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The Maritime Pre-Positioning Ships (MPS) Program: Not All Is Well
CSC 1985
SUBJECT AREA National Military Strategy
                     EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
     This research paper investigates the implications of
the Maritime Pre-Positioning Ships (MPS) Program on the
Marine Corps' readiness, sustainability, and force projec-
tion capability.  Since the inception of the MPS Program in
early 1980, there has been much favorable publicity
surrounding the Program.  However, the publicity has been
associated mostly with the many functions necessary to
implement a program.  The military capability aspects of
the Program (readiness, sustainability, and the force
projection capability), have not been addressed.  The
implication of the MPS Program on the Marine Corps' readi-
ness appears to be quite favorable.  In the sustainability
and force projection capability areas, however, some
significant shortfalls exist.  This research paper identi-
fies and discusses these shortfalls, and concludes by
calling for a thorough investigation of the MPS Program in
order to identify and correct the Program's shortfalls.
     THE MARITIME PRE-POSITIONING SHIPS (MPS) PROGRAM:
                      NOT ALL IS WELL
                          Outline
Thesis Statement:  The implications of the MPS Program on
the Marine Corps' readiness, sustainability, and force
projection capability need to be thoroughly investigated in
order to identify and correct the Program's shortfalls.
I.   READINESS
     A.  MPS MAB flexibility
     B.  Marine Corps Reserve enhanced mobilization
         capability
     C.  MPS MAB rapid deployment capability
II.  SUSTAINABILITY
     A.  Supplies and equipment
     B.  Ammunition and missiles
     C.  Medical support
     D.  Maintenance support
III. FORCE PROJECTION CAPABILITY
     A.  New capability
     B.  Increased amphibious lift
     C.  MPS Squadron and MAB survivability
         1.  MPS Squadron in-transit survivability
         2.  MPS Squadron and MAB survivability during
             initial phasing ashore
     THE MARITIME PRE-POSITIONING SHIPS (MPS) PROGRAM:
                      NOT ALL IS WELL
     The fall of the Shah of Iran, the Iranian hostage
crisis, and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan
shifted the strategic focus of the United States and
created a new political-military situation.1  These events
resulted in former President Carter declaring the Persian
Gulf as vital to the interests of the United States.  In
late 1979, the United States began to recognize both the
necessity of the Nation to be able to rapidly deploy combat
forces to the Persian Gulf and the inability to do so
because of an inherent stategic mobility shortfall.  These
two recognitions resulted in the establishment of the Rapid
Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) and the Near-term
Prepositioning Ships (NTPS) Program.  The RDJTF would
provide the forces; the NTPS Program would provide the
supplies and equipment.  With the Administration change in
1981, the RDJTF was redesignated the U.S. Central Command
(USCentCom) and the NTPS Program was enhanced and
redesignated the Near-term Prepositioning Force (NTPF)
dedicated to Southwest Asia contingencies.  Paralleling the
development of the NTPS Program and the NTPF was the
beginning of a Marine Corps program that was envisioned to
provide a world-wide rapid response capability and an
eventual replacement of the NTPF.  During December of 1984,
the Program came to life as the first of three squadrons
were deployed.  The Maritime Pre-Positioning Ships (MPS)
Program became a reality.
     The MPS Program includes the maritime pre-positioning
of three sets of supplies and equipment for three Marine
Amphibious Brigades (MABs).  Eventually, three MPS
squadrons(designated as MPS-1, 2 and 3) will be deployed on
a world-wide basis.  In the event of a situation in which
an MPS MAB might be employed, an MPS squadron would sail to
the crisis area and the corresponding MAB would be air-
lifted to "marry up" with the supplies and equipment.2  The
MPS MAB could be used in one of five power projection
roles:  (1) seizure of an advance naval base; (2) rein-
forcement of an amphibious assault; (3)  establishment of a
flank force; (4) diplomatic/political purposes; and (5)
deterrence of adventurism.3  The strategic mobility
shortfall identified in the late 1970s will be partially
offset by the MPS Program's capability to either mass or
separately employ three formidable combat forces in a
relatively short period of time.
