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Countering Terrorism-The Novel Approach
CSC 1985
SUBJECT AREA Topical Issues
     The Marine Corps responded to the Beirut bombing of 23
October 1983 and subsequent allegations of unpreparedness by
publishing Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3302.1 Combatting
Terrorism and Marine Corps Development and Education Command
(MCDEC) Operational Handbook (OH) 7-14 Terrorism
Counteraction.  These documents provide policy and guidance to
Marines for response to future terrorist incidents.
Unfortunately, the direction offered by these documents
focuses on increasing individual Marine awareness and reliance
on civilian authority to defuse terror situations.  The
emphasis is on passive measures, or what's known in the trade
as antiterrorism.  Both the MCO and the OH look good on paper,
but ignore the fact that, with a change in training
philosophy, Marines can take an active role in their own
defense and deter terrorists from selecting them as targets.
If the Marine Corps doesn't follow up these publications with
training changes and finances devoted to countering terrorism,
little will have been gained since the bombing in Beirut.
     To prove these points, this paper presents a plausible
terrorist scenario aboard a Marine Corps base.  The responses,
as directed by MCO 3302.1 and OH 7-14, are examined in a first
person narrative.  This forum vividly illustrates the problems
of implementing the sweeping responses directed with the
current resources available to a Base Commander.
     The 23 October 1983 bombing of Marine headquarters in
Beirut by kamikaze-like Islamic fundamentalists burned
terrorism into the American psyche.  The furor raised by
Congress, the media, and the man in the street led the Marine
Corps to take a look inward, focusing on its capability to
counter terrorism in the future.  Marine Corps Order 3302.1
Combatting Terrorism and Marine Corps Development and
Education Center (MCDEC) Operational Handbook (OH) 7-14
Terrorism Counteraction, were the culmination of this two year
introspection.  The thesis of this paper is that the Marine
Corps has taken a first step with the implementation of these
directives, but that much remains to be done before our
actions can be considered viable in the counterterrorism
     In pursuit of this theory, three major difficulties were
     The first was the volume of information on the subject.
It is simply vast.  When added to the fact that the author was
a complete novice on terrorism, a tremendous amount of reading
and interviewing was required in order that a working
knowledge of the subject could be amassed.  This general level
of expertise was required before a proper thesis could be
decided upon.  Once the thesis was decided upon, the scope of
the research could, of course, be limited.  The entire
reading, categorizing, sifting and rejecting process accounted
for more than 97% of the time spent on the creation of the
     Secondly, true expertise in the area of terrorism is hard
to find.  Theorists and psuedo-experts abound.  A spin-off of
the Marine Beirut bombing incident has been the growth of an
entire industry of Washington, D.C. oriented think tanks and
college faculties that produce volumes of ethereal thinking on
the subject.  Unfortunately, very little of it is of much use
to the operations oriented Marine on the ground.
     Fortunately, creditable sources with operational
experience were available, although some wished to remain
anonymous.  Gentlemen like Lieutenant Colonel J. Hensman
(Royal Marines), Major G. Nance (Aus SAS), and Major D. Hunt
(U.S. Army) were invaluable sources.  Colonel P. Collins
provided much of the background information needed to form the
general working knowledge mentioned earlier.  He was also
helpful in providing a reliable list of expert contacts.
     It should be stated here that the use of the above names
in no way indicates endorsement of this paper.   Colonel
Collins, in fact, disagrees strongly with its tenor.  It
should therefore be clear to all that the contents reflect
only the opinion of the author.
     The last challenge faced in the pursuit of this paper was
making the subject matter interesting.  As stated earlier-
there exists a plethora of research papers related to
terrorism.  Some are interesting, most are informative, but by
in large they all make pretty dull reading due to the "fact
sheet" style.  Because the thesis of this paper dealt with
perceived deficiencies in the Marine Corps' approach to
counterterrorism, it was imperative that the subject matter be
presented in a form palatable to Marine readers.
     The concept of a research paper composed of first person
narratives detailing reactions taken during a terrorist
hostage incident aboard a Marine Corps base as prescribed by
MCO 3302.1 and OH 7-14 was chosen as a forum.  The
difficulties that the players encounter provide the bases for
proving the paper's thesis.
     Although the paper is presented in a "novel" style (no
pun intended), the academic standards required for a research
paper were maintained.  Where appropriate, endnotes appear and
an annotated bibliography is provided as well.  The scenario
style was used simply as a vehicle to make the paper more
interesting to write as well as to read.
                              The Gate
     The bearded driver of the van tugged at his black watch cap and
adjusted his sun glasses.  He pulled the vehicle next to the sentry
booth.  A Marine sentry standing in the crisp morning air scanned
the oncoming cars in the outside lane for blue or red entry
stickers, and paid the van little attention.   A smooth flow of
traffic onto the base was top priority during the morning rush
hour.  The lane next to the sentry post was designated for visitors
without Department of Defense (DOD) vehicle entry stickers.  It was
the standby sentry in the booth who had responsibility for
screening and providing visiting vehicles with entry permits.
     As if on cue, the second sentry exited the small sentry booth
of Quantico's Main Gate and approached the van before it had come
to a complete stop.  Without uttering a word, the driver rolled his
window down and handed the sentry a yellow invoice, a Maryland
drivers license and the vehicle's registration .  The sentry
scanned the documents, noticed that the sign on the door of the van
advertised the same logo as the yellow invoice and retreated to the
     The bearded man watched as the sentry scanned the documents
and recorded something in a log book.  "So far, so good," the
bearded man muttered to himself.  The familiar weight of the pistol
hidden under the black sweater reassured him.
     The sentry returned with the documents and a piece of light
cardboard about the size of a business envelope.  "This is your
visitor's pass, sir.  Please keep it on display in the front window
while you're on the base.  You'll find a map on the back."  While
saying so, the sentry waved the van past the gate.
     "How convenient," the driver mused.  Reaching over his right
shoulder he slipped the map part way through the canvas partitions
that separated and hid the rear of the van from view.  "See, I told
you this was going to be easy," he said.  A gloved hand took the
map from his grasp and drew it into the darkness behind the
     The bearded man glanced at his watch and scanned the rear of
the Command and Staff College's (C&SC) Breckinridge Auditorium.  He
scanned the parking lot for any sign of movement amidst the cars.
Convinced that he was safe from prying eyes, he pulled back the
partitions and addressed six black clad figures crouching there.
"Okay, then, pull down your ski masks.  Get ready.  Stick to the
plan.  Two enter the Auditorium from the parking lot and the rest
at the first floor main entrance.  Remember.  Secure the overhead
booth.  Be firm.  Don't let these brown shirt fascists intimidate
you.  You've got the power and they bleed just like anyone else.
Remember what you're fighting for.
     The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Internal Security Affairs)
had just concluded acknowledging the CG, MCDEC and the Director of
the Education Center in the front row, and thanking them for the
opportunity to speak to the gathered C&SC class of 1985, when four
hooded black clad gunmen burst into Breckinridge Auditorium from
the front and rear exits.
     A burst of automatic sub machine gun fire impacted into the
screen and ceiling of the stage.  The racket of the full automatic
weapon firing in the confined enclosure and the bits of plaster and
screen fragments exploding on the stage instantly riveted
everyone's attention.
     "You are prisoners of the Puerto Rican Armed Forces of National
Liberation.  Do as you are told and you will not be harmed.  Stay
seated and do not talk."
     Two of the students in the front row nearest a rear exit
assessed their chances for escape and chose to ignore the
warnings.  They both rose to rush the obviously feminine form
guarding the exit next to the stage.
     She spun as if waiting for just such an action.  The officers
froze  in a half crouch, hovering just above their seats cushions
as the muzzle of the ugly black weapon covered them.  Then she
depressed the trigger.  The majors put out their hands in a vain
attempt to stop the bullets even as bullets crashed into their
chests and midsections.  Their bodies twitched crazily in mid air
as students in subsequent rows were struck by spent rounds, blood,
and splattered flesh from the dying men.
                            The Acting CG
     The acting Base Commander sat in his operations center in
Lejeune Hall.  "What's the latest word S-3?"
     "Well sir, as you know, an armed band calling itself the Puerto
Rican Armed Forces of National Liberation seized Breckinridge
Auditorium during an address to the class of '85 by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense.  They hold not only the Secretary, but the
CG, the Director of the Education Center, the Director of the
Command and Staff College and the entire class of 160 U.S. and
foreign officers as well.  They have limited themselves to
Breckinridge allowing the remaining Marines and civilians in the
building to evacuate."
