle identification training and evaluation. In
fact, no formal Marine Corps program even exists.14 The same is
found to be true within the Marine Divisions. No specific
requirements are levied by the divisions on the regiments or
separate battalions with regard to this subject. Staff officers
note the importance of armored vehicle recognition but state
that other training priorities and operational commitments take
precedence.15,16
Although company and battalion level instruction is given in
vehicle, equipment, and weapons identification, it is not a high
priority item. With the exception of the tank battalions, no
specific guidance exists for the type of training requirements,
techniques of instructions, or materials available to assist in
such instruction. The task of instructing Marines in the proper
recognition of armored vehicles appears to be the function of
the Battalion S-2 and interested company grade officers.17
Officers and Staff NCO's have difficulty in obtaining
adequate quantities of up-to-date training materials. They
generally do not know the wide variety of materials available or
how to acquire them. The most frequently used reference
materials at the battalion and company level are Defense
Intelligence Agency publications and U. S. Army How to Fight
Manuals. The Army manuals are usually acquired by students of
U. S. Army schools, such as, the U. S. Armor School at Fort
Knox, Kentucky or the U. S. Infantry School at Fort Benning,
Georgia. Officers and staff noncommissioned officers generally
acquire their materials through the "Old-Boy" network and not
through official Marine Corps or Army channels.18
The adoption of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
concept of combined arms and the continuing weapons
modernization program reflect the Marine Corps emphasis on
armored warfare. Although tanks and various types of anti-armor
weapons have been in the Marine Corps since prior to World War
II, Marines are relatively new to the armored battlefield. Only
after the Vietnam War did Marines start actively training for
armored operations. Today, Marine Amphibious Brigades (MABs)
frequently deploy to the NATO arena for intensive training with
NATO forces. An armored battlefield scenario is used for much
of this training which exposes Marines to virtually every type
of tank and armored personnel carrier in the NATO inventory.19
Additionally, in 1977 the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center
at Twenty-Nine Palms, California, consisting of 932 square
miles, was opened for mechanized training. At Twenty-Nine
Palms, mechanized task forces, of battalion and brigade size,
receive realistic and extensive "live-fire" training in a
simulated combat environment. Also at Twenty-Nine Palms, the
Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) allows a
"non-fire" training exercise to be conducted where mechanized
units engage each other and receive an accurate score of kills,
etc.20 Both training scenarios are as realistic as one can get
without actually being in combat. However, improper target
identification is noted to be a problem. 21,22
After graduation from recruit training, Marines are sent to
Marine Corps or other service schools to acquire their basic MOS
skills. Tank crewmen (1811) are sent to the U.S. Army Armor
School at Fort Knox, Kentucky where they receive extensive
classes on armored vehicle identification.23 Marines assigned
an infantry MOS (03) attend Infantry Training School at Camp
Lejeune, North Carolina or Camp Pendleton, California. TOW
(0352) and Dragon (0351) crewmen receive three weeks of training
in their primary MOS of which only two hours are devoted to
armored vehicle identification. This training, which was
developed by the schools, is basic and devotes much of the
instruction to armor vulnerabilities. Basic infantrymen (0311)
receive six weeks of training in their various MOS skills. Each
infantryman receives extensive training in firing the LAW and
fires seven practice sub-caliber 35mm rounds and one "live" HEAT
round. However, the basic infantryman receives no training in
target identification.24 The point is that all Marines are not
receiving the necessary training in armored vehicle
identification. Little or no guidance or training materials are
provided to the Marine Corps schools. This same situation
exists in the training of our officers and staff noncommissioned
officers.25 Not only do the officers and staff noncommissioned
officers need to be able to identify armored vehicles, but they
must know where to find readily available references and
materials to conduct meaningful training programs within the
regular Marine Corps ground units.
The Marine Corps Institute (MCI) has a course of instruction
for armor identification. However, the course is out-dated and
uses a 12 year old Army manual (ST 193 FY73) as its basic
reference.26 Although using Army training extension courses
(TECs) as study guides, the course text needs to be expanded to
offer a greater number of armored vehicles. Colored pictures
would also be appropriate and add a greater degree of realism to
an essentially dull and lackluster course of instruction. MCI
also provides courses for the tank and anti-armor weapons
(Dragon, LAW, TOW). The Dragon course devotes 17 pages to
armored vehicle identification, providing students with an
adequate introduction into this subject.27 However, the LAW and
TOW courses provide only a basic knowledge of the weapon system
and places little emphasis on firing procedures or target
identification. 28,29 A need for basic and advanced skill
training in these courses of instruction does exist.
The Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES)
establishes..."within the Marine Corps a standardized evaluation
system designed to provide for the timely and accurate
determination of the combat readiness of Fleet Marine Forces,
including those of the Marine Corps Reserve, to accomplish
assigned missions."30 It is divided into ten volumes of Mission
Performance Standards (MPSs) and Standard Performance Tests
(SPTs) that allow both formal and informal evaluation of
infantry, combat support, combat service support, and air
support units. All Marine Air-Ground Task Forces are required
to successfully complete a formal evaluation prior to being
deployed as a contingency task force. MCCRES is usually
administered to infantry battalions, with combat support
elements attached, once every one-to-two years.31 Volume II,
Infantry Units, and Volume V, Combat Support Units, address
mechanized operations, tank-infantry teams, and employment of
anti-armor assets. Although MCCRES is recognized as an
excellent means of evaluating the combat readiness of infantry
units, particularly straight-legged infantry, it does not
adequately address the training proficiency of tank and
anti-armor crews.32,33
Volume II, Infantry Units, addresses tank-infantry and
mechanized operations as part of the Mission Performance
Standards. This evaluates the interaction between the tank unit
and the infantry organization they are supporting. Besides
being grossly out-dated, in terms of modern armored warfare, the
MPSs do not address employment of the tanks' weapon system. The
Standard Performance Tests are designed to determine whether or
not the tested Marines can accomplish their primary combat
functions. The SPTs provide for the proper evaluation of the
Dragon and LAW weapons employment, but identification of
potential targets is not even mentioned.34 TOW is not addressed
in this manual.
Volume V, Combat Support Units, addresses all combat support
units within a Marine Division, to include, artillery, combat
engineer, assault amphibian, reconnaissance, tank, and TOW
units. Elements of these units are attached to infantry
battalions or regiments for contingency deployments at which
time they are administered the MCCRES. Tanks and TOWs are
required to pass both the Mission Performance Standards and
Standard Performance Tests. Again, the MPSs evaluate the
interaction between elements of the combat support units and the
infantry battalion or regiment to which they are attached but
does not address weapons employment. MCCRES lists 18 SPTs for
the tank crewman with only one task requiring a firing
engagement. Of the eight SPTs required for the TOW crewman,
none require evaluation of firing engagement. Neither the tank
or TOW crewman are required to identify armored vehicles.
The tank and TOW sections of MCCRES are seriously deficient,
not only in terms of armored vehicle recognition but in the
training and evaluation of tactical employment and gunnery
procedures. MCCRES is recognized as the primary means for
commanders to determine the combat readiness of all units, but
it is generally accepted that it provides a proper and accurate
evaluation of only infantry and possibly artillery units.36,37
With substantial revisions and additions, the tank and TOW
sections of MCCRES could become a more meaningful training and
evaluation tool. For this reason and accepting the assumption
that major modifications will be made, several additional
deficiencies warrant mentioning. First, as with all combat
support units, only tank platoons and TOW sections attached to
deploying infantry units are ever evaluated. The majority of
tank and TOW crewmen never receive a formal MCCRES evaluation in
their primary MOS skill! Secondly, MCCRES directs that the
Standard Performance Tests be administered by personnel of the
parent command. This is almost never done.38,39,40
The Marine Corps' training and evaluation program for
armored vehicle identification is grossly deficient and
virtually non-existent. Officers and staff noncommissioned
officers are essentially left to their own initiative and
resourcefulness as to what should be taught to their Marines.
Commanders must quickly come to the realization that to defeat
threat armored forces and to survive on the modern armored
battlefield, the individual Marine must be able to detect,
acquire, identify, and engage the right targets. Other
priorities cannot continue to take precedence over this vital
subject area.
Two courses of action have been identified as possible
alternatives or solutions to this problem. First, the Marine
Corps could adopt, with modifications, the U.S. Army's methods
and materials for vehicle identification. Secondly, the Marine
Corps could develop its own program. As we examine the two
courses of action, we must be aware of the fact that a
standardized and realistic program is essential. This program
must be readily available and in sufficient quantities for the
training of all Marines armed with an anti-armor weapon and
complete with references, lesson plans, films, tapes, etc.
Secondly, emphasis must be placed on developing training goals
and course criteria that will both aid or force, if necessary,
commanders to emphasize armored vehicle identification in their
training plans. Lastly, methods must be made available or
developed that allows commanders to evaluate either formally or
informally the combat readiness of their Marines and units.
