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MAGTF TACAIR In Joint Sustained Land Operations:  USMC Versus USAF
CSC 1985
             FEBRUARY 1985
           MAJOR       USMC
			  Abstract of
			USMC versus USAF
     The U. S. Marine Corps has a history of combat employment in
joint sustained land operations. Currently, various contingen-
cies exist around the world which envision employment of a MAGTF
as part of a joint force in sustained land operations.
     The MAGTF is unique among all armed forces by virtue of its
existence as the only truly integrated air-ground team.  This is
a bone of contention for one of our sister Services and a matter
of envy to another.
     Amphibious doctrine is not at issue!  The issue centers
around the command relationships of the MAGTF during sustained 
joint operations ashore.
Click here to view image
     At stake is the  continued integrity  of Marine  TACAIR as a
constituent element  of the  MAGTF and  retention of control over
Marine TACAIR by  the  MAGTF  commander  during  joint operations
ashore.  The  Air Force  has repeatedly argued for single manage-
ment of all theater  TACAIR.  Failing  realization of  such, USAF
efforts have  been redirected  towards revamping current doctrine
affecting joint  force  organization.   Utilizing  combined force
doctrine as  a precedent,  along with  a narrow interpretation of
military  history,  they  have  attempted  to  align  joint force
organization  on  a  trilateral,  functional  basis.  Potentially
affected is the structure of joint force organizations in several
theaters, scenarios,  and OPLANS  ranging from NATO to the Middle
East and Korea.
     Additionally, the Air Force and army have agreed  upon joint
doctrine  for   the  battlefield  interdiction  effort  (air  and
surface) which  alters  traditional  battlefield  structuring and
responsibilities, thus posing serious and far reaching consequen-
ces to any MAGTF employed ashore in a joint arena.
     The issue is complex.   All Marine  officers need  to under-
stand  much  more  than  the  basic  precepts  of the JCS Omnibus
Agreement  (CMC  White  Letter  7-61)  which  established current
doctrine for the employment of the MAGTF in sustained joint land
operations.   They need to understand both the background  as well
as the  Air Force  perspective of  this issue,  so that it may be
assured that while the  doctrinal issue  is addressed  at the JCS
level, at the operational levels, the MAGTF is properly
employed.   Only through  the education of Marines; insuring that
all  commanders,  joint  planners,  staff  officers,  and liaison
officers  are  thoroughly  conversant  in this issue, may we make
certain that the best possible support is provided  to our Marine
riflemen,  while  simultaneously  providing  the  optimum  combat
force for the joint force.
     While this paper presupposes  a knowledge  of the  MAGTF and
amphibious  doctrine,  it  provides  an  extensive  insight  into
aviation functions, joint force organization, and  the history of
aviation  command  and  control,  as the framework is established
for an indepth analysis  of the  subject issue  in a contemporary
perspective.    Following  this  analysis, the discussion centers
upon the implications of the subject  issue to  the Marine Corps,
and  the  responsibility  of  all  Marines  in  order to meet the
challenges posed.
     There were  ample sources  of information  available on this
subject,  with  classification  comprising  the  only constraint.
Some of the most  enlightening sources  consisted of  a series of
three  Air  Force  Doctrinal  Information  Publications which all
focus primarily upon the Air Force's position on  the command and
control of MAGTF TACAIR in sustained joint land operations.
     It  is  mandatory  that  all  professional  Marine officers,
aviation  or  ground,  be  knowledgeable  and  articulate  in all
aspects of this issue.
                        TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT                                                      ii
I         INTRODUCTION                                         1
               PART I - BACKGROUND
II        FUNCTIONS OF AVIATION                                5
III       JOINT FORCE ORGANIZATION                            18
IV        HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE                              24
V         THE OMNIBUS AGREEMENT                               55
VII       IMPLICATION FOR MARINES                             79
VIII      RESPONSIBILITY OF MARINES                           94
          CONCLUSION                                          98
BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                 101
Chapter I   Introduction
     All Marines should clearly  understand  the  structure of the
Marine  Corps,  and  how  the  Marine Corps organizes for combat-
specifically MAGTFs.   Our amphibious mission and role within the
Department  of  the  Navy  should  be  universally understood and
     A historical  analysis of  past employments  of Marine Corps
forces, along  with a  study of possible future contingencies and
current national strategy  make  it  intuitively  obvious  to all
concerned that  future employment  of the Marine Corps is certain
to involve joint or  combined operations,  as Bell  as the likely
utilization of Marines in sustained operations ashore.
     The employment of Marines in this manner raises many old and
new  questions,  of  interest  to  both  Marines  and  our sister
Services.  While simple logic combined with lessons from the past
seem  to  dictate  solutions  to  these  questions,  and  current
guidance appears to answer the mail, this is not entirely true at
all levels of the chain of command, and particularly in  the case
of certain of our sister Services.
     The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  not  to fuel interService
rivalries of  petty fighting  over dogmatic  or doctrinal issues,
but rather  to make  the Marine  Officer at the lower operational
levels aware of the lost contentious  issue, its  background, and
the ramifications  surrounding ongoing deliberations now occuring
at the highest echelons in the joint arena.  The Marine  Corps is
best served  by having all its professional officers educated and
conversant in this issue.
     Our  sister  Services  certainly   are  familiarizing  their
officers  with  the  Marine  Corps  and  how  it relates to them.
For example, the US Air Force has published  a Doctrinal Informa-
tion  Publication  entitled  Command  Relationships,  the  Marine
Air/Ground Task Forced and What They  Mean to an Airman!  At this
point, suffice  it to  say that this publication goes well beyond
merely describing the  organization  and  mission  of  the Marine
Corps in a manner similar to our Education Center publications on
the Department of the Air Force.
     What implication  does  all  this  have  for  the individual
Marine rifleman?   If logic  prevails, none.  However, taking the
less naive  approach,  there  currently  remain  serious external
challenges to MAGTF integrity under certain scenarios.  It is not
an understatement to  declare  that  there  are  threats  to USMC
retention of  operational control of aircraft and airspace on the
joint battlefield, with a possible severe  loss of responsiveness
in providing support to the Marine rifleman on the ground.
     The purpose  of this  paper is to highlight these issues and
provide a working knowledge for all  Marine officers.   While the
scope of this paper will remain unclassified, and must skirt many
sensitive, closely held  issues  which  are  addressed  at higher
levels, there is a considerable amount of substantive information
which can and should be understood by all professional Marines.
     This paper presupposes a knowledge of the MAGTF  and how the
MAGTF  is  employed  in  its  amphibious  mission, to include the
command relationships therin.1   Since classic  amphibious opera-
tions  and  the  command  and  control of Marine aviation therein
is not a contested issue, this subject will not be addressed,
     Two specific means of MAGTF employment  are relevant  to the
focus of  this paper.  First of all, as previously addressed, the
employment of the MAGTF in protracted  land campaigns.  Secondly,
the  situation   in  which  the  ACE,  or  elements of the ACE are
foward deployed  to a  theater of  operations well  in advance of
the  GCE.   This  is  a  very  plausible scenario today, possibly
associated with an amphibious operation or  the marrying  up with
     Before  specifically  addressing  these  issues,  a thorough
insight into the structures and missions  of aviation  in all the
Services  is  necessary,  along  with  an analysis of joint force
organization,  and  study  of  the  history  of  air  command and
control.  Only  with an  indepth understanding of this peripheral
background, can the stage be set  for homing  in on  the topic of
this paper: functionalism  vs. MAGTF integrity.   This subject is
the crux of the issue at  stake, and  perhaps a  better title for
this dissertation, failing selection for such only because of its
inability to motivate towards readership.
     The effectiveness of the MAGTF in the employment of its
1For a  through discussion of this subject, see LFM 01, AFM 2-53,
Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, 1 August  1967.
     air and ground elements in combat can only  be realized
     by adherence to the basic precepts of MAGTF employment,
     in our training and  in  the  preparation  of operation
     plans.   It   is  not   enough  that  we  understand  the
     subtleties   of   the  distinctions   within  the  policy
     statement; I  expect all   officers who  are involved in
     joint/combined  planning   activities  to   be  able  to
     articulate  these  precepts  and  secure recognition of
     them in operation plans.    This, too,  may require some
                                       General R. H. BARROW
                                   Commandant of the Marine Corps
                                       WHITE LETTER NO. 7-81
     If a Marine Corps Officer  does not understand the rationale
of the argument of Service component vs. functional componency or
the implication  of "air  component commander" as opposed to "Air
Force component commander" he is ill prepared to  comply with the
direction provided him  by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
     The  issue  is  complex.   There  are  many who say that the
US Air Force possesses an ultimate goal of  obtaining centralized
Air Force  control of  all theater TACAIR assets.  Is this a true
observation?  Only through  a  thorough  insight  into  the basic
issue  may  one  judge.   Whatever  the  determination,  the fact
remains, the Marine Corps must always insure the  sound, logical,
effective employment of its forces in all arenas.
                    PART ONE *** BACKGROUND
Chapter II      Functions of Aviation
     Each  of  the  four  major  Services  in the US Armed Forces
possesses  its  own  aviation  force  which   employs  aircraft in
varying  roles  and  missions.   Is   there  a  homology among the
functions of  these different  Service aviation  arms which could
facilitate uniting the efforts of each arm into a centralized air
organization for the prosecution of warfare?
     To address this question, "functions" must  be defined  in a
matter suitable  for application  to the joint arena.  JCS Pub 1,
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
defines functions as:
     The  appropriate  or assigned duties, responsibilities,
     missions,  or  tasks  of  an  individual,   office,  or
     organization.  As  defined in the National Security Act
     of  1947,  as  amended,  the  term  "function" includes
     functions,  powers,  and  duties, (5 United States Code
     171n (a).)
     Each of the military departments is  assigned certain common
functions.   These  include  the requirement to "organize, train,
and  equip  forces  for  assignment  to   unified  and  specified
   Additionally, JCS  Pub 2  states, during  its discussion of the
functions of the various military departments:
     The forces developed and trained to perform the primary
     functions  set  forth  hereinafter shall be employed to
     support and supplement the  other Services  in carrying
     out  their  primary  functions, where and whenever such
     participation will  result  in  increased effectiveness
     and  will  contribute  to  the  accomplishment  of  the
     overall  military   objectives.    As   for  collateral
     functions, while  the assignient  of such functions may
     establish  further  justification   for   stated  force
     requirements, such  assignment shall not be used as the
     basis for establishing additional force requirements.
     The Air Force defines  primary functions  as "those assigned
actions for which a particular Service is mainly responsible, and
collateral functions are those assigned actions where one Service
performs  a  primary  function  of  another service".3  JCS Pub 1
does not contain any definition and/or distinction of  primary as
opposed to collateral functions.  The Air Force interpretation of
these  two  "function"  discriminators  becomes  suspect  when an
analysis  of  various  Services  primary and collateral functions
2Jcs Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, October 1974, p. 16.
3AFM 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine  of the  United States Air
Force, March 1984, p. 3-1.
(JCS Pub 2) is performed.
1)   A primary  function of  the Army  is to organize, equip, and
provide forces for joint amphibious operations  while the collat-
eral function of the Army is to interdict enemy sea and air power
and communications through operations on or from land.
2)   A collateral  function of  the Navy  and Marine  Corps is to
interdict  enemy  land  and  air power and communications through
operations at sea.4
     While  the  Air  Force's  interpretation  of  the difference
between primary and collateral functions may be valid for the Air
Force's assigned primary and collateral functions,  it is clearly
not applicable  to the  other Services'  functions.  Is there any
significance to this disparity?  Taken alone, no; however  in the
overall context  of a  doctrinal argument over the wording of JCS
Pub 2, perhaps it might become relevant.
     The primary functions of the Air Force are:
1)   To organize, train,  and  equip  Air  Force  Forces  for the
conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations in the air.
2)   Provide forces for strategic air warfare.
3)   Furnish  close combat  and logistic air support to the Army
to include:
     ..airlift, support,  and  resupply  of  airborne operations.
     ..aerial photography and tactical reconnaissance.
     ..interdiction of enemy land power and communications.
4)   To provide air transport for the Armed Forces.
4JCS Pub 2, sections 2,3,4.
5)   To develop in coordination with the other services:
     ..doctrines  and  procedures  for  the  unified  defense  of
       the United States against air attack.
     ..doctrine,  procedures   and  equipment   for  air  defense
       from land areas.
     ..tactics,  techniques  and  equipient  for  amphibious  and
       airborne operations. organize and equip Air Force  forces for  joint amphib-
       ious and airborne operations.
6)   Provide Air Force intelligence.
7)   Aerial photography for cartographic purposes.
9)   Doctrine  and  procedures  for organizing, equipping, train-
     ing, and employing the Air Force.
     The collateral functions  of  the  Air  Force  are  to train
1)   To interdict enemy sea power through air operations.
2)   To conduct antisubmarine warfare and to protect shipping.
3)   To conduct aerial minelaying operations5.
     The  latest   revision  of  AFM  1-1  deleted  the  previous
edition's  listing  of  primary  functions  of   the  Air  Force.
This basic  doctrinal "bible" now states "the fundamental role of
the Air Force is to prepare  aerospace forces  to accomplish nine
different missions:"
1)   Strategic  Aerospace Offense  - to neutralize or destroy an
enemy's war-sustaining capabilities or will to fight.
5JCS Pub 2, section 4.
2)     Strategic  Aerospace  Defense  -  to  integrate aerospace
warning,  control,  and  intercept  forces  to  detect, identify,
intercept, and destroy enemy forces (in any medium) attacking our
nation's war sustaining capabilities or will to fight.
3)  Counter Air - to gain control of the aerospace environment.
     ..Offensive  Counter  Air  (OCA)  - to destroy or neutralize
       enemy aerospace forces at a time and place of choice.
     ..Suppression  of  Enemy  Air  Defenses  (SEAD)  - aerospace
       operations directed against enemy air defense systems.
     ..Defensive  Counter  Air  (DCA)  -  against enemy aerospace
       forces that  are attempting  to attack  friendly forces or
       penetrate friendly airspace.
4)   Air  interdiction  (AI)  -  to  delay,  disrupt,  divert, or
destroy an enemy's military potential before it can be brought to
bear  effectively  against  friendly  forces.   "Air interdiction
attacks are normally executed by an  air commander  as part  of a
systematic and persistent campaign.  Although an air interdiction
campaign can be  an  independent  air  effort,  an  air commander
normally  coordinates  an  interdiction  campaign  with a surface
force  commander...   Air  interdiction  attacks  against targets
which are in position to have a near term effect on friendly land
forces are referred to as battlefield air interdiction" (BAI).
"The primary difference between battlefield air  interdiction and
the  remainder  of  the  air  interdiction effort is the level of
interest and  emphasis the land  commander places  on the process
of  identifying,   selecting,  and   attacking  certain  targets.
Therefore, battlefield air interdiction  requires joint coordina-
tion at  the component  level during  planning, but once planned,
battlefield air  interdiction is  controlled and  executed by the
air commander  as an  integral part  of a  total air interdiciton
campaign."  (note  BAI  for as  the  basis  of  various contested
issues. BAI missions  are flown  in the ground commanders area of
influence without any coordination below the component level fair
component  commander  -  ground component commander).  This issue
leads into a discussion of which commander controls  fires beyond
the  FEBA, violates  Marine  Corps  doctrine,  and  will  be the
subject of further discussion in this paper).
5)   Close Air Support (CAS) - to  support surface  operations by
attacking targets  in close proximity to friendly surface forces.
CAS can  be preplanned  or immediate,  and in  all cases requires
coordination and  integration with  the fire  and maneuver of the
surface force.
6)   Special Operations - involve the conduct  of low visibility,
covert, or clandestine military actions.
7)   Airlift - both strategic (inter theater ) and tactical (intra-
8)   Aerospace  surveillance  and  Reconnaissance  -  to  collect
information from airborne, orbital, and surface based sensors.
9)   Aerospace  Maritime  Operations  -  to neutralize or destroy
enemy naval forces  and  to  protect  friendly  naval  forces and
shipping.  (note  - it  is interesting  to notice  how one of the
"collateral functions" of the  Air  Force  has  become translated
into one of the "fundamental role missions").
     AFM 1-1  goes on to list seven "specialized tasks- which the
Air  Force  perfroms  to  enhance  the  execution  and successful
completion  of  Air  Force  missions, as well as often supporting
other services as  well:   Aerial  Refueling;  Electronic Combat;
Warning,  Command,  Control,  and  Communications;  intelligence;
Aerospace  Rescue  and  Recovery;  Psychological  Operations; and
Weather Service.
     The  Tactical  Air  Command  Manual (TACM) 2-1, Tactical Air
Operations, lists six "tactical air operations": Counter Air, Air
interdiction, Close Air Support, Tactical Airlift, Air Reconnais-
sance, and Special Air Operations.  This  manual states  that the
following "capabilities" are required for successful tactical air
operations:   electronic  warfare,  search  and  rescue, airspace
control,  aerial  refueling,  and  defense  suppression.  Defense
suppression,  which  was  a  form  of  Counter  Air  when talking
missions, not a specialized task, is now listed as a capability.
     Under the  subject, "Functions  of Theater  Air Forces"  the
Air Force lists the following missions and tasks as "required for
friendly forces to drive enemy air from the field of battle":6
Counter   Air,   Defense  Suppression,  Electromagnetic  Warfare,
Tactical Reconnaissance, CAS,  BAI,  AI,  Airlift  (strategic and
tactical), UN, Air Refueling, AWACS, SAR, and ABCCC.
6Department of the Air Force, Doctrine Information Publication No.
10, Background Information on Air Force  Perspective for Coherent
Plans (Command  and Control of TACAIR), April 1981, attachient 9,
tab 3.
