Marine Air Over Korea: Pusan To The Chosin Breakout
CSC 1985
SUBJECT AREA Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
When North Korean Communists invaded South Korea in 1950,
UN forces had little time to prepare for war. They had to react
quickly to the Communist agression to prevent being pushed off
the penisula and they had to infuse more UN forces into the fight.
One of the first UN forces sent to Korea was the hastily-
organized 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, a regimental combat team
consisting of the 5th Marine Regiment and Marine Air Group - 33.
As the air component of the Marine Brigade, MAG-33 provided
air support for the ground Marines and for other UN forces, as
needed. While the Brigade was being rushed about the Pusan Per-
imeter plugging up gaps in the UN defenses, the Corsairs of MAG-33
often provided the combat strength required to win the battles.
MAG-33 pilots delivered accurate and highly effective close air
support in early Korean battles known as Chindong-ni, Kosong, and
the 1st and 2nd Battles of the Naktong Bulge.
Within four months of the outbreak of hostilities, 1st Marine
Division and 1st Marine Air Wing arrived in Korea, just in time to
participate in the Inchon amphibious assault. At this battle also,
Marine air played a pivotal role in the outcome of the assault.
After the Inchon invasion initiated the retreat of the North
Korean forces, the Marines were ordered north above the 38th Par-
allel to help encircle and destroy the North Korean forces. Just
when North Korea appeared defeated, the Chinese Communists entered
the fight and surrounded the 1st Marine Division. 1st MAW Corsairs,
once more, provided deadly close air support to enable UN ground
forces to make a fighting withdrawal back to the coast and safety.
In the early campaigns at Pusan, Inchon, and the Chosin Res-
ervoir, the squadrons of 1st MAW provided invaluable aerial sup-
port to the UN forces and often determined whether battles were
won or lost. Their performance was so impressive that numerous
UN commanders commented highly on the effectiveness of Marine air
support.
Without the presence of Marine aviation, the outcome of the
Korean conflict might have been much different for the UN forces.
Marine pilots truly earned their flight pay.
MARINE AIR OVER KOREA:
PUSAN TO THE CHOSIN BREAKOUT
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement: During the early campaigns of the Korean
conflict, U. S. Marine aviation provided reliable and highly
effective air support for UN ground forces and proved to be
a vital key to the UN military successes.
I. Pusan Perimeter
A. Chindong-ni
B. Kosong
C. 1st Battle of the Naktong
D. 2nd Battle of the Naktong
II. Amphibious Landings
A. Inchon
B. Wonsan
III. Chosin Reservoir
A. The Breakout
B. Hagaru
C. Koto-ri
D. Hungnam
ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure Page
1. Map of Korea 2
2. Invasion from North 3
3. North Korean Advances 5
4. Pusan Perimeter 7
5. Japan and Korea 8
6. Combat Air Bases 8
7. Task Force Kean 12
8. 1st Battle of the Naktong 16
9. 2nd Battle of the Naktong 19
10. Inchon Landing 22
11. Wonson - Iwon Landings 25
12. CCF Offensive 28
13. First Marine Division
Line of March 30
MARINE AIR OVER KOREA:
PUSAN TO THE CHOSIN BREAKOUT
At 4 a.m. on 25 June 1950, eight divisions of the North
Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) swept across the 38th Parallel and
struck into South Korea along six invasion routes (figs. 1 &
2). This attack was the culmination of several years of
political disputes and military clashes between the North
and South Korean governments and began what was to be known
as the Korean "conflict" between United Nations and Communist
forces.
The speed and violence of the Communist attack stunned
the South Korean (ROK) defenders, and by mid-morning of the
day of the attack, all six invading columns had broken through
the ROK outposts and were rushing to capture the capital city
of Seoul. On 28 June, Seoul fell, and the South Korean gov-
ernment fled farther south to Taejon.
On 29 June 1950, General Douglas MacArthur, Commander
of UN Forces in the Far East, was ordered by the United Nat-
ions to use U.S. forces in Japan to help stem the Communist
invasion. On 30 June, 2 rifle battalions of the U.S. 24th
Infantry Division were placed under the temporary command of
Major General W. F. Dean and airlifted into Pusan, Korea.
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One U. S. battalion went into position at Osan, south of Seoul,
and was quickly routed by the stronger Communist force (fig. 3).
Three days later, the second U. S. battalion was severely beaten
at Chonan, and the Communist onslaught continued south with great
speed.1 It was already clear that the North Koreans were rush-
ing for Pusan and a quick ending to the war.
U.S. Army reinforcements continued to arrive from Japan,
and by 13 July, 2 regiments of the 24th Infantry Division had
formed hasty defensive positions along the Kum river. That
same day, the 25th Infantry Division landed at Pusan, and Lt.
General W. H. Walker, leader of the U.S. Eighth Army, was named
as commander of all UN ground forces in Korea.
On 15 July, 3 Communist divisions broke through the 20-
mile American front along the Kum river. For 5 days, the
Americans attempted a stand at Taejon but were unsuccessful.
On 21 July, while trying to break out of Taejon, MajGen Dean
was cut off from his troops and was eventually taken prisoner.