     Since the inception of the MPS Program in early 1980,
there has been much favorable publicity surrounding it.
The equipment procurement, embarkation, and ship deployment
schedules have been on schedule.4  The Program has been
advertised as a news means of mobility, sustainability, and
world-wide response.5  The first of three MPS squadrons
(MPS-1) has been deployed.  However, much of the good news
surrounding the MPS Program pertains to issues such as
funding, ship conversions, delivery schedules, and other
necessary functions required to initiate a program.  The
important, discerning issues that pertain to military
capabilities and tactical employment have not been
addressed.  The implications of the MPS Program on the
Marine Corps' readiness, sustainability, and force
projection capability need to be thoroughly investigated
to identify and correct the Program's shortfalls.
                         Readiness
     Combat readiness is the hallmark of the Marine Corps.
This term is measured in several ways such as manning
levels, equipment statuses, and training accomplishments.
The Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JCS Pub. 1)
defines readiness as, "The ability of forces, units, weapon
systems, or equipment to deliver the outputs for which they
were designed (includes the ability to deploy and employ
without unacceptable delays)."6  Since the first part of the
JCS definition applies equally to all Marine Corps units,
consideration will not be given to it.  However, the latter
part of the definition applies most specifically to the
MPS-designated units and warrants close scrutiny.  The MPS
Program has three specific implications on the Marine
Corps' readiness.  All three of these implications appear
to be quite favorable.
     The flexibility of an MPS MAB is the first implication
on the readiness of the Marine Corps.  Currently, the
Marine Corps has designated only two MPS MABs--the 6th MAB
for MPS-1 and the 7th MAB for MPS-2.7  A third MPS MAB will
eventually be designated as MPS-3 and is scheduled to
deploy during 1985-1986.  When fully deployed, each MPS MAB
will have a complete set of MPS supplies and equipment
available in addition to the MAB's organic set of supplies
and equipment.8  The inherent flexibility is in the employ-
ment options.  First, the MPS MAB could be airlifted to its
respective MPS squadron, which contains a complete set of
supplies and equipment.  Second, the MPS MAB could be
employed with some or all of its organic supplies and
equipment by means of airlift or commercial sealift.  The
latter option is unlikely, but it should still be con-
sidered as a capability.  The duplication of the supplies
and equipment is the ingredient that provides this unique
flexibility and the resultant positive impact on readiness.
     The second implication on the Marine Corps' readiness
is the capability of selected reserve units to rapidly
mobilize.  The Commandant of the Marine Corps' "Total Force
Policy" of 21 July 1977 established the Marine Corps
Reserve as a "mirror image" of the Active Force.9  This
policy provided the capability for the quick assimilation
of the Marine Corps Reserve into the Active Force during
mobilization.  One of the roles of the Marine Corps Reserve
during mobilization is to augment the Active Force.10  For
those MPS MABs which might be flown in to their correspond-
ing MPS squadrons, a complete set of MAB supplies and
equipment would be left behind.11  Augmenting Marine Corps
Reserve units would then be able to utilize this remain
behind equipment (RBE).  Upon mobilization,these units
would have only minimal training allowances (T/As)
available.  Normally, the difference between the units'
T/As and tables of equipment (T/Es) would have to be drawn
from the Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel Stocks (PWRMS)
held at the Marine Corps Logistics Bases, Albany, Georgia
and Barstow, California.12  However, the availability of
this RBE would allow the augmenting units to be mobilized
much faster.  The readiness of the Marine Corps is
positively influenced by this enhanced mobilization
capability.