     What is at issue  here is  not the  obvious fact  that there
appears  to  be  disjointed  overlap  and  vagueness in Air Force
doctrine, but rather the fact that there is a question as to what
would be  the functions  when viewed  in the  sphere of the joint
     The Army possesses aviation units which  fight as  part of a
combined arms team.  The objectives of these units are:7
1)   To augment  the Army's  capability to conduct sustained land
2)   To provide the ground  commander  with  the  mobility, fire-
power, and staying power needed to win the first battle, and
3)   To help the ground forces win while outnumbered.
     The principles of employment of Army aviation units are:8
1)   Fight integrated on the combined arms team.
2)   Exploit capabilities of other Services (i.e. CAS).
3)   Capitalize on intelligence gathering capabilities.
4)   Suppress enemy weapons and acquisition means.
5)   Exploit firepower and mobility.
6)   Integrate fire and maneuver.
7)   Employ suprise.
8)   Mass forces.
9)   Utilize terrain for survivability.
10)  Displace foward elements frequently.
7FM 1-2,  Aircraft Battlefield Countermeasures and Survivability,
July 1978, p. 2.
8FM 1-2, pp. 2-3.
11)  Maintain flexibility.
12)  Exercise staying power.
     The Army's  air  defense,  which  consists  of anti-aircraft
guns, missiles, and the related command and control resources are
separate of the aviation branch in the air defense artillery.
     Army aviation does not  possess  "functions".   All tactical
fixed-wing jet aircraft support comes from the Air Force.
     The Navy accomplishes its functions of sea control and power
projection through three  warfare  branches;  surface, submarine,
and aviation.  The Navy's "fundamental warfare tasks" are:9
1)   Antiair warfare
2)   Antisubmarine warfare
3)   Anti-surface (ship) warfare
4)   Strike warfare
5)   Amphibious warfare
6)   Mine warfare
     The Navy's "supporting warfare tasks" are:10
1)   Special warfare
2)   Ocean surveillance
3)   Intelligence
4)   Command, control, and communications
5)   Electronic warfare
9NWP 1 (Rev A), Startegic Concepts of the United States Navy, May
1978, p. I-1-3.
10NWP 1, P. I-1-3.
6)   Logistics
     The Navy  forms task  forces to  perform various fundamental
and supporting warfare tasks.  These task forces include a mix of
organic aviation tailored to the mission of the task force.
     The following  specific function  is assigned  to the Marine
     To  provide  Fleet  Marine  Forces  of  combined  arms,
     together with supporting  air  components,  for service
     with the  fleet in  the seizure  or defense of advanced
     naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations
     as  may  be  essential  to  the  prosecution of a naval
     campaign.   These  functions  do  not  contemplate  the
     creation of a second land army.
     Title  10  of  the  U.S. Code  states  that the Marine Corps
should be so organized as "to include not less than  three combat
divisions and three air wings..."
     A collateral  function assigned to the Navy and Marine Corps
is "to train forces to be prepared to participate in  the overall
air effort, as directed."12
     Marine Corps  aviation is  organized and  equipped as a
     completely expeditionary air  arm.   This expeditionary
11JCS Pub 2, section 3, p. 22.
12JCS Pub 2, section 3, p. 23.
     aspect  sets  Marine  Corps  aviation  apart from other
     aviation organizations.  Marine  Corps  doctrine envis-
     ions  that  Marine  Corps  aviation  will  support  the
     landing  forces  throughout  an   assault  landing  and
     subsequent operations.   Marine Corps  aviation must be
     prepared to provide the  support by  operating tactical
     aircraft squadrons from carriers as part of carrier air
     groups or from airfields within striking distance of an
     aimphibious  objective  area.   It  must  be prepared to
     operate after  raid establishment  ashore, from minimal
     airfields within  the objective area during the assault
     phase  of  an  amphibious   operation... The  FMFs  are
     highly  specialized  amphibious  assualt troops.  Their
     ground and  air  elements  constitute  a  single weapon
     system  --  the  Marine  air-ground task force (MAGTF);
     while the task forces are capable  of sustained combat,
     they  are  primarily  for  use  in  amphibious  aasualt
     operations and are the  principal  means  of projecting
     naval power ashore.13
     The  multitude  of  tasks    to  support  the  Marine aviation
mission have been categorized into six separate functions:14
1)   Air Reconnaissance  -  photographic/multisensor, electronic,
and visual
2)   Antiair  warfare  -  air  defense  (active and passive); and
13FMFM 5-1, Marine Avaition, August 1979, pp. 1-2.
14FMFM 5-1, pp. 5-8.
offensive antiair warfare - aircraft and missiles -  the destruc-
tion  of  the  enemy  aircraft  or missile threat both before and
after it is launched
3)   Assault support - vertical  assault  support,  air delivery,
inflight refueling, and air evacuation
4)   Offensive air  support -  CAS (preplanned  {scheduled and on
calls and immediate); and Deep Air Support (DAS) (excluding those
air operations designed to reduce the enemy air capability)
5)   Electronic  warfare   (EW)  -   electronic  warfare  support
measures,  electronic  countermeasures,  and  electronic counter-
6)   Control of aircraft and missiles
     These lengthy  lists, which  in the  absence of providing a
listing of functions which  equate  to  a  common  denominator of
aviation  tasks  among  the  Services,  present  at a minimum the
doctrinal approach of the Services  to  the  employment  of their
aviation resources.  It would  be incongruent to attempt to unite
all aviation resources together on a functional basis.
     In addition to defining  individual  Service  functions, JCS
Pub  2  lists  responsibilities  for  each  of  the Services with
regard  to four different  areas: air defense,  amphibious opera-
tions,  airborne  operations,  and  close  combat  air support of
ground forces.
     All Services share responsibility for training and coordina-
tion  with   other  Services  in  developing  equipment,  tactics
and techniques for close combat  air  support  of  ground forces.
The Navy  and Marine Corps have unique responsibilities for close
air support of amphibious operations, in addition to a collateral
function of training forces to conduct close air support for land
operations.  The  Air Force  has the  responsibility of providing
Air Force  forces for  close combat air support of ground forces.
While close  air support  is defined  in JCS  Pub 1,  there is no
definition of close combat air support.
     Attempted  development  of  joint  doctrine for planning and
conducting CAS for ground forces has served to  highlight differ-
ences among the various Services along with the issue of airspace
control above  the combat  zone.  A  series of  joint studies and
tests have  been conducted  since 1971.15   Out  of these studies
often arises  the issue  of command  and control  of Marine Corps
TACAIR.16   Before firmly  addressing this issue it is germane to
look briefly at the organization of joint forces.
15USMC Operational Handbook (OH) 5-1.1, Command and Control of USMC
TACAIR, September 1982, p. 1-1.
16There is  not a JCS Pub 1 definition of "TACAIR".  The commonly
accepted usage conveys tactical  fixed  wing  aircraft; excluding
those aircraft  of a  support nature  with solely  a transport or
training role (i.e. TC4C, C-9, C-12, and T-39).
Chapter 11I     Joint Force Organization
     JCS Pub 2 provides  guidance for  the unification  of forces
when  two  or  more  services  are  employed  together in a joint
command  structure.   Historical  practice,  along  with  current
contingency planning  makes it probable that the joint employment
of forces can be expected in future military operations.
     "The term  'joint force' refers equally to unified commands,
subordinate unified  commands, and  joint task forces composed of
significant elements of two or more  Services, operating  under a
single  commander  authorized  to  exercise  unified  command  or
operational control over such  joint forces,  through the Service
component commanders."17
     JCS Pub  2 in  its definition of operational command, states
that  "operational  command" is   synonymous  with  "operational
control"  and  that  it  is  uniquely  applied to the operational
control of unified and specified commands over assigned forces in
accordance with  the National Security Act of 1947 as amended and
revised (10 U.S.C. 124)
     A unified  command is  established by  the President through
the Secretary  of Defense  with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.  It is a command with a broad continuing mission,  under a
single commander, and composed of significant assigned components
of two or more Services.18
17JCS Pub 12, Volume 1,  Tactical  Command  and  Control Planning
Guidance and Procedures for Joint Operations, 1 April 1974,p. 3.
18JCS Pub 1, p. 384.
     JCS  Pub  2  states  that  in  unified  commands operational
command is  exercised  through  Service  component  commander or
through subordinate  unified commander except in certain circua-
stances when the unified commander deals directly with a specific
operational  force  because  of  the mission or urgency (requires
approval by the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  and  the  Secretary of
     The  purpose  of  joint  force  command  organization  is to
provide for:
1)   Centralized direction -  to  coordinate  the  effort  of the
forces commanded
2)   Decentralized execution  - because  of the limitation of one
commander's span of control
3)   Common doctrine - so that appropriate  action will  be taken
by all concerned in the absence of specific instructions.
     The  nature  of  the  responsibilities,  missions, and tasks
assigned to  a  unified  command  will  determine  whether  it is
organized on  an area basis (geographic area) (most commonly used
method) or a functional basis.19
     In addressing the principles  of unified  direction of Armed
Forces, under "Service functions" JCS Pub 2 states:
     To  achieve  stability,  continuity, and economy and to
     facilitate long-range planning,  each  of  the services
     has  the  responsibility  for  organizing, training and
19JCS Pub 2, pp. 40-43.
     equipping,  and  providing  forces  to  fulfill certain
     combatant functions  and for administering and support-
     ing the forces so provided (except as may  otherwise be
     directed  by  the  Secretary  of Defense in the case of
     support of such forces).   The functions  involved in a
     military  operation  determine  the Service identity of
     the forces  to  be  assigned  and  usually  the Service
     identity  of   the  overall   commander.   Because  the
     exact role of each Service  and  weapon  in  future war
     cannot  be   delimited,  the   assignments  of  primary
     functions contained in Chapter  II are  not in tended to
     be rigidly  prescriptive in time of war with respect to
     command structure  or   relationships;   however,  due
     consideration must be given to such Service functions.
     It continues:  "organizational integrity  of Service compon-
ents should  be  maintained  insofar  as  practicable  to exploit
fully their inherent capabilities."20
     A  joint  task  force  "is  a  force composed of assigned or
attached elements of the Army, the Navy or Marine Corps,  and the
Air Force  or two or more of these Services, which is constituted
and so designated by the Secretary of Defense or by the Commander
of a  unified command,  a specified command, or an existing joint
task force."21
     A joint task force  is established  for a  limited objective
20JCS Pub 2, p. 43.
21JCS Pub 2, p. 51.
and is dissolved once that objective is achieved.
     A joint task force is organized of component commands.
     A component  command consists of the component commander and
     all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or
     installations  under  his  military  command which have been
     assigned to the operational command of the commander  of the
     unified command (to include subordinate unified commands and
     joint task forces).  Other  individuals, units, detachments,
     organizations, or  installations may  operate directly under
     the component  commander  in  his  Service  role  and should
     contribute  to  the  mission  of  the  unified  commander as
     In its  guide  to  terminology,  JCS  Pub  2  states  that a
component  command  is  also  called  a "component" or a "Service
component".  While this appears to be a moot  point, it  takes on
considerable  relevance   in  current  day  arguments  concerning
unified command structuring.
     Presented herein are the  basic tennants  of unified command
as they  presently are written.  There is much current focus upon
the subject of component commanders.
     The Air Force Tactical  Air  Operations  Manual  (TACM 2-1),
published in  April 1978, states that joint task force commanders
exercise  operational  control  of   their   force   through  the
commanders of  the Service forces comprising the joint task force
22JCS Pub 2, p. 48.
(the component commanders).  This is in keeping with JCS Pub 2.
     JCS Pub 12 further substantiates this  position in  a series
of tactical information flow diagrams which represent the flow of
information in joint force  organization.  In  these diagrams the
component  commands  of  the  joint task force are entitled "Army
component", "Marine Corps component", "Air Force  component", and
or  "Navy  component";  clearly  depicting components established
along Service lines.
     In a reversal of this documented previous position,  the Air
Force is  now proposing  a change to JCS Pub 2, to organize joint
forces along a functional vice Service basis.23
     The Air Force is now proposing  that joint  forces be organ-
ized on a trilateral basis, with three functional components:
land component, naval component, and air component.  The implica-
tions of this proposal  are far  reaching.  The  question arises:
where does the Marine Corps fit in this equation?
     While  this  proposal  still  awaits  Joint  Chiefs of Staff
action, JCS Pub 2 stands as written.  Yet, in the latest revision
of AFM  1-1 Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air
Force (16 March 1984), there is  no longer  mention of  a "Marine
Corps  component"  and  "Air  Force  component"  has  become "Air
component".  The implication being  that all  air has  been func-
tionally assembled under the air component.
     As  this  issue  is  alive  it must be remembered that while
23Chief of Staff of the Air Force Memorandum (CSAFM) 07-82 Proposal
to Change JCS Pub 2, dated 19 April 1982.
there are  far reaching  impacts in regard to MAGTF TACAIR, there
is     no  assault  on  amphibious  operations.   The  situation  in
question deals  with Marine  forces ashore  in a joint force, and
not as part of an amphibious task force.
     Having examined  joint  force  organization  as  mandated by
current directives and as addressed by a current change proposal;
a review of the historical record of joint force organization, in
particular, aviation  command and  control, will provide a closer
insight into the rationale behind many of the  arguments advanced
on both sides concerning this vital organizational issue.
Chapter IV      Historical Perspective
     Many of  the arguments  which are  put forth on the issue of
command and   control  of  Marine   TACAIR  during  sustained joint
operations   utilize   historical  perspective  as  a main premise.
There are three doctrinal publications, dating  from 1981 through
1984 in which the Air Force has internally promulgated its stance
on this  particular  issue.    Each  is  replete  with historical
justifications.24   The entire issue of historical precedent with
regards to command and control and how it  relates to  the Marine
Corps  and  aviation  forces  is  a  broad  deep  reaching issue,
presenting great  opportunity  for  most  liberal interpretation.
Numerous points  can be  made, often  in a simplistic analysis of
the  situation,  thereby  taken  out  of  context.   This becomes
obvious through  close examination  of the  various positions and
     The historical precedents which are put forth in  support of
centralized control  of all  theater air  assets by the Air Force
can be divided into  three  areas: the  North  Africa experience,
joint force  organization from  World War II through Vietnam, and
the role of Marine aviation in Korea and Vietnam.  it  is clearly
24Department of  the Air Force, Doctrinal Information Publication
(DIP) No. 10, Background Information on Air Force Perspective For
Coherent Plans (Command and Control of TACAIR), April 1981;
DIP  No. 11,  Command  Relationships,  The Marine Air/Ground Task
Force, and What They Mean to an Airman, 1981;
DIP No. 12, Command Relationships, January 1984;
These Doctrinal Information Publications are disseminated  to Air
Force commands, schools, and officers in key billets.
beyond the  scope of  this paper to conduct a thoroughly rigorous
analysis of the historical record; so discussion will  be limited
to those  points which  have been put forth in support of various
positions on the basic issue.  An attempt will be made to explore
each from the perspective of both sides, in an unbiased manner.
     To  state  that  air power ,  its  application,  strategy, and
tactics were  greatly refined  during World  War II  is an under-
statement.  The North Africa experiences of 1942-1943 served as a
focal point for the  evolution  of  Air  Force  doctrine  for the
control  of  air power.   There  was  no  centralized  control  of
air power during the invasion of North Africa; tactical  air units
were tied  to individual  Army units.   Because the main focus of
air effort was applied  to the  support of  ground forces without
achieving air  superiority, the  results were disastrous for both
the British and the Americans.  The  doctrine  at  the  time, as
specified in  Army Field  Manual 1-5, consisted of an air support
command attached to an Army unit,  with direction  for air opera-
tions  coming  from  the  ground  commander.   It  was  felt that
this failed to provide  direction, priority,  and coordination to
the overall  air effort, hence the poor showing.  As a result, at
the  Casablanca  Conference  of  January  1943,   both  President
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill approved a force reorgani-
zation.25  (figs.  1&2).   This  restructuring  provided  a means
25General William  W. Momyer   USAF(Ret), Air Power in Three Wars
(WWII, Korea,  Vietnam),  (Washington  D.C.: GPO,  1978), pp. 40,
Click here to view image
for the  centralized direction of the air effort.  General Momyer
(an experienced and respected  Air Force  commander and tactician
as  well  as  prominent  spokesman  on the subject of centralized
control of  theater  air  assets)  highlights  the  North African
experience in  his many  writings on this subject.  He traces the
air organization in Vietnam to the North Africa experience.26
Studying the North  African  experience,  one  certainly  can not
dispute the fact that centralized coordination of the air effort,
in this case a  coordinated achievement  of air  superiority, was
essential.   The  question  is,  was  a  centralized  air command
structure the only way to accomplish  this aim?   Why was General
Eisenhower as  Commander in  Chief Armed  Forces Northwest Africa
(CICAFNWA) (the joint force commander) with  his staff  unable to
accomplish this  coordination and  direction?  He had two armies
and two corps working for him, yet he  was unable  to direct, and
apportion their focus of effort in employing one of their organic
assets and mass them in pursuit of a theater goal.  Just what did
he create in the reorganization?  Note that a traditional pairing
of ground and supporting air units was maintained.
     The reorganization resulted  in  a  command  organization as
depicted in fig. 3 for the invasion of Sicily.27  Here there were
new problems with the integration  of  the  Air  Force operations
into  the  needs  of  the  force  as  a  whole.28   The Air Force
26Momyer, p. 256.
27E. Morison, The  Two-Ocean War: A  Short History  of the United
States Navy  in the  Second World War, (Boston, Toronto: Atlantic
Monthly Press, 1963), p. 246.
28Morison, p. 255.
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commander, General  Spaatz, focused  largely the  entirety of his
effort on  counter air operations.  This resulted in little or no
tactical air support being provided for  the amphibious landings.
