Armor In Closed Terrain - U. S. Army Experience In Vietnam
SUBJECT AREA Warfighting
Title: Armor in Closed Terrain - U. S. Army Experience in Vietnam
I. Purpose: To establish the combat role of armor in close terrain operations
by using U.S. Army experience in Vietnam.
II. Problem: In spite of the various spectacular victory achieved by armor in
closed terrain operations during Second World War, Korean War and Vietnam War,
the general military perception has been that the combat guidelines for armor
mobility, firepower, protection and chock effect can only be exploited
effectively in an ideal terrain of open, rolling country.
III. Data: The valuable experience on armor operation in closed terrain during the
Second World War were shelved away and forgotten as soon as the war ended. Until
1966, the U.S. Army had no independent armored units deployed in Vietnam. The
decision to deploy U.S. armored units to Vietnam was made only after a careful
and exhaustive study done in 1966. Contrary to the impression of the U.S. Army
planner, the study found that armored forces could operate effectively in
Vietnam. Soon after armored forces arrived in early 1967, they proved to the
critics that their mobility, firepower, and protection could play an effective
combat role in Vietnam. As a result armor played a pivotal role in Vietnam. In
the final offensive mounted against South Vietnam, North Vietnamese Army has
proved beyond doubts that armor was not out of place in close terrain.
IV. Conclusions: The U.S. Army experience in Vietnam indicated that many
military professionals have over estimated the difficulties of closed terrain.
Armor in Vietnam has proved beyond doubts that, with thorough planning and
imaginative employment, armored forces can play a useful combat role in close
V. Recommendations: The U.S. Army must acquire and expand a capability for
operating in close terrain. This capability could be acquired now by re-
examining and analyzing tactics and techniques employed by armor in Vietnam. The
equipment modifications and innovations that were achieved in Vietnam should be
further evaluated and documented. The lession learned should be transformed into
Armor in Closed Terrain: U.S. Army Experience in Vietnam
On 13 May 1940, seven Panzer divisions swept through the Ardennes
forest, hitherto considered by France and other Allies as an impossible
physical barrier, brushed aside the light infantry resistance and dashed
westward into the French plains. The strategic surprise achieved was so
great that by 5 June, France had capitalized along with Belgium and Holland,
while the British ally fled back across the channel. This specticular
victory was achieved through the imaginative use of armored forces by the
German High Command which accomplished within a few weeks what the Germans
had failed to do in four years of bitter fighting in the First World War.1
Although this unexpected and unorthodox use of armor in closed terrain
caused much confusion amongst the Allies, this lesson was largely forgotten
as soon as the war was over.
Instead, it was the magnificant armor battles in North Africa and in
the rolling plains of Western Europe that captured the imagination of most
military men. Since then, the general military perception has been that the
combat qualities of armor mobility, firepower, protection and shock effect
can only be exploited effectively in an ideal terrain of open, rolling
country.2 Unfortunately, the greater part of the world does not enjoy the
advantage of such ideal terrain to exploit the combat qualities of the
tank. So, a doctrinal question must be answered: Can armored forces play a
useful combat role in close terrain? This paper will attempt to determine
the feasibility by examining U.S. experience in Vietnam. But, before one
can discuss the potential role of armor in closed terrain, one must
understand that, notwithstanding inherent combat values, the tank has
definite limitations too.
A glimpse at the technical characteristics of a typical Main Battle
Tank (MBT) will reveal the inherent weaknesses of this kind of weapon. For
example, the U.S. M-60 medium tank has a vertical climbing ability of only
36 inches, a ditch crossing capability of 102 inches and a fording depth of
48 inches. As for slope ascending ability, it can climb a gradient of no
more than 60 percent or traverse of side slope of no more than 30 percent.3
Faced with so many limitations, it is not illogical to conclude that the
tank is only useful in an ideal terrain, with few or no obstacles to impede
its mobility and degrade its shock effect. Terrain should also afford far
reaching and uninterrupted visibility so that the tank can exploit its
long-range firepower and at the same time, protect itself against possible
anti-tank ambushes. From the foregoing, one might conclude that the tank is
not built for the closed terrain.