     "I know all that S-3.  Tell me something I don't
who the hell are the Puerto Rican Armed Forces of National
Liberation?  What do they want?  And just what the hell are we
doing about all this?
     "Sir, the area around the building has been surrounded by the
Military Police."
     "Good.  Then they're trained to handle this sort of thing I
     "No sir they are not.1   Any time there is an incident of
violence on the base, the MPs respond and establish an inner
cordon.  They are trained to do that in order to isolate the crime
     "Crime scene?  This isn't a bank robbery, those weirdos have
     "Yes sir, but the MPs have to respond to every situation as if
it were a criminal action.  They have no way of initially knowing
that they're dealing with terrorists."
     "Okay, what else are we doing?"
     "Luckily sir, Quantico has been one of the focal points for
development of the Marine Corps counterterrorism policy.  We've had
a copy of Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3302.1 Combatting Terrorism and
MCDEC Operational Handbook (OH) 7-14 for some three months now.  So
we've been able to implement most of that guidance."
     "Great, I feel a little better.  Get me a copy of those
documents will you?  I ought to browse through them I guess."
     "Yes, sir,  But I'm afraid that trying to comprehend the Marine
Corps approach to counterterrorism can be a little confusing.
Therefore I've taken the liberty of preparing a flow chart.  If you
take a look at this I think it may make a very complex problem a
little clearer."  (See Figure 1).
     "Yes, excellent.  So what is our status?"
     "We have activated the Crisis Management Team and the Crisis
Management Force."
     "I see them on the chart, but just what are they?"
Click here to view image
     "The whole idea behind MCO 3302.1 is to make the best possible
use of internal available resources to combat terrorism.2  The
Crisis Management Team, as it appears in OH 7-14, is a euphemism
for certain members of your general and special staff assembled to
advise you during a crisis.3  In our case it consists of the
Personnel Officer, the G-3 Ops, the G-2, and the G-4A, with
representatives from Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Naval
Investigative Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, State
Police, our Provost Marshal, the Staff Judge Advocate, Public
Affairs Office, the Air Station, the Communications Officers
School, Base Engineering, the Hospital, and the Chaplain."
     "Why do we have representatives and secondary players
involved?  Why not the principals?"
     "No doubt sir the principals will be informed on what is
happening and I'm sure their advice will be solicited and accepted
on issues where the CMT feels it needs guidance.  But one of  the
prime objectives of a terrorist act is to disrupt normal
operations.  By constructing a special staff to deal with the
incident we ensure as normal as possible operations elsewhere,
managed by the principals, and a quality reaction staff by bringing
to bear select individuals specifically trained in this field."
     "Okay, sounds good.  What is a Crisis Management Force?"
     "The CMF is an attempt to better manage all the security assets
available on base.  The CMF is divided into two major elements. The
first is the interior guard.  These are the normal posts that each
organization on base mans.  It is composed of both the main and
special guard.  The second element is the Base Defense Force or
BDF.  It is commanded by our Provost Marshal.  It consists of a
Provisional Force, a Security Force, and a Reaction Force.  The
Provisional Force is nothing more than a company sized unit placed
on alert as back-up in case extra manpower is needed during the
crisis.  The Security Force is commanded by the Deputy Provost
Marshal and consists of our Military Police, Range Guards, Dog
Handlers, Game Wardens and the Fire Department.  The Reaction Force
is another new organizational structure.  It provides you the
surgical forces necessary to contain and possibly culminate a
terrorist hostage or barricade situation.  It consists of a
headquarters with a leader and assistant leader and one radio
operator.  There is also a perimeter element that provides the
inner and outer cordon forces.  The Support Section consists of
medical, legal, public affairs, photography and negotiation
personnel.  The negotiators are further divided into an officer in
charge,  a primary negotiator, a secondary negotiator, a
investigator, counterintelligence, and language trained
interpreters when needed and available."4
   "Sounds like we've got all we need.   What are we waiting for?
Let's go in there and free the general."
    "That might be a little hasty, sir.   You see there are a few
things that preclude us from doing that. First, there is a
Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Defense and
the Department of Justice.  According to that document, the
Department of Justice has responsibility for terrorist actions
inside the United States, to include those occuring on military
     "You mean we've got civilians making decisions that rightfully
are the prerogative of the military commander?"
     "Well, I don't know about that, sir.  I do know that anytime a
terrorist incident is thought to occur we are required to contact
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  They in turn dispatch an
agent who makes a determination whether the case is of significant
interest to the national interest to warrant FBI assuming
     "They can just waltz in here and run the whole show?  That's
incredible.  Next you'll be telling me these bureaucrats will want
to be directing military forces and acting like generals."
     "No sir, I don't think there is much chance of that.  You see,
a stipulation in the Memorandum of Understanding  is that if the
Senior agent in Charge determines that the FBI will assume
jurisdiction, his next step is to decide if he has enough assets on
hand to handle the problem.  If he wants to use the military assets
of the base, he must request aid through the base commander.  At no
time will the FBI directly circumvent the chain of command."
"What does the FBI do if they decide more forces are needed
than we have to offer.?"
     "Then they have about three options, sir.  The first is to call
for reinforcements in the form of Special Weapons and Tactics
units, either available locally or from the Bureau itself.
Secondly they can call for the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team.  And
lastly, they can request that the national military assets for
counterterrorism be provided to them via the Joint Chiefs of
     "That all sounds reassuring, but it still looks to me like
they're trying to do our jobs.  I may be getting a little long in
the tooth, but for as long as I can remember, the commander was
responsible for everything that happened or failed to happen in his
     "That is still the concept, sir.  The MOU doesn't negate that
     "How can you say such a thing when it is the FBI that is making
all the tactical decisions.?"
     "Well sir, you are still responsible for the protection of life
and property on this base.  If the terrorists started throwing
bodies out of Breckinridge, it would be your call as to what to do
about it."7
     "Even if the FBI was on the scene and calling the shots?"
     "Things get a little hazy in that case sir.  Supposedly, the
FBI has the assets and the training to know how best to manage a
terrorist incident.  After all, it is American policy to treat
these crazies as criminals first and foremost.  If you don't agree
with how the Special Agent in Charge is handling an incident,  then
I guess your recourse is to complain up the chain of command to DOD
or take charge of the incident yourself and suffer the
     "Okay, I get the picture.  What has happened so far today?  Has
the FBI been notified?"
     "Yes sir.  They were notified thirty minutes ago."
     "Thirty minutes?  If they can't respond any faster than that
here on Quantico, what happens if an incident occurs at 29 Palms?"
    "Then, as I stated before, as the commander you are
     "So what assets do I have available?  What are my options?"
     "Well sir, as I mentioned before, the CMT and the CMF have been
activated.  In reality these measures are structural changes that
allow you to focus assets to the management of the incident.  An
inner cordon has been established as well as an outer cordon.  The
terrorists are contained and no unwanted intruders can wander into
the scene.  The Reaction Force is in place behind the
Communications Officers School.  The Negotiator section has
established contact with the terrorists and all communications are
being recorded.  They have been identified as a militant wing of a
Puerto Rican nationalist organization.  They've demanded a promise
of independence for Puerto Rico, release of all Puerto Rican
freedom fighters from American jails, cessation of Marine Corps
maneuvers on the island of Viegas, one million dollars, and safe
passage for themselves to Libya."
     "There is no way that I can authorize any of those demands."
     "I think they realize that, sir.  Their real aim is probably
media coverage.  Their demands will probably include some
interviews with select news persons before long."
     "What do we do in the mean time if they start killing
hostages?  I'm no expert in counterterrorism, but it doesn't take a
genius to realize that if we assault that auditorium with  a rifle
company that few of the hostages will survive."
     "You're absolutely correct, sir.  The experts say it takes very
specialized training and select personnel to conduct a successful
relief operation in a hostage situation.  That is really the reason
behind letting the FBI take jurisdiction if they want it, I
believe.  They have the people and the training.  If you do have to
mount such a relief however, that would be the job of the Reaction
Force Commander.  Using a crew served weapons team in support, if
necessary, the breaching/demolitions team would gain an entrance
point if possible and then the Special Reaction Team consisting of
about five men would assault the auditorium.  The whole operation
would have to be highly surgical in nature and would, in the end,
depend on how well the units had been trained as a team, how well
the rest of the CMF was coordinated and lastly, a great deal of
     "Things don't get any easier do they Colonel?"