The  US force (Western Naval Task Force) landed opposed by almost
total enemy air control of the  beachhead.   In  a similar manner,
the airborne  operation received  no tactical air support.   While
the reorganization at Casablanca allowed for an air commander who
could mass his air effort in the strategic and counter air roles,
the organization clearly was not responsive  to the  needs of the
ground force  commanders.29  It is interesting to note that Naval
aviation, when operating against targets assigned to the tactical
or strategic  forces, also  came under the control of the theater
air  component  commander.30   During  the  invasion  of  Sicily,
carrier  forces,  not  directly  involved  in  air defense of the
fleet, or ships of  the amphibious  force enroute  to the landing
area,   were  under  the  "operational  control"  of  Air Marshall
Tedder, the  Mediterranean Air  Commander who  controlled all air
power flown  in support of the landing force.31  This is contrary
to joint doctrine for  amphibious operations  where the Commander
of  the  Amphibious  Task  Force maintains the responsibility for
command authority of  all  air  operations  within  the objective
29Morison, p. 255.
30Momyer, pp. 44-45; while there was not by definition "component"
commanders at this time, General Momyer  has elected  to refer to
centralized theater commands (ground, naval, and air) during this
time frame as component commands, hence the adoption of this term
31Momyer, p. 45.
     For Operation  Overlord, the  invasion of  Normandy in 1944,
initially the  Allied organization  was as  depicted in fig. 4.33
This  organization  provided  for  an  Allied  naval  and assualt
(landing force) component.  However, air forces were divided into
three  separate  commands: the  Allied  Expeditionary  Air  Force
(subordinate to  the  Supreme  Headquarters  Allied Expeditionary
Force (SHAEF)  and two bomber commands (RAF and the United States
Strategic Air Force).  Air Chief Marshall Portal served as deputy
on the Combined  Chiefs of Staff for coordinating the British and
American bomber forces  (essentially  serving  as  a coordinating
authority)  for  the  Combined  Bomber  Offensive.34   During the
actual invasion, Air Marshall Tedder, the Deputy Supreme Command-
er, coordinated the two bomber forces.35
     After the  invasion, with the establishment of the 12th Army
Group under  General Bradley,  General Eisenhower  was faced with
the  decision  of  whether  or  not  to create a ground component
command to provide  coordination  for  the  various  Army Groups.
This forced General Eisenhower to face the political implications
of choosing either Field  Marshall Montgomery  or General Bradley
as component commander.  A previous precedent had been establish-
ed in North Africa, where  General  Alexander  had  functioned as
both  the  Deputy  Theater  Commander  as  well  as  a  component
32For a thorough discussion see LFM 01 (AFM 2-53), p. 2-9.
33Momyer, p. 49.
34Momyer, p. 45.
35Homyer, p. 50.
commander.   This  resulted   in  arguments  over   dual  hatting.
Reacting  to  the  political  sensitivities   involved, in a since
criticized, perhaps wise (considering the personalities involved)
decision, General  Eisenhower elected  to act as both the theater
commander, SHAEFA and the overall ground forces commander.36
     At this time, the First Allied Airborne Army (which included
organic aviation) served as a theater reserve forces it was later
attached to Field Marshall Montgomery's Army Group.37
     On 15 October 1944  the Allied  Expeditionary Air  Force was
disestablished.   This   left  an  organization  as  depicted  in
fig. 5.38  This removed  the "component  command" and  left three
tactical air forces, each which coordinated directly with an Army
Group, receiving centralized direction from the  Supreme Command-
er.  In  effect, this  meant three  tactical air forces without a
centralized Air  Force  commander  along  with  the  First Allied
Airborne Army's  organic aviation.   While this  seems to belabor
a lot of tedious command relationships, the point to be drawn is,
simply, there  was not a precedent established and maintained for
theater force organization along functional component lines.
     The decision to disestablish  the  Allied  Expeditionary Air
Force  (AEAF)  has  been  described  as  a  reaction  to the fact
that General Esienhower elected not to create a  ground component
commander  (no  ground  component  commander,  no  air  component
36Momyer, p. 50.
37Forrest C. Pogue, The United States Army  in World  War II. The
Supreme Command, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1954),
pp. 269, 280.
38Pogue, p. 455.
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commander).  General Momyer  provides  another  insight  into why
American airmen pushed to disestablish the AEAF:39
     They especially  desired to  eliminate the AEAF because
     it was  an  obstacle  to  returning  the  strategic air
     forces to  the bombing  campaign.  As  long as the AEAF
     existed, it would continue to exert  pressure to employ
     bombers  in  extensive  support of the ground campaign,
     allowing only an  occasional  use  of  the  bombers for
     major strategic offensives.
     This  quote  certainly  displays  a  predisposition  towards
strategic  bombing  at  the  expense  of  support  of  the ground
commands.   While  North  Africa  served  to  establish Air Force
precedent and  doctrine for  centralized air  control; Sicily and
the war  in Europe  appear to have established the overall aim of
the  air  effort  away  from  adequately  supporting  the  ground
campaign.  During  the World  War II,  the ground army commanders
had to compete with strategic bombing,  and often  because of the
aim of the centralized direction, they suffered.  Today, does not
the same situation exist, with the  Army close  air support needs
competing  with  interdiction  for  a  share  of  the overall air
     Turning to the Pacific, a  theater  of  World  War  II which
39Momyer, p. 51.
General Momyer  does not  discuss at all in his book  Airpower in
Three Wars, airpower here  also  played  an  important  role, and
command relationships  continued an  evolutionary process towards
our current unified doctrine.
     The  war  began  without  any  unified   command  structure.
Following  the  attack  on  Pearl Harbor, the Pacific forces were
reorganized with both General  MacArthur and  Admiral Nimitz each
having command of air, land, and naval forces.
     In  the  Philippines,  during  the  defense  of  Bataan  and
Corregidor Island, General MacArthur  had operational  control of
the Fourth Marine Regiment.
     In the  two pronged  offensive northward towards the Philli-
pines and the islands of the central Pacific, all final decisions
with  regard  to  both  General  MacArthur's and Admiral Nimitz's
forces (force composition, objectives,  timing, etc.) rested with
the Joint  Chiefs of  Staff in  the absence of an overall theater
     In  the  central  Pacific,  the  Fleet  Marine  Forces under
Admiral Nimitz  served as integral type forces of the US fleet in
accordance  with   the  established   amphibious  doctrine,  Navy
FTP-167.   This  tentative  manual  for  landing  operations  was
refined to reflect what we now  know as  established doctrine for
amphibious operations.
     In  the  southwest  Pacific,  various  Marine squadrons were
controlled by the Fifth  Air Force  under the  overall command of
40DIP No. 11, p. 33.
General MacArthur.41
     On the  subject of Marine aviation in the Pacific theater of
World War II, the Air Force has said: "Even though Marine Air was
conceived  for  CAS,  historically  it  supported  Marine  ground
operations only in Peleliu  and Okinawa."42   Admittedly, "except
for the  landings at  Bougainville, Peliliu was the only occasion
in the Pacific War when none but Marine  planes were  employed to
assist Marines crossing a beach."43  However Marines additionally
flew in support of  the beach  phase of  the assault  at Iwo Jima
(from fast  carriers) as  well as support from Henderson Field in
Guadacanal  where  they  flew  in  support  of  the  First Marine
Division which  was ashore, along with missions in support of the
rest of the Solomons campaign.44
     There was a persistent  effort on  behalf of  placing Marine
pilots  aboard  escort  carriers  to  fly  solely  in  support of
amphibious landings.45  In the  central  Pacific  Marine  air was
largely utilized to keep bypassed islands nuetralized.
     Marine officers from the Commandant down had repeatedly
     recommended the assignment of  escort carriers  for the
     exclusive  use  of  Marine  aviators.   Only thus, they
     maintained, could  their  ground  troops  be guaranteed
41Jeter A. Isley and Philip A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphib-
ious  War  its  Theory and Its   Practice   in   the Pacific,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 427.
42DIP No  11, p. .35.
43Isley and Crowl, p. 421.
44Isley and Crowl, pp. 135, 508.
45Isley and Crowl, p. 507.
     uninterruptrd  and  efficient  close air support during
     the assualt phase of amphibious operations.   Not until
     the very  end of  the war, and then too late for active
     employment, did the Navy designate escort  carriers for
     the sole use of Marine aviation.46
     Several points  can be taken from this.  First, it serves to
reinforce  the  fact  that  Marine  aviation  was  established to
support  the  Marine  infantryman.   Secondly,  assigning  Marine
aircraft missions away from this primary role degrades the Marine
fighting  team.   Lastly,  a  problem which still exists is high-
lighted.  That is the physical constraints which  serve to hamper
Marine  aviaiton's  support  of  amphibious  operations  (lack of
carrier deck space which can be  devoted to  exclusive support of
an  amphibious  landing  coupled  with  the  possible shorfall of
suitable land  bases  within  range  of  an  amphibious objective
area).47  This  last problem  does not fall under the category of
sustained land operations,  and  it  is  adequately  addressed by
current doctrine  where Navy carrier air and possibly theater Air
Force air will  provide  necessary  support  until  such  time as
suitable  air  facilities  for  landing  force  aviation  can  be
uncovered.48  This is an example of support which can be achieved
46Isley and Crowl, pp. 585-586.
47For excellent  discussion on this issue in present day context,
see:  Lieutenant  Colonel Charles  R. Geiger   USMC, Marine Corps
TACAIR and Strategic Mobility, (Naval War College, March 1983).
48Current training  to insure  that this  type of  support can be
adequately provided includes  the  deployment  of  a  Navy attack
squadron overseas as an integral member of a Marine Air Group.
even  without  an  "air  component  commander" by virtue of joint
force doctrine, possibly highlighted by intiating directives.
     The Marine  aviators  who  left  the  Solomons  to  work for
General MacArthur  in the invasion of the Philippines both amazed
and delighted the Army troops with their close air support.4,
They earned this  praise  largely  because  of  their responsive-
     Most  of  the  complaints  from  ground troops in other
     operations arose  from  the  fact  that  too  much time
     elapsed  between  request  for  close  air  support and
     execution,  that  strikes  were  controlled  by  higher
     echelon  rather   than  front  line  troops,  that  the
     procedure  for  obtaining  air   support  by  appealing
     through several  links in  the chain of command was too
     rigid, and that pilots were inadequately briefed in the
     front  line  situation.   Much  of this was avoided not
     only on  Luzon but  in the  other Philippine operations
     where Marine air participated.50
The system  in the  Philippines worked  because the Marine pilots
were supporting no more than one  division  at  a  time.51   This
speaks loud  and clear  as a testimonial to the established MAGTF
team; and why it is vital that control of Marine  aviation remain
with the MAGTF commander.
49Isley and Crowl, p. 181.
50Isley and Crowl, p. 427.
51Isley and Crowl, p. 580.
     At Okinawa, Admiral Turner commanded the Expeditionary Force
as part of the Fifth Fleet.   The landing  force, the  10th Army,
which included  the III Marine Amphibious Corps, was commanded by
an Army general and the  Army  Air  Forces  and  Marine  air were
placed under the command of a Marine general.52
     The Air  Force has stated that the battle of Okinawa is "one
prominent  example  of  successful  integration  of multi-Service
forces  through  functional  components."53    The Air Force also
contends that "the Marines actively supported commitment of their
assets (and  the AAF assets) under an air component commander."54
The joint force organization  at  Okinawa  was  developed  for an
amphibious  operation.    Amphibious  doctrine calls for specific
command  relationships,   when  more  than  one  Service provides
tactical aviation  (in the joint force) in support of the landing
     When the preponderance of tactical aviation is provided
     by the  Air Force  for the amphibious operation, an Air
     Force officer  will  be  designated  by  the  Air Force
     commander  of  the  participating  Air  Force forces to
     direct the total air effort in the amphibious objective
The Air  Force quotes  the preceeding passage in DIP 11, using it
52DIP No. 11, p. 35.
53DIP 12, p. 10.
54DIP 11, p. 35.
55LFM 01 (AFM 2-53), p. 2-7.
as  an  argument  for  functional  components  in  sustained land
operations.56   The contested issue is sustained land operations,
not amphibious  operations.  LFM  01 does  not use  the term "air
component  commander".   The  remainder  of  LFM  01's discussion
provides a more complete picture:
     He will  exercise such  direction under  the joint task
     force commander  or when  control of  air operations is
     passed ashore, under the landing force  commander or an
     appropriate commander  ashore who has the capability to
     control such  operations.   When  the  perponderance of
     tactical aviation  comes from the Navy or Marine Corps,
     the overall air effort  in the  objective area  will be
     directed by  a naval  aviator under the amphibious task
     force commander until control is passed ashore.
Additionally, LFM 01 states:
     When Air  Force forces  are assigned  to the amphibious
     task force  they will  be organized as a separate force
     or  component  under  the  command  of   an  Air  Force
     officer.  The  Air Force commander, with respect to his
     own forces, exercises command similar to that exercised
     by the  landing force  commander and the ampibious task
     force  commander,   subject  to   the  overall  command
     authority of the amphibious task force commander.57
56DIP 11, p. 35.
57LFM 01 (AFM 2-53), p. 2-7.
While this digresses  from the subject of  joint land operations,
because of  the Air  Force attempt to include it as such in their
DIPs, it is necessary to put the relationships of amphibious task
force   organization   into   proper  perspective.   Furthermore,
analyizing amphibious force organization, it is clearly a Service
force organization and is not along functional component lines.
     Following World  War II,  the National  Security Act of 1947
established  the  Department  of  the  Air  Force  as  a separate
Service, and provided a legal position for the Fleet Marine Force
principles  ("combined  arms  together   with  supporting  air").
Additionally this  act stated that the Marine Corps shall perform
"other duties as the President may direct."
     With the outbreak of the Korean War, the  stage was  set for
the Employment  of Marines  in sustained  land operations and the
ensuing  issue  concerning  the  control  of  Marine  aviation in
such  operations.   The  initial organization for Korea contained
three Service components (Air Force, ground  and naval commands).
Following  the  landing  at  inchon, the landing force came under
control of the  Army's  X  Corps  which  operated  as  a parallel
command  to  the  Eighth  Army  under  the  Far East Ground Force
Command.  The X Corps had Marine aviation assigned  for close air
support.  in  December 1950 X Corps was placed under Eighth Army,
hence the First Marine Division was assigned to  Eighth Army.  At
the same  time The First Marine Aircraft Wing was assigned to the
Fifth Air Force and was employed across the Eighth Army  front or
on interdiction depending upon the tactical situation.58
     The Marine  Corps wanted  its air employed in direct support
of Marine ground forces  and General  Almond (Commander  of the X
Corps) argued  to have the First Marine Aircraft Wing assigned to
the control of his Corps; however the Air Force gained operation-
al control  of all  aircraft in the execution of the Far East Air
Force (FEAF) mission as  assigned by  the Commander  in Chief Far
East (CINCFE)  and the  Far East  Naval Commander  had command or
operational control of  all  aircraft  in  the  execution  of his
mission as  assigned by  CINCFE.  Coordination when both the Navy
and Air Force were assigned missions  was delegated  by CINCFE to
FEAF.59  Day to  day working procedures were established between
the various Services and the Air Force commander  had centralized
control of  the air  effort.  With  this relationship, an area of
dispute surfaced concerning the division of labor between CAS and
interdiction.  General Momyer states:
     Also, with a stable front there were fewer requirements
     for close  air support  and consequently  more need for
     the Marine  air units in the interdiction campaign.  As
     a result   of the  integration of  Marine air operations
     with 5th   Air Force  operations, centralized control of
     all the air power assigned  to the  Far East  theater of
     operation provided  the flexibility  that it did in the
58Momyer, p. 62.
59Momyer, p. 58.
     campaigns of World War II.60
The subject  has  been  addressed  from  a  different  vantage by
Marine Corps Lieutenant General M. A. Twining:
      The  winning  combination which  had  taken inchon and
      Seoul had been broken up. The surface ships, operating
      as a  form of  floating artillery, bombarded Wonsan and
      the  northern ports  for  years  with  no  discernable
      results; the  carriers participated  with the Air Force
      in operations against the enemy lines of communication-
      the 1st  Marine Air   Wing was  separated from its team-
      mate, the 1st Marine  Division, thereby  destroying the
     most   effective  air-ground  team  the  world  had ever
     seen.  The Wing was placed under Air Force  command and
     operated as  a component  of the  5th Air Force...  The
     fleet, which had performed  so brillantly  in September
     1950  as  a  balanced  instrument of sea power, had been
     dispersed by circumstances into  relatively ineffective
     components- of land, sea, air.61
     In  the  intervening  years  between  Korea and Vietnam, the
Marine Corps was  deployed  to  both  Lebanon  and  the Dominican
Republic, where  it was assigned as a component of a joint force.
60Momyer, p. 62.
61Colonel R. D. Heinl  Jr.   USMC  (Ret),  Soldiers  of  the Sea,
(Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1962), pp. 588-589.
In each of  these  two  instances,  Marine  forces  were employed
under  a   land  force  component  commander,  maintaining  their
complete integrity.62
     A Marine  helicopter squadron,  HMM-362, in  1962 became the
first Marine  unit to deploy to Vietnam.  By 11 May 1965 a Marine
air-ground team, III Marine Amphibious Force  (MAF) (Third Marine
Division  and  the  First  Marine  Aircraft Wing) was in place in
     In September 1963, CINCPAC convened a  board to  examine how
TACAIR should  be coordinated  in a future conflict.  This action
was largely prompted by the lessons of the Korean War.  The board
included representatives from all the Services.  The board in its
findings,  acknowledged   that  each   Service  utilizes  organic
aircraft to  carry out tactical missions, and recommended compon-
ent commanders should be appointed by a joint  force commander to
serve as a coordinating authority for tactical air operations.64
     JCS Pub  1 provides the following definition for "coordinat-
ing authority":
     A commander or  individual assigned  responsibility for
62Major Jack  K. Ringler  USMC and Henry I. Shaw Jr., U.S. Marine
Corps Operations in the  Dominican Republic  April-June 1965 (U),
(Washington D.C.: HQMC Historical Division, 1970), pp. 43-44; and
HQMC  Point   Paper  #  718-82,  subj. Functional  Components,  1
November 1982.