In conventional military usage, closed terrain is defined as an
environment of poor visibility and trafficability such as that found in
jungles, hilly and mountainous terrain, or in built-up areas. In the
jungle, the terrain is usually rugged, covered with dense, multiple-canopied
trees and inpenetrable undergrowth, and criss-crossed by numerous rivers and
streams. In such an environment, visibility is inevitably limited and
movement is near impossbile, even for infantry. As for armor, the use of
its weaponry is greatly constrained, while vulnerability to anti-tank
ambushes is ever present. Thus, it is no surprise that the jungle has been
regarded by military men as a barrier to be avoided by armor.4
Isolated experience in World War II had shown that armor, when employed
judiciously, can play a useful combat role even in closed terrain. This was
amply demonstrated in the decisive use of armor twice by the Germans in the
Ardennes forest, again in the marshy bogland of the Kurst by the Russians;
and in the humid forests of Burma and Malaysia by the British and Japanese
respectively. Even the U.S. Army made significant use of tanks in the
rugged mountains of Sicily and Italy, and in the steaming jungles of the
Pacific Islands.5 But, as soon as the war ended, these valuable experiences
were shelved away and forgotten.
A case in point is to be found in the 1957 U. S. Army FM17-1 - Armor
Operations, Small Units6 and the 1961 FM17-30 - Armor Division Operations7
which reveals that no more than a few brief paragrpahs have been devoted to
combat in mountains, woods, and jungle areas. Obviously, there has been a
singular lack of U.S. doctrine for mechanized warfare in areas other than
the Middle East and Europe.8 In the light of this inadequacy, the U.S. Army
was compelled to relive the painful experience of learning how to use armor
in the closed terrain of Vietnam.
The closed terrain of South Vietnam presented a variety of problems,
ranging from mountains to jungles and paddy fields. The relief divides the
country into four distinct terrain types: the mountains, central plateu,
coastal plains and the delta. The mountains, which constitute two-thirds of
South Vietnam, are rugged and jungle covered. They are criss-crossed by
numerous streams and rivers. Land communications are virtually impossible
except for a few inferior roads and trails that can be used only in the dry
season. The central plateau extends along the entire Cambodian border and
is covered with either thick forests or tall Savannah grass. This terrain
is equally unsuitable for vehicular movement. The coastal plains, although
highly trafficable, are discontinuous and segmented by mountain spurs and
hills that reach out to the sea. The delta is a vast, utterly flat region
of paddy fields traversed by few roads and criss-crossed by a dense network
of deep, steep-banked canals and broad tidal rivers. The coast line and
rivers are usually lined with mangrove swamps. Trafficability, while
affected most significantly by land-forms, is also influenced by weather.
Vietnam has two distinct seasons. The Southwest Monsoon, beginning in
April and running to September, brings heavy rainfall to the mountains and
to the south and southwest. The Northeast Monsoon, lasting from October to
March, brings heavy rains to the northwest coast. One might easily conclude
from the foregoing brief review that South Vietnam, is scarcely to be
regarded as an armor-country. According to General Donn A. Starry, it was
this impression that led the U.S. Army planners to conclude that there was
no combat role for armored forces in Vietnam.9
Apart from terrain and weather considerations, there were several other
reasons that led U.S. Army planners to conclude in the early 1960's that the
war in Vietnam would be on infantry and special forces fight. The most
important reason was that the valuable experience learned so painfully in
the closed terrain of Korea has been shelved away and forgotten. It was not
suprrising that up to the 1960's, there was a singular lack of doctrine for
mechanized combat in areas other than Europe and the Deserts of the Middle
East. Take for example, the 1960 Field Manual FM17-30 - Armor Division
Operations which devoted only one brief, 14-line paragraph to combat in
closed terrain. Another reason could be traced to the unsuccessful
experience of the French armored forces in Indochina, which reinforced U. S.
military opinion that there was no place for armor in Vietnam.10 The last
reason was that U.S. Army planners felt that armored forces would not be
able to cope with the elusive "guerilla enemy" in a counterinsurgency
setting. Moreover, the emergence of the air mobile concept during this
period was thought to be the panacea to the counterinsurgency problem.
