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An Analysis Of The Command And Control And Integration Of Marine Air-Ground
Task Force Tactical Fixed Wing Aviation In Sustained Joint Force Operations Ashore
CSC 1985
    An Analysis of the Command and Control and Integration
     of Marine Air-Ground Tack Force Tactical Fixed Wing
     Aviation in Sustained Joint Force Operations Ashore
            LtCol W. Todd Frommelt, Jr., USMC
                    1 April 1985
        Marine Corps Command and Staff College
    Marine Corps Development and Education Command
               Quantico, Virginia  22134
   An Analysis of the Command and Control and Integration
   of Marine Air-Ground Task Force Tactical Fixed Wing
   Aviation in Sustained Joint Force Operations Ashore
                      LtCol W. Todd Frommelt, Jr., USMC
     This paper is a discussion and analysis of the command
and control (C2) of Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
tactical fixed wing aviation (TACAIR) in sustained joint
force land operations.  The analysis examines background C2
information, the Commandant Marine Corps (CMC) White Letter
7-81 on the subject, and the problems associated with the
joint service issues surrounding the C2 of MAGTF TACAIR
when the MAGTF's substantive air combat element is opera-
ting in an integrated joint air battle environment.  The
paper attempts to consolidate and clarify the C2 issues,
discusses clarification to CMC guidance issued subsequent
to the JCS "Omnibus" policy statement and proposes a Marine
Corps/MAGTF Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and
Control Systems (JINTACCS) program implementatation of the
"Omnibus" provisions.
     The paper does this in eight chapters.  The first
five chapters provide a rather extensive background on
"Omnibus", air command historical perspectives, the
Services' air command and control structures, further
Service C2 issues and associated terminology problems.
These reviews attempt to provide a reader with the C2
background on Service perspectives and considerations
necessary to fully appreciate the very real difficulties
encountered when a joint force commander attempts to
establish a coordinated and integrated air campaign.
     Chapters Six and Seven review the "Omnibus" and pro-
pose procedures to effectively implement the integration of
MAGTF TACAIR into the joint force air campaign utilizing
the soon to be approved JINTACCS air operations joint
interface operating procedures and air tasking cycle
messages.  The final chapter presents conclusions and
recommendations derived from the analysis.  Annexes B and C
offer clarified versions of the "Omnibus" statement and
Operational Handbook 5-1.1, Command and Control of MAGTF
TACAIR for consideration.
     The paper has been developed in response to my percep-
tions of significant misunderstandings within the Corps and
other Services of what the "Omnibus" represents.  I hope it
serves to clarify the issue and consolidate pertinent
material for review.  The paper's length and background
material may be somewhat disconcerting.  It is expected
that a reader may use the table of contents to select those
chapters which are of most interest and skip those which
may contain only background with which he is familiar.
PREFACE                                                1
     The Ominbus                                      12
     Purpose and Scope                                19
     Terminology                                      21
     Outline                                          22
     World War II                                     24
     Korea                                            33
     Vietnam                                          37
     MAGTF TACAIR C2                                  46
     Air Foce TACAIR C2                               64
     Army TACAIR C2                                   77
     Navy TACAIR C2                                   84
     Joint Task Force (JTF) TACAIR C2                 86
     CENTCOM TACAIR C2 Example                       108
     JINTACCS TACAIR C2                              111
     The Push for "Functional Componency"
        and "Unity of Command"                       130
     Command Relationships                           144
     Applicable Issues Related to Avaiation   
        Functions                                    147
     Areas of Influence and Interest                 152
     TACAIR Command and Control Terminology          156
     Air Mission Terminology                         164
     Omnibus Terminology                             174
     JINTACCS Terminology                            179           
     The General Support Apportionment               182
     Coordinating and Integrating MAGTF
         Direct Support                              186
     Command and Control and Communications
         Dependencies                                188
     Transition to Doctrine                          190
     JINTACCS Preplanned Air Tasking Cycle           193
     Other Air Tasking Cycles                        200
     Conclusions                                     204
     Recommendations                                 209
     A -- Annotated Bibliography                   A-1-A-6
     B -- Proposed Reworded Omnibus                B-1
     C -- Operational Handbook 5-1.1, Command
          and Control of USMC TACAIR               C-1
     APPENDIX 1.  Extracts of MCDEC Draft
                  Revision to OH 5-1.1            C-1-2-
     APPENDIX 2.  Comments on OH 5-1.1
                  Draft Revision                   C-2-4-
                LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE   3-1.  Typical MAGTF/ACE Composition             48
FIGURE   3-2.  Example ACE Employment                    53
FIGURE   3-3.  Example TAF and ACF                       69
FIGURE   3-4.  Air Force TACS and MAGTF MACCS            73
FIGURE   3-5.  Air Force - Army TACAIR C2                81
FIGURE   3-6.  Example JTF Command                       89
FIGURE   3-7.  JCS Pub 12 Component Air
               Plan Message                              97
FIGURE   3-8.  JCS Pub 12 CJTF Sortie Allotment
               Message Example                           99
FIGURL   3-9.  JCS Pub 12 Sample "Common Air
               Tasking"                                 101
FIGURE   3-10. Example JCS Pub 12 Air
               Plan Message                             103
FIGURE   3-11. Example JCS Pub 12 CJTF
               Sortie Allotment Message                 104
FIGURE   3-12. Example JCS Pub 12 Cross-Force
               ATO:  Navy to Air Force                  106
               AIRSUPREQ with SARTS                     122
               with Partial SARTS                       124
               with Partial SARTS                       125
               with Partial SARTS                       126
               with Partial SARTS                       127
FIGURE   4-1.  MAGTP Employments in Sustained
               Land Operations                          145
FIGURE   5-1.  Marine Corps - Air Force Fixed
               Wing TACAIR Mission/Function
               Terminology                              165
FIGURE   5-2.  Fixed Wing TACAIR Functions by
               Nature of Support Provided               171
FIGURE   5-3.  Graphic Presentation of Fixed
               Wing TACAIR Missions                     173
FIGURE   6-1.  Example CJTF Apportionment               184
FIGURE   7-1.  Example CJTF Apportionment
               Guidance to MAGTF                        194
               8ALLOCAT Set                             195
               8JNTEXC Set                              196
               8ALLOT Set Extract                       198
     The command and control of Marine Corps tactical
aviation assets when employed as an integral part of a
MAGTF in sustained joint-service land operations has been
the subject of decades-long controversy.  The subject and
related issues often drift somewhat from that central
theme, but the basic thrust remains the command and control
of MAGTF TACAIR.  The same may be said of this paper.  Its
central theme and related discussions are directed at the
command and control of Marine Air-Ground Task Force
(MAGTF), tactical fixed wing aviation (TACAIR) in
situations totally removed from amphibious operations --
sustained operations ashore.  The Marine Corps does not
particularly like employment in sustained land operations --
it's neither equipped, trained or doctrinally oriented for
such combat.  Since WWII, however, with limited Army assets
(divisions) available, such employments have become reality
in both conflict and contingency planning.  In practical
application, MAGTF employment with the Army and Air Force
presents a theater commander with both a unique combat force
and some unique integration requirements.
     I have found the topic of interest since my first
exposure to it in 1981 when CMC White Letter 7-81 was
promulgated.  Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) White
Letters promulgate guidance from the Commandant to all
Marines on significant matters which he feels need
elaboration.  In March of 1981, the chiefs of all the
Services promulgated a "JCS Policy Statement for the
Command and Control of USMC TACAIR in Sustained Operations
Ashore."  This policy statement reflected a vigorously
negotiated concensus on the issue and was very assuredly a
statement which warranted White Letter guidance.  The
policy statement also became known as the "Omnibus".  I'm
not sure where that title came from -- and don't believe it
matters -- but since it has become widely associated with
the JCS policy statement and is a bit less cumbersome, I
will use the word "Omnibus" to refer to the statement
     The Omnibus is essentially a compromise between the
USAF and the USMC on command and control of a theater's or
joint task force's MAGTF tactical fixed wing aviation when
the MAGTF includes a substantive air combat element and is
engaged in a sustained land campaign.  The USAF, expecting
to be the joint force's predominant air arm, wants command
and control of all force air assets.  The USMC views its
organic air combat element as inseparable.  Both positions
are convincingly supportable -- and hence, the controversy
is born.
     I distinctly remember reviewing the White Letter
shortly after its distribution to the Corps.  I can
remember seeing it as a seemingly simple and reasonable
arrangement for sharing and integrating MAGTF air assets in
a joint task force environment in what seemed straight-
forward and understandable  terms.  I also remember some
startingly sharp comments from several of my senior
officers directed towards those "x!:Z$ (expletives deleted)
headquarters gentlemen who had "given away the farm" to the
Air Force!  Being relatively quick witted, I immediately
recognized the need for caution in discussions concerning
the Omnibus.  "Not for me to worry" thought the Major on
his way to a rather tiring-sounding job at MCTSSA (Marine
Corps Tactical System Support Activity) to work on
something called "interoperability" and JINTACCS (Joint
Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems.)
Well, JINTACCS and interoperability turned out not only
more challenging and interesting than that impression, but
also to be at times intimately involved with Omnibus.  This
involvement with Omnibus through my activities with
JINTACCS let me see both the Air Force and other Service
perspectives as well as the Marine Corps'.
     I have gradually come to realize that what was promul-
gated as a JCS policy statement representing an agreement
between all Service chiefs on the issue of command and
control of USMC TACAIR must  be recognized as something
far short of an "agreement" which has done far less than
"resolve" the issue of the command and control of Marine
TACAIR in sustained land operations.  I have also become
aware of a very prevalent lack of understanding within the
Marine Corps' lower command echelons of what Omnibus meant
and within the Air Force of the Marine Corps concept of
MAGTF integrity, organization, and command and control.
     I changed courses in the development of this paper
several times.  In research, I was surprised to find little
in writing about the Marine Corps or Air Force perspectives
of what the Omnibus statement says.  It seems the almost
traditional Marine Corps-Air Force command and control
dialogue (tactful wording, no?) has moved upwards or
onwards to "the bigger and greater issues" (although
related intimately) of functional versus service componency
within Unified Commands.  For a time, then, I thought that
should be the focus of my thesis.  As it turns out, far
more eloquent and conversant authors have churned out a
plethora of point papers, memoranda and studies on this
very important and very current topic.  The Advanced
Amphibious Study Group Background Paper, Service vs.
Functional Components, 23 July 1982, is a thorough and well
written analysis.  After uncovering and digesting all these
materials, I would have felt somewhat foolish continuing
in a redundant effort or similar direction.
     While these studies and point papers are all relevant
to the Omnibus and are necessary responses to a very real
issue confronting the Marine Corps and Air Force (and the
Army and Navy to a lesser degree), my concern became that
unless we somewhow returned our focus to the Omnibus, any
mutual (albeit limited, perhaps even flawed) understanding
and agreement that we may have in Omnibus on the command
and control of USMC TACAIR in sustained operations ashore
would be lost.  In early 1981, the Marine Corps and Air
Force came to an understanding on the issue.  I expect it
was the result of hard negotiations and perceived
compromises on both sides.  I will show in the paper that
the agreement is flawed.  I will also propose that it can
be fixed and that it can be implemented.  Perhaps if the
Air Force knew more clearly how we interpreted the
statement (I suspect we should also work on ensuring that
we in the Corps know how we interpret it) and how we
propose to implement our interpretation, their pressure for
fuctional componency in unified and joint commands would be
eased.  If that's too presumptuous then let's at least get
our focus back to the Omnibus -- to clarify its intent,
promote its understanding, offer some corrections and
develop effective implementation procedures.  That's what
this paper is all about.
     A quick review of the bibliography would show that my
sources include a wide variety of Services doctrinal
publications, JCS Publications, air power books, and
innumerable papers and staff writings.  I am thankful to
the many Marine and Air Force officers whose less formal
verbal contributions to my research assisted me greatly and
yet may not he formally recognized with attribution.  My
sources also include previous personal efforts in this area
while at MCTSSA and are in several places annotated as
MCTSSA or MCDEC formal papers.  I comment in that regard
when major extracts are incorporated in the thesis.
I realize that its size may be intimidating.  Remember that
I (prehaps foolishly) felt it appropriate to consolidate
substantive background information in the initial chapters.
A reader may choose to skip such background material and
still expect to have covered in analysis my major conclu-
sions.  I hope the writing of this paper proves of value to
the Corps in this somewhat complex and politicized area of
                       CHAPTER ONE
     The Marine Corps plans to go into future combat as a
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) composed of a MAGTF
command element, a ground combat element, an aviation
combat element and a combat service support element.  The
MAGTF is sized and organized for a specific mission with
its elements drawn from resources residing in the peacetime
structures ot the Fleet Marine Forces (FMF's), divisions,
air wings and fleet service support groups.  Sizing of the
MAGTF is generally guided by the mission and determination
of the ground combat element to be employed.  When built
around a battalion landing team, the aviation combat
element is normally a composite helicopter squadron
occasionally strengthened by OV-10 or AV-8 aircraft.  This
size MAGTF is termed a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) and is
capable of relatively limited combat operations such as
non-combatant personnel evacuations.  It may also be
considered the forward deployed element of a larger MAGTF.
The larger MAGTF's, Marine Amphibious Brigades (MAB's) and
Forces (MAF's) are organized around ground combat elements
of one or more regiments or divisions, and aviation combat
elements of composite group or wing size respectively.  As
the size of these MAGTF's expands, they are capable of an
increasingly wider range of combat effort from amphibious
assault to sustained operations ashore.  When a large MAB
or MAF sized MAGTF is employed, it will include an aviation
combat element task organized to provide all the functions
of Marine aviation from offensive air support to the
command and control of its assets.  This aviation combat
element (ACE), while highly capable of independent
offensive action, is inherently tasked as an organic,
integral supporting air component of the MAGTF's air-ground
team.1  The concept of Marine aviation as an organic
supporting arm of the MAGTF is a pervasive element of
Marine Corps doctrine, has been developed through decades
of experience and is provided tor in U.S. law.  The
organizational and doctrinal precepts which establish the
bonds within MAGTF air-ground teams provide its commander
an integrated combined arms force of enhanced flexibility,
responsiveness and power.2
     While the Marine Corps views its combat organizations
as synergistic by virtue of the tightly integrated effec-
tiveness of its combined arms, the inherent flexibility of
tactical fixed wing aviation make such assets appear quite
separabie to other commanders with other missions and
interests in mind.  This is especially the case when the
MAGTF is considered for employment in a joint service
sustained land campaign.  Envision, if you will, a
European, Southeast Asian or Korean theater of operations
involving a division and wing sized MAGTF, an Army corps or
more of several divisions (each) and a tactical (U.S.) air
force of several wings.  All Services agree on the require-
ment for unity of command in such a scenario and have gone
to great lengths to promote and prepare for implementing
command relationships.  Undoubtedly the most complete
documentation of this premse is found in JCS Publication 2
(hereafter JCS Pub 2), Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).
Does it seem consistent with the principle of unity of
command to employ a small (relatively!) MAGTF, with its
supporting air combat assets ranging deeping into the
enemy's rear areas and attacking second and third echelon
targets, as an independent entity-- a total force within a
force?  The theater commander would probably need justi-
fication to do so.  The Air Force component commander would
logically be interested in absorbing at least the MAGTF
TACAIR and command and control assets into his command.
The Army component commander would logically be interested
in absorbing the MAGTF ground combat element into his
command.  The synergistic effect we the Marine Corps like
to attribute to our air-ground team may apply as well to
the additive effects these Air Force and Army component
commanders, and the theater commander, might hope to
achieve by organizing theater forces into single land and
air components.  Such "functional" organization, while
having obvious command advantages, is at the expense of
MAGTF integrity and is an anathema to the Marine Corps.
The Corps trains, organizes and functions as a combined
arms team.  Its ground combat elements lack the mobility
and firepower of similarly sized Army elements, and this
requires a dependence on its organic air power for most
effective firepower and force projection.  Additionally,
the expeditionary basis of the Marine Corps in law requires
this type of force structure.  This introduction, however,
is not the place to provide continued justification for the
MAGTF integrity argument.  Let it be sufficient for now to
say that the Marine Corps view is that the integrated MAGTF
in the sustained land combat scenario will better serve the
theater commander than will the additive impact of parcel-
ing its ground and air combat elements to the Army and Air
Force components.  The paper will go into more detail on
this issued by reviewing the "functional" componency issue
in Chapter 4.
     The Marine Corps is not inflexible regarding its
doctrinal stance on MAGTF integrity.  While adamantly
resisting efforts and proposals to sever the MAGTF combat
elements, it does see the potential inefficiency of
employing a MAGTFs tactical fixed wing aviation and air
command and control elements as completely independent and
MAGTF self-serving assets within a theater or joint task
force environment.  It has historically cooperated with,
supported, and even had its MAGTF's under the operational
control of a variety of unified force commanders.  World
War II, Korea and Vietnam each saw MAGTF's employed in
concert with the other Services.  In each period, the
command and control of organic Marine TACAIR was exercised
in a variety of organizational command structures.  What
the Marine Corps generally has perceived as losses of
control over organic TACAIR and diminished responsiveness
to Marine requirements,3 the Air Force has perceived as
necessary, incomplete and grudgingly won assumptions of
more centralized command and control of theater tactical
aviation assets.  In November 1979, the issue was raised
(again) formally and soon became elevated to the JCS and
Heads of Service level.  In March of 1981, the JCS Policy
Statement (popularly known as the "Omnibus") was promul-
                  The "Omnibus" Statement
                         POLICY FOR
     The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander
will retain operational control of his organic air assets.
The primary mission of the MAGTF air combat element is the
support of the MAGTF ground element.  During joint
operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in
support of the MAGTF mission.  The MAGTF commander will
make sorties available to the joint force commander, for
tasking through his air component commander, for air
defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnais-
sance.  Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support require-
ments will be provided to the joint force commander for
tasking through the air component commander for the support
of other components of the JTF, or of the JTF as a whole.
     Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the
Theater or joint force commander, in the exercise of
operational control, to assign missions, redirect efforts,
and direct coordination among his subordinate commanders to
insure unity of effort in accomplishment of his overall
mission, or to maintain integrity of the force, as
precribed in JCS Pub II, "Unified Action Armed Forces
     The Omnibus statement represents an agreement by the
Chiefs of Service as a guiding principle for the employment
of Marine Corps TACAIR in sustained combat operations
ashore.  The Omnibus was promulgated to Marines via CMC
White Letter 7-81 of 29 June 1981.  The White Letter
emphasized the importance of the policy statement and
offered background and elaboration on its substance.  More
importantly, it stressed that only through adherence to the
basic precepts of MAGTF employment, the Omnibus agreement
included -- in training, in joint/combined operations
planing activities and in our proper articulaton of these
precepts -- can the effectiveness of the MAGTF in combat be
realized. 5
     Let's take a look, then, at the Omnibus "agreement"
and evaluate what it says, starting with the title.  It
obviously deals with the "command and control" of MAGTF
"TACAIR" assets, and is restricted to "sustained operations
ashore" applications.  JCS Pub 1 defines the phrase
"command and control" as "The exercise of authority and
direction by a properly designated commander over assigned
forces in the accomplishment of the mission...."  "TACAIR"
is not JCS Pub 1 defined but the White Letter provides that
"Marine TACAIR is construed in this paper as tactical fixed
wing aircraft...."  "Sustained operations ashore" is
undefined but can reasonably be interpreted as restricting
application to MAGTF employments in sustained land combat
succeeding, or in other than, amphibious operations.  The
first two Omnibus sentences affirm agreement on the
organizational integrity of the MAGTF in that the MAGTF
commander will retain operational control of his air assets
and that those air assets' primary mission is the support
of the MAGTF.  "Operational control" is defined in JCS
Pub 1 as synonymous with operational command:
          Those functions of command involving the
          composition of subordinate forces, the
          assignment of tasks, the designation of
          objectives and the administrative direc-
          tion necessary to accomplish the mission... 6
It further relates that it is exercised through the
established chain of command:
     The next two sentences will be evaluated in detail
throughout the paper, principally in Chapter 6, The Omnibus
Reexamined.  For this introduction, let it suffice to
explain that there are two categories of sorties that the
MAGTF commander will "make available" or "provide" to the
joins force commander, "for tacking through his air
component commander" in "support of" the JTF as a whole or
its components.  The first category is unnamed but includes
sorties for "air defense, long-range interdiction, and
long-range reconnaissance."  Air defense is defined in JCS
Pub 1 as:
       air defense--All defensive measures de-
          signed to destroy attacking enemy
          aircraft or missiles in the earth's
          envelope of atmosphere, or to nullify
          or reduce the effectiveness of such
          attack.  See also active air defense;
          passive air defense.7
Air defense sorties in the Marine Corps comprise a defen-
sive portion of its "antiair warfare (AAW) operations."8
If such sorties were provided to the JTF commander for
tasking by the Air Force, the Air Force mission tasking
category would be "defensive counter-air (DCA)," a portion
of their counter-air effort to achieve air superiority.9
I will not even try at this point to evaluate the terms
"long-range interdiction" and "long-range reconnaissance."
While interdiction and reconnaissance are to varying
degrees determinable, adding the phrase "long-range" to
them completely muddles the picture.   In any event, this
first category of MAGTF provided sorties establishes a
foundation of MAGTF support of the JTF in quasi-functional
aviation mission areas which share important character-
istics.  While they would be conducted by MAGTF TACAIR
whether in a uni-service or joint service environment, they
would not generally be executed in "direct support" of the
MAGTF ground combat element.  There certainly are
exceptions to this and the omission of the offensive
portion of AAW is another anomaly -- but, generally, these
are mission areas in which TACAIR provides "general" as
opposed to "direct" support of the MAGTF.  They are, in
other terms, missions conducted whose effects the ground
combat element commander may not see or appreciate (much)
but whose conduct is nevertheless essential.  In the joint
service operational environment, they are missions also
which are conducted against opposition forces and other
targets which often cannot be assessed as directly
threatening to one part of the joint force and not
another.  Is an enemy air strike engaged by MAGTF
fighters or missiles coming at the MAGTF or enroute to an
Army, Air Force or JTF target?  If we knew, should we let
it go by to be engaged by someone else?  Certainly not.
Air defense for the JTF should be provided as an integrated
umbrella for the JTF as a whole.  By the same reasoning, is
the opposing armor concentration at a "long range" beyond
the JTF ground elements of interest or threatening only to
one component or another?  That would indeed be hard to
say.  "Long-range" interdiction and reconnaissance should
be certrally managed for the benefit of the JTF as a whole
and their centralized coordination (minimally) is essential
for mission deconflictions and to prelude redundancy.  The
problems in terminology aside, this category of sorties
provided by the MAGTF commander, in accordance with the
Omnibus, is designed to formalize the MAGTF commitment to
participate in these designated aviation functions when the
JTF commander assumes such responsibility for the JTF as a
whole.  If the JTF commander elects to run a force-wide air
defense campaign, centrally controlled by an air component
commander, the MAGTF will make its air defense sorties
available for that commander's tasking rather than
conducting an independent sector air defense.  The same
premise is extended to the long-range interdiction and
reconnaissance campaigns.  The Omnibus commits the MAGTF to
participation in joint force air campaigns executed with
"pooled" joint force air assets.  The MAGTF receives
general" support from its sortie contributions because the
functional campaigns addressed are conducted for the JTF as
a whole.  By providing sorties for tasking, operational
control of its contributed air assets is maintained by the
     The second category of sorties provided to the JTF
commander by the MAGTF is termed "excess."  The provision
of excess sorties to the JTF commander by all air capable
Service components has long been an uncontested premise of
joint force operations.  Idle and uncommitted force assets
must be made available to support other JTF components
which may be experiencing requirements shortages.  Another
practical and realistic justification of this support for
the JTF is the implied future return of such support
rendered.  Air Force excess used to support MAGTF CAS
requirements on one day makes it realistically easier for
the MAGTF to provide "excess" CAS support to help the Air
Force in its support of the Army the next day.  Navy
excess" bombers provided the Air Force one day may make it
easier for the Air Force to support Navy shortages some
other time.  There are, however, problems with the term and
the subtleties of implementing the sharing of "excess"
sorties.  Again, this introduction will stay superficial.
The MAGTF air planning and tacking process may identify
sorties available in excess of MAGTF requirements and such
sorties will be made available to the JTF commander.  It
should be considered a MAGTF requirement, however, to
provide air defense and long-range interdiction and
reconnaissance to either itself or to the JTF as discussed
earlier.  Excess sorties, then, must be determined as
availability beyond those sorties required in direct
support of the MAGTF and those sorties provided to the JTF
"umbrella" campaigns.  The White Letter's " excess of
MAGTF dorect support: requirements... " phraseology is
troublesome.10  More detailed dicussion will appear in
Chapter 5.
     These distinctive categories of sorties, those pro-
vided to general support air campaigns of the JTF as a
whole and those provided as MAGTF excess, are very
significant contributions to the joint force air effort.
They are distinctive in other terms as well.  The MAGTF
expects equivalent "general" support in return for its
sorties provided to the air defense and long-range inter-
diction and reconnaissance campaigns; the air defense
"umbrella" would cover MAGTF airspace and MAGTF nominated
targets for interdiction and reconnaissance would receive
equitable prioritization.  Such is not the case with excess
sorties.  They are given up for tasking freely with only an
implied expectation of future returned support from other
components when they generate "excess" themselves.  To
confuse the two categories of sorties provided is unaccept-
able and may have potentially harmful implications.
    The Omnibus concludes with a reaffirmation of the
authority of the theater or joint force commander to
exercise "operational control" of his force as defined
previously in this chapter.  This operational control
authority includes functions relating to the composition
and direction of subordinate forces necessary to accomplish
the mission.  Since the Omnibus, I can find but one
reference to the employment of a MAGTF within a JTF
(exercise or operation/contingency plan) which provided for
MAGTF TACAIR sortie contributions of the scope provided for
in the policy statement.  And that's fine.  The theater or
joint force commander has the authority to organize
operations  as he sees appropriate.  Without exercise,
however, the policy will prove difficult to implement.  In
the one exercise, Gallant Knight 82, the MAGTF ACE found
use of JTF air tasking procedures in compliance with the
Omnibus "totally unworkable."11  We obviously need
practice -- and a clear understanding of the Omnibus
                      Purpose and Scope
     The Omnibus is flawed in many ways, making it hard
to understand and difficult to implement.  There is
currently very concerted pressure from the Air Force and to
some extent from the Army to realign JCS Pub 2, UNAAF, to
promote "functional componency" and the severing of the
MAGTF ground and air components -- which would, by the way,
eliminate the need for the Omnibus.  The Joint Interoper-
ability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS)
program is approaching an expected implementation date of
September 1986.  It includes air tasking messages and 
interface iperating procedures which will potentially
provide a major overhaul of current JCS common air tasking
guidance and procedures.  These three factors have reduced
Service impetus to refine the Omnibus and its implied
agreements, and to resolve implementation problems.  Their
focus is now more towards the confrontation over the
service versus functional componency issue and the 
approaching JINTACCS implementation.
     This paper will hopefully serve to resurface the
Omnibus and explain its intent, illuminate its many problem
areas, discuss at least potential corrections and propose
usable implementation procedures using JINTACCS air tasking
     What this paper will not do is to dwell on inter-
service positions of doctrine, command and control or
terminology.  To deal with these areas fully would take
forever.  My emphasis is going to be the JCS policy state-
ment for command and control of USMC TACAIR in sustained
operations ashore; the Omnibus, its meanings, problems and
proposed corrections and implementation procedures.
     As has been discussed already, the Omnibus -- indeed
all interservice efforts -- are troubled and complicated
due to the Services' use of non-standard terminology.
