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Defeating Insurgency On The Border
CSC 1985
SUBJECT AREA National Military Strategy
                     Executive Summary
I.  Purpose:  To establish the validity of border barriers as
a counterinsurgency strategy for United States military
II. Problem:  Although border barriers have been used
successfully by other armies, United States forces have
developed little doctrine on the subject.  This oversight
should be a matter of concern because United States forces
are likely to be involved in counterinsurgency warfare for
much of the future.
III.  Data:  Much of United States counterinsurgency doctrine
has been taken from the French who perfected the use of
border barriers in Algerian  United States forces, however,
did not use border barriers well in Vietnam, and as a result
current doctrine is rudimentary.  Border barriers are needed,
however, because they are one of only three methods of
eliminating the benefits of sanctuary to the guerrilla.  The
other two methods, diplomacy and direct military
intervention, provide more timely solutions to the sanctuary
problem, but often can not be used because of political
constraints.  Border barriers can best be used when the
insurgency is still in unconventional phases, adequate
manpower and material resources are available, and the nation
is committed to a lengthy war.  The technology, mobility, and
firepower available to United States forces make them
particularly well suited to use border barriers.
IV.  Conclusions: Border barriers must be a primary
consideration in developing strategies for countering
guerrilla sanctuaries, especially for United States forces
who are well equipped to efficiently use them.
V.  Recommendations:  The various military Services should
develop appropriate doctrine for establishng and controlling
border barriers during counterinsurgency operations.
          Defeating Insurgencies On the Border
Thesis  The use of border barriers should be a primary
consideration in the development of any United States
counterinsurgency strategy because many insurgencies can not
be defeated without barriers and United States military
forces are well  equipped to use them.
I.   Evolution of Border Barrier Doctrine
    A.   Morice Line in Algeria
    B.   McNamara Line in Vietnam
    C.   Doctrine for United States forces
II.  Importance of Sanctuary to Guerrillas
    A.   Base to establish and supply army
    B.   Haven for guerrilla operations
III. Methods of eliminating sanctuaries or their benefits
    A.   Diplomacy
    B.   Direct military intervention
    C.   Border barriers
IV.  Requirements for effective border barrier operations
    A.   Insurgency in unconventional war phases
    B.   Resources and manpower to control all border routes
    C.   National commitment to a lengthy war
V.  Special  capabilities of United States forces
    A.   Infiltration detection devices
    B.   Firepower and mobility
VI. United States' need for border barrier doctrine
    A.   Likely commitment to counterinsurgency operations
    B.  Effectiveness of border barriers as a strategy
    C.  Special capabilities of United States forces
     In I957 the French Army, fresh from defeat at the hands
of guerrillas in Indo-China, found itself losing to them
again in Algeria.  Despite five years of fighting and the
commitment of nearly one half million men, France's continued
role in the colonization of Algeria appeared clearly in
doubt.  A guerrilla army of independence-seeking Algerians,
protected and supplied by sanctuaries in Tunisia, had grown
from an initial strength of less than 400 to nearly 70,000
men.1  As a result, guerrilla operations against the French
Army and its surrogate forces had become more threatening and
     As casual ties increased to more than 900 per month and
the situation grew more desperate, it became evident to the
French leadership that a change in strategy was needed.  The
tactic of using French troops primarily to garrison and
secure the major towns and settlements of Algeria was not
working.  If France hoped to prevail, the battle would have
to be taken to the enemy, first along the Tunisian border and
then in the Algerian countryside.
     In the spring of 1957 the French began construction of
an elaborate barrier--the Morice Line--along 200 miles of the
frontier with Tunisia.  Anchored by the Mediterranean Sea in
the north and the Sahara Desert in the south, it was a
miracle of modern technology.  Its main feature was an eight
foot high electric fence through which a charge of 5000 volts
was passed.  There was a 45 meter minefield on either side of
it, and on the Algerian side there was a barbed wire
entanglement, and then a footpath, patrol led day and night.