MajGen Dean would remain in captivity for the remainder of the
war, but his bravery in battle had won him the Medal of Honor.2
The delaying action fought by the unaided 24th Division
had cost over 1,000 American lives, but it had slowed the
Communist advance and won precious time while fresh UN forces
were being sent to Korea. One of the forces enroute by this
time was the hastily organized 1st Provisional Marine Brigade.
On 2 July 1950, General MacArthur requested a Marine Reg-
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imental Combat Team (RCT), with appropriate air support for
employment in Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this
request the same day, and, with the conflict only 10 days old,
U.S. Marines were on their way to war once more, this time in
Korea.
The 5th Marine Regiment, supported by the artillery of
1st Battalion, 11th Marines, was selected as the ground unit
of the Marine Brigade. Marine Air Group (MAG) - 33 was chosen
as the air component. On 5 July 1950, this RCT-MAG force was
designated as the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. BGen E. A.
Craig was appointed as Commanding General of the Brigade, and
BGen T. J. Cushman was designated as Commanding General of the
reinforced air group.
The Marine Brigade, including its air component, was form-
ally activated on 7 July 1950, and began loading for Korea on
the 9th. By 14 July, approximately 6,500 ground and air Marines
set sail for the Far East and the Korean conflict.3
By late July, the situation in Korea had reached a crisis.
The Communists were threatening to break through the Pusan Per-
imeter, which was held by remnants of the battered and sorely
outnumbered American and ROK armies (fig. 4). The Marines were
badly needed. With the Army units falling back along all fronts,
Pusan, the only Korean port still in UN hands, was in danger of
being lost. The Marine Brigade was originally scheduled to stage
into Korea through Japan, but the urgency of the military situat-
ion forced the Brigade to proceed directly to Pusan. The ground
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elements landed at Pusan on 2 August and began to debark. The
air component proceeded to Japan by faster transportation and
landed there on 31 July (fig. 5).4
While the ground units of the Brigade were debarking at
Pusan, MAG-33 quickly deployed its units and readied for combat
operations. The major elements of MAG-33 included:
UNIT AIRCRAFT / MISSION
VMF-214 F4U4B Corsairs
VMF-323 F4U4B Corsairs
VMF(N)-513 F4U5B Corsairs
VMO-6 OY-2 spotter aircraft
HO3S-1 helicopters
MTACS-2 Tactical Air Control
Squadron
MGCIS-1 Ground-Controlled
Intercept Squadron
For maximum mobility and striking power, VMF-214 and
VMF-323 were based aboard "jeep" aircraft carriers during
the initial operations in Korea. The VMF-214 "Blacksheep"
Corsairs were based on the USS Sicily, and the VMF-323
"Deathrattlers" operated from the deck of the USS Badoeng
Strait. VMF(N)-513, equipped with a night-fighter version
of the Corsair, was initially land-based at Itazuke airfield
in Japan. The helicopters and spotter aircraft of VMO-6
were staged at Chinhae, Korea, for closer coordination with
the Marine Brigade (fig. 6). MTACS-2, the Tactical Air Con-
trol squadron, set up shop at Pusan.
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In the bitter fighting that ensued in Korea, Marine
aviators proved that they had trained well during the years
following World War II. During the early campaigns of the
Korean conflict, U.S. Marine aviation provided reliable and
highly effective air support for UN ground forces and proved
to be a vital key to the UN military successes.
PUSAN PERIMETER
When the Marine Brigade landed at Pusan of 2 August 1950,
it was immediately assigned as part of the U.S. Eighth Army
Task Force Kean. While ground elements of the Brigade were
preparing for a counterattack west toward Chonju, the aviation
elements of MAG-33 struck the first blow for the Marine Corps
in Korea. On 3 August, Major R. P. Keller led a flight of 8
VMF-214 Corsairs from the USS Sicily in the first Marine air
strike of the Korean war. Major Keller's flight bombed, rock-
eted, and strafed enemy positions near the towns of Sandon-ni
and Chinju. Three days later, the "Deathrattlers" of VMF-323
flew 30 sorties in support of Eighth Army units west of Pusan.
On 7 August, VMF(N)-513 added its support with a night strike
launched from Itazuke airfield in Japan against enemy-held
positions near Kumchon.5
Although these first Marine air strikes were interdiction
and deep air support missions, the two carrier-based squadrons
would quickly be tasked with that type of mission for which
Marine aviators were best known -- close air support. The vet-
eran Marine pilots of World War II soon realized that they
would have to modify the aerial tactics they had used in
the previous war.
Enemy air forces had been controlled early in the fight,
and there was little heavy anti-aircraft opposition in the
early actions. However, due to the low cloud ceilings common
to the summer rainy season, close air support (CAS) attacks
had to be made at low altitude, and the attacking aircraft
usually encountered heavy enemy small arms fire. Numerous
aircraft and several pilots were lost to this crude, but
effective, method of anti-aircraft fire.
