MAGTF TACAIR In Joint Sustained Land Operations: USMC Versus USAF
CSC 1985
SUBJECT AREA Aviation
MAFTF TACAIR in JOINT
SUSTAINED
LAND OPERATIONS:
USMC VERSUS USAF
FEBRUARY 1985
BY
JAMES S. MENDELSON
MAJOR USMC
THE CONTENTS OF THIS PAPER REFLECT THE PERSONAL VIEWS
OF THE AUTHOR AND ARE NOT NECESSARILY ENDORSED BY THE
MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR THE UNITED
STATES MARINE CORPS.
Abstract of
MAGTF TACAIR IN JOINT SUSTAINED
LAND OPERATION:
USMC versus USAF
The U. S. Marine Corps has a history of combat employment in
joint sustained land operations. Currently, various contingen-
cies exist around the world which envision employment of a MAGTF
as part of a joint force in sustained land operations.
The MAGTF is unique among all armed forces by virtue of its
existence as the only truly integrated air-ground team. This is
a bone of contention for one of our sister Services and a matter
of envy to another.
Amphibious doctrine is not at issue! The issue centers
around the command relationships of the MAGTF during sustained
joint operations ashore.
Click here to view image
At stake is the continued integrity of Marine TACAIR as a
constituent element of the MAGTF and retention of control over
Marine TACAIR by the MAGTF commander during joint operations
ashore. The Air Force has repeatedly argued for single manage-
ment of all theater TACAIR. Failing realization of such, USAF
efforts have been redirected towards revamping current doctrine
affecting joint force organization. Utilizing combined force
doctrine as a precedent, along with a narrow interpretation of
military history, they have attempted to align joint force
organization on a trilateral, functional basis. Potentially
affected is the structure of joint force organizations in several
theaters, scenarios, and OPLANS ranging from NATO to the Middle
East and Korea.
Additionally, the Air Force and army have agreed upon joint
doctrine for the battlefield interdiction effort (air and
surface) which alters traditional battlefield structuring and
responsibilities, thus posing serious and far reaching consequen-
ces to any MAGTF employed ashore in a joint arena.
The issue is complex. All Marine officers need to under-
stand much more than the basic precepts of the JCS Omnibus
Agreement (CMC White Letter 7-61) which established current
doctrine for the employment of the MAGTF in sustained joint land
operations. They need to understand both the background as well
as the Air Force perspective of this issue, so that it may be
assured that while the doctrinal issue is addressed at the JCS
level, at the operational levels, the MAGTF is properly
employed. Only through the education of Marines; insuring that
all commanders, joint planners, staff officers, and liaison
officers are thoroughly conversant in this issue, may we make
certain that the best possible support is provided to our Marine
riflemen, while simultaneously providing the optimum combat
force for the joint force.
While this paper presupposes a knowledge of the MAGTF and
amphibious doctrine, it provides an extensive insight into
aviation functions, joint force organization, and the history of
aviation command and control, as the framework is established
for an indepth analysis of the subject issue in a contemporary
perspective. Following this analysis, the discussion centers
upon the implications of the subject issue to the Marine Corps,
and the responsibility of all Marines in order to meet the
challenges posed.
There were ample sources of information available on this
subject, with classification comprising the only constraint.
Some of the most enlightening sources consisted of a series of
three Air Force Doctrinal Information Publications which all
focus primarily upon the Air Force's position on the command and
control of MAGTF TACAIR in sustained joint land operations.
It is mandatory that all professional Marine officers,
aviation or ground, be knowledgeable and articulate in all
aspects of this issue.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER
PAGE
ABSTRACT ii
I INTRODUCTION 1
PART I - BACKGROUND
II FUNCTIONS OF AVIATION 5
III JOINT FORCE ORGANIZATION 18
IV HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 24
PART II - CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS
V THE OMNIBUS AGREEMENT 55
VI FUNCTIONALISM VS MAGTF INTEGRITY
VII IMPLICATION FOR MARINES 79
VIII RESPONSIBILITY OF MARINES 94
CONCLUSION 98
BIBLIOGRAPHY 101
Chapter I Introduction
All Marines should clearly understand the structure of the
Marine Corps, and how the Marine Corps organizes for combat-
specifically MAGTFs. Our amphibious mission and role within the
Department of the Navy should be universally understood and
acknowledged.
A historical analysis of past employments of Marine Corps
forces, along with a study of possible future contingencies and
current national strategy make it intuitively obvious to all
concerned that future employment of the Marine Corps is certain
to involve joint or combined operations, as Bell as the likely
utilization of Marines in sustained operations ashore.
The employment of Marines in this manner raises many old and
new questions, of interest to both Marines and our sister
Services. While simple logic combined with lessons from the past
seem to dictate solutions to these questions, and current
guidance appears to answer the mail, this is not entirely true at
all levels of the chain of command, and particularly in the case
of certain of our sister Services.
The purpose of this paper is not to fuel interService
rivalries of petty fighting over dogmatic or doctrinal issues,
but rather to make the Marine Officer at the lower operational
levels aware of the lost contentious issue, its background, and
the ramifications surrounding ongoing deliberations now occuring
at the highest echelons in the joint arena. The Marine Corps is
best served by having all its professional officers educated and
conversant in this issue.
Our sister Services certainly are familiarizing their
officers with the Marine Corps and how it relates to them.
For example, the US Air Force has published a Doctrinal Informa-
tion Publication entitled Command Relationships, the Marine
Air/Ground Task Forced and What They Mean to an Airman! At this
point, suffice it to say that this publication goes well beyond
merely describing the organization and mission of the Marine
Corps in a manner similar to our Education Center publications on
the Department of the Air Force.
What implication does all this have for the individual
Marine rifleman? If logic prevails, none. However, taking the
less naive approach, there currently remain serious external
challenges to MAGTF integrity under certain scenarios. It is not
an understatement to declare that there are threats to USMC
retention of operational control of aircraft and airspace on the
joint battlefield, with a possible severe loss of responsiveness
in providing support to the Marine rifleman on the ground.
The purpose of this paper is to highlight these issues and
provide a working knowledge for all Marine officers. While the
scope of this paper will remain unclassified, and must skirt many
sensitive, closely held issues which are addressed at higher
levels, there is a considerable amount of substantive information
which can and should be understood by all professional Marines.
This paper presupposes a knowledge of the MAGTF and how the
MAGTF is employed in its amphibious mission, to include the
command relationships therin.1 Since classic amphibious opera-
tions and the command and control of Marine aviation therein
is not a contested issue, this subject will not be addressed,
Two specific means of MAGTF employment are relevant to the
focus of this paper. First of all, as previously addressed, the
employment of the MAGTF in protracted land campaigns. Secondly,
the situation in which the ACE, or elements of the ACE are
foward deployed to a theater of operations well in advance of
the GCE. This is a very plausible scenario today, possibly
associated with an amphibious operation or the marrying up with
NTPS or MPS.
Before specifically addressing these issues, a thorough
insight into the structures and missions of aviation in all the
Services is necessary, along with an analysis of joint force
organization, and study of the history of air command and
control. Only with an indepth understanding of this peripheral
background, can the stage be set for homing in on the topic of
this paper: functionalism vs. MAGTF integrity. This subject is
the crux of the issue at stake, and perhaps a better title for
this dissertation, failing selection for such only because of its
inability to motivate towards readership.
The effectiveness of the MAGTF in the employment of its
1For a through discussion of this subject, see LFM 01, AFM 2-53,
Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, 1 August 1967.
air and ground elements in combat can only be realized
by adherence to the basic precepts of MAGTF employment,
in our training and in the preparation of operation
plans. It is not enough that we understand the
subtleties of the distinctions within the policy
statement; I expect all officers who are involved in
joint/combined planning activities to be able to
articulate these precepts and secure recognition of
them in operation plans. This, too, may require some
educating...
General R. H. BARROW
Commandant of the Marine Corps
WHITE LETTER NO. 7-81
If a Marine Corps Officer does not understand the rationale
of the argument of Service component vs. functional componency or
the implication of "air component commander" as opposed to "Air
Force component commander" he is ill prepared to comply with the
direction provided him by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
The issue is complex. There are many who say that the
US Air Force possesses an ultimate goal of obtaining centralized
Air Force control of all theater TACAIR assets. Is this a true
observation? Only through a thorough insight into the basic
issue may one judge. Whatever the determination, the fact
remains, the Marine Corps must always insure the sound, logical,
effective employment of its forces in all arenas.
PART ONE *** BACKGROUND
Chapter II Functions of Aviation
Each of the four major Services in the US Armed Forces
possesses its own aviation force which employs aircraft in
varying roles and missions. Is there a homology among the
functions of these different Service aviation arms which could
facilitate uniting the efforts of each arm into a centralized air
organization for the prosecution of warfare?
To address this question, "functions" must be defined in a
matter suitable for application to the joint arena. JCS Pub 1,
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
defines functions as:
The appropriate or assigned duties, responsibilities,
missions, or tasks of an individual, office, or
organization. As defined in the National Security Act
of 1947, as amended, the term "function" includes
functions, powers, and duties, (5 United States Code
171n (a).)
Each of the military departments is assigned certain common
functions. These include the requirement to "organize, train,
and equip forces for assignment to unified and specified
commands".2
Additionally, JCS Pub 2 states, during its discussion of the
functions of the various military departments:
The forces developed and trained to perform the primary
functions set forth hereinafter shall be employed to
support and supplement the other Services in carrying
out their primary functions, where and whenever such
participation will result in increased effectiveness
and will contribute to the accomplishment of the
overall military objectives. As for collateral
functions, while the assignient of such functions may
establish further justification for stated force
requirements, such assignment shall not be used as the
basis for establishing additional force requirements.
The Air Force defines primary functions as "those assigned
actions for which a particular Service is mainly responsible, and
collateral functions are those assigned actions where one Service
performs a primary function of another service".3 JCS Pub 1
does not contain any definition and/or distinction of primary as
opposed to collateral functions. The Air Force interpretation of
these two "function" discriminators becomes suspect when an
analysis of various Services primary and collateral functions
2Jcs Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, October 1974, p. 16.
3AFM 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air
Force, March 1984, p. 3-1.
(JCS Pub 2) is performed.
1) A primary function of the Army is to organize, equip, and
provide forces for joint amphibious operations while the collat-
eral function of the Army is to interdict enemy sea and air power
and communications through operations on or from land.
2) A collateral function of the Navy and Marine Corps is to
interdict enemy land and air power and communications through
operations at sea.4
While the Air Force's interpretation of the difference
between primary and collateral functions may be valid for the Air
Force's assigned primary and collateral functions, it is clearly
not applicable to the other Services' functions. Is there any
significance to this disparity? Taken alone, no; however in the
overall context of a doctrinal argument over the wording of JCS
Pub 2, perhaps it might become relevant.
The primary functions of the Air Force are:
1) To organize, train, and equip Air Force Forces for the
conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations in the air.
2) Provide forces for strategic air warfare.
3) Furnish close combat and logistic air support to the Army
to include:
..airlift, support, and resupply of airborne operations.
..aerial photography and tactical reconnaissance.
..interdiction of enemy land power and communications.
4) To provide air transport for the Armed Forces.
4JCS Pub 2, sections 2,3,4.
5) To develop in coordination with the other services:
..doctrines and procedures for the unified defense of
the United States against air attack.
..doctrine, procedures and equipment for air defense
from land areas.
..tactics, techniques and equipient for amphibious and
airborne operations.
..to organize and equip Air Force forces for joint amphib-
ious and airborne operations.
6) Provide Air Force intelligence.
7) Aerial photography for cartographic purposes.
9) Doctrine and procedures for organizing, equipping, train-
ing, and employing the Air Force.
The collateral functions of the Air Force are to train
forces:
1) To interdict enemy sea power through air operations.
2) To conduct antisubmarine warfare and to protect shipping.
3) To conduct aerial minelaying operations5.
The latest revision of AFM 1-1 deleted the previous
edition's listing of primary functions of the Air Force.
This basic doctrinal "bible" now states "the fundamental role of
the Air Force is to prepare aerospace forces to accomplish nine
different missions:"
1) Strategic Aerospace Offense - to neutralize or destroy an
enemy's war-sustaining capabilities or will to fight.
5JCS Pub 2, section 4.
2) Strategic Aerospace Defense - to integrate aerospace
warning, control, and intercept forces to detect, identify,
intercept, and destroy enemy forces (in any medium) attacking our
nation's war sustaining capabilities or will to fight.
3) Counter Air - to gain control of the aerospace environment.
..Offensive Counter Air (OCA) - to destroy or neutralize
enemy aerospace forces at a time and place of choice.
..Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) - aerospace
operations directed against enemy air defense systems.
..Defensive Counter Air (DCA) - against enemy aerospace
forces that are attempting to attack friendly forces or
penetrate friendly airspace.
4) Air interdiction (AI) - to delay, disrupt, divert, or
destroy an enemy's military potential before it can be brought to
bear effectively against friendly forces. "Air interdiction
attacks are normally executed by an air commander as part of a
systematic and persistent campaign. Although an air interdiction
campaign can be an independent air effort, an air commander
normally coordinates an interdiction campaign with a surface
force commander... Air interdiction attacks against targets
which are in position to have a near term effect on friendly land
forces are referred to as battlefield air interdiction" (BAI).
"The primary difference between battlefield air interdiction and
the remainder of the air interdiction effort is the level of
interest and emphasis the land commander places on the process
of identifying, selecting, and attacking certain targets.
Therefore, battlefield air interdiction requires joint coordina-
tion at the component level during planning, but once planned,
battlefield air interdiction is controlled and executed by the
air commander as an integral part of a total air interdiciton
campaign." (note BAI for as the basis of various contested
issues. BAI missions are flown in the ground commanders area of
influence without any coordination below the component level fair
component commander - ground component commander). This issue
leads into a discussion of which commander controls fires beyond
the FEBA, violates Marine Corps doctrine, and will be the
subject of further discussion in this paper).
5) Close Air Support (CAS) - to support surface operations by
attacking targets in close proximity to friendly surface forces.
CAS can be preplanned or immediate, and in all cases requires
coordination and integration with the fire and maneuver of the
surface force.
6) Special Operations - involve the conduct of low visibility,
covert, or clandestine military actions.
7) Airlift - both strategic (inter theater ) and tactical (intra-
theater).
8) Aerospace surveillance and Reconnaissance - to collect
information from airborne, orbital, and surface based sensors.
9) Aerospace Maritime Operations - to neutralize or destroy
enemy naval forces and to protect friendly naval forces and
shipping. (note - it is interesting to notice how one of the
"collateral functions" of the Air Force has become translated
into one of the "fundamental role missions").
AFM 1-1 goes on to list seven "specialized tasks- which the
Air Force perfroms to enhance the execution and successful
completion of Air Force missions, as well as often supporting
other services as well: Aerial Refueling; Electronic Combat;
Warning, Command, Control, and Communications; intelligence;
Aerospace Rescue and Recovery; Psychological Operations; and
Weather Service.
The Tactical Air Command Manual (TACM) 2-1, Tactical Air
Operations, lists six "tactical air operations": Counter Air, Air
interdiction, Close Air Support, Tactical Airlift, Air Reconnais-
sance, and Special Air Operations. This manual states that the
following "capabilities" are required for successful tactical air
operations: electronic warfare, search and rescue, airspace
control, aerial refueling, and defense suppression. Defense
suppression, which was a form of Counter Air when talking
missions, not a specialized task, is now listed as a capability.