If the fence was penetrated, an alarm was automatically
activated which brought instant fire from 105mm howitzers and
attack from mobile strike farces consisting of helicopters,
tanks, and airborne infantry.  Some 80,000 French soldiers
defended the line.3  During the remainder of 1957 and 1958,
Tunisian-based guerrillas tried every conceivable means of
breaching the wire using high tension cutters, bangalore
torpedoes, tunnels, ramps, and even assaults by entire
infantry battalions.  French countermeasures, however, in
every case proved to be decisive.  By the end of 1958 the
guerrillas had lost over 6,000 men and 4,300 weapons to the
deadly combination of the barrier and mobile strike forces.4
In addition nearly 30,000 insurgents in Tunisia were left cut
off from the war in Algeria.  Guerrillas left in Algeria,
stripped of reinforcement and resupply, proved to be easy
prey for the French offensives in the countryside which
quickly followed.  By the end of 1959 less than 10,000
guerrillas remained in Algeria, most without weapons or
ammunition.  In less then two years the French Army had
accomplished with the Morice Line what it had failed to
achieve in the five previous years using conventional
counterinsurgency tactics.5
     Although political unrest in Paris caused the French to
later abandon Algeria, the military aspects of their
"successful" countersurgency were studied widely by the major
powers of the world, particularly the United States.  French
counterinsurgency methods such as resettlement, pacification,
combined action programs, and cordon and search techniques
were later adopted and used by United States forces in
Vietnam.  The concept of border barriers, however, received
little attention.  Army Field Manual 31-16, Counterquerrilla
Operations -- the bible for military operations in
Vietnam--discussed border operations only briefly, noting
     While certain definite portions of an international land
border or shoreline may be placed under effective
surveillance and control led by use of static security posts,
reserve forces, ground and aerial observers, electronic
listening posts, and patrols, the continuous surveillance and
control of an extensive land border or shoreline is extremely
     The United States, nevertheless decided in 1967 to
employ a "fence" or "iron shield" along the DMZ between North
and South Vietnam.7  This line, erected at the direction of
Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, was primarily an
electronic barrier rather than a physical one.  Although it
included a barbed wire fence, its main feature was a field of
secret, electronic detection devices hidden along its length
which were used to alert air and ground forces of enemy
infiltration.  Political and practical considerations
prevented the extension of the McNamara line along the
lengthy Laotian border, the main infiltration route for the
North Vietnamese guerrillas.8  As a result, the line presented
only a minor obstacle to infiltrating guerrillas who easily
avoided it by traveling through Laos rather than across the
DMZ.  Construction of the final phase of the line was
subsequently terminated when its ineffectiveness became
     Since the failure of the McNamara Line in 1971, the
United States doctrine on the use of border barriers has
remained rudimentary.  Border operations of all types have,
in general, been neglected by military planners, probably
because of the political repercussions that have often
accompanied their use in the past.  Instead, it has been
emphasized that control of the borders during
counterinsurgency operations is primarily a responsibility of
the government of the host nation; and that border police,
customs personnel, local police, and other government
agencies should be used before military forces.  Military
forces are committed to border denial operations only, "after
careful consideration of the threat, the environment, and the
location of the infiltrators probable targets and method of
     The absence of any definitive U.S. doctrine on the use
of border barriers strongly suggests that most military
planners have concluded that border barriers are not needed,
are ineffective when used, and make poor use of military
capabilities.   Such a conclusion, however, ignores the
shortcomings of other border denial methods and fails to
recognize the technological capabilities of U.S.  forces.   In
fact, the use of border barriers should be a primary
consideration in the development of any United States
counterinsurgency strategy because many insurgencies can not
be defeated without barriers, and United States military
forces are well  equipped to use them.