     "No sir, they sure don't!"
                             The Game Begins
     The leader of the terrorists scratched at his face with a
gloved hand.  The beard itched in the heat. He hadn't planned on
this much warmth in the auditorium.  Jumpsuits and ski masks were
very uncomfortable.  He knew it added to the tension factor and
thought he'd have to personally make an effort to keep his team
calm.  He continued moving from post to post.
     Stopping at the female form he whispered, "It won't be long
now.  I've made contact and given our demands.  They know who we
are and what we want."
    He imagined she smiled although the mask hid her features.
"Excellent, and what do you think they will do? she asked.
    "The long wait will now begin.  They are definitely amateurs.
In many ways it is just as the school in Havana said it would be.
The negotiator is being very nice, but still trying to get as much
information from me as possible.  It is easy to see that he's not
had much experience nor training.  I fully expect the next
conversation to be with a new negotiator, probably one from the
    "Will he be harder to deal with?"
    "Absolutely not," he stated somewhat perplexed by her
question.  Then realization focused in his eyes.  "How stupid of
me, but of course women were involved in a different training
package while I was undergoing the negotiator manipulation phase.
Let me explain.  They will try to get me to accept the new
negotiator.  To do so would be to my disadvantage.  He will
undoubtedly be a trained professional in the employ of the FBI.
Probably a psychologist and maybe even a psychiatrist.  They will
make up some excuse that the original negotiator is no longer
available.  He will have left the base or become ill or some other
excuse will be offered.  I will then insist.  They will be
extremely polite, but stick to their original story.  I will be
forced to make threats against one of the hostage's lives.  They
will give me all the reasons why I shouldn't.  Their entire charade
is based on buying time."
    "Time to allow a commando unit to deploy against us?"
    There was concern in her voice, but he knew that was natural.
He had seen her in action on several occasions.  He didn't doubt
her courage in the least.
    "Not necessarily.  They are really interested in gathering all
the information on us they can.  The more they know about our
situation and our motivation, the better they are able to control
us.  They feel that the longer the incident drags on, the better
their chances are to wear us down.  All our conversations will be
taped, and as soon as the FBI arrives, they will try to establish
video cameras and long range listening devices and all sorts of
gadgetry to try to pry on us.  But three things will scare hell out
of them and keep them off balance.  The first is the ski masks.  By
not allowing the hostages to see our faces, the bonding action
between hostage and freedom fighter known as the Stockholm Syndrome
will not take place.  The second is that I will act perfectly calm
in my demands on the phone with the negotiator.  And thirdly, we
will get their attention by pitching the dead bodies of those two
would be heroes you killed out a second story window."
    "But what of the new FBI negotiator?  Will you allow him to
deal with you?"
    "Absolutely not.  I can do nothing about his standing behind
the amateur coaching him, but by forcing the experienced one off
the phone I can gain us a little by being better able to gauge his
reactions.  I can gather my own intelligence."
    "It sounds to me as if your time spent in Cuba was well worth
                       The Crisis Management Team
    "Major, Captain Hoot reports he's moving the headquarters,
assault, and support section of the Reaction Force behind the Staff
NCO Academy."
     A red faced major with four rows of ribbons on a wrinkled open
collar long sleeve shirt, looked up from the scattered papers he
was leaning over and asked sarcastically, "Just fine, corporal.
And why, pray tell, did Captain Hoot believe it imperative that he
move our assault element another two hundred yards from their
objective area?"
    The young radio operator raised his voice over the noise in the
small room that was the CMT headquarters.  "He said something about
better fields of fire for his machine guns, sir."
    The major looked at the four men surrounding his small desk and
said in disgust, "I've been in the G-3 business for three years,
been all the way around the world, seen a goat rope, two world's
fairs and a hanging.  But I've never seen anything so screwed up in
all my life as this terrorist management business."
    The four captains at the desk ceased their squabbling and
focused their attention on the major.  One ventured the question
that all wanted to ask, but were afraid to.  "What's so screwed up
about this operation, sir?"
    The major swept his arm in a large arc, signifying the whole
room.  "Just look at this mess.  I'm running a Crisis Management
Team from a room the size of an outhouse with a staff that would
dwarf Ike's on D-Day.  We've got representatives in here from the
general staff, the special staff, EOD, PMO, NIS, FBI, SJA, PAO,
Motor T, COMM, ENG, MED, and the Chaplain.  Each one brought his
own radio operator and radio, for which they're now trying to run
slash wire out the only window to remote their antennas.  No one
thought to bring headphones, so the squawk level in here is about
two decibels below a jet engine doing high turns.  There are only
two telephones in here and they're constantly tied up by my
superiors wanting updates I don't have.  Everyone thinks he's an
expert on counterterrorism operations because they've read the
MCDEC OH and one Le Claire novel, and now I've got troop commanders
moving units around on whims.  I'm suppose to be doing the
operational planning for this evolution and the only real
intelligence I've been able to manage, even with the assistance of
all this high priced help, is that the terrorists and hostages are
in Breckinridge Auditorium.  Hell, I knew that much two hours ago.
The only thing we need to make this circus complete is popcorn."
    The captains shrank from the major's tirade.  "Yes sir, it is a
little confusing all right.  I reminds me of the Wuerzburg
    The major looked at the captain a full five seconds his gaze
dropping to the gold shield on the officers chest, "Okay captain,
what's the punch line?  What's the Wuerzburg incident?"
    "Well sir, it was a barricade/hostage situation at Leighton
Barracks, Wuerzburg, West Germany on 30 June 1980."
    When the captain paused, "Yeah, so what.  How was it like our
    "Well sir, it wasn't completely like our situation.  It wasn't
a terrorist incident, per se.  A soldier went off the deep end and
took some bank personnel hostage and demanded some money and safe
passage.  To date it has been the only hostage situation on a U.S.
military installation in Europe.  The guy wore a ski mask, so the
authorities didn't know what they were dealing with until after it
was over.  Because the military was obliged to alert the host
nation and because it was an obvious violation of host nation law
and because the U. S. military had no expertise in cases like this,
the German police were allowed on base with a SWAT unit.  They
killed him as he exited the bank with a hostage."
    "That's it captain?  That's the whole story?"
    "No sir, not all of it.  In the after action report on lessons
learned, one of the most glaring errors admitted to  was the over
staffing of the Crisis Management Team facilities.  The commander
complained that he was never able to find the people he wanted when
he wanted and that everyone and his brother wandered through the
    The major appraised the captain more closely.  "Interesting
Captain.  So the Army uses our CMT concept as well?"
    "Well sir, I wouldn't exactly call it our concept.  You see our
MCO and the OH pretty much plagiarize Army Training Circular 19-16,
titled Countering Terrorism on Army Installations."
    The major looked genuinely surprised.  "Really?"
    The captain was enjoying his role of educator.  "Yes sir.  In
fact they borrowed everything except the element that makes it work
for the Army."
    "And what would that be?"
    "In the Army sir, it is the Provost Marshal that is the key
player in the CMT and, in fact, throughout the entire spectrum of
counterterrorism.  From the Security Forces to the Reaction Teams,
it is all pretty much a Military Police show."9
    The major muttered under his breath something about ignorance
and boot captains.  "Well, there is no way that such a thing would
work in the Marine Corps.  We don't have a big enough military
police organization first of all and, besides, combat arms run the
Marine Corps, not support elements."
    "You're probably right on the first part of your statement,
sir.  But I think a shifting of current assets might solve most of
our problems for the major installations.  I understand that the
military police section at HQMC is contemplating just such a
reorganization.  Additionally, in 1986 there will be 375 new Table
of Organization billets, mostly in the air wing, identified for
staffing by military policemen for the first time.10  So the police
structure is growing."
    "Even so captain, what benefit would the Marine Corps derive
from handing counterterrorism functions over to the military
    "There are quite a few benefits to be derived if you think
about it logically, sir.  Who are the first people to respond to a
disturbance?  The MPs, of course.  They are the first line of
reactive defense at the Commanding General's disposal.  Whether it
is a fist fight or a bombing, the MPs would be called by the
interior guard, officer of the day, or even an innocent witness.