Under the subject, "Functions of Theater Air Forces" the
Air Force lists the following missions and tasks as "required for
friendly forces to drive enemy air from the field of battle":6
Counter Air, Defense Suppression, Electromagnetic Warfare,
Tactical Reconnaissance, CAS, BAI, AI, Airlift (strategic and
tactical), UN, Air Refueling, AWACS, SAR, and ABCCC.
6Department of the Air Force, Doctrine Information Publication No.
10, Background Information on Air Force Perspective for Coherent
Plans (Command and Control of TACAIR), April 1981, attachient 9,
tab 3.
What is at issue here is not the obvious fact that there
appears to be disjointed overlap and vagueness in Air Force
doctrine, but rather the fact that there is a question as to what
would be the functions when viewed in the sphere of the joint
arena?
The Army possesses aviation units which fight as part of a
combined arms team. The objectives of these units are:7
1) To augment the Army's capability to conduct sustained land
combat.
2) To provide the ground commander with the mobility, fire-
power, and staying power needed to win the first battle, and
3) To help the ground forces win while outnumbered.
The principles of employment of Army aviation units are:8
1) Fight integrated on the combined arms team.
2) Exploit capabilities of other Services (i.e. CAS).
3) Capitalize on intelligence gathering capabilities.
4) Suppress enemy weapons and acquisition means.
5) Exploit firepower and mobility.
6) Integrate fire and maneuver.
7) Employ suprise.
8) Mass forces.
9) Utilize terrain for survivability.
10) Displace foward elements frequently.
7FM 1-2, Aircraft Battlefield Countermeasures and Survivability,
July 1978, p. 2.
8FM 1-2, pp. 2-3.
11) Maintain flexibility.
12) Exercise staying power.
The Army's air defense, which consists of anti-aircraft
guns, missiles, and the related command and control resources are
separate of the aviation branch in the air defense artillery.
Army aviation does not possess "functions". All tactical
fixed-wing jet aircraft support comes from the Air Force.
The Navy accomplishes its functions of sea control and power
projection through three warfare branches; surface, submarine,
and aviation. The Navy's "fundamental warfare tasks" are:9
1) Antiair warfare
2) Antisubmarine warfare
3) Anti-surface (ship) warfare
4) Strike warfare
5) Amphibious warfare
6) Mine warfare
The Navy's "supporting warfare tasks" are:10
1) Special warfare
2) Ocean surveillance
3) Intelligence
4) Command, control, and communications
5) Electronic warfare
9NWP 1 (Rev A), Startegic Concepts of the United States Navy, May
1978, p. I-1-3.
10NWP 1, P. I-1-3.
6) Logistics
The Navy forms task forces to perform various fundamental
and supporting warfare tasks. These task forces include a mix of
organic aviation tailored to the mission of the task force.
The following specific function is assigned to the Marine
Corps:11
To provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms,
together with supporting air components, for service
with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced
naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations
as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval
campaign. These functions do not contemplate the
creation of a second land army.
Title 10 of the U.S. Code states that the Marine Corps
should be so organized as "to include not less than three combat
divisions and three air wings..."
A collateral function assigned to the Navy and Marine Corps
is "to train forces to be prepared to participate in the overall
air effort, as directed."12
Marine Corps aviation is organized and equipped as a
completely expeditionary air arm. This expeditionary
11JCS Pub 2, section 3, p. 22.
12JCS Pub 2, section 3, p. 23.
aspect sets Marine Corps aviation apart from other
aviation organizations. Marine Corps doctrine envis-
ions that Marine Corps aviation will support the
landing forces throughout an assault landing and
subsequent operations. Marine Corps aviation must be
prepared to provide the support by operating tactical
aircraft squadrons from carriers as part of carrier air
groups or from airfields within striking distance of an
aimphibious objective area. It must be prepared to
operate after raid establishment ashore, from minimal
airfields within the objective area during the assault
phase of an amphibious operation... The FMFs are
highly specialized amphibious assualt troops. Their
ground and air elements constitute a single weapon
system -- the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF);
while the task forces are capable of sustained combat,
they are primarily for use in amphibious aasualt
operations and are the principal means of projecting
naval power ashore.13
The multitude of tasks to support the Marine aviation
mission have been categorized into six separate functions:14
1) Air Reconnaissance - photographic/multisensor, electronic,
and visual
2) Antiair warfare - air defense (active and passive); and
13FMFM 5-1, Marine Avaition, August 1979, pp. 1-2.
14FMFM 5-1, pp. 5-8.
offensive antiair warfare - aircraft and missiles - the destruc-
tion of the enemy aircraft or missile threat both before and
after it is launched
3) Assault support - vertical assault support, air delivery,
inflight refueling, and air evacuation
4) Offensive air support - CAS (preplanned {scheduled and on
calls and immediate); and Deep Air Support (DAS) (excluding those
air operations designed to reduce the enemy air capability)
5) Electronic warfare (EW) - electronic warfare support
measures, electronic countermeasures, and electronic counter-
countermeasures
6) Control of aircraft and missiles
These lengthy lists, which in the absence of providing a
listing of functions which equate to a common denominator of
aviation tasks among the Services, present at a minimum the
doctrinal approach of the Services to the employment of their
aviation resources. It would be incongruent to attempt to unite
all aviation resources together on a functional basis.
In addition to defining individual Service functions, JCS
Pub 2 lists responsibilities for each of the Services with
regard to four different areas: air defense, amphibious opera-
tions, airborne operations, and close combat air support of
ground forces.
All Services share responsibility for training and coordina-
tion with other Services in developing equipment, tactics
and techniques for close combat air support of ground forces.
The Navy and Marine Corps have unique responsibilities for close
air support of amphibious operations, in addition to a collateral
function of training forces to conduct close air support for land
operations. The Air Force has the responsibility of providing
Air Force forces for close combat air support of ground forces.
While close air support is defined in JCS Pub 1, there is no
definition of close combat air support.
Attempted development of joint doctrine for planning and
conducting CAS for ground forces has served to highlight differ-
ences among the various Services along with the issue of airspace
control above the combat zone. A series of joint studies and
tests have been conducted since 1971.15 Out of these studies
often arises the issue of command and control of Marine Corps
TACAIR.16 Before firmly addressing this issue it is germane to
look briefly at the organization of joint forces.
15USMC Operational Handbook (OH) 5-1.1, Command and Control of USMC
TACAIR, September 1982, p. 1-1.
16There is not a JCS Pub 1 definition of "TACAIR". The commonly
accepted usage conveys tactical fixed wing aircraft; excluding
those aircraft of a support nature with solely a transport or
training role (i.e. TC4C, C-9, C-12, and T-39).
Chapter 11I Joint Force Organization
JCS Pub 2 provides guidance for the unification of forces
when two or more services are employed together in a joint
command structure. Historical practice, along with current
contingency planning makes it probable that the joint employment
of forces can be expected in future military operations.
"The term 'joint force' refers equally to unified commands,
subordinate unified commands, and joint task forces composed of
significant elements of two or more Services, operating under a
single commander authorized to exercise unified command or
operational control over such joint forces, through the Service
component commanders."17
JCS Pub 2 in its definition of operational command, states
that "operational command" is synonymous with "operational
control" and that it is uniquely applied to the operational
control of unified and specified commands over assigned forces in
accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 as amended and
revised (10 U.S.C. 124)
A unified command is established by the President through
the Secretary of Defense with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. It is a command with a broad continuing mission, under a
single commander, and composed of significant assigned components
of two or more Services.18
17JCS Pub 12, Volume 1, Tactical Command and Control Planning
Guidance and Procedures for Joint Operations, 1 April 1974,p. 3.
18JCS Pub 1, p. 384.
JCS Pub 2 states that in unified commands operational
command is exercised through Service component commander or
through subordinate unified commander except in certain circua-
stances when the unified commander deals directly with a specific
operational force because of the mission or urgency (requires
approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of
Defense).
The purpose of joint force command organization is to
provide for:
1) Centralized direction - to coordinate the effort of the
forces commanded
2) Decentralized execution - because of the limitation of one
commander's span of control
3) Common doctrine - so that appropriate action will be taken
by all concerned in the absence of specific instructions.
The nature of the responsibilities, missions, and tasks
assigned to a unified command will determine whether it is
organized on an area basis (geographic area) (most commonly used
method) or a functional basis.19
In addressing the principles of unified direction of Armed
Forces, under "Service functions" JCS Pub 2 states:
To achieve stability, continuity, and economy and to
facilitate long-range planning, each of the services
has the responsibility for organizing, training and
19JCS Pub 2, pp. 40-43.
equipping, and providing forces to fulfill certain
combatant functions and for administering and support-
ing the forces so provided (except as may otherwise be
directed by the Secretary of Defense in the case of
support of such forces). The functions involved in a
military operation determine the Service identity of
the forces to be assigned and usually the Service
identity of the overall commander. Because the
exact role of each Service and weapon in future war
cannot be delimited, the assignments of primary
functions contained in Chapter II are not in tended to
be rigidly prescriptive in time of war with respect to
command structure or relationships; however, due
consideration must be given to such Service functions.
It continues: "organizational integrity of Service compon-
ents should be maintained insofar as practicable to exploit
fully their inherent capabilities."20
A joint task force "is a force composed of assigned or
attached elements of the Army, the Navy or Marine Corps, and the
Air Force or two or more of these Services, which is constituted
and so designated by the Secretary of Defense or by the Commander
of a unified command, a specified command, or an existing joint
task force."21
A joint task force is established for a limited objective
20JCS Pub 2, p. 43.
21JCS Pub 2, p. 51.
and is dissolved once that objective is achieved.
A joint task force is organized of component commands.
A component command consists of the component commander and
all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or
installations under his military command which have been
assigned to the operational command of the commander of the
unified command (to include subordinate unified commands and
joint task forces). Other individuals, units, detachments,
organizations, or installations may operate directly under
the component commander in his Service role and should
contribute to the mission of the unified commander as
appropriate.22
In its guide to terminology, JCS Pub 2 states that a
component command is also called a "component" or a "Service
component". While this appears to be a moot point, it takes on
considerable relevance in current day arguments concerning
unified command structuring.
Presented herein are the basic tennants of unified command
as they presently are written. There is much current focus upon
the subject of component commanders.
The Air Force Tactical Air Operations Manual (TACM 2-1),
published in April 1978, states that joint task force commanders
exercise operational control of their force through the
commanders of the Service forces comprising the joint task force
22JCS Pub 2, p. 48.
(the component commanders). This is in keeping with JCS Pub 2.
JCS Pub 12 further substantiates this position in a series
of tactical information flow diagrams which represent the flow of
information in joint force organization. In these diagrams the
component commands of the joint task force are entitled "Army
component", "Marine Corps component", "Air Force component", and
or "Navy component"; clearly depicting components established
along Service lines.
In a reversal of this documented previous position, the Air
Force is now proposing a change to JCS Pub 2, to organize joint
forces along a functional vice Service basis.23
The Air Force is now proposing that joint forces be organ-
ized on a trilateral basis, with three functional components:
land component, naval component, and air component. The implica-
tions of this proposal are far reaching. The question arises:
where does the Marine Corps fit in this equation?
While this proposal still awaits Joint Chiefs of Staff
action, JCS Pub 2 stands as written. Yet, in the latest revision
of AFM 1-1 Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air
Force (16 March 1984), there is no longer mention of a "Marine
Corps component" and "Air Force component" has become "Air
component". The implication being that all air has been func-
tionally assembled under the air component.
As this issue is alive it must be remembered that while
23Chief of Staff of the Air Force Memorandum (CSAFM) 07-82 Proposal
to Change JCS Pub 2, dated 19 April 1982.
there are far reaching impacts in regard to MAGTF TACAIR, there
is no assault on amphibious operations. The situation in
question deals with Marine forces ashore in a joint force, and
not as part of an amphibious task force.
Having examined joint force organization as mandated by
current directives and as addressed by a current change proposal;
a review of the historical record of joint force organization, in
particular, aviation command and control, will provide a closer
insight into the rationale behind many of the arguments advanced
on both sides concerning this vital organizational issue.
Chapter IV Historical Perspective
Many of the arguments which are put forth on the issue of
command and control of Marine TACAIR during sustained joint
operations utilize historical perspective as a main premise.
There are three doctrinal publications, dating from 1981 through
1984 in which the Air Force has internally promulgated its stance
on this particular issue. Each is replete with historical
justifications.24 The entire issue of historical precedent with
regards to command and control and how it relates to the Marine
Corps and aviation forces is a broad deep reaching issue,
presenting great opportunity for most liberal interpretation.
Numerous points can be made, often in a simplistic analysis of
the situation, thereby taken out of context. This becomes
obvious through close examination of the various positions and
counterarguments.
The historical precedents which are put forth in support of
centralized control of all theater air assets by the Air Force
can be divided into three areas: the North Africa experience,
joint force organization from World War II through Vietnam, and
the role of Marine aviation in Korea and Vietnam. it is clearly
24Department of the Air Force, Doctrinal Information Publication
(DIP) No. 10, Background Information on Air Force Perspective For
Coherent Plans (Command and Control of TACAIR), April 1981;
DIP No. 11, Command Relationships, The Marine Air/Ground Task
Force, and What They Mean to an Airman, 1981;
DIP No. 12, Command Relationships, January 1984;
These Doctrinal Information Publications are disseminated to Air
Force commands, schools, and officers in key billets.
beyond the scope of this paper to conduct a thoroughly rigorous
analysis of the historical record; so discussion will be limited
to those points which have been put forth in support of various
positions on the basic issue. An attempt will be made to explore
each from the perspective of both sides, in an unbiased manner.
To state that air power , its application, strategy, and
tactics were greatly refined during World War II is an under-
statement. The North Africa experiences of 1942-1943 served as a
focal point for the evolution of Air Force doctrine for the
control of air power. There was no centralized control of
air power during the invasion of North Africa; tactical air units
were tied to individual Army units. Because the main focus of
air effort was applied to the support of ground forces without
achieving air superiority, the results were disastrous for both
the British and the Americans. The doctrine at the time, as
specified in Army Field Manual 1-5, consisted of an air support
command attached to an Army unit, with direction for air opera-
tions coming from the ground commander. It was felt that
this failed to provide direction, priority, and coordination to
the overall air effort, hence the poor showing. As a result, at
the Casablanca Conference of January 1943, both President
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill approved a force reorgani-
zation.25 (figs. 1&2). This restructuring provided a means
25General William W. Momyer USAF(Ret), Air Power in Three Wars
(WWII, Korea, Vietnam), (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1978), pp. 40,
257.
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for the centralized direction of the air effort. General Momyer
(an experienced and respected Air Force commander and tactician
as well as prominent spokesman on the subject of centralized
control of theater air assets) highlights the North African
experience in his many writings on this subject. He traces the
air organization in Vietnam to the North Africa experience.26
Studying the North African experience, one certainly can not
dispute the fact that centralized coordination of the air effort,
in this case a coordinated achievement of air superiority, was
essential. The question is, was a centralized air command
structure the only way to accomplish this aim? Why was General
Eisenhower as Commander in Chief Armed Forces Northwest Africa
(CICAFNWA) (the joint force commander) with his staff unable to
accomplish this coordination and direction? He had two armies
and two corps working for him, yet he was unable to direct, and
apportion their focus of effort in employing one of their organic
assets and mass them in pursuit of a theater goal. Just what did
he create in the reorganization? Note that a traditional pairing
of ground and supporting air units was maintained.
The reorganization resulted in a command organization as
depicted in fig. 3 for the invasion of Sicily.27 Here there were
new problems with the integration of the Air Force operations
into the needs of the force as a whole.28 The Air Force
26Momyer, p. 256.
27E. Morison, The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United
States Navy in the Second World War, (Boston, Toronto: Atlantic
Monthly Press, 1963), p. 246.