     The importance of border barriers in counterinsurgency
operations can best be appreciated by understanding the
importance of sanctuary to guerillas.   According to the late
Dr. Bernard Fall  in his book  "Street Without Joy", a sanctuary
is "a territory contiguous to a rebellious area which though
ostensibly not involved in the conflict, provides the rebel
side with shelter, training facilities, equipment, and--if
they can get away with it--troops."10  Sanctuaries are an
essential  requirement for the conduct of any successful
insurgency.   The availability of sanctuaries allows
relatively small groups of guerrillas to establish and equip
entire armies within the safety of neighboring borders.
These guerrilla armies are then able to attack
counterinsurgency forces at a time of their own choosing,
returning to the safety of their sanctuaries between combat
operations.  The guerrilla without sanctuary is, on the other
hand, vulnerable to attack at any time and therefore has
little opportunity to train and equip his forces.
     The value of sanctuaries to guerrillas was never more
apparent than during the Algerian war.  During that war
Tunisian sanctuaries provided both a supply base and a safe
haven for Algerian guerrillas. The guerrillas were able to
transport arms from Arab and communist-bloc  nations directly
to their Tunisian camps while the French looked on
helplessly.  In just three months during 1957 the guerrillas
received 17,000 rifles, 380 machineguns, 296 automatic
rifles, 190 bazookas, 30 mortars, and over 100 million rounds
of ammunition by this means.    Within Tunisia, they
established five command posts, two replacement depots, eight
hospitals, nine arsenals and three training camps all of
which were free from French attack.   Without such
sanctuaries the guerrillas would never have been able to
support their 70,000-man Army.
     Sanctuaries proved to be equally essential to guerrilla
forces some ten years later when Vietnamese Communist (VC)
and North Vietnam Army (NVA) forces, operating from protected
sanctuaries in Cambodia and Loas,  challenged the armies of
South Vietnam and the United States.  Many historians credit
the success of the VC and NVA to their ability to use their
sanctuaries effectively against an enemy with vastly greater
manpower, firepower and maneuverability.   In this regard,
some writers suggest that the outcome of every insurgency
since WWII has depended upon how well the sanctuary performed
its expected role.  Others such as Walter Lippman claim that
"it is for all practical purposes impossible to win a
guerrilla war if there is a privileged sanctuary behind the
guerrilla fighters."14  How then can sanctuaries be defeated?
     There are three widely recognized methods for
eliminating or denying guerrillas the use of sanctuaries.  Of
these, diplomacy is almost always the first attempted,
followed by direct military intervention, and finally border
barriers depending upon the situation.
     The diplomacy method depends upon persuasion to force
the country "hosting" the sanctuary to eliminate it.  Because
it does not require the commitment of troops, diplomacy is
normally the most desirable approach.  For it to be
successful, however, substantial world opinion must be
marshalled against the host country, the host country must be
swayed by that opinion, and it must have the power to force
the guerrilla to surrender his sanctuary.  Seldom are all
three of these essential conditions met.  Most countries
hosting sanctuaries share common goals with the insurgent and
along with him enjoy substantial economic and military
support from one or more world powers or power blocks.  Thus,
it is to their advantage to continue the sanctuary condition.
     Such was the case during the Algerian War in France's
former colony, Tunisia.  With powerful support from the Arab
and communist worlds, the Tunisians had few incentives to
help its former master, France, eliminate the Algerian
guerrilla sanctuaries.  Even had the Tunisians been
persuaded, it is unlikely that they could have eliminated
30,000 armed insurgents from their borders.
     In this regard, the potential consequencies facing a
host country which agrees to militarily oppose sanctuaries
within its borders are particularly severe.  For example,
during the Southeast Asian conflict of the 60's and 70's,
Cambodia, a declared neutral, had 40,000 North Vietnamese
Army(NVA) regulars and Vietnamese Communist (VC) guerrillas
occupying sanctuaries within its borders.  In 1970, after
years of United States diplomatic pressure, Cambodia
reluctantly agreed to resist communist use of these
sanctuaries.  In March of that year Cambodia's small, poorly
lead army was ordered to move against selected sanctuaries in
coordinated attacks with elements of the Army of the Republic
of Vietnam(ARVN).  The results were disastrous for both
Cambodia and the United States.  Within a matter of weeks the
communist forces drove the ARVN back into South Vietnam and
destroyed the Cambodian Army.   The Cambodian government, no
longer considered a neutral by the communist forces, became
subject to attack both from its oun constituents and the
communist forces.   In its weakened condition it fell to the
communist forces shortly after their victory in South
Vietnam.15  Thus, what the United States had hoped would be
the least costly method of eliminating the communist
sanctuaries, instead became the catalyst for the eventual
communist takeover of one of the few neutral countries in the
     When dipomatic pressures fail to eliminate sanctuaries
direct military intervention against them must be considered.