Certainly with the modern weapons of today and with the numerous
armored assets found throughout the world, proper identification
of friend or foe is a vital factor in determining combat
readiness.
The U.S. Army is recognized as the United States' expert in
armored warfare. Today's Army has over 12,500 tanks and 20,000
armored personnel carriers in addition to other armor related
assets, such as, self-propelled artillery and anti-tank
helicopters, etc. The active Army forces maintain four armored
divisions and six mechanized divisions, with the National Guard
and Reserves maintaining two armored divisions and one
mechanized division. In the active component, two armored
divisions, two mechanized divisions, one armored brigade, and
two mechanized brigades are stationed in Germany as part of the
NATO Defense Force.41
The U.S. Army has conducted extensive research of recent
armored battles and has continously conducted studies on the
organization and equipment of both friendly and hostile forces
throughout the world. As a result, the U.S. Army has developed
an excellent and comprehensive training and evaluation program
for armored vehicle identification that is available to the
Marine Corps.42 The program is more than merely a "threat"
program. In addition to vehicles employed by Warsaw Pact
nations, the program includes U.S. vehicles, as well as,
vehicles considered to be allied with the United States. The
program, Combat Vehicle Identification Training, contains nine
individually bound booklets. The first booklet tells the
instructor what the program is and how it operates. The second
contains answer sheets. The next six, each with a tray of 35mm
slides, are individual training packages which can be used
independently. This permits several different units to train at
the same time, if desired. When each unit learns the vehicles
in one package it can be exchanged for another until all six
have been learned. The ninth booklet is a final test package,
again, accompanied by a tray of 35mm slides, which includes all
vehicles in this training program. In essence, the instructor
has all the materials, lesson plans, and related information in
one self-contained package.43 The Army is already in the
process of up-grading this program with training packages
reflecting vehicle identification under degraded conditions,
vehicle identification through thermal sights, etc.44 This is
the best armored vehicle identification program in existence.
The U.S. Army's Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) and
Soldiers Manual of Common Tasks-Skills are similar to MCCRES but
are in much greater detail. The ARTEP is designed to evaluate
the ability of a Battalion Task Force to perform specific
missions under simulated combat conditions.45 The Soldier's
Manual is used for training and evaluation of the individual
soldier in his particular MOS.46 Obviously, these two manuals
are different in that a task force is addressed in one manual
and the individual soldier in the other. However, each manual
establishes training objectives with specified tasks,
conditions, and standards of performance for combat critical
conditions. Further, the Army encourages using the training
objectives and tasks found in these manuals in developing unit
training plans. The point is that the Army has designed a
building block concept of training that interfaces the Soldier's
Manual of Common Tasks-Skills with ARTEP. The ARTEP and
Soldier's Manual both emphasize armored vehicle identification
as a common skill that every soldier should know. Additionally,
each manual tasks tank and anti-armor crewmen to correctly
identify armored vehicles as part of their training and
evaluation.47,48 Because the format and concept of evaluating
these tasks are essentially the same, the Army's training
objectives with specified tasks, conditions, and standards of
performance could easily be incorporated into MCCRES.
A second possible solution to this problem is for the Marine
Corps to develop its own training and evaluation program for
armored vehicle identification. The advantage to this course of
action would be development of a formal training and evaluation
program which would increase the combat readiness of individual
anti-armor crewmen. The major disadvantage is that an already
existing and proven Army program is available that meets all
Marine Corps requirements. Additionally, development of a
realistic and viable program by the Marine Corps would require
extensive research and continuous up-dating that would be
costly, time consuming, and unnecessary.
The most viable solution to this problem is for the Marine
Corps to adopt the U.S. Army's program for armored vehicle
identification. There are several advantages for adopting this
course of action. First, the Army's program is an already
existing and proven program that is readily available to the
Marine Corps. Secondly, the U.S. Army will maintain the
responsibility for continously up-dating the program as new
vehicles and equipment are developed or acquired by various
nations around the world. This would be at no cost or burden to
the Marine Corps. Third, and most importantly, the program
meets all U.S. Marine Corps training requirements.49 Efforts
should also be made to incorporate this program within the
curriculms of the Basic School, the SNCO and NCO Academies, and
the Infantry Training Schools.