28Morison, p. 255.
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commander, General Spaatz, focused largely the entirety of his
effort on counter air operations. This resulted in little or no
tactical air support being provided for the amphibious landings.
The US force (Western Naval Task Force) landed opposed by almost
total enemy air control of the beachhead. In a similar manner,
the airborne operation received no tactical air support. While
the reorganization at Casablanca allowed for an air commander who
could mass his air effort in the strategic and counter air roles,
the organization clearly was not responsive to the needs of the
ground force commanders.29 It is interesting to note that Naval
aviation, when operating against targets assigned to the tactical
or strategic forces, also came under the control of the theater
air component commander.30 During the invasion of Sicily,
carrier forces, not directly involved in air defense of the
fleet, or ships of the amphibious force enroute to the landing
area, were under the "operational control" of Air Marshall
Tedder, the Mediterranean Air Commander who controlled all air
power flown in support of the landing force.31 This is contrary
to joint doctrine for amphibious operations where the Commander
of the Amphibious Task Force maintains the responsibility for
command authority of all air operations within the objective
29Morison, p. 255.
30Momyer, pp. 44-45; while there was not by definition "component"
commanders at this time, General Momyer has elected to refer to
centralized theater commands (ground, naval, and air) during this
time frame as component commands, hence the adoption of this term
herein.
31Momyer, p. 45.
area.32
For Operation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy in 1944,
initially the Allied organization was as depicted in fig. 4.33
This organization provided for an Allied naval and assualt
(landing force) component. However, air forces were divided into
three separate commands: the Allied Expeditionary Air Force
(subordinate to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary
Force (SHAEF) and two bomber commands (RAF and the United States
Strategic Air Force). Air Chief Marshall Portal served as deputy
on the Combined Chiefs of Staff for coordinating the British and
American bomber forces (essentially serving as a coordinating
authority) for the Combined Bomber Offensive.34 During the
actual invasion, Air Marshall Tedder, the Deputy Supreme Command-
er, coordinated the two bomber forces.35
After the invasion, with the establishment of the 12th Army
Group under General Bradley, General Eisenhower was faced with
the decision of whether or not to create a ground component
command to provide coordination for the various Army Groups.
This forced General Eisenhower to face the political implications
of choosing either Field Marshall Montgomery or General Bradley
as component commander. A previous precedent had been establish-
ed in North Africa, where General Alexander had functioned as
both the Deputy Theater Commander as well as a component
32For a thorough discussion see LFM 01 (AFM 2-53), p. 2-9.
33Momyer, p. 49.
34Momyer, p. 45.
35Homyer, p. 50.
commander. This resulted in arguments over dual hatting.
Reacting to the political sensitivities involved, in a since
criticized, perhaps wise (considering the personalities involved)
decision, General Eisenhower elected to act as both the theater
commander, SHAEFA and the overall ground forces commander.36
At this time, the First Allied Airborne Army (which included
organic aviation) served as a theater reserve forces it was later
attached to Field Marshall Montgomery's Army Group.37
On 15 October 1944 the Allied Expeditionary Air Force was
disestablished. This left an organization as depicted in
fig. 5.38 This removed the "component command" and left three
tactical air forces, each which coordinated directly with an Army
Group, receiving centralized direction from the Supreme Command-
er. In effect, this meant three tactical air forces without a
centralized Air Force commander along with the First Allied
Airborne Army's organic aviation. While this seems to belabor
a lot of tedious command relationships, the point to be drawn is,
simply, there was not a precedent established and maintained for
theater force organization along functional component lines.
The decision to disestablish the Allied Expeditionary Air
Force (AEAF) has been described as a reaction to the fact
that General Esienhower elected not to create a ground component
commander (no ground component commander, no air component
36Momyer, p. 50.
37Forrest C. Pogue, The United States Army in World War II. The
Supreme Command, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1954),
pp. 269, 280.
38Pogue, p. 455.
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commander). General Momyer provides another insight into why
American airmen pushed to disestablish the AEAF:39
They especially desired to eliminate the AEAF because
it was an obstacle to returning the strategic air
forces to the bombing campaign. As long as the AEAF
existed, it would continue to exert pressure to employ
bombers in extensive support of the ground campaign,
allowing only an occasional use of the bombers for
major strategic offensives.
This quote certainly displays a predisposition towards
strategic bombing at the expense of support of the ground
commands. While North Africa served to establish Air Force
precedent and doctrine for centralized air control; Sicily and
the war in Europe appear to have established the overall aim of
the air effort away from adequately supporting the ground
campaign. During the World War II, the ground army commanders
had to compete with strategic bombing, and often because of the
aim of the centralized direction, they suffered. Today, does not
the same situation exist, with the Army close air support needs
competing with interdiction for a share of the overall air
effort?
Turning to the Pacific, a theater of World War II which
39Momyer, p. 51.
General Momyer does not discuss at all in his book Airpower in
Three Wars, airpower here also played an important role, and
command relationships continued an evolutionary process towards
our current unified doctrine.
The war began without any unified command structure.
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Pacific forces were
reorganized with both General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz each
having command of air, land, and naval forces.
In the Philippines, during the defense of Bataan and
Corregidor Island, General MacArthur had operational control of
the Fourth Marine Regiment.
In the two pronged offensive northward towards the Philli-
pines and the islands of the central Pacific, all final decisions
with regard to both General MacArthur's and Admiral Nimitz's
forces (force composition, objectives, timing, etc.) rested with
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the absence of an overall theater
commander.40
In the central Pacific, the Fleet Marine Forces under
Admiral Nimitz served as integral type forces of the US fleet in
accordance with the established amphibious doctrine, Navy
FTP-167. This tentative manual for landing operations was
refined to reflect what we now know as established doctrine for
amphibious operations.
In the southwest Pacific, various Marine squadrons were
controlled by the Fifth Air Force under the overall command of
40DIP No. 11, p. 33.
General MacArthur.41
On the subject of Marine aviation in the Pacific theater of
World War II, the Air Force has said: "Even though Marine Air was
conceived for CAS, historically it supported Marine ground
operations only in Peleliu and Okinawa."42 Admittedly, "except
for the landings at Bougainville, Peliliu was the only occasion
in the Pacific War when none but Marine planes were employed to
assist Marines crossing a beach."43 However Marines additionally
flew in support of the beach phase of the assault at Iwo Jima
(from fast carriers) as well as support from Henderson Field in
Guadacanal where they flew in support of the First Marine
Division which was ashore, along with missions in support of the
rest of the Solomons campaign.44
There was a persistent effort on behalf of placing Marine
pilots aboard escort carriers to fly solely in support of
amphibious landings.45 In the central Pacific Marine air was
largely utilized to keep bypassed islands nuetralized.
Marine officers from the Commandant down had repeatedly
recommended the assignment of escort carriers for the
exclusive use of Marine aviators. Only thus, they
maintained, could their ground troops be guaranteed
41Jeter A. Isley and Philip A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphib-
ious War its Theory and Its Practice in the Pacific,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 427.
42DIP No 11, p. .35.
43Isley and Crowl, p. 421.
44Isley and Crowl, pp. 135, 508.
45Isley and Crowl, p. 507.
uninterruptrd and efficient close air support during
the assualt phase of amphibious operations. Not until
the very end of the war, and then too late for active
employment, did the Navy designate escort carriers for
the sole use of Marine aviation.46
Several points can be taken from this. First, it serves to
reinforce the fact that Marine aviation was established to
support the Marine infantryman. Secondly, assigning Marine
aircraft missions away from this primary role degrades the Marine
fighting team. Lastly, a problem which still exists is high-
lighted. That is the physical constraints which serve to hamper
Marine aviaiton's support of amphibious operations (lack of
carrier deck space which can be devoted to exclusive support of
an amphibious landing coupled with the possible shorfall of
suitable land bases within range of an amphibious objective
area).47 This last problem does not fall under the category of
sustained land operations, and it is adequately addressed by
current doctrine where Navy carrier air and possibly theater Air
Force air will provide necessary support until such time as
suitable air facilities for landing force aviation can be
uncovered.48 This is an example of support which can be achieved
46Isley and Crowl, pp. 585-586.
47For excellent discussion on this issue in present day context,
see: Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Geiger USMC, Marine Corps
TACAIR and Strategic Mobility, (Naval War College, March 1983).
48Current training to insure that this type of support can be
adequately provided includes the deployment of a Navy attack
squadron overseas as an integral member of a Marine Air Group.
even without an "air component commander" by virtue of joint
force doctrine, possibly highlighted by intiating directives.
The Marine aviators who left the Solomons to work for
General MacArthur in the invasion of the Philippines both amazed
and delighted the Army troops with their close air support.4,
They earned this praise largely because of their responsive-
ness:
Most of the complaints from ground troops in other
operations arose from the fact that too much time
elapsed between request for close air support and
execution, that strikes were controlled by higher
echelon rather than front line troops, that the
procedure for obtaining air support by appealing
through several links in the chain of command was too
rigid, and that pilots were inadequately briefed in the
front line situation. Much of this was avoided not
only on Luzon but in the other Philippine operations
where Marine air participated.50
The system in the Philippines worked because the Marine pilots
were supporting no more than one division at a time.51 This
speaks loud and clear as a testimonial to the established MAGTF
team; and why it is vital that control of Marine aviation remain
with the MAGTF commander.
49Isley and Crowl, p. 181.
50Isley and Crowl, p. 427.
51Isley and Crowl, p. 580.
At Okinawa, Admiral Turner commanded the Expeditionary Force
as part of the Fifth Fleet. The landing force, the 10th Army,
which included the III Marine Amphibious Corps, was commanded by
an Army general and the Army Air Forces and Marine air were
placed under the command of a Marine general.52
The Air Force has stated that the battle of Okinawa is "one
prominent example of successful integration of multi-Service
forces through functional components."53 The Air Force also
contends that "the Marines actively supported commitment of their
assets (and the AAF assets) under an air component commander."54
The joint force organization at Okinawa was developed for an
amphibious operation. Amphibious doctrine calls for specific
command relationships, when more than one Service provides
tactical aviation (in the joint force) in support of the landing
force:55
When the preponderance of tactical aviation is provided
by the Air Force for the amphibious operation, an Air
Force officer will be designated by the Air Force
commander of the participating Air Force forces to
direct the total air effort in the amphibious objective
area.
The Air Force quotes the preceeding passage in DIP 11, using it
52DIP No. 11, p. 35.
53DIP 12, p. 10.
54DIP 11, p. 35.
55LFM 01 (AFM 2-53), p. 2-7.
as an argument for functional components in sustained land
operations.56 The contested issue is sustained land operations,
not amphibious operations. LFM 01 does not use the term "air
component commander". The remainder of LFM 01's discussion
provides a more complete picture:
He will exercise such direction under the joint task
force commander or when control of air operations is
passed ashore, under the landing force commander or an
appropriate commander ashore who has the capability to
control such operations. When the perponderance of
tactical aviation comes from the Navy or Marine Corps,
the overall air effort in the objective area will be
directed by a naval aviator under the amphibious task
force commander until control is passed ashore.
Additionally, LFM 01 states:
When Air Force forces are assigned to the amphibious
task force they will be organized as a separate force
or component under the command of an Air Force
officer. The Air Force commander, with respect to his
own forces, exercises command similar to that exercised
by the landing force commander and the ampibious task
force commander, subject to the overall command
authority of the amphibious task force commander.57
56DIP 11, p. 35.
57LFM 01 (AFM 2-53), p. 2-7.
While this digresses from the subject of joint land operations,
because of the Air Force attempt to include it as such in their
DIPs, it is necessary to put the relationships of amphibious task
force organization into proper perspective. Furthermore,
analyizing amphibious force organization, it is clearly a Service
force organization and is not along functional component lines.
Following World War II, the National Security Act of 1947
established the Department of the Air Force as a separate
Service, and provided a legal position for the Fleet Marine Force
principles ("combined arms together with supporting air").
Additionally this act stated that the Marine Corps shall perform
"other duties as the President may direct."
With the outbreak of the Korean War, the stage was set for
the Employment of Marines in sustained land operations and the
ensuing issue concerning the control of Marine aviation in
such operations. The initial organization for Korea contained
three Service components (Air Force, ground and naval commands).
Following the landing at inchon, the landing force came under
control of the Army's X Corps which operated as a parallel
command to the Eighth Army under the Far East Ground Force
Command. The X Corps had Marine aviation assigned for close air
support. in December 1950 X Corps was placed under Eighth Army,
hence the First Marine Division was assigned to Eighth Army. At
the same time The First Marine Aircraft Wing was assigned to the
Fifth Air Force and was employed across the Eighth Army front or
on interdiction depending upon the tactical situation.58
The Marine Corps wanted its air employed in direct support
of Marine ground forces and General Almond (Commander of the X
Corps) argued to have the First Marine Aircraft Wing assigned to
the control of his Corps; however the Air Force gained operation-
al control of all aircraft in the execution of the Far East Air
Force (FEAF) mission as assigned by the Commander in Chief Far
East (CINCFE) and the Far East Naval Commander had command or
operational control of all aircraft in the execution of his
mission as assigned by CINCFE. Coordination when both the Navy
and Air Force were assigned missions was delegated by CINCFE to
FEAF.59 Day to day working procedures were established between
the various Services and the Air Force commander had centralized
control of the air effort. With this relationship, an area of
dispute surfaced concerning the division of labor between CAS and
interdiction. General Momyer states:
Also, with a stable front there were fewer requirements
for close air support and consequently more need for
the Marine air units in the interdiction campaign. As
a result of the integration of Marine air operations
with 5th Air Force operations, centralized control of
all the air power assigned to the Far East theater of
operation provided the flexibility that it did in the
58Momyer, p. 62.
59Momyer, p. 58.
campaigns of World War II.60
The subject has been addressed from a different vantage by
Marine Corps Lieutenant General M. A. Twining:
The winning combination which had taken inchon and
Seoul had been broken up. The surface ships, operating
as a form of floating artillery, bombarded Wonsan and
the northern ports for years with no discernable
results; the carriers participated with the Air Force
in operations against the enemy lines of communication-
the 1st Marine Air Wing was separated from its team-
mate, the 1st Marine Division, thereby destroying the
most effective air-ground team the world had ever
seen. The Wing was placed under Air Force command and
operated as a component of the 5th Air Force... The
fleet, which had performed so brillantly in September
1950 as a balanced instrument of sea power, had been
dispersed by circumstances into relatively ineffective
components- of land, sea, air.61
In the intervening years between Korea and Vietnam, the
Marine Corps was deployed to both Lebanon and the Dominican
Republic, where it was assigned as a component of a joint force.
60Momyer, p. 62.
61Colonel R. D. Heinl Jr. USMC (Ret), Soldiers of the Sea,
(Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1962), pp. 588-589.
In each of these two instances, Marine forces were employed
under a land force component commander, maintaining their
complete integrity.62
A Marine helicopter squadron, HMM-362, in 1962 became the
first Marine unit to deploy to Vietnam. By 11 May 1965 a Marine
air-ground team, III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) (Third Marine
Division and the First Marine Aircraft Wing) was in place in
Vietnam.63
In September 1963, CINCPAC convened a board to examine how
TACAIR should be coordinated in a future conflict. This action
was largely prompted by the lessons of the Korean War. The board
included representatives from all the Services. The board in its
findings, acknowledged that each Service utilizes organic
aircraft to carry out tactical missions, and recommended compon-
ent commanders should be appointed by a joint force commander to
serve as a coordinating authority for tactical air operations.64
JCS Pub 1 provides the following definition for "coordinat-
ing authority":
A commander or individual assigned responsibility for
62Major Jack K. Ringler USMC and Henry I. Shaw Jr., U.S. Marine
Corps Operations in the Dominican Republic April-June 1965 (U),
(Washington D.C.: HQMC Historical Division, 1970), pp. 43-44; and
HQMC Point Paper # 718-82, subj. Functional Components, 1
November 1982.