     The third implication on readiness is the capability
of an MPS MAB to be rapidly employed.  The goal in the
employment of an MPS MAB is to have it established ashore
within 1O days of the decision to do so.13  To meet this
employment goal, the Marine Corps has established the MPS
deployment objective to take maximum advantage of airlift
speed and sealift capacity in order to rapidly move the MPS
MAB with 30 days of supplies/ammunition (DOS/A) to the
objective area.14  In a benign environment or perhaps even
in reinforcing a hostile situation, the MPS MAB is
recognized as the most rapid means to deploy and employ a
credible combat force into a potentially hostile or hostile
environment.15,16  The combination of airlift and sealift
is the basis of the rapid employment capability of an MPS
MAB.  Again, the Marine Corps' readiness is enhanced by the
MPS Program.
                       Sustainability
     Readiness is the first part of the military capability
equation.  As was previously demonstrated, the MPS Program
has had a positive implication on the Marine Corps' overall
readiness.  The second part of the equation, sustain-
ability, is much more elusive to analyze than readiness.
Sustainability involves the projected activities of both
the friendly and the enemy forces in terms of resource
consumption.  JCS Pub. 1 defines sustainability as, "The
ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of
combat activity to achieve national objectives.  Sustain-
ability is a function of providing and maintaining those
levels of force, materiel, and consumables necessary to
support a military effort."17  On the surface, it appears
that the MPS Program has had an overwhelming positive
implication on the Marine Corps' sustainability.  The
Marine Corps Capabilities Plan and the Memorandum of
Agreement on Joint USN/USMC Concept of Operations for
Maritime Prepositioning both allude to the capability of a
30 day level of sustainability.18,19  However, there are
some critical sustainability issues that need to be
addressed in order for sustainability to complement the
very favorable implications that the MPS Program has had on
the readiness of the Marine Corps.
      In the first category of sustainability, supplies
(less ammunition and missiles) and equipment, the MPS
Program has had a favorable implication on the Marine
Corps' sustainability.  This category might very well be
the one on which the Marine Corps bases its advertised
capability of a 30 day level of sustainability.  Funding
the MPS Program has been consistent with the objectives
of providing equipment and sustainability for the MPS
Program by the end of the FY 1985 funded delivery period
which ends in mid-1986.20  A total of $324 million in
procurement, operation and maintenance, and stock fund
dollars has been dedicated to the MPS Program's supplies
and equipment.21  Similar funding has also been dedicated
to MPS-2 and MPS-3.22  The first category of sustainability
is in a favorable position.  The good news on
sustainability declines in the other three categories.
     Ammunition and missiles constitute the second category
of sustainability.  Unlike equipment which has both allow-
ances (or T/Es) and sustainability, this category consists
of only sustainability.  Thirty days of ammunition is
currently loaded to MPS-1 and is funded for MPS-2 and
MPS-3.  However, due to production constraints, there are
critical shortages in the 155mm ADAM, 155mm RAAMS, and
155mm Copperhead ammunition.*  These shortages are not
expected to be remedied until at least 1988.23  During the
interim period, a definite risk exists in ammunition
sustainability.
     The situation is even more severe in missiles.  Hawk
and Stinger surface-to-air missiles have 60 DOA programming
objectives, but currently have only a limited number of
missiles available for use.24,25  The amount available is
for total Marine Corps use and is shared with the MPS
      *ADAM--area denial anti-personnel munitions
       RAAMS--remote anti-armor munition system
       Copperhead--laser seeking munition
     **Hawk--mobile, low to medium altitude, air defense,
             surface-to-air missile
       Stinger--light-weight, man-portable, shoulder-fired,
                low altitude, surface-to-air missile
Program.  Neither of these air defense missiles are loaded 
nor will be loaded to the MPS squadrons.  The missiles will
be flown in to the MPS squadrons when required.  Another
risk is realized in the ammunition and missile category not
only in the limited quantity of air defense missiles avail-
able but also in the reliance on their having to be flown
in to the MPS squadrons.  As an aside, critical low-density
items or limited high-cost repair parts for the Hawk
missile are also in very low supply.26  TOW and Dragon
anti-armor missiles are in a more favorable posture when
compared to the Hawk and Stinger missiles.*  Thirty DOA of
TOW and Dragon missiles are either loaded or will be loaded
to the MPS squadrons.27  However, the drawdown on an
already moderate inventory level for the MPS Program might
have a somewhat negative implication on overall Marine
Corps anti-armor sustainability.  The sustainability of
ammunition and missiles is unfavorable and needs to be
addressed.  The items in this category are critical combat
items and their limited combat availability or complete
absence in combat could be catastrophic.  The status of the
second catgegory of sustainability is very unfavorable.