It's their job to restore order, capture the perpetrators and
cordon the crime scene.  And what about the problem your having on
intelligence?  You've got three separate police forces represented
in here that I can see, yet you don't have any mechanism for
interfacing with them on a continuing basis.  As an MP, I do.  I
often train with each of them and we share data on crimes and
criminals.  I know that each one of them has their own files on
terrorist organizations in the area as well.  I have access to that
information because of our almost daily contact.  Even the reaction
forces lend themselves to MP control."
    "You support guys want the whole enchilada, don't you?"
    "Think about it, major.  Everyone knows that the Reaction Force
must be specifically trained.  That can't be done overnight or with
the meager time and assets available to most line companies.11
Every modern country with a counterterror force has built that
force on the British Special Air Service (SAS) model.  They spend
months in physical and mental selection processes before assigning
men to counterterrorism duty.  Once assigned the arduous training
process really begins with the emphasis on teamwork.  You can't
throw together a team of Marines with expert shooting badges and
expect them to preform well in a real terror situation.  Even if
everything went well for your training program and your ad hoc team
reached some semblance of expertise, on a base this size, how long
before some are transferred, discharged or sent TAD?  Reaction
Force duties should be a unit mission, just as guard duty or air
alert in the FMF.  For MPs Reaction Force training is no more than
what we've been doing for years--SWAT methods.  Instead of SWAT, we
us  Special Reaction Teams (SRT).  The Marine Corps currently has
eight installations with provost marshal activities trained and
equipped with SRTs.  They are Camp Lejeune, El Toro, Camp
Pendleton, Camp Elmore, Kaneohe Bay, Iwakuni, Parris Island, and
Yuma.  Additionally Barstow, Henderson Hall, Camp Smith, Beaufort,
and Twenty-nine Palms are in the process of forming, training and
equipping SRTs.12  So why not capitalize on an asset we already
    The major stared silently at the young captain, as if searching
for a response, when a Lance Corporal in mess whites stepped
through the door with a huge tin in his arms.  After scanning the
scene of mass confusion for a minute, he bellowed over the noise,
"Who ordered the popcorn?"
    The major threw the papers into the air. "That tears it.
Master Gunnery Sergeant, get everyone out of here.  Put them into
the hall.  I'll let you know when I need them!"
                        The Reaction Force
    The captain glanced down at the plastic tag above the right
breast pocket of his field jacket.  The letters carved there
identified him as Captain S. Jock, PAO.  The initials for the
Public Affairs Officer, or duty public relations man for the base.
His job was dealing with the media.  As usual, no one wanted to
talk with him.  Finally another captain dressed in flak jacket and
combat gear approached.  The Marine that had been standing guard
over Captain Jock saluted the approaching figure.
    "What can the guys in the trenches do for the palace dwellers,
Slim?" asked the camouflaged clad captain.
    "First of all, Bill, you can tell this Marine that I'm not the
enemy.  I couldn't get within 100 yards of the SNCO Academy.  We're
all on the same side you know."
    "He's only following orders, Slim.  He's part of the outer
cordon established to ensure that only essential personnel enter
the incident area."
    "Really?  Who are you trying to keep out?
    "Just about anyone that doesn't directly contribute to our
mission here.  You'd be surprised who we get trying to poke their
noses in.  Senior officers are usually the worst.  But with all the
heavies held captive in the Staff College, there aren't many left
to wander around.  But we also have to keep the press reporters out
and the day dreaming Marine that is trying to take a short cut to
the gym.  Just about anyone who doesn't belong.  So what brings you
    "Well I'm really supposed to be in the Crisis Management Team,
but the crazy major that is running it threw everyone out.  I
didn't really know what was going on anyway, and neither did he.
I'll be the one that will have to conduct press briefs as soon as
the word of this thing gets out, so I figured I'd better get some
first hand exposure while things are still relatively quiet on my
end.  So what can you tell me?"
    "I can't tell you anything.  I'm just the assistant Reaction
Force Team leader.  Major Hugh Janly is the leader.  I'm sure that
both he and the Security Force commander, Major Whit Billow, will
want to brief you themselves.  Why don't you follow me?"  Then
signalling to the Marine sentry, "Its okay Smith, I'll take him
from here."
    The two captains entered the room marked Director, SNCO
Academy.  In the Director's chair sat one major addressing a second
major in a leather sofa along one wall of the small room.  The
talking ceased as the captains knocked at the entrance.  The major
behind the desk waved them in.
    "Brought you a problem, sir.  This is Captain Slim Jock.  He's
the base PAO and needs some information on the situation."
    The major behind the desk rose and shook hands. "Yeah, I know
Slim.  You remember me don't you, Slim?
    "Yes, sir.  You're the deputy Provost Marshal."
    "That's right. Only for the next couple of days I'm the
Security Force Commander.  This is Major Billow.  He's the gent in
charge of the Reaction Force."
    "Sir, I'm new to this terrorism business.  Just what is a
Reaction Team and a Security Force?"
    As Major Janly moved toward the black board, the rest sat
down.  "It's really pretty easy, Slim.  We provide the reactive
portion of the base defenses."
    "What's that mean in English, sir?"
    "The Marine Corps' response to terrorism is pretty much
prevention oriented."
    "Why is that?"
    "Well, for one thing it's a realistic approach.  Terrorists are
like the bully on the block.  They pick on people that they have a
good chance of getting away with hurting.  If you beef up your
security in the area they've chosen for a target, they will change
their target to some place else.  Awareness is the key ingredient
in a sound counterterrorism program.  Each individual Marine must
be aware of the threat and keep his senses tuned to the possibility
of becoming a target."
     "Is this a realistic worry?  I know that somebody has seized
Breckinridge, obviously.  And of course there was the 23 October
1983 Beirut bombing, but why should the average Marine feel
     "Slim, the average Marine meets two important criteria in the
terrorist's selection process.  First he is an official symbol of
the established order.  Secondly the terrorist can be assured of
rapid access to the extensive and sophisticated resources of the
American media if he targets American servicemen."13
     "But how real is the threat?  Aren't we over reacting a
     "Here, I've got a few things in my briefcase that may help
you.  Let me dig them out.  Ah, here we are.  Take a look at this."
(See Figure 2).14  As you can see, in less than a one year period
U.S. military men were the targets of 17 bombings, 3
assassinations, and one attempted assassination.  Of course you've
Click here to view image
already mentioned the Marine Compound bombing in 1983, but right
here much closer to home we had the Washington Navy Yard bombing of
the Officer's Club on 20 Apr. 1984 by the same group that has
seized Breckinridge.  A year before, the National War College at
Ft. McNair, VA was bombed as well.15  Since 1968 there has been a
four fold increase in the number of terrorist incidents in the
world.  During the past decade, more than one half of recorded
terrorist incidents have been against facilities and personnel of
the U.S.  In 1983 alone there were 666 deaths attributed to
terrorism.  If nothing else terrorism is increasing in
lethality.16  And we'll be placed in a position to see more of it,
no doubt.  Do you realize, Slim, that since World War II modern
western military forces have been involved more  frequently in
protecting urban areas, key population centers and territory than
in maneuvering against conventional forces on a battlefield?  We
can just about be sure that we'll continue to be employed on
foreign soil in security, peace keeping, or defensive roles in the
future.  The likelihood of being the target of a terrorist attack
is much greater than engaging a Soviet Motorized Rifle Regiment.17
Face it, Slim, terrorism and counterterrorism operations are here
to stay.  Conventional war is too costly in both lives and
money.18  The threat is real."
    "Okay, the threat is real.  And the Marine Corps
counterterrorism program is geared toward awareness and
preventiveness.  But what capability do we have when the incident
occurs?  Why don't we have a highly skilled team along the lines of
the British SAS or the U.S. Army's Delta Force?"
    "Slim, I'll attempt to answer your last question first.  When
the Marine Corps was deciding how it should structure its
counterterrorism capability, one of the options considered was the
creation of a special unit.  It was found not to be necessary
National level assets in the form of highly trained special
counterterrorism teams already exist in the form of the FBI's
Hostage Rescue Team and the Joint Chiefs' Delta Force.  These are
the guys with the dollars, equipment, training and support who have
the best chance to successfully executing a hostage rescue.  And
believe it or not, seizing hostages is not a method preferred by
terrorists.  It is too dangerous.  Bombs are by far the weapon of
choice.  Timers and remote detonators don't require the terrorist
to place himself in jeopardy.  So, with the realization that the
Marine Corps couldn't afford expenditures in dollars nor manpower
to staff, train, and maintain a special unit, combined with the
fact that such national level assets already existed, it was
decided that no counterterrorist capability should exist in the
Marine Corps beyond the base/installation level."