63Lieutenant General Kieth B. McCutcheon  USMC,  "Marine Aviation
in Vietnam, 1962-1970" United States Naval Institute Proceedings,
May 1971, pp. 124,127.
64McCuthcheon, p. 135.
     coordinating specific functions or activities involving
     forces of two or more Services or two or more forces of
     the same Service. The commander  or individual  has the
     authority to  require consultation between the agencies
     involved, but does not  have  the  authority  to compel
     agreement.   In  the  event  that  essential  agreement
     cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the
     appointing authority.65
     CINCPAC  utilized  a  coordinating  authority  during  photo
missions flown in Laos  in  1964.66    With  the  introduction of
Marines  into  Vietnam  in  1965,  CINCPAC  issued  the following
guidance  to  the  Commander  U.S.  Military  Assistance  Command
Vietnam (COMUSMACV):
     a.  The  Commanding General  of the MEB (Marine Expedi-
     tionary Brigade) would  report  to  COMUSMACV  as Naval
     Component Commander.*
     b.  COMUSMACV  would  exercise  operational  control of
     the MEB  through the  CG of the MEB.
     c.  Commander, 2d  Air  Division,  in  his  capacity as
     Air  Force  Component  Commander  of  MACV would act as
     coordinating  authority  for   matters   pertaining  to
     tactical air  support and air traffic control in MACV's
     area of responsibility.67
65JCS Pub 1, p. 92.
66McCuthcheon, p. 135.
67McCutcheon, p. 135.
     * note: In April 1966,  III  MAF became  a uni-Service
     COMUSMACV  protested   to  CINCPAC  that  the  Marine  Corps
fixed-wing squadron  in  the  MEB  should  be  under "operational
control" of  his Air Force component commander.  CINCPAC replied,
reemphasizing his previous guidance, that "operational control of
the squadron  would be  exercised through  the MEB and not the 2d
Air Division."68
     In an April 1965 directive, CINCPAC  stated that  close air
support was  the priority mission in Vietnam along with reiterat-
ing the  previous guidance  that COMUSMACV's  Air Force component
commander was the coordinating authority in matters pertaining to
tactical air support and air traffic control.69
     A later directive from CINCPAC  stated  that  the  Air Force
component commander  (now designated Commander Seventh Air Force)
was the "coordinating  authority"  for  all  U.S. and  Free World
Military  Air  Force  air  operations  and  Vietnamese  Air Force
activities in the MACV area of operations.70   The same directive
stated that  the Commanding  General of  III MAF exercised opera-
tional control over all Marine aviation.   The one  exception was
when COMUSMACV  directed the Air Force component commander in the
event of a "major  emergency  or  disaster"  to  take operational
control of  Marine aviation.   Furthermore, excess Marine sorties
were  to  be  identified   to  the   air  coordinating  authority
68McCutcheon, p. 135.
69McCutcheon, p. 136.
70McCutcheon, p. 136.
(Commander Seventh Air Force) for use in support  of other forces
or missions.71
     In August 1965 an agreement was reached between the Command-
er of the Seventh Air Force and III  MAF concerning  air defense.
The Air  Force wanted  operational control of air defense assets,
while the Marine  Corps  had  been  concerned  because  their air
defense fighter,  the F-4,  was a  multi-mission aircraft equally
suitable  for  direct  support  of  Marine  ground  forces.   The
agreement retained  operational control  of Marine  air under III
MAF while the Marines conceded the  necessity of  having a single
commander responsible  for air defense, hence  "requisite author-
ity for purposes of air defense was passed  to the  Air Force."72
Such was  the framework  for the pre-1969 policy for the command,
control, and  coordination  of  Marine  aviation  in  Vietnam, an
"entirely  adequate  system"  as  far as III MAF was concerned.73
This system as it then existed, was very  similar to  the current
JCS  guidance  on  the  command  and  control of Marine TACAIR in
sustained  joint  land  operations.   However,  1968  saw certain
events transpire which served to alter this arrangement.
     Looking  at  the  pre-1968  arrangement  from  the Air Force
perspective, the Air Force had attempted unsuccessfully to obtain
control of both Marine TACAIR as well as Army helicopters.74   in
his book General Momyer  addresses the  directives which provided
71McCutcheon, pg. 136
72McCutcheon, p. 136.
72McCutcheon, p. 136.
74Momyer, pp. 81-82.
for III  MAF retention  of operational control of all Marine air,
however he fails to mention the Air Force's  role as coordinating
authority.  In  explanation of  the many  attempts on the part of
the Air  Force  to  obtain  operational  control  of  Marine air,
General  Momyer  provides  some  interesting  observations on his
part.  It should be noted that  General Momyer  was the Commander
of the  Seventh Air  Force from July 1966 to August 1969.  On the
subject of how Marine air responded to the tasking of III MAF, he
     III  MAF  did  not  evaluate  the  requests for the air
     support, nor determine what  the  priority  for support
     would  be.   Instead,  the  Marine tactical air control
     system scheduled  all in-commission  aircraft into each
     of the  division areas  on a planned flow, a costly way
     to manage air resources for sustained  operations of an
     air-ground  campaign.   The  Marine system was designed
     for amphibious operations, where the lack  of artillery
     required  air power  overhead  at  all  times.   In this
     operation where obtaining a beachhead is  critical, the
     use  of  air power  in  this  manner  can  be justified.
     However,  it  is  highly  expensive  to  keep  aircraft
     overhead at  all times  throughout the day and critical
     periods at night when there are no targets.75
     This quote certainly appears to be a major  overstatement of
75Momyer, p. 285.
the fundamental ideological differences between the Air Force and
the  Marine  Corps,  while  it  casts  justified doubt on General
Momyer's personal comprehension of what the Marines were doing.
The Air Force felt that "preplanned strikes were  more economical
than on-station  sorties, and  that directed strikes would deter-
mine ground operations."76  The Marine  Corps doctrine  calls for
air operations  in support  of the  ground effort  and the Marine
Corps argued against "single  management"  on  two  counts: 1) it
would increase response time, and 2) it was not necessary.77
     General Momyer paints an almost slanderous picture of Marine
air, stating: "the  1st  Marine  Air  Wing  divided  its aircraft
between the  two Marine divisions and, irrespective of the ground
situation, scheduled these aircraft into their areas in  a steady
stream."78    Anyone  even  vaguely  familiar  with the doctrine,
procedures, and functioning in question, of Marine Corps tactical
air command and control, can immediately recognize the fallacy of
this representation!
     As events unfolded during the seige of Khe Sanh and with the
Tet offensive providing a back drop for the argument for central-
ized control of air, Generals Westmoreland and Momyer won a split
decision from  the U.S. national military command authority.  The
result was a single  management  system  in  which  U.S. Army and
Marine forces  were placed  under one commander, MACV foward, and
Marine  TACAIR  was  placed  under  the  "operational  direction"
76DIP No. 12, p. 36.
77McCutcheon, p. 137.
78Momyer, p. 286.
authority  of  Seventh  Air   Force  (the   Air  Force  component
commander- General Momyer).79
     What evolved, appears to be a precarious system interdepend-
ent upon the personalities of  the  individuals  involved  in the
application of a directive void of detailed procedures.
     The Air Force describes the outcome of the implementation of
this policy when it  quotes from  Lieutenant General McCutcheon's
article on  Marine aviation in Vietnam (misidentifying the author
as "Lieutenant Colonel" McCutcheon):
     There was no doubt  whether  single  management  was an
     overall  improvement  as  far  as  MACV  as a whole was
     concerned.  It was.80
     This is another example, where in  historical examination of
the basic  issue, quotes  have been  taken out  of context by the
USAF to serve as a dramatic  means of  justifying their position.
In his article, Lieutenant General McCutcheon goes on to describe
how through cooperation between on  scene commanders  and cooper-
ation at  the operational level, "for all practical purposes, the
system worked around to just about where it was in the pre-single
management days  as far  as identification  or fragging of Marine
sorties."81   One  factor  which  affected  the  working  of the
new policy  was the  fact that  "operational direction" was not a
defined term.  it appears that in the actual working execution of
79DIP No. 12, p. 14, and McCutcheon, p. 137.
80DIP No. 11, p. 6.
81McCutcheon, p. 137.
the single  management directive,  the Marine  Corps never relin-
quished operational control of its aircraft.
     The following excerpt contains  testimony  of  Major General
H.S. Hill  USMC  (DCS-Air  when  questioned by Mr. Kendall, Chief
counsel to U.S. Senate, Special  Close  Air  Support Subcommittee
hearing on  Close Air Support, 1 November 1971, on the subject of
control of Marine air in Vietnam,82
       Mr. Kendall.  General, isn't it true that ultimately
     the  control  of  all  the  Marine  air assets in South
     Vietnam were placed under  the control  of the  7th Air
       General  Hill.    No,  sir,  that  is  not  correct,
     Mr. Kendall.   The  arrangement   initially   in  South
     Vietnam  prescribed  in  MACV  Directive  95-4 was that
     Marine air assets were primarily in support of  the III
     MAF and  III MAF would augment daily the U.S. Air Force
     effort with resources not  required  to  support opera-
     tions of  prime concern  to III MAF.  Those assets that
     were not required or could be made available  were made
     available  to  the  joint  task  force commander and he
     could frag them and  utilize them  wherever he desired.
     There  was  a  change  to  that  directive in which all
     preplanned  requests  for  aircraft,  including  Marine
82U.S. Cong., Senate,  Special Subcommittee on Close Air Support,
Close Air Support, 92nd Cong., 1st  Sess., (Washington D.C.: GPO,
1972), pp. 291-292.
aircraft,  were  processed  by  the  MACV  Tactical Air
Support Element (TASE)  for  assignment  of priorities.
The Marines  retained sorties necessary to support USMC
peculiar operations, but  the  other  remaining sorties
were  allocated   through  the  TASE  in  Saigon.   The
commander 7th Air Force, being the commander, coordina-
ted the  fragging of these aircraft with the 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing.
   Mr. Kendall.  Are you familiar  with  the  fact that
General Momyer  testified that  he insisted that all of
the in-country assets be placed under  his control, and
particularly at the time of Khe Sanh?
   General Hill.   Yes, sir;  I am  aware of that.  The
way it turned out, the control of those air assets were
under the joint force commander, Mr. Kendall.
   Mr. Kendall.  Isn't  General Momyer  the joint force
   General Hill.   No; he  was the  Air Force component
commander.  The joint force commander was MACV.
   Mr. Kendall.   So   then  to   that  extent  General
Momyer's  testimony   was  inaccurate;   is  that  your
   General  Hill.  I  would  say  that  it just lacked
further detailed explanation, sir,  because the assign-
ment of priorities actually came through the TASE which
was  underneath  the  joint   force  commander  General
Westmoreland, and later, General Abrams.
     From  the  Marine  Corps  vantage,  there  is  an  important
distinction between having the joint force commander,  not the Air
Force component  commander assign  priorities.  This subject will
be examined in the next chapter.
     In 1970 there  was  a  revision  of  MACV's  guidance, which
basically stated that CG III MAF had operational control over all
his air assets  and  that  7th  Air  Force  was  the coordinating
     Embroiled in  the many  conflicting accounts  are few common
threads.  Vietnam did  not  provide  a  precedent  for functional
components; it was a mixture of uni-Service, area, and functional
commands.  Additionally, depending upon  the  perspective  of the
author, the command relationships between the various Service air
arms gas either one of  intense  inter-Service  rivalry  or great
cooperation.   Valid  arguments  for centralized direction of the
air effort existed, but  the question  arises, at  what level was
the  centralized  direction  to  take  place?   The advantages of
centralized direction  were  demonstratively  offset  by degraded
responsiveness to  the needs  of the  supported ground commander.
Centralized control  of  air power  is  of  great  benefit  to the
theater Air Force component commander but at potential great cost
to the MAGTF.
     It can be argued  that the  theater air  component commander
83McCutcheon, p. 137, and DIP No. 11, p. 36.
was  gaining  air  resources  to  fulfill his responsibilities in
executing  an  interdiction  campaign  and  to  support  the Army
forces.  This  hypothesis can  be examined through the CAS issue.
Colonel Robert E. Buhrow USAF  in his  research paper,  Close Air
Support Requirements: A Study of Interservice Rivalry sheds light
upon this issue.  He begins with a quote from a  1966 House Armed
Services Committee hearing on close air support:".... we feel that
in its [the Air  Force] magnificent  accomplishments in  the wild
blue yonder it has tended to ignore the foot soldier in the dirty
brown under."84  Colonel  Buhrow states  that at  the begining of
U.S. involvement in Vietnam the Air Force did not have a suitable
attack aircraft.  He describes how members of the House Committee
made  the  statement  that  the  Air Force failed in its assigned
mission of providing close  air support  to the  Army in Vietnam.
After examining  the Air  Force and Army reactions to this state-
ment, Colonel Buhrow concludes  that  "the  House  Armed Services
Committee was correct--the Air Force entered the Vietnam conflict
with little or no close air support capability."  He finishes his
study  by  recommending  that  the  Air  Force  operate  aircraft
dedicated to  Army  support  and  that  the  Army  have "complete
command and control of these assets."85
     Viewing  the  CAS  issue  from  another perspective, General
Momyer testified: "the U.S. Air Force is  proud of  its tradition
84Colonel Robert E. Buhrow  USAF, Close Air Support Requirements: A
Study in  Interservice Rivalry,  (U.S. Army War  College, 1 March
1971), p. 1.
85Buhrow, pp. 9, 39, 50.
in providing  close air  support to ground forces; this is one of
the most important missions conducted by tactical air power."86
     Fundamentally it boils down to the fact that Marine aviation
is tailored  to one mission, support of the Marine ground action,
while the Air  Force  has  the  divided  responsibility  for both
support  of  the  Army  ground  action as well as the theater air
effort.  History has raised  the possibility  that the  Air Force
may not  have been  adequately equipped  or prepared  for the two
tasks at hand; which leads to conjecture that  in the centralized
direction of  TACAIR assets the Air Force is attempting to offset
its own shortfalls.  Regardless  of  the  degree  of  validity of
this presumption,  the mere  fact that  it is conceivable weakens
arguments  for  centralized  control  of  theater  TACAIR.   This
couples  with  the  documented  fact  that, in actuality, the Air
Force component commander in Vietnam never really served  as more
than a  coordinating authority  for air; to set the stage for the
post Vietnam controversy concerning  the  subject  of  control of
Marine  air  in  sustained  land operations.  These deliberations
culminated in the JCS Omnibus Agreement, which today, almost four
years after  its inception is still often obscured by attempts to
organize into trilateral functional components on the basis  of a
fallacious  historical  precedent  which  is not borne out by the
86U.S. COng., Senate, Close Air Support, p. 174.
                    PART TWO *** CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS
Chapter V       The Omnibus Agreement
     With the  end of  U.S. military involvement  in Vietnam, the
issue  of  centralized  control  of  all theater TACAIR assets to
include Marine  Corps  aviation  (when  Marines  are  involved in
sustained  joint  land  operations)  remained unresolved, largely
because  of  the  inability  of  the  various  Services  to reach
     Starting  in  1971,  at  the  direction  of the Secretary of
Defense, a series of tests  centering  around  close  air  support
were conducted.  They were multi-phased, involving the Air Force,
Marine Corps, and theater commanders.  One issue which was raised
was response  time in terms of support of ground troops.  Discus-
ions between Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC)  and the  USAF Air
Staff were  unproductive.  During  this same time frame the basic
issue surfaced frequently  at  the  FMF  operating  level.87   In
November 1979  the USAF brought the issue before the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.88
     In March 1980 the issue was at the forefront as  a result of
the  review  of  CINCNORTH's  OPLAN  "Brawny Gambit" in which the
policy concerning the employment of a MAGTF participating as part
of  a  joint  task  force  was  contested.   The  Air  Force took
87OH 5-1.1, p. 1-1.
88Commandant of the Marine Corps, White Letter No. 7-81, Encl (2),
p. 1.
exception to  the employment of the MAGTF as an entity, insisting
that it be broken up with  its  air  and  ground  elements placed
under separate NATO component commanders.  By December 1980 there
were four additional plans  awaiting review.   The review process
was held up for over a year because of continued intransigence on
the part of the Air Force  concerning  the  issue  of  control of
Marine TACAIR.89  The  Marine Corps position had remained stead-
fast: that even in joint  operations, the  MAGTF commander always
maintains integrity  of the  MAGTF, he always retains operational
control of  his  organic  air  assets,   that  MAGTF  aviation is
employed in  support of  Marine ground forces and that the Marine
Corps would provide  those  sorties  in  excess  of  MAGTF direct
support requirements  to other  components of the joint force, or
the joint force as a whole.90
     The  Marine  Corps  positon  at  this  time  was  very much
identical to the pre-1968 arrangement for the command and control
of Marine air in Vietnam as  directed by  CINCPAC and implemented
by  MACV  (see  chapter  IV)  even  to the point of acknowledging
relinquishment  of  operational  control  when  the  joint  force
commander (JFC) declared a major emergency.
     In March 1981 the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed and published
a policy for the employment of  the MAGTF  as a  part of  a Joint
task force in sustained operations ashore.  This policy statement
89Memorandum by CMC for JCS #6-80,  subj: Command  and Control of
TACAIR, 22 December 1980, pp. 1-2.
90Memorandum by  J-3 for  the JCS  2521/384-8, subj:  Command and
Control of TACAIR DECISION, revised 27 March 1981, p. 15.
is commonly referred to as the  "Omnibus Agreement"  and it reads
in whole:
          The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander
     will retain  operational  control  of  his  organic air
     assets.  The  primary mission  of the  MAGTF air combat
     element is the support  of  the  MAGTF  ground element.