63Lieutenant General Kieth B. McCutcheon USMC, "Marine Aviation
in Vietnam, 1962-1970" United States Naval Institute Proceedings,
May 1971, pp. 124,127.
64McCuthcheon, p. 135.
coordinating specific functions or activities involving
forces of two or more Services or two or more forces of
the same Service. The commander or individual has the
authority to require consultation between the agencies
involved, but does not have the authority to compel
agreement. In the event that essential agreement
cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the
appointing authority.65
CINCPAC utilized a coordinating authority during photo
missions flown in Laos in 1964.66 With the introduction of
Marines into Vietnam in 1965, CINCPAC issued the following
guidance to the Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command
Vietnam (COMUSMACV):
a. The Commanding General of the MEB (Marine Expedi-
tionary Brigade) would report to COMUSMACV as Naval
Component Commander.*
b. COMUSMACV would exercise operational control of
the MEB through the CG of the MEB.
c. Commander, 2d Air Division, in his capacity as
Air Force Component Commander of MACV would act as
coordinating authority for matters pertaining to
tactical air support and air traffic control in MACV's
area of responsibility.67
65JCS Pub 1, p. 92.
66McCuthcheon, p. 135.
67McCutcheon, p. 135.
* note: In April 1966, III MAF became a uni-Service
component.
COMUSMACV protested to CINCPAC that the Marine Corps
fixed-wing squadron in the MEB should be under "operational
control" of his Air Force component commander. CINCPAC replied,
reemphasizing his previous guidance, that "operational control of
the squadron would be exercised through the MEB and not the 2d
Air Division."68
In an April 1965 directive, CINCPAC stated that close air
support was the priority mission in Vietnam along with reiterat-
ing the previous guidance that COMUSMACV's Air Force component
commander was the coordinating authority in matters pertaining to
tactical air support and air traffic control.69
A later directive from CINCPAC stated that the Air Force
component commander (now designated Commander Seventh Air Force)
was the "coordinating authority" for all U.S. and Free World
Military Air Force air operations and Vietnamese Air Force
activities in the MACV area of operations.70 The same directive
stated that the Commanding General of III MAF exercised opera-
tional control over all Marine aviation. The one exception was
when COMUSMACV directed the Air Force component commander in the
event of a "major emergency or disaster" to take operational
control of Marine aviation. Furthermore, excess Marine sorties
were to be identified to the air coordinating authority
68McCutcheon, p. 135.
69McCutcheon, p. 136.
70McCutcheon, p. 136.
(Commander Seventh Air Force) for use in support of other forces
or missions.71
In August 1965 an agreement was reached between the Command-
er of the Seventh Air Force and III MAF concerning air defense.
The Air Force wanted operational control of air defense assets,
while the Marine Corps had been concerned because their air
defense fighter, the F-4, was a multi-mission aircraft equally
suitable for direct support of Marine ground forces. The
agreement retained operational control of Marine air under III
MAF while the Marines conceded the necessity of having a single
commander responsible for air defense, hence "requisite author-
ity for purposes of air defense was passed to the Air Force."72
Such was the framework for the pre-1969 policy for the command,
control, and coordination of Marine aviation in Vietnam, an
"entirely adequate system" as far as III MAF was concerned.73
This system as it then existed, was very similar to the current
JCS guidance on the command and control of Marine TACAIR in
sustained joint land operations. However, 1968 saw certain
events transpire which served to alter this arrangement.
Looking at the pre-1968 arrangement from the Air Force
perspective, the Air Force had attempted unsuccessfully to obtain
control of both Marine TACAIR as well as Army helicopters.74 in
his book General Momyer addresses the directives which provided
71McCutcheon, pg. 136
72McCutcheon, p. 136.
72McCutcheon, p. 136.
74Momyer, pp. 81-82.
for III MAF retention of operational control of all Marine air,
however he fails to mention the Air Force's role as coordinating
authority. In explanation of the many attempts on the part of
the Air Force to obtain operational control of Marine air,
General Momyer provides some interesting observations on his
part. It should be noted that General Momyer was the Commander
of the Seventh Air Force from July 1966 to August 1969. On the
subject of how Marine air responded to the tasking of III MAF, he
states:
III MAF did not evaluate the requests for the air
support, nor determine what the priority for support
would be. Instead, the Marine tactical air control
system scheduled all in-commission aircraft into each
of the division areas on a planned flow, a costly way
to manage air resources for sustained operations of an
air-ground campaign. The Marine system was designed
for amphibious operations, where the lack of artillery
required air power overhead at all times. In this
operation where obtaining a beachhead is critical, the
use of air power in this manner can be justified.
However, it is highly expensive to keep aircraft
overhead at all times throughout the day and critical
periods at night when there are no targets.75
This quote certainly appears to be a major overstatement of
75Momyer, p. 285.
the fundamental ideological differences between the Air Force and
the Marine Corps, while it casts justified doubt on General
Momyer's personal comprehension of what the Marines were doing.
The Air Force felt that "preplanned strikes were more economical
than on-station sorties, and that directed strikes would deter-
mine ground operations."76 The Marine Corps doctrine calls for
air operations in support of the ground effort and the Marine
Corps argued against "single management" on two counts: 1) it
would increase response time, and 2) it was not necessary.77
General Momyer paints an almost slanderous picture of Marine
air, stating: "the 1st Marine Air Wing divided its aircraft
between the two Marine divisions and, irrespective of the ground
situation, scheduled these aircraft into their areas in a steady
stream."78 Anyone even vaguely familiar with the doctrine,
procedures, and functioning in question, of Marine Corps tactical
air command and control, can immediately recognize the fallacy of
this representation!
As events unfolded during the seige of Khe Sanh and with the
Tet offensive providing a back drop for the argument for central-
ized control of air, Generals Westmoreland and Momyer won a split
decision from the U.S. national military command authority. The
result was a single management system in which U.S. Army and
Marine forces were placed under one commander, MACV foward, and
Marine TACAIR was placed under the "operational direction"
76DIP No. 12, p. 36.
77McCutcheon, p. 137.
78Momyer, p. 286.
authority of Seventh Air Force (the Air Force component
commander- General Momyer).79
What evolved, appears to be a precarious system interdepend-
ent upon the personalities of the individuals involved in the
application of a directive void of detailed procedures.
The Air Force describes the outcome of the implementation of
this policy when it quotes from Lieutenant General McCutcheon's
article on Marine aviation in Vietnam (misidentifying the author
as "Lieutenant Colonel" McCutcheon):
There was no doubt whether single management was an
overall improvement as far as MACV as a whole was
concerned. It was.80
This is another example, where in historical examination of
the basic issue, quotes have been taken out of context by the
USAF to serve as a dramatic means of justifying their position.
In his article, Lieutenant General McCutcheon goes on to describe
how through cooperation between on scene commanders and cooper-
ation at the operational level, "for all practical purposes, the
system worked around to just about where it was in the pre-single
management days as far as identification or fragging of Marine
sorties."81 One factor which affected the working of the
new policy was the fact that "operational direction" was not a
defined term. it appears that in the actual working execution of
79DIP No. 12, p. 14, and McCutcheon, p. 137.
80DIP No. 11, p. 6.
81McCutcheon, p. 137.
the single management directive, the Marine Corps never relin-
quished operational control of its aircraft.
The following excerpt contains testimony of Major General
H.S. Hill USMC (DCS-Air when questioned by Mr. Kendall, Chief
counsel to U.S. Senate, Special Close Air Support Subcommittee
hearing on Close Air Support, 1 November 1971, on the subject of
control of Marine air in Vietnam,82
Mr. Kendall. General, isn't it true that ultimately
the control of all the Marine air assets in South
Vietnam were placed under the control of the 7th Air
Force?
General Hill. No, sir, that is not correct,
Mr. Kendall. The arrangement initially in South
Vietnam prescribed in MACV Directive 95-4 was that
Marine air assets were primarily in support of the III
MAF and III MAF would augment daily the U.S. Air Force
effort with resources not required to support opera-
tions of prime concern to III MAF. Those assets that
were not required or could be made available were made
available to the joint task force commander and he
could frag them and utilize them wherever he desired.
There was a change to that directive in which all
preplanned requests for aircraft, including Marine
82U.S. Cong., Senate, Special Subcommittee on Close Air Support,
Close Air Support, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., (Washington D.C.: GPO,
1972), pp. 291-292.
aircraft, were processed by the MACV Tactical Air
Support Element (TASE) for assignment of priorities.
The Marines retained sorties necessary to support USMC
peculiar operations, but the other remaining sorties
were allocated through the TASE in Saigon. The
commander 7th Air Force, being the commander, coordina-
ted the fragging of these aircraft with the 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing.
Mr. Kendall. Are you familiar with the fact that
General Momyer testified that he insisted that all of
the in-country assets be placed under his control, and
particularly at the time of Khe Sanh?
General Hill. Yes, sir; I am aware of that. The
way it turned out, the control of those air assets were
under the joint force commander, Mr. Kendall.
Mr. Kendall. Isn't General Momyer the joint force
commander?
General Hill. No; he was the Air Force component
commander. The joint force commander was MACV.
Mr. Kendall. So then to that extent General
Momyer's testimony was inaccurate; is that your
statement?
General Hill. I would say that it just lacked
further detailed explanation, sir, because the assign-
ment of priorities actually came through the TASE which
was underneath the joint force commander General
Westmoreland, and later, General Abrams.
From the Marine Corps vantage, there is an important
distinction between having the joint force commander, not the Air
Force component commander assign priorities. This subject will
be examined in the next chapter.
In 1970 there was a revision of MACV's guidance, which
basically stated that CG III MAF had operational control over all
his air assets and that 7th Air Force was the coordinating
authority.83
Embroiled in the many conflicting accounts are few common
threads. Vietnam did not provide a precedent for functional
components; it was a mixture of uni-Service, area, and functional
commands. Additionally, depending upon the perspective of the
author, the command relationships between the various Service air
arms gas either one of intense inter-Service rivalry or great
cooperation. Valid arguments for centralized direction of the
air effort existed, but the question arises, at what level was
the centralized direction to take place? The advantages of
centralized direction were demonstratively offset by degraded
responsiveness to the needs of the supported ground commander.
Centralized control of air power is of great benefit to the
theater Air Force component commander but at potential great cost
to the MAGTF.
It can be argued that the theater air component commander
83McCutcheon, p. 137, and DIP No. 11, p. 36.
was gaining air resources to fulfill his responsibilities in
executing an interdiction campaign and to support the Army
forces. This hypothesis can be examined through the CAS issue.
Colonel Robert E. Buhrow USAF in his research paper, Close Air
Support Requirements: A Study of Interservice Rivalry sheds light
upon this issue. He begins with a quote from a 1966 House Armed
Services Committee hearing on close air support:".... we feel that
in its [the Air Force] magnificent accomplishments in the wild
blue yonder it has tended to ignore the foot soldier in the dirty
brown under."84 Colonel Buhrow states that at the begining of
U.S. involvement in Vietnam the Air Force did not have a suitable
attack aircraft. He describes how members of the House Committee
made the statement that the Air Force failed in its assigned
mission of providing close air support to the Army in Vietnam.
After examining the Air Force and Army reactions to this state-
ment, Colonel Buhrow concludes that "the House Armed Services
Committee was correct--the Air Force entered the Vietnam conflict
with little or no close air support capability." He finishes his
study by recommending that the Air Force operate aircraft
dedicated to Army support and that the Army have "complete
command and control of these assets."85
Viewing the CAS issue from another perspective, General
Momyer testified: "the U.S. Air Force is proud of its tradition
84Colonel Robert E. Buhrow USAF, Close Air Support Requirements: A
Study in Interservice Rivalry, (U.S. Army War College, 1 March
1971), p. 1.
85Buhrow, pp. 9, 39, 50.
in providing close air support to ground forces; this is one of
the most important missions conducted by tactical air power."86
Fundamentally it boils down to the fact that Marine aviation
is tailored to one mission, support of the Marine ground action,
while the Air Force has the divided responsibility for both
support of the Army ground action as well as the theater air
effort. History has raised the possibility that the Air Force
may not have been adequately equipped or prepared for the two
tasks at hand; which leads to conjecture that in the centralized
direction of TACAIR assets the Air Force is attempting to offset
its own shortfalls. Regardless of the degree of validity of
this presumption, the mere fact that it is conceivable weakens
arguments for centralized control of theater TACAIR. This
couples with the documented fact that, in actuality, the Air
Force component commander in Vietnam never really served as more
than a coordinating authority for air; to set the stage for the
post Vietnam controversy concerning the subject of control of
Marine air in sustained land operations. These deliberations
culminated in the JCS Omnibus Agreement, which today, almost four
years after its inception is still often obscured by attempts to
organize into trilateral functional components on the basis of a
fallacious historical precedent which is not borne out by the
record.
86U.S. COng., Senate, Close Air Support, p. 174.
PART TWO *** CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS
Chapter V The Omnibus Agreement
With the end of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, the
issue of centralized control of all theater TACAIR assets to
include Marine Corps aviation (when Marines are involved in
sustained joint land operations) remained unresolved, largely
because of the inability of the various Services to reach
agreement.
Starting in 1971, at the direction of the Secretary of
Defense, a series of tests centering around close air support
were conducted. They were multi-phased, involving the Air Force,
Marine Corps, and theater commanders. One issue which was raised
was response time in terms of support of ground troops. Discus-
ions between Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) and the USAF Air
Staff were unproductive. During this same time frame the basic
issue surfaced frequently at the FMF operating level.87 In
November 1979 the USAF brought the issue before the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.88
In March 1980 the issue was at the forefront as a result of
the review of CINCNORTH's OPLAN "Brawny Gambit" in which the
policy concerning the employment of a MAGTF participating as part
of a joint task force was contested. The Air Force took
87OH 5-1.1, p. 1-1.
88Commandant of the Marine Corps, White Letter No. 7-81, Encl (2),
p. 1.
exception to the employment of the MAGTF as an entity, insisting
that it be broken up with its air and ground elements placed
under separate NATO component commanders. By December 1980 there
were four additional plans awaiting review. The review process
was held up for over a year because of continued intransigence on
the part of the Air Force concerning the issue of control of
Marine TACAIR.89 The Marine Corps position had remained stead-
fast: that even in joint operations, the MAGTF commander always
maintains integrity of the MAGTF, he always retains operational
control of his organic air assets, that MAGTF aviation is
employed in support of Marine ground forces and that the Marine
Corps would provide those sorties in excess of MAGTF direct
support requirements to other components of the joint force, or
the joint force as a whole.90
The Marine Corps positon at this time was very much
identical to the pre-1968 arrangement for the command and control
of Marine air in Vietnam as directed by CINCPAC and implemented
by MACV (see chapter IV) even to the point of acknowledging
relinquishment of operational control when the joint force
commander (JFC) declared a major emergency.
In March 1981 the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed and published
a policy for the employment of the MAGTF as a part of a Joint
task force in sustained operations ashore. This policy statement
89Memorandum by CMC for JCS #6-80, subj: Command and Control of
TACAIR, 22 December 1980, pp. 1-2.
90Memorandum by J-3 for the JCS 2521/384-8, subj: Command and
Control of TACAIR DECISION, revised 27 March 1981, p. 15.
is commonly referred to as the "Omnibus Agreement" and it reads
in whole:
The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander
will retain operational control of his organic air
assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF air combat
element is the support of the MAGTF ground element.