Thus, Army planners saw little or no need for armored unit in the initial
U.S. force structure in Vietnam.11
Until 1966, the U.S. Army had no independent armored units deployed in
Vietnam. Those units that operated there were the organic armored elements
of U. S. infantry and Marine divisions, or independent infantry brigades.
These consisted of one Marine tank battalion, four divisional armored
calvary squadrons, four brigade armored cavalry squadrons, and seven
mechanized infantry battalions.12 It was clear that these armored units were
not deployed to Vietnam through deliberate planning, but found their way
there as organic parts of their parent divisions or brigades. Nevertheless,
their presence enabled a pattern for mechanized infantry and armor
operations to emerge, and this was to blaze a trail for a dramatic increase
in the deployment of armored forces to Vietnam after 1967.
The decision to deploy U.S. armored units to Vietnam was made only
after a careful and exhaustive study. In late 1966, the Chief of Staff
directed the Department of Army to determine whether mechanized infantry and
armor operations would be feasible in Vietnam.13 This led to a study
entitled, "Evaluation of U.S. Army Mechanized and Armor Combat Operations in
Vietnam", MACOV in brief. The study, under the direction of Major General
Arthur L. West, Jr., was conducted between 6 January to 28 March 1967 by a
team of 99 military and civilian analysts.14 The team evaluated 18,000
questionnaires which were sent to infantry, mechanized infantry and armor
officers, and NCO's stationed in Vietnam. The military team members not
only conducted field observations, but also participated physically in
operations undertaken by armored units organic to the infantry and Marine
divisions or independent infantry brigades. The team also analyzed over
2,000 Headquarters Reports, Unit After Action Reports and Embassy files, and
interviewed many commanders and staff officers. All these data were than
analyzed in relation to the terrain and prevailing weather in Vietnam. The
findings of the MACOV Study were revealing.
Contrary to the impression of the U.S. Army planners, the study found
that armored forces could operate effectively in Vietnam. The experience of
the organic armored elements showed that armor, with its inherent combat
qualities of mobility, firepower and protection, could be a useful component
of the combined arms concept used widely in Vietnam.15 The study also found
that armored units suffered far fewer and less casualties than the infantry.
For example, 59 percent of armor personnel casualties could return to duty
within a week in comparison to 22 percent of the infantry casualties. More
importantly, the MACOV study concluded that tanks, with organic support,
could move in 61 percent of Vietnam during the dry season and 46 percent
during the wet season. Armored personnel carriers could move in 65 percent
of the country all the year round. Perhaps, what was more important was
that the results of the study provided the overriding rationale for the U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff to sanction the deployment of armored forces to
The official deployment of U.S. armored forces to Vietnam commenced in
late 1967. By 1973 the list of armored forces included four tank
battalions, one mechanized brigade, one armored calvary regiment, ten
mechanized infantry battalions, and eight armored calvary regiments. These
units made up 46 percent of the total U.S. combat forces in Vietnam. The
armor equipment used in Vietnam came from the conventional inventory of the
U.S. Army and was not modified for use in this theatre. The tank battlions
were all equipped with the M48A3, a medium tank. The only light tank
possessed by the U.S. armor in the Vietnam era was the M-551 Sheridan tank.
The M-551 was withdrawn from the Vietnam theatre after a six-month trial
revealed that it had numerous technical shortcomings which could not be
rectified.17 The main armored fighting vehicles used by the mechanized
infantry battalions and the armored calvary squadrons were the M113A1
Armored Personnel Carrier (APC), the M132 Flame Thrower, and the M125 81mm
Mortar Carrier. All this equipment, although not specifically modified, was
able to support the users with great effectiveness.