Such intervention may include aerial bombing, artillery and
rocket attacks, raids, or even assaults against the
sanctuaries by entire mechanized divisions.   Military
intervention offers the swiftest and most direct method of
eliminating the sanctuary.   On the other hand, it is frought
with risks.  The crossing of soverign borders by allied
forces is likely to turn public and world opinion against
their cause, and may expand the war in totally unpredictable
and undesirable directions.   In this regard, the United
States and its allies have enjoyed few successes in using
this method against sanctuaries.
     For example, as has been previously noted, the
intervention of ARVN and U.S. forces against communist
sanctuaries in Cambodia eventually led to the downfall of
that country.  Furthermore it expanded the war, forcing the
long term commitment of U.S. firepower and logistical
support, and of ARVN troop support to the Cambodian forces at
a time when these resources were badly needed in South
Vietnam.16  Although the operation was successful from a
military point of view-communist operations were reportedly
set back six months-it did little to contribute to the long
term, strategic plan for this area.  Reported one observer
     The Cambodian decision has set in motion a
     secondary chain reaction in the U.S..  For Richard
     Nixon, that reaction must seem a negative and not
     fully foreseen outcome.  It has cost him
     credibility with the people, aroused and angered
     the Congress and surely limited his future choices
     for Indochina.  [The Cambodian decision]... may be
     working out in ways that he did not expect and
     would not have chosen.17
No example more graphically illustrates the risks of direct
military intervention against sanctuaries than the recent
Israeli operations in Lebanon in June 1982.  What was planned
as a shallow penetration to drive Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) guerrillas from sanctuaries along the
Israeli border, quickly became an all out war.  Israeli
forces, initially enjoying overwhelming success, drove deeper
into Lebanon than originally planned.  Syrian forces were
drawn into the fighting, and the balance of power among
guerrilla forces, previously a stabalizing element in
Lebanon, was destroyed.  As a result, Israel has been forced
to stay in Lebanon for nearly three years at a tremendous
cost to its army and economy.  In return Israel has achieved
little in terms of securing its borders, but instead has seen
the PLO replaced by even more radical guerrilla
organizations.  Thus, while direct military intervention
often appears to offer the quickest and least complicated
method of eliminating sanctuaries, it seldom does.  Instead,
it more often creates new problems which can not be forseen.
     When diplomatic methods fail and nations are unwilling
to risk direct military intervention against sanctuaries,
border barriers must be employed.  Border barriers require
costly manpower and material resources to erect, and more
time than other methods to eliminate the sanctuary.  On the
other hand, border barriers are defensive in nature, and
therefore avoid the political pitfalls associated with other
border crossing operations.  Furthermore, they generally
provide a more lasting and effective solution to the
sanctuary problem.
     For example, in addition to the Morice Line in Algeria,
border barriers have been used successfully by both the
Soviets and Israelis.  In this regard, it has been reported
that barriers erected by Soviet forces within the mountain
passes of the Afganistan-Pakistan border have limited Afgan
rebel resupply across that border to less than twenty percent
of the total supplies received.  As a result, the rebels have
been denied most of the United States aid that originates in
Pakistan, and have instead had to rely heavily upon internal
     The Israelis, have been even more successful with their
"Security Belt" along the border with Lebanon.  This line,
consisting of a wire fence, minefields, watch towers, and a
variety of sensor and alarm devices is supported by
helicopter-borne pursuit forces and artillery.19 To reduce
the manpower cost of patrolling the 60 mile border the
Israel is have established outposts and settlements in
frontier areas which provide bases for patrols by both
military units and local personnel.  Upon establishment of
the security belt and a "dead zone" six miles deep along the
border in 1970, Israeli casualties due to infiltrators
dropped from 14.5 per month to 3.2 in less than a year.20 The
Security Belt has thus proven to be an effective combat power
multiplier for this small nation of relatively limited
military means.