There have been standardization conferences and studies for
decades but essentially the problems remain.  The tradi-
tional alignments by missions et the Marine Corps and Navy
and of the Air Force and Army have promoted standardization
amongst the pairings, but differences still exist even
there.  The terminology problems which shroud the Omnibus
will be considered in greater detail in succeeding sections
of the paper, particularly in Chapter 5, Terminology
Background.  This paper attempts to address the Omnibus
problems, including those associated with language, in a
logical sequence.  It would be impossible, however, to
consolidate the terminology problem discussions any sooner
than Chapter 5.  The reader, then, is asked to take them as
they come and wait until that chapter for a more consoli-
dated review.  Priority will, of course, be given to JCS
Publication 1 definitions.  The Omnibus language and
Service peculiar terminology will be source identified.
     What I intend to do in the remainder of this paper is
consolidate background information on TACAIR command and
control (C2) -- touching on both the Service and joint
force systems, organizations and operating procedures --
and subsequently illuminating peripheral issues and topics
which have a direct bearing on Service perceptions and
principles in their conduct of TACAIR C2.  The paper will
consolidate and compare Service, mainly Air Force and
Marine Corps, terminology as it applies to TACAIR, the
Omnibus and JINTACCS, and then reexamine the Omnibus with
all of this background information in mind.  Before
concluding, I intend also to outline a JINTACCS and JTF
implementation proposal.  JINTACCS will rewrite substantial
existing joint interface operating procedures when imple-
mented in 1986.  This implementation proposal may prompt
more timely Marine Corps' preparation for that evolution.
  Chapter  2  TACAIR C2 Historical Perspectives
  Chapter  3  Basic TACAIR C2 Background
  Chapter  4  Further Background -- other TACAIR C2 issues
  Chapter  5  Terminology Background -- TACAIR, Omnibus,
                                        and JINTACCS
  Chapter  6  Omnibus Reexamined
  Chapter  7  JINTACCS and Omnibus-- implementation proposal
  Chapter  8  Conclusions and Recommendations
                     CHAPTER ONE
     1FMFM 0-1, Marine Air-Ground Task Force (Wash-
ington, D.C.:  Hdqtrs USMC, 31 Aug 79), pp. 1-1 through
     2CMC White Letter 7-81, Command and Control of USMC
TACAIR In Sustained Operations Ashore (Washington, D.C.:
Hdqtrs USMC, 29 Jan 81), p. 1.
     3CMC White Letter 7-81, p. 1, enclosure (2).
     4CMC White Letter 7-81, enclosure (1).
     5CMC White Letter 7-81, p. 1.
     6JCS Pub 1, DOD Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.:  JCS, 1 Apr 84),
p. 263.
     7JCS Pub 1, p. 14.
     8FMFM 5-5, Antiair Warfare (Washington, D.C.:
Hdqtrs USMC, 14 Jul 80), p. 44.
     9JCS Pub 1, p. 93.
     10CMC White Letter 7-81, p. 5, enclosure (2).
     11CG Third MAW message 240039Z Feb 82, Joint
Readiness Exercise Gallant Knight 82, After Action
Report Concerning RDJTF Common Air Taskin  Procedures.
                     CHAPTER TWO
          TACAIR C2 - Historical Perspectives
     Before getting into much detail on current command and
control structures, systems and issues, a short review of
aviation command and control history will be of benefit.
This chapter will look at three major conflicts, World War
Two, Korea and Vietnam, and the aviation C2 structures
and relationships through which theater commanders employed
their multi-service aviation resources.  Keep in mind that
one major area of influence pertinent to command and
control structures and relationships is not directly
addressed -- that of the personalities and convictions of
the commanders involved.  This influence on C2 is
substantial, perhaps even paramount.  To examine it,
however, would require volumes of research.  Instead, the
reader is asked to keep its influence in mind as this and
succeeding chapters are reviewed.  The paper will
occasionally touch on personalities of commanders, but
much like political/Service parochialisms, they are not
subjected to analysis.
                      World War Two
     World War Two provides innumerable examples of variety
in joint and combined forces command structures.  Its
combat zones included maritime theaters such as most of the
Pacific campaigns, continental theaters as in Central
Europe and innumerable combinations of the two.  Experi-
ences gained in this war provided much of the impetus for
the National Security Act of 1947 which reorganized the
defense establishment completely.  It not only brought into
being a separate and distinct Department of the Air Force
in legal status equal to the Navy and Army as departments,
but also established unique roles and missions for the
Services and established, under a joint chiefs of staff,
unified commands in strategic areas.
     The North African theater of operations is very note-
worthy in an examination of tactical command and control.
General Eisenhower, serving as the Commander-in-Chief
(CINC), Allied Forces Northwest Africa, commanded a force
of American, French, and British Corps.  As established in
Army Field Manual 1-5 of the time, doctrine for the use of
air power at the start of the campaign provided that air
support was attached to, and directed by, the supported
ground force commander.  Army formations, therefore, had
supporting air support commands while no overall theater
commander for air was provided.1  Airpower was imple-
mented to support these independent ground operations and
as a result there was virtually no effort to apply
theater-wide air campaign strategies.  The German Air
force was initially able to confront these separate air
support commands piecemeal and decisively maintained air
superiority.  The ineffectiveness of allied air was
recognized quickly as was the major factor in its weakness
-- fragmented command.  A reorganization of all allied
forces in the broad Mediterranean theater was accomplished
at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943.  It estab-
lished Allied Naval, Ground and Air CINC's for the entire
Mediterranean theater, with Air Officers subordinate to the
Mediterranean Air Command for Northwest Africa, the Middle
East and Malta.  The Air Officer/Commander of the Northern
African Air Force had four subordinate commands:  the
Strategic Air Force, the Tactical Air Force, Coastal Air
Force and Troop Carrier Command.  A further look at the
Tactical Air Force reveals that four separate air forces
retained identity under this reorganization.  Three of
these, the American XII Air Support Command, the British
Desert Air Force and the Royal Air Force 242 Group, each
were assigned close support of specified ground forces.2
The fourth, the Tactical Bomber Force, was concerned with
the conduct of a mission equivalent to today's inter-
diction.  This centralized air command structure facili-
tated the application of air power and its inherent
advantage of speed, range and flexibility.  And while the
success of the Allies in North Africa was in no small part
influenced by this more efficient air forces organization,
there were problems in the integration and reduction of
support proferred to the land and naval forces from this
integrated air command.  For instance, in E. Morison's The
Two-Ocean War:  A Shoot History of the U.S. Navy in the
Second World War, the premise is made that Mediterranean
Air Command and Northwest African Air Forces set mission
priorities which resulted in virtually no tactical close
support for the allied amphibious and airborne landings at
the start of the Sicily invasion.3  General Patton often
complained of the low priority given to the close support
of his Army by air.  The "interdiction" mission was quickly
becoming the glamor stock of the Air Corps with a very
high apportionment priority.
     Shifting to the Normandy invasion, the command struc-
ture was the subject of long and hard arguments and nego-
tiations at all levels of Service and national command.  In
general, the most difficult TACAIR related areas of concern
were control of the strategic bomber forces and the
"functional compontent commander" issues.  Two strategic
bomber commands existed for the invasion -- separate and
distinct commands, one RAF and one U.S. -- under the
temporary operational direction of the Allied Supreme
Commander (Eisenhower).  Neither were ever under the Allied
tactical air commander, who himself commanded two tactical
air forces, one RAF and one U.S.  Strategic bomber forces
were withdrawn from Eisenhower's command soon after the
success of the assault.
     After the assault and consolidation phases of Over-
lord, there were further command structure arguments.  The
resulting structure evolved essentially into three pairs of
geographically oriented Army groups and their supporting
tactical air forces throughout all of Europe -- each of the
air commands under Eisenhower and his deputy, British Air
Chief Marshal Teder.  It is of interest to note that;
1) the strategic bomber commands were not in this chain of
command and, 2) the allies retained a separate "air-ground
team," the First Allied Airborne Army, throughout the
remainder of the war in Europe.  This was withheld as a
theater-wide force of opportunity or strategic reserve.4
     The Normandy invasion command structure included an
air (tactical) "component" commander, Allied Expeditionary
Air Forces, over RAF and U.S. Tactical Air Forces.  After
the invasion, Eisenhower decided to act as overall land
forces commander as well as Supreme Commander.  While this
was principally a political decision, it and the avail-
ability of his air-oriented deputy resulted in the
elimination of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force command
and any vestages of an air component commander.  American
airmen at the time accepted the loss gladly because it
served to reduce the pressure on high command levels to
secure strategic bomber assets for tactical support
operations.  The major strategic bombing offensive had
become very important to the Army Air Corps.  They saw this
very publicized campaign as a very impressive influence in
their efforts to ensure that the end of the war would also 
bring birth to a separtate Air Force.  It was also, of
course, important to them because of their belief in the
effectiveness of the strategic mission in contributing to 
the successful conclusion of the war.
     Although not a Marine Corps vs. Air Force confronta-
tion, the African and European TACAIR C2 experiences
continue today to provide fuel to Service perspectives on
joint force command structures.  The same can be said of
the war in the Pacific.
     The Pacific offensive of the allies was characterized
by as many command structures as ther were campaigns in the
progress of "island hopping" operations.  In general, they
necessarily reflected the principles of maritime/naval task
organization to meet the particular circumstances of the
     In the Solomons, the command structure reflected both
Service and "functional" organization.  The Pacific Ocean
Area theater commander, Admiral Nimitz had in Admiral
Halsey, Commander, South Pacific (COMSOPAC), the equivalent
of a sub-unified command. Under COMSOPAC were a variety of
forces including an Amphibious Force Task Force, (composed
of Marine, Navy and Army units), other Naval forces, Army
Forces South Pacific, South Pacific Aircraft (land based
air), and a South Pacific Island Bases command.  In
Guadalcanal, the principle landing force was the 1st Marine
Division.  All aviation units ashore, Marine, Army, Navy
and Allied, were under the Division's commander.  Land
based air from the Army and Navy were under a Navy task
force command and carrier-based and amphibious force
aviation ashore were under their respective force
commanders who were commanded in turn by the Expeditionary
Force task force commander.  Thus aviation resources were
employed in three separate contingents.5
     In the Gilbert Islands campaign against Tarawa and
Makin, the command structure was task organized for the
dual objective islands.  Air continued to be organized for
the tactical situation and to optimize the advantages of
land and sea-basing.
     In the Marianas, air was organized in support of the
campaign in three commands, land based air, a fast carrier
task force in general support of the operation, and
a carrier support group providing air support to the
landing force.  The Army contingent was organized into the
landing force as a whole and did not have Service component
representation at amphibious task force or fleet level.
This and subsequent operations in the South Pacific theater
saw a variety of command structures, all under the ultimate
command of the CINC Pacific Fleet/Pacific Ocean Areas.
     In the Southwest Pacific theater, with General
MacArthur as commander, the command organization reflected
a more complex approach.  At the Leyte campaigns there were
three separate Army components and an Allied Air Forces
command -- with Naval air under Allied Naval Forces,
Southwest Pacific.  Naval carrier groups were employed "in
support of" landing forces while Marine land-based air was
organized under the Fifth Air Force within the Allied Air
Forces command.
     In the Central Pacific, the operation at Okingawa was
characterized by an Army commander of the landing force,
Tenth Army -- including the Marine III Amphibious Corps --
and a Marine commander of its organic tactical air force.
In Southeast Asia the U.S., British and Chinese forces
endured command structures which were "by no means
militarily or organizationally optimal... established to
support unalterable political realities in the theather."6
This is mentioned to highlight yet another influence on
command structures, the political aspect.  One need only
review the current NATO organization for command to see
that it is still an influence today.
      World War II, then, provides historical precedence for
just about any command structure a proponent might desire.
The command of air was centralized and decentralized at a
wide variety of command levels.  Joint air forces were
organized as Service components, geographic forces and
functional elements.  Command structures were influenced by
factors as abstract as politics and commander personalities
and as concrete as assets available, objectives and
opposition forces.  Collaboration, coordination, mutual
support, various "in support of" relationships and total
integration of air forces were used to bring available air
power to bear on the enemy.  Unity of command was found to
be indispensible -- but at which level of the command
structure it should reside was not demonstrated
decisively.  Certainly some organizations worked better
than others, just as some air commanders apportioned and
employed their assets better than others and just as some
air staffs planned their various air campaigns better than
others.  One further item had also become clear.  Air power
had become a decisive combat arm of the commander and to
organize the country's principle air power command as a
supporting organic component of the Army was untenable.  As
separatist air power promoters such as Mitchell, Douhet and
Blunt had been espousing for years, the Air Force needed
separate Service status and the United States was ready to
agree.  In 1947, the U.S. defense estabishment was
reorganized under the National Security Act of 1947.
establishing three Service departments under a Department
of Defense.  The Departments of the Army, Navy (to include
the Marine Corps as a separate Service within the Depart-
ment) and the Air Force were assigned unique responbili-
ties and functions for operations, missions and doctrines.
The Act (as amended) further established under the new JCS
"unified commands in strategic areas."  These were the
evolutionary successors of World War II theater commands.7
      In Korea command and control again became a major 
problem.8  Under the CINC, United Nations Command, were
the U.S. "Unified" Far East Command (FECOM) and the Allies
Command.  Under the FECOM came the Far East Air Force
(FEAF), the Naval Forces Far East (NAVFE) and Far East
Ground Force Command.  This latter command was not initally
activated as the CINC, General MacArthur, commanded FECOM
and Army ground forces.  Under the Ground Force Command,
the Eighth Army and X Corps operated as adjacent commands
untile late in 1950 when the Eighth Army absorded the X
Corps and Genral Ridgewar was given command of all ground
operations in Korea.9  While these command relationships
reflected both regional and functional organization, it was
not a distinct "functional" command structure and this
concerned the Air Force.  Despite FEAF operational control
of Marine air after the Inchon operation by its Fifth Air
Force, NAVFE air operated "in support of" instead of under
USAF desired operational control.  The operational control
argument, and an all important targeting jurisdiction
question, make the Korean TACAIR C2 question revelant to
this background.
     General Stratomeyer, FEAF commander, maintained that
the principle of centralized control of air power in a
theater applied to naval aviation.  NAVFE opposed placing
his air under FEAF for many reasons.  It is interesting to
note the effects of ambigious terminology in this instance,
however, as they reappear in several forms throughout this
paper.  Stratemeyer, of course, requested that FECOM grant
FEAF operaitional control of naval air.  The FECOM response
was to place all aircraft in support of the FEAF mission
under FEAF operational control (the over-land campaign) and
all aircraft in support of the NAVFE mission under NAVFE
control.  That seeined quite reasonable, especially since
there was no naval mission to speak of.  The FECOM guidance
didn't stop there however.  The FECOM directive also stated
that when both FEAF and NAVFL were assigned to a mission
in Korea, FEAF was delegated FECOM's prerogative for
"coordination control".  FEAF wanted this interpreted
as operational control while NAVFE interpreted it as an
"in support of" relationship.10  Despite this interpreta-
tion difference, by mid-1952 most of the coordination of
air operations was concentrated in the Joint Operations
Center (JOC) of 5th Air Force.  This JOC had good NAVFE
representation, as was also the case in the FEAF Targetting
     The targeting issue is one which can be constructively
introduced at this point.  In joint operations, target
prioritization for attack and/or reconnaissance can be a
very political and tactically significant concern for all
commanders.  This is especially so for the ground forces
commanders who are concerned first about the apportionment
of total air to the close air support function and then to
the prioritization of targets they have nominated in the
deep strike and reconnaissance mission categories, versus
those generated by other commanders.  In Korea, coordina-
tion of the deep strike/interdiction and reconnaissance
efforts of the several air forces was attempted through the
establishment of a joint targeting office.  A General Head-
quarters Targeting Selection Committee was created within
the FECOM headquarters, with representation from both FEAF
and NAVFE.  FEAF rankled under this arrangement feeling
that this was a functional usurption of an air component
commander responsibility.  While the FECOM Targeting
Selection Committee continued throughout the war, FEAF's
own targeting committee was gradually staffed with senior
5th Air Force and NAVFE representatives and essentially fed
the FECOM commander targeting recommendations for approval.
The essential points are:  1) that a central targeting
agency is required for joint operations and, 2) that,
regardless of whether it resides at the JTF or air
component level, it must have access to all and the best
intelligence available, must have equitable representation
from all supported elements of the task force, and must be
responsive to both the users and the JTF commander's
     Other Marine Corps concerns in the Korean C2 arena
were immediate close air support (CAS) responsiveness --
often sluggish due mostly to the staggering communications
and staffing congestion into a very large, centralized
operations center -- and a continued unswerving Air Force
insistence on an extremely resource consuming interdiction
campaign, often at the expense of CAS.11  To a ground
commander or the commander of an air-ground team, troops in
contact requesting support are of utmost import -- and when
your organic air is in theater, its simply intolerable to
have it's support not under your control.
     Korea, then, despite the defense establishment
reorganization and Service mission clarification,
demonstrated that  command and control of TACAIR was still
a sensitive, if not problematic, area of concern for the
unified commander.  Command structures were distinctly
simpler and more workable -- perhaps as much due to the
uniqueness of the combat zone and the limited forces
employed than as to applications of WWII experiences and
"lessons learned" or the new Department of Defense.
     Vietnam saw command and control of TACAIR revived as
a Service issue of significant importance.  The rather long
course of the conflict and relatively controlled intensity
of the air war served to make C2 structure and relation-
ships adaptable but also still resistant to change.  The
unified command structure of the theather in its entirety
was complex and cumbersome throughout the war, making it
understandably hard to simplify that of its subordinate
elements.  Many factors contributed to this overall
complexity -- divergent strategic perspectives of
commanders, severe differences in Service rivalries and
conflicting doctrines.  It is not necessary to cover all
these areas, however, as much of the pertinent material has
been developed previously in the WWII or Korean discussions
of this chapter.  TACAIR C2 issues in Vietnam, however,
do add to this historical perspective in several areas.
     U.S. forces were introduced into the Vietnam theater
over an extended period of time, starting as early as 1950
with a small Military Advisory Group (MAG) working with and
through the French.  The role of assigned Air Force and
Army advisors changed significantly after the French
withdrawal in 1955.  The next seven years saw increased
involvement and commitment of both Services to the advisory
and assistance roles and in 1962 the command structure was
reorganized to reflect it.  The Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (MACV) was established as a sub-unified
command under CINCPAC, with subordinate Air Force and Army
commands of the 2nd Air Division Advanced Echelon (of the
13th Air Force, Philippines) and U.S. Army Support Group,
Vietnam, respectively.  This sub-unified command concept
was not favored by all the Services.  The Army and Air
Force, instead, strongly favored creation of a unified
command for the Southeast Asian theater, reporting directly
to the JCS.  CINCPAC, of course, was (and remains) a Navy
commander, while the MACV staff was in all likelihood going
to be heavily ground or Army weighted.  The Service rivalry
lines were apparent and as the MACV staff developed, the
Air Force was allotted the J-2 and J-5 positions, the Army
J-1, J-3 and J-4 and the Marine Corps the head of the
Combat Operations Center and the Chief of Staff.12  As
argued by the Army, MACV leaned heavily towards the premise
that Vietnam was a counterinsurgency theater, primarily a
land war for which the Army held principal responsibility.
     The CINC's of Pacific air forces (CINCPACAF) and naval
forces (CINCPACFLT), in turn, wanted to minimize force
contributions to MACV.  Ostensibly this would enable them
to keep their main elements available for the greater
Southeast Asian contingencies while they could still
provide forces to MACV "in support of" as the situation
dictated.  As Laos air operations intensified, the Air
Force build up in Thailand proceeded rapidly.  As 1965
approached, the theater had a Military Assistance Command,
Thailand (MACTHAI) in operation, predominantly major
elements of the 13th Air Force, and a Navy Task Force
(TF-77) in the Gulf of Tonkin.  All elements remained
under a 7,000 mile distant single commander, CINCPAC, with
major air elements in each of the subordinate commands,
Eventually the situation was further complicated with
the support of B-52's of the Strategic Air Command.
The Air Force had peculiar internal command structure
problems that do not require elaboration here.  These
did, however, further complicate the coordination of the
"outside of South Vietnam" interdiction campaign.  Marine
participation in this campaign was relatively minor (A-6
operations in Laos and Cambodia) and was fully integrated
into 7th Air Force (the outgrowth of tho 2nd Air Division
under MACV) operations.
     The "outside of South Vietnam" interdiction campaign
involved strikes within North Vietnam, Laos and, to a
lesser degree, Cambodia, with the 7th Air Force and the
Navy's TF-77 (carrier air wings) the principle players.
While CINCPACAF, of course, wanted control of carrier air,
traditional Service arguments eventually resulted in the
PACAF/7th Air Force being delegated, instead, "coordinating
authority", expressly not including Air Force operational
control of Navy aircraft, for the air campaign in North
Vietnam.  What resulted was the negotiation of a "route
package" control arrangement.  These geographic areas of
responsibility were assigned based on target density and
importance, component air resources available and range
limitations of carrier air.  It was not an ideal arrange-
ment but rather a compromise approach to a sensitive
command and control issue further influenced by the Navy's
range and carrier operating limitations.  Such geographic
responsibilities made it difficult if not impossible to
adjust an interdiction effort as tactical and operational
situations varied.  This "coordinating authority" was
compromised into a geographic separation of target areas as
his principle means of  "coordinating" the joint air effort
and was at a serious disadvantage in the application of
total available air power.
     Returning to "in-country" operations, MACV in 1965-
1966 was organized into two Army Field Forces, the III
Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), the 7th Air Force and
several other commands.  The U.S. Army, Vietnam, Command
handled administration and logistics for all Army units
in-country.  The structure was a combination of regional
and functional elements.  It is interesting to note that
until April 1966, the CG, III MAF was the "Naval Component
Commander" under COMUSMACV.  When the command U.S. Naval
Forces, Vietnam was created, III MAF was simultaneously
made a uniservice force under the operational control of
COMUSMACV.  Until early 1968, III MAF not only had
operational control of all Marine combat elements but of
significant Army units as well.  Marine air was organic and
was commanded and directed by III MAF in support of I Corps
(northern South Vietnam) forces.  "Excess" sorties were
provided to the 7th Air Force.
     In February 1968, COMUSMACV reorganized the force
structure in I Corps in anticipation of the Tet offensive.
This reorganization also included the decision to give the
Air Operations Deputy, MACV, responsibility for "single
management" of fixed wing aircraft in South Vietnam.  While
the Air Force interpreted this as operational control, the
Marine Corps viewed "mission direction," the phrase used in
the MACV directive, as something certainly less than
operational control.  In 1970, a revised MACV directive
stated that mission direction was "the authority delegated
to one commander (i.e., Deputy COMUSMACV for Air) to assign
specific air tasks to another commander (e.g., CG III MAF)
on a periodic basis as implementation of a basic
mission previously assigned by a superior commander
(COMUSMACV).13  There were further changes in the command
structures as U.S. forces were phased out of country, but
this "mission direction" and "single management" relation-
ship existed until the phase-out was complete... with the
Air Force claiming "operational control" and the Marine
Corps saying "no" but complying with 7th Air Force "mission
     Enough historical perspective.  In the three periods
of conflict examined, air command and control structures
and relationships have varied signficantly.  They have
evolved throughout each of the conflicts as a result of
changes in the tactical sitiuation and force compositions,
unique aspects of the battle theater and a myriad of other
reasons.  Some generalizations can certainly be made.  The
U.S. Air Force is a proponent of centralized command.  It
consistently promotes and even fights vehemently for a
single air commander in "command" of all theater air
assets, including its own strategic assets of SAC.  The
U.S. Navy has not allowed its air assets to be employed in
other than an "in support of" relationship to the overall
JTF air campaign.  It is enthusiastically supportive of
joint force operations but will not release its aviation
arm to Air Force control.  The Marine Corps, as generally
the smallest combat element in a joint operation, often
finds itself in a tenuous position -- with its organic air
assets convetted by the Air Force and its ground element
looked upon as a small maneuver elements of the much larger
U.S. ground force.  The Marine Corps has been flexible, 
adapting to many varied command relationships, and has
generally succeeded in its efforts to retain MAGTF unity.
It has held tenaciously to its "operational control" over
MAGTF organic air.  As was mentioned early in this chapter,
the personalities and preferences of commanders and their
subordinates and their often parochial Service politics,
while not herein emphasized, have and will continue to play
a major role in influencing TACAIR C2.
                       CHAPTER TWO
     1William Moymer, Air Power in Three Wars (Wash-
ington, DC:  Dept of Air Force, 1978), p. 40.
     2Moymer, p. 42.
     3U.S.M.C. Advanced Amphibious Study Group Back-
ground Paper (AASGBP) Service vs. Functional Components.
(Washington, DC:  Hdqtrs USMC, 1982), p. 3-2.
     4USMC AASGBP, p. 3-9.
     5USMC AASGBP, p. 3-1,2.
     6USMC AASGBP, p. 3-11.
     7Roser, H.B., LtCol, USMC, Point Paper 781-84
(Washington, DC:  Hdqtrs USMC, 1984), p. 3, Tab F.
     8Moymer, Air Power in Three Wars, p. 52.
     9USMC AASGBP, p. 3-11.
     10Moymer, Air Power in Three Wars, p. 58.
     11Roser, H.G., LtCol, USMC, Point Paper 781-84,
p. 3-13.
     12Moymer, Air Power in Three Wars, p. 70.
     13USMC AASGBP, 3-17.
                      CHAPTER THREE
               Basic TACAIR C2 Background
     This chapter will examine the TACAIR command and
control (C2) apparatus maintained by the Services, both
inter and intra-service, and to a lesser extent that of the
Unified Command/Joint Task Force (JTF) structure.  It will
also introduce the JINTACCS program's interface operating
procedures -- now in the final stages of development and
certification.  The examination is not going to be in
depth.  It will, instead, touch on the basic structures,
systems and philosophies of the Services and the higher
level command structures under which they can operate.  It
stays principally at the tactical theater and JTF levels
and does not address strategic or national command and
control.  The emphasis on the tactical C2 will intention-
ally be on the Omnibus mission areas -- antiair warfare
(USN/USMC) or counter air (USAF) and offensive air
support.  As the following sections are considered, two
major influences on command and control should be kept in
mind; the personalities and preferences of commanders in
the C2 structures (already mentioned), and the inherent
uniqueness of every conceivable conflict in which they find
themselves engaged.  These two influences have and will
consistently make generalizations arduous, result in
innumerable variations in command and control structures
and procedures, and provide very reasonable justification
for procedural and structural flexibility, adaptability
and, where written guidance is concerned, even non-
specificity (if not ambiguity!).  The authority of a
commander to organize his command as he deems appropriate
is acknowledged and provided for throughout the Department
of Defense.
                      MAGTF TACAIR C2
     The U.S. Marine Corps is a Service under the Depart-
ment of the Navy separate yet closely tied to the U.S. Navy
(Service).  Title 10 U.S. Code, paragraph 5013, states in
part that:
       The Marine Corps should be organized, trained
       and equipped to provide fleet Marine forces of
       combined arms, together with supporting air
       components, for service with the fleet in the
       seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and
       for the conduct of such land operations as may
       be essential to the prosecution of a naval
       campaign.  In addition,...such other duties as
       the President may direct.  However, these addi-
       tional duties may not detract from or interfere
       with the operation for which the Marine Corps is
       primarily organized.
     Marine Corps policy is that Fleet Marine Forces will
normally be employed as integrated air-ground teams, task
organized for specific missions.  These task organizations
are called Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF's) and
consist of command, ground combat, aviation combat and
combat service support (CSS) elements.  Both the aviation
and CSS elements are distinctly supporting elements of the
MAGTF's ground combat element.  There are three basic types
of MAGTF's; Marine Amphibious Units (MAU's), Brigades
(MAB's) and Forces (MAF's) generally built around infantry
battalion, regiment and division-sized landing teams.