CHINDONG-NI
On 6 August, the Eighth Army Task Force Kean (named for
its commander, MajGen W. B. Kean) launched a UN counterattack
west from Pusan to halt a Communust "end run" through the
southwest portion of the perimeter (fig. 7). The 1st Prov-
isional Marine Brigade was attached to the 25th Infantry
Division and ordered west to relieve U.S. Army units near
Chindong-ni.
Task Force Kean moved out with VMF-323 and VMF-214
Corsairs flying constant close air support strikes ahead of
the Marine and Army ground units. Marine aviators on the
front lines and Army artillery forward observers acted as
forward air controllers, using radios to direct the aircraft
to enemy trouble spots. Ground commanders quickly discovered
that air strikes were the most effective weapon against enemy
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positions dug in on the reverse slopes of the ridges.
Napalm, dropped from low altitude, was recognized as
the most effective air weapon against tanks, troops in trenches,
and inflammable targets. The 5-inch rockets were good against
vehicles, trains, and gun positions, but 100- and 500-pound
bombs proved best against bridges, buildings, and area targets.
However, the pilots' favorite was a mix of high-explosive, in-
cendiary, and armor-piercing 20mm cannon ammunition, which dis-
intigrated vehicles, stopped locomotives, and mowed down enemy
troops.6
Task Force Kean's attack stalled during the morning of
7 August, and BGen Craig was ordered to assume control of all
troops in the Chindong-ni area. Under this new leadership,
the Task Force gained momentum, repulsed a Communist dawn
attack on 8 August, and continued the attack toward the task
force objective of Chinju. By the evening of 9 August, the
core of the enemy resistance had broken, and the Brigade moved
ahead rapidly.
KOSONG
August 11 proved to be a very productive day for Marine
air near the village of Kosong. This action, later known as
the "Kosong turkey shoot", began with an artillery bombard-
ment of the town of Kosong. The artillery was devastating
and prompted major elements of the North Korean 83rd Motor-
ized Regiment to attempt a hasty withdrawal to the west. Too
late, they realized their mistake. Overhead, a division of
VMF-323 Corsairs, led by Major A. A. Lund, spotted the road-
bound enemy column of over 200 trucks, jeeps, and other veh-
icles which carried the regiment's troops and supplies. As
the Corsairs began their strafing runs, the enemy column
ground to a halt and became totally disorganized. During
the attack, the Corsairs encountered heavy enemy ground fire,
but managed to destroy over 40 vehicles before being relieved
by another flight of VMF-323 aircraft.7 However, not all went
well for the pilots of VMF-323 this day.
The original attacking flight did not escape unscathed.
Two of the four planes, piloted by Capt. V. Moses and 2Lt. D.
Coyle, were damaged by enemy fire and forced to make emergency
landings in enemy territory. When his plane crash-landed,
Capt. Moses was thrown clear of the aircraft but landed un-
concious in a rice paddy and drowned. He became MAG-33's
first combat death.8
Luckily, 2Lt. Coyle's experience that day had a more
fortunate and even somewhat humorous ending. Within 5 minutes
of his emergency landing, 2Lt Coyle was rescued by an HO3S-1
helicopter piloted by Lt G. F. Lueddeke of VMO-6. After enter-
ing the helicopter, Coyle slapped what he thought was an enlist-
ed man on the back and said, "Thanks, Mac. I sure am glad to
see you." He was later somewhat embarassed to learn that he
had been addressing the Brigade commander, General Craig, who
had gone along to observe helicopter operations.9
1ST BATTLE OF THE NAKTONG
At midnight on 12 August, the Brigade was ordered to
disengage from the enemy near Sanchon and to move to another
threatened portion of the Pusan Perimeter along the Naktong
river (fig. 8). During the morning of 15 August, the Marine
Brigade arrived by truck at the location which would soon
become known as the "Naktong Bulge."
During the night of 6 August, one of the most disting-
uished Communist units, the NKPA 4th Division, had forced a
1,000-man bridgehead across the Naktong river by wading
through chest-deep water and pulling crude rafts loaded with
vehicles, heavy weapons, and supplies.10 By 8 August, the
NKPA 4th Division had engaged elements of the U.S. 24th
Infantry and had a firm foothold within the UN perimeter.
Thus began the 1st Naktong Counteroffensive.
During the now well-known battles of the "1st Naktong"
(Obong-ni Ridge, Finger Ridge, etc.), MAG-33 provided in-
valuable combat strength to both U.S. Army and Marine units.
OY-2 spotter aircraft from VMO-6 hovered over the battlefield
throughout the daylight hours, spotting for artillery units
and providing control for the numerous airstrikes conducted
by the Corsairs. At night, VMF(N)-513's "Nightmare" Corsairs
silenced enemy artillery and mortars by aiming at little more
than just artillery muzzle flashes. One pilot dive-bombed
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the "X" formed by tracers from two widely displaced machine
guns, both sighted in over the target which was in defilade.11
After much fighting in the Naktong Bulge, the enemy
forces were finally driven back across the river, and the
perimeter was restored. Marine supporting arms were credited
with the final restoration of the perimeter, due to the dev-
astating air and artillery barrages delivered on the withdraw-
ing enemy forces.