     The success of the Israeli Security Belt and of the
Morice Line suggests that certain requirements must be met
before the use of border barriers can be used successfully.
     First, the insurgency must still be in the
unconventional war phases.  Guerrillas, especially in the
early stages of an insurgency, are too poorly trained and
equipped to overcome a well established barrier.  In the
later stages of an insurgency, however, as the guerrilla
transitions into conventional warfare, his ability to
overcome such barriers is greatly increased.  In this regard,
border barriers are seldom effective against conventional
weapons such as tanks, armored vehicles, heavy artillery, and
     Secondly, the counterinsurgency force must have the
rescources and manpower to effectively control all primary
border routes for guerrilla ingress and egress.  In this
regard, border barrier operations require a large commitment
of troops, both to patrol the border and to provide  reaction
forces and fire support when the barrier is penetrated.  In
Algeria for example, more than 200 troops were required along
each mile of the Morice Line.21
     This is not to say, however, that border barriers could
not be used in almost any country in the world.  Almost all
countries have natural barriers such as mountains, seas, and
deserts along much of their border.  These barriers make
infiltration difficult if not impossible for guerrillas.  For
example, the Mediterranean Sea and Sahara Desert on Algeria's
northern and southern borders proved to be insurmountable
obstacles to the guerrillas who had neither the mobility for
sea nor desert operations.  Attempts by the guerrillas to
bypass the Morice Line by crossing these natural barriers
were easily defeated by the highly mobile French.  Likewise,
the rugged mountains along the Afganistan-Pakistan border
have hindered guerrilla operations and allowed the Soviets to
use border barriers with a minimum of manpower along a border
of almost 1200 miles in length.  In this regard, many areas
where U.S. forces are likely to be committed to
counterinsurgency operations, such as Central America, have
natural barriers which are particularly supportive of border
barrier operations.  Why then are United States forces not
prepared to use border barriers today?
     The commitment of a government and nation to a lengthy
counterinsurgency operation is the third, and probably the
most difficult requirement for effective use of border
barriers.  In most situations, months or even years are
required before border barrier operations eventually strangle
the external support of an insurgency.  Unless therefore, a
nation is committed to a long term counterinsurgency
operation, border barriers will not be effective.  Few
nations, particularly the United States, have demonstrated
such patience.  In this regard, the United States approach in
Vietnam was plagued by strategies to achieve a quick victory.
Yet when one considers the time and resources ultimately
expended by the United States in Vietnam, the failure to use
border barriers early in that conflict appears to have been a
tragic oversight.
     This is unfortunate because United States forces are
particularly well suited for conducting border barrier
operations, even under conditions that other larger, and more
experienced armies would find unacceptable.  Efficient border
barrier operations require the utilization of modern
technology and light, mobile forces inlieu of costly
fortifications and large numbers of troops.  In this regard,
the United States armed forces, which for several decades
have depended upon technology and mobility to meet a broad
range of global commitments are well equipped and organized
for conducting border barrier operations.  For example,
United States forces have a broad range of devices to assist
them in detecting enemy movements including seismic and
acoustical ground sensors, thermal vision devices, ground and
airborne radar, and even infrared cameras mounted or
satellites.   Information received from these devices can be
relayed to high speed computers which develop  real time
targeting information for artillery, gunships, airborne
attack aircraft, or heliborne reaction forces.  In addition,
the computers can identify patterns of enemy infiltration and
select likely areas to be seeded with pressure activated
anti-personnel mines or other types of area denial weapons.