Further background was provided in Chapter 1.  The MAB
sized MAGTF is capable of amphibious and sustained land
operations of limited scope while the MAF or larger MAB
sized MAGTF is capable of a full range of combat opera-
tions.  These larger MAGTF's carry with them organic
aviation and command and control resources to provide all
the required functions of Marine aviation; air reconnais-
sance, antiair warfare, assault support, oftensive air
support, electronic warfare and control of aircraft and
missiles.  There is normally only one aviation combat
element (ACE) in a MAGTF and it contains aviation command
and control, combat support and combat service support
units as assigned in its task organization.  Essentially,
the remainder of this section will deal only with the ACE
command and control apparatus as it applies to fixed wing
TACAIR.  It will consider this ACE in support of a full MAF
to realistically discuss a Marine aircraft wing (MAW) sized
air combat element and its full spectrum of aviation
functional capabilities.
     The air combat element of a Marine Amphibious Force
(division or larger ground combat element) is essentially a
Marine aircraft wing -- of which the Marine Corps has four
(one reserve).  A wing-sized ACE employed in combat will
have squadrons of fighter, attack, air refueler/transport,
and observation fixed wing aircraft, detachments of recon-
naissance and electronic warfare aircraft, a variety of
helicopter squadrons, an air control group of communica-
tions, C2, and air defense missile squadrons/batteries, a
headquarters squadron and a support group.  The ACE would
be commanded by the wing commanding general who in combat
operations usually becomes the Tactical Air Commander or
TAC of the MAGTF.  For simplicity, he is referred to
subsequently as the TAC.  The TAC is directly responsible
to the MAGTF commander for the ACE's support of the MAGTF.
Click here to view image
     This wing-sized ACE would be task organized in accord-
ance with its mission and would likely include over 200
fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.  The Air Control Group
would include a Tactical Air Command Center (TACC), perhaps
two Tactical Air Operations Centers (TAOC's), a Direct Air
Support Center (DASC), a battalion of IHAWK missiles,
Stinger missiles and other aviation C2 elements.
     ACE tactical operations are supervised and managed by
the Tactical Air Commander through the TACC, the senior
command and control agency.  The TACC functions:
 the senior MAGTF air command and control
          agency and to establish the operational command
	  post of the Marine Air Command and Control
	  Systems (MACCS) from which the TAC can super-
          vise, direct, control, and coordinate all MAGTF
	  tactical air operations.1
The TACC has a myriad of tasks and duties in this role but
more detail will only be provided as required to support
the discussions in the remainder of the paper.  Essentially
though, the TACC is the "hub" of the many spokes in the
wheel of an extensive Marine Air Command and Control System
(MACCS).  To facilitate the discussions that follow, this
paper will consider the TACC and ACE command element as a
fully integrated ACE C2 center.  Not all wing commanders
may choose to do so.
     Subordinate to the TACC are the agencies TAOC and
DASC.  The TAOC(s) of the MACCS are designed to control
an air defense sector(s), enroute air traffic and air
defense operations, including both aircraft and missiles.
It is the primary source of radar surveillance information
to the MACCS while both the TACC and TAOC(s) are capable of
air track and C2 data exchange with other tactical data
systems, including those of each of the U.S. services and
NATO.  These tactical data information link (TADIL)
exchanges are an essential capability of the MACCS,
expanding its surveillance and control capacity
dramatically.  The role of the TAOC is: detect, identify and control the inter-
	cepts of hostile aircraft and missiles and to
	provide navigational assistance to friendly
	aircraft.  Additionally, the TAOC functions
	as the alternate TACC/TADC when directed.2
     The DASC is the principle air control agency respon-
sible for the conduct of tactical operations directly
supporting ground forces of the MAGTF.  It operates in a 
decentralized mode of operations but is directly supervised
by the TACC.  It coordinates close air support strikes,
assault support, and air reconnaissance missions which
require coordination with fire support means; it dissemi-
nates verbal air track information to Stinger units and
coordinates the distribution of direct air support air
assets assigned by the TACC to terminal control agencies.
It works closely with the Fire Support Coordination Center
(FSCC) of the GCE and is often co-located with that agency.
It does not currently employ organic sensors (radar) or
receive data link information and depends entirely on voice
position reports and other communications to control assets
assigned.  Its role is: provide the means of processing direct
	air support requests, to coordinate aircraft
	employment with other supporting arms, and to
	control assigned aircraft and unassigned air-
	craft transiting their area of control.3
     These are the major MACCS agencies through which the
ACE TAC exercises command and control of his aviation
assets.  An example of their employment will be helpful in
understanding much of the succeeding chapter's material.
     The MAGTF is designed for amphibious operations.  With
the limited amphibious lift available it would, however,
take far too long to realistically put together an
amphibious task force for a MAF sized operation.  In this
example, then, a forward deployed MAU is used to occupy/
seize a lightly defended port city and its medium size
airport.  Amphibious shipping is gathered at U.S. ports to
embark another one "plus" MAB.  While Navy carrier battle
group (CVBG) air and naval gunfire support the MAU ashore,
another "stripped" MAB is flown into the city's airport
and marries up with maritime prepositioned equipment 
being offloaded at the port.  The Marine aviation combat
element's fixed wing assets flight ferry to a friendly air
facility some 200 miles away while the MAGTF's helicopter
assets, are built up through strategic airlift at the local
airfield.  Air Force and Army assets are simultaneously
preparing for deployment and strategic airlift starts
bringing them to friendly facilities adjacent to the
theater.  For the initial week, however, it is a Navy-
Marine Corps amphibious operation.
     Within the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA), the MAGTF
commander is subordinate to the Commander, Amphibious Task
Force (CATF) and is also wearing the Commander, Landing
Force (CLF) hat.  The CATF has operational control of the
MAGTF as a whole, it being a part of the ATF, while the
MAGTF commander exercises command  over the MAGTF elements.
Initially, control of MAGTF air is conducted through the
Navy TACC afloat.  As Marine C2 elements are established,
control authority incrementally passes ashore.  The first
element ashore is normally the DASC and it soon begins
controlling direct air support to the GCE.  In this case,
Navy C2 agencies would be handing off close air support
(CAS), assault support and other direct air support to the
DASC as these aircraft approach the MAGTF's beachhead.  As
soon as possible, the TACC, TAOC and IHAWK elements are
established ashore. The TACC and its subordinate MACCS
agencies remain subordinate to the TACC (Navy) afloat until
they are fully prepared to assume their responsibilities.
The TACC (Marine) ashore is termed a Tactical Air Direction
Center (TADC) until it assumes control of the landward
sector of the AOA, and essentially is "monitoring" the air
operations of the Navy TACC afloat.  The TAOC and IHAWK
elements are integrated by voice and data link into the
amphibious airspace control and air defense networks as
soon as they're operational.  For simplicity, assume that
the TACC (Marine) is operational and assumes control of the
landward sector about the time the ACE's fixed wing
squadrons become operational at the distant friendly base.
Figure 3-2 depicts, then, a MAB (reinforced) sized MAGTF
controlling a force beach head (FBH) within an amphibious
objective area whose over-water airspace is controlled by
the Navy (TADC) and the over-land airspace is controlled by
Click here to view image
     At this stage in the operation, both Navy and Marine
Corps fixed wing aviation support is being provided to the
MAGTF and controlled by the TACC once "feet dry."  While
Marine air support flows directly into and out of the TACC,
Navy air from the CVBG comes to the TACC via the CATF --
although shortcuts may be authorized and/or established.
     The TACC has now assumed responsibilities for the C2
of all Marine air operations in support of the MAGTF,
ranging from deep air support (DAS) to close air support,
and all the other functions of Marine aviation.  The Navy
is protecting the ATF shipping and seaward flank and
supports the landing force/MAGTF as requested.
     The TACC operates two major sections -- one for plans
and one for current operations and is manned by an
integrated crew of the wing headquarters and MACG.  The
planning section is developing expected aviation
requirements from one to several days in advance and
developing in increased detail the ACE's daily air tasking
(or fragmentary) order (ATO).  The operations section is
coordinating and managing the current period's air opera-
tions, executing the ATO, directing air defense operations
and making operational decisions to meet the changing
tactical situation.  The TACC's planning or air tasking
process is of particular importance to this paper.
    The air tasking process can be separated into two
distinct repeditive cycles, preplanned and immediate.  The
preplanned air tasking cycle involves the preparation of an
ATO for a specific future period, usually of a day's
duration.  It, of course, meets air support requirements
foreseen in advance.  The immediate air tasking cycle
involves the rapid reaction to, planning, adjustment for
and fulfilling of air support requirements which develop
on short notice.  It will often involve sacrificing or
delaying preplanned operations to fill higher priority
"immediate" air support requirements.  The emphasis within
the paper will be with the preplanned air tasking process.
     Although a MAGTF commander and TAC may organize the
process as they see fit, the following discussion describes
a realistic procession of the planning involved.  It is
substantially derived from OH 5-3, Tasking USMC Fixed Wing
Aviation.  The preplanned air tasking process begins with
guidance from the commander.  At this point in the example,
it may be the CATF, MAGTF commander or TAC, most probably
all three.  TACC planners naturally hope for general,
"mission oriented" guidance but it may, of course, be as
detailed as the commander(s) desire.  This commander's
guidance is normally called "apportionment."  The term,
however, can apply to several levels of command, depending
on how specific a senior commander is in his apportionment
          Apportionment--The determination and
            assignment of the total expected effort
            by percentage and/or by priority that
            should be devoted to the various air
            operations and/or geographic areas for
            a given period of time.4
It may take the form of a statement as general as "continue
to maintain air superiority and interdict enemy third
echelon assembly areas as possible" or be as specific as
"apportion air effort as follows:  40% anti-air warfare,
40% close air support, 20% deep air support."
     While this preplanned air tasking process is underway,
the TACC is accumulating air support requirements and
support requests from several supported elements.  Since
each day's planning process will usually take place over
several preceding days, the TACC planners are also in
various stages of preplanning for several air tasking
cycles simultaneously.
     The next stage of preplanning involves the translation
of apportionment guidance into total numbers of sorties by
aircraft type available.  This is termed allocation.
            allocation--The translation of the
             apportionment into total numbers
             of sorties by aircraft type avail-
             able for each operation/task.5
     This allocation phase is probably the most complex and
demanding portion of the air tasking process.  To realize
the full potential and effectiveness of available air
resources, and to simultaneously maximize the ACE's con-
tribution to the overall MAGTF objective, requires that
aviation tasks be prioritized and integrated into the MAGTF
commander's  concepts of operations.  Each of the aviation
functions are complementary yet always are in competition
for the use of limited assets.  Planners use three basic
sets of information; the numbers and types of available
resources, the array of targets and operational require-
ments suitable for air operations, and the MAGTF
commander's guidance on threat and air support priorities.6
The TACC planners are of necessity mated with an extensive
intelligence apparatus drawing information from within the
MAGTF and external agencies to provide and evaluate
the opposition.  This threat analysis and the targeting
evolution provide the foundation for combat power require-
ments determination and cannot be overemphasized.  Combat
power requirements are converted to ground and air combat
support requirements and the air support portion is ready
for further refining.  This refinement begins with air
tasking prioritization.
     The requirements to achieve and maintain air superi-
ority are always considered the highest priority.  That may
seem unreasonable to many ground commanders, but the simple
fact is that no other air-ground operation can be conducted
effectively without the air superiority umbrella overhead.
"Dominance in the air battle...that permits the conduct of
operations...without prohibitive interference..."7 is
paramount and the sorties required to achieve and maintain
the required degree of air superiority are essentially
skimmed off the top" of ACE asset availability.  The
Marine aviation function which includes the air superiority
requirement is antiair warfare (AAW), further categorized
into offensive and defensive AAW operations.  Offensive AAW
generally consists of striking into an enemy's rear areas
to destroy his aircraft, air facilities and air defenses
before they are employed against the MAGTF.  This is
potentially the most efficient means of achieving air
superiority but is also quite costly in terms of sorties
required and potential attrition.  The more enemy aircraft
damaged on the ground and the longer his airfields are
inoperable, the smaller his offensive air effort will be.
Defensive AAW, also termed "air defense", is concerned with
minimizing the enemy air offensive through aircraft and
missile interception (active), and camouflage, hardened
defensive positions and dispersion (passive).  The TACC
planners not only allocate into the AAW function but must
also plan the offensie and defensive mix.
     The TAC presents his AAW plan and the remaining sortie
availability to the MAGTF commander and the GCE commander
at an apportionment conference or through some other
expedient means as directed.  The GCE commander presents
his CAS and other support requirements planning.  After
review, the MAGTF commander approves or modifies the AAW
plan and in so doing also detemines the sorties available
for the remaining fixed wing air effort.  This remainder is
essentially dedicated to the offensive air support (OAS)
operations of CAS and DAS (close in meaning to the more
common term interdiction).  The rest of the apportionment
conference deals with the apportionment and allocation of
assets into these mission areas.  Determining the mix of
sorties within OAS is at least as difficult as the AAW mix
determination.  CAS requirements of the GCE may well be
critical -- but some dozens of hours before-hand, they
still are just educated estimates.  DAS requirements are
generated by both the TAC and GCE commanders and often
higher commanders as well.  DAS is potentially a more
efficient manner to engage opposing forces, similar to the
offensive AAW effort, with strikes against massed
concentrations of enemy assets prior to their tactical
deployment.  The TAC and GCE commanders, staffs and/or 
representatives weigh the costs and benefits involved in a
variety of air employment options.  They consider the
impact of ACE surges to provide more sorties, the timing of
DAS strikes, possible adjustments to GCE operations, the
availability of external air support, and the reassignment
of other fire support assets.  Their deliberations deter-
mine the best possible OAS (CAS/DAS) mix.
     After this conference, the GCE commander knows the CAS
effort available and which of his nominated targets for DAS
will be struck.  An apportionment agreement such as this
may well be used for several succeeding tasking cycles with
only mission details changing daily.  The ACE leaves the
conference knowing his allocation of sorties by aircraft
type and number to AAW, CAS, and DAS, and those DAS targets
selected for strike.
     For the GCE commander, his next task is to allot
available CAS sorties to fulfill requirements of his
subordinate ground units and to forward the selected or
tentatively "approved" CAS air support requests to the
ACE.  When necessary requests exceed the allocation,
further adjusting is attempted by both elements.  The ACE
can also request additional support from outside the MAGTF.
     The ACE TACC planners commence roughing the ATO and
wait on the consolidated GCE air support request.  Once the
air support requests are received, external MAGTF (e.g.
Navy) air support is integrated, and the support require-
ments and allocation refined, the planners produce what has
now become the ATO.  Once published and distributed it is
passed to the TACC operations section for execution during
the period covered.  The ATO serves several purposes; it
tasks the  ACE's operational groups and squadrons, is used
by various control agencies to coordinate their activities,
confirms the GCE (or other supported unit) requests and
provides mission details for other sorties provided in
support of the MAGTF from other force components, in the 
example, the Navy's CVBG.
     In this portion of the paper, external air support is
touched only lightly.  It will be covered in greater detail
later in the chapter.  For now, assume that the TAC would
probably come to the apportionment conference with the
MAGTF and GCE commanders with at least a general idea of
what external support will be available.  While the
commanders can consider such support, they will not know
specific availabilities until sometime during the day prior
to the tasking period.
     Before leaving the MAGTF air tasking process two -
further items need be examined; the OAS apportionment for
the MAGTF, and the term allotment.
     Air support in the Marine Corps is of two categories,
preplanned and immediate.  Immediate air missions are those
for which no requirement was foreseen in advance but, due
to the threat posed or importance and fleeting nature of
the target, must be engaged rapidly, most often by divert-
ing preplanned missions.  Preplanned missions are those for
which requirements were foreseen in advance and which allow
for detailed mission coordination, planning and integration
into the supported unit's operations.  In the CAS category,
they are further categorized as scheduled or on-call.
Preplanned scheduled missions are assigned complete mission
details in the ATO to include specified targets and target
times.  Preplanned on-call missions are assigned many
mission details, but due to the anticipated fluidity of
battle, one or more mission details are withheld, usually
including target time and specific target location.  Such
missions are placed on ground or air alert status "on-call"
for certain periods of time.  The distinction between
preplanned on-call missions in execution and "immediate"
missions is often hazy.  If the GCE commander or the TAC
desire, they may put aircraft in alert status for
"immediate" contingencies, in addition  to those preplanned
on-call missions requested by the GCE.  Given the mobility
current potential opposing forces may present, the majority
of preplanned missions may have to be "on-call".  This is
applicable to the paper in that CAS and other OAS requests
are a major element of the "direct support" an ACE provides
to its MAGTF.  It is easy to see that between preplanned
scheduled and on-call missions and a reserve for potential
"immediate" requirements beyond those preplanned, planners
can obligate major portions of available sorties.  TACC
planners must weigh the reduced availability and effective-
ness of all such alert sorties against the flexibility for
contingencies gained when allocating aircraft to alerts.
     The term allotment is used internally to the MAGTF by
the GCE commander in his distribution of CAS and other
OAS sorties amongst his subordinate units.  It must remain
distinct from the higher headquarters use of the term in
the JCS Pub 1 context:
       allotment--The temporary change of assignment
          of tactical air forces between subordinate
          commands.  The authority to allot is vested
          in the commander having operational command.
     For instance, a joint task force commander may allot
the use of several Air Force component sorties to the MAGTF
to fill a MAGTF air support request.  Allotment at the
joint task force (JTF) or unified command level will most
often take this form and is a part of the process termed
common air, or cross-force, tasking.  Before discussing JTF
TACAIR C2 and common air tasking, however, a quick look at
Air Force, Navy and Army TACAIR C2 is appropriate.
                    Air Force TACAIR C2
     The United States Air Force is a separate Service
component of the Department of Defense established by the
National Security Act of 1947 and amendments " perform
prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air opera-
tions."  The primary functions of the Air Force (JCS Pub 2,
paragraph 20402) as apply to this paper include the gaining
and maintenance of general air supremacy, the defeat of
enemy air forces, the control of vital air areas, the
establishment of local air superiority and the furnishing
of close combat air support to the Army, to include
tactical reconnaissance and interdiction of enemy land
power and communications.8  Air Force missions as apply
to this paper include:  counter air (CA), air interdiction
(AI), and close air support (CAS).  These are extracted
from Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Functions and Basic
Doctrine of the United States Air Force.  The central
beliefs of the Air Force for employing aerospace forces
(air power) to wage war (again from AFM 1-1) are:
   1) employ aerospace power as an indivisible entity
         based on objectives, threats, and opportunities
         (p 2-10)
   2) conduct simultaneous strategic and tactical
         actions (p 2-11)
   3) gain control of the aerospace environment (p 2-11)
   4) attack an enemy's warfighting potential (p 2-13)
   5) consider both offensive and defensive action (p 2-15)
   6) exploit the psychological impact of aerospace power
         (p 2-17)
   7) develop a coherent pattern for employing forces
         (p 2-18)
   8) establish one authority for air defense and airspace
         control (p 2-20)
   9) command, control, communications and intelligence
         (p 2-20)
     Inherent in these central beliefs are the Air Force's
premises for an all-encompassing unity of command,
centralized control and decentralized execution, and the
critical importance of the counter-air and air interdiction
campaigns for air superiority and strikes against an
opponent's warfighting potential.  Some further quotes from
AFM 1-1 highlight these premises:
       Unity of command, combined with common
       doctrine, obtains unity of effort by the
       coordinated action of all forces towards
       a common goal.  While coordination may
       be attained by cooperation, it is best
       achieve by giving a single commander full
       Control of the aerospace environ-
       ment gives commanders the freedom
       to conduct successful attacks which
       can neutralize or destroy an enemy's
       warfighting potential.10 air commander must consider ...
       the enemy, the air actions that will
       most clearly deny enemy objectives,
       and the needs and requirements of
       friendly surface forces.11
       While the urgency of enemy actions
       may require direct attacks against
       forces in contact, efficient use of
       air forces should emphasize attack
       in depth upon those targets that deny
       the enemy the time and space to employ
       forces effectively.12
       Although battlefield situations may
       interrupt this plan of attack, air
       and surface commanders must remain
       committed to their coordinated actions
       and must not allow the full impact of
       aerospace power to be diverted away
       from the main objective.13
       Through the process of taking these
       actions, an air commander has specific
       authorities and responsibilities.  As
       a specified air commander, he makes
       apportionment decisions on where the
       overall weight of effort will go.
       As an air component commander, he makes
       apportionment recommendations.14
       As a critical element of the interde-
       pendent land-naval-aerospace team,
       aerospace power can be the decisive
       force in warfare.15
     One may surmise from these and other such statements
that the Air Force as a Service is very enamored with what
it feels are its primary roles in theater tactical warfare
-- air defense and air interdiction -- and that it further
desires command authority over all tactical aviation assets
in a theater to be vested in a single air commander.  It
is, of course, committed and dedicated to providing close
air support as well as to the land forces, but such support
may easily be viewed as a distraction or degrading
influence on its main campaigns of counter air and air
interdiction.  Whether or not these are valid perceptions
is not too important.  That they may exist as perceptions
of the other Services or their components is the relevant
     Anyhow, such premises set the Air Force apart from
MAGTF air combat element TACAIR -- and from the air
elements of the Army and Navy as well.  MAGTF TACAIR
supports the MAGTF as an organic subordinate element.
Every mission it normally flies is in direct or general
support of the MAGTF.  Unlike the ACE, the Air Force often
has its own independent missions and objectives within
the theater.  It may develop and conduct at least major
portions of its counter-air and especially its air inter-
diction campaigns with little consideration of a particular
land force's objectives.  This is mentioned to provide the
reader some distinctions in command and control philosophy
between the Air Force and the Marine Corps -- not to say
that such is wrong.  Once past these philosophy differ-
ences, however, the command and control structures and
systems employed are remarkably similar.
     The Air Force has several major air commands which
organizationally contain tactical air assets.  They would
normally be employed tactically under the existing unified
command structure as numbered air forces.  In a theater of
operations such as Europe, there may, for example, be three
or four numbered air forces established under the Air
Forces, Europe, command.  These air forces would, in turn,
be composed of several wings each with several squadrons of
aircraft.  Wings are usually functionally organized with
fighter (including attack), reconnaissance, airlift or
strategic assets assigned.  For a Marine Corps comparison,
the Air Force wing is similar to a Marine group with
aircraft squadrons assigned.  The numbered air force, then,
is somewhat similar to the Marine Corps wing.  Although air
forces are flexibly sized, a numbered air force operating
in a combat theater would probably be significantly larger
than a MAGTF ACE in regards to fixed wing tactical air-
craft.  To facilitate further discussions in this and
subsequent chapters, the following ACE and Tactical Air
Force (TAF) structures will be used:
click here to view image
Admittedly, both the TAF and ACE are rather large.  The
intent is to portray the potential relative numbers of
TACAIR assets rather than necessarily realistic theater
     The ACE brings with it a command and control apparatus
which had already bean discussed.  The TAF has very
similar C2 apparatus.  One major difference is that where
continuing missions dictate, such as in Korea and Europe,
numbered air forces (TAF's) and their supporting C2
apparatus are already in place and operating.  Although not
as expeditionary as the Marine Corps MACCS, the Air Force
Tactical Air Control System, TACS, is also capable of
strategic mobility.  In the example continued through this
paper, the Air Force TACCS will be considered employed with
a joint task force of one of the unified commands -- for
instance Central Command.
     The Air Force component of this example JTF is the
tactical air force depicted in Figure 3-3.  Within the JTF
command structure, this TAF's commander is then the Air
Force Component Commander (AFCC).  He may wear other hats
but for now this will be his title.  The TAF headquarters
(TAFHQ) element does not contain its own tactical opera-
tions center.  Like the ACE, the TAF/AFCC utilizes his TACS
organization and equipment to plan, direct, control and
coordinate tactical air operations.  The major agencies of
a deployed TACS are discussed below.
     The Air Force TACS discussion should begin with its
Tactical Air Control Center (TACC).  The TACC is the heart
and senior agency of the TACS.  Although the TAFHQ is
distinct, its AFCC uses the TACC as his operations center.
It provides the commander information handling capability
necessary for the centralized control of assigned air
resources, decentralized execution of operations, and
all required coordination and integration of operations
internal and external to the Air Force component.  Despite
the "control" center terminology, its role in the TACS
parallels closing that of the MACCS and its TACC, a
"command" center.  To preclude confusing the two agencies,
when there may be a question as to which is being referred
to, the Air Force TACC will be denoted as TACC-AF and the
Marine TACC, the TACC-M.
     The TACC-AF has several principal subordinate agencies
through which it authorizes decentralized execution of air
operations.  The Combat Reporting Center (CRC) directs
within its area of responsibility air defense operations,
provides aircraft guidance or monitoring for both offensive
and defensive missions, may relay mission changes to
airborne aircraft and coordinates control of missions with
other elements of the TACS as required.  It is the primary
element concerned with the decentralized execution of air
defense and airspace control and is very similar in role to
the MACCS TAOC.  Subordinate to the CRC are one or more
Combat Reporting Posts (CRP's) and, subordinate to them,
Forward Air Control Party (FACP) elements.  These CRP's and
FACP's are supervised by the CRC and provide extensions to
its radar surveillance and control capabilities.  A CRC
might normally be supported by two CRP's, each with two or
more FACP's.
     The TACS will also employ one or more Air Support
Operations Centers (ASOC's) subordinate to its TACC to
coordinate and direct tactical air operations in support
of ground forces.  Normally one ASOC is employed for each
Army corps supported and ASOC's work closely with their
respective Corps Tactical Operation Centers (CTOC's).  The
ASOC is, of course, very similar in function to the MACCS
DASC.  In fact it has only been in the past several years
that the Air Force has transitioned to the ASOC termi-
nology.  As in the MAGTF the ASOC/DASC is the principal
coordinator and director of air support provided the ground
     The TACS has many more agencies, systems and equip-
ments.  The E-3A Sentry, for instance, is an airborne
warning and control system which not only extends radar
surveillance but can also function as an airborne TACC
or CRC it required.  The Airborne Battlefield Command
and Control Center (ABCCC) is an airborne management and
communications element used as an extension of the combat
operations section of the TACC.  The TACC also deals with
its operating wings via wing operations centers (WOC's) --
similar but far more sophisticated (equipment) than she
MAGTF ACE's aircraft group headquarters.  So although the
Air Force TACS is more extensive, elaborate and in some
ways more sophisticated than the MACCS, the C2 apparatus
is far more similar than different, as reference to the
below figure suggests.
Click here to view image
     Internal to the TACC-AF are similar parallels.  The
TACC is made up of three major divisions; plans, intelli-
gence and operations.  As in the TACC-M, the TACC-AF Combat
Plans Division recommends force allocation and develops and
issues the Air Tasking Order.  It, of course, does so with
some sophisticated computer assistance, the Computer-
Assisted Forces Management System (CAFMS).  (Someday we'll
get help too!)  The Intelligence Division both supports
TACC plans with threat assessments collection management
and analysis, and TACC operations as a focal point for time
perishable intelligence collection and reactions recom-
mendations.  The TACC-AF Combat Operations Divison
supervises the detailed execution of daily air operations,
through its subordinate TACS elements.
     In regards to the air tasking cycle and the processes
used to distribute sorties from apportionment guidance into
air missions, the TACC-AF and its TAF commander produce an
ATO much like the MAGTF's ACE, although on a much larger
scale.  The basic steps of apportionment, allocation,
allotment and ATO production are the same.  Some of the
major differences have been touched on previously.  First,
the TAF will normally be the principal air capable
component of the JTF and will have componenet status equal
to the Navy and Army components and, in some command
structures, the MAGTF.  It has its own JTF missions and,   
as concerns TACAIR, is normally responsible for JTF air
defense and the air interdiction campaign.  It will also
normally be assigned to support of the Army component for
close support air requirements.  This is, of course, a
major difference and certainly justifies TAF emphasis on
its air defense and interdiction missions as well as its
support relationship with the Army.  Its air defense and
interdiction campaigns provide "general support" to the
Army and the rest of the JTF and, while the interdiction
campaign will be coordinated to various degrees with the
JTF land forces, it is principally planned by the TAFHQ in
response to the JTF commander's guidance.  One can surmise
that the JTF commander would develop this guidance with
advice from each of his subordinate commanders.  The fact
remains that this sets Air Force air tasking cycle planning
well apart from that of the ACE -- whose total purpose is
doctrinally the support of the MAGTF, and, more to the
point, the GCE's missions and scheme of maneuver.