No sooner had they arrived in early 1967, than the newly deployed
armored forces proved to the critics that their mobility, firepower, and
protection could play an effective combat role in Vietnam. This was clearly
evident in the series of multi-divisional operations conducted between
January and April 1967. The most notable of these were Operation Cedar
Falls and Operation Junction City, which were major search and destroy
actions conducted around Saigon in the III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ III).18
In search and destroy operations, armored units were usually employed as
fixing (cordon) and reaction forces so that their mobility and firepower
could be exploited to the best advantage. These characteristics also
enabled mechanized units to control twice as much terrain as conventional
The combat effectiveness of armor can best be illustrated by the combat
at Fire Base Gold near Suoi Tre, 85 miles northwest of Saigon. This was one
of the three major battles fought in Operation Junction City. On 21 March
1967, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor and 2nd Battalion, 22 Infantry Mechanized
were participating in a search and destroy operation when they were ordered
to reinforced Fire Base Gold, which had come under attack by a large force
of Viet Cong (VC's) at first light.20 The fire base was defended by one U.S.
infantry battalion and one artillery battalion. By 0700 hours, parts of
defense perimeter had been breached and ammunition was running low!21 At this
juncture, a glimpse of the organization of the two armored battalions would
enable one to understand better how armor could make a difference in this
The two battalions, like all other armored elements, possessed
tremendous organic firepower and mobility. A mechanized infantry battalion
had a strength of 758 personnel mounted on 82 APC's. The APC's were armed
with 107 0.5 inch and 172 7.62mm machine guns, and 12 81mm self-propelled
mortars. The troops, apart, from their personnel M-16 rifles, were equipped
with 188 40mm grenade launchers.22 The tank battalion had 68 M4FAB's, each
equipped with one 90mm cannon, one 0.5 inch and two 7.62mm machine guns, and
one 40mm rocket launcher.23 This bristling firepower and organic mobility
proved to be a valuable combat asset in Vietnam.
While racing to the beleaguered fire base, the two battlions had to
bash through five kilometers of jungle and ford the Suoi Samat River. For
these tasks, a helicopter helped in the navigation and selection of a
suitable crossing site, and the medium tanks were used to smash through the
jungle.24 While enroute, the battalions also brushed aside two hastily-set VC
ambushes. They arrived just in time to save the embattled base as the VC's
were within five meters of the battalion aid station and within hand grenade
range of the combat post. Into this chaos came 68 medium tanks and 82
APC's, crushing through the last few trees into the clearing surrounding the
base. Upon reaching the base, the lead tanks and APC's opened up with their
cannons, machine guns and rocket launchers. The shock effect was
overwhelming, especially when the attacking VC's were caught in the open.
The ground shook as the tanks and APC's maneuvered around the perimeter of
the beleaguered base firing into the ranks of the attacking enemies and
crushing many of them under their tracks. The VC's realizing that they
could not outrun or outgun the armored vehicles, charged at them and even
attempted to climb on board. But, they were cut down by the deadly machine
gun fire. The VC's lost more than 600 men in this action.25 LtCol John A.
Bender, the Fire Base Commander, described it, "just like the late show on
T.V., the U.S. cavalry came charging to the rescue."26
The armored forces, as in many other set piece battles in Vietnam, had
turned the tide at Fire Base Gold. Their inherent flexibility enabled them
to be switched from one mission to another with the minimum of time and
fuss. In fact, a new mission could be planned by the commanders and others
delivered to the troops through the intercommunication system, all done
while on the move to the new destination. Their mobility enabled them to
bash through the jungles and reach the beleaguered base in time. Their
firepower and armored protection enabled them to deliver deadly blows to the
attacking VC's without suffering the high casualty rates of conventional
infantry. The combat effectiveness the armored forces demonstrated at Fire
Base Gold was only one of the many battles that armor played a pivotal role,
both in Operation Cedar Falls and Junction City, and throughout the Vietnam
conflict. That the combat qualities of armored forces could be exploited
with such effectiveness in the closed terrain of Vietnam had to do with
their ability to adapt to the various terrain constraints.
Within a year of their arrival in Vietnam, the armored forces had found
a useful niche in the U.S. strategy of search and destroy and also
demonstrated that they were quick to adapt to the terrain constraints. Not
surprisingly, the Commander, U. S. Army Vietnam emphasized in his 1967
Vietnam Report that,
"Tanks, APC's, self-propelled artillery and other tracked
vehicles are being employed with increasing success in
regions formerly thought alien to armored units....