Training and Audiovisual Support Centers (TAVSCs) are
located throughout the Marine Corps to support the training
needs of Marine units.50 These centers have various assortments
of training aids on-hand for off-the-shelf issue. Items found
in these centers include audiovisual products, graphic training
aids (GTAs), training publications and manuals, locally
fabricated aids and devices, and training extension courses
(TECs), etc. Justifiable items, not found in the local TAVSC,
can be ordered using catalogs that list all training aids and
devices held by each military service and the Department of
Defense.51 Chapter six and Appendix G of Marine Corps Order
P5290.1 specifies how to acquire training items for units not
located in close proximity to a TAVSC. Many officers and staff
noncommissioned officers are not aware of the functions of and
the services available from the TAVSC and consequently do not
benefit from available training aids or use sources outside the
Marine Corps to acquire essential training aid materials. The
local TAVSCs should make these materials available and in
sufficient quantity to support all units requesting armor
identification materials. Tank and anti-armor units should have
these materials in their unit training libraries.
The Marine Corps Institute (MCI) program for armored vehicle
identification and courses dealing with tanks and anti-armor
weapons should be updated and expanded. For example, Volume I
of the TOW course could contain only basic information on the
TOW, similar to what now exists. A Volume II could be developed
to address advanced tactics, weapons employment techniques,
target acquisition, target identification, and fire commands,
etc. A second example, would be to have a comprehensive armored
vehicle identification course as a prerequiste for completing
courses dealing with tanks and anti-armor weapons.
MCCRES must be modified to emphasize the importance of this
subject and to properly evaluate the employment and gunnery
skills of tank and anti-armor crewmen. Otherwise, commanders
will continue to let other commitments take precedence over
armored vehicle identification training, regardless of the type
of program adopted. The sections addressing tanks and
anti-armor weapons are deficient and do not provide a viable
means to evaluate the combat readiness of these personnel. It
is recommended that selected sections from the Army's ARTEP and
Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks-Skills concerning tanks and
anti-armor weapons be incorporated into a revised MCCRES. FM
17-12-2 also provides useful reference material that relates to
this subject and is in MCCRES style format. These modifications
would provide the commander with a valid evaluation program and
a means to select meaningful training objectives for inclusion
into unit training plans. Additionally, a requirement should be
instituted that requires a formal annual evaluation of all tank
and anti-armor crewmen.
The development of a formal and well structured armored
vehicle identification training and evaluation program is
essential to increase the individual Marine's and unit's combat
readiness. No one will get a second chance after he mistakenly
fires and destroys his fellow Marines or allies. A requirement
exists for a comprehensive armored vehicle identification
training and evaluation program to improve the individual
Marine's ability to rapidly distinguish who is friend or foe,
maximize survivability of friendly forces, and produce long
range destructive fire on the enemy.
The adoption of the U.S. Army's program for armored vehicle
identification is the most viable solution to this problem. It
is an excellent and proven program that is available to the
Marine Corps. Guidance and instructional assistance must be
provided to institute this program within the Marine Divisions
and in our basic MOS producing schools. MCI courses dealing
with tanks and anti-armor weapons must be updated and expanded
to reflect current data found in the Army's program. TAVSCs
must be able to readily support the training needs of requesting
units. In turn, officers and staff noncommissioned officers
must be aware of the services available from these centers.
MCCRES must emphasize armored vehicle identification by
intergrating training standards and evaluation procedures into
pertinent sections of Volume II and V. This would allow
commanders to use MCCRES as both a formal and informal
evaluation tool and as a means of selecting meaningful training
objectives for inclusion into unit training plans. With the
lethality of today's tank and anti-armor weapons, it is
essential that Marines be formally and frequently evaluated in
the employment of these weapons and their ability to distinguish
between friendly and enemy vehicles.
The Marine Corps has provided Marines with weapons capable
of defeating all known enemy armored forces. Today's Marines
are most proficient in maintaining and firing these volatile
weapons of destruction. Let us waste no time in training and
evaluating their skills in armored vehicle identification to
ensure these weapons are correctly employed against hostile
forces and not against our own forces or those of our allies.
FOOTNOTES
1Department of the Army, USA, Army Training and Evaluation
Program for Mechanized Infantry/Tank Task Forced ARTEP 71-2
(Washington, D.C, 1981), p. ii.
2John Paperone, Armor Instructor, Supporting Arms Division,
Command and Staff College, personal interview about tank and
anti-armor weapons and training and evaluation of tank and
anti-armor crewmen, Quantico, Virginia, February 8, 1985.
3Richard Gabriel, "Lessons of War: The IDF in Lebanon,"
Military Review, August, 1984, p.53.