     This principal command orientation difference also
provides a second major difference in the air tasking
cycle, the interaction between the Air Force planners and
the supported Army planners.  Remember in the ACE and GCE
planning, the ACE skims air defense requirements "off the
top" of available assets/sorties.  What TACAIR remaining is
then negotiated, essentially, by the ACE and GCE commanders
into CAS and DAS -- but in both cases with the objectives
being support of the GCE.  That's, of course, simplistic,
but close enough to use for reference.  Over at the TAFHQ,
however, the planners work vary closely with the expected
and eventual JTF commander's apportionment guidance and,
beyond that, its "close support" relationship with the
Army.  If the apportionment guidance is specific, it may in
effect specify by percentage of effort the sortie support
provided to CAS.  If it's not, then the Army commander is
now in the position of the "supported" commander and must
negotiate his allocation. Again, the JTF commander's
apportionment guidance is influenced by preliminary
recommendations from all of his subordinate commanders.  It
can also be assumed, however, that the Air Force component
recommendations is weighed heavily.  JCS Pub 2 (para 30278)
gives the supporting force commander substantial latitude in
weighing the requested level of support desired.  No
transfer of command or operational control is effected and
the commander of the supporting force ascertains the
supported forces' requirements and takes
         such action to fulfill them as is within his
         capabilities, consistent with the priorities
         and requirements of other assigned tasks.16
It should also be noted that recent negotiations between the
Air Force and Army have resulted in a "Joint Service
Agreement on Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (J-SAK)".
This agreement formally recognizes Army influence on a
portion of the air interdiction campaign termed battlefield
air interdiction which will be discussed in latter sections
of this paper.  The Air Force-Army relationship, like that
of the Navy-Marine Corps, is not simply "in support of".
There is a lot of tradition, history, and "joint" service
doctrine between each of the pairings which goes far beyond
the relationship of supporting/supported services.  As it
applies to the tasking processes, however, the relationship
remains far removed from that of the MAGTF's GCE and its
organic, supporting air arm, the ACE.  The relationship can
be looked at further after a discussion of the Army TACAIR
                        Army TACAIR C2
     The Army is the Service component of the Department of
the Army which has the primary (applicable) function
         to organize, train, and equip Army forces
         for the conduct of prompt and sustained
         combat operations on land -- specifically,
         forces to defeat enemy land forces and to
         seize, occupy and defond land area.17
As is the case with each of our Services, the Army feels it
has a very unique and important mission.
            While the power to deny or to destroy is
         possessed by all the military Services, the
         fundamental truth is that only ground forces
         possess the power to exercise direct, con-
         tinuing, and comprehensive control over land,
         its resources, and its peoples.  Land forces
         thus perform important, and largely unique,
         functions besides denial and destruction:
         landpower can make permanent the otherwise
         transitory advantages achieved by air and
         naval forces.18
The Army, itself, maintains a significant organic air arm
as an "integral part of the Army commander's land combat
forces and as such, is immediately responsive to his
needs."19  This organic air support (principally heli-
copters), however, is not TACAIR as it relates to this
paper.  The supporting relationship between the Army and
the Air Force and other Services providing tactical air
support is one which provides the Army "essential
capability" but
         Other service support, while providing
         an essential capability, requires a
         relatively long lead time in planning
         and may be subject to withdrawal or
         cancellation on short notice due to
         factors over which Army commanders have
         little or no control such as higher
         priority requirements, adverse weather,
         or enemy action.20
Then while "air support operations assist in the attainment
of the immediate tactical objectives" of the Army and
provide "an essential capability", they are not under Army
command.  This section will address the concepts and
organization for integration of air support into the Army's
"Air-Land Battle" philosophy.
     The Army's expeditionary force in a remote combat
theater will probably be one or more corps, each with five
or less divisions.  These corps comprise a theater army
normally commanded by the joint task force's Army (or Land)
component commander.  If only one corps is employed, that
corps commander is the Army component commander.  To con-
tinue the MAGTF and TAF examples, the discussion will
assume two corps each with two or three divisions and
various support organizations.  The Corps tactical
operations center (CTOC) functions as the command and
control center for operations and planning.  Tactical
objectives assigned and assessed by the corps commander are
passed to the divisions for planning and execution.  This
organization is supported by the Army Air/Ground Operations
System (AGOS) which integrates the Army's Air-Ground System
(AAGS) and the Air Force's Tactical Air Control System
(TACS) to provide tactical air support for Army ground
     The Army has in addition to its ground maneuver
elements very significant organic air and air defense
arms.  These elements require C2 structures and apparatus
which are elements of the AGOS but do not relate directly
to the paper.  It is sufficient to note that the employed
Army in the joint force theater has airspace and air
traffic control and air defense responsibilities and
interfaces in the JTF organization.  Further discussion
will emphasize the Army C2 of Air Force (and Navy/Marine
as appropriate) TACAIR support provided.
     The Army component commander exercises command and
control over assigned forces through his tactical oper-
tions center.  TOC's are established at all levels of
subordinate headquarters, down to battalion level.  The
senior TOC, however, establishes a battlefield coordination
element (BCE) to be located at the Air Force TACC.  This
BCE staff agency conducts air tasking, intelligence and
operations coordination with TACC-AF for the Army
           The BCE must be closely linked to
	   the TACC.  The BCE has the LCC's
	   priorities and guidance and pos-
	   sesses the requisite knowledge of
           the situation on the battlefield.
           Collocation and close coordination
           between the TACC and BCE, in
           conjunction with the ACC and LCC
           dialogue, provides the coordination
           mechanism for successful joint air-
           land combat operations.21
(ACC and LCC in this quote refer to air and land component
commanders respectively.)  Through this BCE, the Army
component commander's planning and operational input are
represented at he TAFHQ TACC.  As mentioned previously,
further coordination is accomplished for direct air support
execution processes by the assignment of Air Force air
support operations centers (ASOC's) (USMC DASC equivalents)
at each Army Corps TOC. 
The structure is depicted below.22  
Click here to view image
In the execution of preplanned air support and immediate
CAS, the Army C2 apparatus, in conjunction with the TACS,
coordinates the entrance of tactical air support into
airspace under its control and through its air defense
system.  The co-located ASOC works closely with the Army
corp(s) to filter CAS missions through to terminal
controllers working with subordinate Army units.
     As relates to the air tasking cycle, Army preplanning
input is normally coordinated through the BCE at the TACC-
AF.  In some areas, direct input from the Army component
commander to the JTF commander is made but the BCE, through
the TACC, is normally his representative.  The initial input
is a recommendation for air apportionment for subsequent
operations, based on anticipated Army operations in the
period covered and initial air support requirements in CAS
and certain air interdiction.  This recommendation will
usually be integrated with the AFCC recommendation.  The
apportionment decision and guidance of the CJTF establishes
percentages or priorities of effort for the TAF.  As has
been mentioned before, CJTF apportionment guidance may be
very general and may not break out Army-requested portions
of the air interdiction effort.  If this is the case, Army-
TAF negotiations establish a percentage of the air inter-
diction effort projected for Army requested battlefield air
interdiction (BAI).23  After percentages are agreed upon
for CAS and BAI (and other tactical air support), the Army
component commander is now aware of the approximate sorties
available for the period addressed.  Much like the MAGTF
process, this portion of the cycle may start out as a daily
operation, to support the normally daily ATO execution
period, but over a period of time will probably result in
the establishment of a periodic baseline set of percentages,
with adjustments made as often as are required.  The Army
component ccommander generally then allocates most of
his apportioned tactical air support sorties to subordinate
commands.  This allocation and suballocation may ripple
down well into the component command structure.  Tactical
air support requests (TAR's) for the period are aligned
with the sortie availabilities and the TACS elements at
each of the levels is advised.  These TAR'S are then used,
of course, to develop the TAF's ATO.  One further area
needs to be mentioned.  In the air interdiction category,
Army input will normally be made as early in the process as
possible and is made through an integrated "surveillance-
reconnaissance-attack-assessment" process in which Army
nominated air interdiction targets are prioritized.24
Those interdiction targets which have near term effect and
influence on the operations of friendly land forces, while
not in close proximity to them, are referred to as BAI and
get targetted as the BAI allocation permits.
     This, essentially, is the applicable Army TACAIR C2
background.  With the advent of the Army's airland battle
concept in the past several years, and its emphasis on
corps level operations and deep atack, there has been
increasing controversy on tactical C2 with the Air
Force.  Command and control of operations well beyond the
FLOT/FEBA has long been considered by the Air Force as its
domain.  While some further discussions will touch these
issues, they will be limited to the perspectives of the
paper.  No attempt has been made to cover them all.
                      Navy TACAIR C2
     The Navy, of course, is the larger sister Service of
the Marine Corps within the Department of the Navy.  The
Services are intimately related in their naval/amphibious
functions and also in the aviation procurement and support
areas.  The Navy has a very substantial supporting air arm
which is provided for in law.  The Navy's JCS Pub 2
principal functions are:
         To organize, train, and equip Navy and
         Marine Corps forces for the conduct of
         prompt and  sustained combat operations
         at sea, including operations of sea-
         based aircraft and land-based naval air
         components--specifically, forces to seek
         out and destroy enemy naval forces and
         to suppress enemy sea commerce, to gain
         and maintain general naval supremacy,
         to control vital sea areas and to protect
         vital sea lines of communication, to
         establish and maintain local superiority
         (including air)in an area of naval opera-
         tions, to seize and defend advanced naval
         bases, and to conduct much land and air
         operations as may be essential to the
         prosecution of a naval campaign.
     This paper will not examine Navy TACAIR C2 in any
depth.  There are several reasons for this.  For one, the
Navy C2 systems and apparatus are very analogous to those
already discussed for the other Services.  Its TACAIR
command structure is somewhat simplified due to its usual
consolidation within one or more fixed wing carrier battle
groups (CVBG's).  The CVBG's contain surface and subsurface
ships and embarked carrier air wings.  Navy doctrine
provides for the support of joint task forces as either a
part of the JTF (as its naval component) or through an "in
support of" relationship.  In either case, the Officer in
Tactical Command (OTC) has overall responsibility for
successfully accomplishing the mission of his force.
TACAIR and C2 capabilities of his force are coordinated and
integrated into the JTF without loss of operational control
of any assets.  The air defense and control assets of the
naval force consist principally of innumerable sensors and
missile systems aboard major combatant vessels, the Navy
and Airborne Tactical Data Systems (NTDS and ATDS), the
F-2C airborne radar system and TACAIR of the carrier air
wing(s).  The NTDS and ATDS are compatible with the Marine
MACCS and Air Force TACS allowing tactical data sharing
between components and, depending on the tactical situa-
tion, will often enable the Navy to assume responsibility
for air C2 of the seaward side of the JTF area of opera-
tions.  Navy TACAIR will be employed over land to support
CATF/MAGTF amphibious operations and, subsequently, to
support other JTF objectives as excess sortie availability
     Although the tactical situation may often allow
extensive integration of Navy anti-air warfare operations
into the overall JTF air defense network, the Navy "treads
very softly" when it comes to the integration of TACAIR
in overland operations.  Its TACAIR, of course, must be
primarily concerned with fleet defense and with this in
mind it cannot tolerate any loss of operational control.
It will coordinate land targeting efforts, will participate
in the air tasking cycle and will make excess sorties
available to the JTF commander as possible.  These comments
are based on observations of the author and further
research was not deemed necessary.
	      Joint Task Force (JTF) TACAIR C2
     This section will discuss the integration of the com-
ponent service's TACAIR C2 apparatus under a typical joint
task force command structure.  The discussion will continue
with the example force structure of previous sections and
how they would normally operate together in accordance with
current JCS publications.  It will also look at the U.S.
Central Command Operations SOP (R525-1) as a sample unified
command application and will end with a more detailed look
at the Omnibus as it might be reflected in the air tasking
and planning processes.
     An appropriate starting point would be an overview of
some of the pertinent JCS publications.  JCS Pub 2 is the
foundation for joint force command structures and opera-
tions.  This Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) provides
guidance governing the exercise of command by unified,
specified and joint force commanders.  It provides guidance
for and supports  the intent of Congress in establishing
these commands to provide unitied direction to component
assigned forces -- through this "operational command" by
the specified or unified/joint commander.
     JCS Pub 8, Doctrine for Air Defense from Oversea Land
Areas, prescribes "doctrines and principles governing the
activities and performance" of joint forces conducting or
planning overseas air defense operations.  It provides
broad guidance to the joint force commander for establish-
ing a coordinated and integrated air defense system under a
single commander -- the Area Air Defense Commander (AADC).
This AADC's mission "will be to coordinae and integrate the
entire air defense effort within the unified command."  An
additional joint service publication, (AFM 1-3, FM 100-28,
NWP 17, and LFM 04) Doctrine and Procedures for Airspace
Control in the Combat Zone, is closely related.  It deals
with airspace control while JCS Pub 8 is exclusively air
defense oriented.
     JCS Pub 12, Tactical Command and Control Procedures
for Joint Operations, is a multiple volume publication
which provides guidance for the joint force commander in
establishing command and control procedures for the
coordination of his multi-service organization.  In
conjunction with JCS Pub 10, it goes into great detail on
air defense management.  Of particular applicability is its
Volume IV, Part IV, Chapter 1, "Common Air Tasking."  Until
the probable implementation of revised "joint interface
operating procedures" via the JINTACCS program in September
1986, this chapter will continue to be a principle source
of JCS-level doctrine on joint force air tasking.  It was
revised as recently as December 1982 and now includes as a
"special consideration" the Omnibus policy statement.
     Other joint service publications are pertinent to this
discussion but have been used as background reference in
general -- either noted or referenced in the annotated
bibliography rather than specifically mentioned in the
text.  Among them are the recent bilateral "Army-Air Force
Agreement for the Joint Attack of the Second Echelon
(J-SAK)", several NATO Allied Tactical Publications
(principally ATP's 33 and 40), applicable Naval Warfare
Publication (NWP's) and Landing Force Manuals (LFM's), and,
of course, JCS Pub 1 and its definitions.
     These publications provide guidance for a United
States conduct of warfare in a theater perspective as a
joint service team (of components) under the direction of a
single commander.  This single commander is vested with
authority over each of his component Service elements which
is termed operational command and which is exercised
through his "Service component" (JCS Pub 2) commanders.
The command structure of an example sustained land opera-
tions JTF, subordinate to one of the U.S. Unified Commands,
is provided below.
Click here to view image
     There are enumerable variations possible given the
Service preferences and tactical considerations involved.
The Army may want its JTF component to be the "Land
Component Commander" -- with the MAGTF as a subordinate
element.  The Air Force would probably agree -- but would
prefer the MAGTF split into ground and air elements with
the (Air Force) "Air Component Commander" having the ACE
subordinate to this commander.  The Navy would likely
prefer to be a supporting force, not subordinate to the JTF
at all.  What really matters is the force's unity of
command, unity of effort (e.g., teamwork towards the JTF
mission), and the CINC, Unified Command, and Commander, JTF
(CJTF) concepts of command which in their minds will
optimize those principles.  Joint force commanders are
guided and provided authority over the component elements
in JCS Pub 2.  For the senior Unified Commander:
	    Unity of effort among Service forces
            assigned to unified or specified
            commands is achieved by exercise of
            operational command and administrative
            command organization.25
            These commanders shall have full opera-
            tional command over the forces assigned
            to them and shall perform such functions
            as are assigned by competent authority.26
            ...the commander of a unified command or
            specified command is authorized to....
            Plan for, deploy, direct, control, and
            coordinate the action of assigned
            Within unified commands, operational
            command will be exercised through
            Service component commanders... or
            in some cases through the commanders
            of subordinate commands.28
     The subordinate CJTF exercises "operational control"
over his entire force, synonymous with the Unified
Commander's operational command:
            Operational Command.  Those functions
       of command involving the composition of
       subordinate forces, the assignment of
       tasks, the designation of objectives, and
       the authoritative direction necessary to
       accomplish the mission.  Operational com-
       mand should be exercised by the use of the
       assigned normal organizational units through
       their responsible commanders or through the
       commanders of subordinate forces established
       by the commander exercising operational
     Using the preceding Service examples, the example CJTF
has under his operational control; an Army component
consisting of a field army of two corps and four to six
divisions; an Air Force component of a tactical air force
with several assorted wings; a Navy component of one or
more carrier battle groups under the command of an OTC; and
a Marine component of a large MAGTF as previously
described.  The CJTF has elected to employ the MAGTF as a
"uni-service force" for this example operation.  The
general missions of these components are:  Army -- seize
and occupy designated JTF objectives and destroy opposing
forces in zone; Air Force -- achieve and maintain air
superiority over the landward JTF area of operations,
conduct JTF air interdiction campaigns as directed, provide
direct support to the Army and provide other support as
directed; Navy -- achieve and maintain naval supremacy over
adjacent JTF sea areas, and air superiority over seaward
JTF area of operations; Marine -- seize and occupy
designated JTF objectives and destroy opposing forces in
zone; be prepared to reembark aboard amphibious shipping
and tactical airlift for redeployment within JTF area of
operations.  In addition, the Air Force is designated the
Area Air Defense Commander, the Airspace Coordinating
Authority and will be responsible for the activities of the
Joint Rescue and Coordination Center and Joint Targeting
Panel (to be discussed later).  In the next paragraphs, the
paper will look at the CJTF's operations and intelligence
staffs, emphasizing their impact on and responsibilities
for TACAIR, and the JTF's air tasking cycle.
     When  a  JTF is formed, its commander is normally
augmented with or otherwise forms a joint staff with
balanced representation to all the Services involved.
There is, however, usually no standing headquarters
organizational tables and certainly no established head-
quarters facilities or equipments.  The CJTF accumulates
these facilities and equipment as are required for the
mission and as are available from the Unified Commander's
resources.  Often the CJTF will co-locate his staff and
headquarters with an appropriate headquarters of one of his
assigned components.  For instance, when the JTF mission
involves an amphibious assault, he may co-locate with the
amphibious task force commander.  In a sustained land
combat operation, he may be with the theater Army
commander.  In either case, he may also locate his staff
headquarters far removed from the actual combatant
commands.  It is, of course, his decision, and he will
ensure that required communications are established to
provide for the exercise of command.  For this example, it
is assumed that he is separated from each of the component
headquarters and that he and his staff have enumerable
communication paths to each of his component commanders.
This paper will discuss only two joint staff elements, the
J-3 and J-2.
     His J-3 Operations Staff has ground, air and sea
elements within both their Plans and Operations Sections.
This J-3 staff, of course, directly commands no combatant
joint assets.  It, instead, serves the CJTF for the control
of operations through overall direction, tasking, and
support of the subordinate components.  Much as was
discussed earlier with the TACC-M and TACC-AF, the Plans
and Operations Sections work future and present operations
respectively.  The Plans Section air element also
represents the CJTF in the air tasking cycle.  The
Operations Section monitors and influences as required
current operations, and also responds to component support
requests of an immediate nature.  There are several
pertinent joint agencies that will often be operated
through the J-3.  There will normally be one or more joint
movement control centers that coordinate logistics,
tactical lift, etc., within the JTF.  There currently
(author's perception) is a general preference to make this
an all-modes "movement" control center but as the situation
requires it may also be split into airlift, sealift and
ground transport sections.  There will also usually be a
joint rescue coordination center (JRCC) established to
coordinate and conduct with dedicated assets search and
rescue type operations.  These centers may be established
at the joint force headquarters or charged to a Service
component best able to perform them for the CJTF.  Dealing
exclusively with the air staff sections will be two other
joint agency commanders, the Airspace Control Authority and
the Area Air Defense Commander.  Their activities will
normally be combined under the principal air component of
the force which will normally be the Air Force Component
Commander.  As designated by the CJTF, the Airspace Control
Authority plans, establishes and coordinates the airspace
control structure and procedures for the JTF and ensures
coordination and integration with the Area Air Defense
Commander's JTF air defense structure.
     The J-2 Intelligence Staff is completely joint in all
of its sections (as prescribed in JCS Pub 2 general terms)
and is tasked with assuring the availability of sound
intelligence, considering operations area information and
opposing forces data in their entirety.  It is further
tasked to plan the collection, processing and dissemination
of intelligence as a coordinated effort with minimal
duplication amongst the JTF components.  While the JTF's
Intelligence Staff may have access to national intelligence
sources, it probably has no collection assets of its own
and, instead, receives its information by tasking the
components.  It may be expedient or efficient to centralize
certain intelligence support functions in the JTF.  When
feasible, JCS Pub 2 suggests that such functions should be
charged to the Service component best able to perform the
function.  One area usually considered in this vein is the
master target list(s) of the JTF.  A joint targeting panel
(JTP) will normally be established at the JTF headquarters
or the responsibility charged to the most capable Service
component.  Component interests here are very important and
the "jointness" of the panel must provide for equitable
component representation and weighing of prioritization.
Since this agency deals with targets predominantly for
interdiction and tactical reconnaissance, the Air Force
component will often be charged with integrating its
targeting agency to perform the joint functions.  Component
commanders will nominate targets to the JTP which considers
and adds them to the joint targets list(s), assigns them
priorities in accordance with CJTF guidance, tasks them to
appropriate components for action and performs other tasks
as required to maintain and disseminate to the components a
current joint targets list(s).
     The air tasking cycle of a typical JTF is the princi-
pal subject of JCS Pub 12, Volume IV, Chapter 1, "Common
Air Tasking" and will be used as the primary source for
the succeeding discussion.  This Chapter's purpose is "to
promulgate standard procedures for coordinating the air
effort in a joint operation and to establish a standard
format for the exchange of information during the air
tasking process."30  It is comprised of general pro-
cedures and standard message formats for the air tasking
     Although no longer addressed in the latest JCS Pub 12
revision, the air tasking cycle is conducted within
apportionment guidelines promulgated as often as required
by the CJTF.  Although not necessarily occurring for each
daily tasking cycle, the process begins when the CJTF
solicits and considers air apportionment recommendations
from his component commanders and then issues his
apportionment guidance.  The component responses and the
succeeding exchanges are outlined in JCS Pub 12 as follows:
     Air Employment/Allocation Plans:  are submitted by the
air-capable components to the CJTF.  These plans normally
take the following message format:
click here to view image
The employment/allocation section of the message provides
the CJTF an estimate of the total TACAIR effort of the
component and the excess sorties it expects to produce.  It
takes the form of multiple rows and columns with a row of
data for each type of aircraft (TYP) and successive columns
of total sorties (SA), sorties of defensive counter air
(DCA), offensive counter air (OCA), interdiction (INT), CAS
and other air support missions (SUP) such as electronic
warfare, SAR, etc.  The "EX" column reflects anticipated
excess sorties expected by type aircraft.  This is defined
as "Those sorties, of the total available, by type of
aircraft, remaining after allocation to support the origi-
nating command's mission."  There is also a remarks space
for amplification of each row of data.  The request section
of the message allows the originator to reflect support
requirements unfilled by his assigned air support and, with
other component "excess", forms the basis for any number of
cross-force air support missions later in the cycle.
     The CJTF reviews the component employment plans for
approval or adjustment as required.  He then consolidated
reported excess sorties and preliminary air support
requests and pairs as many of the requests with excess 
sorties as is possible.  The next message in the cycle is
the CJTF's Sortie Allotment Message.
     Sortie Allotment Message:  is sent to all components
in response to their Air Employment/Allocation Plans.  It
is used to approve or adjust these component plans and
allots paired component excesses to other component
shortages/air support requests.  Its format is quite
similar to the preceeding messge.  For each component the
first two sections address support provided and support
received and the third section approves and/or adjusts the
employment plan.
Click here to view image
While in this extract only one component is addressed, the
normal message would contain several iterations of these
sections, an iteration for each component.  In this
example's paragraph A, the Navy component is providing four
CAS sorties to the Army reflecting a pairing between the
Navy's reported excess (support available) and a CAS
shortage reported by the Army (requesting command) and
CJTF's allotment for tasking of the sorties from the Navy
to the Army.  In paragraph B, the Navy component sees that
a DCA shortage reported has been filled by CJTF allotment
of two Air Force sorties which were excess.  In paragraph
C, the Navy has had its employment plans for its E2C air-
craft modified -- a touchy area but one beyond the scope of
this paper.  At this point the components have CJTF-
approved employment plans, know which of their shortages
will be filled -- and by whom -- and, further, which of
their reported excess sorties were allotted -- and to
whom.  Mission details are then passed from requesting
commands to supporting commands via Cross-Force Air Tasking
Order messages.
     Cross-Force Air Tasking Order (ATO) Message:  is sent
by each component who has had a shortage (reported in its
employment plan as a preliminary air request) filled by
CJTF allotment (of another component's excess) to the
component directed to support it in the Sortie Allotment
message.  This message essentially feeds the supporting
component all the air mission data required to conduct the
mission.  While a format is presented in JCS Pub 12, it is
extremely incomplete and is not depicted here.  CJTF's will
undoubtedly promulgate their own standardized formats,
reflecting a compromise between component Service prefer-
ences.  Once the exchanges of cross-force ATO's are
complete, each of the air capable components completes the
tasking process by incorporating the cross-force support
into their internal taskings, publishing its intra-service
ATO and sending a confirmation message to the requesting/
supported component, confirming the support mission(s).
     This is, of course, a very simplified discussion of
JCS Pub 12's "Common Air Tasking."  In schematic terms:
Click here to view image
Several notes are necessary.  The traditional Air Force-
Army air support relationship will normally have Army
participation in the process incorporated via the Air
Force.  Air support provided to Army units by another CJTF
component is often considered, then, as support of the Air
Force vice the Army.  No Army shortages would actually get
into the process unless the Air Force could not fill them.
The same situation would exit for any supported/supporting
relationship established within the JTF, including the
Navy-Marine Corps relationship within amphibious task force
operations.  JCS Pub 12 also offers a timeline of "NLT's"
for these message exchanges.  The employment plans are
transmitted NLT 29 hours prior to the ATO effective period
(e.g., for an ATO period of 0600 3 May to 0600 4 May, the
components employment plans are on the wire by 0100
2 May!); the CJTF's Sortie Allotment NLT 23 hours prior;
component Cross-Force ATO's NLT 19 hours prior; ATO
confirmations NLT 14 hours and; intra-service ATO's
ASAP. 31
     It should also be noted that this is the preplanned
air tasking cycle only and no reference is made to "common
air tasking" of a more immediate nature to cover changes in
the support requirements and ATO's during execution.  The
extensive lead times referenced are not unrealistic, sadly,
and force extensive preplanning by all supported elements
of the JTF.  To better visualize what these messages look
like, the following examples are presented from JCS Pub 12:
Click here to view image
    It can be seen that these JCS Pub 12 message formats
and procedures provide for common air tasking exclusively
through component-provided "excess" sorties.  Other cross-
force support may be derived from establishing supported/
supporting command relationships.  Aside, then, from the
"special considerations" section where the Omnibus
statement is reproduced, there are no provisions for its
implementation.  If the MAGTF was to provide sorties to the
CJTF for air defense and/or certain interdiction and
reconnaissance of forts, the implication might be that these
would be reported as "excess" (EX in the message formats)
or through special procedures developed in the CJTF's
operations orders or plans.  The author has a lot of
discomfort with the application of the term "excess" to
sorties provided by the MAGTF for JTF air defense, inter-
diction and reconnaissance.  Chapter 5 will cover this
area in some detail.  It should, finally, be noted that
the JINTACCS program messages and interface operating
procedures will supercede this JCS Pub 12 process when
approved for implementation.