     During  joint  operations,  the  MAGTF  air assets will
     normally be in support of the MAGTF mission.  The MAGTF
     commander  will  make  sorties  available  to the joint
     force commander, for tasking through his  air component
     commander,  for  air  defense, long-range interdiction,
     and long-range reconnaissance.   Sorties  in  excess of
     MAGTF direct  support requirements  will be provided to
     the joint force commander  for tasking  through the air
     component commander for the support of other components
     of the JTF, or the JTF as a whole.
          Nothing herein shall infringe on the  authority of
     the Theater  or joint  force commander, in the exercise
     of operational control,  to  assign  missions, redirect
     efforts, and  direct coordination among his subordinate
     commanders to insure unity of effort  in accomplishment
     of his overall mission, or to maintain integrity of the
     force, as prescribed in  JCS  Pub  II,  "Unified Action
     Armed Forces (UNAAF)."91
91CMC, White Letter 7-81  encl (1), p. 1.
This agreement  has since  been written into JCS Pub 12, Tactical
Command and  Control Planning  Guidance and  Procedures for Joint
Operations.  Analyzing  the agreement,  it is very similar to the
position the Marine  Corps  had  been  maintaining.   Of foremost
import  is  the  retention  of  operational  control by the MAGTF
commander of his organic  air assets.   Of additional importance
is the affirmation of the primary mission of Marine air being the
support of Marine ground forces.
     In this agreement the Marines provide sorties to  the JFC in
the  areas   of  air  defense  and  long-range  interdiction  and
long-range reconnaissance.  This is, in essence,  a concession by
the  Marines  that  the  Air  Force  component commander can best
support the joint force as a  whole  (to  include  the  MAGTF) by
centralized management  of these particular mission areas.  It is
also inherent in this provision that, by accepting these sorties,
the Air  Force component  commander agrees  to manage and fulfill
the requirements of the  entire joint  task force  in these three
mission areas.   One problem  which immediately surfaces is: what
is the definition of "long-range"?  The answer is no where  to be
found.  It is not contained in the text of the agreement, any JCS
Pubs, Air Force or Marine Corps directives!
     In addition to the sorties in those three  specified mission
areas, sorties  in excess  of Marine  direct support requirements
(read support of Marine ground element)  will be  provided to the
JFC.  inherent  in this  is the  responsibility for the Air Force
component commander to be  prepared  to  provide  support  to the
MAGTF when the tactical situation so warrants.
     The final  paragraph of  the agreement reaffirms the command
prerogative of the  JFC  and  basically  is  a  rewording  of his
authority to  assume control  of Marine  TACAIR in the event of a
major emergency.
     While the  Omnibus Agreement  is fairly  straight foward and
succinct, it  contains leeway  for misunderstanding and confusion
in its implementaion.
     The Omnibus Agreement was  disseminated to  the Marine Corps
in a  White Letter from the Commandant of the Marine Corps, which
contained an enclosure  providing  guidance  for  its interpreta-
tion.92  This guidance centers upon joint land operations, since
as it  states, amphibious operations were not at issue in the JCS
decision which led to  the  Omnibus  Agreement.   In  addition to
defining terms, the guidance contains some other salient points.
     Under explanation  of the  sorties to be provided the JFC in
air defense,  long-range interdiction,  and long-range reconnais-
sance, when  the Air  Force component commander assumes responsi-
bilities of these functions for the joint force as a  whole, dual
mission  aircraft  are  addressed. Current  Marine  VMFA (fighter
attack squadrons) possess aircraft which are  capable of perform-
ing  either  air  defense,  close  air  support,  or interdiction
missions (Marine functions  of  AAW,  CAS,  DAS).   The important
point  here  is  that  the  MAGTF commander provides sorties, not
92Additonally, OH 5.1-1, Command and Control  of USMC  TACAIR has
been promulgated  to aid  Marines in  understanding the agreement
along with related Marine Corps policy and doctrine.
     The next point addresses deployment of  MAGTF air  assets in
advance of the ground element.  There are certain scenarios where
all or portions of the air combat element (ACE) will  deploy into
a  theater  of  operation  well  in  advance of the ground combat
element (for instance due  to  time  constraints  in assemblying,
loading, and floating amphibious shipping).  In these instances a
MAGTF foward command will be esablished  (i.e. the ACE, normally
the  Marine  Air  Wing  commander,  would  become  the MAF foward
commander).  As the MAGTF foward commander he would  then operate
in compliance  with the  provisions of the Omnibus Agreement.  If
an aviation force is in place  and operationally  mission capable
prior to  requirements for MAGTF direct support, the MAGTF foward
commander will offer all his  available  sorties  to  the  JFC in
accordance with the excess sortie provision of the agreement.
     In  all   cases  the  MAGTF  commander  retains  operational
control.   This   is  accomplished   through  the  apportionment,
allocation,  and  tasking  processes.   JCS  Pub  1  provides the
following definitions:
     Apportionment- The determination and assignment of the total
expected effort  by percentage  and/or by priority that should be
devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for
a given period of time.
     Allocation-  The translation of the apportionment into total
numbers of sorties by aircraft  type  available  for  each opera-
     Tasking-  The process  of  translating  the  allocation into
orders,  and  passing  these  orders to the units involved.  Each
order  normally  contains  sufficient  detailed  instructions  to
enable the executing agency to accomplish the mission successful-
     To understand how  the  MAGTF  commander  accomplishes these
actions, it  is necessary  to examine  them at the joint force or
theater level first.
     The JFC starts by  making  an  apportionment  decision based
upon his  concept of  operations and  the enemy situation.  This,
normally, is in  the  form  of  a  percentage  of  utilization by
functional area  (i.e. offensive counter  air, interdiction, CAS,
etc.).  This effectively  provides  a  demarcation  between which
portion  of  the  Air  Force component commander's effort will be
utilized supporting  the ground  component, and  which portion is
devoted  to  the  theater  or  joint  force air war.  How the JFC
arrives at this decision is  not  specified.   He  may  make this
decision in  isolation with his staff, with the advice of all his
subordinate component  commanders,  or  simply  by  accepting the
recommendation of his Air Force component commander.  Included in
the air assets that  are  affected  by  this  decision  are those
sorties provided to the JFC by the Marines in accordance with the
Omnibus Agreement.  The Air  Force component  commander takes the
apportionment  decision  along  with  any concurrent guidance and
allocates the resources available to him (organic Air  Force plus
Marine sorties provided) among the various missions designated by
the JFC.  This allocation  consists of  translation of apportion-
ment (which  is predicated upon availability) into sortie numbers
with distribution  among using  units where  applicable.  The Air
Force component commander then tasks them through his Air Tasking
Order (ATO) normally in  the  form  of  a  message.   JCS  Pub 12
contains the detailed procedures for effecting these actions.
     At  the  MAGTF  level,  the  MAGTF  commander apportions his
assets by  percentage  or  priority  based  upon  his  concept of
operations  and  the  enemy  situation.   Additionally, the MAGTF
apportionment decision includes identification of sorties  in the
areas  of  air  defense,  long-range  interdiction and long-range
reconnaissance which will be made available to the JFC.  Through-
out  the   apportionment  process  the  MAGTF  commander's  first
priority is supporting the accomplishment of the MAGTF's assigned
     Normally the  allocation process for the MAGTF occurs at the
MAGTF Tactical Air Command Center (TACC).93  In the event sorties
are available  in excess of MAGTF requirements, these sorties are
made available to the  JFC; likewise  if there  is a  shortage of
Marine TACAIR  assets to  support the  MAGTF, these shortages are
identified to the JFC.94
     Tasking for the MAGTF occurs at the MAGTF  TACC and consists
of development  of a frag or ATO.  Here there must be liaison and
93For a detailed discussion of the factors and mechanics involved
in the  MAGTF apportionment  and allocation processes see OH 5-3,
Tasking  USMC Fixed-Wing  Tactical Aviation, July 1982, section 3.
94CMC, White Letter 7-81, encl (2), p. 5.
coordination between the MAGTF TACC and  the Air  Force component
     While the framework for these actions is relatively straight-
foward, and there  is  amplifying  guidance  for  the  conduct of
these three  processes (JCS  Pub 12,  OH 5-1.1,  and OH 5- 3), the
Marine Corps experiences problems in the practical application of
these tasks.
     Many Marine  officers do  not understand  that there are two
unique categories of sorties  provided  to  the  JFC  for tasking
through the  Air Force  component commander.   The first category
consists of those sorties provided in the three  specific mission
areas, when  the Air  Force component commander assumes responsi-
bility for air defense,  long-range interdiction,  and long-range
reconnaissance.  The  second category of sorties provided are the
excess  sorties,  which  are  offered  or  received  without  any
expectation  of  support  in  return.   Despite  the  plethora of
definitive  guidance  on  the  subject,  many  Marines  have  the
mistaken belief that MAGTF will provide to the JFC excess sorties
only in the areas  of air  defense, long-range  interdiction, and
long-range reconnaissance.95     There are  Marine commanders and
staff officers who do not fully understand their responsibilities
in the apportionment and allocation processes.96
     This lack  of understanding on the part of some Marine Corps
95CO Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support  Activity (MCTSSA) ltr
D122-.3/WTF:cj over 3900-303 dtd 14 November 1983 and
CO MCTSSA ltr D122-3/WTF:meb over 3920-303-1 dtd 12 March 1984.
"Personal observations of author during joint exercises.
players in  this area is exacerbated by the Air Force's interpre-
tation  of   the   Omnibus   Agreements   often   making  working
relationships at  the operational levels difficult.  For example,
the Air Force does not share  the Marine  Corps interpretation of
what sorties  are in excess of MAGTF requirements.  The necessity
for understanding and cooperation between the  Air Force  and the
Marine Corps has been brought to the forefront with the advent of
the Joint Tactical Interoperability Tactical Command  and Control
Systems  (JINTACCS)   where  written  joint  interface  operating
procedures must be developed to effect the necessary interService
functioning.   A  large  portion  of  the problem of developing a
system of information data  exchange for  JINTACCS centers around
the Air Force's interpretation of the Omnibus Agreement.
     The JCS  reached agreement  on the  policy set  forth in the
Omnibu  Agreement in a meeting on 27 March 1981.97  in April 1981
the Air  Force issued Doctrinal Information Publication (DIP) No.
10 in response to the Omnibus Agreement.  In  this publication it
is  stated  that  the  JCS  agreement  "is an interim JCS Omnibus
Agreement on the way the MAGTFs  should be  integrated into plans
for sustained operations ashore.  This is a first step."98  (bold
added for  emphasis).   No  where  else  is  or  has  the Omnibus
Agreement been referred to as interim.!
     Next the  Air Force drafted DIP No. 11 outlining the command
relationships for the MAGTF.  This publication contains a copy of
97JCS Memorandum 2521/384-8, p. 14.
98DIP Ho. 10, p. 1.
the following  message which  was sent by the JCS to the CINCs of
all unified add specified commands:99
     Also included  in DIP  No. 11 is an attachment providing the
Air Force interpretation of  the debate  items  in  the 4 December
1981 OCS  meeting in  which the  JCS agreed to send this message.
it states that the  JCS agreed  that during  sustained operations
ashore a  field commander  should place "the Marine ground forces
subordinate   to  a  land  component   commander."100    Concerning
control  of   MAGTF  air   it  repeats  the  intent  of the Omnibus
     Speaking of this message,  the Air  Force states:    "the Air
Force  endorses  the  message  as  the most current iteration and
interpretation of this issue."101
     Upon review of what is presented  in DIP  No, 11  along with
the  unofficial  opinions  of  individuals  knowledgeable on this
subject, it appears that the 4 December 1981 message was  sent as
99JCS 042226Z  Dec 81, subj: Command Relationships in Operational
Plan Development.
100DIP No. 11, p. 21.
101DIP No. 11, p. 2.
a compromise measure following deadlocked debate centering around
the  repeated  nemesis:  whether  Marine TACAIR should come under
control of a theater Air Force component commander?  Clearly, the
Air  Force  then  attempted  to  establish the position that this
message abrogated the Omnibus Agreement.
     However,  such  is  not  the  case.   The  Omnibus Agreement
remains  in  force  as  written.   But has it served to quell the
issue?  Has it helped or hurt the Marine Corps?  Is it an end all
to this subject?
Chapter VI       Functionalism vs. MAGTF Integrity
     Through  simple  reflection  on  the military history of the
past fifty  years  it  is  prudent  to  expect  that  the Omnibus
Agreement  might  not  serve  as  an  end all to the basic issue.
While it has delineated guidance on the issue,  establishing what
has  been  the  true  historical precedent of MAGTF employment as
doctrine, such specificity has  led to  a redirection  of efforts
aimed at unseating prescribed arrangements.
     During August  1971, both  the Air Force and the Army issued
memorandums for the JCS dealing with  the issue  of MAGTF employ-
ment.  The Air Force memorandum was brief, simply calling for the
JCS to specify whether a MAGTF would come under a  land component
commander for  sustained operations ashore or whether it would be
employed as a separate component (hence  the JTF  would have four
components: land, naval,  air, and  Marine Corps).102    The Army
memorandum  paralleled  the  Air  Forces,  concluding  that "JCS
should accept subordination of a MAGTF to a land component."103
     Having  lost  the  TACAIR  issue with the Omnibus Agreement,
the Army and the Air  Force  have  made  a  concerted  effort (as
reflected in these memoranda) to transfer the issue to a doctrin-
al battle over componency; focusing upon the issue of whether the
102Department of the Air Force Memorandum for the Director Plans and
Policy Joint  Staff (No. 87-81),  subj: Command Relationships for
the  MAGTF  in  Sustained  Operations  Ashore  (J-5P156-81/D), 27
August 1981, p. 1.
103Department of the Army Memorandum for the Director Joint Staff,
subj: Command Relationships for the MAGTF in Sustained Operations
Ashore (J-5P156-81/D), 24 August 1981, p. 2.
MAGTF should comprise a fourth component in joint force structur-
ing.  By  establishing the MAGTF under a land component commander
(a relationship which has occurred in certain instances, histori -
cally  (see  Chapter  IV)),  as  a written mandate, a prelude for
future trilateral  functional  organization  is  steadily formed.
The logical follow on is to place all aviation under a functional
air component.  It is interesting to  note that  this proposal to
establish definitive  guidance for placing the MAGTF under a land
component commander in effect inhibits JFC  authority in organiz-
ing  his  forces  in  the  manner  he  determines most effective;
the very same argument  which the  Air Force  had used previously
against the Omnibus Agreement's delineatior, of MAGTF integrity.
     In February  1982 the  Air Force held a planners  conference
at  which  MAGTF  command  relationships  were   discussed.   The
resultant Air Force position was that a theater command structure
should consist of a ground force component controlling all ground
operations, an  air component controlling all air operations, and
a  naval  component  controlling  all  naval  operations.   It is
important to  remember that JCS Pub 2, Chapter 11 states that the
terms "Service component commands"  and "component  commands" are
synonymous and can be used interchangeably.
     In a  memorandum to  the JCS, dated 19 April 1982, the Chief
of Staff of the Air Force proposed that JCS Pub  2 be  changed to
remove the  term "Service  component" and  to assert that unified
commands are designed to  employ  forces  "functionally, distinct
and separate  from their  military departments, and that the role
of the Services is to organize, train, equip,  and provide forces
for theme combatant commands."104
     Records  at  Headquarters  Marine  Corps (HQMC) document the
fact that during a two year  period (July  1980 -  July 1982) the
MAGTF  TACAIR  issue  was  addressed  from  one  angle or another
(command and control of USMC  TACAIR,  air  command  and control,
review of  JCS Pub 2, functional vs. Service component etc.) over
forty times by the JCS or their operational deputies.
     Throughout 1982, every OPLAN under review  was challenged by
the Air  Force on  the issue  of a MAGTF Service component vice a
trilateral functional  component relationship.   In a representa-
tive OPLAN  under review (where the subordinate unified commander
involved was an Air Force officer) the OPLAN came up  for review,
rewritten, deleting  all references to COMMARFOR  (Commander
Marine Forces) (the USMC  component commander)  and replac-
ing "Air Force" component commander with "air", component command-
er.105  An "air" vice "Air Force" component implies more than one
Service.   The  usage  of  air  component  commands  is  found in
"combined" plans.   Combined operations  have not  been addressed
hereinbefore.   Without  totally  investigating  this  subject, a
few points should be made.
     JCS Pub  1  defines  combined  force  as  "a  military force
composed of  elements of  two or  more allied nations."  Combined
104Memorandum by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force  for the JCS
(CSAFM 07-82), subj: Proposal to Change JCS Pub 2  Unified Action
Armed Forces, 19 April 1982, p.
105Documentation of OPLAN involved omitted due to classification.
force structure is  normally  organized  functionally  under air.
land,  and  naval  components.   The  Air Force justification for
revising JCS Pub 2  (CSAFM  07-82)  cites  combined  doctrine and
utilize  the rationale of aligning national (joint) doctrine with
combined  philosophy.   It  must  be  appreciated  that  combined
dortrine is  adapted to  certain scenarios  where alliances unite
military forces  from a  multitude of  nations, e.g. NATO, Korea,
each of  which possesses  separate Service  components of varying
sizes and force structure.  Therefore in  the international arena
it  may  be necessary  and  prudent to organize along functional
lines for purposes of support, to cover all mission areas, and to
place  like  Service  components  together.   CSAFM  07-82 states
that: 106
     We have espoused  to our allies the doctrine  of employ-
     ing  forces  functionally  through land, naval, and air
     component commands.   This  has  been  accepted  by our
     allies with  a sense  of military  judgement that bears
     the weight of logic and experience.
However not all  combined  commands  are  functionally organized.
Figure 6,  from Air Force TACM 2-1, depicts the command structure
for Allied Command Europe.  It is composed of  various geographic
(area)  commands  which  are  broken  into  subordinate  commands
(geographically),  some  of  which  possess  more  than  one land
compontent.  The  ACE mobile  force is "formed by seven countries,
106CSAFM 07-82, p. 1.