     Medical support is the third category of sustain-
ability.  The issue of medical support is associated with
     *TOW--tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-command
           link, anti-tank guided missile
      Dragon--man-portable, medium anti-tank missile
neither the supplies and equipment available nor the
concept of medical support.  Both of these areas are in
favorable positions relative to near-term sustainability.28
Immediate medical support will be available to all of the
MPS MABs should they be employed.  On the other hand, the
sustainability of hospital ships is presently non-existent,
and the concept that will be implemented during 1986-1987
is questionable. 
     Two T-AH hospital ships are funded in the FY 1985 Ship
Construction, Navy budget for FY 1983 and FY 1984.29  The
ships will be delivered in FY 1986 and FY 1987.30  Each
ship will have a complete medical and surgical capability,
and a 1,000 bed capacity.  Although it is recognized that a
critical deficiency exists, the two hospital ships will not
fully remedy the deficiency as currently advertised.31
With MPS-1 available for use, and MPS-2 and MPS-3 deploying
in 1985 and 1986, respectively, a serious medical sustain-
ability gap exists.  Even after the hospitals ships are
deployed, they will be employed only as general purpose
ships, rather than being dedicated to the MPS Program.  The
hospital ships could also be used for a variety of non-MPS
Program purposes: support of the amphibious MABs; support
of the U.S. Army; and support of the State Department
(e.g., civil relief).32  Additionally, and notwithstanding
the non-availability due to ship maintenance or closure
time to the area of operations, there will be only two
hospital ships and three MPS MABs.  The hospital ships will
not remedy the medical support deficiency even if there
were no other operations occurring other than three
committed MPS MABs.  Human life is the issue in this
category.  The implication of this category on the Marine
Corp's sustainability is very unfavorable.
     The last sustainability category is maintenance
support.  The ground equipment maintenance concept appears
to be well thought out and capable of continuing the
maintenance on the employed equipment that was previously
carried out by the contact maintenance teams.33  The
intermediate maintenance activity (IMA) maintenance of
aircraft, however, could pose severe problems in the
sustainability of an MPS MAB.  The FY 1985 Ship Construc-
tion, Navy budget funds for two aviation logistics support
ships (T-AVBs) in FY 1985 and 1986.34  Both ships will be
available in FY 1986 for use as IMAs.35  Like the hospital
ships, the T-AVBs will be two in number and will be general
purpose ships.  Also, a short support gap will exist until
these ships are deployed.  Unlike medical support which
provides limited in-theater medical, surgical and bed
support, aviation intermediate maintenance is almost
non-existent without the T-AVBs.  Although a 10 day fly-in
support package will be available to each MPS MAB, the
capability is very limited and does not cover the T-AVB
closure gap.36  Additionally, two T-AVBs in support of
three MPS MABs, or perhaps a multitude of other general
purpose missions, is a risky situation.  An essential
member in the Marine Air-Ground Task Force could cause some
serious sustainability problems if the MPS MABs were
employed independently as is advertised as a distinct
capability.37,38  Like the second and third sustainability
categories, this category also poses some potentially
serious sustainability problems to the Marine Corps.
                Force Projection Capability
     Force projection is not considered to be a military
capability as are readiness and sustainability.  Rather,
force projection is an extension of the two latter concepts
through combat units being prepared (readiness) and ade-
quate resources being available (sustainability).  Forces
are then airlifted or sealifted into potentially hostile or
hostile areas.  The MPS Program offers two major force
projection implications--a new capability (though partially
offset) and an increased amphibious lift capacity.  On the
contrary, the Program offers two negative force projection
implications--the survivability of the in-transit MPS
Squadron and the survivability of the MPS Squadron and MAB
as they phase ashore.