    "Okay, sir.  I guess I can accept that logic.  But what about
the first part of my original question?  What capability are we
left with at the base level?"
    "That's a fair question.  First of all, the security elements
of the base are centralized under a Crisis Management Force.  This
force consists of two major components.  The first is an interior
guard.  The second is the Base Defense Force.  This force is
commanded by the Provost Marshal and is subdivided into three
groups.  The Provisional Force is a back-up company of infantrymen,
with little or no background in counterterrorism.  The Security
Force is commanded by the Deputy Provost Marshal who is responsible
for centralizing the efforts of all the standing regulatory
authorities on the base during a time of crisis.  These include
everyone who carries a badge, from MPs to the Game Wardens and Fire
Department.  And the third component in the Base Defense Force
organization is the Reaction Force.  Ours is commanded by Major
Billow here.  Whit, why don't you explain to the good captain what
the Reaction Force does?"
    "Be happy to, Hugh.  Basically the Reaction Force is divided
into four organizations.  The Headquarters consists of myself, an
assistant Force leader," pointing to the captain that had escorted
him into the room, "that's Bill Hoot whom I think you know, and a
radioman.  The second element in the Force is the Perimeter Team
which contains the incident with an inner and an outer cordon."
    "I think that Captain Jock has already had a demonstration of
their proficiency," interjected Captain Hoot.
    "Yes, well they are pretty conscientious about their job,"
continued Major Billow.  "The third element is the Support Team.
This team is comprised of representatives from medical, legal,
photography, and your own office, the PAO."
    "That would be SSgt Bob Rerral I guess?" ventured Captain Jock.
    "Yes, that is correct.  It is his responsibility to record via
video, movies, and still photos all that transpires during the
incident.  His efforts become a great help not only during
subsequent training sessions for the Defense Force, but also in
criminal proceedings once the terrorists are brought to trail."
    "I take it his English is getting better then?" inquired
Captain Jock.
    "Oh, yes.  He's a regular chatter box now."  Major Billow
stopped talking and closed his eyes as if to recall his train of
thought.  "Another part of the support element is the negotiation
section.  It is extremely important in situations like the one
we're faced with today.  It's headed by Captain Dan Jurham.  He's a
crusty old military policeman who has a hard time getting along
with everybody, but he has a thorough knowledge of the terrorist
psychological profile.  Working for him are two negotiators, a
primary and a secondary.  In our case the primary is from the
Criminal Investigative Division (CID) of our MPs and the secondary
is from the Naval Investigative Service (NIS).  CID also supplies
an investigator who works with our counter intelligence expert to
keep track of the information gained by the negotiators.  Normally
a provision is made for a linguist to assist the negotiations team,
but we don't have that capability here at Quantico."
    "I've been scribbling down a quick wiring diagram while you've
been talking, Major.  It appears to me that this entire
counterterrorism business, although not relying on additional
assets, encompasses an extensive change in organization.  How
important is training in this concept?"
    The majors looked at each other and smiled.  "Extremely
important," answered Major Billow, "but let me get to the last
element of the Reaction Force and then I'll come back to your
question.  The last element is the Assault Team.  They are the
trigger pullers, the gunfighters if you will.  If the world turns
sour on us and the negotiators are unable to influence the action
in Breckinridge, or hostage lives are endangered, then the Assault
Team is the organization that would try to culminate the incident
by subduing the terrorists."
    "Interesting, sir.  And just how large an organization are we
talking about?"
    "Pretty small actually, less than platoon size.  The Team is
divided into four sections.  A crew served weapons element provides
heavy support in the way of machine gun, LAAW, and CS projection if
needed.  A demolition section provides the explosives expertise to
breach walls, doors and other obstructions to allow the SRT to gain
    "Special Reaction Teams, they're the third element to the
Assault Team.  We have three SRTs.  Each one consists of five men.
They enter the hostage area using surprise as their greatest ally,
and  surgically eliminate the terrorist.  It's close combat at its
most exacting.
    The fourth and final elements are the sniper teams.  They are
deployed in two man units.  Their job is to be able to selectively
destroy a terrorist if the need arises.
    Our entire Assault Force has been through the FBI's SWAT course
here on base and are all expert rifle and pistol shots."
    "Something is missing here, Major.  I don't hear the ring of
confidence in your voice that such a well rehearsed explanation of
our counterterrorism defenses should invoke.  Why is that?"
    Major Billow smiled again.  "Your observations concerning the
tenuous strands that hold our counterterrorism organization
together are valid.  To keep from having to increase costs and
manpower, the Marine Corps has chosen to emphasize awareness and
precaution and ad hoc the organizational requirements as needed.
We're paper tigers."
    "That sounds like a confession, Major."
    "Just plain fact, Captain.  Our approach as defined in OH 7-14
has some gaping holes.  You have inadvertently put your finger on
what Hugh and I consider to be one of its major flaws.  We feel OH
7-14 to be a first step, but only a tentative step at best."
    Captain Jock took copious notes as Major Billow spoke and
Major Janly nodded his head in affirmation.
    "Counterterrorist operations require some rather special
skills. OH 7-14 indirectly recognizes this fact.  That is why the
emphasis is on reliance on the FBI.  In the Base Commander's
options for using force,  containment and stabilization are the
preferred methods.  In an explanation of Reaction Force duties, the
reader is cautioned that the installation SRTs should not be
expected to rescue all hostages.  The inference is that the
installation SRTs are not expert enough to execute a successful
rescue.19   In my mind there is only one explanation for such an
admission.  Headquarters Marine Corps does not fully expect to
apply the funding and the emphasis needed to make their own concept
    "What do you mean?"
    "I mean exactly what I just said, Captain."
    "Wait a minute, Major.  I'm a little confused. Didn't you tell
me a little while ago that the Maine Corps had discarded the idea
of creating an elite counterterrorist unit?  And didn't I
understand that you endorsed that decision?"
    "Quite right on both counts, Captain."
    "Then what is the problem?  On one hand you tell me that OH 7-
14 is based on sound concepts, i.e.,discarding the elitism idea,
and on the other you infer the document is built on sand."
   "Once again, you've stated the facts perfectly.  You've
explained my position completely.  Let me explain.  I endorse the
Marine Corps position on not creating a special unit.  But on the
other hand, I see OH 7-14 as just one step beyond not doing
anything.  It's a great document if our intent is to cover our
tails with paper work."
    "Okay Major, I'll bite.  What do you see in OH 7-14 that
convinces you that we're just creating paper forces?"
    "The ad hoc organizational structure of the Crisis Management
Team and the Crisis Management Forces."
    "Why is that a big deal?"
    "Simple, Slim, it ensures failure.  The tone of the document is
that military SRTs will continue to be second rate and that we must
rely on local, state and federal teams to bail us out.  It is a
self fulfilling prophecy for failure.  Counterterrorist operations
require some special training.  The negotiators, snipers and SRT
groups not only need unique skills, those skills are extremely
perishable.  If they are not retrained and exercised repeatedly,
they atrophy.  By ad hoc'ing the organizations, you ensure that men
won't be available for the training needed to keep their skills
from rusting.  OH 7-14 does recognize that teamwork is the most
important element in counterterrorist operations, but the unit
integrity required to foster that teamwork, especially in an
environment where training will be at a premium, is thoroughly
    "An interesting observation, Major.  What should have been
    "I think the easiest approach would have been to copy the
Army's concept of assigning the bulk of counterterrorist
responsibilities to the military police, and make use of their MOS
related skills and their established contacts with the criminal
authorities or intelligence purposes.  Most importantly, we should
make use of that unit integrity.  MPs have a career progression.
The Marine Corps could keep an MP's counterterrorist expertise
working for as long as he's in the Corps.  But with the approach of
OH 7-14, men assigned to a counterterrorist mission and provided
training might be assigned elsewhere, i.e., mess duty, rifle range,
etc...and not be available when needed.  Likewise, when the man is
transferred to another duty station, he most likely would not be
assigned to another counterterrorist mission.  Therefore his
expertise in this area would be lost.  On the other hand, if MPs
were assigned this mission formally, counterterrorist assignments
would came with the turf."