During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will
normally be in support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF
commander will make sorties available to the joint
force commander, for tasking through his air component
commander, for air defense, long-range interdiction,
and long-range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of
MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to
the joint force commander for tasking through the air
component commander for the support of other components
of the JTF, or the JTF as a whole.
Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of
the Theater or joint force commander, in the exercise
of operational control, to assign missions, redirect
efforts, and direct coordination among his subordinate
commanders to insure unity of effort in accomplishment
of his overall mission, or to maintain integrity of the
force, as prescribed in JCS Pub II, "Unified Action
Armed Forces (UNAAF)."91
91CMC, White Letter 7-81 encl (1), p. 1.
This agreement has since been written into JCS Pub 12, Tactical
Command and Control Planning Guidance and Procedures for Joint
Operations. Analyzing the agreement, it is very similar to the
position the Marine Corps had been maintaining. Of foremost
import is the retention of operational control by the MAGTF
commander of his organic air assets. Of additional importance
is the affirmation of the primary mission of Marine air being the
support of Marine ground forces.
In this agreement the Marines provide sorties to the JFC in
the areas of air defense and long-range interdiction and
long-range reconnaissance. This is, in essence, a concession by
the Marines that the Air Force component commander can best
support the joint force as a whole (to include the MAGTF) by
centralized management of these particular mission areas. It is
also inherent in this provision that, by accepting these sorties,
the Air Force component commander agrees to manage and fulfill
the requirements of the entire joint task force in these three
mission areas. One problem which immediately surfaces is: what
is the definition of "long-range"? The answer is no where to be
found. It is not contained in the text of the agreement, any JCS
Pubs, Air Force or Marine Corps directives!
In addition to the sorties in those three specified mission
areas, sorties in excess of Marine direct support requirements
(read support of Marine ground element) will be provided to the
JFC. inherent in this is the responsibility for the Air Force
component commander to be prepared to provide support to the
MAGTF when the tactical situation so warrants.
The final paragraph of the agreement reaffirms the command
prerogative of the JFC and basically is a rewording of his
authority to assume control of Marine TACAIR in the event of a
major emergency.
While the Omnibus Agreement is fairly straight foward and
succinct, it contains leeway for misunderstanding and confusion
in its implementaion.
The Omnibus Agreement was disseminated to the Marine Corps
in a White Letter from the Commandant of the Marine Corps, which
contained an enclosure providing guidance for its interpreta-
tion.92 This guidance centers upon joint land operations, since
as it states, amphibious operations were not at issue in the JCS
decision which led to the Omnibus Agreement. In addition to
defining terms, the guidance contains some other salient points.
Under explanation of the sorties to be provided the JFC in
air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnais-
sance, when the Air Force component commander assumes responsi-
bilities of these functions for the joint force as a whole, dual
mission aircraft are addressed. Current Marine VMFA (fighter
attack squadrons) possess aircraft which are capable of perform-
ing either air defense, close air support, or interdiction
missions (Marine functions of AAW, CAS, DAS). The important
point here is that the MAGTF commander provides sorties, not
92Additonally, OH 5.1-1, Command and Control of USMC TACAIR has
been promulgated to aid Marines in understanding the agreement
along with related Marine Corps policy and doctrine.
aircraft.
The next point addresses deployment of MAGTF air assets in
advance of the ground element. There are certain scenarios where
all or portions of the air combat element (ACE) will deploy into
a theater of operation well in advance of the ground combat
element (for instance due to time constraints in assemblying,
loading, and floating amphibious shipping). In these instances a
MAGTF foward command will be esablished (i.e. the ACE, normally
the Marine Air Wing commander, would become the MAF foward
commander). As the MAGTF foward commander he would then operate
in compliance with the provisions of the Omnibus Agreement. If
an aviation force is in place and operationally mission capable
prior to requirements for MAGTF direct support, the MAGTF foward
commander will offer all his available sorties to the JFC in
accordance with the excess sortie provision of the agreement.
In all cases the MAGTF commander retains operational
control. This is accomplished through the apportionment,
allocation, and tasking processes. JCS Pub 1 provides the
following definitions:
Apportionment- The determination and assignment of the total
expected effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be
devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for
a given period of time.
Allocation- The translation of the apportionment into total
numbers of sorties by aircraft type available for each opera-
tion/task.
Tasking- The process of translating the allocation into
orders, and passing these orders to the units involved. Each
order normally contains sufficient detailed instructions to
enable the executing agency to accomplish the mission successful-
ly.
To understand how the MAGTF commander accomplishes these
actions, it is necessary to examine them at the joint force or
theater level first.
The JFC starts by making an apportionment decision based
upon his concept of operations and the enemy situation. This,
normally, is in the form of a percentage of utilization by
functional area (i.e. offensive counter air, interdiction, CAS,
etc.). This effectively provides a demarcation between which
portion of the Air Force component commander's effort will be
utilized supporting the ground component, and which portion is
devoted to the theater or joint force air war. How the JFC
arrives at this decision is not specified. He may make this
decision in isolation with his staff, with the advice of all his
subordinate component commanders, or simply by accepting the
recommendation of his Air Force component commander. Included in
the air assets that are affected by this decision are those
sorties provided to the JFC by the Marines in accordance with the
Omnibus Agreement. The Air Force component commander takes the
apportionment decision along with any concurrent guidance and
allocates the resources available to him (organic Air Force plus
Marine sorties provided) among the various missions designated by
the JFC. This allocation consists of translation of apportion-
ment (which is predicated upon availability) into sortie numbers
with distribution among using units where applicable. The Air
Force component commander then tasks them through his Air Tasking
Order (ATO) normally in the form of a message. JCS Pub 12
contains the detailed procedures for effecting these actions.
At the MAGTF level, the MAGTF commander apportions his
assets by percentage or priority based upon his concept of
operations and the enemy situation. Additionally, the MAGTF
apportionment decision includes identification of sorties in the
areas of air defense, long-range interdiction and long-range
reconnaissance which will be made available to the JFC. Through-
out the apportionment process the MAGTF commander's first
priority is supporting the accomplishment of the MAGTF's assigned
mission.
Normally the allocation process for the MAGTF occurs at the
MAGTF Tactical Air Command Center (TACC).93 In the event sorties
are available in excess of MAGTF requirements, these sorties are
made available to the JFC; likewise if there is a shortage of
Marine TACAIR assets to support the MAGTF, these shortages are
identified to the JFC.94
Tasking for the MAGTF occurs at the MAGTF TACC and consists
of development of a frag or ATO. Here there must be liaison and
93For a detailed discussion of the factors and mechanics involved
in the MAGTF apportionment and allocation processes see OH 5-3,
Tasking USMC Fixed-Wing Tactical Aviation, July 1982, section 3.
94CMC, White Letter 7-81, encl (2), p. 5.
coordination between the MAGTF TACC and the Air Force component
TACC.
While the framework for these actions is relatively straight-
foward, and there is amplifying guidance for the conduct of
these three processes (JCS Pub 12, OH 5-1.1, and OH 5- 3), the
Marine Corps experiences problems in the practical application of
these tasks.
Many Marine officers do not understand that there are two
unique categories of sorties provided to the JFC for tasking
through the Air Force component commander. The first category
consists of those sorties provided in the three specific mission
areas, when the Air Force component commander assumes responsi-
bility for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range
reconnaissance. The second category of sorties provided are the
excess sorties, which are offered or received without any
expectation of support in return. Despite the plethora of
definitive guidance on the subject, many Marines have the
mistaken belief that MAGTF will provide to the JFC excess sorties
only in the areas of air defense, long-range interdiction, and
long-range reconnaissance.95 There are Marine commanders and
staff officers who do not fully understand their responsibilities
in the apportionment and allocation processes.96
This lack of understanding on the part of some Marine Corps
95CO Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (MCTSSA) ltr
D122-.3/WTF:cj over 3900-303 dtd 14 November 1983 and
CO MCTSSA ltr D122-3/WTF:meb over 3920-303-1 dtd 12 March 1984.
"Personal observations of author during joint exercises.
players in this area is exacerbated by the Air Force's interpre-
tation of the Omnibus Agreements often making working
relationships at the operational levels difficult. For example,
the Air Force does not share the Marine Corps interpretation of
what sorties are in excess of MAGTF requirements. The necessity
for understanding and cooperation between the Air Force and the
Marine Corps has been brought to the forefront with the advent of
the Joint Tactical Interoperability Tactical Command and Control
Systems (JINTACCS) where written joint interface operating
procedures must be developed to effect the necessary interService
functioning. A large portion of the problem of developing a
system of information data exchange for JINTACCS centers around
the Air Force's interpretation of the Omnibus Agreement.
The JCS reached agreement on the policy set forth in the
Omnibu Agreement in a meeting on 27 March 1981.97 in April 1981
the Air Force issued Doctrinal Information Publication (DIP) No.
10 in response to the Omnibus Agreement. In this publication it
is stated that the JCS agreement "is an interim JCS Omnibus
Agreement on the way the MAGTFs should be integrated into plans
for sustained operations ashore. This is a first step."98 (bold
added for emphasis). No where else is or has the Omnibus
Agreement been referred to as interim.!
Next the Air Force drafted DIP No. 11 outlining the command
relationships for the MAGTF. This publication contains a copy of
97JCS Memorandum 2521/384-8, p. 14.
98DIP Ho. 10, p. 1.
the following message which was sent by the JCS to the CINCs of
all unified add specified commands:99
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WISH TO INSURE THAT ALL
UNDERSTAND THE ORGANIZATIONAL AUTHORITY OF FIELD
COMMANDERS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR PLANS. COMMAND-
ERS DO HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ORGANIZE THEIR FORCES AS
THEY DETERMINE TO BE MOST EFFECTIVE FOR IMPLEMENTATION
OF THEIR OPERATIONAL PLANS, TO INCLUDE EXERCISING.
Also included in DIP No. 11 is an attachment providing the
Air Force interpretation of the debate items in the 4 December
1981 OCS meeting in which the JCS agreed to send this message.
it states that the JCS agreed that during sustained operations
ashore a field commander should place "the Marine ground forces
subordinate to a land component commander."100 Concerning
control of MAGTF air it repeats the intent of the Omnibus
Agreement.
Speaking of this message, the Air Force states: "the Air
Force endorses the message as the most current iteration and
interpretation of this issue."101
Upon review of what is presented in DIP No, 11 along with
the unofficial opinions of individuals knowledgeable on this
subject, it appears that the 4 December 1981 message was sent as
99JCS 042226Z Dec 81, subj: Command Relationships in Operational
Plan Development.
100DIP No. 11, p. 21.
101DIP No. 11, p. 2.
a compromise measure following deadlocked debate centering around
the repeated nemesis: whether Marine TACAIR should come under
control of a theater Air Force component commander? Clearly, the
Air Force then attempted to establish the position that this
message abrogated the Omnibus Agreement.
However, such is not the case. The Omnibus Agreement
remains in force as written. But has it served to quell the
issue? Has it helped or hurt the Marine Corps? Is it an end all
to this subject?
Chapter VI Functionalism vs. MAGTF Integrity
Through simple reflection on the military history of the
past fifty years it is prudent to expect that the Omnibus
Agreement might not serve as an end all to the basic issue.
While it has delineated guidance on the issue, establishing what
has been the true historical precedent of MAGTF employment as
doctrine, such specificity has led to a redirection of efforts
aimed at unseating prescribed arrangements.
During August 1971, both the Air Force and the Army issued
memorandums for the JCS dealing with the issue of MAGTF employ-
ment. The Air Force memorandum was brief, simply calling for the
JCS to specify whether a MAGTF would come under a land component
commander for sustained operations ashore or whether it would be
employed as a separate component (hence the JTF would have four
components: land, naval, air, and Marine Corps).102 The Army
memorandum paralleled the Air Forces, concluding that "JCS
should accept subordination of a MAGTF to a land component."103
Having lost the TACAIR issue with the Omnibus Agreement,
the Army and the Air Force have made a concerted effort (as
reflected in these memoranda) to transfer the issue to a doctrin-
al battle over componency; focusing upon the issue of whether the
102Department of the Air Force Memorandum for the Director Plans and
Policy Joint Staff (No. 87-81), subj: Command Relationships for
the MAGTF in Sustained Operations Ashore (J-5P156-81/D), 27
August 1981, p. 1.
103Department of the Army Memorandum for the Director Joint Staff,
subj: Command Relationships for the MAGTF in Sustained Operations
Ashore (J-5P156-81/D), 24 August 1981, p. 2.
MAGTF should comprise a fourth component in joint force structur-
ing. By establishing the MAGTF under a land component commander
(a relationship which has occurred in certain instances, histori -
cally (see Chapter IV)), as a written mandate, a prelude for
future trilateral functional organization is steadily formed.
The logical follow on is to place all aviation under a functional
air component. It is interesting to note that this proposal to
establish definitive guidance for placing the MAGTF under a land
component commander in effect inhibits JFC authority in organiz-
ing his forces in the manner he determines most effective;
the very same argument which the Air Force had used previously
against the Omnibus Agreement's delineatior, of MAGTF integrity.
In February 1982 the Air Force held a planners conference
at which MAGTF command relationships were discussed. The
resultant Air Force position was that a theater command structure
should consist of a ground force component controlling all ground
operations, an air component controlling all air operations, and
a naval component controlling all naval operations. It is
important to remember that JCS Pub 2, Chapter 11 states that the
terms "Service component commands" and "component commands" are
synonymous and can be used interchangeably.
In a memorandum to the JCS, dated 19 April 1982, the Chief
of Staff of the Air Force proposed that JCS Pub 2 be changed to
remove the term "Service component" and to assert that unified
commands are designed to employ forces "functionally, distinct
and separate from their military departments, and that the role
of the Services is to organize, train, equip, and provide forces
for theme combatant commands."104
Records at Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) document the
fact that during a two year period (July 1980 - July 1982) the
MAGTF TACAIR issue was addressed from one angle or another
(command and control of USMC TACAIR, air command and control,
review of JCS Pub 2, functional vs. Service component etc.) over
forty times by the JCS or their operational deputies.
Throughout 1982, every OPLAN under review was challenged by
the Air Force on the issue of a MAGTF Service component vice a
trilateral functional component relationship. In a representa-
tive OPLAN under review (where the subordinate unified commander
involved was an Air Force officer) the OPLAN came up for review,
rewritten, deleting all references to COMMARFOR (Commander
Marine Forces) (the USMC component commander) and replac-
ing "Air Force" component commander with "air", component command-
er.105 An "air" vice "Air Force" component implies more than one
Service. The usage of air component commands is found in
"combined" plans. Combined operations have not been addressed
hereinbefore. Without totally investigating this subject, a
few points should be made.
JCS Pub 1 defines combined force as "a military force
composed of elements of two or more allied nations." Combined
104Memorandum by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force for the JCS
(CSAFM 07-82), subj: Proposal to Change JCS Pub 2 Unified Action
Armed Forces, 19 April 1982, p.
105Documentation of OPLAN involved omitted due to classification.
force structure is normally organized functionally under air.
land, and naval components. The Air Force justification for
revising JCS Pub 2 (CSAFM 07-82) cites combined doctrine and
utilize the rationale of aligning national (joint) doctrine with
combined philosophy. It must be appreciated that combined
dortrine is adapted to certain scenarios where alliances unite
military forces from a multitude of nations, e.g. NATO, Korea,
each of which possesses separate Service components of varying
sizes and force structure. Therefore in the international arena
it may be necessary and prudent to organize along functional
lines for purposes of support, to cover all mission areas, and to
place like Service components together. CSAFM 07-82 states
that: 106
We have espoused to our allies the doctrine of employ-
ing forces functionally through land, naval, and air
component commands. This has been accepted by our
allies with a sense of military judgement that bears
the weight of logic and experience.