On 19 August, the Marine Brigade was detached from Task
Force Kean and was ordered into Eighth Army reserve. BGen
Craig ordered his units to a rear bivouac area near Masan to
rest and await further orders. This bivouac area became known
as the "Bean Patch" because it was just that -- a bean patch
large enough to accomodate a brigade.
At the Bean Patch, the Brigade busied itself rearming
and restocking with supplies trucked in from Pusan. Patrols
in the rugged country around the Bean Patch were fed hot meals
delivered in special containers by the versatile helicopters
of VMO-6. BGen Craig also utilized the services of VMO-6's
helicopters to fly him and his staff to and from meetings
within the perimeter.
For the air component of the Brigade, however, the
successful close of the 1st Battle of the Naktong Bulge
brought little change in operations. Other UN forces were
still engaged and needed the air support which MAG-33 could
deliver. For the remainder of the month of August, the
Corsairs of VMF-214 and VMF-323 ranged along the perimeter
in support of U.S. Army and ROK units. During this period,
Marine aircraft were largely directed by airborne Air Force
controllers or by Army ground controllers, but they still
consistently produced the same high quality results as when
working under Marine control.
2ND BATTLE OF THE NAKTONG
The end of August brought an unexpected turn of events
for the Marine Brigade. By 1 September, fresh Communist
forces had again penetrated east of the Naktong river and
were seriously threatening the UN perimeter (fig. 9). Once
more the call went out for the "fire brigade" to plug the
hole.
When news of the projected recommitment reached Brigade
headquarters, VMF-323 was in Japan enjoying some rest and
recuperation, and VMF-214 was scheduled to follow soon after.
At 1600 on 1 September, VMF-323 received the new word while
most of its personnel were on leave in Kyoto and its planes
were at Itami airfield. By 2200, all but 12 members of the
squadron had reported in, and VMF-323 headed back into the
action.12
On 3 September, the Brigade returned to the Naktong area
and was placed opposite the center of the new bulge in the
perimeter. As the Marine units stepped off in the attack,
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Marine air was unable to help initially due to heavy fog and
low cloud cover. This time, the Brigade found itself pitted
against the NKPA 9th Division, which was armed with Russian-
made tanks and heavy direct fire weapons.
By 4 September, the NKPA 9th Division was attacking
under a full head of steam and was met head-on by the Marine
Brigade. The weather had cleared, and the Corsairs of MAG-33
ranged overhead, delivering their ordnance with deadly accur-
acy. Under the combined combat weight of the Marine air-
ground forces, the NKPA 9th Division eventually collapsed
and withdrew across the Naktong river once more. After re-
establishing the perimeter, the Brigade was withdrawn to Pusan
to embark aboard shipping for the anticipated amphibious land-
ing at Inchon.
Although it had been in combat for only about a month,
the Marine Brigade had exceeded all expectations. An accur-
ate estimate of the damage inflicted upon the enemy by Marine
pilots is difficult to determine, but one thing was certain --
the aviators of MAG-33 had acquitted themselves well, and no
one knew it better than the Marines on the ground. Of MAG-33's
performance, Brigadier General Craig said:
Close air support furnished by Marine airmen
was a marvel to everybody concerned, including the
Marines. We had never seen anything like it, even
in our practice.13
INCHON / WOSAN LANDINGS
After the 2nd Battle of the Naktong, UN and Communist
forces reached a stalemate along the Pusan Perimeter. To
break this deadlock, General MacArthur conceived a daring
plan to conduct an amphibious assault at Inchon to cut the
Communist supply lines to the north and to isolate the North
Korean forces in the south.
For the landing at Inchon and to facilitate future
operations, two reinforced U.S. divisions, the 7th Infantry
and the 1st Marine, were combined to form X Corps, under the
command of Marine Major General E. M. Almond.
By mid-September, the major elements of the 1st Marine
Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing were in place in
Korea and Japan and were beginning to take part in the combat
operations. Major General Field Harris commanded the Marine
Air Wing, which now included MAG-12 and the elements of MAG-33
which had taken part in the Pusan campaign. Besides the Cor-
sairs of MAG-33, 1st MAW assets now included the Corsairs of
VMF-312 and VMF-212, as well as the twin-engined F7F "Tiger-
cats" from VMF(N)-542.
INCHON
On 15 September, X Corps, following in the wake of a
terrific naval bombardment, stormed ashore at Inchon and
began to fight its way to the capital city of Seoul. All
during D-Day of the invasion, the carrier-based Corsairs of
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VMF-214 and VMF-323 added their bomb, napalm, and strafing
power to the bombardment of Inchon and the island of Wolmi-do.
The port of Inchon fell on the first day, and Kimpo airfield
was captured shortly before midnight on the 17th by the 5th
Marine Regiment.14 Less than one hour after the capture of
Kimpo airfield, the helicopters of VMO-6 landed and started
to evacuate the dead and wounded.
On 19 September, VMF-212 and VMF(N)-542 flew into Kimpo
from Itami airfield in Japan. VMF-312 was called forward to
Kimpo on 28 September, and by 1 October, MGCIS-1 and MTAS-2
had established a radar warning system and a Tactical Air
Direction Center (TADC) at Kimpo to direct all aircraft in
the X Corps area.15 Now, Marine air efforts began in earnest.