Warfare in Vietnam is oriented to the enemy rather than
to terrain, therefore shock effect and heavy firepower
become most important."27
Contrary to general impressions, the jungle was not impenetrable or
insurmountable. This became more evident in the aftermath of the 1968 Tet
Offensive, when both sides changed strategy. The NVA and VC's, after having
lost more than 60,000 trained troops in the recent Tet Offensive, were
forced to retreat into the border and jungle sanctuaries to lick its wound.
The new Commander of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, General Creighton W. Abrams,
decided to pursue the enemy into these sanctuaries to keep up the pressure
on them.28 Armored units, with their inherent mobility and firepower would
now spend most of their time in the bush or jungle rooting out the NVA and
VC's. A telling example was Operation Montana Raider. This was a
reconnaissance-in-force, located near the Cambodian border. The regiment,
with 250 tracked vehicles, combed no less than 1,600 kilometers from 13
April to 13 May 19698. Of that distance, 1,300 kilometers were in dense
jungles.29 For movement in these jungles, tanks were used to break paths
through the thick vegetation for other vehicles. Where tanks encountered
difficulties, the Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV), was used to blaze a trail.
Navigation in the jungles was made easier with the aid of vehicle-mounted
compass, designed by the U.S. Army Material Command in Vietnam.30 When
terrain obstacles interfered with navigation, helicopters were used to guide
tracked vehicles along the lines of least resistance or to locate suitable
river crossing sites. To enable tracked vehicles to cross the numerous
streams and other natural obstacles, the M113 AVLB's were used with great
success, thus greatly enhancing the mobility of tracked vehicles in closed
Apart from providing tactical mobility, tanks and APC's also proved to
be extremely useful against booby traps and anti-personnel mines that were
randomly found in the jungles. As armored vehicles were extremely
vulnerable to anti-tank weapons in closed terrain, "RPG Screens" were used
during night laagers to protect armored vehicles from anti-tank chemical
rounds. The RPG screen was another field innovation in Vietnam that was no
more than a strip of cyclone fense. When erected around vehicles, it would
detonate any chemical rounds before they hit the targets.31
Operation Montana was not the only armor operation in the jungle.
Throughout the Vietnam conflict, armored forces had, either independently or
combined with the infantry, conducted numermous successful search and
destroy operations in the jungles of CTZ's I and III or in the tall Savannah
grass along the Cambodian border. In fact, 75 percent of the missions for
armored forces were on search and destroy operations.32 That mechanized
forces could operate in the jungle was due largely to their ability to
improvise equipment and techniques in overcoming terrain difficulties.
Although U.S. armored forces played a pivotal role in the Allied
Strategy in Vietnam, ironically, it was the NVA that finally proved beyond
any doubts that armor was not out of place in closed terrain.
In the final offensive mounted against South Vietnam in April 1975, the
NVA skillfully exploited the combat advantages of armor to provide the
colorful ending to the last chapter of the Vietnam War. The NVA employed
fully integrated combined arms attack formations. These consisted of a
nucleus of armor and infantry, with artillery, mobile anti-aircraft and
engineers in close support. The attack formations, organized in echelons
and well-drilled in "sudden assault" and "deep advance", were used by NVA
with spectacular success. For example, in the Tay Nguyen Battles near
Saigon, infantry were used in diversion battles on Routes 19 and 21, while
tanks and armored forces were concentrated for the next battle at Ban Me
Thout. Another example was the final assault on Saigon, in which infantry,
supported by tanks, assaulted the outer defenses in the outskirts of the
city, while tanks and armored forces were sent 40-50 kilometers into the
heart of the capital to seize the enemy's most critical military and
political targets. All this was possible only because great emphasis was
given to the mobility of the armored battle groups by the NVA.
All NVA advance columns were well supported by engineer forces whose
task was to ensure favorable trafficability. They would move ahead to
secure and strengthen bridges, organize staging areas, remove mines, repair
bridges, and overcome obstacles. Improvisations and use of local resources
were widely practiced with much imaginative planning, thorough preparations,
and aggressive execution. The NVA's advance was reported to have averaged
50-60 kilometeres per day. By 30 April 1975, the T-54's rolled into Saigon
and South Vietnam ceased to exist as a nation with the fate of the Vietnam
War now decided, it would be appropriate to conclude the experience of the
U.S. armored forces in Vietnam.