4US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "World Military
Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1972-1982," Defense Program and
Analysis Division, April, 1984, p.19.
5Department of the Army, USA, The Soviet Army: Troops,
Organization and Equipment, FM 100-2-3 (Washington, D.C., 1984)
pp. 1-5.
6Robert Sellers, ed., Armed Forces of the World: A
Reference Handbook (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), pp.
109 and 250.
7US Marine Corps, Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)
Approval on the M1A1 Main Battle Tank 5 February 1985, pp. 1-5.
8Jerry Varela, U.S. Marine Corps Program Manager, Tank
Systems and Liaison Officer M60 Series/M1A1 Tank, Tank
Automotive Command (TACOM) 1981-1984, personal interview about
M1A1 Abrams Tank, Quantico, Virginia, February 13, 1985.
9Bill Cook, Commanding Officer, Anti-Tank (TOW) Company,
Second Marine Division, personal interview about training and
evaluation precedures for TOW crewmen, Camp Lejeune, North
Carolina, February 9, 1985.
10TOW II (Canoga Park, California: Hughes Aircraft Company,
1981), pp.1-3.
11Gazette Staff, "More Changes to Infantry Battalion
Structure," Marine Corps Gazette, January, 1982, pp. 24-25.
12W.E. Muzbeck, Development Project Officer, Firepower
Division, Development Center, Marine Corps Development and
Education Command, personal interview about anti-armor weapons,
Quantico, Virginia, March 9, 1985.
13Ibid.
14G.J. Eschenfelder, Training Division, Headquarters Marine
Corps, personal interview about tank and anti-armor training and
evaluation programs, Quantico, Virginia, February 15, 1985.
15A.J. Schmidt, G-3 Training Officer, First Marine Division,
telephone interview about armored vehicle identification
programs, Quantico, Virginia to Camp Pendleton, California,
February 10, 1985.
16P.R. Vogt, G-3 Training Section, Second Marine Division,
telephone interview about armored vehicle identification
programs, Quantico, Virginia to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina,
February 10,1985.
17Anonymous Source, personal interview about armored vehicle
identification training within the Second Marine Division, Camp
Lejeune, North Carolina, October 15, 1984.
18Ibid.
19Herbert Steigleman, US Marine Corps Representative, US Army
Armor School, telephone interview about armored warfare training
and armored vehicle identification, Quantico, Virginia to Fort
Knox, Kentucky, February 26, 1985.
20Ronald Richard, Command and Staff Faculty and previously
Executive Officer, Seventh Marine Amphibious Brigade, personal
interview about training and evaluation methods for combat and
combat support units, Quantico, Virginia, February 23, 1985.
21Ibid.
22Steigleman, February 26, 1985 interview.
23Ibid.
24L.A. Summers, Officer-In-Charge, Weapons Division, Marine
Corps Infantry Training School, telephone interview about
armored vehicle identification training for anti-armor crewmen,
Quantico, Virginia to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February 4,
1985.
41Tom Davis, Major, U.S. Army, assigned as student to Command
and Staff College, personal interview about armored warfare
training in the US Army, Quantico, Virginia, March 11, 1985.
42Allen Velo, Branch Chief Instructor, Gunnery Division and
previously Command and Staff Advanced Tactics Instructor, US
Army Armor School, telephone interview about US Army's Armored
Vehicle identification program, Quantico, Virginia to Fort Knox,
Kentucky, February 27, 1985.
43 Department of the Army, USA, Combat Vehicle Training
Program (CVI), GTA 17-2-9-A (Washington, D.C., 1981), p.1
(instructor's guide).
44Department of the Army, USA, Thermal: An Interim Training
Program (CVI), GTA 17-2-10 (Washington, D.C., 1982),p.8
(instructor's guide).
45ARTEP 71-2, p.1-1.
46Department of the Army, USA, M48-M60 Armor Crewman
Soldier's Manual: Skill Level 1/2, FM 17-19E 1/2 (Washington,
D.C., 1982), p.iii.
47ARTEP 71-2, p. A-351.
48FM 17-19E 1/2, pp. 2-5 and B-5.
49Velo, February 27, 1985 interview.
50MCO P5290.1, Marine Corps Training and Audiovisual Support
Manual, dtd 20 Jan 83, pp.D-1 thru D-3 (Headquarters, US Marine
Corps, Washington, D.C.).
51Jeffery Marlin, Training Support and Audiovisual
Department MCDEC, personal interview about available training
aids, Quantico, Virginia, February 26, 1985.
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