The invasion at Inchon broke the back of the Communist
forces in South Korea, and UN forces began to advance stead-
ily north from the Pusan Perimeter. Thousands of North Korean
soldiers were captured, and South Korea was soon back in friend-
ly hands.
On 8 October, the amphibious phase of the Inchon operat-
ion was declared terminated. X Corps was loaded back onto
ships at Inchon and transported by the Navy to the northeast-
ern coast of Korea for still another amphibious landing.
General MacArthur's overall plan called for X Corps to land
at the port city of Wonsan, 80 miles above the 38th Parallel,
while the Eighth Army continued its attack north from Seoul
across the 38th Parallel. Eventually, these two forces would
encircle the enemy forces, destroy them, and end the war in
Korea.
WONSAN
The 1st Marine Division landed unopposed at Wonsan on
26 October, and three days later, the 7th Infantry Division
came ashore at Iwon (fig. 11). All units drove quickly in-
land, with the Marines striking toward the Chosin Reservoir
and the 7th Infantry Division heading to the northwest.
Simultaneously, two ROK divisions swept north toward the
Manchurian border.16
A former Japanese airfield at Wosan became the first
base of operations for the 1st MAW in this new area, and on
14 October, VMF-312 and VMF(N)-542 landed there to begin work.
The USS Badoeng Strait moved into the waters off Wonsan with
VMF-323 embarked, and VMF-214 debarked from the USS Sicily
to operate from the Wonsan airfield.
1st MAW aircraft provided close air support as Marine
units fought north and as the Siberian-like winter began to
close in on the UN forces. In late October and early November,
the carrier-based pilots were confronted with new dangers from
the icy and snow-covered carrier decks. Aircraft which had
stood the night on the carrier deck had to be taken below to
the hangar deck to thaw out and have the ice removed. Ashore,
similar problems faced the aviation units. Icing conditions,
low cloud ceilings, and snow combined to make flight operations
extremely hazardous. However, despite these hardships, Marine
air units continued to provide timely and accurate air support.
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During this period, VMF-312's normal missions consisted
of attacking bodies of North Korean troops attempting to es-
cape the UN forces. On 19 October, a flight of VMF-312 Cor-
sairs attacked 500 enemy troops near Yangdok, killing about
100. On 24 October, another VMF-312 flight attacked a body
of 800 enemy on the road near Kansong and caused over 200
casualties.17
As November wore on and UN forces met with continued
success, the North Koreans seemed pretty well beaten. There
was even some talk of "home before Christmas," as the UN
forces raced for the Yalu river which formed the border be-
tween North Korea and China.
As the world would soon discover, the Chinese Communists
had another surprise in store for the UN forces.
CHOSIN RESERVOIR
On 26 November 1950, ten divisions of the Chinese Com-
munist Army crossed the Yalu river and attacked the ROK II
Corps, and the U.S. 2nd and 25th Army Divisions.18 The ROK
forces were anihilated, and the 2nd Division lost over 80
percent of its troops and heavy weapons. The UN forces soon
realized that they were in a "new and different" war, and
that they faced a fresh, new army of over 200,000. British
and Turkish brigades were badly mauled as they attempted to
cover the withdrawing UN forces. By 28 November, the Eighth
Army was wholly turned south with the Chinese in pursuit at
the rate of about six miles per day.19
On 20 November, the advance guard of the main Marine
column captured several Chinese soldiers who warned that a
Communist ambush awaited at Yudam-ni, west of the Chosin
Reservoir. Little heed was paid to these enlisted soldiers,
and the column continued north. During the night of 28 Nov-
ember, a new Chinese army seemed to rise from the ground as
8 Chinese divisions struck the 1st Marine Division. At the
time of this attack, the 7th and 5th Marines were in Yudam-ni,
and the 1st Marines were protecting the main supply route
(MSR) with single battalions at Hagaru, Koto-ri, and Chin-
hung-ni (fig. 12). Within two hours after darkness fell,
Marine units all along the 53-mile MSR were simultaneously
engaged by the Communists.20
On 28 November, Marine Corsairs provided support for
the UN forces in numerous areas. Northeast of the Chosin
Reservoir, VMF-323 planes supported the withdrawing ROK forces.
To the west, VMF-312 and VMF-214 aircraft conducted their at-
tacks in support of the Eighth Army, which was attempting to
withdraw to more defensible positions. VMF-212 flew all of
its sorties in support of Marine units near the reservoir.
The Corsairs were most effectively used at this point
to prevent the Chinese from massing their forces. Marine
pilots were constantly strafing enemy concentrations and
breaking up Communist attacks. On 28 November, enemy troop
concentrations were attacked 29 times; on 29 November, the
number of similar attacks jumped to 61.21
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With their supply routes blocked in the south, the units
of X Corps attempted to regroup and to establish defensive
positions, as the bitter cold and supply shortages began to
take their toll. Ammunition and medical supplies were air-
dropped by Marine R4Ds and R4Q transports, while helicopters
from VMO-6 made regular flights to evacuate the wounded.