    "Yes Major, I think I see your point.  MPs could improve the
installation's reactive counterterrorist capabilities as a result
of past experience and normal MOS training.  Refresher training
would be done as a matter of course."
    Yes, that is exactly my point.  How good an SRT or sniper team
will become is largely dependent on the amount of training they are
exposed to."
    "Why is training so important?"
    "Let me answer that one, Whit," Major Janly responded.  "Let's
look at just two teams, the SRTs and the snipers.  The sniper teams
try to work from covert observation posts.  They often become the
eyes and ears of the CMT.  They always deploy in teams of two, a
sniper and his observer/communicator.  As a rule, snipers try to
work within a range of 200 yards of their targets.20  Marine Corps
snipers are equipped with one of the best weapons for the job in
the world.  It is the M40A1 rifle.  It is built on the base by the
armorers at Weapons Training Battalion.  It even has a 10 power
Unertl scope."
    "What kind of scope?"
    "Unertl, it is the name of a Hungarian family that lives in
Pittsburgh, PA.  Mr. Unertl has been supplying fine scopes to
Marines for years."
    "Is all the fancy equipment a necessity?  Most Marines can hit
a man at 200 yards.  We routinely shoot silhouettes at 500 yards
during requalification. "
    "That's true Slim, but in a counterterrorist barricade
situation you've got the hostages to think about.  If a terrorist
is using a hostage as a shield and has a pistol to his head, you've
got to be able to put your first and only shot into a two inch
window between the terrorist's eye and the front of the ear.  A
bullet impacting in this area will sever the motor nerves and
prevent the brain from transmitting the signal to pull the pistol's
    "Two inches at two hundred yards is some pretty fancy
    The stress can be immense on the sniper.  He had to be a very
cool customer who can realistically measure the chances for a
successful first round hit.  He must also have no compunction about
pulling the trigger.  There are seldom any second chances in this
    "Does the sniper make the decision to fire on his own?"
    "Ultimately he has to decide whether he can pull the trigger
with some degree of potential success.  Usually he watches the
target and assesses his chances for a shot.  If he thinks it
possible he passes that word on to central control via the
observer.  It's usually central control, in our case the Assault
Force leader, who passes a recommendation on up to the CMT and
eventually the base commander as to 'whether a shot ought to be
    "Isn't that a little restrictive?  Things could happen pretty
fast inside Breckinridge.  Wouldn't waiting for a decision to shoot
take too much time?"
    "To be perfectly honest with you, Captain, it might.  But I can
see that if we were all from one unit, say the MPs, and if we had
trained together, the concept might work.  It would never be
smooth, however, for the reasons you've mentioned.  On the plus
side, it's the CMT leader who is supposed to have the consolidated
big picture.  Theoretically he should be best able to make an
informed decision on shooting.  I will say that one of the best
counterterrorist teams in the world, the West German Border Group
Nine (Grenzschutagruppe Neun) or GSG-9, has been concerned about
the time delay from central control to the sniper.  They've gone so
far as to develop a series of red and green lights mounted on the
sniper's rifle and in the central control van where the CMT leader
is located.  The sniper signals the CMT that he believes he has a
clear shot by depressing the green light on his weapon.  If the CMT
concurs in the shot, they signal such by illuminating the sniper's
green light mounted on the rifle.  The entire process could take
place in seconds."21
    "It sounds like this GSG-9 has a lot of sophisticated
equipment.  Do we possess any of the same stuff?"
    "Not by a long shot.  We're equipped with standard Marine Corps
issue field gear.  Even the sniper rifles and scopes are those
found in the FMF at infantry battalion level.  But don't get the
wrong idea, Captain.  I don't believe we need to pattern ourselves
after GSG-9, or even the British 22 SAS.  GSG-9 is a federal level
force belonging to the border police.  They were formed after the
1972 Munich Olympic killings of Israeli athletes by the PLO's Black
September Organization.  This incident embarrassed the West German
government and precipitatied the creation of a counterterrorist
capability.  GSG-9 has plenty of funding and tend to be gadget
oriented.  The opposite tends to be true of the 22 SAS.  They rely
more on human skills in entry, target selection and shooting.  We
can't compete with these type elite units and shouldn't try."
    "Let's get back to training.  How do you find shooters that can
hit a two inch target at 200 yards?"
    "Actually, that is not so difficult.  The Quantico Scout Sniper
School graduates are able, with a 95% probability, of hitting the
black on a moving target at 800 yards and a stationary target at
1000 yards."
    "Then the Marine Corps should find it a relatively simple task
to find snipers for its installation SRTs."
    "There is no doubt that the Marine Corps Scout Sniper School
turns out the best shooters in this country.  The FBI, Treasury
Department, Secret Service and countless police departments compete
to get quotas to the school.  Even the Army's counterterrorists,
5th Special Forces Group from Fort Bragg, NC, send their shooters
to Quantico to train.  The problem is that the number of shooters
turned out is limited.  Additionally, shooting skills are extremely
    Major, I've heard that term used twice now.  What skills are
perishable and why?"
    "The Scout Sniper School runs two classes a year.  Soon there
will be three.  All graduates are able to keep a two inch group at
200 yards, with no difficulty.  Six months later most graduates
have trouble keeping a 12 inch group.  The secret to shooting
skills is constant practise.  In school, the students will shoot
almost constantly for up to four hours a day, six days a week for
almost the entire 8 weeks of the school.22  When they return to
their units, they'll probably fire their rifles on the average of
once a quarter.  A Joint Special Operations Center counterterrorist
unit at Fort Bragg, NC23 reportedly shoots 80,000 rounds per man per
year for training.24  They attempt, like the SAS, to enter a room
quickly, discern a terrorist from the hostages, and place a round
in an eight inch target at twenty paces.25  They use the same
shooting technique that the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team and some
Europeans have adopted called 'double tap'.  This technique
requires the shooting of the first shot by the SRT member as he
sees his target, and then follow it immediately with a second
shot.  The idea is to place both shots into that eight inch target--
the terrorist's head."26
    "Impressive, do we have anyone with that proficiency?"
    "Not really.  It's a skill that can be easily taught.  However,
it does require a few variations on standard USMC training
    "Such as...?"
    "Well, we must first modify the old Marine Corps pistol
handling procedures learned on the requalification range (the two
handed grip with the body facing the target and the pistol aimed
with the elbows locked).  This technique was designed for safety
not combat shooting.  In an assault entry situation the SRT member
that relies on the old technique will never get his shot off, it is
too slow.  The terrorists will have time to respond.  Even a stun
grenade might not allow the SRT member time to line up his shot
before either he or the hostages are killed."
    "So what do you teach him instead?"
    "The Weaver shooting method, or a modification."
    "What's so great about this method?"
    "Let me answer your question with a question.  What happens to
you on the pistol range each year when you line up the target in
your sights and squeeze off the first round with your elbows locked
out in the classical Marine Corps position?"
    "You get a big explosion and you're rocked backward."
    "Where does the pistol go in relation to your target?"
    "It jumps up, of course.  That is why you have to bend your
elbows, to stop the upward rotation."
    "Correct, Captain.  Now what do you think the upward and
backward jump would do for an SRT member trying to use double tap?"
    "It would be very slow I would suspect, sir,"
    "Correct again.  In the Weaver method a boxer's stance is
used.  If you're a right handed shooter, the left side is slightly
forward.  The pistol is in the right hand, of course, and the right
hand rests in the cup formed by the left.  In this position, the
recoil of the weapon thrusts backwards, as your elbows are already
bent.  The shoulders act in a swinging motion allowing the weapon
to remain pointed in the general direction of the target.  Precious
seconds are saved allowing the second shot to be tapped off."
    "That's all well and good, Major.  But it would seem that in
order to employ this double tap method, you'd have to take a lot of
time to line back up on the target."
    "Sight alignment.  Is that what you're referring to, Captain?"
When Captain Jock nodded, "Forget it, Captain.  Quick kill methods
are what we would employ.  It's a variation of the Army's
instinctive shooting methods.  You don't aim in the classical
sense.  You look over the sights and instinctively point and tap."
    "That sounds a little dangerous to me.  How can you be expected
to put the shots in the right eight inch circle?"
    "Practice, Captain.  Plenty of practice.  Besides, OH 7-14 is
correct about one thing.  Assaulting  the terrorist is a last
resort.  Even national level units assault only when all other
methods have failed.  Anything can go wrong during a fire fight.
All the variables have to be weighed and the alternatives thought
out before the decision to commit the SRT is made."