When armor arrived in Vietnam in early 1967, they proved to the critics
that the jungle was no barrier to their mobility, and that their firepower
and protection could play a useful role in the U. S. strategy and tactics
employed in Vietnam. Following this initial demonstration of effectiveness,
armor participated either independently or in conjunction with air mobile
and conventional infantry forces, in almost every major operation from the
humid jungles to the inundated delta and to the concrete jungles of the
built-up areas. Armor's protection, firepower, and ability to react quickly
prevented many certain defeats and brushed aside many ambushes with ease.
Their inherent flexibility, coupled with an ability for sustained actions,
enabled units from a typical mechanized battalion to fight up to three or
more critical battles simultaneously at widely separated locations.
That mechanized forces could operate effectively in the closed terrain
of Vietnam was largely due to their ability to improvise equipment and
techniques in overcoming terrain difficulties. In the absence of any
specifically tailored equipment and appropriate doctrine, the U. S. armor
personnel resorted to imagination and resourcefulness. They adapted quickly
and soon improvised and innovated many useful devices and techniques.
Prominent among such innovations were the AVLB's for crossing of obstacles,
use of helicopters and APC-mounted compasses for navigation in closed
terrain and RPG screens against anti-tank weapons. Many, if not most of
these innovations and improvisions were evalued by the field users in
Vietnam. In retrospect, they went a long way in enhancing the mobility of
armored forces in closed terrain. But, this was not achieved without
heartbreaks and trials.
In summing up, the U.S. Army experience in Vietnam indicated that many
military professionals have over-estimated the difficulties of closed
terrain. This unnecessary fear caused the initial absence of armor. But,
as soon as armor arrived, it found a useful niche, and as the wars
progressed, armor began to play a pivotal role. While it is true that armor
alone could not have won the wars, it provided the badly needed close
support to the infantry and constituted an essential component of all
combined arms teams or task forces.
In Vietnam, armored forces were able to overcome most of the terrain
difficulties through improvisions and thus could play a greater pivotal
role. They could even operate independently throughout Vietnam, whether in
the jungle or in the unundated delta. While it is true that armor could
operate quite effectively in closed terrain of Vietnam, experience shows
that there are some practical limits to which armor can be used in such
Although mechanized forces could move with reasonable freedom in
Vietnam, there were practical limits. For example, the mountainous jungles
would certainly be off limits to armor. The less undulating jungle can only
be traversed if tracked vehicles follow the lines of least resistance. For
this, they need to be guided by helicopter.
To be sure, armor will not be along in being confronted with such
unsurmountable terrains. These terrains are equally untrafficable to the
infantry, air mobile units, and artillery. The latter particularly requires
favorable terrain for mobility and deployment. Apart from these practical
limits, the major lesson to be learned from this study is that the U.S. Army
has, to its detriment, paid far too little attention to armored operations
Strategic and doctrinal thinking of the U.S. Army has, since World War
II, been fixed with the open, rolling fields of her Allies in NATO. It is,
therefore, not surprising that the U.S. Army has more or less consistently
ignored the experience gained by armor in closed terrain. The few but
successful examples from World War II were ignored after that conflict.
Fortunately, the U. S. Army was flexible enough to adapt to the demanding
environment in Vietnam.
The next war in which the U. S. Army is required to get involved in is
likely to be in the Third World, and again, most likely with a closed
terrain. If the U.S. armor is to avoid the painful experience of
re-learning how to use armor in closed terrain, it might be worth the while
to prepare now. For an army that boasts of global responsibilities no
aspect has been more neglected. Since the U.S. Army's main theatre of
operation is in NATO, its organization and doctrines should rightfully be
geared primarily toward this theatre. There is no need for any drastic
institutional or organizational changes within the U. S. Army. The U.S.
Army must however, have the ability to acquire immediately and expand
quickly a capability for operating in closed terrain. This capability could
be acquired now by re-examining and analyzing all the tactics and techniques
that were employed by the armored forces in Vietnam, and the fire support
and logistics systems that were used in the various types of closed terrain.