                 CENTCOM TACAIR C2 EXAMPLE
     United States Central Command (CENTCOM) is an existing
unified command which would probably draw component forces
from each of the military Services in its execution of an
assigned mission.  In support of its various operations
plans, CENTCOM has developed and maintained an SOP for
operations, USCENTCOM Regulation R-525-1.  Appendix 12 to
Annex C (Operations) outlines a unique approach to "common
air tasking" using elements from JCS Pub 12, the Omnibus
statement and other Service doctrine.  A review of this
appendix will provide an example of a unified commander's
authority to exercise operational command of his component
forces as he interprets existing JCS guidance in the TACAIR
C2 and air tasking areas.
     In the general discussion of common air tasking (CAT)
procedures, USCINCENT assumes responsibility for the
execution of the overall air campaign and designates
COMUSCENTAF (the Air Force component commander) as
coordinating authority for air (CAA), an option within JCS
Pub 2, for the purposes of CAT.  The paper will address the
authorities of a coordinating authority later.  For now, be
aware that they include the authority to require consul-
tation but not to compel agreement in (his) coordinating
efforts.  CENTCOM's CAT is defined as "assets of a com-
ponent or supporting command remaining after allocation is
made to support that commander's mission."35  This is, of
course, esentially the same definition as that for "excess"
sorties from JCS Pub 12, without the stigma of the basic
meaning of "excess."
     The CENTCOM CAT process differs from JCS Pub 12 in
several respects.  First, the CINC's air tasking guidance
(apportionment plus other) may include requests to
components to provide additional CAT assets for common
tasking in support of specific operations of another
component.  This is a realistic authority, but is the first
time the author has seen it in writing.  It essentially
allows the CINC to direct a component to create excess
sorties.  Components respond to the CINC's guidance with a
"CAT Plan" (vice an employment/allocation plan).  This CAT
Plan does not include an employment plan of the component
and instead contains only CAT (excess) assets offered and
component shortages (requests for air support).  These CAT
Plans are sent to the COMUSCENTAF (the CAA) as well as the
CINCCENT.  The CAA, with support from component liaison
officers, pairs CAT assets with requests for support,
informs components of the status of their requests, and
returns unused CAT assets to the offering components.
The CAA/COMUSCENTAF then promulgates all common air
tasking in a special CAT section of the COMUSCENTAF ATO.
Intraservice ATO's will be published by the other compo-
nents, exclusive of missions they may be flying under the
CAT ATO.  Component subordinate units would then deal with
both their intraservice ATO and applicable portions of the
     This process eliminates several steps from the JCS
Pub 12 air tasking cycle.  It essentially combines the
Sortie Allotment, Cross-Force Tasking and Confirmation
messages into the COMUSCENTAF ATO and other preliminary
liaisons.  This will require a massive effort at the Air
Force component TACC and will require that all components
receive (and digest applicable portions) a quite massive
COMUSCENTAF ATO.  An earlier version of this process proved
"totally unworkable" to the participating MAGTF in the
RDJTF (predecessor to CENTCOM) exercise Gallant Knight-82,
principally due to magnitude of the TACC-AF effort in
coordinating and producing a timely ATO and deficiencies in
supporting communications circuits.37
     Despite such potential problems, the CENTCOM process
does provide the procedural capacity to integrate and
coordinate component TACAIR in a JTF environment.  It is
the only written guidance the author was able to find
concerning current JTF TACAIR C2 procedures which have
provisions to accommodate the Omnibus statement's sortie
provisions.  The final section of this chapter will look at
the nearly complete JINTACCS character-oriented message
standard program and its provisions for TACAIR tasking.
                      JINTACCS TACAIR C2
     The Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and
Control Systems (JINTACCS) program is a Department of
Defense inter-service standardization program which has as
its goal the development of JTF operations messages and
procedures to improve interoperability among DOD Services
and agencies.  While the program now has several sub-
programs under the direction of the Joint Tactical Command,
Control and Communications Agency (JTC3A), this paper will
deal only with the original aspect of the program, that of
the development of standardized character oriented (tele-
type) messages (COM), voice backup messages, and accompany-
ing interface operating procedures (IOP's) to effectively
utilize the messages developed.  The messages developed in
the program currently cover inter-service information
exchange requirements in a joint task force environment for
the functional segments of intelligence, air operations,
(land combat) operations control, fire support and maritime
     The messages are very structured, detailed and man/
machine readable teletype formats composed of sets and
fields of "allowable" coded data entries.  These regulated
formats will hopefully make Service transitions to
automated message content processing a reality in the not
too distant future.  All Services and participating
agencies are well along towards initial automated
assistance processing capability -- and none too soon.
Following nearly a decade of developmental activity,
certification testing and two operational effectiveness
demonstrations (OED's), the message standards and IOP's are
currently undergoing their final OED in exercise Solid
Shield '85.  Barring unexpected problems in the OED,
Service approval of the standards is expected in 1986 with
a projected JCS implementation scheduled for September of
that year.  If the program succeeds in its intentions,
joint forces will have increased interoperability through
the availability of standardized messages and operating
procedures and machine assisted/enhanced tactical
information exchanges.  The message standards, rules and
data base are destined to become JCS Pub 25, U.S. Message
Text Formats for Joint Operations, while the joint IOP's
will be incorporated into JCS Pub 12.38
     While this paper will review JINTACCS air C2 messages,
especially those of the air tasking cycles, it will deal
more principally with the accompanying interface operating
procedures as they relate to TACAIR C2 and the Omnibus.
JINTACCS messages and IOP's will be the JCS standard
utilized by the joint force commander of the near future
for inter-command information exchange.  As such its review
is very pertinent.  No coverage of maritime, fire support
or operations control is intended and only minor reference
to the intelligence segment is made.
     The future set of joint interface operating procedures
(JIOP) is currently in the format of the JINTACCS Joint
Procedures Training Manual (JPTM) for Service staffing and
use by USLANTCOM in OED '85.  This JTPM will be used as the
principle source for the following discussions.39
     The JPTM contains guidance in consonance with current
JCS Pubs for JTF organization, C2, and CJTF/component
interrelationships and information exchange.  It further
describes each interfacing Service's and agency's command
and control facility.  These procedures, interrelationships
and information exchange requirements closely parallel
those which have been discussed previously in this chapter.
There are some differences and elaborations which will be
highlighted in the following review.
     One of the first major differences which appears is in
the JPTM's discussion of the normal JTF command relation-
ships.  It should be remembered that this final JTPM was
prepared by USREDCOM, a unified command composed prin-
cipally of the Air Force and Army.  With that in mind, the
following is extracted:
             COMJTF exercises operational control
         of all assigned forces through the Land
         Component Commander (usually Army Forces
         Commander), the Air Component Commander
         (usually the Air Force Forces Commander),
         and the Naval Component Commander (usually
         Naval Forces Commander).  (Forces/elements
         from other unified commands and Department
         of Defense/United States Agencies may operate
         either in support of, or under the operational
         control of COMJTF as the JCS may direct).40
As has been discussed previously, this is not in conform-
ance with JCS Pub 2 guidance.  While an option of the
unified commander, the exercise of operational command of
components is "normally" through Service component
commanders.  That note made, the rest of the joint head-
quarters/staff discussion parallels that already presented
in the paper.  Throughout the JTPM, staff agencies and C2
posts are referred to as operational facilities or OPFACS.
As apply to the CJTF headquarters and staff, pertinent
functions are essentially as previously outlined.  The
OPFACS align with the previous discussions as follows:  the
J-3 interfaces as the Joint Operations Center (JOC); the
J-2 as the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC); and the AADC,
Joint Movement Center (JMC) and JRCC remain as previously
discussed.  The JIC description includes responsibility
assignment for the administration of joint targeting
activity.  The component C2 elements have OPFACS aligned
closely with the previous service discussions.
     Although related to command and control of TACAIR, the
paper will continue here to brush over joint force air
defense organization and structure.  The JINTACCS program
essentially left the JCS Pub 2, 8, 10 and 12 procedures for
joint air defense as they presently exist.  Necessary
messages were developed for both current teletype (COM)
exchanges and the voice back-up of data link messages.  The
authority and relationships between the AADC and partici-
pating air defense components remain in consonance with
existing doctrine and procedures.  Joint SAR and "movement"
(or airlift) are addressed extensively in the air opera-
tions segment but do not directly involve the paper's
subject of TACAIR.  The remainder of this section, then,
will look at the JINTACCS air tasking cycles as they apply
to TACAIR and as they diverge from existing JCS Pub 12
     To begin discussion of the JINTACCS air tasking cycle,
several terms need to be examined as presented in and apply
to the JPTM.
             Air Tasking Cycle.  The interrelated
        series of actions that begins with one or
        more requests for the air support and,
        upon approval, culminates in the publishing
        of an intra-Service air tasking order.  Air
        tasking cycles may deal with either pre-
        planned or immediate missions.
             Preplanned Mission.  A mission, in
        response to a preplanned mission request,
        which can be anticipated sufficiently in
        advance to allow detailed coordination
        and planning.  Preplanned missions may be
        further categorized as scheduled or on-
        call.  Scheduled missions fulfill specific
        requirements at a specific time.  On-call
        missions involve aircraft preloaded with
        ordnance in expectation of a particular type
        of mission, placed in an appropriate ground
        alert readiness condition, and then launched
        when requested by the supported unit.
             Immediate Mission.  A mission, in
        response to an immediate mission request,
        which could not be identified sufficiently
        in advance to permit detailed coordination
        and planning.  Preplanned, scheduled and
        on-call missions may be diverted from their
        original purpose to fulfill immediate, high
        priority requirements.41
     These definitions are substantively in agreement with
JCS Pub 1 and Service publications.  They form, along with
the following two terms, the basis for the two major
JINTACCS air tasking cycles and significant variations
             Air Operations in Close Support.  In
        accordance with established doctrine, or
        at the direction of the COMJTF, one air
        capable service component of the JTF may
        be designated to provide air support to
        another service component of the JTF, and
        answer directly the supported service com-
        ponent's requests....
             Cross-Force Support.  This includes
        all sorties flown by air capable service
        components in support of other service
        components of the JTF  It encompasses
        those situations in which the supporting
        service has:
been designated to provide direct support to another
service component (in "close support"), agrees to provide
requested support after approved liaison/coordination is
effected, or is otherwise tasked to provide support by the
     Close support is a JCS Pub 1 and 2 term for a formal
supported/supporting relationship established between
components such as will normally be the case between the
Air Force and Army.  If direct liaison is authorized
(DIRLAUTH) between two components, simplified cross-force
support may be available through such DIRLAUTH.  The COMJTF
(CJTF) may task inter-component support in several ways but
most often this will take the form of CJTF directed sortie
allotments in the preplanned air tasking cycle.
     A review of the JINTACCS messages developed for the
air tasking cycles (ATC's) will facilitate understanding of
the succeeding ATC discussions.
        CJTF apportionment guidance:  no unique
           JINTACCS message exists for this purpose
           but the guidance is noted as part of the
           preplanned ATC.
Air Support Request (AIRSUPREQ):  this message
  is used by components or subordinate units
  to request air support.  It includes as much
  mission detail as possible.  It is also used
  to pass mission data between supported and
  supporting components to add to or otherwise
  change data previously provided.  It will be
  the message counterpart to the current JCS
  Tactical Air Request (TAR) Form.
SARTS:  this "standard air request/tasking
  sets" is not actually a message.  It is,
  rather, a group of standard sets utilized
  within any of the air tasking messages to
  amplify detailed mission data.
Allocation/Request (ALLOREQ):  this message is
  the JINTACCS equivalent to the JCS Pub 12
  Air Employment/Allocation Plan message.  It
  is used by components to pass to the CJTF
  employment/allocation plans, excess sorties 
  anticipated and requested cross-force air
  support (shortages/requests).  The basic
  AIRSUPREQ sets and SARTS are included as
  mission data is available.
Sortie Allotment (SORTIEALOT):  this message his
  the equivalent of the JCS Pub 12 message of
  the same name.  It is used by the CJTF to
  approve/modify component employment plans,
  allot sorties (normally declared excess) from
  one component to another (to fill shortages),
  and passes all available mission data on
  approved cross-force support to the supporting
Request Confirmation (REQCONF):  this message
  is used by a component to confirm cross-
  force support missions with the supported
Alert Launch Order (ALORD):  this message is
  used by a supported component to order the
  launch of supporting component sorties
  placed in ground alert status.
Joint Launch Report (JLNCHREP):   this message
  is used to inform a supported component
  that a cross-force support mission has been
  aborted, delayed, canceled, or launched in
  response to an ALORD.
It should be noted that the USAF has a unique message with-
in JINTACCS which they will use in lieu of the REQCONF.
This is their combination internal ATO and cross-force
confirmation message, the ATOCONF.  It will be received in
lieu of the REQCONF by components supported by the USAF in
the preplanned ATC.
     The preplanned air tasking cycle starts with the
exchange of CJTF apportionment guidance, component
allocation (employment) plan responses (ALLOREQ) and the
CJTF's return allotment message to the components --
as was discussed under the JCS Pub 12 section.  The only
substantive differences in the JINTACCS process at this
point is the much more complete (and structured) format of
the messages.  The IOP also allows for a close support
relationship which impacts, somewhat, on the supporting
component's ALLOREQ.  The supporting component's employ-
ment plan and excess sorties (ALLOREQ) would incorporate
preplanned air support requests of the supported component
-- therefore not offering excess sorties to the CJTF until
all possible requested support was allocated to the 
supported component.
     At this point in the preplanned ATC, supporting com-
ponents, having received tasking in the CJTF SORTIEALOT'S
allotment section, send REQCONF confirmations to the
supported components.  As more detailed mission data
becomes available, it is passed to the supporting component
via AIRSUPREQ messages.  Execution during the tasked period
is in accordance with normal procedures.  The ALORD/
JLNCHREP exchange is used to request and confirm launches
of ground alert aircraft.  Immediate air support require-
ments which develop after the preplanned ATC process is
underway or during the actual air tasking execution period
are supported by a separate process.  Example preplanned
ATC messages from the JINTACCS Technical Interface Design
Plan (TIDP) are provided at the end of the chapter.   
     The immediate air tasking cycle varies significantly
depending on the establishment (or lack of such) of close
support relationships.
     With no close support relationship established, a
component needing immediate cross-force support sends its
AIRSUPREQ message to the CJTF.  The CJTF will normally not
have excess sorties "in his pocket" to apply to such
requests since preplanned excess not allotted in the
period's SORTIEALOT are returned to the offering component.
The CJTF will, instead, use voice circuits or other means
available to inquire from his air-capable components as
to sortie availability.  His negative or positive response
to the requesting component or his positive response and
allotment tasking to a providing component, are formatted
in another message used for this immediate ATC:
	Air Mission Request/Tasking (REQSTATASK):
            this message is used by the CJTF to 
            respond to a requesting component --
	    and to task a supporting component if
	    one is found -- concerning an immediate
            air support request.
A supporting component confirms such tasking with a
REQCONF, or a JLNCHREP if immediate launch of alert
aircraft is exercised.
     Where a close support relationship does exist, a
supported component sends it immediate AIRSUPREQ directly
to its supporting component, greatly reducing the response
time and message traffic involved.
     At this point, no further discussion of the JINTACCS
TACAIR C2 documentation is required.  A REQSTATASK message
example from the JINTACCS TIDP concludes Chapter 3.
Click here to view image
                        CHAPTER 3
     1USMC, Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-1 Marine
Aviation (Washington, D.C.:  Hdqtrs USMC, 1979), p. 49.
     2FMFM 5-1, p. 51.
     3FMFM 5-1, p. 54.
     4JCS Publication 1 DOD Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.:  JCS, 1984), p. 32.
     5JCS Pub 1, p  24.
     6Operational Handbook (OH) 5-3 Tasking USMC
Fixed Wing Aviation (Quantico, Va.:  MCDEC, 1982), p. 1-2.
     7JCS Pub 1, p. 21.
     8JCS Publication 2 Unified Action Armed Forces
(UNAAF) (Washington, D.C.:  JCS, 1974), p. 20.
     9Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1 Functions and Basic
Doctrine of the United States Air Force (Washington, D.C.:
Dept. of the Air Force, 1984), P. 2-8.
     10AFM 1-1, p. 2-11.
     11AFM 1-1, p. 2-13.
     12AFM 1-1, p. 2-14.
     13AFM 1-1, p. 2-14.
     14AFM 1-1, p. 2-12.
     15AFM 1-1, p. 1-3.
     16JCS Pub 2, p. 56.
     17JCS Pub 2, p. 18.
     18Army Field Manual (FM) 100-26 Air-Ground
Operations System (Washington, D.C.:  DOA, 1973),
P. 3-1.
     19Army FM 1-1 The Army (Washington, D.C.:  DOA,
1981), p. 8.
     20FM 100-26, P. 3-1.
     21U.S . Readiness Command Pamphlet 525-8 General
Operating Procedures for Joint Attack of the Second Echelon
(J-SAK), (MacDill AFB, F1:  USREDCOM, 1984), p. 2-5.
     22USREDCOM Pamphlet 525-8, p. 2-3.
     23USREDCOM Pamphlet 525-8, p. 4.
     24USREDCOM Pamphlet 525-8, p. 1-3.
     25JCS Pub 2, p. 6.
     26JCS Pub 2, p. 6.
     27JCS Pub 2, p. 37.
     28JCS Pub 2,, p. 37.
     29JCS Pub 2, p. 36.
     30JCS Publication 12 Tactical C2 Procedures for
Joint Operations (Washington, D.C.:  JCS, 1982), Volume IV,
Part IV, p. I-1.
     31JCS Pub 12, Vol. IV, Part IV, p. I-3.
     32JCS Pub 12, Vol. IV, Part IV, Figure I-2, p. I-9.
     33JCS Pub 12, Vol. IV, Part IV, Figure I-5,
pp. I-13, 14, 15.
     34JCS Pub 12, Vol. IV, Part IV, Figure I-6, p. I-22.
     35USCINCCENTCOM, Operations SOP, Regulation 525-1
(MacDill AFB, Fl:  USCENTCOM, 1984), p. C-12-1.
     36USCINCCENTCOM, Reg. 525-1, p. C-12-2.
     37CG 3D MAW message DTG 240039Z Feb 82.
     38JTC3A "JINTACCS Update", (Ft. Monmouth, N.J.:
JITF, 1984), pp. 1-5.
     39JTC3A "JINTACCS Update", p. 14.
     40USREDCOM Joint Procedures Training Manual for
Message Text Formats (MacDill AFB, Fl:  USREDCOM, 1984),
p. I-2.
     41USREDCOM JPTM, pp. III-41, 42.
     42USREDCOM JPTM, p.  III-42.
                       CHAPTER FOUR
                     Further Background
     There are several issues confronting the Services
which inhibit to various degrees the "jointness" of any
unified action.  JCS Pub 2 gives the commander of a joint
force substantial authority and a wide variety of suggested
command options and guidance.  The potential variety of
missions assigned, forces allotted, threats opposed and
general tactical situations encountered, as perceived by
very different commanders and their staffs, require this
flexibility.  Many applicable issues deal with understand-
able Service desires to influence the joint force commander
in his choices of organization and execution options.  This
chapter will illuminate some of these issues as they apply
to the command, control and integration of joint force
The Push for "Functional Componency" and "Unity of Command"
     Probably the principal issue currently confronting the
Services as relates to the command and control of TACAIR is
the major effort by the Air Force to convince the Services
and JCS that "functional componency" should be the basis
for standard, or normal, joint force command relationships.
As was mentioned in the preface, argumentative papers and
articles for both sides of the issue are abundant.  Air
Force Doctrinal Information Publications (DIP's) 10, 11,
and 12 all treat the issue as do numerous Marine Corps
point papers and a major study produced by the Advanced
Amphibious Study Group.  Rather than argue the Marine
Corps Position, the paper will, instead, outline the
opposing Positions through narrative and extracts from
existing material.
     The Air Force perspective is currently outlined in
publications drafted or revised since 1981 -- the year that
Omnibus was promulgated.  Starting with the April 1981
Doctrinal Information Publication 10, two subsequent DIP's
on the MAGTF and joint command and, most recently, a late
1984 revision to AFM 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of
the United States Air Force, the Air Force has conducted
a very energetic campaign to promote what it terms
"functional componency" within unified commands (in
particular, theater level).  It maintains that only
through the centralized command of all joint force land,
air and sea resources under such "functionally" oriented
commanders, subordinate only to the joint force commander,
can the necessary levels of integration be achieved to gain
or maintain control of the respective operations mediums --
land, aerospace and sea.  It argues that the unity of
command warfighting principle must be applied at the
"functional component" level as well as at the unified
commander level.
From AFM 1-1:
       Unity of command is the principle of vesting
       appropriate authority and responsibility in
       a single commander to effect unity of effort
       in carrying out an assigned task.  Unity of
       command provides for the effective exercise
       of leadership and power of decision over
       assigned forces for the purpose of achieving
       a common objective.  Unity of command, combined
       with common doctrine, obtains unity of effort
       by the coordinated action of all forces toward
       a common goal.  While coordination may be
       attained by cooperation, it is best achieved
       by giving a single commander full authority.
       Unity of command is imperative to employing all
       aerospace forces effectively.  The versatility-
       and decisive striking power of aerospace forces
       places an intense demand on these forces in
       unified action.  To take full advantage of these
       qualities, aerospace forces are employed as an
       entity through the leadership of an air commander.
       The air commander orchestrates the overall air
       effort to achieve stated objectives.  Effective
       leadership through unity of command produces a
       unified air effort that can deliver decisive
       blows against an enemy, dissipate his strengths,
       and exploit his weaknesses.  The air commander,
       as the central authority for the effort, develops
       strategies and plans, determines priorities,
       allocates resources, and controls assigned aero-
       space forces to achieve the primary objective.
       Success in carrying out these actions is greatly
       enhanced by an effective command, control, com-
       munications, and intelligence network.1
The air (component) commander essentially assumes command
of all theater air assets and protects them from attempts
by other commanders to divide air power amongst them-
selves -- to control it when needed for their own missions.
For the greatest good of the combined forces in a theater
of war "There must be a command structure to control the
assigned air power coherently and consistently and to
ensure that the air power is not frittered away by dividing
it among army and navy commands."2  The theater perspective
of warfare is emphasized as is the theme of centralized
        Centralized control is essential to positive
        control of aerospace power.  Centralized
        control is established under a single air
        commander who directs the employment of
        forces at a level of command from which the
        overall air situation can best be judged.3
     When Omnibus was agreed to and promulgated, the Air
Force somewhat hedged on its acceptance of the policy
statement.  It considered the "interim" Omnibus a "first
step" only and soon published a related series of DIP's.
From DIP 10, April 1981:
         The basic organizational tenet of joint and
         combined operations is that one commander
         should control land, sea and air components
         and that the components should act as a joint
         team of land, sea and air forces.
         The principle of centralized control, under a
         single commander, has been derived from history,
         and should be the basis for organizational
         arrangements to joint and combined plans.
         The Marine Corps has inserted uni-Service
         employment into joint and combined plans
         expanding their functions -- roles and
         missions.  Independent USMC operations
         during sustained operations ashore is
         anathema to the functioning of the unified
         command structure as postulated in JCS Pub 2.4
DIP 10 presents Air Force perspectives on joint organiza-
tions in operations plans, historical background on the
differences between the Air Force and Marine Corps on C2 of
TACAIR, rationale for a "single manager for all tactical
air assets within theater of operations" and further
functional componency arguments.  Some further extracts:
	By their nature, aerospace forces have
	broader perspectives than surface-bound
	forces.  From a tactical air stand point,
	this perspective is viewed from the entire
	theater.  Additionally, from this perspec-
	tive all peripheral, attached, assigned,
        and "in support of" air resources must work
	for one air component commander.  This air
	commander is charged with planning for the
	integration of these air assets and ensuring
	their protection as well as employment
	strategy to effectively employ their maneuver,
	firepower, and psychological potential.
	USMC officers assigned to joint and combined
	positions have placed wording in plans that
	restricts the flexibility of air resources
	as they do not view air employment from a
	theater-wide perspective.  Rather they threat
	air resources as highly mobile -- yet fixed --
	artillery; a view that limits the effects and
	effectiveness of airpower.  During combat,
	this decentralized control of air assets
	leads to the inappropriate division of the
	battlefield where the air commander is unable
	to mass his forces in times of necessity --
	offensive or defensive.  The North Vietnamese
	route pack structure exemplifies this in-
	appropriate division where the 7th Air commander
	was unable to mass Air Force and Navy strikes
	for mutual support.5
        To accomplish the theater objectives the
	commander employs his assets through land,
	naval and air component commanders.
	  operational command will be exercised
	  through the Service component commanders
	  (JCS Pub 2, para 30202b).  The component
	  commander, based upon the apportionment
	  decision of the commander, allocates
	  forces to accomplish the theater
	Air Component Commander.  The Air Component
	Commander exercises operational control --
	targeting and tasking authority -- over
	fixed wing air elements.6
     DIP 11 discusses Air Force perspectives of the MAGTF
and the Marine Corps preferences on command relationships.
DIP 12, Command Relationships, is the latest in the series
of related guidance material disseminated within the Air
Force and serves to consolidate and refine their perspec-
tives and policies on the C2 of (Marine) TACAIR:
        "The mission to be accomplished and the
        objective to be attained in accomplish-
        ment of the mission are the two most
        fundamental of all considerations in the
        establishment of command organization.
         ...each commander shall organize his force
         so as best to perform his mission . . . The
         arrangement and groupment of Service elements
         within his force should be sufficiently
         flexible to meet the planned phases of the
         contemplated operation and any development
         that may necessitate a change in plan.
         (emphasis added)
     The Service component methods of command
     used in our  current operational plans do
     not serve this stated purpose.  Instead,
     the organization of our forces is motivated
     more by an attempt to preserve the autonomy
     of the individual Services to direct the
     employment of their own Service forces.
     Consequently, the Air Force has proposed
     (as endorsed by the Army) that we modify our
     current approach to employing joint forces.
     The suggestion to change is based on the
     imperatives of historical military experience
     and the earnest desire to establish the most
     effective structure for unified effort.  It
     is the assertion of the Air Force that employ-
     ing U.S. Armed Forces through functional com-
     ponents (air, land, and naval), rather than
     Service components (USAF, USA, and USN and
     USMC), would establish an improved unified
     employment structure.  Functional employment
     of forces would reduce the complications of
     introducing forces from one theater to another,
     create a structure for the operational employ-
     ment of a multi-Service force under one func-
     tional component, improve the effort to develop
     joint doctrine, and enhance a smooth transition
     from joint to combined operations.7
In presenting historical examples of problems with command
relationships over the period since WW II, DIP 12 finds
     LESSONS LEARNED:  Joint planning and employment
     of forces as Service entities is ineffective,
     inefficient, and does not foster common doctrine.
     When the military action becomes intense and the
     prompt and concentrated use of firepower is
     essential, functional employment of forces that
     crosses Service barriers is the most effective
     method to coordinate and integrate forces towards
     a common purpose.8
It concludes that JCS Pub 2 is ambiguous on force employ-
ment, and needs changing:
     Therefore, the Air Force, with the support of
     the Army, has recommended the following actions:
        - Commanders should normally plan to employ
          their forces functionally.  This is the
          fundamental concept of unified action,
          and JCS Pub 2 must be changed primarily in
          the context of that broad objective (this
          would in no way limit a CINC's authority or
          flexibility to arrange his forces so as best
          to accomplish his assigned mission).
        - Delete the term "Service component" and
          use only the term "component" to describe
          the subordinate commander tasked with the
          operational employment of air, land, or
          naval forces.
        - The exclusive use of components in war-
          time command relationships would help to
          clarify the distinctions between Service
          and component areas of authority and
          responsibility and to implement one of the
          basic intentions of our past leaders in
          drafting and enacting the Reorganization
          Act of 1958.
        - When referring to the tasks within each
          Military Department of administering and
          supporting Service forces, the specific
          (senior Service commander) should be
          referred to in operations plans.9
     While granting that the Air Force can cite historical
examples where joint force integration and cooperation have
been less than noteworthy, the Marine Corps maintains that
the overall argument is flawed in several respects.