    "Major, this has been a very enlightening conversation.  Thank
you for your patience.  Before I get out of your hair, let me ask
one more question.  How would you rate our chances of success if
you had to commit the SRT right now?"
    The majors exchanged glances again.  Major Billow shrugged.
Major Janly answered, "What do you think?"
                        The Morning After
    "Welcome back, General.  We're all thankful that you are safe
and back with us again."
    "Cut the crap, Chief. I want the entire general and special
staff in the conference room in thirty minutes."
    The chief of staff physically quaked.  "Aye aye, sir."  Moving
to his intercom box, he depressed the talk button and alerted the
staff one by one.  Satisfied that the wheel to gather the staff had
been set in motion, he growled at the adjutant to ensure the
conference room was ready.  Then he moved into the little office
marked "Aide".
    "What is the old man pissed about?"
    The tall officer of oriental heritage stood to attention.  His
desk name plate identified him a Captain Lang Lee.  He was the Aide
de Camp.  "I really don't know, Colonel.  He's been that way ever
since we got released late last night.  I guess 36 hours of being a
hostage didn't agree with him.  I can't say as I blame him.  A
general having to urinate in a bucket and eat baloney sandwiches
and koolaid is a bit much.  He keeps mumbling something about the
Corps going to the lawyers and psychologists.  I haven't got a clue
as to what it means."
    "Okay, Lang   I guess we'll all find out soon enough."
                            The Meeting
    The Commanding General surveyed the officers assembled and sat
at the head of a large table.  It was crowded despite the large
room.  Chairs had been brought in to accommodate the full staff.
Besides the conference table that sat twelve, chairs were
positioned two rows deep on three sides of the table.  Every chair
but one was filled.  All eyes were rivetted on the General.
"Chief, do we have everyone?"
    "Everyone but the Provost Marshal, General.  He's on the way."
    The General fixed the 6-1 with a stare that could wither
    "Very well, I called you all together because I want to get
your reactions to how things went on this end during the terrorist
incident of the last two days.  I want to know what your gut feel
is about how the incident was handled.  Chief, why don't you lead
    The Colonel started sweating.  He knew the General was setting
him up.  He was obviously in one of those moods and they always
ended with the Chief getting his tail chewed.  What was he up to
this time.
    Before the Chief could open his mouth, the door opened and an
old Lieutenant Colonel entered.  He wore a gold badge over his left
breast pocket.  "Sorry I'm late, General.  The FBI wants our
reports and photographs as soon as possible.  They're causing us to
jump through some hoops."
    A grunt was all the general would offer in response.
    The Chief was still wrestling with his answer when he thought
he knew what the General wanted to hear.  He took a deep breath and
plunged ahead.
    "Well General, considering that we were dealing with one of the
more violent terror organizations in the U. S. and that we lost
only two officers, I'd have to rate the operation a success.  That
is how the press is handling it and that's the way the FBI sees
    The General smiled to himself and crossed his arms over his
chest.  The Chief wondered what the body language meant.  You could
never read the old man.
    "Thank you, Chief.  Now let's hear from everyone else."
    "General, I'm sure no one has had time to compile a complete
after action report.  If we held this meeting in a day or so, I
could get you much better data."
    "I'm sure you could, Chief.  I want their gut reaction now,
that's all."
    "Right, sir.  Okay G-3, your turn."
    "Good morning, General.  Based on the reports I've received and
my observations from both the operations center and the Crisis
Management Center, I'd have to agree with the Chief.  We were
successful.  We implemented all the wickets of our local
contingency plans and stayed within the spirit of the Marine Corps
Order and MCDEC Operational Handbook.  If you want any more
complete information, I've brought Major Sike Mulligan.  He ran the
CMT and can relate those details more accurately."
    The Chief waved him off.  "We'll hear form Major Mulligan
later.  G-4, your turn next."
    Man after man ratified the Chief's original words,  The system
had worked as it was designed to.  The majority of the hostages
were safe.  The terrorists had surrendered to the FBI.  All was
normal again.
    The round robin discussion had taken approximately forty-five
minutes.  The general had a far away look in his eyes and
occasionally doodled on a scratch pad.  He held eye contact with
the speakers only when they began talking.
    "General, I believe that leaves the PAO, Captain Jock.  Be
brief Captain."
    "Certainly, Colonel.  General, it is my belief that the Marines
performed as best they could under new and difficult conditions.
It is also my opinion that fundamentally the Marine Corps' approach
to countering terrorism sucks."
    The Chief almost bit his cigar in half.  All breathing in the
room ceased.  Eyes shifted between the Captain and the General.
The General's gaze was firmly focused on the PAO.
    "In what way, Captain.?"
    "It's not an easy thing to pin down, General.  In fact it may
be more feeling than anything else.  But I object to a bunch of
social misfits being allowed on a Marine Corps Base.  I object to
them killing two officers and then surrendering without being
hurt.  I object to the FBI coming in and shoving us aside to
implement their own brand of patience.  I object to those punks in
ski masks being allowed to read a statement on local radio as a
condition for your release.  And most of all, I hate the fact that
we are convinced that handled this thing correctly.  We may have
handled it the way we were expected to, but we didn't handle it
    "Captain, the General isn't interested in your emotional
outbursts.  He's interested in facts."
    "That's not quite true, Chief.  I am interested in gut
    The Chief smiled at the general and nodded his understanding,
but inside he was angry.  He had almost been home free when that
upstart Captain had to stir up trouble.
    "I believe we have one more officer to hear from, Chief."
    "Yes, General.  Major Mulligan, why don't you give us a run
down on the fine job done in the CMT?"
    Major Mulligan's eyebrows raised.  "Are we talking about the
same CMT, Colonel?"  Turning towards the General he continued.
"General, the running of the CMT was the most screwed up thing I've
ever seen.  We just don't know what we're doing yet when it comes
to counterterrorism management.  We let everyone and his brother
into our CMT center and it was utter chaos.  About the time I
started to get things sorted out, in came the FBI ordering everyone
around and confusing things all over again."
    "What's your projection for the future, Major?  Can we become
proficient in this arena?"
    "Certainly, General.  As much as I grew to dislike the FBI, I
learned quite a bit by watching them.  There is nothing magical
about what they do.  In fact, once I got a clear idea of how they
were structured and their command and control apparatus, it was
very much like a military command post.  What we need is more
    "Thank you, Major Mulligan."  The General then turned to
address the entire assemblage.  "Gentlemen, my feelings mirror
those of Captain Jock's.  I'm unhappy with our counterterrorism
capability.  Last night I went over the Marine Corps Order and
Operational Handbook 7-14.  I also re-read our contingency plans.
I don't like the fact that terrorists feel that they can attack
Marines with impunity.  The problem is greater than just our
actions here at Quantico.  I don't like the Marine Corps' approach
to combatting terrorism.
    I made some telephone calls last night as well.  The
governments' stated policy on terrorism is that there will be no
concessions to terrorist demands and they will be considered
criminals.27  I can understand both of these policies. By granting
concessions you open the door to more terrorist acts.  If you don't
treat them as criminals you provide some form of legitimacy.  I
believe this is why the Department of Justice is given the lead in
such incidents.  But, as happened here, the FBI can't always
respond as quickly as we'd like, or they might decline to intercede
at all.  Either way, we need not only the mechanism to defend
ourselves, but the will to do so.
    "It's a sad day when I have to say that I think Marines have
lost that will, but I believe we're in that predicament right  now."
    "We've got a problem with a mind set.  We've done it to
ourselves.  Headquarters recently took some barracks and sea duty
Marines through the FBI's urban shooting course.  These were
Marines who deal on a daily basis with special weapons protection
and the use of deadly force.  They didn't do well."
     "They were reluctant to shoot, and almost to a man, would not
fire on a female terrorist.28  What you may not know is that women
usually make the most brutal terrorists.29  They have the tendency
to want to be right next to their victims.  It makes for some
pretty bloody scenes.  I can say from personal experience of the
last two days that it was definitely the woman in the group who
wanted to hurt people.  But be that as it may, we've got Marines on
some very important security duties who lack the wherewithal to
pull the trigger when their duty requires it.
     The magnitude of the problem can be appreciated better if you
realize that there are 14,000 Marines assigned to security billets
round the world.  These figures do not include interior guard.