Marine R4D and R4Q transports shuttled day and night from
Itami airfield in Japan to Yongpo airfield, bringing in vit-
ally needed medical supplies and evacuating casualties to
hospitals in Japan. Marine transports also flew supply and
evacuation sorties into the short airstrip at Hagaru.22
After four days of fighting the bitter cold and the
fanatical Chinese Communists, 1st Marine Division's position
became untenable. On 30 November, the decision was made for
the Marines to break out of the encirclement and to return
to the coast.
THE BREAKOUT
On 1 December, the 1st Marine Division wheeled about
and, led by the 7th Marines, started to fight south toward
Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni (fig. 13). This Marine withdrawal
was destined to become an epic story of courage and survival,
and, once again, Marine air support would play a decisive
role.
Never in Marine history had so much depended on a sup-
porting arm, yet never had circumstances conspired so well
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to prevent Marine air from carrying out its mission. The low
overcasts combined with the bitter cold and rugged terrain to
render close air support missions almost impossible. The ex-
treme cold also produced maintenance and logistic problems
for 1st MAW units, as engine oil froze and mechanics were
forced to perform delicate engine work while exposed to the
extreme cold. Lack of fueling and bomb-handling equipment
and spare parts also plagued 1st MAW squadrons, yet these ob-
stacles were eventually overcome, and air support was avail-
able to cover the ground elements fighting south.
During the breakout, Corsairs from all the Marine squad-
rons participated in day-long strikes against the Chinese.
OY-2 spotter aircraft flew artillery-spotting missions along
the withdrawing column, while VMO-6's helicopters continued
their medical evacuation and rescue missions. The crowded
air above the UN column was filled with cargo planes dropping
much-needed supplies, and the Corsairs were constantly wheel-
ing and diving in attacks on enemy positions. Marine Corsairs
ranged the length of the withdrawing column providing flank
security, attacking enemy concentrations, and destroying enemy
roadblocks and weapons.
1st Marine Division received 36 close air support sorties
during the daylight hours of 1 December, but the greatest ef-
fort was made in behalf of three Army battalions from the 7th
Infantry Division. For three days, these Army units had fought
a grim battle for survival against heavy odds and were in
danger of being overrun by over 3,000 Communists troops.
Captain E. P. Stamford, a Marine forward air controller as-
signed to one of the beleagured battalions, directed the
Corsairs of VMF(N)-513 against the enemy, just as the Com-
munists launched a fierce attack against the battalions.
For a few moments, the fighting was touch and go, but as
the Corsairs made repeated napalm, bomb, rocket, and straf-
ing attacks, the enemy broke ranks and fled for better cover.
In all, 46 Marine sorties were flown in support of these
Army units, allowing them to eventually join up with the
main withdrawing Marine force.23
Throughout the breakout, the Corsairs of VMF(N)-513 and
the "Tigercats" of VMF(N)-542 were constantly on station at
night over the scattered fighting fronts, silencing Chinese
artillery and automatic weapons fire. Gun flashes revealed
the enemy's guns, and Marine night-fighters proved that they
could knock the guns out. Ground commanders noted that the
mere sound of the night-fighters' engines would often be
enough to silence the enemy artillery.
HAGARU
By 4 December, the Marine column had reached Hagaru and
the exhausted forces were able to enjoy a brief lull in the
fighting. However, there was no respite for the Marine fliers.
On 4 and 5 December, Marine pilots flew a total of 297 sorties
against enemy positions, vehicles, and troop concentrations
around Hagaru.24
On the morning of 6 December, the 1st Marine Division
broke out of Hagaru and continued its attack toward the coast.
By 0715, 18 Corsairs of VMF-214 had reported on station and
were quickly put to work. After advancing only 2,000 yards
from Hagaru, the column was halted by intense enemy fire. As
the Corsairs attacked the enemy positions, 81mm mortar fire
was continued, even though the mortar shell trajectories
were higher than the altitude of the attacking planes. Rather
than lose the firepower of the 81s, the mortar gunners were
instructed to aim at the tails of the attacking aircraft to
ensure that none of the planes were shot down. Under this
combined bombardment, the enemy guns were silenced in about
an hour, and the column continued southward.
On this day also, a new innovation was introduced to help
control the crowded airspace over the withdrawing Marine column.
A four-engine Marine R5D transport, hastily equipped with add-
itional communications equipment, was provided by VMR-152 and
operated as a flying Tactical Air Direction Center. From its
station above the column, this airborne TADC was in excellent
position to receive radio transmissions from ground units and
to control all aircraft supporting the division.25
KOTO-RI
With its arrival at Koto-ri on 7 December, the 1st Marine
Division had completed all but the last leg of its fighting
withdrawal. VMO-6 immediately continued its medical evac-
uation missions by helicopter, and Marine R4D transports
landed on the short airstrip at Koto-ri to assist in the
evacuation. The airstrip at Koto-ri was so short that a
landing signals officer (LSO) had to guide the large trans-
port aircraft onto the field, using the same techniques em-
ployed on the carrier decks.