     The MPS Program has clearly provided the Marine Corps
with a new and unique capability.  The capability can be
expressed in a number of ways.  First, the MPS Program
provides for a pre-emptive response, both in an unopposed
landing and in a reinforcement.39  Second, the Program
allows for an MPS MAB to administratively "marry-up" with
the corresponding MPS Squadron outside the Amphibious
Objective Area, board amphibious ships, and conduct an
amphibious assault.40  Third, a substitute to an amphibious
assault is offered as an option;41 and fourth, the Program
offers the Nation with a "diplomatic trump card."42  This
new, unique capability can also be expressed in terms of
flexibility.  The MPS Program allows for either the
multi-theater stationing of separate MPS squadrons or for
the massing of all three MPS squadrons.43  Moreover, the
capability can be expressed as, unlike NTPF, world-wide in
scope.44  Insofar as a capability is concerned, the MPS
Program has had a powerful implication on the Marine Corps'
force projection means.
    Similarly, the MPS Program has had a significant
impact on the Marine Corps' amphibious lift capacity.
However, there is a significant negative aspect involved.
Two events called the attention of the Nation to the
strategic mobility shortfall--the Iranian hostage crisis
and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan.45  As was
previously discussed, the NTPS Program, the ENTPS Program,
the NTPF, and now the MPS Program were designed to mitigate
this strategic mobility shortfall.  The MPS Program is
recognized as not a substitute for amphibious shipping but
an addition to it.  In reality, the Program has clearly
been a substitute.  As early as 1976, the Brookings
Institution highlighted the Marine Corps' strategic
mobility dilemma.  Brookings showed that the Marine Corps
could only deploy three Battalion Landing Teams (BLTs) (two
with helicopters and one without) in 1976.  Brookings also
stated that the 1976 Department of Defense long-term goal
was to be able to deploy 1 1/3 Marine Amphibious Forces
(MAFs) on amphibious shipping by FY 1979.46  Nine years
later, the FY 1985 Ship Construction, Navy budget projects
that amphibious shipping will be available by FY 1994 to
lift only the assault echelons of a MAF and a MAB.47  The
advantage of the increased amphibious lift capacity
realized by the MPS Program is partially offset by the
deleterious effect of the premise that the MPS Program is a
substitute for the amphibious shipping that the Marine
Corps desperately needs.
     The first negative implication that the MPS Program
has had on the Marine Corps' force projection capability is
the survivability of the in-transit MPS Squadron.  A
critical period exists between the time an MPS squadron is
deployed in peacetime and the time the Navy provides
in-transit security after the decision is made to employ an
MPS MAB.  Research has not disclosed any indication that
direct protection will be afforded to the unarmed MPS
squadrons during this critical period.  Although an MPS
squadron has a good communications system and falls under
the "umbrella of seapower," it is extremely vulnerable
without direct protection.48  After the decision is made to
employ an MPS MAB, the fleet commander's initiating direc-
tive will contain operations security guidance.49  Damage
or loss of an MPS squadron could occur if this aspect of
fleet survivability is not resolved.
     The second negative implication on the force
projection capability is the survivability of the MPS
Squadron and MAB as they phase ashore.  The Commandant of
the Marine Corps has implemented measures such as anti-
terrorist training for deploying units.50 Despite the
awareness of terrorist activities, there appears to be a
"benign" mindset attendant to those individuals involved in
the MPS Program.  The landing of an MPS squadron and an MPS
MAB will, except in a few remote cases, be administrative.
The landing will be in a non-hostile environment but it
will not necessarily be benign.  Terrorists can quickly
turn a non-hostile environment into a hostile one.  OH
4-11, Maritime Prepositioned Deployment, provides guidance
for security during the previously-discussed, vulnerable
build-up/marry-up phase.  This mindset needs to be changed
and operational security must be thoroughly understood and
practiced if survivability is to be maintained during the
critical phasing ashore of the MPS Squadron and MAB.