However not all combined commands are functionally organized.
Figure 6, from Air Force TACM 2-1, depicts the command structure
for Allied Command Europe. It is composed of various geographic
(area) commands which are broken into subordinate commands
(geographically), some of which possess more than one land
compontent. The ACE mobile force is "formed by seven countries,
106CSAFM 07-82, p. 1.
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it comprises seven infantry battalion groups,... ground support
fighter squadrons, and reconnaissance aircraft."107 Addition-
ally there is one uni-Service command (UK Air). Clearly this
is not the trilateral functional arrangement the Air Force is
attempting to subscribe joint doctrine to; rather, national
Service components serve as she building blocks for this organi-
zation.
To justify not utilizing the MAGTF as a Service component
because of combined doctrine is a mistake, the result of an
attempted oversimplistic approach. The MAGTF is unique. No
other allied nation possesses a Service like the MAGTF, possess-
ing organic air and the means to control it. The MAGTF is bigger
than she Armies and Air Forces of some countries. Additionally
the MAGTF has the ability to integrate its command and control
into the conbined structure (ie. NATO and South Korea) and has
and continues to successfully participate in combined and joint
exercises maintaining MAGTF integrity. The Omnibus Agreement is
written in joint vice combined terminology, however the spirit
and intent of the agreement is readily translatable into the
combined arena, as is evidenced in the results of repeated
exercises.
1984 did not see a decline in efforts to resurrect the basic
issue. It saw the dissemination of DIP No. 12 by the Air Force,
entitled, "Command Relationships". Its basic theme remains
107Tactical Air Command Manual (TACM) 2-1, Tactical Air Operations,
15 April 1978, p. 11-17.
centered on the functional componency vs. Service component
issue, very much in line with the single manager for TACAIR tact
of DIP N0. 10 and DIP No. 11. It parallels the earlier works;
replete with historical views and semantical analyses of JCS
Pub 2.
Obviously this battle is not over. Despite many repeated
initiatives, there has not been any JCS action to countermand,
lessen, or rescind the Omnibus Agreement. The issue will
probably not be brought to a JCS vote until those proposing
change are sure of winning. Currently it appears deadlocked with
the Air Force and Army supporting functionalism in opposition to
the Navy and Marine Corps. But the issue has remained alive in
various forms, even as the key players (the members of the
JCS) change. This issue is orchestrated from the highest
levels. That is where it belongs, if it must exist. What is
important is what the issue means to Marines in the fleet?
Prior to looking at the implications of change, it is beneficial
to see what has been occurring at the operational levels. The
source of this desired insight is contained in the results of
joint exercises.
The ability of the MAGTF to successfully function as a
Service component (in terms of both the objectives of the
MAGTF and the JTF) while operating under the precepts of the
Omnibus Agreement, is well documented in after action reports
(AARs) of many joint exercises. Analysis of a representative
sample, encompassing a variety of contingent scenarios (NATO,
South Korea, and the Middle East) yields consistently successful
results:
1) Successful integration of Marine Air Command and Control
into local air defense systems.
2) Successful practice of command relationships.
3) Effective testing and practice of common air tasking (CAT)
procedures.
4) Expeditious execution of the tasking of excess sorties
with correct procedures well disseminated and well known,
These comments all reflect experiences derived from exercising
the MAGTF as a Service component. They are taken from a one year
sample of joint force level AARs (individual reference omitted
due to classification). In the five force level AARs there were
no deleterious consequences mentioned concerning employment of
the MAGTF as a Service component. However this is not to imply
that there were not minor difficulties in execution and some
lessons learned. These are best summarized by the following
problem areas which are extracted from a Marine Corps report.108
It should be noted that the force level AAR for the same
exercise did not portray these or any other problem areas
concerning the basic issue.
1) There were several ATO distribution problems, with copies of
the ATO never being received by Marine Forces on two of the
exercise days.
108CG THIRD MAW 240039Z FEB 82, subj: Joint Readiness Exercise After
Action Report Concerning Common Air Tasking Procedures (UNCLAS).
2) The Air Force component commander attempted to include all
available fixed-wing sorties (Air Force, Navy, and Marine) in the
ATO. Once the ATO was disseminated, the Air Force component
commander "demonstrated total in flexibility with regard to
implementation of timely changes to the ATO."
3) The definitions and terms employed in the air employment
plan message do not reflect USMC aviaiton functions and mis-
sions. The air employment plan message is sent by subordinate
commanders to the CJTF to identify any excess sorties and
unfulfilled requirements (reference- JCS Pub 12, Vol IV).
4) Current Air Force component commander procedures pointed to
the fact that the Air Force "wants to pursue an air campaign in
context that air power is the ultimate weapon and that there is
absolutely no thought given to the fact that aviation is a
supporting arm and therefore must integrate ite efforts so as to
optimize its support of the ground forces and the overall JTF
objectives".
5) During the exercise the Air Force component commander's
attitude "was one of attempting to implement absolute control
vice coordination" when dealing with the Marine aviation as
"every effort was made to restrict initiatives" in supporting the
Marine ground forces scheme of maneuver beyond the fire support
coordination line (FSCL). The Air Force's "arrogant attitude"
was exemplified by instances when Air Force sorties were flown
within the Marine forces objective area without any attempted
coordination on the part of the Air Force (to include a strike
which was conducted inside the Marine force's FSCL).
These items which affected MAGTF aviation during this
particular joint exercise are representative of problems fre-
quently encountered and are worthy of analysis.
Procedures for CAT and ATO distribution need refining.
This is a real problem which is currently being addressed and
hopefully reconciled with the advent of JINTACCS. The develop-
ment of JINTACCS interface operating procedures appears to
include procedures for efficient handling of joint mission
(ie. air defense) sorties and cross force (excess sorties)
tasking. However other ATO problems are likely to endure:
communication difficulties, Air Force lead time requirements, and
the lack of universally accepted phraseology. These are all
problems which will arise regardless of whether the MAGTF is
employed as a Service component, maintaining its integrity, or in
the manner currently espoused by the Air Force. ATO lead time is
a major concern. It would be severely magnified in scope if
Marine TACAIR was to fall under operational control of the Air
Force component commander. Problems with the dissimilarity of
terms are highlighted with the comparison of DAS and INT. In the
Marine Corps, DAS is equivalent solely to the Air Force mission
of INT, however the Air Force mission of BAI may fall into the
Marine Corps definition of either CAS or DAS (dependent upon the
target: location with respect to the FSCL). While the Marine
Corps resists usage of Air Force terminology, in certain OPLANS
the Marine Corps has signed off on usage of these terms. An
across the board policy or adjustment is needed.
The remaining problem highlighted by the Marine AAR centers
on the interpretation and application of the doctrine and concept
of MAGTF employment. All players, Air Force and Marine, must
understand, appreciate, and employ the role of the Air Force
component commander as one of coordinating authority vice one of
direction. Marines should be given a large enough parcel of
airspace (airspace control sector) to take full advantage of the
Marine Corps capability to project firepower beyond the FSCL.
These problems do not always arise and are probably best describ-
ed as "personality dependent" and the likely result of Marine
planning staffs, commanders, and liaison officers who are unable
to effectively articulate proper doctrine and employment proced-
ures. Failing satisfaction at this level, it should be a JFC
problem.
The bottom line is that the system works. It works in all
scenarios. At the operational level there are no major prob-
lems, and the problems that do exist are identified. They do not
revolve around the current established doctrinal employment of
the MAGTF. Rather they are the nuts and bolts inter-working
procedures which must be identified and hammered out through
exercise at the operational level.
Herein is how the system works with MAGTF integrity.
However given the continual efforts at higher levels to ammend
JCS Pub 2 and to reorganize along a trilateral functional basis,
the potential implications at the operational level should be
contrasted with the current situation potrayed above.
Chapter VII Implication for Marines
From the theater level perspective, centralized control of
airpower is clearly the most efficient means of operation.
Service affiliations should be placed aside, allowing a doctrine
of single management to emerge.
Viewing air employment at a level below the theater level
results in limits on the effects and effectiveness of airpower.
A decentralized control of air assets leads to an inappropriate
division of the battlefield where the air commander is unable to
mass his forces in times of necessity -- offensive or defensive.
Air forces inherently have a broader scope than surface-
bound forces. Tactically, this perspective is viewed from the
vantage of the entire theater. In line with this perspective all
peripheral, attached, assigned, and in support of air resources
must work for one air component commander. The air component
commander is then responsible for planning and integrating these
assets and insuring their protection and tactical employment to
properly marshal their maneuver, firepower, and psychological
potential.
A single manager of all theater air assets provides the
mechanism for managing all assets (ie. EW, CAS, air defense, air
refueling etc.) in support of theater requirements, providing for
coordinated, effective, integrated air operations.
Centralized management and direction results in decreased
late sorties, missed targets, inappropriate ordnance loads and
otherwise inefficient air asset employment. Additionally,
aviators receive the benefits of more planning time, better
sequencing, and improved management.
These are all arguments and justifications which have been
put forth by the Air Force. Admittedly they suggest a strong
case for managing the finite resources of air power in order to
maximize the punch in terms of effort expended, provide a means
for massing air power, and provide an improved management design
leading to zero diverts. However while these points should be
recognized, a careful distinction must also be acknowledged:
observation of the fact that the Air Force is proposing a
"producer" oriented system as opposed to a "consumer" oriented
system.
A system as espoused by the Air Force stands to impact
heavily upon a MAGTF. There are real and valid implications
involved here. They must be understood, for there are a variety
of scenarios which could lead to either a loss of MAGTF integrity
or an air component commander functionally in charge of all
theater TACAIR:
1) A change to JCS Pub 2 and current joint doctrine resulting
in a trilateral functional approach to joint force organization.
While this is not likely, the Air Force has not backed down from
its repeated attempts to institute such a change.
2) A unified commander utilizing his perogative and authority
to exercise operational command to include organization of
subordinate forces for missions assigned to him on either an
area or functional basis. While this is possible, current
exercise results and established doctrine militate against it.
However, in "emergency" situations it is reasonable to expect
that a JFC may temporarily assume operational control of all
TACAIR.
3) The current Air Land Battle doctrine, in particular the Army-
Air Force agreement on procedures for the Joint Attack of the
Second Echelon (J-SAK) with its inherent division of battlefield
responsibilities and structuring, may in effect serve as a
de facto means of providing for the establishment of an air
component commander with authority exceeding that of an Air Force
component commander as established by the Omnibus Agreement and
JCS Pub 2.109 This raises pertinent questions about the arrange-
ment of the joint battlefield, particularly when a MAGTF conduct-
ing sustained land operations is included.
Given Air Force control of Marine TACAIR beyond the level
established by current doctrine (Omnibus Agreement- joint
missions/excess sorties) for one of the above or any other
potential reasons, there are four areas of major concern to the
MAGTF:
1) loss of the primary mission role of Marine TACAIR
2) responsiveness
109TRADOC Pam 525-45/TACP 50-29, General Operating Procedures for
Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (J-SAK), 31 December 1984,
pp. [2-2] - [2-5].
3) structuring of the battlefield- areas of interest/influence
4) loss of MAGTF aviation force tailoring
The MAGTF's aviation combat element primary mission is
support of the MAGTF. This is clearly established by both Marine
Corps and joint doctrine. The placement of all TACAIR under
control of an air component commander would result in a loss of
commitment to this first priority. While support needs of the
MAGTF might be filled first from Marine aviation assets, this is
not to say that Marine aviation wouldn't be used to offset Air
Force shortfalls in support of the land component commander and
the theater air war, potentially, to the detriment of MAGTF
support requirements. There is a history of Marine air ful-
filling Air Force CAS shortcomings in both Korea and Vietnam.
Beyond the joint mission areas, there are certain aviation
functions which in select contingency scenarios the Air Force
will not have theater assets for, early on. Marine aviation
will be on the scene and capable of performing these functions
(ie. EW, night/all weather CAS (FLIR, TRAM, LTD), and basket
refueling for allied nations aircraft). Marine Corps aviation's
primary mission is not to make up for Air Force force structure
deficiencies. Following fulfillment of MAGTF support reqiure-
ments, excess sorties in these critical mission areas are
provided to the JTF.
Responsiveness is probably the greatest advantage of the
centralized control, decentralized execution aviation command
system of the MAGTF. It is a prime feature of Marine offensive
air support and understandably an area of vital concern to the
ground commander. Responsiveness in terms of dedicated assets,
flexibility, and more importantly, the time factor. Minutes on
the battlefield equate to lives and lost or gained objectives.
The impact upon responsiveness would exist in both immediate and
preplanned requests. All air support requests would have to be
submitted to an additional agency, the air component commander,
and possibly through a land component commander. Clearly, the
more agencies involved, even assuming no communications break-
downs, the greater the response time. Preplanned missions would
be administered through the Air Force frag cycle. The ideal
Marine Corps air tasking cycle is a 24 hour process.110 The Air
Force ATO planning cycle extends out to a 72 hour process.111
The actual allocation in the Air Force process takes place around
36 hours in advance. JINTACCS should refine CAT procedures.
JINTACCS is being evaluated at 24 hours, however the Marine Corps
is pushing for 18 hours.112 The bottom line is responsiveness.
The structuring of the battlefield in joint sustained land
operations, is an area of major importance and concern to the
MAGTF.
110OH 5-3, Tasking USMC Fixed-Wing Tactical Aviation, July 1982,
p. 3-1.
111TRADOC Pam 525-45/TACP 50-29, p. 5-2.
112MCDEC Doctrine Department briefing on "Command and Control of
Marine Air", 19 December 1984
A variety of scenarios exist for inclusion of the MAGTF
within the JTF area of operations (AO). Assigning the MAGTF an
AO separate and detached from the AO for the land components
subordinate commands presents little or no problems. Such would
be the case where the MAGTF is inserted on a geographically
separated flank, or other isolated area as a diversionary or
supporting attack. This could be accomplished with an amphibious
landing, with the AOA translating into an AO and an airspace
control sector (ACS) as the MAGTF chops to the CJTF. This manner
of employment should present no major problems. Remaining
options envision the MAGTF deployed along a Corps or Army front.
If the MAGTF occupies an extreme flank of the front (again
possibly following amphibious establishment ashore) one possible
arrangement would call for the MAGTF's boundary with its one
adjacent unit to serve as a boundary between the distinctively
dissimilar battlefield arrangements (responsibilities, areas of
interest/influence) between the MAGTF and its neighboring Army
unit. This boundary would have to serve as an airspace control
demarcation. While this is not ideal, it is the only working
solution to providing a means for the MAGTF commander to doctrin-
ally employ his TACAIR.
If the MAGTF finds itself on a frontage with adjacent Army
units on each side, then the Army-Air Force doctrine for battle-
field control will most certainly impact negatively upon the
MAGTF and its ability to take advantage of its integral aviation
and other means of indirect firepower.
To analyze what is involved, AirLand Battle doctrine must
be examined, in particular J-SAK, which concerns itself with
the battlefield interdiction effort. To fully appreciate this
agreed doctrine, the Air Force's position on control of the
interdiction effort, and in particular, on firepower expended
beyond the FEBA/FLOT must be understood. The following quotes
from writings in Air Force doctrinal publications, highlight the
Air Force's position during the formulation stage:
The MAGTF is not defined in terms of units or power nor
is its integrity within a sustained broad area air-land
battle practical.113
The Fire Support Coordination Line represents the
extent of land force engagement with their organic
firepower. 114...