     The Service component methods of command
     used in our  current operational plans do
     not serve this states purpose.  Instead,
     the organization of our forces is motivated
     more by an attempt to preserve the autonomy
     of the individual Services to direct the
     employment of their own Service forces.
     Consequently, the Air Force has proposed
     (as endorsed by the Army) that we modify our
     current approach to employing joint forces.
     The suggestion to change is based on the
     imperatives of historical military experience
     and the earnest desire to establish the most
     effective structure for unified effort.  It
     is the assertion of the Air Force that employ-
     ing U.S. Armed Forces through functional com-
     ponents (air, land, and naval), rather than
     Service components (USAF, USA, and USN and
     USMC), would establish an improved unified
     employment structure.  Functional employment
     of forces would reduce the complications of
     introducing forces from one theater to another,
     create a structure for the operational employ-
     ment of a multi-Service force under one func-
     tional component, improve the effort to develop
     joint doctrine, and enhance a smooth transition
     from joint to combined operations.7
In presenting historical examples of problems with command
relationships over the period since WW II, DIP 12 finds
     LESSONS LEARNED:  Joint planning and employment
     of forces as Service entities is ineffective,
     inefficient, and does not foster common doctrine.
     When the military action becomes intense and the
     prompt and concentrated use of firepower is
     essential, functional employment of forces that
     crosses Service barriers is the most effective
     method to coordinate and integrate forces towards
     a common purpose.8
     First, as was recognized in DIP 12, "normalizing"
functional vice Service componency in the make-up of
unified commands at all levels is contrary to the vast
majority of current JCS level doctrine, in particular, JCS
Pub 2.  JCS Pub 2 mentions as a broad objective to be
achieved by the unified commands the "Integration of the
Armed Forces into an efficient team of land, naval, and air
forces."  This, however, is JCS Pub 2's only reference to
"land, naval and air forces" in other than Service related
contexts.  This statement and others like it in various
documents (such as the Unified Command Plan) is interpreted
or at least used by the Air Force to promote an "intent of
Congress" call for functional componency.  It is the Marine
Corps premise, however, that this type statement, instead,
refers to the three mediums in which the Service components
operate.  It is the Services, themselves, which are
"functionally" oriented in accordance with their assigned
functions and responsibilities.  JCS Pub 2 makes repeated
references to the use of Service components as the basic
structure of unified commands while also providing a great
degree of flexibility to the overall unified force
commander -- to plan for, deploy, organize, direct,
coordinate and control his assigned forces.
        para. 30202:  ...operational command will
             be exercised through the Service
             component commanders... or through
             the commanders of subordinate
        para. 30203:  pertaining to the exercise of
             directive authority " not intended
             to:  (1) Discontinue Service responsi-
             bility for logistic support."  and
             administrative support of component
        para. 30205:   Sound command organization
             should provide for:  a.  Centralized
        para. 30213:  Maintenance of Uni-Service
             Integrity.  The command organization
             should integrate components of two or
             more Services into efficient teams
             while, at the same time, preserving
             to each Service its uni-service
             responsibilities.  The commander of
             any force must give due consideration
             to these responsibilities.  Further-
             more, organizational integrity of
             Service components should be maintained
             insofar as practicable to exploit fully
             their inherent capabilities.10
        para.  30215:  As to methods of exercising
             command by a unified force commander:
             (a)  Through the Service component
     Although these extracts relate to the commander of a
unified command, verbage in paragraphs 30234 and 30255
reflect similar authorities of subordinate unified and
joint task force commanders.  Paragraphs 30209 through
30212 also provide guidance for the organizational form of
a command, including area and functional basis.  The author
could quote JCS Pub 2 for pages to support Service com-
ponency at all levels of the unified command sructure.
So, too, is there (lesser) support for the functional
arguments.  The Marine Corps premise, however, is as much
behind preserving the unified commander's prerogative and
authority for composition of subordinate forces as it is
for promoting its preference for Service componency.  JCS
Pubs currently slant heavily towards this Marine Corps
preference in their Service component verbage.
     Secondly, the Marine Corps position is supportable on
a military efficiency and effectiveness level argument.
Service forces are structured and trained to accomplish
their primary missions as established by law and guided by
JCS doctrine.  A joint force commander must know that to
employ and fight forces in a manner other than that in
which they have trained and existed would sacrifice effec-
tiveness.  Communications, despite standardization efforts
at various levels, still exhibit significant Service idio-
syncracies.  Logistics and administrative support to forces
provided to unified commanders are very substantially
Service oriented.  To eliminate the Service component at
any level would severely encumber these Service responsi-
bilities.  The MAGTF organization brings with it a fully
integrated staff, command and control and coordination
networks and systems and combat service support elements.
To split this organization into ground and air elements
would destroy the economies of integration in these areas
and would require extensive reorganization and augmenta-
tion.  The MAGTF entity also provides the unified commander
a unique, independent combined arms force capable of
employment, reemployment and forceable entry anywhere
within his area of responsibility.  To dismember the MAGTF
would destroy that flexibility and capability and diminish
drastically the synergism of the integrated air-ground
     There is also question as to what a functionally
organized component command structure provides when such a
component includes forces of two or more Services.  This
aspect -- the authority and responsibility of, say, the
"Air Component Commander" -- is the heart of the matter and
is not well defined.  The ambiguities in the command rela-
tionships associated with a variety of historically used
"air component commander" terms have existed as long as
joint operations have been conducted.  The Marine Corps
position is accepting of "coordinating authority" for
TACAIR and, as formally accepted in the Omnibus, single
manager/mission direction authority as it relates to air
defense and deep interdiction and reconnaissance.  The
Marine Corps position is tolerant also of the employment of
the MAGTF as a subordinate element of an overall Land
Component Commander.  What is intolerable is the loss of
MAGTF integrity or loss of operational control of any of
its organic assets.  It can accept tasking authority over
designated portions of its TACAIR -- but it cannot accept
an externally dictated TACAIR "weight of effort" deter-
mination by anyone other than the joint force commander.
This weight or priority of effort variable must be reserved
to ensure adequate TACAIR support of the MAGTF.  Its loss
under the suspected "full command" relationship proposed
within "functional componency" is contrary to the essence
of MAGTF doctrine.  It is probably also the essence of the
of the Air Force's ultimate objective in the campaign for
functional componency.  Marine Corps (and Navy) beliefs
maintain that unity of command, unity of effort and
effective joint force integration are achieved through the
designation of a joint force commander with the authority
and responsibilities outlined in the current JCS Pub 2.
     It should also be noted that when the National
Security Act of 1947 (and its subsequent amendments) and
U.S. statutes reorganized the defense establishment, they
not only created an independent Air Force Service, but also
provided that both the Marine Corps and Navy were to have
organic tactical aviation elements within the Services to
support their functions, roles and missions.  The arguments
beyond the basic "functional componency" issue propose that
when such organic Service TACAIR is involved in a theater
of operations, it should be essentially stripped from its
responsible Service -- and placed under the operational
command/control of the Air Component Commander.  Neither
the statutes nor JCS doctrine imply that organic TACAIR was
provided the Services only for their principal functions --
to be (normally?) reassigned to another Service when sup-
porting collateral roles or missions.  JCS Pub 2, instead,
describes various supporting concepts, coordinating author-
ities and attachment options available to the commander.
These will be examined in Chapter 5.
                  Command Relationships
     Although not presented in consolidated form, the paper
has touched on historical, planned and proposed varieties
of employment of a MAGTF within a joint force command
structure.  Each of several of these employment possibi-
lities carries with it one or more potential command
relationships to which the MAGTF and its TACAIR may find
themselves subject.  A brief examination of these command
relationships is the subject of this section.
     The Marine Corps organizes for combat as a MAGTF.
While the major elements of the MAGTF may actually arrive
at or depart from a combat theater at different times, each
element doctrinally remains under the command of the MAGTF
commander.  Within a (non-amphibious) joint force, the
Marine Corps expects above all else to maintain its MAGTF
integrity.  There are, then, two basic command structures
acceptable for the MAGTF within the joint force; one in
which the MAGTF is employed as one of several equal-status
Service components, and one in which the MAGTF is employed
as an element of the forces assigned to a Land Component
Click here to view image
These two options do not consider the Navy-Marine Corps
amphibious relationship (although the MAGTF could conceiv-
ably remain subordinate to the Navy component) nor does it
consider the dismemberment of the MAGTF into separate air
and ground elements as desired by the Air Force.
     In the second case, the MAGTF is probably under the
operational control of the Land Component Commander.  The
capability still exists, although somewhat cumbersome to
exploit, for the CJTF to detach the MAGTF for independent
theater operations.  If the Army force commander is
designated a Land Component Commander, however, the chances
are that the Air Force commander has been designated the
Air Component Commander.  The authorities of these
"functional" componencies as apply especially to other
Service forces in the joint force must be spelled out in
the establishing orders.  While JCS Pub 2 touches on
command organization on functional basis, its guidance is
too general to establish acceptable authority without
extensive elaboration.
     In either case, the roles of the predominant TACAIR
force commander, normally the Air Force component, are a
principal concern of the Marine Corps -- and this paper.
MAGTF TACAIR, through the MAGTF and JTF commanders, will
have a relationship with this air commander.  His roles as
the AADC, the Airspace Control Authority, and coordinator
of CJTF command air tasking (excess) sorties are already
established in joint doctrine.  Omnibus adds to that set of
responsibilities in its implied acceptance of his probable
roles as coordinator of the JTF's air defense, interdiction
and reconnaissance campaigns.  These roles need to be
defined and clearly understood when the CJTF establishes
the command relationships.  Historically MAGTF TACAIR has 
had relationships with such a joint force air component
commander ranging from simple mutual support to complete
loss of operational control.  In very few cases has the
relationship been perceived identically by the MAGTF, CJTF
or Air Force -- and Omnibus does little to correct this
regrettable dilemma.  Chapter 5 will review the terminology
ambiguities which contribute significantly to the problem.
     Applicable Issues Related to Aviation Functions
     Several aviation functional issues impact upon Omnibus
implementation and the integration of designated MAGTF
TACAIR into the joint force air environment and have not
yet been examined.  Some will be addressed more logically
in the terminology discussions of the next chapter; others
will be addressed below.
     Air defense is a principal element of the anti-air
warfare or counter air functions of aviation.  It is, more
than most other aviation functions, intimately related to
and dependent on Service or force command and control
systems.  It is important to distinguish between the "C2 of
TACAIR" and the C2 systems and procedures used to conduct
air defense.  Command, control and direction assume dif-
ferent practical meanings when used in the context of air
defense C2 systems such as the MACCS and TACS.  Essentially
air defense C2 and direction are activities through which
air commanders execute air defense operations through their
C2 and weapons systems.  Air direction is a form of control
in this context which is involved in current operations to
regulate, employ and maintain a balance between limited
assets and priorities.  Air control is the external
direction of the maneuvering of an aircraft in relation to 
another object -- such as a radio or data link instruction
to a fighter being maneuvered to intercept a hostile air
     Service command and control systems, in the air
defense perspective, are highly compatible and mutually
supportive.  They are most often very easily integrated in
a joint force environment through data link (TADIL's) and
voice communication nets.  In most operations or contin-
gency plans and in joint exercises, the Services' organic
air C2 systems are intergrated into the joint force air
defense network in accordance with their capabilities,
capacities and the tactical situation.  Guidance from JCS
doctrine (JCS Pubs 8, 10 and 12 principally) and the force
commander's directives provide both the technical and
operational data to effect this integration.  Service or
joint force introduction into a theater with an already
existing C2 system creates a different situation.  If the
theater C2 system is still operational, the incoming force
may not be tasked to integrate and may, instead, establish
its C2 systems to monitor and probably supplement or back-up
a portion of the overall network.
     The MAGTF will normally do either of these --
integrate into the new or established network or set up
to monitor and supplement the theater system.  The MAGTF
prefers to be assigned an airspace/air defense sector
overhead the MAGTF's (ground) area of responsibility.
MAGTF direct support air operations would logically be
expected to be the predominant air activity within at least
a portion of this area.  The assignment of such a sector is
in consonance with JCS Pub 8.
     Any air defense network depends on integrated sensor
(radar) data shared throughout the total system by each
Service subscriber.  This sharing of air track information
maintains very comparable system's effectiveness despite
different sensor limitations, attritions and down times.
The MAGTF MACCS benefits especially in low altitude
coverage afforded by Air Force AWACS E-3A's and Navy
E-2C's.  The MACCS benefits the TACS and NTDS through its
very diverse TADIL buffers for linking between Service and
allied systems.  Assigning the MAGTF a sector for air
defense/airspace control contributes significantly to the
joint force network and facilities the MAGTF's organic
direct (air) support.
     Air Interdiction is defined in JCS Pub 1 and Army and
Air Force doctrine generally as operations against an
enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear
effectively against friendly forces -- at such distances
from those friendly forces as to not require detailed
integration with them.  The Air Force considers this as a
mission which addresses targets essentially from the Fire
Support Coordination Line (FSCL) out to the limits of
TACAIR ranges -- and also an air campaign for which the Air
Force is responsible.  With the development of the Army's
Air-Land Battle Doctrine, Army interest in the deep battle
has assumed greater tactical priority.  This deep battle --
to destroy, divert, delay or disrupt enemy forces of the
"second echelon" -- obviously includes the air interdiction
campaign as well as Army deep assaults and missile strikes.
Army desire for control or at least greater influence over
the air interdiction campaign, however, is a sensitive
issue to the Air Force.  Enter J-SAK.  In late 1984, the
Army and Air Force concluded an agreement on "joint attack
of the second echelon" (J-SAK).  A principal segment of the
agreement is an Air Force acceptance (re-acceptance?) of
the term Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) as a portion of
the function air interdiction which applies to:
             attacks against land force targets which
        have a near term effect on the operations or
        scheme of maneuver of friendly forces, but are
        not in close proximity to friendly forces. ...
        The primary difference between BAI and the
        remainder of the air interdiction effort is the
        near term effect ad influence produced against
        the enemy in support of the land component
        commander's scheme of maneuver.  BAI attacks
        require joint coordination at the component
        level during planning and may require coordina-
        tion during execution.  BAI is executed by the
        air component commander as an integral part of
        a total air interdiction campaign.11
     The J-SAK agreement on BAI closes a definition gap
in the Air Force reference to ground attack in close and
general support of a ground force.  Interdiction by all
referenced definitions refers either to area denial type
targets such as roads, railways, bridges, communication
centers, supply centers and the like, or to "...the enemy's
military potential before it can be brought to bear...."
This leaves a rather grey area between attacks on closely
engaged enemy (CAS) and those echelons of an enemy not
engaged at the FEBA/FLOT.  Enemy there, although not in
close contact, could be either capable of engaging friendly
forces from longer ranges or could be upon the close
engagement rapidly.  BAI is not a clean gap filler.  The
restrictive air interdiction definition, of which BAI is
supposedly "an integral part....", still requires "no
detailed integration" and talks about a very ambiguous
"distance".  That may be somewhat irrelevant because, in
fact, the Air Force's concept of an "air interdiction"
campaign is far more encompassing than those limitations
might allow.
be discussed and, hopefully, placed beyond concern of the
Omnibus provisions.  These terms are "area of influence"
and "area of interest".  They are proposed for Omnibus
control purposes in OH 5-1.1 and are an integral part of
the Army's airland battle doctrine.  From JCS Pub 1:
        area of interest--That area of concern to
          the commander, including the area of
          influence, areas adjacent thereto, and
          extending into enemy territory to the
          objectives of current or planned opera-
          tions.  This area also includes areas
          occupied by enemy forces who could
          jeopardize  the accomplishment of the
        area of influence--A geographical area
          wherein a commander is directly capable
          of influencing operations by maneuver or
          fire support systems normally under his
          command or control.12
     The Army airland battle doctrine within FM 100-5,
Operations, talks to the area of influence as that within
which the current battle is fought and the area of interest
as an area which must be additionally monitored for enemy
potential that may affect future operations.  The terms are
most often related to potential "time to contact" between
the FLOT and enemy forces located.  The area of interest is
monitored for information which will affect tactical
maneuver and firepower requirements.  Within the enclosed
area of influence, the commander needs to acquire detailed
intelligence and target enemy forces for attack.  Air Force
commentary on these terms defines a corps sized area of
influence as extending out to about a 90 NM radius from the
FLOT and some 40 NM for a division.  The area of interest
extends roughly out to 200 NM for the Corps.
     These terms and distances are very significantly sub-
jective.  They may very well be useful for the commander of
a MAGTF, employed independently or within a CATF's AOA, to
limit and guide subordinate commanders' tactical planning.
Their use by the MAGTF in a joint force environment for
anything but such planning is probably unacceptable.  A
joint force commander with several ground forces under his
command will require the establishment of unit boundaries,
zones or areas of responsibility.  To allow or assign the
subordinate commanders such imprecise, greatly overlapping
and very subjective areas of influence and interest would
serve no practical purpose in that regard.  When organic or
assigned air support is incorporated into the determination
of an "area of influence," that area comes into obvious
conflict with adjacent units.  Its use as a determining
factor in combat responsibilities assignment such as
targeting or airspace control seems to the author
redundant, unmanageable and illogical.  The terms will
only be addressed further in the subsequent proposals to
change OH 5-1.1.
                         CHAPTER 4
     1AFM 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the
United States Air Force (Wash, D.C.:  Dept. of the Air
Force, 1984), p. 2-8.
     2AFM 1-1, p. 4-2.
     3AFM 1-1, p. 4-2.
     4USAF Doctrinal Information Pub (DIP) 10, Back-
ground Information on Air Force Perspectives for Coherent
Plans (Wash, D.C.:  Hdqtrs USAF, 1981), p. 1.
     5DIP 10, Attachment 2, p. 1.
     6DIP 10, Attachment 4, p. 4.
     7DIP 12, Command Relationships (Wash, D.C.:  Hdqtrs
USAF, 1984), p. 1.
     8DIP 12, Attachment 1, p. 7.
     9DIP 12, Attachment 1, p. 9.
     10JCS Pub 2, p. 43.
     11US REDCOM Pamphlet 525-8, p. 2-7.
     12JCS Pub 1, p  34.
accomplishment of the assigned mission.  Control, also from
Pub 1, is authority that may be less than full command.
The connected term "command and control" is the
"...exercise of authority and direction by a properly
designated commander over assigned forces...."  One can
see very subtle differences in even the basic terms.
     Operational command in the military JCS Pub 1 context
             Those functions of command involving
        the composition of subordinate forces,
        the assignment of tasks, the designation
        of objectives and the authoritative direc-
        tion necessary to accomplish the mission.
     It should be exercised through the use of the assigned
normal subordinate organizational unit commanders.  It does
not include such matters as administration, discipline,
internal organization and unit training (unless requested)
and in areas of logistic support of a subordinate it very
often is limited to coordination only.  It, further, is
uniquely applied to the operational control exercised by
commanders of unified and specified commands over assigned
forces.  The terms operational command and operational
control are synonymous in Department of Defense references.
Change in operational control (OPCON), also known as CHOP,
is therefore a change in operational command as defined.
OPCON is, then, also a very authoritative relationship --
one which gives the authority for organization (not
internal to elements), composition of forces, assignment
of tasks and objectives and authoritative direction.
(Although the word "organization" does not apply in the
JCS Pub 1 or 2 definitions of OPCON, JCS guidance has on
several occasions confirmed that such is included in the
authorities of operational command.)  In TACAIR C2
vernacular, this covers planning, appropriate apportion-
ment, allocation, allotment, tasking authority, and the C2
of assigned forces.
     The operational control of the unified commander,
theater commander and other joint force commanders over
assigned forces is not normally subject to misunder-
standing.  It is the relationships between the forces
assigned to such commanders, especially at a joint task
force lever, which are often subject to great disagreement.
The CJTF, for instance, cannot be involved too deeply in
the detailed conduct of land or air operations of his force
and will often delegate authorities and responsibilities to
subordinate Service component commanders -- normally the
commander with the preponderance of such resources.  These
designated commanders may also be assigned distinctive
titles such as "Air Component Commander" (ACC), "Land
Component Commander," or "Coordinating Authority for Air"
(CAA), in addition to their Service component commander
title.  These titles mean little until their authorities
and responsibilities are defined and promulgated.
     Coordinating authority is defined in JCS Pub 1
(and 2):
         A Commander or individual assigned
       responsibility for coordinating specific
       functions or activities involving forces
       of two or more Services .... The commander
       or individual has the authority to require
       consultation between the agencies involved,
       but does not have the authority to compel
       agreement.  In the event that essential
       agreement cannot be obtained, the matter
       shall be referred to the appointing
JCS Pub 2 notes that a coordinating authority is more
applicable to planning than operations but is useful "when
it is desired to coordinate two or more agencies for a
special common task without disturbing normal organiza-
tional relationships in other matters."  "Component com-
mander" is discussed in JCS Pub 2 but leans very distinc-
tively towards the Service component commander application.
The only component-related JCS Pub 1 definition is that of
an Air Force Component Headquarters, a field headquarters
charged with conduct of Air Force operations.  The terms
air and land component commander are not JCS defined.
     Attachment as a command relationship is similar to
"coordinating authority" in that it is not defined in it
self.  Within JCS Pub 1, attachment is the placement of a
unit(s) or personnel in an organization on a temporary
nature.  The authority of the receiving organization is
subject to limitations imposed by the attachment order.
If none are stated, the receiving organization exercises     
command and control over the attachment to the same degree
as his organic assets (less, normally, personnel tranfers   
and promotions).  JCS Pub 2 grants authority over and
responsibility for the attachment only as provided in the 
attachment order, and to require compliance to applicable
reseiving command general regulations.  Attached units must   
have their command relationships and responsibilities
delineated in the attachment order.
     The relationship between the joint force commander and
his immediate subordinate commands is OPCON.  Relationships
below that level involving different Services need to be
clearly delineated in the establishment order.  The title
Air Component Commander means little unless the command
structure and relationships are well defined.  The title
Coordinating Authority for Air means little unless the
"specific functions or activities," and the participants
are clearly delineated.  Unless the term OPCON is used to
define the relationship, the relationship is something less
than that and needs definition.  Of particular conern to
the MAGTF commander will be command relationship descrip-
tions and definitions which use terms like air component
commander, single manager, and tasking authority -- as
these very often are construed and used by the Air Force
as OPCON -- and are sufficiently ambiguous to possibly
authorize directing of priorities or weights of effort.
    Support relationships are also used in TACAIR C2.
Support from JCS Pubs 1 and 2 is "the action of a force
that aids, protects, complements or sustains another force
in accordance with a directive requiring such action."7
Supporting relationships do not effect a transfer of
command or operational control.  There are several
different types of support, first from JCS Pub 1:
            General support is that support which is
        given to the supported force as a whole and
        not to any particular subdivision thereof.8
            Close support is that action of the sup-
        porting force against targets or objectives
        which are sufficiently near the supported
        force as to require detailed integration or
        coordination of the supporting action with
        the fire, movement, or other actions of the
        supported force.9
            Mutual support is that support that units
        render each other against an enemy, because
        of their assigned tasks, their position
        relative to each other and to the enemy, and
        their inherent capabilities.10
JCS Pub 2 elaborates on these definitions.  Mutual support
is planned to facilitate attainment of common objectives --
but may also help with separate objectives of the forces.
A joint force commander can direct mutual support and
coordinate that support through joint planning and other
liaisons.  JCS Pub 2 continues in its discussion of general
support to reflect that a supporting force in "general
support" of another should have described in the establish-
ing directive the purpose and scope of action taken.  It
may also include the strength to be allocated in support
and further coordinating instructions.  In its discussions
of a "close support" relationship, it relates that the
supported force will exercise general direction of the
supporting effort within acceptable practices of the
Service of the supporting force -- to include designation
of objectives or targets, timing and duration of the
supporting action.11, In each of these support relation-
ships, the supported force commander is required to
indicate in detail the support missions desired and all
necessary coordinating information.  The supporting force
commander is required to take such necessary action to fill
the desired missions, consistent with the priorities and
requirements of other assigned tasks.  The supporting force
commander normally prescribes his own tactics and the
strength to be committed to the support action unless it
is directed in the establishing directive.12
     Interestingly (to the author), the term direct support
is not mentioned in JCS Pub 2.  It's JCS Pub 1 definition:
            A mission requiring a force to support
        another specific force and authorizing it
        to answer directly the supported force's
        request for assistance.13
Although many consider "direct support" to be an artillery
mission, the JCS Pub 1 in no way restricts it to such --
as it does for other types of artillery missions.  As
applies to TACAIR C2, direct support appears to be a much
cleaner and more appropriate counterpart to general support
than "close support."  The close support definition
actually implies that forces need to be within an estab-
lished "close support" relationship to fly CAS cross-force.
The author sees no value to the JCS Pub 2 descriptions of
close support given the accompanying caveat statements
concerning responsibilities and prerogatives of supporting
     Before moving into air mission terminology, a review
of applicable Service use of stated support terms is
     "Direct support" is used none other than within
Omnibus:  "Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support
requirements will be provided to the Joint Force
Commander...."  It is important to note that direct
support as a command relationship requires a force to
support another and is authorized to answer directly the
supported force's requests -- but support provided does
not have to be in direct response to a supported force's
request to be termed direct support.  Certain sorties of
such general support missions as AI or air defense may in
some situations become direct support due to, for instance,
the location of a target or an air intercept.  General
support is used in the recently Published J-SAK operating
procedures pamphlet for joint attack of the second echelon:
             From the air perspective, close combat
       and general support are provided to land
       forces to win the battle.... General support
       is provided by interdicting the enemy's combat
       power... and by attaining and maintaining air
       superiority.  General support attack missions
       are provided by...air interdiction (AI) and
       counter air (CA).14
This is a consistent application of the general support
definition.  It follows that joint force SAR, tactical
airlift and tactical air reconnaissance provided as support
to the joint force as a whole are all conceptually "general
support", although such missions may be principally flown
in direct support of requesting components.  The author has
used this direct and general support thrust in previous
work on TACAIR C2 and will use it significantly in the
remainder of the paper.
                  Air Mission Terminology
     Both Air Force and Marine Corps tactical air opera-
tions doctrine direct the overall functions and missions of
TACAIR into distinct functional air mission categories.
Service function and mission breakouts are similar in many
respects.  Air Force terminology is shared by the Army while
Navy doctrine is similar to that of the Marine Corps.
Click here to view image
NOTE: Endnotes will not be used in the following section.
Due to the expected need of a reader to know from where
the definitions are coming as the material is read, the
reference and page numbers are included in the text.
   Figure 5-1 is a fairly close alignment of fixed wing
TACAIR functions and missions of the Marine Corps and Air
Force.  The alignment, is tenuous because of unique terms,
different applications and slants of terms, and the
continuing and often piecemeal evolution and reorgani-
zation of Service documentation.  There are basically two
aspects of these functions and missions which are used
(inconsistently) to organize the terms -- the nature of the
support they provide to friendly ground forces (not the
nature of the support relationship between them) and the
degree of integration (and/or coordination) required with
these ground forces.
     The antiair warfare and counter air functions of the
Services are very closely aligned and aside from the
terminology titles and the placement of SEAD, the Service
breakouts are essentially equivalent.  Note, however, that
"Air Defense" is only a portion of the AAW or CA effort.
This will be examined in respect to Omnibus later in the
     The alignment problems in the lower half of Figure 5-1
are extensive.  The definitions used are prioritized in
order of JCS Pub 1 or most senior or recent Service docu-
mentation unless otherwise noted:
       Air Interdiction:
       Air operations conducted to destory,
           neutralize, or delay the enemy's
           military potential before it can
           be brought to bear effectively
           against friendly forces, at such
           distance from friendly forces that
           detailed integration of each air
           mission with the fire and movement
           of friendly forces is not required.