Click here to view image
it comprises  seven infantry  battalion groups,... ground support
fighter squadrons,  and   reconnaissance aircraft."107  Addition-
ally there is one uni-Service  command  (UK  Air).   Clearly this
is  not  the  trilateral  functional arrangement the Air Force is
attempting  to  subscribe  joint  doctrine  to;  rather, national
Service components  serve as she building blocks for this organi-
     To justify not utilizing  the MAGTF  as a  Service component
because  of  combined  doctrine  is  a  mistake, the result of an
attempted oversimplistic  approach.   The  MAGTF  is  unique.  No
other allied  nation possesses a Service like the MAGTF, possess-
ing organic air and the means to control it.  The MAGTF is bigger
than she  Armies and  Air Forces of some countries.  Additionally
the MAGTF has the  ability to  integrate its  command and  control
into the  conbined structure  (ie. NATO and  South Korea) and has
and continues to successfully  participate in  combined and joint
exercises maintaining  MAGTF integrity.  The Omnibus Agreement is
written in  joint vice  combined terminology,  however the spirit
and  intent  of  the  agreement  is readily translatable into the
combined arena,  as  is  evidenced  in  the  results  of repeated
     1984 did not see a decline in efforts to resurrect the basic
issue.  It saw the dissemination of DIP No. 12 by  the Air Force,
entitled,  "Command  Relationships".   Its  basic  theme  remains
107Tactical Air Command Manual (TACM) 2-1, Tactical Air Operations,
15 April 1978, p. 11-17.
centered  on  the  functional  componency  vs. Service  component
issue, very much in line with the single manager for  TACAIR tact
of DIP  N0. 10  and DIP  No. 11.  It parallels the earlier works;
replete with historical  views  and  semantical  analyses  of JCS
Pub 2.
     Obviously this  battle is  not over.   Despite many repeated
initiatives, there has not  been any  JCS action  to countermand,
lessen,  or  rescind  the  Omnibus  Agreement.    The  issue  will
probably not be brought  to  a  JCS  vote  until   those proposing
change are sure of winning.  Currently it appears deadlocked with
the Air Force and Army supporting functionalism in  opposition to
the Navy  and Marine  Corps.  But the issue has remained alive in
various forms, even  as  the  key  players  (the  members  of the
JCS)  change.   This  issue  is  orchestrated  from  the  highest
levels.  That is where  it belongs,  if it  must exist.   What is
important  is  what  the  issue  means  to  Marines in the fleet?
Prior to looking at the implications of change,  it is beneficial
to see  what has  been occurring  at the operational levels.  The
source of  this desired  insight is  contained in  the results of
joint exercises.
     The  ability  of  the  MAGTF  to  successfully function as a
Service component (in  terms  of  both  the  objectives  of   the
MAGTF  and  the  JTF)  while  operating under the precepts of the
Omnibus Agreement, is well  documented  in  after  action reports
(AARs)  of  many  joint  exercises.  Analysis of a representative
sample, encompassing a  variety  of  contingent  scenarios (NATO,
South Korea,  and the Middle East) yields consistently successful
1)   Successful integration of  Marine  Air  Command  and Control
into local air defense systems.
2)   Successful practice of command relationships.
3)   Effective testing  and practice  of common air tasking (CAT)
4)   Expeditious  execution  of  the  tasking  of  excess sorties
with correct procedures well disseminated and well known,
These  comments  all  reflect experiences derived from exercising
the MAGTF as a Service component.  They are taken from a one year
sample of  joint force  level AARs  (individual reference omitted
due to classification).  In the five force level  AARs there were
no  deleterious  consequences  mentioned concerning employment of
the MAGTF as a Service component.  However this  is not  to imply
that  there  were  not  minor  difficulties in execution and some
lessons learned.  These  are  best  summarized  by  the following
problem areas  which are extracted from a Marine Corps report.108
It should be noted  that  the  force  level  AAR    for  the same
exercise  did  not  portray  these  or  any  other  problem areas
concerning the basic issue.
1)   There were several ATO distribution problems, with copies of
the  ATO  never  being  received  by  Marine Forces on two of the
exercise days.
108CG THIRD MAW 240039Z FEB 82, subj: Joint Readiness Exercise After
Action Report Concerning Common Air Tasking Procedures (UNCLAS).
2)   The Air  Force component  commander attempted to include all
available fixed-wing sorties (Air Force, Navy, and Marine) in the
ATO.   Once  the  ATO  was  disseminated, the Air Force component
commander  "demonstrated  total  in flexibility   with  regard  to
implementation of timely changes to the ATO."
3)   The  definitions  and  terms  employed in the air employment
plan message do not  reflect  USMC  aviaiton  functions  and mis-
sions.  The  air employment  plan message  is sent by subordinate
commanders  to  the  CJTF  to  identify  any  excess  sorties and
unfulfilled requirements (reference- JCS Pub 12, Vol IV).
4)   Current Air  Force component commander procedures pointed to
the fact that the Air Force "wants to  pursue an  air campaign in
context that  air power  is the ultimate weapon and that there is
absolutely no thought  given  to  the  fact  that  aviation  is a
supporting arm  and therefore must integrate ite efforts so as to
optimize its  support of  the ground  forces and  the overall JTF
5)   During  the  exercise  the  Air  Force component commander's
attitude "was one of  attempting  to  implement  absolute control
vice  coordination"  when  dealing  with  the  Marine aviation as
"every effort was made to restrict initiatives" in supporting the
Marine ground  forces scheme  of maneuver beyond the fire support
coordination line (FSCL).  The  Air  Force's  "arrogant attitude"
was exemplified  by instances  when Air  Force sorties were flown
within the Marine forces  objective  area  without  any attempted
coordination on  the part  of the  Air Force (to include a strike
which was conducted inside the Marine force's FSCL).
     These  items  which  affected  MAGTF  aviation  during  this
particular  joint  exercise  are  representative of problems fre-
quently encountered and are worthy of analysis.
     Procedures  for  CAT  and  ATO  distribution  need refining.
This   is  a real  problem which  is currently  being addressed and
hopefully reconciled with the  advent of  JINTACCS.  The develop-
ment  of  JINTACCS  interface  operating  procedures  appears  to
include  procedures  for  efficient  handling  of  joint  mission
(ie. air  defense)  sorties  and  cross  force  (excess  sorties)
tasking.   However  other  ATO  problems  are  likely  to endure:
communication difficulties, Air Force lead time requirements, and
the lack of  universally  accepted  phraseology.   These  are all
problems  which  will  arise  regardless  of whether the MAGTF is
employed as a Service component, maintaining its integrity, or in
the manner currently espoused by the Air Force.  ATO lead time is
a major concern.  It would  be  severely  magnified  in  scope if
Marine TACAIR  was to  fall under  operational control of the Air
Force component commander.  Problems  with  the  dissimilarity of
terms are highlighted with the comparison of DAS and INT.  In the
Marine Corps, DAS is equivalent solely  to the  Air Force mission
of INT,  however the  Air Force  mission of BAI may fall into the
Marine Corps definition of either CAS or DAS  (dependent upon the
target:  location  with  respect  to the FSCL).  While the Marine
Corps resists usage of Air Force  terminology, in  certain OPLANS
the  Marine  Corps  has  signed  off on usage of these terms.  An
across the board policy or adjustment is needed.
     The remaining problem highlighted by the  Marine AAR centers
on the interpretation and application of the doctrine and concept
of MAGTF employment.  All players,  Air  Force  and  Marine, must
understand,  appreciate,  and  employ  the  role of the Air Force
component commander as one of coordinating authority vice  one of
direction.   Marines  should  be  given  a large enough parcel of
airspace (airspace control sector) to take full advantage  of the
Marine  Corps  capability  to  project firepower beyond the FSCL.
These problems do not always arise and are probably best describ-
ed  as  "personality  dependent"  and the likely result of Marine
planning staffs, commanders, and liaison officers  who are unable
to effectively  articulate proper doctrine and employment proced-
ures.  Failing  satisfaction at  this level,  it should  be a JFC
     The bottom  line is  that the system works.  It works in all
scenarios.  At the operational level  there  are  no  major prob-
lems, and the problems that do exist are identified.  They do not
revolve around the current  established  doctrinal  employment of
the  MAGTF.   Rather  they  are  the nuts and bolts inter-working
procedures which must  be  identified  and  hammered  out through
exercise at the operational level.
     Herein  is  how  the  system  works  with  MAGTF  integrity.
However given the continual  efforts at  higher levels  to ammend
JCS Pub  2 and to reorganize along a trilateral functional basis,
the potential implications at  the  operational  level  should be
contrasted with the current situation potrayed above.
Chapter VII          Implication for Marines
     From the  theater level  perspective, centralized control of
airpower  is  clearly  the  most  efficient  means  of operation.
Service affiliations  should be placed aside, allowing a doctrine
of single management to emerge.
     Viewing air employment at  a level  below the  theater level
results in  limits on  the effects and effectiveness of airpower.
A decentralized control of air assets  leads to  an inappropriate
division of  the battlefield where the air commander is unable to
mass his forces in times of necessity -- offensive or defensive.
     Air forces inherently have a broader scope than surface-
bound forces.   Tactically, this  perspective is  viewed from the
vantage of the entire theater.  In line with this perspective all
peripheral, attached, assigned, and  in support  of air resources
must  work  for  one  air component commander.  The air component
commander is then responsible for planning  and integrating these
assets and  insuring their  protection and tactical employment to
properly marshal  their  maneuver,  firepower,  and psychological
     A  single  manager  of  all  theater air assets provides the
mechanism for managing all assets (ie. EW, CAS, air  defense, air
refueling etc.) in support of theater requirements, providing for
coordinated, effective, integrated air operations.
     Centralized management and  direction  results  in decreased
late  sorties,  missed  targets, inappropriate ordnance loads and
otherwise  inefficient  air   asset   employment.   Additionally,
aviators  receive  the  benefits  of  more  planning time, better
sequencing, and improved management.
     These are all arguments  and justifications  which have been
put forth  by the  Air Force.   Admittedly they  suggest a strong
case for managing the  finite resources  of air power  in order to
maximize the  punch in  terms of effort expended, provide a means
for massing air power, and provide an improved  management design
leading to  zero diverts.   However while  these points should be
recognized, a  careful  distinction  must  also  be acknowledged:
observation  of  the  fact  that  the  Air  Force  is proposing a
"producer"  oriented  system as  opposed to  a "consumer" oriented
     A  system  as  espoused  by  the  Air Force stands to impact
heavily upon a MAGTF.   There  are  real  and  valid implications
involved here.   They must be understood, for there are a variety
of scenarios which could lead to either a loss of MAGTF integrity
or  an  air  component  commander  functionally  in charge of all
theater TACAIR:
1)   A change to JCS Pub 2  and current  joint doctrine resulting
in a  trilateral functional approach to joint force organization.
While this  is not likely, the Air Force has not  backed down from
its repeated attempts to institute such a change.
2)   A unified  commander utilizing  his perogative and authority
to  exercise  operational  command  to  include  organization  of
subordinate  forces  for  missions  assigned  to him on either an
area  or  functional  basis.   While  this  is  possible, current
exercise  results  and  established doctrine militate against it.
However, in "emergency" situations  it  is  reasonable  to expect
that  a  JFC  may  temporarily  assume operational control of all
3)   The current Air Land Battle doctrine, in particular the Army-
Air Force  agreement on  procedures for  the Joint  Attack of the
Second Echelon (J-SAK) with its inherent  division of battlefield
responsibilities  and  structuring,  may  in  effect  serve  as a
de facto means of  providing  for  the  establishment  of  an air
component commander with authority exceeding that of an Air Force
component commander as established  by the  Omnibus Agreement and
JCS Pub 2.109  This raises pertinent questions about the arrange-
ment of the joint battlefield, particularly when a MAGTF conduct-
ing sustained land operations is included.
     Given Air  Force control  of Marine  TACAIR beyond the level
established  by   current  doctrine   (Omnibus  Agreement-  joint
missions/excess  sorties)  for  one  of  the  above  or any other
potential reasons, there are four areas  of major  concern to the
1)   loss of the primary mission role of Marine TACAIR
2)   responsiveness
109TRADOC Pam 525-45/TACP 50-29, General Operating  Procedures for
Joint Attack of the Second  Echelon  (J-SAK),  31  December 1984,
pp. [2-2] - [2-5].
3)   structuring of the battlefield- areas of interest/influence
4)   loss of MAGTF aviation force tailoring
     The  MAGTF's  aviation  combat  element  primary  mission is
support of the MAGTF.  This is clearly established by both Marine
Corps  and  joint  doctrine.   The  placement of all TACAIR under
control of an air component commander would result  in a  loss of
commitment to  this first  priority.  While  support needs of the
MAGTF might be filled first from Marine aviation  assets, this is
not to  say that  Marine aviation  wouldn't be used to offset Air
Force shortfalls in support of the  land component  commander and
the  theater  air  war,  potentially,  to  the detriment of MAGTF
support requirements.  There is  a  history  of  Marine  air ful-
filling  Air  Force  CAS  shortcomings in both Korea and Vietnam.
Beyond  the  joint  mission  areas,  there  are  certain aviation
functions  which  in  select  contingency scenarios the Air Force
will not have theater assets  for,  early  on.    Marine aviation
will be  on the  scene and  capable of performing these functions
(ie. EW, night/all weather  CAS  (FLIR,  TRAM,  LTD),  and basket
refueling for allied nations aircraft). Marine Corps aviation's
primary mission is not to make up for  Air Force  force structure
deficiencies.   Following  fulfillment  of MAGTF support reqiure-
ments,  excess  sorties  in  these  critical  mission  areas  are
provided to the JTF.
     Responsiveness  is  probably  the  greatest advantage of the
centralized control, decentralized  execution    aviation command
system of  the MAGTF.  It is a prime feature of Marine offensive
air support and understandably  an area  of vital  concern to the
ground commander.   Responsiveness in  terms of dedicated assets,
flexibility, and more importantly,  the time  factor.  Minutes on
the battlefield  equate to  lives and  lost or gained objectives.
The impact upon responsiveness would exist in both  immediate and
preplanned requests.   All air  support requests would have to be
submitted to an additional  agency, the  air component commander,
and possibly  through a  land component  commander.  Clearly, the
more agencies involved, even  assuming  no  communications break-
downs, the  greater the response time.  Preplanned missions would
be administered through the  Air  Force  frag  cycle.   The ideal
Marine Corps air tasking cycle is a 24 hour process.110   The Air
Force ATO  planning cycle  extends out  to a  72 hour process.111
The actual allocation in the Air Force process takes place around
36 hours in  advance.   JINTACCS  should  refine  CAT procedures.
JINTACCS is being evaluated at 24 hours, however the Marine Corps
is pushing for 18 hours.112  The bottom line is responsiveness.
     The structuring of the  battlefield in  joint sustained land
operations, is  an area  of major  importance and  concern to the
110OH 5-3, Tasking USMC Fixed-Wing Tactical  Aviation, July 1982,
p. 3-1.
111TRADOC Pam 525-45/TACP 50-29, p. 5-2.
112MCDEC Doctrine  Department briefing on "Command and Control of
Marine Air", 19 December 1984
     A variety of scenarios  exist  for  inclusion  of  the MAGTF
within the  JTF area  of operations (AO).  Assigning the MAGTF an
AO separate  and detached  from the  AO for  the land components
subordinate commands  presents little or no problems.  Such would
be the case where  the  MAGTF  is  inserted  on  a geographically
separated  flank,  or  other  isolated  area as a diversionary or
supporting attack.  This could be accomplished with an amphibious
landing,  with  the  AOA  translating  into an AO and an airspace
control sector (ACS) as the MAGTF chops to the CJTF.  This manner
of  employment  should  present  no  major  problems.   Remaining
options envision the MAGTF deployed along a Corps  or Army front.
If  the  MAGTF  occupies  an  extreme  flank  of the front (again
possibly following amphibious establishment  ashore) one possible
arrangement  would  call  for  the  MAGTF's boundary with its one
adjacent unit to serve  as a  boundary between  the distinctively
dissimilar  battlefield  arrangements (responsibilities, areas of
interest/influence) between the MAGTF  and  its  neighboring Army
unit.  This  boundary would  have to serve as an airspace control
demarcation.  While  this is  not ideal,  it is  the only working
solution to providing a means for the MAGTF commander to doctrin-
ally employ his TACAIR.
     If the MAGTF finds itself on  a frontage  with adjacent Army
units on  each side, then the Army-Air Force doctrine for battle-
field control will  most  certainly  impact  negatively  upon the
MAGTF and  its ability to take advantage of its integral aviation
and other means of indirect firepower.
     To analyze  what is  involved, AirLand  Battle doctrine must
be  examined,  in  particular  J-SAK,  which concerns itself with
the battlefield interdiction effort.   To  fully  appreciate this
agreed  doctrine,  the  Air  Force's  position  on control of the
interdiction effort, and  in  particular,  on  firepower expended
beyond the  FEBA/FLOT must  be understood.   The following quotes
from writings in Air Force doctrinal  publications, highlight the
Air Force's position during the formulation stage:
     The MAGTF is not defined in terms of units or power nor
     is its integrity within a sustained broad area air-land
     battle practical.113
     The  Fire  Support  Coordination  Line  represents  the
     extent of  land  force  engagement  with  their organic
     firepower. 114...
     BAI missions require joint planning and coordination---
     but not  close integration,  continuous coordination or
     land   force   directed  control  during  execution.115
     [note-  source  publication  contains  graphic diagrams
     depicting BAI targets on both sides of the FSCL]...
     Targets beyond  the FEBA should be brought under attack
     by a  single  component  commander  since  there  is no
     arbitrary  geographic   boundary.   The  air  component
     commander should be the  responsible commander  for the
113DIP No. 10, p. 11.
114DIP No. 10, attachment  9, background paper or Theater Warfare
Planning Boundaries.
115DIP No. 10, attachment 9.
     location, identification and  attack  of  such targets.