BAI missions require joint planning and coordination---
but not close integration, continuous coordination or
land force directed control during execution.115
[note- source publication contains graphic diagrams
depicting BAI targets on both sides of the FSCL]...
Targets beyond the FEBA should be brought under attack
by a single component commander since there is no
arbitrary geographic boundary. The air component
commander should be the responsible commander for the
113DIP No. 10, p. 11.
114DIP No. 10, attachment 9, background paper or Theater Warfare
Planning Boundaries.
115DIP No. 10, attachment 9.
location, identification and attack of such targets.
The ground force commander provides information from
his sources and his interest in the target, but the air
commander makes the decisions to attack, keeps the
ground force commander informed and reports results...
it seems to me the only command level that cuts across
the entire front is the Air component commander and for
that reason, if for no other, must have operational
control, or how one wishes to define it, for weapons
that are employed beyond the FSCL. If that is the
case, why should a Corps weapon system be developed at
all for the ground forces to engage targets beyond the
FSCL when the Air commander already has an arsenal of
weapons for striking such targets; i.e., hard bombs,
CBUs,...stand-off vehicles and GLCM?... We have always
said that interdiction only requires coordination for
the sake of keeping the ground commander informed of
what the air was doing.116
The same process would be applicable in the case of a
Corps weapon that could engage targets beyond the
FEBA. The Corps commander would nominate a target or
the target could be developed by the Air commander and
the Air commander would decide which was the best
weapon to engage the target--Corps weapon, cruise
116DIP No. 10, attachment 9, letter by General Momyer on Theater
Warfare Planning Boundaries, 1 April 1981.
missiles or fighter-bombers. Based on this evaluation,
the Air commander would tell the Corps commander when
to fire the weapon... Since the tactical Air Force is
the only force that has the means and ability to
control firepower beyond the FEBA, it only makes sense
to assign to the operational control of that command
those ground based weapons which are primarily for use
beyond the FEBA.117
These statements reflect the Air Force's position as the
Air Land Battle doctrine was being developed. They should cause
alarm and grave concern in the minds of Marines. The air
component commander concept, stated above, divides the battle-
field both at the FEBA and again horizontally, with the air
component commander assuming vast responsibilities traditionally
belonging to the ground commander.
As Air Land Battle and J-SAK progressed through evolutionary
development, dialogue between the Army and Air Force took
place, independent of the Marine Corps. In 1983 the Air Force
and Army agreed that the area foward of the FSCL was not the
province of either the Army or the Air Force, with both wanting
to attack or battle manage against targets in that area.
Simultaneously debate raged over whether BAI targets can exist
117DIP No. 11, attachment 1, p. 17, Some Thoughts on Command of
Theater Forces, by General Momyer.
short of the FSCL.118
In November 1984 a joint service agreement was signed by the
Army and Air Force on J-SAK. This agreement formed the basis for
the joint publication on "General Operating Procedures for
J-SAK", which has not been formally distributed to the Marine
Corps. The agreement did not mention the FSCL, and the publica-
tion skirts the issue, mentioning it twice, only in reference to
the exchange of information between component commanders on the
placement of it. No where in either document is the location of
BAI wish respect to the FSCL mentioned. The proceedures which
were agreed on, establish the air component commander as respon-
sible for the planning and execution of the interdiction cam-
paign. While the land component commander may attack targets
beyond his FLOT, he coordinates the attack with the air component
through the battlefield coordination element (an Army liaison
agency) which is collocated with the Air Force TACC.
The main concern to the MAGTF is not merely the establish-
ment of a single manager for TACAIR assets, it is, how will the
MAGTF fold into a theater where it must operate adjacent to Army
units employing these established procedures for battlefield
control beyond the FLOT? The implications are multiple. First
of all, the MAGTF commander could be forced to relinquish control
of the airspace above his AO. He then effectively loses the
118CDR TRADOC 231400Z NOV 83, subj: Joint Attack of the Second
Echelon. This message reflects the results of deliberations
between General Richardson USA, CDR TRADOC and General Creech
USAF, CDR TAC.
capability of conducting air operations in support of his scheme
of maneuver within his areas of influence and interest. Ad-
ditionally, the MAGTF stands to have the burden of additional
coordination responsibilities which would increase response time
for artillery support. Since the Air Force has essentially
established the area beyond the FLOT as a free fire area for air
interdiction, control of targets within the MAGTF AO as well as
the safety of long-range patrols and reconnaissance teams would
be threatened. While control of TACAIR may be retained by the
MAGTF, the additional communications and coordination require-
ments stand to deal the MAGTF a measure of impotency in project-
ing its synergistic combat power on the joint battlefield.
The Air Force, AirLand Battle doctrine, and manuever
warfare advocates all are effectively attempting to strip the
battlefield of lines and its traditional systematic organiza-
tion. However the Marine Corps has not lost sight of the fact
that:
The application of air delivered munitions in close
proximity to friendly units in combination with their
scheme of fire and maneuver and their commanders
intent, requires control measures that are both strict
and clear. Laxness, vagueness or ambiguity in direc-
tion and execution will result in ineffective delivery
at best, or friendly casualties at worst.... It must be
kept in mind that these geographic control measures are
not meant merely to permit senior echelon commanders to
impose arbitrary limits on initiative and independence
of his subordinates, but rather to permit the sure and
timely application of combined arms firepower and
logistic support.119
This major serious implication to the MAGTF in joint sustained
land operations centers around the fact that not only must the
MAGTF retain its integrity, it must be employed in a manner in
which the MAGTF commander can employ his aviation and other
organic firepower effectively within his AO beyond his FLOT and
FSCL. This appears to entail the MAGTF being assigned a geo-
graphically detached or flank AO within the theater perspective.
There remains an additional area of concern to the MAGTF
surrounding the consequences of a change to current employment
doctrine. Marine aviation is structured by its various functions
to provide a force capable of supporting the GCE. It contains
just the right amount of precise capabilities to provide this
support, probably more the result of cummulative experience than
visionary planning. The modern battlefield will require that
aviation be employed in balanced strike packages to insure
survival and success. These strike packages will include, by
neccessity, such functions as fighter escort, electronic warfare
support, anti-radiation missiles, airborne foward air control,
119Lieutenant Colonel Jack W. Rippy USMC, The Impact of Maneuver
Warfare Strateqy/Tactics on the U.S. Marine Corps' Integrated
Air/Ground (MAGTF) Doctrine, (Naval War College, 22 June 1984),
pp. 12-13.
tanker support, and multi-sensor reconnaissance. Within the ACE
of a MAGTF exists the capability to put together the neccessary
packages in order to provide effective offensive air support.
This is one of the tangible advantages of the level of control
provided by the MAGTF. It speaks strongly against routine
employment of Marine aviaiton in support of the Air Force
component commander's air war. Despite advances in inter-Service
interoperability, there is no substitute or match for a tailored
force, such as a MAGTF, which shares operational and administra-
tive command along with common tactics and training. Given
difficulties of communications and coordination alone, joint-
Service strike packages pose real challenges during both the
planning and execution stage.
This is not to say that in joint mission areas (air defense,
long-range interdiction and long-range reconnaissance) there is
not an advantage to having a joint effort and coordinating
authority. And certainly, excess sorties will be provided, as
they historically have been (even pre-dating written agreements
to that effect). However little mention is made of the inductive
benefits of uni-Service strike package composition, particularaly
in light of the "fog of war".
The arrangement for joint mission sorties has the potential
to influence the composition of Marine aviation. To have an
aircraft which possesses the sole mission capability of say air
defense or long-range reconnaissance would in effect be to have
an aircraft which has a primary mission of providing joint
mission sorties vice support of the MAGTF, during joint opera-
tions ashore. While this is not a factor given the current
aircraft inventory and established doctrine; given a change with
the Air Force component commander controlling all or increased
functions of Marine air, the structuring of Marine aviation might
very well be no longer driven solely by the requirement of
supporting the Marine on the ground. The Marine Corps could be
forced to tailor its aviation forces so it doesn't have a
capability that the Air Force would get outright
It is doubtful that the Air Force wants to absorb Marine
TACAIR into their inventory. The Air Force is looking beyond the
immediate area of the battlefield, towards space, and a means of
winning the war through their unilateral conduct of air war
aimed at the enemy's means of waging war. The Air Force merely
wants Marine TACAIR to assist in what they certainly appear to
view as a mission of lessor importance, support of the ground
battle.
The Marine Corps fights the enemy directly, be it either a
classic amphibious operation or as part of a sustained land
campaign. In either case, the Marine Corps contains a tailored
force of supporting aviation which adds to its punch in a highly
synergistic manner, with an optimal level of command and control,
firmly backed up by a professional corps of personnel, air and
ground, who are educated and trained together towards unified
pursuit of the assigned MAGTF mission.
Aside from the problem of strategic mobility of Marine
TACAIR, the main problem facing the combat employment of the ACE
of a MAGTF is the implication of greatly diminished capability to
provide tactical aviation support to the GCE in the event that
during joint sustained operations ashore, the Air Force either
obtains single management and/or through a functional arrangement
of the battlefield, abrogates the MAGTF commander's ability to
employ and maximize his organic firepower beyond the FLOT. This
problem presents a challenge to all Marines,
Chapter VIII Responsibility of Marines
Marine officers are brought up told that the Air Force is
trying to steal Marine Corps fixed-wing aviation. Few officers
understand the meaning behind this allegation. While there is a
valid point involved, few Marines understand where, at what
level, on what basis, and with what implication. Education is
the primary, missing ingredient.
All Marine officers (be they current or future commanders,
planners, staff officers, or liaison officers) have a need to be
knowledgeable with regard to the issue of contention, and its
many related facets. First of all, it goes without saying that
a thorough knowledge of MAGTF doctrine must be possessed. This
extends beyond basic organization into compositing, strategic
mobility, and prepositioning. Added to this must be knowledge of
the functions of Marine aviation and a full appreciation of the
various scenarios and means in which a MAGTF may be employed.
Along with this fundamental knowledge, more than just an
understanding of the precepts of the Omnibus Agreement is
required. The Air Force perspective (current and past versions)
which serve as the foundation of efforts to establish single
management of TACAIR and functional joint force organization,
must be understood and acknowledged in order to insure that the
rationale of MAGTF doctrine may be effectively articulated at all
levels, enabling its sound logic to reign supreme in joint force
operations.
Battles over the joint doctrine presented in JCS directives
and publications, and its legality (i.e. in terms of creation of
a second land army) are best left where they currently are, at
the highest levels of the Services and the JCS.
At the operational level, the spirit of cooperation and
unity of effort between the various Services, which exists for
the most part (as evidenced in repeated exercises), must
flourish, unencumbered by inter-Service rivalries. However, when
faced with obstinate violations of established doctrine, Marines,
armed with knowledge of the issues involved, must be prepared to
stand their position and initiate prompt, proper rectification of
the point(s) of contention at the appropriate level. The salient
difference lies in educated Marines, knowledgeable in all the
ramifications of the basic issue as opposed to possessing myoptic
paranoia based on ill defined generalizations.
It is a personal responsibility, however, obviously Marine
Corps interests are best served through establishing a framework
to assist in educating Marines.
Marine Corps schools need to expand discussion of the
issue beyond the Omnibus Agreement and OH 5-1.1 to include the
Air Force view and its broad implications. Ramifications
of current AirLand Battle doctrine and J-SAK warrant exposure.
Doctrinal publications need further expansion and refinement
on the subject.
MAGTF doctrine needs to be effectively presented to sister
and allied Services. The Amphibious Warfare Presentation Team
along with videotaped expositons could provide excellent media
for this task.
Alot of responsibility falls upon contingency planners and
liaison officers. While it appears that the planners are
currently kept attuned to the matters at hand, liaison officers
are of ten ill prepared. For example, there is no formal assur-
ance that those officers sent to function as a liaison to either
a JFC's or Air Force component commander's staff are adequately
conversant in the issue. Yes, they certainly know the precepts
of the Omnibus Agreement; however, beyond that, they often
operate with suspicion and little appreciation for the Air Force
perspective. This impedes cooperation, where it should exist,
and possibly allows for comprimise of established doctrine. An
additional related problem is the lack of disseminated proced-
ures, at the working levels, for the day to day proceedings of
joint mission and excess sortie apportionment, allocation, and
tasking. While during exercises the learning curve is high,
personnel turnover in these billets is an ongoing fact of life.
We can not afford to be learning during the initial hours and
days of actual hostilities. Hopefully, establishment of JINTACCS
and its interface operating procedures will assist in rectifying
this problem. With a concurrent effort by the Marine Corps
in the education of commanders and staffs, as well as identifica-
tion and training of key liaison officers, and continued frequent
participation in joint exercises, these problems can all be met
head on.
The issue is complex and pervasive. Much has been omitted
from this discussion. Airspace control, air defense
coordination, communications, and data exchange requirements have
not been addressed.
To read the three Air Force doctrinal information publica-
tions concerning this issue, there is no doubt about the rigidity
of the Air Force position. On the other hand, there are Marines,
for example, who say that our participation in the Air Force
sponsored Red Flag and Cope Thunder training exercises is
detrimental to the Marine Corps. This is based on the rationale
that our after action reports, which repeatedly praise this
coveted training, are in effect testimonials in support of Air
Force TACAIR control, since the exercise sorties are Air Force
tasked; hence we are therefore commending their ability to manage
all air assets. This is an extremely unfortunate view, since
undoubtedly some of our very best tactical aviation training is
achieved in these exercises, and our participation in them must
not be comprimised over this issue. This highlights where a
blind, paranoid approach towards this issue could lead us.
Logic can, has, and must prevail. Indepth understanding of
the issue, a responsibility which all Marines must fulfill, is
the key.
Chapter IX Conclusion
The root of the issue lies in acceptance of the fact that
the MAGTF is a truly unique entity which can not be compared to
any other military organization in the world. To attempt to
define it in terms of its ingredients, as a ground unit and or
an aviation unit, so as to align it with a trilateral functional
force organization is a grave error.
The management approach and its producer oriented advantages
of centralizing all TACAIR does not serve the best interests of
either the JTF or the MAGTF. It renders the MAGTF into a
partially impotent, ineffectively organized and equipped,
disjointed force. However when properly employed, the MAGTF,
even outside of its primary amphibious role, is an incredibly
economical, efficient, unparalleled fighting organization.
Analysis of the subject issue reveals a plethora of mis-
interpretations and misrepresentations of fact by the Air
Force in justification of their position. Historical precedent
has been totally distorted by the Air Force. The following
passage from an Air Force publication underscores the absence of
authenticity in their position:
For example, the Marines in peacetime are organized
into Marine Amphibious Units (MAUs), Marine Amphibious
Brigades (MABs), Marine Amphibious Forces (MAFs), and
Marine Air Wings (MAWs), but in war, they are employed
as MAGTFs and sized to meet the specific mission
objectives.120
It is painfully obvious that the very same airmen who are
drafting the Air Force's official position regarding the MAGTF,
do not even possess even a rudimentary understanding of what a
MAGTF is!
The MAGTF is functional. It is a functional entity; a
combined air-ground team task organized for the assigned mis-
sion. it should be functionally employed as a fourth component
in a functional JTF organization (land, naval, air, MAGTF).
However, realistically, and given the limited historical prece-
dent which exists, Marines should be prepared to be employed
as part of a land component. This is not an offically acknow-
ledged Marine Corps position, but it is likely and reasonably
prudent. However, absolutely and unequivocally, in no instance
should the MAGTF loose the integrity or operational command and
control of its TACAIR. This is the bottom line.