                           (JCS Pub 1, p. 18)
     This is a major function of aviation for the Air
Force.  It is the major part of the Marine Corps' deep
air support category of its offensive air support
function.  Note that it includes effects beyond that of
"interdicting", and that in modern warfare its definition
is flawed in that "before it can be brought to bear effec-
tively against friendly forces" and detailed integration
not required" should no longer be applied.  Tactical
missile (surface-to-surface) units may well be interdiction
targets.  With extensive use of maneuver warfare and deep
battle tactics, detailed integration may often be required.
These considerations significantly affect the subcategory
of AI missions classified now as BAI.  To both update the
AI definition and cleanly include BAI within the AI
function would entail modifying the AI definition to
provide that such air operations are "normally" against
opposition before it  can be brought to bear... and that
integration is "normally" not required.
          Offensive Air Support:
            ...those operations that actually
            deliver firepower against enemy
            ground forces for the destruction
            or neutralization of installations,
            equipment and personnel.
                           (FMFM 5-1, p. 7)
     It should be noted that the NATO term OAS addresses
tactical air operations which directly support the land
battle -- CAS and those parts of interdiction and tactical
air reconnaissance in direct support of land operations
(not airlift).
      FMFM 5-4 (p. 7) states further that such missions are
conducted to "directly assist the attainment of ground
objectives..." (emphasis added).  The Marine Corps further
classifies OAS missions according to the degree of coordi-
nation required with ground elements -- into deep and close
air support.
         Deep Air Support (DAS).  Air attacks
         against hostile targets which are at
         such distances from friendly units as
         to require no coordination with the
         fire and movement of those units; the
         term "deep air support" connotes de-
         livery or firepower beyond the fire
         support coordination line to destroy,
         neutralize, or delay enemy ground
         forces before they can be brought to
         bear effectively against friendly
                             (FMFM 5-1, p. 7)
       Tactical Air Support -- Air operations
           carried out in coordination with
           surface forces which directly assist
           the land or naval battle.
                         (JCS Pub 1, p. 361)
     "Tactical air support" is used by the Air Force and
Army to address air operations which directly support the
land battle and includes close air support, tactical air
reconnaissance, battlefield air interdiction and tactical
airlift (Army FM 101-5-1).  Again, with the exception of
tactical airlift, this term equates to NATO's version of
       Battlefield Air Interdiction:   "Air inter-
       diction attacks against land targets which
       have a near term effect on the operations
       or scheme or maneuver of friendly forces,
       but are not in close proximity to friendly
                  (US REDCOM Pamphlet 525-8, J-SAK
                  agreement operating procedures,
                  p. 2-7)
     The J-SAK operating procedures pamphlet definition is
used because it represents the latest Air Force statement
on BAI (Dec '84).  It further states that BAI requires
"joint coordination at the component level during planning
and may require coordination during execution."
     The mission close air support requires detailed inte-
gration with friendly force fire and maneuver due to the
close proximity between targets and friendlies.  Services
and publications are in agreement on CAS and elaboration is
unnecessary.  The terms air reconnaissance and tactical air
reconnaissance are also jointly aligned -- Services and
publications essentially agree, with JCS Pub 1 defining the
latter term more comprehensively.  No reference is made to
support or coordination with ground forces.  Antisurface or
maritime air operations, armed recce, and electronic war-
fare will not be directly addressed, although some of the
subsequent discussion may be applied.
     Some general observations may help illuminate the
alignment problems.  The functions "Offensive Air Support"
(USMC) and "Tactical Air Support" (USAF) share a support
provided to friendly ground force characteristic -- their
inclusive missions directly assist or support land opera
tions.  (The principal difference is that the Marine Corps
OAS breakout limits included missions to those delivering
firepower on the enemy, thereby excluding recce, airlift,
assault support, etc.)  Air Interdiction (Air Force) and
AAW/CA air missions indirectly support friendly ground
forces and could be termed "General Support."  These
distinctions allow an alignment as follows:
General Support:  Antiair Warfare (or Counter Air)
                  Air Interdiction (including armed
                   Air Reconnaissance
                    [other missions not TACAIR -- air-
                       lift, SAR, etc.]
Direct Support:    Cerain Air Interdiction (in-
                       cluding armed recce/maritime)
                   Certain Air Reconnaissance
                   Close Air Support   
                   [other missions not TACAIR --
                       assault spt, etc.]
                   Figure 5-2
Fixed Wing TACAIR Fuctions by Nature of Support Provided
     The certain air interdiction of Figure 5-2 is basic-
ally the J-SAK (and NATO) BAI mission.  It is also the
Marine Corps' DAS air interdiction mission given its (OAS)
"directly assist..." elaboration from FMFM 5-4.
     When the Services define missions both in accordance
with their supporting nature and the level of coordination
or integration required with ground forces, conflicts in
terminology are unavoidable.  Direct support is distin-
guished by the direct and timely assistance provided to
a friendly ground force and its near term effect and
influence on enemy force potential.  It normally would
include all missions flown in "direct support" of the
ground force but does not need to be specifically in
response to a request for support -- a potentially
confusing play on words.  Direct (air) support is
predominantly, but not limited to, missions flown through
the request procedures of an established "direct support"
command relationship.  This premise, however, conflicts with
the "direct air support" definition in FMFM 5-4 (p. 4).  The
Marine Corps term direct air support is not defined in JCS
Pub 1.
     Coordination and integration requirements should be
applied to any mission which due to proximity or influence
between forces or missions so demands it.  Coordination and
integration are required at different command levels and in
different detail not so much because of mission category or
requirement origination but because of the tactical situa-
tion.  Air operations planning and execution liaison must
be pervasive to ensure that they take place.
     While on the subject of integration and coordination,
it may be appropriate to touch on the Fire Support
Coordination Line.  The JCS Pub 1 and Service definitions
of the FSCL all require coordination with ground forces for
missions conducted within the line and require no
coordination beyond the line.  This last characteristic is a
flaw in the definition (author's view) -- which is supported
by narrative in FMFM 5-1, p. 215, para. 5305b.  An effort
should be made to change this JCS definition -- to retain
the coordination required within the FSCL, but to replace
the no coordination required beyond the line with a
statement which prescribes coordination and integration
as the tactical situation dictates for missions flown
against targets beyond the FSCL.  The author suspects the
airland battle concept of the Army and Air Force will place
them in agreement.
     Graphic representation of these fixed wing TACAIR
missions shows that surface coordination measures beyond
the Fire Support Coordinaion Line are probably impractical.
Click here to view image
The pertinence of these discussions will become evident in
the analysis of the Omnibus terminology.
                   Omnibus Terminology
     The Omnibus policy statement is quite full of terms
that have been identified as Service-distinct, ambiguous or
otherwise not condusive to making the JCS policy statement
an "agreement."
     To start this discussion from top to bottom, the
statement's title terms "Marine Corps TACAIR" and
"Sustained Operations Ashore" are not defined in the
Omnibus or any other known JCS document.  Marine tactical
aviation/aircraft includes very tactical helicopter
aircraft which are not applicable to the intent of
Omnibus.  The title should have been "...Fixed Wing
TACAIR...".  "Sustained operations ashore" is an ambiguous
term -- and so long as it excludes amphibious operations,
that ambiguity is probably appropriate.
     The first three sentences recognize the established
supporting unity of the MAGTF:
         The MAGTF commander will retain operational
         control of his organic assets ...The primary
         mission of the air combat element is the
         support of the MAGTF ground element...air
         assets will normally be in support of the
         MAGTF mission.
This is "Support in the Broadest Sense"  (JCS Pub 2,
paragraph 30272, p. 55) -- organic air support.
     The next sentence starts revealing terminology
         The MAGTF commander will make sorties
         available to the Joint Force Commander
         for tasking through his air component
         commander for air defense, long-range
         interdiction and long-range recon-
CMC White Letter 7-81 explains that sorties "will be made
available" in this context only when the CJTF assumes
responsibility for those missions for the entire force.
These are missions as discussed previously which are very
condusive to, and would benefit significantly from,
centralized management for a joint force.  They would be
run by the CJTF or his representative in "general support"
of the JTF components -- as a whole.  If not controlled
through centralized management, then they would at least
require extensive coordination by some type of coordinating
authority for air.  The AADC from JCS Pub 8 is such an
established coordinator for air defense as is the ACA,
from AFM 1-3 (etc.), for airspace control.  This part of
Omnibus, then, is a Marine Corps agreement to contribute
through sortie provision, or at least by coordination, to
CJTF managed missions in general support of the force.
The three mission area designations make this agreement
most ambiguous.
     Air defense, as noted in the last section, is a sub-
division of both AAW and CA.  It applies to the active and
passive defensive measures taken against the enemy air
threat.  The offensive portion of AAW/CA is distinguishable
from air interdiction only by the objectives/targets of the
missions -- enemy air or air defense potential.  In Omnibus
then, the Marine Corps basically agrees to play in the
joint force  "long-range interdiction" campaign, but  
apparently does not agree to play in the conceptually
similar offensive AAW effort.  This is inconsistent and the
author expects it is an inconsistency based on terminology
misapplication rather than intent.
     Just what are the joint force long-range interdiction
and reconnaissance campaigns?  The terms are neither
defined nor discussed in any doctrinal publication the
author has found.  Recall, however, that air interdiction
in Marine Corps doctrine (as a part of DAS and OAS) is
limited to air missions which "directly assist" the ground
forces.  If one were to arbitrarily say that air
interdiction was normally "short-range" when in direct
support of ground forces and "long-range" when in general
support of the total force (at such distance that detailed
integration is not required with friendly forces), then
it may follow that the Omnibus term refers to "general
support" air interdiction.  That rationale applies also to
the "long-range reconnaissance" mission.  The Marine Corps
has agreed to participate (in Omnibus-flawed terminology)--
in TACAIR-provided general support air campaigns of AAW/CA,
air interdiction and air reconnaissance.  It will do so by
providing sorties to the JTF manager of those campaigns --
the air component commander or whatever title is bestowed
upon the preponderant air component's commander.  That
Omnibus refers to an ACC is without regard to the recent
Air Force functional componency and air component commander
authority issues, and certainly without recognition of
operational control authority.  It is the author's conten-
tion that the "air defense" term refers to all AAW or CA
efforts and that "long range" refers to those portions of
AI and air reconnaissance flown in "general support" of the
     The following line is also troublesome:
         Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support
         requirements will be provided... for the
         support of other components of the JTF,
         or of the JTF as a whole.
The MAGTF actually has no internal direct support relation-
ships -- it's all organic, support in the "broadest sense."
The MAGTF, then, will satisfy its own air support require-
ments that are of a direct support nature -- CAS, certain
air interdiction and certain air reconnaissance -- before
declaring excess fixed wing TACAIR sortie availability.
"Certain" in this case is as discussed through Figure 5-3,
those portions of AI and reconnaissance flown which
directly support or assist ground forces.
     It should be noted that the MAGTF in this JTF arena
would not report excess based just on internal direct
support requirements.  It will also have "general support"
obligations as discussed previously.  The MAGTF will
provide such sorties as are excess after allocation to
fulfill both its direct support requirements and its
general support obligations.  These excess sorties can be
used by the CJTF in support of other components (which
would be essentially a direct support relationship) or in
support of the JTF as a whole (a general support
     In Air Force vernacular, the MAGTF in Omnibus agrees
to equitably contribute sorties to the joint force AAW/CA,,
air interdiction and air reconnaissance campaigns in
general support of the entire JTF.  It will fulfill its own
direct support requirements as much as possible in CAS, BAI
and tactical air reconnaissance.  Sorties expected to be
available in excess of those obligations and requirements
will be offered to the CJTF for direct or general support
within the JTF.    While sounding quite clear in these
terms, a reading of the existing policy statement is quite
less.  A reworded Omnibus is Annex B.
                    JINTACCS Terminology
     This paper will provide an implementation plan for the
provisions of Omnibus in the JINTACCS air tasking cycle.
This section will discuss several items pertaining to
particular JINTACCS terminology.
     TACAIR C2:  As has been previously mentioned,
Chapter 1 of the JPTM discusses JTF organization/command
relationships in a functional componency vein.  This is
inappropriately not in consonance with current JCS Pub 2.
In the Air Operations chapter, it also makes multiple
references to the establishment of "close support" rela-
tionships.  While consistent with JCS Pub 2, it is the
author's opinion that JTF support relationships should be
either general support or direct support.  The close
support relationship is equivalent to establishing
authority to conduct only CAS in support of another
component.  Actually, the JTPM close support description
is more like a direct support relationship and is so
referenced as such under its "Cross-Force Support"
discussion.  Omission of the word "close" or its change to
"direct" where it appears in the JPTM "close support"
narratives would not detract from the text and will be
recommended.  It should also be noted that the JPTM Omnibus
paragraph is an earlier version of this paper's Annex B --
provided by the author while working on the JINTACCS
program.  Its refinement or replacement by Annex B is
probably desirable.
     ATOCONF Message:  The ATOCONF message is an Air Force
message used to both confirm cross-force support missions
and disseminate the internal Air Force air tasking order.
The fact that it is an Air Force only originated message is
rather obscure in the JPTM.  While it may be compatible
with CAFM's, its use by the Navy/Marine Corps, other than
in reading, would be impractical due to its complexity and
CAFM's orientation.  There is also concern about sending
cross-force a message titled an "air tasking order."
Cross-force mission data, requests and confirmations are
far more palatable.  The CENTCOM "Common Air Tasking"
(derived from JCS Pub 12).is another palatable title.
                        CHAPTER 5
1JCS Pub 1, pp. 76 and 87.
2JCS Pub 1, p. 263.
3JCS Pub 1, p. 92.
4JCS Pub 2, p. 57.
5JCS Pub 1, p. 40.
6JCS Pub 2, p. 53.
7JCS Pub 1, p. 356.
8JCS Pub 1, p. 158.
9JCS Pub 1, p. 70.
10JCS Pub 1, p. 242.
11JCS Pub 2, p. 55.
12JCS Pub 2, pp. 55-56.
13JCS Pub 1, p. 115.
14US REDCOM Pamphlet 525-8, p. 1-2.
                         CHAPTER 6
                     Omnibus Reexamined
     This paper has provided substantial background and
analysis of fixed wing TACAIR command and control and the
integration of such MAGTF assets into the joint force air
operations.  There are still a few Omnibus items left to be
examined; the general support apportionment, coordination
and integration of MAGTF direct support, communication
dependencies, and the transition from policy to doctrine.
             The General Support Apportionment
     The MAGTF commander "will make sorties available", in
the author's view, to participate equitably in the general
support of the JTF air campaigns of antiair warfare (or
counter air), air interdiction and air reconnaissance.
What would "equitable participation" entail?  The following
discussion represents a proposal of the author.
     The joint task force commander must consider the JTF's
tactical situation, with emphasis on the MAGTF's situation,
and the expected availability of fixed wing TACAIR within
each of the participating force components when developing
his apportionment guidance applicable to MAGTF Omnibus
participation.  The apportionment guidance can be in terms
ranging from general mission guidance to weight of effort
mission percentages or priorities.  It may be promulgated
daily, for periods of several days or based on a particular
phase of the operation.  It's the CJTF's preference.  If
the apportionment is issued by mission percentages, his
breakout by mission should cover the specific JTF general
support campaigns -- antiair warfare, air interdiction and
air reconnaissance.  Antiair warfare is essentially all
general support.  Air interdiction and reconnaissance,
however, both may include general and direct support
components.  To distinguish between them may not seem
necessary.  The MAGTF ACE and Air Force TAF, however, have
limited attack and tactical reconnaissance assets
available.  The apportionment distinction between the
percentages given to direct or general support missions
would represent the CJTF's guidance on which of those
limited assets gets applied to the direct support of
supported ground forces (e.g., the MAGTF and its GCE and
the Air Force, the Army, for example) and which would go
into the JTF's general support air interdiction and
reconnaissance campaigns.  BAI is an acceptable
discriminator for the direct support portion of AI.
There is no known similar term to discriminate direct
support air reconnaissance.  The author suggests that
the terms tactical or battlefield air reconnaissance
(TAR/BAR respectively) may be suitable.  TAR is JCS Pub 1
defined -- but not as direct support limited.  BAR is
simply an author-proposed BAI counterpart.  A CJTF's
apportionment might then look like this:
click here to view image
In this example, the CJTF has apportioned the air effort in
two related paragraphs.  Paragraph 1 is his guidance for
air function apportionment.  This guides components in the
preparation of their multipurpose TACAIR (aircraft) sortie
allocation.  Note that the AR (air reconnaissance) and EW
missions are dashed -- components will have TACAIR air-
frames configured (or designed for) several peculiar
missions.  Reconnaissance, electronic warfare, etc.
aircraft are normally not capable of a variety of support
missions and components need no guidance to fly them as
appropriate; hence the dashes.  The OTH category would be
reserved for TACAIR missions not part of the five or more
preceding functional categories.  EX is the CJTF's guidance
relating to component provisions to support CJTF common air
tasking.  This, of course, is a rather tenuous category --
and if used would have to be a "requested" apportionment.
To make EX pure apportionment guidance would be contrary to
the "excess" definition.  It is a realistic apportionment,
however, as components will rarely, if ever, have any
excess other than that requested and "volunteered."  Pure
excess sorties in combat are probably non-existent.
Realistically, too, the CJTF's apportionment "guidance" is
subject to various Service interpretations -- ranging from
"directive" to  "suggested."  The author suspects that it is
probably someplace in between.
     Paragraph 2 of the example has the CJTF breaking out
direct and general support portions of the AI and AR air
campaigns under discussion.  In AI, for instance, this
would have the MAGTF providing 40 percent of their AI
efforts to the JTF AI campaign and 60 percent to direct
support (BAI).
     Service preferences and unique capabilities and limi-
tations would be taken into account.  The MAGTF ACE may not
have 40 percent (per example) of its effort (sorties)
capable of counter air.  Certainly the CJTF may add
categories and amplifying instructions to either
paragraph.  And, of course, the CJTF may not care to go
into such detail at all.  The paragraphs would be repeated
for each air capable Service.  The Services are structured
and tasked very differently -- one apportionment breakout
would rarely, if ever, apply to all components.
     Lacking such detailed apportionment guidance, the
MAGTF simply would develop its normal internal apportion-
ment and allocation as if it were alone on the battlefield
(considering only a portion of the threat.)  Those sorties
that it would have flown alone for AAW, AI and AR in
"general support" of the MAGTF would then be offered as its
contribution to those JTF air campaigns, to be tasked or
coordinated through the designated CJTF air manager.  This,
of course, could be very little -- the MAGTF does not
usually fly a great deal of  "long-range" air interdiction
and reconnaissance.
     Coordinating and Integrating MAGTF Direct support
     The direct and general support campaigns of AI and AR
as developed in this paper are potentially conflicting in
execution.  With the MAGTF conducting direct support
interdiction, or BAI, and reconnaissance, BAR (author's
acronym, for grins), along the MAGTF frontage and the Air
Force managing and conducting general support JTF air
interdiction and reconnaissance campaigns over the JTF
operations area, there is certain to be geographic over-
lap.  As has been discussed, there is no tactical or pure
geographical dividing line between AI/AR and BAI/BAR.  The
coordination, integration and deconfliction of MAGTF and
Air Force efforts in these areas pose difficult problems.
Several proposals have been made.  The Marine Corps in
Operational Handbook 5-1.1 (and a 1982 CENTCOM paper)
proposed the establishment of a surface coordination line
separating MAGTF controlled targeting and direct support
mission conduct from JTF/Air Force air interdiction and
reconnaissance.  This Deep Air Support Coordination Line
(DASCL), as it was called, would be aligned with the MAGTF
area of influence and, as possible, with its airspace -
control sector.  The author believes the area of interest
"line" too subjective and ambiguous and the airspace
control sector too unrelated to direct support or DAS to be
of any use.  In certain situations, such a coordination
measure may be workable -- but not often enough to
establish a DASCL or equivalent as a normal control measure
procedure or doctrine.
     The author proposes several mutually supportive pro-
cedures.  First, the JTF AI/AR campaign manager should
adopt as policy the tasking/assignment of MAGTF provided
general support sorties to those AI/AR missions which are
along the MAGTF frontage.  This would pass a significant
portion of the BAI/BAR deconfliction responsibility back to
the MAGTF TACC.  Secondly, the CJTF should require the
MAGTF to staff a coordination element at the appropriate
JTF command center, probably the TACC-AF, much like the
Army's Battlefield Coordination Element.  Their function
would be to coordinate MAGTF BAI/BAR with the air campaign
manager and applicable JTF AI/AR with the MAGTF.  Mainte-
nance and integration of target lists and assignments, air
tasking cross-feed and preparation assistance for the
MAGTF's portion of the common air tasking message (or
JINTACCS ATOCONF) would be their principle tasks.  It would
not be a liaison officer or office.  It, instead, would be
an element/staff which would supplement the liaison officer
in the implementation of Omnibus provisions.  The author
contends that if the Marine Corps wants to retain OPCON of
its TACAIR beyond the FSCL, it has to make a large coordi-
nation effort as outlined above.  The Army-Air Force J-SAK
agreement and procedures previously referenced may assist
in the development of detailed targeting and air integra-
tion procedures for Omnibus implementation.
   Command and Control and Communications Dependencies
     Omnibus commits the MAGTF to integrate its TACAIR
extensively into the JTF air effort.  Implementation of
the provisions of the policy makes great demands on the
command and control and communications networks of the
JTF.  The demands are, however, somewhat redistributed
and are substantially greater than normal in respect to
their required reliability, responsiveness and timeliness.
A significant portion of the MAGTF ACE planning process
may be shifted under Omnibus to the TACC-AF (or any CJTF
designated manager's C2 center.)  The JOC also has
increased workloads and MAGTF coordination elements should
pick up these added burdens.  Each message in the
preplanned air tasking cycle takes on very increased
importance when Omnibus assets are being provided,
allotted, tasked and confirmed.  The failure or delay in
communications at any place in the cycle brings the entire
policy to a grinding halt, potentially wasting valuable
sortie capacity -- and creating undesirable JTF vulner-
     The MAGTF coordination elements must be adequately
staffed and fully utilized.  The preplanned air tasking
cycle message exchanges must be protected and provided
secondary and tertiary communication paths.  Air delivery
of these messages may provide communications reliability
worth far more than the asset cost in delivery duties.
                   Transition to Doctrine
CMC White Letter 7-81 promulgated the Omnibus policy state-
ment and limited elaboration.  While the White Letter
explains the basic intent of the JCS policy statement, it
often is ambiguous and does not go into any detail on
unique terms or implementation procedures.  OH 5-1.1 is
the Marine Corps' only (interim and quasi-) doctrinal
elaboration yet available.  However, the OH not only offers
several new terms and aspects of the terminology, but also
contradicts the White Letter significantly.  It further
presents the material in a manner which might easily be
interpreted by a reader as an explanation of procedures
and agreements developed by the Service chiefs in the
formulation of the JCS policy statement.  Much of the OH,
however, is totally uni-service developed and is therefore
well beyond the JCS policy statement.  Marine commanders in
joint exercises have great difficulty implementing Omnibus
given the absence of useable OH or JCS guidance.  During
the spring of 1983, major Fleet Marine Force commands
submitted detailed review comments to OH 5-1.1.  A draft
revision was developed and, in June 1984, entered Marine
Corps Development and Education Command (MCDEC) staffing.1
It's still there.  It does, however, provide a good
starting point for further transitioning of Omnibus policy
into doctrine.
     The entire FMFM 5-series aviation doctrine publica-
tions are currently under review for a major update and
reorganization.2  It would be timely, then, to promulgate
the draft revised OH to allow further staffing and
incorporation of Omnibus into the FMFM 5-series, completing
the transition from policy to doctrine.
     The applicable chapters of the proposed draft OH are
attached as Annex C, Appendix 1, to this paper.  In light
of the author's research, several changes to the draft are
offered in the accompanying Appendix 2.  Change bars and
notes referencing the numbered comment paragraphs of
Appendix 2 are annotated on the applicable pages of
Appendix 1.  It is proposed that they be incorporated in
the draft and that the "revised draft revision" be
distributed for FMF review prior to final rework of the
FMFM 5-series publications.
     This concludes the reexamination of Omnibus.
Chapter 7 will provide a JINTACCS program implementation
procedure for the Omnibus procedures.
                         CHAPTER 6
     1CG MCDEC letter on "C2 of Marine TACAIR" (Quantico,
Va.: MCDEC, 1984), Enclosure (1), Draft Revision to
OH 5-1.1, Chapters 1, 3 and 4.
     2CG MCDEC letter on "Annual Review of MC Doctrinal
Publications System" (Quantico, Va.:  MCDEC, 1984),
Enclosure (1), Chairman, PAB 1tr 29 Nov 84, TAB G of
Enclosure (4).
                        CHAPTER 7
           Omnibus Implementation and JINTACCS
     As mentioned previously, the JINTACCS character
oriented message standard and the concurrently developed
interface operating procedures (IOP's) are scheduled for
JCS-wide implementation in September 1986.  At this
writing, the standard and IOP's are undergoing a final
operational effectiveness demonstration (OED) in the
CINCLANT joint service exercise Solid Shield '85.  The
standard and IOP's are expected to pass the OED and be
promulgated for final Service staffing over the coming
year.  This brief chapter will review the JINTACCS
preplanned air tasking cycle, explain a proposed
Omnibus implementation, and provide JINTACCS ALLOREQ
and SORTIEALLOT message examples.
          The JINTACCS Preplanned Air Tasking  Cycle
     To reset the stage, the JTF is established ashore in
sustained land operations.  It is composed of a MAF sized
MAGTF, a two corps Army force, a tactical air force and a
Navy component in support.  The TAF is the preponderant air
component and has been designated as the CJTF's Air
Component Commander (ACC) (not to include OPCON, but
coordination/management responsibilities) as well as AADC,
ACA and manager of the general support JTF counter air, air
interdiction and air reconnaissance campaigns.  He is also
managing the JRCC and the JMC.  The CJTF is considering
placing the MAGTF under the Army in a Land Component
Commander relationship -- but for now is preserving full
MAGTF Service componency.  CJTF has been promulgating air
apportionment guidance every other day.  His latest message
passed the following guidance to the MAGTF:
Click here to view image
     MAGTF ACE planners now get to work translating this
guidance into an employment plan for inclusion in their
ALLOREQ -- due back to the CJTF some thirty hours prior
to the tasking period.  That MAGTF ALLOREQ not only
includes its employment plan, but also lists and amplifies
anticipated excess sorties for the period, requests cross-
force air support which it requires and cannot fill itself
and passes all available mission data on those requests.
     There are only two data sets of the ALLOREQ which need
to be addressed in respect to Omnibus, the 8ALLOCAT and
8JNTEXC sets (allocation and joint/excess sorties sets
respectively).  The MAGTF would use the 8ALLOCAT to not
only report its employment plan but also to make sorties
available for its contributions to the general support JTF
CA, AI and AR efforts.  Of 200 applicable TACAIR sorties
(not including recce, etc.) expected for the period, then,
the JTF guidance is to fly 40 CA sorties, 60 AI/BAI
sorties, 80 CAS sorties and 10 other and excess sorties.
This would look as follows in the current JINTACCS set:
Click here to view image
This complies fully with CJTF guidance -- whether such exact
compliance would normally be the case is not important here.
Note that the SA column totals 220 and would be higher if
more aircraft were listed.  The 20 extra sorties available
(SA), are from the REC (reconnaissance) and OTH (other,
such as OA-4 AFAC) allocations not apportioned in total by
the CJTF.  The INT (AI) column totals 24 which is 30
percent of 200 sorties split between AI and BAI (.30 X 200
X .40) .  BAI is computed similarly.  All recce sorties to
be flown are reported in the REC column as there is no
functional DS/GS breakout and a comment is used instead.