                         Conclusion
     The MPS Program has had some positive implications on
the Marine Corps' readiness, sustainability, and force
projection capability.  In terms of readiness, there have
been three significant implications:  MPS MAB flexibility,
selected reserve unit rapid mobilization capability, and
MPS MAB rapid employment capability.  In the area of
sustainability, favorable implications exist in supplies
(less ammunition and missiles) and equipment; ammunition
and missiles; medical supplies and equipment, and medical
support; and ground equipment maintenance support.  Lastly,
two positive force projection capability implications
exist.  First, a new and unique capability is realized
through the MPS Program.  Second, the Marine Corps'
amphibious lift capacity has been enhanced.  Unfortunately,
the positive implications of the MPS Program are offset by
several significant negative implications.
     Three major negative implications exist in the area of
sustainability.  First, limited ammunition and missile
availability could cause critical problems to an employed
MPS MAB.  Second, the current hospital ship non-avail-
ability and the questionable T-AH hospital ship employment
concept are definite sustainability detractors.  Third, the
IMA maintenance support concept, similar to the T-AH
hospital ship problem, is fraught with risk.  Two
additional negative implications also exist in the force
projection capability area: the survivability of the
in-transit MPS Squadron and the survivability of the MPS
Squadron and MAB as they phase ashore.  At present, only
cursory attention has been directed to these two force
projection capability areas.  A combination of any of the
sustainability and force projection shortfalls, or perhaps
only one of these shortfalls, could offset all of the
positive aspects of the MPS Program and jeopardize the
accomplishment of the mission of an employed MPS MAB.
       The Commandant of the Marine Corps has advertised the
MPS Program as "a significant new dimension in mobility,
sustainability, and global response."51 If the Marine
Corps wants to be able to stand behind this claim, then a
discerning investigation of the MPS Program needs to be
accomplished.  The implications of the MPS Program on the
Marine Corps' readiness, sustainability, and force projec-
tion capability need to be thoroughly investigated in order
to identify and correct the Program's shortfalls.
                         FOOTNOTES
     1Maxwell O. Johnson, Maj, USMC, "The Role of a Mari-
time Based Strategy," Marine Corps Gazette, 68 (February
1984), p. 65.
     2Dov S. Zakheim, Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Policy/Resources), "The Role of Amphibious Operations in
National Military Strategy," Marine Corps Gazette, 68
(March 1984), p. 36.
     3David B. Brown, LtCol, USMC (Ret), "MPS: An Evolving
Entity," Marine Corps Gazette, 69 (January 1985), pp.
34-35.
     4R. F. Itnyre, LtCol, USMC, Special Assistant on
Amphibious and Prepositioning Matters (SAAPM), Head-
quarters, U.S. Marine Corps, personal interview about MPS
Program delivery schedules and equipment costs, Washington,
D.C., 19 February 1985.
     5Paul X. Kelley, Gen, USMC, "CMC FY-85 Posture State-
ment," Marine Corps Gazette, 68 (April 1984), p. 33.
     6Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms (JCS Pub. 1), p. 229.
     7Brown, p. 37.
     8U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense
Defense Guidance FY 1985-1989, p. 56.
     9U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Development and
Education Command, The Marine Corps Reserve, IP 15-1,
(Quantico, March 1983), p. 37.
     10Ibid., p. 37.
     11U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Development and
Education Command, Maritime Prepositioned Deployment, OH
4-11, (Quantico, June 1984), p. 1-2.
     12U.S. Marine Corps, Headquarters, Marine Corps
Capabilities Plan (Washington, D.C., 13 July 1984), p.
II-2-37.
     13CNO/CMC, Memorandum of Agreement on Joint USN/USMC
Concept of Operations for Maritime Pre-Positioninq, dated
14 April 1983, p. 2.
     14U.S. Marine Corps, Maritime Prepositioned Deploy-
ment, p. 1-1.