Additionally, the equipment modifications and innovations that were
achieved in the field in Vietnam should be further evaluated and documented.
The synthesis of all these experiences and lessons should be transformed
into relevant doctrines or recommendations on equipment modifications that
are necessary for the various types of closed terrain.
After all, U. S. Army experience in Vietnam has shown beyond any doubt
that, with thorough planning and imaginative employment, armored forces can
play a useful combat role in closed terrain.
1R. E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1950, p. 141.)
2Colonel Robert J. Icks (Ret.), Famous Tank Battles From World War I to
Vietnam (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1972), p. 34.
3U.S. Army Operator's Manual, Tank, Combat, Full Tracked 105mm Gun M60A1
(RISE), Washington: Department of the Army, 2 June 1978), p. 29.
4U.S. Army, Vietnam Studies Series, Mounted Combat in Vietnam,
(Washington: Department of the Army, 1978), p. 6.
5Colonel Icks Famous Tank Battles, p. 181-187 and p. 236.
6U.S. Army, FMIF-1, Armour Operations, Small Units, (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 101.
7U.S. Army, FM1F-30, Armor Division Operations, (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 122.
8U.S. Army, Mounted Combat, p. 7.
9U.S. Army, Mounted Combat, Preface P.V.
10U.S. Army, Mounted Combat, p. 3.
11U.S. Army, Mounted Combat, P.V.
12U.S. Army, MACOV I, p. I-51.
13Ibid., p. i.
14Ibid, p. ii.
15U.S. Army, ARVS 675-1231, Evaluation of U.S. Army Mechanized and Armor
Combat Operations in Vietnam (MACOV) Volume II, (Washington: Department of
the Army, March 1967)
16U.S. Army, Mounted Combat, p. 85.
17"Problem of M-551", Armed Forces Journal, Vol. 107. (10 Jan 1970), p.
18U.S. Army, MACOV II, p. G-17.
19U.S. Army, Mounted Combat, p. 94.
20Ibid, p. 100.
21Ibid, P. 101.
22U.S. Army, ARVS 675-2131, Evaluation of U.S. Army Mechanized and
Armored Combat Operations in Vietnam (MACOV), Volume V, (Washington:
Department of the Army, March 1967), p. V-69.
23U.S. Army, MACOV I, p. 1-c-38.
24U.S. Army, Mounted Combat, p. 101.
25U.S. Army, Mounted Combat, p. 102.
27U.S. Army, Vietnam, "1967 Report in Vietnam," Army, Vol. 17 (Oct 1967),
28U.S. Army, Mounted Combat, p. 138.
29 Ibid, p. 155.
30U.S. Army, Material Innovations, p. 64.
31Ibid., p. 109.
32U.S. Army, MACOV I, p. I-72.
U.S. Department of the Army. Evaluation of U.S. Army Mechanized and Armor
Combat Operations in Vietnam (MACOV) Volume I - Basic Report
(Washington: Department of the Army, Mar 1967).
U.S. Department of the Army. MACOV Volume II - Methods and Procedures.
U.S. Department of the Army. MACOV Volume V - MACOV Organization.
Icks, Robert J., Colonel (Ret.), Famous Tank Battles From World War I to
Vietnam (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc. 1972).
Department of the Army. Vietnam Studies Series. Mounted Combat in Vietnam.
(Washington: Department of the Army, 1978).
Department of the Army. Vietnam Studies Series. Tactical and Material
Innovations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1974).
U.S. Army, FM1F-1: Armor Operations Small Units (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1957).
U.S. Army, FM1F-30: Armor Division Operations (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1961).
U.S. Army. Operator's Manual. Tank, Combat, Full Tracked 105mm Gun M60A1
(RISE) (Washington: Department of the Army, 1978).
Armor, Vols. 72-90.
Army, Vols. 17 (Oct 1967), 18 (Nov 1968) and 20 (Feb 1970).
Infantry, Vols 57 (Mar-Apr 1967) and 59 (Aug 1969).
Military Review, Vols. 50 (Sep 1970) and 52 (Feb 1972).
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