     The 8JNTEXC set elaborates JTF general support and
excess sortie categories; the tasking period for this
example is 010001 to 020001:
Click here to view image
In this set, the MAGTF has distinguished general support
from excess sorties by notes in the CMNT column and further
limits and amplifies the general support and excess sorties
as required.  The Service ALLOREQ's also include air
mission data as is available on all their shortages --
contained within the set 8REQUEST and the SARTS (Chapter 3).
     The data sets in Figures 7-2 and 7-3 are received at
the CJTF's JOC.  The CJTF now allots the JTF general
support sorties to the ACC for tasking and pairs (and
allots) the excess sorties provided with other compatible
component requests for support.  These allotments are sent
to the components in the CJTF SORTIEALOT message.
     There are three applicable data sets in the CJTF
SORTIEALOT.  The 8ALLOCAT set, as was shown in the ALLOREQ
example, reflects the component sortie allocations into an
employment plan.  The set would be repeated in the
SORTIEALOT to change the employment plans of multiple
components if required -- one component per set.  In this
example, no changes are made by the CJTF and no 8ALLOCAT set
would therefore be included in the message.
     The 8ALLOT set is used to establish,allot and pro-
mulgate the excess and request pairings for cross-force
support.  It would also be the CJTF's vehicle to allot the
MAGTF's JTF general support sorties to the ACC.  The
following example does this first, then pairs the MAGTF
excess with some hypothetical Army requests -- which would
have been reported on the Air Force ALLOREQ due to their
unique supporting relationships.
Click here to view image
This allotment set has now passed MAGTF general support
sorties to the Air Force as ACC.  It also has paired excess
A-4 and AV-8 CAS sorties with Army requests -- numbers
1AR060 and 1AR066.  Note that the REQNO field (request
number) for general support has a joint task force (JT)
request number assigned.  This is appropriate since they
are JTF missions and did not get allotted in response to Air
Force requests.  Note that in the AMPN (amplification) set,
AMPN note A1 and A2 refer a reader to the subsequent 8JNTEXC
set.  This is because all limitations on these sorties
delineated in the component ALLOREQ 8JNTEXC set still apply
and are forwarded in such cases in the CJTF's SORTIEALOT
8JNTEXC set.  The 8JNTEXC set should reference the assigned
REQNO in the comment field.  For example, the fourth line,
6 A-4 INT, of the 8JNTEXC would look like this:
Click here to view image
     The SORTIEALOT continues with mission data duplicated
from the component ALLOREQ's on all approved (APP)
requests.  This is essentially a direct lift from those
ALLOREQ's of lines pertaining to the approved requests and
is consolidated in the SORTIEALOT's 8REQUEST set and SARTS.
     In response to this allotment of MAGTF JTF general
support sorties, the Air Force uses its ATOCONF message not
just for internal ATO dissemination and cross-force support
confirmation, but also to provide air mission tasking data
to those CA, INT and AR sorties to be flown by the MAGTF.
In an Omnibus unique play of the air tasking cycle, the
MAGTF would properly respond with a REQCONF -- confirming
that it will fly the allotted sorties as tasked in the
ATOCONF.  In this example, the MAGTF would also send a
REQCONF to the Army confirming the two lines of cross-force
CAS support.
     That essentially is all that would be required for
Omnibus implementation of the general support provisions
developed within the paper.  The last section briefly
discusses potential JCS cub 12 and CENTCOM SOP implemen-
tations within their existing air tasking cycles.
                  Other Air Tasking Cycles
     In Chapter Three, the paper examined the air tasking
cycle of JCS Pub 12 and that of a representative unified
command, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).  Some brief notes
on Omnibus implementation within these processes is
     In the pure JCS Pub 12 preplanned air tasking cycle
(no other is presented), the messages follow an exchange
process similar to that just explained in the preceding
JINTACCS section.  The Air Allocation/Employment Plan and
Sortie Allotment messages serve functions very similar to
the JINTACCS ALLOREQ and SORTIEALOT.  They, however, lack
format capacity for elaboration on air requests and
reported excess and do not address the general support
type of sorties.  This will require the use of extensive
narrative in these messages to explain sortie provisions
and misson request data -- similar but more comprehensive
than that shown in the, CMNT and AMPN fields and sets of the
JINTACCS examples of Chapter 4 and the preceding figures in
this chapter.  Instead of including air support request
mission data within these two messages, the Pub 12 cycle
follows with cross-force mission data and confirmation
messages.  These messages can easily be used by the JTF
general support air campaign manager to task MAGTF general
support sorties and by the Marine Corps to confirm such
tasking.  The JCS Pub 12 air tasking process, then,
requires substantial narrative elaboration but is capable
of implementing Omnibus without further modification.
Again, distinctions mut be made between JTF general
support and excess sorties provided by the MAGTF.
     The CENTCOM air tasking cycle was referenced as a
sample unified command tasking process.  Instead of
excess" sorties, CENTCOM uses the term common air tasking,
or CAT, sorties.  It is important to keep the categories
"excess" and "general support" distinct.  As long as the
narrative elaboration makes the distinction between
"excess" and JTF general support sorties, the CENTCOM
preplanned common air tasking cycle is capable of
implementing the Omnibus provisions.  If the CENTCOM CAT
process is to include JTF general support sorties as well
as excess, their definition of CAT needs to be revised.
     The JINTACCS preplanned air tasking cycle, messages
and IOP's provide the best documented support for an
Omnibus implementation.  Other available processes will
require much more elaborating narrative.
                       CHAPTER EIGHT
              Conclusions and Recommendations
      The Omnibus policy statement represents significant
Service compromise in, and JCS recognition of, some very
basic doctrinal premises.  For the Marine Corps, it is an
Air Force/JCS recognition of the MAGTF as a unity, that the
MAGTF commander will normally retain operational control of
MAGTF elements, and that MAGTF TACAIR will remain
principally in support of the MAGTF mission.  For the Air
Force, it is a Marine Corps/JCS recognition that MAGTF
TACAIR will contribute equitably and significantly to the
JTF general support missions of counter air (or at least
the air defense portion), air interdiction and air
reconnaissance, and, as is at least implied, that the
Marine Corps recognizes these as principally Air Force
component missions in support of the JTF as a whole,
requiring their single management approach (less OPCON).
The author contends that if the Marine Corps jointly
exercised, planned and otherwise participated with the Air
Force with a clear understanding of these compromises --
and an intent to integrate MAGTF TACAIR accordingly --
that much of the wind now in the sails of the functional
componency issue would be spent.
     Omnibus establishes a policy for major integration of
MAGTF fixed wing TACAIR into the JTF air effort and,
practically speaking, into the Air Force air tasking
process.  It is the MAGTF acknowledgement not that the Air
Force is any better than it is in planning antiair warfare,
air interdiction or air reconnaissance but that such
missions should be conducted in general support of the JTF
(as a whole), under centralized management.  The MAGTF will
participate equitably in that JTF general support.  To do
so while maintaining operational control of its partici-
pating assets and reserving for itself primary MAGTF direct
(air) support responsibility is the concept behind the
Omnibus policy.  What has been lacking in the Omnibus arena
is an understandable elaboration of the concept and a
workable implementation plan for the exercise of its
provisions.  These deficiencies have been the thrust of
this paper.
     Historically Marine combat forces and their TACAIR
have been employed in theater warfare within a wide variety
of joint force command structures and relationships.  The
effectiveness of these structures and relationships and
the impact they have had on combat efficiency have been as
subjectively varied as the proficiency, personalities and
perceptions of the commanders involved.  The functional
componency issue is essentially derived from a strong Air
Force perception that history and logic demand that the
unified command structure recognize functional command as
the best of several command structure options.  While
disagreeing with that premise, the Marine Corps does agree
that several aviation functions do need single joint force
management.  Omnibus obligates the MAGTF to support such
single management so long as it does not involve its loss
of TACAIR operational control.
     The Marine Corps prefers strongly joint force employ-
ment as a uni-service force -- preferably with Service
component status or under the Army as a land component
commander if necessary and appropriate.  These preferences
are not simply self-serving.  The MAGTF's unique combat
potential and "synergism" as a potent, redeployable combat
force justifies maintenance of MAGTF unity within a joint
force environment.  The benefits of unity of command at
this component level must be carefully weighed.  The MAGTF
argues such while recognizing that the final organizational
decisions are the task force and unified commanders'.
     Marine and Air Force command and control philosophies,
procedures and systems are remarkably similar.  Differences
do exist principally due to the basic roles and missions of
the Services.  While the Marine Corps emphasis is on short
duration, limited scope amphibious operations, the Air
Force perspective is justifiably oriented to sustained
theater warfare.  This is a major impetus to their
functional componency arguments.  Within this theater
perspective, Air Force "general support' missions are a
very legitimate primary concern.  They must prepare and
organize to provide effective umbrella counter air, air
interdiction and air reconnaissance (also SAR and airlift)
to the joint force as a whole throughout the theater.
MAGTF command and control and TACAIR assets are fully 
capable of integration into the support of these Air Force
     Terminology is the root of significant difficulties
encountered in this integration effort.  Unique terms and
varying perceptions of like terms create misunderstanding
and miscommunication all too frequently -- in both history
and current operations.  Intentionally ambiguous termi-
nology, unclarified in operational exercise, is a further
source of misunderstanding.  Associated with these termi-
nology troubles are some problems with doctrinal publica-
tions.  JCS Pub 2's use of general and "close" support to
the exclusion of direct support tends to limit the use of
the latter in the joint force environment.  The author
perceives that as detrimental and unduly imposing on the
joint force commander.  Closer to home, Marine Corps
FMFM 5-series publications have some serious inconsisten-
cies amongst themselves and in functionally categorizing
aviation missions.  By definition and implication, the
Marine Corps does not have an indirect/general support air
interdiction mission.  All its strike missions, except
offensive AAW, must directly assist the ground force as
part of its offensive air support function.  FMFM 5-5
incorrectly dissects AAW into active and passive elements
vice FMFM 5-1's correct offensive and defensive breakouts.
FMFM 5-4 does not completely support FMFM 5-1's DAS defini-
tion, nor is OAS clearly defined.  Direct air support is a
unique Marine Corps term which the author believes is
defined too restrictively.  OAS is also uniquely explained
and results in a breakout of aviation functions in the
Marine Corps which is unnecessarily out of sync with the
Air Force (Tactical Air Support), Army and NATO (OAS).
There are two JCS terms the author takes issue with as
well.  Air interdiction's attack of the enemy potential
"before it can be brought to bear effectively" and at such
distances so as to not require detailed integration with
friendly ground forces are characteristics which often are
no longer appropriate, and in practice are no longer
considered.  The FSCL's "without coordination" (non-)
requirement for strikes beyond it is too permissive.  While
this control measure is needed to ensure coordination for
the ground commander of strikes inside the FSCL, coordi-
nation on strikes beyond it are a function of diverse
tactical situations, not some line in front of the FLOT.
These are terminology problems that can be resolved and
incorporated into a more complete JCS Pub 1.
     Omnibus is a flawed policy statement in that it uses
ill-defined terminology subject to much misinterpretaton
and is plain hard to decipher.  Perhaps it represents the
best that could be done politically?  The author believes
its intent was to represent a reasonable and realistic
compromise between the Services on TACAIR employment.  OH
5-1.1, instead of clarifying the intent and offering
implementation guidance, grievously confused the issues.
Although not analyzed within the report, volumes of files
at MCDEC's air doctrine department and the Annex C draft
revision extract attest to the Marine Corps' failure to
transition from the JCS policy statement to doctrinal
incorporation.  It's been over four years now and with a
major overhaul of the FMFM 5-series publications in
progress, the time for transition to doctrine seems
upon us.
     JINTACCS message standards and IOP's (JPTM) scheduled
for implementation in 1986 offer additional impetus and
utility in promulgating and implementing Omnibus.  They
also do a good job at refining the inter-Service relation-
ships within a joint force.  The latest version of the
JPTM, however, (REDCOM modified) has a distinctive func-
tional componency slant which must be scrutinized.  It also
needlessly realigns itself with the cumbersome JCS Pub 2
"close support" support relationship verbage.  A basic
"in support of" or direct support terminology is much
     The most difficult area for Omnibus implementation is
the integration of MAGTF direct support beyond the FSCL
(e.g., BAI and recce) with the overlapping JTF general
support air interdiction and air reconnaissane campaigns.
It is the author's opinion that this will be best handled
by prudent tasking of MAGTF general support into the area
of potential mission conflict, reasonable commanders'
liaison and the formation of MAGTF TACC coordination
elements to serve with the JTF's air manager.  Further
surface coordination measures, such as the DASCL, and
areas of influence/interest, are believed unsuitable for
application in what should be an integration effort.
     Annex B is a reworded Omnibus aligned with the
premises developed in this paper and phrased in JCS
terminology.  It is offered as the author's perception of
the intent of the compromises which produced the Omnibus
policy statement.  Its promulgation in the next OH 5-1.1
may be of benefit.  Annex C, Appendix 2, is the author's
recommended changes to the draft MCDEC revision to the
currently flawed OH 5-1.1.
      FMFM 5-series need to be aligned.  Terms which are in
conflict or otherwise flawed are OAS, DAS (FMFM 5-1 versus
5-4), AAW (FMFM 5-1 versus 5-5) and direct air support.
Chapter 5 suggests a major realignment of the OAS category,
including the separation of air interdiction and the
adoption of the BAI term.  There appears to be little
justification for such important terms to be misaligned
between Services.  Such disparities should be eliminated as
a matter of priority.
     JCS Pub 1 terms believed flawed are air interdiction
and the FSCL.  Joint service effort should be pursued to
update these terms.  The JCS Pub 2 discussion of close
support should be reworked into the cleaner direct support
(Pub 1) context.  The terms excess sortie, BAI and OAS
(a joint/NATO version) should be reviewed in the joint
arena for inclusion of acceptable definitions into JCS
Pub 1.
     The JINTACCS implementation schedule should be
supported enthusiastically.  Service final review,
especially of the functional componency slant of the JPTM
Chapter 1 and the close support discussions and references
in Chapter 3, should be conducted in a thorough and timely
manner with an emphasis on joint standardization.  Service
doctrinal publications should be revised accordingly.
     Finally, coordination with the Air Force should be
effected to arrange for full and consistent exercise of the
Omnibus provisions in all joint exercises.  The piece-
meal and inconsistent air integration efforts currently
being exercised provide experiences too varied to be of
long-term benefit.  They are distinctly unique from one
unified command, and even exercise, to the next.  Omnibus
should be the basis for cooperative MAGTF-Air Force joint
TACAIR integration.  It's a step in the right direction --
towards one another -- for both Services.  Until it's
communicated effectively and exercised accordingly, they
may be steps that leave both Services still too far apart
on this very important aspect of joint coordination.
		      ANNEX A
                      ANNEX A
               Annotated Bibliography
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Service and NATO Publications
                       Joint Primary
JCS Publication 1.  DOD Dictionary of Military and
     Associated Terms.  Washington, D.C.:  JCS, 1 April
         JCS Pub 1 has been used throughout the paper as
     the principal reference for definitions.
JCS Publication 2.  Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).
     Washington, D.C.:  JCS, 1974.
          JCS Pub 2 was used extensively for command and
     control applications within the joint force environ-
     ment.  The author agrees with Hdqtrs, USMC positions
     that componency within Pub 2 is heavily slanted
     towards Service componency.  Whether the level of this
     componency is restricted to the unified command level
     as opposed to subordinate joint forces is perhaps open
     to further interpretation.
JCS Publication 8.  Doctrine for Air Defense from Overseas
     Land Areas.  Washington, D.C.:  JCS, 1964.
          Background information dealing with joint force
     air defense and the AADC.
JCS Publication 12.  Tactical Command and Control Pro-
     cedures for Joint Operations.  Volume IV, Part 4.
     Washington, D.C.:  JCS, 1 Dec 1984.
          Chapter 1 of Part 4, in particular, is the
     current JCS guidance on common (cross-force) air
     tasking within a joint force.
Joint Interface Test Force (JITF).  JINTACCS Functional
     Segments IOP.  Ft. Monmouth, N.J.:  JITF, 2 Dec 1984.
          This is the final JITF produced IOP compilation.
     The author used Chapters 1 (General), 2 (Intelli-
     gence), and 3 (Air Operations) as initial reference
     for JINTACCS IOP's.
U.S. Central Command.  Operations SOP, Regulation 525-1
     (Air Tasking).  MacDill AFB, Fl:  Hdqtrs CENTCOM,
     30 Mar 1984.
          The SOP is used as a sample current unified
     command procedural set-up for common air tasking.
     CENTCOM has done some excellent work in this area
     as discussed in the paper.
U.S. Readiness Command.  Joint Procedures Training Manual
     for Message Text Formats.  MacDill AFB, Fl:  USREDCOM,
     15 Oct 1984.
          The author bases JINTACCS IOP material within the
     paper on this document.  It is the final input to
     CINCLANT for the 1985 OED and as such practically
     supercedes the JITF IOP document.  It was of interest
     to note the functional componency element inserted by
U.S. Readiness Command.  General Operating Procedures for
     the Joint Attack of the Second Echelon.  USREDCOM
     Pamphlet 525-8.  MacDill AFB, Fl:  USREDCOM, 31 Dec
          This J-SAK SOP relates the most recent agreement
     between the Army and Air Force on the BAI mission --
     command and control, target nomination and air
                       USMC Primary
Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-1.  Marine Aviation.
     Washington, D.C.:  Hdqtrs USMC, 24 Aug 1979 (reprint
          Basic reference for Marine aviation doctrine.
FMFM 5-4.  Offensive Air Support.  Washington, D.C.:
     Hdqtrs USMC, 13 Sep 1979.
          Supplement to FMFM 5-1 as applies to OAS.
     The author used major portions of this FMFM -- in
     particular definitions and employment/tasking concepts
     and procedures.
FMFM 5-5.  Antiair Warfare.  Washington, D.C.:  Hdqtrs
     USMC, 14 Jul 1980.
          Supplement to FMFM 5-1 as applies to AAW.  The
     author used extensively the definitions and employment
     concepts sections.
Operational Handbook 5-1.1.  Command and Control of USMC
     TACAIR.  Quantico, Va.:  Marine Corps Development and
     Education Command (MCDEC), 10 Sep 82.
          A very flawed document relating to C2 of TACAIR
     -- especially its treatment of Omnibus.  The paper
     offers recommended changes in detail.
Operational Handbook 5-3.  Tasking USMC Fixed-Wing Tactical
     Aviation.  Quantico, Va.:  MCDEC, 27 Jul 1982.
          Excellent background on TACC tasking processes.
                       USAF Primary
Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1.  Functions and Basic Doctrine
     of the United States Air Force.  Washington, D.C..
     Hdqtrs USAF, 1984.
          A recently reorganized and updated narrative on
     USAF mission perceptions.
AFM 1-3 (and FM 100-18, NWP-17, and LFM 04).  Doctrine and
     Procedures for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.
     Washington, D.C.:  Hdqtrs USAF, 1 Dec 1975.
          This is essentially a joint service version for
     airspace control and the ACA, similar to JCS Pub 8 but
     for air defense and the AADC.
AFM 2-7.  Tactical Air Force Operations -- Tactical Air
     Control System (TACS).  Washington, D.C.:  Hdqtrs
     USAF, 1979.
          The author used this publication, updated via
     JINTACCS IOP material, for TACS background and
     employment concepts.
Doctrinal Information Publication (DIP)-10.  Background
     Information on Air Force Perspectives for Coherent
     Plans.  Washington, D.C.:  Hdqtrs USAF, April 1981.
          DIP 10 is one of the initial documents of the
     post-Omnibus USAF campaign to promote functional
     componency within unified commands.
DIP-12.  Command Relationships.  Washington, D.C.:  Hdqtrs
     USAF, Jan 1984.
          DIP 12 follows earlier DIP's 10 and 11 and intro-
     duces the desired changes to JCS Pub 2 required to
     promote functional componency within unified commands.
                        USA Primary
Field Manual (FM) 100-1.  The Army.  Washington, D.C.:
     Hdqtrs USA, 14 Aug 1981.
          Basic Army mission perception background.
FMFM 100-5.  Operations.  Washington, D.C.:  Hdqtrs USA,
     Sept 1982.
          This publication is the basic organization and
     operations explanation of the Air-Land Battle concept
     now practiced by the Army.
FM 100-26.  The Air-Ground Operations System.  Washington,
     D.C.:  Hdqtrs USA, 1979.
          The AGOS publication was used to review the Air
     Force-Army direct/close air support operations
Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-6.  NATO Glossary
     of Terms and Definitions for Military Use.  Brussels,
     Belgium:  NATO Military Agency for Standardization
     (NMAS), 1 Apr 1984.
Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) 33.  NATO Tactical Air
     Doctrine.  Brussels, Belgium:  NMAS, 11 Mar 1976.
ATP 40.  Doctrine and Procedures for Airspace Control in
     the Combat Zone.  Brussels, Belgium:  NMAS, Dec 1984.
DIP 1.  So You Want to Know About JCS Pub 2!  Washington,
     D.C.:  Hdqtrs USAF, 25 Aug 1979.
DIP 4.  Service Issues -- How They Arise.  Washington,
     D.C.:  Hdqtrs USAF, 23 Feb 1979.
DIP 11.  Command Relationships, The Marine Air/Ground Task
     Force, and What Than to an Airman!  Washington,
     D.C.:  Hdqtrs USAF, 1981.
FMFM 0-1.  Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine.
     Washington, D.C.   Hdqtrs USMC, 31 Aug 1979.
JITF.  JINTACCS Technical Interface Design Plan, Volume VI,
     Air Operations.  Fort Monmouth, N.J.:  JITF, Dec 1984.
Joint Service Agreement:  USA/USAF Agreement for the Joint
     Attack of the Second Echelon.  Washington, D.C.:
     Hdqtrs USA and USAF, 28 Nov. 1984.
Moymer, William W.  Airpower in Three Wars.  Washington,
     D.C.:  Dept. of Air Force, 1978.
          Retired General Moymer is one of the foremost
     USAF writes on theater functional componency for all
     joint force operations.  This history is slanted
     heavily to support that preference but is still a very
     comprehensive review of TACAIR C2 and employment in
     WW II, Korea and Vietnam.
                Studies, Papers and Messages
Advanced Amphibious Study Group Background Paper.  Service
     vs. Functional Components.  Washington, D.C.:  Hdqtrs
     USMC, 23 Jul 1982.
          This is the most comprehensive compilation of
     USMC Service componency arguments and directly
     counters many USAF functional componency arguments.
Commanding General MCDEC Letter "Command and Control of
     Marine Tactical Aviation (TACAIR) During Sustained
     Land Operations as Simulated in JINTACCS Combined
     Functional Segment Test-02" (with Enclosure (1) --
     Draft OH 5-1.1).  Quantico, Va.: MCDEC, 11 Jun 1984.
          This is a major revision to OH 5-1.1, regrettably
      never promulgated.  it incorporates changes proposed
     by the author and innumerable FMF commands.
Commanding Officer MCTSSA letter "Command and Control of
     Marine Tactical Aviation (TACAIR) During Sustained
     Land Operations."  Camp Pendleton, Ca.:  MCTSSA,
     12 Mar 1984.
          This letter contained OH 5-1.1 proposed changes
     developed by the author while working JINTACCS air
     operations IOP's at MCTSSA.
Harke, D. M., LtCol, USMC, letter "MAGTF Command Relation-
     ships During Sustained Operations Ashore; Point Paper
     179-82."  Washington, D.C.:  Hdqtrs USMC, 1 Apr 1982.
          This and the following three references are major
     point papers, with innumerable enclosures, outlining
     Marine Corps positions on the major TACAIR C2 and
     functional componency issues.
Harke, D. M., LtCol, USMC, letter "Service vs. Functional
     Components, the Marine Corps Position; Point Paper
     378-83."  Washington, D.C.:  Hdqtrs USMC, 20 May 1983.
Roser, H. G., LtCol, USMC, letter "Information for MGen
     Godfrey Concerning Command and Control Issues Relating
     to the Employment of Marine TACAIR; Point Paper
     781-84."  Washington, D.C.:  Hdqtrs USMC, 12 Oct 1984.
Thiry, G. E., LtCol, USMC, letter "Command and Control of
     Marine TACAIR; Point Paper 455-84."  Washington, D.C.:
     2 Jul 1984.
Commanding General, Third Marine Aircraft Wing message DTG
     240039Z Feb 82.  "Joint Readiness Exercise Gallant
     Knight 82 After Action Report."  El Toro, Ca.
          This after action report elaborates on signifi-
     cant difficulties experienced by 3D MAW during a joint
     exercise in which Omnibus was exercised.  It high-
     lights several potential communications and commander
     personality problem areas.
Joint Chiefs of Staff message DTG 042226Z Dec 81.  "Command
     Relationships in Operational Plan Development."
     Washington, D.C.
          This message was distributed following the
     Omnibus statement to reaffirm the JCS position
     that the joint force commander had the authority
     to organize his command as he deemed appropriate.
Commanding General MCDEC letter "Annual Review of the
     Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication System."  Quantico,
     Va.:   MCDEC, 30 Nov 1984.
           This letter and its enclosures outline the now
     underway program for complete reorganization of the
     Marine Corps FMFM series publications.  The new
     alignment parallels closely that of the USAF with
     its different levels of doctrine and operational
     procedures publications.
Cardwell, Thomas A., III, Col, USAF.  "One Step Beyond:
     Airland Battle, Doctrine Not Dogma."  Military
     Review, Vol. LXIV, No. 4, Apr. 19, 84, pp. 45-54.
           Col Cardwell is a major author on USAF doctrine
     at this time.  His work in periodicals, DIP's and AFM
     is strongly unity of command and air functional
     componency related.  This particular article is on
     doctrinal nuances and implications for the Air Force
     on the "deep battle" of the Airland concept.
Cardwell, Thomas A., III, Col, USAF.  "The Quest for Unity
     of Command," Air University Review, Vol, XXXV, No. 4,
     May-Jun 1984, pp. 25-29.
          A strong appeal for functional componency and
     theater functional component commander authority.
Joint Tactical Command, Control and Communication Agency
     (JTC3A).  JINTACCS Update.  Nov 1984, pp. 1-12.
     (Ft. Monmouth, N.J.).
          This quarterly publication delineates update
     material on all the JINTACCS programs.
Kosiba, Leo M., Col, USA.  "Improving the Joint Doctrinal
     Process:  Reinforcing Success," Military Review,
     Vol., LXIV, No. 1, Jan 1984, pp. 46-49.
          This article promotes joint service activity of
     many kinds to resolve and standardize the operating
     procedures required for joint operations.  Its review
     of the Army-Air Force ALFA projects is particularly
Machios, James A., Maj, USAF.  "TACAIR Support for the Air-
     land Battle," Air University Review, Vol. XXXV, No. 4,
     May-Jun 1984, pp. 16-24.
                        ANNEX B
		        ANNEX B
                Proposed Reworded Ominbus
                     POLICY FOR 
     The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander
will retain operational control of his organic air assets.
The primary mission of the MAGTF air combat element is the
support of the MAGTF ground element.  During joint opera-
tions, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of
the MAGTF mission.  When the joint force commander estab-
lishes antiair warfare (or counter air), air interdiction
and/or air reconnaissance campaigns in general support of
the JTF as a whole, the MAGTF commander will make sorties
available to the joint force commander, for coordination or
tasking through his designated air authority, to equitably
support and participate in those campaigns.  The MAGTF will
fulfill as much as possible its own direct support air
requirements.  Sorties expected to be available in excess
of its joint force general support obligations and its own
direct support requirments will be provided to the joint
force commander for further appropriate support of the
joint force.
     Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the
theater or joint force commander, in the exercise of
operational control, to assign missions, redirect efforts,
and direct coordination among his subordinate commanders to
insure unity of effort in accomplishment of his overall
mission, or to maintain integrity of the force, as
prescribed in JCS Pub II, "Unified Action Armed Forces
                OPERATIONAL HANDBOOK 5-1.1,
     TO OH 5-1.1
MCDEC Draft Revision to OH 5-1.1 of 11 June 1984
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