     15Brown, p. 35.
     16Andrew Jampolar, Capt, USN, "A Central Role for
Naval Forces?...to Support the Land Battle,"  Naval War
College Review, 37 (November-December 1984), p. 11.
     17JCS, JCS Pub. 1, p. 358.
     18U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Capabilities Plan,
pp. I-2-12,13.
     19CNO/CMC, Memorandum of Agreement on Joint USN/USMC
Concept of Operations for Maritime Pre-Positioning, p. 3.
     20U.S. DOD, DOD Defense Guidance FY 1985-1989, p. 56.
     21Itnyre.
     22F. Marutolla, Programs and Financial Management
Branch (LPF), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, telephone
interview about Procurement, Marine Corps costs of MPS
Program, Washington, D.C., 13 February 1985.
     23William Z. Dement, Maj, USMC, Ammunition/Missile
Branch (LMG), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, telephone
interview about ammunition, Washington, D.C., 4 March 1985.
     24Keith H. Stivers, LtCol, USMC, Weapons Branch (LMW),
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, personal interview about
Hawk missile, Washington, D.C., 19 February 1985.
     25Robert Halliday, Maj, USMC, Weapons Branch (LMW),
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, personal interview about
Stinger missile, Washington, D.C., 19 February 1985.
     26Stivers.
     27Thomas Shirk, Capt, USMC, Weapons Branch (LMW),
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, personal interview about
Dragon and TOW missiles, Washington, D.C., 19 February
1985.
     28John Lawrence, LCdr, USN, Logistics Plans and Policy
Branch (LPP), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, personal
interview about hospital ships, the Fleet Hospital Program,
and the Rapidly Deployable Medical Facility, Washington,
D.C., 19 February 1985.
     29Dan Bergstrom, Maj, USMC, Amphibious Requirements
and Prepositioning Programs Branch (PONP), Headquarters,
U.S. Marine Corps, personal interview about amphibious and
MPS Program shipbuilding, Washington, D.C., 19 February
1985.
     30Itnyre.
     31Zakheim, p. 39.
     32Lawrence.
     33U.S. Marine Corps, Maritime Prepositioned
Deployment, p. 3-3.
     34Bergstrom.
     35Itnyre.
     36David B. Brown, LtCol, USMC (Ret), "MPS: Aviation
Combat and the TAVB," Marine Corps Gazette, 69 (February
1985), p. 67.
     37U.S. Marine Corps, Advanced Amphibious Study Group,
"Improving Operational Capabilities: Maritime
Prepositioning and MAGTF Operations," (Quantico, 1 February
1983), p. I-1.
     38CNO/CMC, Memorandum of Agreement on Joint USN/USMC
Concept of Operations for Maritime Pre-Positioning, p. 2.
     39Brown, "MPS: Aviation Combat and the TAVB," p. 64.
     40Zakhein, p. 36.
     41Jampolar, p. 11.
     42Johnson, p. 67.
     43CNO/CMC, Memorandum of Agreement on Joint USN/USMC
Concept of Operations for Maritime Pre-Positioning, p. 2.
     44U.S. Marine Corps, Advanced Amphibious Study Group,
p. I-1.
     45Michael J. Cross, Maj, USMC, "Sealift and Our
Amphibious Capability," Marine Corps Gazette, 68 (March
1984), p. 40.
     46Martin Binkin and Jeffrey Record, Where Does the
Marine Corps Go From Here?, (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 26.
     47Bergstrom.
     48T.M. Witte, LCdr, USN, Strategic Sealift Division,
Military Sealift Command Operations Branch (OP 422D), Chief
of Naval Operations, telephone interview about Navy
protection of MPS squadrons, Washington, D.C., 1 March
1985.
     49U.S. Marine Corps, Maritime Prepositioned
Deployment, pp. 2-2,3.
     50Kelley, p. 48.
     51Kelley, p. 33.
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