     The  ground  force  commander provides information from
     his sources and his interest in the target, but the air
     commander  makes  the  decisions  to  attack, keeps the
     ground force commander informed and reports results...
     it seems to me the only command level  that cuts across
     the entire front is the Air component commander and for
     that reason, if for  no  other,  must  have operational
     control, or  how one  wishes to  define it, for weapons
     that are employed beyond  the  FSCL.   If  that  is the
     case, why  should a Corps weapon system be developed at
     all for the ground forces to engage targets  beyond the
     FSCL when  the Air  commander already has an arsenal of
     weapons for striking such  targets;  i.e.,  hard bombs,
     CBUs,...stand-off vehicles and GLCM?...  We have always
     said that  interdiction only  requires coordination for
     the sake  of keeping  the ground  commander informed of
     what the air was doing.116
     The same process would be applicable  in the  case of a
     Corps  weapon  that  could  engage  targets  beyond the
     FEBA.  The Corps commander  would nominate  a target or
     the target  could be developed by the Air commander and
     the Air  commander   would  decide  which  was  the best
     weapon  to  engage   the  target--Corps  weapon,  cruise
116DIP No. 10, attachment  9, letter by General Momyer on Theater
Warfare Planning Boundaries, 1 April 1981.
     missiles or fighter-bombers.  Based on this evaluation,
     the Air commander would  tell the  Corps commander when
     to fire  the weapon...  Since the tactical Air Force is
     the only  force  that  has  the  means  and  ability to
     control firepower  beyond the FEBA, it only makes sense
     to assign  to the  operational control  of that command
     those ground  based weapons which are primarily for use
     beyond the FEBA.117
     These statements reflect the  Air  Force's  position  as the
Air Land Battle  doctrine was  being developed.  They should cause
alarm and  grave  concern  in  the  minds  of  Marines.   The air
component  commander  concept,  stated above, divides the battle-
field both at the  FEBA  and  again  horizontally,  with  the air
component commander  assuming vast responsibilities traditionally
belonging to the ground commander.
     As Air Land Battle and J-SAK progressed  through evolutionary
development,  dialogue  between  the  Army  and  Air  Force  took
place, independent of the  Marine Corps.   In 1983  the Air Force
and Army  agreed that  the area  foward of  the FSCL  was not the
province of either the Army or the Air  Force, with  both wanting
to  attack  or  battle  manage  against  targets  in  that  area.
Simultaneously debate  raged over  whether BAI  targets can exist
117DIP No. 11,  attachment  1, p. 17, Some Thoughts on Command of
Theater Forces, by General Momyer.
short of the FSCL.118
     In November 1984 a joint service agreement was signed by the
Army and Air Force on J-SAK.  This agreement formed the basis for
the  joint  publication  on  "General  Operating  Procedures  for
J-SAK",  which  has  not  been formally distributed to the Marine
Corps. The agreement did not mention the FSCL,  and the publica-
tion skirts  the issue, mentioning it twice, only in reference to
the exchange of information  between component  commanders on the
placement of  it.  No where in either document is the location of
BAI wish respect to  the  FSCL  mentioned. The  proceedures which
were agreed  on, establish the air component commander as respon-
sible for the planning and  execution  of  the  interdiction cam-
paign.   While  the  land  component commander may attack targets
beyond his FLOT, he coordinates the attack with the air component
through  the  battlefield  coordination  element (an Army liaison
agency) which is collocated with the Air Force TACC.
     The main concern to the MAGTF  is not  merely the establish-
ment of  a single  manager for TACAIR assets, it is, how will the
MAGTF fold into a theater where it must operate adjacent  to Army
units  employing  these  established  procedures  for battlefield
control beyond the FLOT?   The implications  are multiple.  First
of all, the MAGTF commander could be forced to relinquish control
of the airspace above his  AO.   He  then  effectively  loses the
118CDR TRADOC  231400Z NOV  83, subj: Joint  Attack of the Second
Echelon.  This  message  reflects  the  results  of deliberations
between  General  Richardson  USA,  CDR TRADOC and General Creech
capability of conducting air operations in support of  his scheme
of  maneuver  within  his  areas  of influence and interest.  Ad-
ditionally, the MAGTF stands to  have  the  burden  of additional
coordination responsibilities  which would increase response time
for artillery  support.   Since  the  Air  Force  has essentially
established the  area beyond the FLOT as a free fire area for air
interdiction, control of targets within the  MAGTF AO  as well as
the safety  of long-range  patrols and reconnaissance teams would
be threatened.  While control  of TACAIR  may be  retained by the
MAGTF,  the  additional  communications and coordination require-
ments stand to deal the MAGTF a measure of impotency  in project-
ing its synergistic combat power on the joint battlefield.
     The  Air   Force,  AirLand  Battle  doctrine,  and  manuever
warfare advocates all are  effectively  attempting  to  strip the
battlefield  of  lines  and  its traditional systematic organiza-
tion.  However the Marine Corps has  not lost  sight of  the fact
     The  application  of  air  delivered munitions in close
     proximity to friendly units  in combination  with their
     scheme  of  fire  and  maneuver  and  their  commanders
     intent, requires control measures that are  both strict
     and clear.   Laxness, vagueness  or ambiguity in direc-
     tion and execution will result in  ineffective delivery
     at best, or friendly casualties at worst.... It must be
     kept in mind that these geographic control measures are
     not meant merely to permit senior echelon commanders to
     impose arbitrary limits on  initiative and independence
     of his  subordinates, but rather to permit the sure and
     timely  application  of  combined  arms  firepower  and
     logistic support.119
This major  serious implication  to the  MAGTF in joint sustained
land operations centers around  the fact  that not  only must the
MAGTF retain  its integrity,  it must  be employed in a manner in
which the MAGTF  commander  can  employ  his  aviation  and other
organic firepower  effectively within  his AO beyond his FLOT and
FSCL.  This  appears to  entail the  MAGTF being  assigned a geo-
graphically detached or flank AO within the theater perspective.
     There  remains  an  additional  area of concern to the MAGTF
surrounding the  consequences of  a change  to current employment
doctrine.  Marine aviation is structured by its various functions
to provide a force  capable of  supporting the  GCE.  It contains
just  the  right  amount  of precise capabilities to provide this
support, probably more the result of  cummulative experience than
visionary  planning.   The  modern  battlefield will require that
aviation  be   employed  in  balanced  strike  packages  to insure
survival  and   success.   These  strike packages will include, by
neccessity, such functions as fighter escort,  electronic warfare
support,  anti-radiation  missiles,  airborne foward air control,
119Lieutenant Colonel Jack W. Rippy  USMC, The Impact of Maneuver
Warfare  Strateqy/Tactics  on  the  U.S. Marine Corps' Integrated
Air/Ground (MAGTF) Doctrine, (Naval  War College,  22 June 1984),
pp. 12-13.
tanker support,  and multi-sensor reconnaissance.  Within the ACE
of a MAGTF exists the capability  to put  together the neccessary
packages  in  order  to  provide effective offensive air support.
This is one of the tangible  advantages of  the level  of control
provided  by  the  MAGTF.   It  speaks  strongly  against routine
employment  of  Marine  aviaiton  in  support  of  the  Air Force
component commander's air war.  Despite advances in inter-Service
interoperability, there is no substitute or match for  a tailored
force, such  as a MAGTF, which shares operational and administra-
tive command  along  with  common  tactics  and  training.  Given
difficulties  of  communications  and  coordination alone, joint-
Service strike packages  pose  real  challenges  during  both the
planning and execution stage.
     This is not to say that in joint mission areas (air defense,
long-range interdiction  and long-range  reconnaissance) there is
not  an  advantage  to  having  a  joint  effort and coordinating
authority.  And  certainly, excess  sorties will  be provided, as
they historically  have been  (even pre-dating written agreements
to that effect).   However little mention is made of the inductive
benefits of uni-Service strike package composition, particularaly
in light of the "fog of war".
     The arrangement for joint mission sorties  has the potential
to  influence  the  composition  of  Marine aviation.  To have an
aircraft which possesses the sole mission  capability of  say air
defense or  long-range reconnaissance  would in effect be to have
an aircraft  which  has  a  primary  mission  of  providing joint
mission sorties  vice support  of the  MAGTF, during joint opera-
tions ashore.  While this  is  not  a  factor  given  the current
aircraft inventory  and established doctrine; given a change with
the Air  Force component  commander controlling  all or increased
functions of Marine air, the structuring of Marine aviation might
very well be  no  longer  driven  solely  by  the  requirement of
supporting the  Marine on  the ground.  The Marine Corps could be
forced to  tailor  its  aviation  forces  so  it  doesn't  have a
capability that the Air Force would get outright
     It is  doubtful that  the Air  Force wants  to absorb Marine
TACAIR into their inventory.  The Air Force is looking beyond the
immediate area  of the battlefield, towards space, and a means of
winning the war  through  their  unilateral  conduct  of  air war
aimed at  the enemy's  means of waging war.  The Air Force merely
wants Marine TACAIR to  assist in  what they  certainly appear to
view as  a mission  of lessor  importance, support  of the ground
     The Marine Corps fights the enemy  directly, be  it either a
classic  amphibious  operation  or  as  part  of a sustained land
campaign.  In either case, the Marine  Corps contains  a tailored
force of   supporting aviation which adds to its punch in a highly
synergistic manner, with an optimal level of command and control,
firmly backed  up by  a professional  corps of personnel, air and
ground, who are educated  and  trained  together  towards unified
pursuit of the assigned MAGTF mission.
     Aside  from  the  problem  of  strategic  mobility of Marine
TACAIR, the main problem facing the combat employment  of the ACE
of a MAGTF is the implication of greatly diminished capability to
provide tactical aviation support  to the  GCE in  the event that
during joint  sustained operations  ashore, the  Air Force either
obtains single management and/or through a functional arrangement
of the  battlefield, abrogates  the MAGTF  commander's ability to
employ and maximize his organic firepower beyond the  FLOT.  This
problem presents a challenge to all Marines,
Chapter VIII        Responsibility of Marines
     Marine officers  are brought  up told  that the Air Force is
trying to steal Marine  Corps fixed-wing  aviation.  Few officers
understand the  meaning behind this allegation.  While there is a
valid point  involved,  few  Marines  understand  where,  at what
level, on  what basis,  and with  what implication.  Education is
the primary, missing ingredient.
     All Marine officers (be  they current  or future commanders,
planners, staff  officers, or liaison officers) have a need to be
knowledgeable with regard to the  issue  of  contention,  and its
many related  facets.   First of all, it goes without saying that
a thorough knowledge of MAGTF doctrine  must be  possessed.  This
extends  beyond  basic  organization  into compositing, strategic
mobility, and prepositioning.  Added to this must be knowledge of
the functions  of Marine  aviation and a full appreciation of the
various scenarios and means in which a MAGTF may be employed.
     Along with this fundamental  knowledge,  more  than  just an
understanding  of  the  precepts  of  the  Omnibus  Agreement  is
required.  The Air Force perspective (current  and past versions)
which  serve  as  the  foundation  of efforts to establish single
management of TACAIR  and  functional  joint  force organization,
must be  understood and  acknowledged in order to insure that the
rationale of MAGTF doctrine may be effectively articulated at all
levels, enabling  its sound logic to reign supreme in joint force
     Battles over the joint doctrine presented  in JCS directives
and publications,  and its legality (i.e. in terms of creation of
a second land army) are best  left where  they currently  are, at
the highest levels of the Services and the JCS.
     At  the  operational  level,  the  spirit of cooperation and
unity of effort between  the various  Services, which  exists for
the  most  part    (as  evidenced  in  repeated  exercises), must
flourish, unencumbered by inter-Service rivalries.  However, when
faced with obstinate violations of established doctrine, Marines,
armed with knowledge of the issues involved, must  be prepared to
stand their position and initiate prompt, proper rectification of
the point(s) of contention at the appropriate level.  The salient
difference  lies  in  educated  Marines, knowledgeable in all the
ramifications of the basic issue as opposed to possessing myoptic
paranoia based on ill defined generalizations.
     It is  a personal  responsibility, however, obviously Marine
Corps interests are best served through  establishing a framework
to assist in educating Marines.
     Marine  Corps  schools  need  to  expand   discussion of the
issue beyond the Omnibus  Agreement and  OH 5-1.1  to include the
Air  Force   view  and  its  broad  implications.   Ramifications
of current AirLand Battle doctrine and J-SAK warrant exposure.
     Doctrinal publications need further expansion and refinement
on the subject.
     MAGTF doctrine  needs to  be effectively presented to sister
and allied Services.  The  Amphibious  Warfare  Presentation Team
along  with  videotaped  expositons could provide excellent media
for this task.
     Alot of responsibility falls  upon contingency  planners and
liaison  officers.   While  it  appears  that  the  planners  are
currently kept attuned to the matters  at hand,  liaison officers
are of ten  ill prepared.   For example, there is no formal assur-
ance that those officers sent to function as a liaison  to either
a JFC's  or Air  Force component commander's staff are adequately
conversant in the issue.  Yes, they  certainly know  the precepts
of  the  Omnibus  Agreement;  however,  beyond  that,  they often
operate with suspicion and little appreciation for the  Air Force
perspective.   This  impedes  cooperation, where it should exist,
and possibly allows for  comprimise of  established doctrine.  An
additional related  problem is  the lack  of disseminated proced-
ures, at the working levels, for  the day  to day  proceedings of
joint  mission  and  excess sortie apportionment, allocation, and
tasking.  While during  exercises  the  learning  curve  is high,
personnel turnover  in these  billets is an ongoing fact of life.
We can not afford  to be  learning during  the initial  hours and
days of actual hostilities.  Hopefully, establishment of JINTACCS
and its interface operating procedures will  assist in rectifying
this  problem.   With  a  concurrent  effort  by the Marine Corps
in the education of commanders and staffs, as well as identifica-
tion and training of key liaison officers, and continued frequent
participation in joint exercises, these problems  can all  be met
head on.
     The issue  is complex  and pervasive.  Much has been omitted
from   this   discussion.    Airspace    control,   air   defense
coordination, communications, and data exchange requirements have
not been addressed.
     To read the three  Air Force  doctrinal information publica-
tions concerning this issue, there is no doubt about the rigidity
of the Air Force position.  On the other hand, there are Marines,
for  example,  who  say  that  our participation in the Air Force
sponsored   Red  Flag  and  Cope  Thunder  training  exercises is
detrimental to  the Marine Corps.  This is based on the rationale
that our  after  action  reports,  which  repeatedly  praise this
coveted training,  are in  effect testimonials  in support of Air
Force TACAIR control, since  the exercise  sorties are  Air Force
tasked; hence we are therefore commending their ability to manage
all air assets.  This is  an  extremely  unfortunate  view, since
undoubtedly some  of our  very best tactical aviation training is
achieved in these exercises, and our  participation in  them must
not  be  comprimised  over  this  issue.  This highlights where a
blind, paranoid approach towards this issue could lead us.
     Logic can, has, and must prevail.   Indepth understanding of
the issue,  a responsibility  which all  Marines must fulfill, is
the key.
Chapter IX          Conclusion
     The root of the issue lies  in acceptance  of the  fact that
the MAGTF  is a  truly unique entity which can not be compared to
any other military organization  in  the  world.   To  attempt to
define it  in terms  of its  ingredients, as a ground unit and or
an aviation unit, so as to align it with a  trilateral functional
force organization is a grave error.
     The management approach and its producer oriented advantages
of centralizing all TACAIR does not  serve the  best interests of
either  the  JTF  or  the  MAGTF.   It  renders  the MAGTF into a
partially  impotent,   ineffectively   organized   and  equipped,
disjointed  force.   However  when  properly employed, the MAGTF,
even outside of its primary  amphibious  role,  is  an incredibly
economical, efficient, unparalleled fighting organization.
     Analysis  of  the  subject  issue reveals a plethora of mis-
interpretations  and  misrepresentations  of  fact  by   the  Air
Force in  justification of  their position.  Historical precedent
has been totally  distorted  by  the  Air  Force.   The following
passage from  an Air Force publication underscores the absence of
authenticity in their position:
     For example, the  Marines  in  peacetime  are organized
     into Marine  Amphibious Units (MAUs), Marine Amphibious
     Brigades (MABs),  Marine Amphibious  Forces (MAFs), and
     Marine Air  Wings (MAWs), but in war, they are employed
     as  MAGTFs  and  sized  to  meet  the  specific mission
It  is  painfully  obvious  that  the  very  same  airmen who are
drafting the Air Force's  official position  regarding the MAGTF,
do not  even possess  even a  rudimentary understanding of what a
     The MAGTF is  functional.   It  is  a  functional  entity; a
combined  air-ground  team  task  organized for the assigned mis-
sion.  it should be functionally employed  as a  fourth component
in  a  functional  JTF  organization  (land,  naval, air, MAGTF).
However, realistically, and given  the limited  historical prece-
dent  which  exists,  Marines  should  be prepared to be employed
as part of a land component.   This is  not an  offically acknow-
ledged  Marine  Corps  position,  but it is likely and reasonably
prudent.  However, absolutely and  unequivocally, in  no instance
should the  MAGTF loose  the integrity or operational command and
control of its TACAIR.  This is the bottom line.
     Additionally, either as a uni-Service component, functional-
ly as  a fourth  component, or  under the  land component (in all
cases maintaining its integrity), the  MAGTF  must  be  given the
opportunity  to  operate  in  its  AO  with  control  of airspace
extending beyond its FSCL and area of influence, into its area of
interest.  An  airspace control sector, analogous to an AOA in an
amphibious operation, should be assigned
     To dissect the MAGTF  and describe  its integral  parts as a
120DIP No. 11, p. 5.
subordinate land  component and subordinate air component is akin
to describing a coyote, in  terms  of  fighting  potential,  as a
domestic dog.  Perhaps General Trainor has said it best:
     The  Marine  Corps  is  unique  among the armies of the
     world because of our total integration  of combat power
     in  the  air-ground  task  force  and  an  unparalleled
     capability to orchestrate  the  integrated  effort.  If
     there  were  ever  a  force  multiplier  on  the modern
     battlefield it is the  Marine  Corps'  organization for
121Major  General  B. E. Trainor    USMC,  "New Thoughts on War",
Marine Corps Gazette, December 1990, p. 51.