On 8 December, the Marine column resumed the attack to
reach the safety of Chinhung-ni and, eventually, the port of
Hungnam. A raging blizzard grounded all Marine aircraft on
that day, but 9 December dawned bright and clear. By 0715,
planes from VMF-312 were over the column, attacking both
sides of the road. Flights from all the other Marine squad-
rons followed and kept up continuous attacks in support of
the ground forces.
On 10 December, another chapter in Marine aviation hist-
ory began with the arrival of VMF-311 at Yongpo airfield.
VMF-311 was the first Marine jet squadron to fly in combat,
and until 14 December, VMF-311's F9F "Panther" jets flew
interdiction sorties in support of the Marine column. The
squadron was then moved to Pusan to operate with the 5th
Air Force jets to cover the withdrawal of the Eighth Army.26
HUNGNAM
By 1300 on 11 December, the last units of the Marine
force reached Chinhung-ni, boarded trucks, and headed for
Hungnam. With the departure of the 1st Marine Division for
Hungnam and eventual evacuation by sea, the main task of the
1st Marine Aircraft Wing was finished. VMF-312, VMF(N)-513,
and VMF(N)-542 departed for Japan to join VMF-214, which had
left Korea earlier. VMR-152 continued to evacuate supplies,
equipment, and personnel. By 18 December, 1st MAW had com-
pletely withdrawn from the Hungnam area.
The fighting withdrawal was over. A Marine division
and a Marine air wing, fighting against bitter cold and seem-
ingly impossible odds, had severely mangled an enemy force
vastly superior in strength. The courage and fighting ability
of the ground Marine had been proved once more, yet the ground
Marine was the first to demand that a large share of the credit
for the successful withdrawal was due to their flying counter-
parts in 1st MAW. In the hour of greatest need, Marine airmen
had not faltered.
Major General O. P. Smith, Commanding General of the
1st Marine Division expressed the sentiments of the ground
Marines when he said:
During the long reaches of the night and in
the snow storms, many a Marine prayed for the coming
of day or clearing weather when he would again hear
the welcome roar of your planes as they dealt out
destruction to the enemy.... Never in its history
has Marine Aviation given more convincing proof of
its indispensable value to the ground Marine. A
bond of understanding has been estableshed that will
never be broken.27
REFLECTIONS
Although the fighting raged on for another two years
before the Korean armistice was signed, the evacuation of
the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Marine Air Wing at Hung-
nam marked the end of the initial phase of Korean combat for
the Marine air-ground team. Marine units had fought well,
and lessons had been learned.
During the early months of Korean combat, new tactical
developments pioneered by 1st MAW greatly advanced the UN
air effort and added to the 1st MAW reputation for versatil-
ity.28 Marine squadrons refined close air support techniques,
developed an airborne tactical air control center, and proved
that night close air support missions could be safely accomp-
lished.
Of the new tactical air support developments in the
Korean action, none had a more revolutionary effect than that
created by the Marine helicopters of VMO-6.29 Marine heli-
copters reshaped battlefield logistics in Korea and pioneered
techniques for vertical troop envelopment, aerial wire-laying,
medical evacuation, and vertical resupply.
At the end of the Pusan Perimeter campaign, BGen Craig
commended the pilots of VMO-6 and said, "Marine helicopters
have proven invaluable.... They have been used for every
conceivable type of mission."30
In the early campaigns at Pusan, Inchon, and the Chosin
Reservoir, the squadrons of 1st MAW provided invaluable aerial
support to the UN forces, and often determined whether battles
were won or lost. Pilots, as well as ground crews, were taxed
to their limits but delivered air support for the ground units
both day and night. From 3 August to 14 December, Marine tact-
ical squadrons flew a total of 7,822 sorties, and evacuated
over 5,000 UN casualties.31
5,305 of the 1st MAW sorties were close air support mis-
sions which were so accurate and deadly as to prompt UN com-
manders to comment on the effectiveness of Marine close air
support. One such comment was made by Colonel P. L. Freeman,
commander of the U.S. Army 23rd Regiment at Pusan. He stated:
The Marines on our left were a sight to behold.
Not only was their equipment superior or equal to
ours, but they had squadrons of air in direct support.
They used it like artillery. It was, "Hey, Joe - this
is Smitty - knock the left off that ridge in front of
Item Company." They had it day and night.32
Marine air in Korea, from Pusan to the Chosin Reservoir,
contributed significantly to the UN military successes and
truly earned its flight pay.
NOTES
1S. L. A. Marshall. The Military History of the Korean War.
New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1963, p. 18.
2Ibid., p. 19.
3Ernest H. Giusti. "Marine Air Over the Pusan Perimeter."
Marine Corps Gazette, v. 36, no. 5 (May 1952), p. 20.
4Ibid., p. 21.
5Ibid., p. 20.
6LtCol. C. A. Phillips, USMC (Ret.), and Major H. D. Kuokka,
USMC. "1st MAW In Korea." Marine Corps Gazette, v. 41, no. 6
(June 1957), p. 44.
7Lynn Montross and Captain N. A. Canzona, USMC. The Pusan
Perimeter -- U. S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, vol. I.
Washington: Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, U. S. Marine
Corps, 1954, p. 140.
8Ibid.