Additionally, either as a uni-Service component, functional-
ly as a fourth component, or under the land component (in all
cases maintaining its integrity), the MAGTF must be given the
opportunity to operate in its AO with control of airspace
extending beyond its FSCL and area of influence, into its area of
interest. An airspace control sector, analogous to an AOA in an
amphibious operation, should be assigned
To dissect the MAGTF and describe its integral parts as a
120DIP No. 11, p. 5.
subordinate land component and subordinate air component is akin
to describing a coyote, in terms of fighting potential, as a
domestic dog. Perhaps General Trainor has said it best:
The Marine Corps is unique among the armies of the
world because of our total integration of combat power
in the air-ground task force and an unparalleled
capability to orchestrate the integrated effort. If
there were ever a force multiplier on the modern
battlefield it is the Marine Corps' organization for
battle.121
121Major General B. E. Trainor USMC, "New Thoughts on War",
Marine Corps Gazette, December 1990, p. 51.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary
AF/XOX 231405Z NOV 81. Subj, Air Force Planners' Conference.
Message announcing Air Force planners' conference which was
held 24-25 February 1992. The agenda items included: joint
operations, Omnibus briefing, and MAGTF command relation-
ships and doctrinal issues.
CDR TRADOC 231400Z NOV 83. Subj: Joint Attack of the Second
Echelon. This message reflects the results of deliberations
between General Richardson, Commander U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command and General Creech, Commander U.S. Air
Force Tactical Air Command concerning J-SAK. It highlights
problems in distinguishing between BAI and the remainder of
the INT effort. It discusses the functions of the BCE.
Also addressed is battlefield structuring and the fact that
BAI targets were being located inside the FSCL by Army
commanders.
CG THIRD MAW 240039Z FEB 82. Subj: Joint Readiness Exercise
After Action Report Concerning Common Air Tasking Proce-
dures. Unclassified message from the ACE of joint exercise
highlighting problem areas encountered in CAT procedures
and the working relationship with the Air Force component
commander. Excellent insight into the problems facing MAGTF
aviation during joint exercises.
CO Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (MCTSSA) ltr
D122-3/WTF:cj over 3900-303 dtd 14 November 1983. Letter to
the Commanding General MCDEC recommending changes to OH
5-1.1 based on the results of problems encountered by MCTSSA
in the development of air operations joint interface
operating procedures for JINTACCS. This letter outlines
misperceptions on the part of Marine officers regarding the
Omnibus Agreement and excess sorties.
----------. ltr D122-3/WTF:meb 3920-303-1 dtd 12 March 1984.
Follow up letter to above correspondence.
Commandant of the Marine Corps. White Letter No. 7-81. 29 June
1981. Promulgates the JCS Omnibus Agreement to the Marine
Corps along with guidance for the employment of Marine Corps
TACAIR.
Department of the Air Force Memorandum for the Director Plans and
Policy Joint Staff (No. 87-91). Subj: Command Relationships
for the MAGTF in Sustained Operations Ashore (J-5
P156-81/D). 27 August 1981. Memorandum to JCS, requesting
that JCS specify whether a MAGTF would be employed under a
land component or as a separate component during sustained
operations ashore.
Department of the Army Memorandum for the Director Joint Staff.
Subj: Command Relationships for the MAGTF in Sustained
Operations Ashore (J-5 P156-81/D). 24 August 1981. Army
memorandum, apparently in concert with above Air Force
memorandum. Suggests that JCS should accept surordination
of a MAGTF to a land component as its normal means of
employment in sustained operations ashore,
Headquarters Marine Corps Point Paper # 718-82. Subj: Functional
Components. 1 November 1982. Addresses functional compon-
ent issue. Includes material on past employment of the
Marine Corps in joint forces. Is a part of a historical
file concerning the MAGTF TACAIR command and control issue.
This file contains numerous point papers as well as classi-
fied joint exercise after action reports.
JCS 042226Z DEC 81. Subj: Command Relationships in Operational
Plan Development. Message from JCS to CZNC's reiterating
the joint force commander's authority to organize forces for
implementation of plans. Air Force has attempted to cite
this message as rescinding the intent of the Omnibus
Agreement.
Joint Service Agreement: Department of the Army, Department of
the Air Force. USA/USAF Agreement for the Joint Attack of
the Second Echelon (J-SAK). 28 November 1984. Agreement
between the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff which
promulgates the agreed upon J-SAK doctrine and provides
guidelines for incorporating the doctrinal statements into
Army and Air Force manuals and publications.
Memorandum by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force for the JCS
(CSAFM 07-82). Subj: Proposal to Change JCS Pub 2f Unified
Action Armed Forces. 19 April 1982. This memorandum calls
for a review of JCS Pub 2 incorporating functional employ-
ment of forces. it also recommends that decisions on joint
plans and publications be withheld until JCS Pub 2 is
changed.
Memorandum by the Commandant of the Marine Corps for the JCS
(CMCM 1-80). Subj: Review of CINCNORTH OPLAN 20721, "BRAWNY
GAMBIT" (U). 5 March 1980. Secret memorandum which discus-
ses Air Force non-concurrence with employment of a MAGTF as
an entity.
Memorandum by the Commandant of the Marine Corps for the JCS
(CMCM 6-80). Subj: Command and Control of Tactical Air. 22
December 1980. Secret memorandum requesting JCS attention
to "BRAWNY GAMBIT" and other plans held hostage by the Air
Force for more than tweleve months over the issue of control
of MAGTF TACAIR.
Memorandum by J-3 for the JCS 2521/384-8. Subj: Command and
Control of TACAIR Decision. Revised 27 March 1981. Resolved
the MAGTF TACAIR command and control issue as adressed in
the original memorandum dated 12 January 1981, with the
promulgation of JCS policy decision, which has come to be
known as the Omnibus Agreement.
Memorandum of Understanding: Department of the Army, Department
of the Air Force. Joint USA/USAF Efforts for Enhancement of
Joint Employment of the AirLand Battle Doctrine. 21 April
1983. Initiated agreement of inter-Service cooperation in
joint tactical training and field exercises. It highlighted
the need for increased cooperation in the development and
coordination of battlefield air interdiction and interdic-
tion programs.
Secondary
Advanced Amphibious Study Group. Draft Planner's Reference
Manual Volume II. Quantico, August 1983. Part of a three
volume series on MAGTF expeditionary planning. Chapter
thirteen deals with aviation planning for the MAGTF. It
contains a brief section on "Recurrent Avaition issues in
Joint Operations." Although it provides little background,
it covers most of the facets of the issue.
----------. Strategy Rapid Deployment and the Fleet Marine
Force. Washington D.C., May 1981. This concept paper
includes a comprehensive discussion of the strategic
mobility issue, but it does not specifically address
strategic mobility of MAGTF aviation.
Buhrow, Robert E., Colonel USAF. Close Air Support Require-
ments: A Study in Interservice Rivalry. U.S. Army War
College, 1 March 1971. An excellent study addressing the
adequacy of USAF CAS provided the U.S. Army during the
initial stages of U.S. involvement. Includes sound rigorous
analysis which leads to interesting conclusions.
Department of the Navy. Joint Interoperability of Tactical
Command and Control Systems, Marine Corps. Washington D.C.,
February 1984. Unclassified supporting data for fiscal year
1985 budget estimates. Contains descriptive summaries which
provide program requirements for fiscal years 1983 through
1985.
Gaines, R. Stockton, Naslund, Willard E. and Straunch, Ralph.
Combat Operations Decisionmaking in Tactical Air Command and
Control. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, December 1980.
Study which was prepared for the U.S. Air Force. Looks at
the organizational and human processes involved in tactical
air command and control. Discusses lack of joint/combined
representation during training.
Geiger, Charles R., Lieutenant Colonel USMC. Marine Corps TACAIR
and Strategic Mobility. U.S. Naval War College, March
1983. Excellent work which addresses a vital issue.
Contains viable solution proposal.
Heinl, Robert Debs Jr., Colonel USMC. Soldiers of the Sea.
Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1962. Classic, renowned
history of the U.S. Marine Corps.
Hofstetter, David G., Major(P) USA. Joint Attack of the Second
Echelon (J-SAK). Langley AFB: Air Land Forces Application
Agency, undated. A short paper which describes the five
year history of J-SAK procedures and their development.
Hurley, Alfred F., Colonel USAF and Ehrhart, Robert C., Major
USAF, eds. Air Power and Warfare. Washington D.C.: GPO,
1979. A collection of transcripts from presentations given
at the Eighth Military History Symposium which was held at
the U.S. Air Force Academy 18-20 October 1978. An interest-
ing insight into the evolution of the Air Force doctrine of
Air Power employment.
Isley, Jeter A. and Crowl, Phillip A. The U.S. Marines and
Amphibious War: Its Theory, and its Practice in the
Pacific. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. An
outstanding, thorough and incisive work. Includes ample
discussion on the role of aviation during World War II in
the Pacific.
Kruse, John, Captain USMC. "Command and Control of USMC
TACAIR." Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-One
Newsletter. MCAS Yuma, fall 1983. Good brief discussion
which highlights the subject issue. Addresses misun-
derstandings concerning joint mission air defense sorties.
McCutcheon, Keith B., Lieutenant General USMC. "Marine Aviation
in Vietnam 1962-1970." U.S. Naval institute Proceedings.
(May 1971), 122-155. A comprehensive narrative of Marine
aviation involvement in Viet Nam written by a Marine aviator
who served as Commanding General III MAF.
Mersky, Peter B. and Polmar, Norman. The Naval Air War in
Vietnam. Annapolis: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing
Company of America, 1981. An excellent, descriptive book;
although it does not address command and control issues.
Momeyer, William W., General USAF (Ret). Air Power in Three Wars
(World War II, Korea, Vietnam). Washington D.C.: GPO, 1978.
A largely biased account based on the personal experiences
and perceptions of the author. The alleged necessity of
single management of theater TACAIR is a recurring theme of
this book.
Morison, Samuel E. The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the
United States Navy in the Second World War. Boston,
Toronto, Atlantic Monthly Press, 1963. This masterful work
selects highlights from the author's previous fifteen volume
series History of the United States Naval Operations in
World War II.
Pogue, Forest C. The United States Army in World War II the
Supreme Allied Command. Washington D.C.: Department of the
Army, 1954. This is the third volume of part four (the
European Theater of Operations) of an indepth multi-volume
series on the history of the U.S. Army in World War II.
Ringler, Jack K., Major USMC and Shaw, Henry, I. Jr. U.S. Marine
Corps Operations in the Dominican Republic April - June
1965. Washington D.C.: Headquarters Marine Corps Historical
Division, 1970. A previously secret (declassified in 1977)
account which provides background and the history of Marine
Corps activities in the Dominican Republic during the spring
of 1965.
Rippy, Jack W., Lieutenant Colonel USMC. The impact of Maneuver
Warfare Strategy/Tactics on the U.S. Marine Corps' Integra-
ted Air/Ground (MAGTF) Doctrine. U.S. Naval War College, 22
June 1984. Informative, well presented exposition contrast-
ing maneuver warfare and firepower attrition warfare with an
excellent insight on the integration of aviation.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms, JCS Pub 1. Washington D.C.: JCS, 1 April 1984.
Defines terms for all Department of Defense components as
well as incorporating NATO and inter-American Defense Board
definitions.
----------. Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and
Procedures for Joint Operations, JCS Pub 12. Washington
D.C.: JCS, 1974. Multi-volume series. Volume I, Informa-
tion Exchange Planning Guidance; Volume II, Procedures and
Formats; Volume III, Tactical Command and Control Procedures
for Joint Operations (S); Volume IV, Part IV, Chapter I,
Common Air Tasking.
----------. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) JCS Pub 2.
Washington D.C.: JCS, October 1974. Provides princi-
ples, doctrine and guidance for the formation of joint
forces.
Trainor, B.E., Major General USMC. "New Thoughts on War."
Marine Corps Gazette. (December 1980), 49-51. Discusses war
on the high-intensity conventional battlefield.
U.S. Air Force. Background Information on Air Force Perspective
for Coherent Plans (Command and Control of TACAIR), Doctrin-
al Information Publication No. 10. Washington D.C.:
AF/XOXID, April 1961. First in a series of three publica-
tions disseminated to USAF commands, schools, and officers
in key billets in response to the Omnibus Agreement. This
edition contains a series of background papers and letters
proposing single management, and discussing common air
tasking and theater warfare planning boundaries.
----------. Command Relationships, The Marine/Air Ground Task
Force, and What They Mean to an Airman!, Doctrinal Informa-
tion Publication No. 11. Washington D.C.: AF/XOXID, 1981.
Second in a series (see above). This publication includes a
reprint of CMC White Letter NO. 7-81 in its entirety, along
with USAF historical analysis. It proposes functional
componency.
----------. Command Relationships, Doctrinal Information
Publication No. 12. Washington D.C.: AF/XOXID, January
1984. Third in a series (see above). This publication
continues the USAF attack upon the Omnibus Agreement. It
includes a copy of CSAFM 07-82 along with the party line
concerning USAF position on adjusting joint force doctrine
and rewriting JCS Pub 2.
----------. Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States
Air Force, AFM 1-1. Washington D.C., 16 March 1981. A
complete change from the previous edition which omits all
reference to MAGTF as a component in joint force organiza-
tion. Appears to have been rewritten to reflect "air
component commander" concept.
----------. Tactical Air Operations TACM 2-1. Langley AFB:
TAC, 15 April 1978. Doctrinal guide for the Tactical Air
Command. Uses term "Air Force component commander." Has
not been rewritten to reflect functional componency/ air
component commander concept.
U.S. Army. Aircraft Battlefield Countermeasures and Survivabil-
ity, FM 1-2. Washington D.C., July 1978. Techniques,
procedures and concepts for Army aviation on the modern
battlefield.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Special Subcommittee on Close Air
Support. Close Air Support. 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.
Washington D.C.: GPO, 1972. Transcripts of hearings on
CAS. Discusses conduct of CAS in Vietnam. Hearings debated
Army - Air Force A-10 issue.
U.S. Marine Corps. Command and Control of USMC TACAIR. Quan-
tico, September 1962. Written in elaboration of the Omnibus
Agreement. Ineffective publication which does not expand
upon previous guidance or background contained in enclosure
2 to CMC White Letter No. 7-81.
-----------. Doctrine For Amphibious Operationsg LFM 01/FM
31-11/NHP 22(B)/AFM 2-53. Washington D.C., 1 August
1967. The joint Service "bible" for amphibious operations.
----------. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine, FMFM 01.
Washington D.C., 11 August 1979. Presents the doctrine,
tactics, organization, and techniques of MAGTF employment.
----------. Marine Aviation, FMFM 5-1. Washington D.C., 24
August 1979. Basic doctrinal guide to Marine aviation.
Does not address the issue of Marine aviation during joint
sustained land operations.
---------. Task in USMC Fixed-Wing Aviation, OH 5-3. Quantico,
July 1982. A basic and conceptual guide to the air tasking
process. Does not provide sufficiently detailed discussion
of the required interface with the JTF Air Force component
commander.
U.S. Navy. Strategic Concepts of the United States Navy NWP 1
(Rev A). Washington D.C., May 1978. Basic Navy doctrinal
publication.
U.S. Readiness Command. General Operating Procedures for Joint
Attack of the Second Echelon (J-SAK) REDCOM Pam 525-8/
TRADOC Pam 525-45/TACP 50-29. MacDill AFB, 31 December
1984. A U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and
U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command joint publication which
sets forth the procedures for J-SAK and the conduct of the
battlefield interdiction effort. It outlines command
(component) responsibilities with regard to this aspect of
the AirLand battle. It should be noted that no Marine
Corps organizations, activities, or headquarters were on the
distribution list for this document.
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