The massive firepower immediately available to US forces from
heavy artillery, aircraft-mounted cannons, and laser guided
munitions, when tied into the sensor network, makes the use
of troops unnecessary along the remote, rugged strips of many
borders.  The speed with which helicopters, short take-off
and landing aircraft, and armored vehicles can deploy U.S.
reaction forces from inland bases to trouble spots along the
border further reduces the need for large numbers of
     The effectiveness of U.S. technology against guerrilla
sanctuaries was clearly demonstrated during Operation Dewey
Canyon in Southeast Asia.  This air interdiction operation
against the Ho Chi Minh Trail , the main guerrilla supply
route and sanctuary in Loas, made superb use of United States
technology.  To locate the enemy, ground sensors were
emplaced along the Ho Chi Minh Trail by helicopters and
transport aircraft while reconnaissance aircraft, using
highly sensitive thermal detectors, monitored the trail day
and night.  Information from these sources was fed into
computers which developed patterns of guerrilla convoy
movement and identified supply depots.  Based upon this
information jet aircraft and helicopters were able to seed
guerrilla supply routes, truck parks, and depots with
anti-material and anti-personnel mines.  Additionally,
convoys were brought under attack from bombs, rockets, and
laser-guided munitions the minute they started to move.  The
operation was so successful that in one year it was estimated
that NVA supplies entering Vietnam were reduced by eighty
percent.  According to one observer, for every 320 tons of
supplies along the trail only 10 tons survived to reach South
     Some military experts who were close to this secret and
highly successful electronic war have concluded that "the
presistent and patient application of superior technology can
be decisive in guerrilla war situations."24  Certainly U.S.
capabilities are even more impressive today and, if properly
applied, could be just as decisive in defeating a guerrilla
along almost any border in she world.
     Guerrilla warfare has become the predominant method of
waging war in the twentieth century.  As the military
capabilities of the major powers of the world have rapidly
outpaced those of their adversaries, they have found
themselves increasingly involved in counterinsurgency
operations.  France, the United States, Great Britain, and
the Soviet Union have all, in the last twenty years alone,
found themselves involved in lengthy, bloody
counterinsurgency operations, often with disappointing
results.  The United States, more than any other major power,
faces the prospect today of having to fight guerrillas again.
The task at hand then for the military leadership of our
country is to determine how counterinsurgencies can be fought
and won.
     The strategic use of border barriers has been one
successful technique employed by other counterinsurgency
forces in the past.  It has provided these forces with the
capability to deny the guerrilla the benefits of sanctuary so
critical to his survival.  Border barriers have worked to
defeat sanctuaries when diplomacy failed, and direct military
intervention was not possible or was unwise.  Along with
other counterinsurgency techniques, it has allowed the
counterinsurgency forces to divide the guerrilla and defeat
him piecemeal
     United States forces are well equipped to use border
barriers and grow more capable in this respect every day.
They possess both the technology, firepower and mobility
required to make border barrier operations both efficient and
     What the United States military needs now is a better
appreciation of the benefits of border barriers and an
understanding of how they are best employed.  In this regard,
doctrine is needed which defines the conditions which favor
the use of border barriers, describes how they are
constructed, and provides the concepts for tactical barrier
operations.  Then and only then can America forces be
expected to employ such barriers effectively.
     More than 10,000 Frenchmen lost their lives before the
strategy of the Morice Line was perfected. We in the miltary
today can ensure that this sacrifice was not for naught.
     1"Tunisia," TIME, 3 March,1985,p.25.
     2"Algeria-Reluctant Rebel," TIME,  13 October, 1958,
p. 25.
     3Alistar Horne, A Savage War of Peace (New York: Viking
Press, 1978), pp.263-264.
     4Ibid, p.266.
     5Harold D. Nelson,ed. Algeria, A Country Study.
(Washington: The American University, 1979), p.58.
     6Headquarters, Department of the Army, Couterguerrilla
Operations, FM31-16 (Washington, 1967), pp. 98-100.