9Ibid., p. 141.
10Ibid., p. 174.
11Major Frank Smyth, USMC. "Night Support: A New Weapon."
Marine Corps Gazette, v. 35, no. 11 (Nov 1951), p. 19.
12Ernest H. Giusti. "Marine Air Over the Pusan Perimeter."
Marine Corps Gazette, v. 36, no. 5 (May 1952), p. 26.
13 Peter B. Mersky. U. S. Marine Corps Aviation - 1912 to the
Present. Maryland: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of
America, 1983, p. 131.
14LtCol. C. A. Phillips, USMC (Ret.), and Major H. D. Kuokka,
USMC. "1st MAW In Korea." Marine Corps Gazette, v. 41, no. 6
(June 1957), p. 45.
15Ibid.
16S. L. A. Marshall. The Military History of the Korean War.
New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1963, p. 30.
17Kenneth W. Condit and Ernest H. Giusti. "Marine Air at the
Chosin Reservoir." Marine Corps Gazette, v. 36, no. 7 (June 1952),
p. 20.
18S. L. A. Marshall. The Military History of the Korean War.
New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1963, p. 36.
19Ibid., p. 37.
20Ibid., p. 39.
21Kenneth W. Condit and Ernest H. Giusti. "Marine Air at the
Chosin Reservoir." Marine Corps Gazette, v. 36, no. 7 (July 1952),
p. 23.
22LtCol. C. A. Phillips, USMC (Ret.), and Major H. D. Kuokka,
USMC. "1st MAW In Korea." Marine Corps Gazette, v. 41, no. 6
(June 1957), p. 46.
23Kenneth W. Condit and Ernest H. Giusti. "Marine Air at the
Chosin Reservoir." Marine Corps Gazette, v. 36, no. 7 (June 1952),
p. 22.
24Ibid., p. 25.
25Ernest H. Giusti and Kenneth W. Condit. "Marine Air Covers
The Breakout." Marine Corps Gazette, v. 36, no. 8 (Aug 1952), p. 25.
26LtCol. C. A. Phillips, USMC (Ret.), and Major H. D. Kuokka,
USMC. "1st Maw In Korea." Marine Corps Gazette, v. 41, no. 6
(June 1957), p. 47.
27Ernest H. Giusti and Kenneth W. Condit. "Marine Air Covers
The Breakout." Marine Corps Gazette, v. 36, no. 8 (Aug 1952), p. 25.
28LtCol. P. Meid, USMCR, and Major J. Yingling, USMC. U. S.
Marine Operations in Korea -- Operations in West Korea, vol. V.
Washington: Historical Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps,
1972, p. 491.
29Ibid., p. 493.
30Peter B. Mersky. U. S. Marine Corps Aviation - 1912 to the
Present. Maryland: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of
America, 1983, p. 131.
31Ibid., p. 488.
32Andrew Geer. The New Breed: The Story of the U. S. Marines
in Korea. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952, p. 104.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Banks, Charles L., LtCol., USMC. "Air Delivery In Korea." Marine
Corps Gazette, v. 35, no. 11 (Nov 1951), pp. 46-47.
Braitsch, Fred G., Jr., MSgt., USMC. "Marine Air War." Leatherneck,
v. 34, no. 11 (Nov 1951), pp. 30-35; v. 35, no. 11 (Nov 1952),
pp. 30-35.
Condit, Kenneth W. and Ernest H. Giusti. "Marine Air at the Chosin
Reservoir." Marine Corps Gazette, v.36, no. 7 (Jul 1952), pp.
18-25.
Geer, Andrew. The New Breed: The Story of the U. S. Marines in
Korea. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952.
Giusti, Ernest H. "Marine Air Over the Pusan Perimeter." Marine
Corps Gazette, v. 36, no. 5 (May 1952), pp. 18-27.
Giusti, Ernest H. and Kenneth W. Condit. "Marine Air Covers the
Breakout." Marine Corps Gazette, v. 36, no. 8 (Aug 1952), pp.
20-27.
Giusti, Ernest H. and Kenneth W. Condit. "Marine Air Over Inchon -
Seoul." Marine Corps Gazette, v. 36, no. 6 (Jun 1952), pp. 18-
27.
Marshall, S. L. A. The Military History of the Korean War. New
York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1963.
Meid, P., LtCol., USMCR, and Major J. Yingling, USMC. U. S. Marine
Operations in Korea -- Operations in West Korea, vol. V.
Washington: Historical Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine
Corps, 1972.
Mersky, Peter B. U. S. Marine Corps Aviation - 1912 to the Present.
Maryland: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America,
1983.
Montross, Lynn, and Captain N. A. Canzona, USMC. The Pusan Perimeter
-- U. S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, vol. I. Wash-
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Montross, Lynn, and Captain N. A. Canzona, USMC. The Inchon-Seoul
Operation -- U. S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, vol. II.
Washington: Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, U. S. Marine
Corps, 1955.
Montross, Lynn, and Captain N. A. Canzona, USMC. The Chosin Reser-
voir Campaign -- U. S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953,
vol. III. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters,
U. S. Marine Corps, 1957.
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