AF/XOX  231405Z  NOV  81. Subj, Air  Force  Planners' Conference.
     Message announcing  Air Force planners' conference which was
     held 24-25 February 1992.  The agenda  items included: joint
     operations,  Omnibus  briefing,  and MAGTF command relation-
     ships and doctrinal issues.
CDR TRADOC  231400Z  NOV  83. Subj: Joint  Attack  of  the Second
     Echelon.  This message reflects the results of deliberations
     between General Richardson, Commander U.S. Army Training and
     Doctrine  Command  and  General  Creech,  Commander U.S. Air
     Force Tactical Air Command concerning J-SAK.   It highlights
     problems in  distinguishing between BAI and the remainder of
     the INT effort.  It  discusses  the  functions  of  the BCE.
     Also addressed  is battlefield structuring and the fact that
     BAI targets were  being  located  inside  the  FSCL  by Army
CG  THIRD  MAW  240039Z  FEB 82.  Subj:  Joint Readiness Exercise
     After Action Report  Concerning  Common  Air  Tasking Proce-
     dures.  Unclassified  message from the ACE of joint exercise
     highlighting problem  areas  encountered  in  CAT procedures
     and the  working relationship  with the  Air Force component
     commander.  Excellent insight into the problems facing MAGTF
     aviation during joint exercises.
CO Marine  Corps Tactical  Systems Support  Activity (MCTSSA) ltr
     D122-3/WTF:cj over 3900-303 dtd 14 November 1983.  Letter to
     the  Commanding  General  MCDEC  recommending  changes to OH
     5-1.1 based on the results of problems encountered by MCTSSA
     in  the   development  of  air  operations  joint  interface
     operating procedures  for  JINTACCS.   This  letter outlines
     misperceptions on  the part of Marine officers regarding the
     Omnibus Agreement and excess sorties.
----------. ltr  D122-3/WTF:meb  3920-303-1  dtd  12  March 1984.
     Follow up letter to above correspondence.
Commandant of  the Marine Corps.  White Letter No. 7-81.  29 June
     1981. Promulgates the JCS Omnibus  Agreement  to  the Marine
     Corps along with guidance for the employment of Marine Corps
Department of the Air Force Memorandum for the Director Plans and
     Policy Joint  Staff (No. 87-91). Subj: Command Relationships
     for  the  MAGTF   in    Sustained   Operations  Ashore  (J-5
     P156-81/D). 27  August 1981.   Memorandum to JCS, requesting
     that JCS specify whether a MAGTF  would be  employed under a
     land component  or as  a separate component during sustained
     operations ashore.
Department of the Army Memorandum for  the Director  Joint Staff.
     Subj: Command  Relationships  for  the  MAGTF  in  Sustained
     Operations Ashore (J-5  P156-81/D).  24  August  1981.  Army
     memorandum,  apparently  in  concert  with  above  Air Force
     memorandum.  Suggests  that JCS  should accept surordination
     of  a  MAGTF  to  a  land  component  as its normal means of
     employment in sustained operations ashore,
Headquarters Marine Corps Point Paper # 718-82.  Subj: Functional
     Components.  1  November 1982.  Addresses functional compon-
     ent issue.  Includes  material  on  past  employment  of the
     Marine Corps  in joint  forces.  Is  a part  of a historical
     file concerning the MAGTF TACAIR command  and control issue.
     This file  contains numerous point papers as well as classi-
     fied joint exercise after action reports.
JCS 042226Z DEC 81. Subj:  Command  Relationships  in Operational
     Plan Development.   Message  from JCS  to CZNC's reiterating
     the joint force commander's authority to organize forces for
     implementation of  plans.  Air  Force has  attempted to cite
     this  message  as  rescinding  the  intent  of  the  Omnibus
Joint  Service  Agreement: Department  of the Army, Department of
     the Air  Force. USA/USAF Agreement  for the  Joint Attack of
     the  Second  Echelon  (J-SAK). 28  November 1984.  Agreement
     between the Army    and  Air  Force  Chiefs  of  Staff which
     promulgates  the agreed   upon  J-SAK  doctrine and provides
     guidelines for  incorporating the  doctrinal statements into
     Army and Air Force manuals and publications.
Memorandum by  the Chief  of Staff  of the  Air Force for the JCS
     (CSAFM 07-82). Subj: Proposal to Change  JCS Pub  2f Unified
     Action Armed  Forces. 19  April  1982.  This memorandum calls
     for a review of JCS Pub   2 incorporating  functional employ-
     ment of  forces. it also   recommends that decisions on joint
     plans and  publications   be  withheld  until  JCS  Pub  2 is
Memorandum  by  the  Commandant  of  the Marine Corps for the JCS
     (CMCM 1-80).  Subj: Review of CINCNORTH OPLAN 20721, "BRAWNY
     GAMBIT" (U). 5  March 1980.  Secret memorandum which discus-
     ses Air Force non-concurrence with employment of a  MAGTF as
     an entity.
Memorandum  by  the  Commandant  of  the Marine Corps for the JCS
     (CMCM 6-80).  Subj: Command and  Control of Tactical Air. 22
     December 1980.   Secret memorandum  requesting JCS attention
     to "BRAWNY GAMBIT" and other plans  held hostage  by the Air
     Force for more than tweleve months over the issue of control
Memorandum by J-3  for  the  JCS  2521/384-8.   Subj: Command and
     Control of  TACAIR Decision. Revised 27 March 1981. Resolved
     the MAGTF TACAIR command  and control  issue as  adressed in
     the  original  memorandum  dated  12  January 1981, with the
     promulgation of JCS policy  decision, which  has come  to be
     known as the Omnibus Agreement.
Memorandum of  Understanding: Department of  the Army, Department
     of the Air Force. Joint USA/USAF Efforts  for Enhancement of
     Joint  Employment  of  the AirLand Battle Doctrine. 21 April
     1983.  Initiated  agreement of  inter-Service cooperation in
     joint tactical training and field exercises.  It highlighted
     the need  for increased  cooperation in  the development and
     coordination of  battlefield air  interdiction and interdic-
     tion programs.
Advanced  Amphibious  Study  Group.   Draft  Planner's  Reference
     Manual  Volume  II. Quantico,  August  1983. Part of a three
     volume  series  on  MAGTF  expeditionary  planning.  Chapter
     thirteen  deals  with  aviation  planning for the MAGTF.  It
     contains a  brief section  on "Recurrent  Avaition issues in
     Joint Operations."   Although it provides little background,
     it covers most of the facets of the issue.
----------.   Strategy  Rapid  Deployment  and  the  Fleet Marine
     Force.   Washington  D.C.,  May  1981.   This  concept paper
     includes  a   comprehensive  discussion   of  the  strategic
     mobility  issue,   but  it  does  not  specifically  address
     strategic mobility of MAGTF aviation.
Buhrow, Robert E.,  Colonel  USAF.   Close  Air  Support Require-
     ments: A  Study  in  Interservice  Rivalry.   U.S. Army  War
     College, 1  March 1971.   An excellent  study addressing the
     adequacy  of  USAF  CAS  provided  the  U.S. Army during the
     initial stages of U.S. involvement.  Includes sound rigorous
     analysis which leads to interesting conclusions.
Department  of  the  Navy.   Joint  Interoperability  of Tactical
     Command and Control Systems, Marine Corps.  Washington D.C.,
     February 1984.  Unclassified supporting data for fiscal year
     1985 budget estimates.  Contains descriptive summaries which
     provide program  requirements for  fiscal years 1983 through
Gaines, R. Stockton,  Naslund,  Willard  E. and  Straunch, Ralph.
     Combat Operations Decisionmaking in Tactical Air Command and
     Control.   Santa  Monica: Rand  Corporation,  December 1980.
     Study which  was prepared  for the U.S. Air Force.  Looks at
     the organizational and human processes involved  in tactical
     air command  and control.   Discusses lack of joint/combined
     representation during training.
Geiger, Charles R., Lieutenant Colonel USMC.  Marine Corps TACAIR
     and  Strategic  Mobility.   U.S.  Naval  War  College, March
     1983.   Excellent  work  which  addresses  a   vital  issue.
     Contains viable solution proposal.
Heinl,  Robert  Debs  Jr.,  Colonel  USMC.   Soldiers of the Sea.
     Annapolis: U.S. Naval  Institute,  1962.   Classic, renowned
     history of the U.S. Marine Corps.
Hofstetter, David  G., Major(P)  USA.  Joint Attack of the Second
     Echelon  (J-SAK). Langley  AFB: Air Land  Forces  Application
     Agency,  undated.   A  short  paper which describes the five
     year history of J-SAK procedures and their development.
Hurley, Alfred F., Colonel USAF  and  Ehrhart,  Robert  C., Major
     USAF,   eds.   Air  Power and Warfare.  Washington D.C.: GPO,
     1979.   A collection of transcripts from  presentations given
     at the  Eighth Military  History Symposium which was held at
     the U.S. Air Force Academy 18-20 October 1978.  An interest-
     ing insight  into the evolution of the Air Force doctrine of
     Air Power employment.
Isley, Jeter  A. and  Crowl,  Phillip  A.   The  U.S. Marines and
     Amphibious  War:   Its  Theory,  and  its  Practice  in  the
     Pacific.  Princeton: Princeton University  Press,  1951.  An
     outstanding,  thorough  and  incisive  work.  Includes ample
     discussion on the role  of aviation  during World  War II in
     the Pacific.
Kruse, John,  Captain USMC.   "Command and  Control of  USMC
     TACAIR."   Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-One
     Newsletter.  MCAS Yuma, fall  1983.   Good  brief discussion
     which  highlights  the  subject  issue.    Addresses  misun-
     derstandings concerning joint mission air defense sorties.
McCutcheon, Keith B., Lieutenant General USMC.   "Marine Aviation
     in  Vietnam  1962-1970."   U.S. Naval institute Proceedings.
     (May 1971),  122-155.   A comprehensive  narrative of Marine
     aviation involvement in Viet Nam written by a Marine aviator
     who served as Commanding General III MAF.
Mersky, Peter  B. and  Polmar,  Norman.   The  Naval  Air  War in
     Vietnam.  Annapolis: The  Nautical  and  Aviation Publishing
     Company of America, 1981.   An excellent,  descriptive book;
     although it does not address command and control issues.
Momeyer, William W., General USAF (Ret).  Air Power in Three Wars
     (World War II, Korea, Vietnam).  Washington D.C.: GPO, 1978.
     A largely  biased account  based on the personal experiences
     and perceptions of the  author.   The  alleged  necessity of
     single management  of theater TACAIR is a recurring theme of
     this book.
Morison, Samuel E.  The Two-Ocean  War: A  Short  History of the
     United  States  Navy  in  the  Second  World  War.   Boston,
     Toronto, Atlantic Monthly Press, 1963.   This masterful work
     selects highlights from the author's previous fifteen volume
     series History of  the  United  States  Naval  Operations in
     World War II.
Pogue, Forest  C.  The  United States  Army in  World War II  the
     Supreme Allied Command.  Washington  D.C.: Department of the
     Army,  1954.   This  is  the  third volume of part four (the
     European Theater of Operations)  of an  indepth multi-volume
     series on the history of the U.S. Army in World War II.
Ringler, Jack K., Major USMC and Shaw, Henry, I. Jr.  U.S. Marine
     Corps Operations in  the  Dominican  Republic  April  - June
     1965.  Washington D.C.: Headquarters Marine Corps Historical
     Division, 1970.  A previously secret (declassified  in 1977)
     account which  provides background and the history of Marine
     Corps activities in the Dominican Republic during the spring
     of 1965.
Rippy, Jack  W., Lieutenant Colonel USMC.  The impact of Maneuver
     Warfare Strategy/Tactics on the  U.S. Marine Corps' Integra-
     ted Air/Ground (MAGTF) Doctrine.  U.S. Naval War College, 22
     June 1984.  Informative, well presented exposition contrast-
     ing maneuver warfare and firepower attrition warfare with an
     excellent insight on the integration of aviation.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Dictionary of Military and Associated
     Terms,  JCS  Pub  1.   Washington  D.C.: JCS,  1 April 1984.
     Defines terms  for all  Department of  Defense components as
     well as  incorporating NATO and inter-American Defense Board
----------.  Tactical Command and  Control Planning  Guidance and
     Procedures  for Joint  Operations,  JCS Pub 12.  Washington
     D.C.: JCS, 1974.   Multi-volume series.   Volume I, Informa-
     tion Exchange  Planning Guidance;  Volume II, Procedures and
     Formats; Volume III, Tactical Command and Control Procedures
     for  Joint  Operations  (S);  Volume IV, Part IV, Chapter I,
     Common Air Tasking.
----------.   Unified Action  Armed  Forces  (UNAAF)     JCS  Pub 2.
     Washington   D.C.: JCS,   October  1974.   Provides  princi-
     ples, doctrine  and  guidance  for  the  formation  of joint
Trainor,  B.E.,  Major  General  USMC.   "New  Thoughts  on War."
     Marine Corps Gazette. (December 1980), 49-51.  Discusses war
     on the high-intensity conventional battlefield.
U.S. Air Force.   Background Information on Air Force Perspective
     for Coherent Plans (Command and Control of TACAIR), Doctrin-
     al Information Publication No. 10.  Washington D.C.:
     AF/XOXID, April  1961.  First  in a series of three publica-
     tions disseminated to USAF  commands, schools,  and officers
     in key  billets in  response to the Omnibus Agreement.  This
     edition contains a series  of background  papers and letters
     proposing  single  management,  and  discussing  common  air
     tasking and theater warfare planning boundaries.
----------.  Command Relationships,  The  Marine/Air  Ground Task
     Force, and  What They Mean to an Airman!, Doctrinal Informa-
     tion Publication No. 11.   Washington  D.C.: AF/XOXID, 1981.
     Second in a series (see above).  This publication includes a
     reprint of CMC White Letter NO. 7-81 in its  entirety, along
     with  USAF  historical  analysis.   It  proposes  functional
----------.    Command   Relationships,   Doctrinal   Information
     Publication  No. 12.    Washington  D.C.: AF/XOXID,  January
     1984.  Third in  a  series  (see  above).   This publication
     continues the  USAF attack  upon the  Omnibus Agreement.  It
     includes a  copy of  CSAFM 07-82  along with  the party line
     concerning USAF  position on  adjusting joint force doctrine
     and rewriting JCS Pub 2.
----------.  Functions  and Basic  Doctrine of  the United States
     Air  Force,  AFM  1-1.   Washington  D.C., 16 March 1981.  A
     complete change  from the  previous edition  which omits all
     reference to  MAGTF as  a component in joint force organiza-
     tion.   Appears  to  have  been  rewritten  to  reflect "air
     component commander" concept.
----------.  Tactical Air Operations  TACM 2-1.  Langley AFB:
     TAC, 15  April 1978.   Doctrinal guide  for the Tactical Air
     Command.  Uses term "Air  Force  component  commander."  Has
     not  been  rewritten  to  reflect functional componency/ air
     component commander concept.
U.S. Army.  Aircraft Battlefield Countermeasures  and Survivabil-
     ity,  FM  1-2.   Washington  D.C.,  July  1978.  Techniques,
     procedures and concepts  for  Army  aviation  on  the modern
U.S. Congress.   Senate.    Special  Subcommittee  on  Close  Air
     Support.   Close  Air  Support.    92nd  Cong.,   1st  Sess.
     Washington  D.C.: GPO,   1972. Transcripts  of  hearings  on
     CAS. Discusses conduct of CAS in Vietnam.   Hearings debated
     Army - Air Force A-10 issue.
U.S. Marine Corps.   Command and  Control of  USMC TACAIR.  Quan-
     tico, September 1962.  Written in elaboration of the Omnibus
     Agreement.   Ineffective  publication  which does not expand
     upon previous guidance or background contained  in enclosure
     2 to CMC White Letter No. 7-81.
-----------.  Doctrine   For  Amphibious  Operationsg  LFM  01/FM
     31-11/NHP  22(B)/AFM   2-53.    Washington   D.C.,  1  August
     1967. The joint Service "bible" for amphibious operations.
----------.  Marine  Air-Ground  Task  Force  Doctrine, FMFM 01.
     Washington D.C., 11  August  1979.   Presents  the doctrine,
     tactics, organization, and techniques of MAGTF employment.
----------.  Marine  Aviation,  FMFM  5-1.   Washington D.C., 24
     August 1979.   Basic  doctrinal  guide  to  Marine aviation.
     Does not  address the  issue of Marine aviation during joint
     sustained land operations.
---------.  Task in  USMC Fixed-Wing Aviation, OH 5-3.  Quantico,
     July 1982.   A basic and conceptual guide to the air tasking
     process.  Does not provide  sufficiently detailed discussion
     of the  required interface  with the JTF Air Force component
U.S. Navy.  Strategic Concepts of the United  States Navy  NWP 1
     (Rev A).    Washington D.C.,  May 1978.  Basic Navy doctrinal
U.S. Readiness Command.   General Operating  Procedures for Joint
     Attack of the Second Echelon (J-SAK)  REDCOM Pam 525-8/
     TRADOC  Pam  525-45/TACP  50-29. MacDill  AFB,  31  December
     1984.   A  U.S. Army  Training  and  Doctrine   Command  and
     U.S. Air Force  Tactical Air Command joint publication which
     sets forth the procedures for J-SAK  and the  conduct of the
     battlefield   interdiction   effort.   It  outlines  command
     (component) responsibilities with regard  to this  aspect of
     the  AirLand  battle.   It  should  be  noted that no Marine
     Corps organizations, activities, or headquarters were on the
     distribution list for this document.

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