     7"Why Saigon's Neighbors Fear Was Expansion," Armed
Forces, 14 (February,1968), p.83.
     9Headquarters, Department of the Army, Low Intensity
Conflict,FM100-20 (Washington, 1981), pp.96.
     10Professor John D. Deiner, "Guerrilla Border
Sanctuaries and Counterinsurgency War fare, " The Army
Quarterly and Defense Jounal, 109 (April 1976), p.162.
     11Horne, p.264.
     12TIME, 13 October, 1958, p.28.
     13George Weiss, "Bottle For the Ho Chi Minh Trail,"
Armed Forces Journal, 108 (February 1971), p. 18.
     14Major G.R. Christmas, "Guerrilla Sanctuaries,"
Infantry, 63 (May-June, 1973), p.25.
     15"The Cambodia Venture: An Assessment," TIME, 6
July, 1970, pp.16-17.
     16Ibid, p. 17.
     18"Reports of More Aid to Afghan Rebels Stir Fueds,"
Washingtn Post, February 7, 1985, Section A, p.1.
     19Major Leonard Supko, USMC, Personal  Interview about
observations while a member of U.N. Peacekeeping Forces in
Palestine:   Quantico, Virginia, 5 March 1985.
     20Bard E. O'Neill, Armed Struggle in  Palestine:A
Political-Military Analysis (Boulder:Western Press,  1978),
pp. 76-84.
     21Horne, p. 264.
     22Ibid, p.18.
     23Weiss, pp.18-23.
     24Ibid, p.18.
"Algeria,Reluctant Rebel." TIME, 13 October 1985, pp. 25-29.
"Behind the Lines In Algeria-Quiet, Then Sudden Death." US
    News and World Report, 18 April 1958, pp. 58-63.
Brace, Richard and Joan.  Ordeal In Algeria.  Princeton: D.
    Van Nostrand Company, Inc.
"The Cambodia Venture:  An Assessment." TIME, 6 July 1970,
    pp. 16-17.
Christmas, Major G. R. "Guerrilla Sanctuaries."   Infantry,
    63(May-June 1968), 22-27.
Deiner, Professor John D.  "Guerrilla Border Sanctuaries and
    Counterinsurgent Warfare."  Army Quarterly and Defense
    Journal 109 (April 1976), 162-178.
"Fortifications,"  Collier's Encyclopedia (1975), Volume 10,
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Counterquerrilla
    Operations, FM 31-16.  Washington:  1967.
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Denial Operations and
    Barriers- FM 31-10.  Washington:  1968.
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Low Intersity Conflict,
    FM 100-20.  Washington:  1981.
Headquarters, United States Marine Corps.  Counterinsurgency
    Operations, FMFM 8-2.  Washington:  1980.
Horne, Alistair.  A Savage War of Peace.  New York: Viking
    Press, 1978.
Hutcheson, Major John M.  "Scorched Earth Policy:  Soviets in
    Afganistan." Military Review, LXII (April 1982) 32-33.
"McNamara Line:  It's Still Abuilding, But."  U.S. News and
    World Report, 13 (25 March 1968), 14.
Nelson, Harold D., ed. Algeria, A Country Study.  Washington:
    The American University, 1979.
O'Neill, Bard E.  Armed Struggle in Palestine:  A Political-
    Military Analysis.  Boulder:  Westview Press, 1978.
"Reports of More Aid to Afghan Rebels Stir Fueds," Washington
    Post, February 7, 1985, Section A, p.1.
Supko, Leonard, Major, USMC, Former member of U.N. Peace-
    keeping Forces, Palestine.  Interview concerning
    Israeli security belt.  Quantico, Virginia, March 5,
"Tunisia, Good Offices From Friends." TIME, 3 March 1958,
    pp. 25-27.
Weiss, George.  "Battle For Control of Ho Chi Minh Trail."
    Armed Forces Journal, 108 (February 1971), 18-22.
"Why Saigon's Neighbors Fear War Expansion." Armed Forces
    Management, 14 (February 1968), 83.

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