Yet we have no formal training to qualify our Marines in security
duties.30  Security qualifications are assumed based on basic
infantry training.  This assumption becomes dangerous when you
realize that not all Marines receive infantry training coupled with
the realization that those that do are exposed to weapons and
firing techniques do so on a very small scale.  If we're not going
to improve the caliber of infantry training, then maybe we ought to
look at establishing some formal standards and schooling for
security duty.
    "Even the Marine Security Guards are in much the same dilemma.
We send our young guards through six weeks of formal training right
here at Quantico.  He learns all the tools of his trade and fires
all sorts of weapons, from the Uzi sub-machine gun to the 87OP
shotgun.  But when it comes to training him when to pull the
trigger, in all but two embassies, he has only the tenants of
deadly force as described in Marine Corps Order 5500.6D, to guide
his actions.31  In those two embassies, the ambassadors have
stipulated in writing specific instances when they believe firing
of their weapons to be justified.  In all the other embassies, MSG
Marines have to rely on their own interpretation of the situation
as compared to the six reasons described in MCO 5500.6D.  That's
asking a lot of a young man.32  It isn't enough guidance.  In all
but the case of self defense, the situations presented in the order
are vague and nebulous.  It's no wonder our Marines are faced with
the situation of having hordes of angry militants storming the
gates, with Marines unable to fire unless they're shot at first.
    "After the 20 Sep. 83 bombing of the Beirut embassy, Secretary
of State, George Shultz, made each ambassador personally
responsible for the security of the embassy.  It would seem that
the emphasis at the top is for a beefed up security system.  Yet,
17 months later, there exist only two embassies where the
Ambassador has proffered a definitive set of rules of engagement
for the MSG Marines.  These guards are limited to firing only when
threatened personally.33  It appears as if we are afraid to shoot
for fear of offending someone.
    "Does anyone disagree with me so far?"
    No one spoke.  Finally the Chief decided he couldn't get into
any more trouble, so he spoke his mind.  "No sir, I don't think
anyone disagrees with you.  Everyone of us that has dealt with
security and deadly force realizes that one of the paragraphs
preceding the tenets deals with accidental discharges.  If you ever
have one, you have to report it to HQMC and submit an informal
investigation to include training procedures, SOPs, preventive
measures taken and anticipated disciplinary action.  Additionally,
officers exercising general court martial authority have to
personally review the investigation and may take disciplinary
action on their own.34  This, coupled with the Commandant's White
Letter on the same subject, is enough to scare any Marine and
commanding officer into feeling that the best choice between two
evils is to let the terrorist have what he wants."
    "Exactly my point, Chief.  This entire approach by the Marine
Corps to countering terrorism ignores the individual Marine as a
deterrent.  It considers him only in an awareness sense.  Awareness
training is fine.  It helps Marines spot the enemy.  But, by God,
our business is closing with and destroying the enemy once he's
   "The government didn't put FBI agents on trains to guard the
mail in the 20s.  No.  They put Marines on board because we knew
how to handle weapons and had a reputation for using them.
Robberies ceased.  Terrorists are of the same ilk.  They go after
targets they can hit with impunity.
    "Secretary Shultz has a good idea when he talks about pre-
emptive strikes against terrorist targets.35  The Israelis do it
with a great deal of success.  Take the war to the bad guy.  Use an
offensive spirit.  Don't be afraid to shoot.  I also understand
Secretary Weinberger's argument for national resolve before any
such action is attempted.  He doesn't want another Viet Nam on his
hands.  But I'm afraid the terrorists would have to blow up Capital
Hill before this country would galvanize behind the military option
in counterterrorism.
    "We're the ones on the forefront of this thing.  Terrorists are
targeting us.  We've got to do something for our own self-defense.
Thinking offensively is the first step."
    A somewhat timid legal officer raised his hand and voiced a
question.  "General, are you advocating support for a new
acceptable level of accidental discharges and adopting a gunslinger
    "Maybe I am.  I kept wondering the whole time I was a hostage,
where the hell are the Marines?  Why were we not being treated to
the spectacle of an assault team at high port crashing through the
doors.  So what if some of us got hurt.  I want it known that if
terrorists play games with us, we'll squash  em.  They'll get the
message soon enough.  Let  em pick on an easier target than
    "I just can't convince myself that we're taking the security
business seriously.  For instance, of the sentries that failed to
stop the speeding Mercedes truck in Beirut, one had never fired his
M-16 and one hadn't shot a weapon at all since boot camp.  None of
them were infantrymen.36 Yesterday we had combat hardened field
Marines hesitant to commit the SRT because to do so would conflict
with the spirit of the Department of Justice/Department of Defense
Memorandum of Understanding.  Hell!  Two officers had been killed
and two others wounded.  Why not take control of the situation and
decide how many terrorists to kill instead of letting them decide
how many of us they'll kill or maim before they surrender."
    The legal officer tried once more.  "General there is such a
thing as minimum force.  It's a guideline for all police forces in
the country."
    "I don't agree with the Israeli approach of shooting the
terrorist and then bulldozing the family home.37  That's too much.
I agree with minimum force, but let's use a little common sense.
If a terrorist uses a club, then the Marines go in and club him.
But when we're dealing with guns and bombs, no more mister nice
guy.  We're dealing with a form of warfare here.38  You must train
like it's war.  Everyone from private to general should realize
    "General, it seems as if you are proposing that we revamp the
entire Marine Corps training program, starting at entry level right
through top level school."
    "That's almost correct, Chief.  We've got to get back to the
basics of Marines knowing weapons and not being afraid to use
them.  You only accomplish that through realistic training.  Our
individual and unit training is as good as the best in the world.
When Los Angeles Police Department SWAT members were asked what was
the most important things in their tactics, they stated discipline
and teamwork.  They further said they strived for the same
discipline and teamwork in SWAT that they'd experienced in Marine
Corps rifle squads years before.39  So, our elemental training is
correct.  We've got to break out of the mind set that says it is
improper to fire your weapon.  We've got to increase our ammunition
allocations so that Marines become totally confident and absolutely
familiar with their weapons.
    "Do you gentlemen realize that for all our talk about
countering terrorism, neither the FY 86 budget nor POM 87 contain
any increase in funding for combatting terrorism?  No additional
training, no additional ammunition, and no additional equipment
exists in either document.  So how serious are we?
    "There are many imaginative things that we could be doing to
train in a more realistic manner.  For instance, go up to the
Secret Service's Beltsville, Maryland combat assault range.  Watch
how they train for something as routine as a malfunction with the M-
16.  Their agents are provided ammunition laced with an occasional
dummy round.   These dummies are identical to the functional
ammunition.  In the midst of an on line combat assault on pop-up
targets, an agent will experience a misfire.  He is expected to
take immediate action right there in the assault.  There are no
helmeted instructors following in trace and none of the idiotic
hand raising to signify a problem and request assistance that has
become standard fare on our ranges.  The agent is expected to clear
his weapon and continue the assault, on his own.  Safety is
stressed, but the mission is paramount.
    "Another example of what we could be investing in to make
training more realistic is the use of a new  shoot/don't shoot'
scenario trainer being marketed by GQ Defense Systems of England.
It's realistic because you have the capability to create your own
scenarios.  The scenario is filmed using standard video cassette
camera equipment.  Plausible situations that security Marines might
confront are acted out and later projected on a screen at a 15 to
25 yard pistol range.  A Marine faces the screen with a loaded
pistol in his holster;  He views the unfolding situation on the
screen in front of him; and he makes a decision whether to draw and
fire or not.  If he's an MP, the scenario could be approaching a
stopped motorist for speeding.  If he's an MSG Marine the scenario
could be a women approaching post number one at an embassy.
Scenarios can be tailored for any of the 14,000 security jobs that
Marines perform, from special weapons protection to flight line
security.  When the MP is confronted with the motorists pulling out
a pistol instead of a driver's license or a woman tossing a grenade
at an MSG Marine instead of asking directions, a shoot/don't shoot
situation is created.  The Marine must decide what to do
instantly.  If he doesn't shoot and the situation was life
threatening, he is advised that he has been killed or wounded.  If
he does choose to shoot, the action is frozen as soon as he fires.
Behind the first screen is a second layer made of paper on rollers
at either end.  Behind this paper a light projecting system is
illuminated as soon as the action frame is frozen on the front
screen.  The light shinning through the  paper backing toward the
shooter clearly identifies where the shooter's round or rounds
impacted.  As the action continues, the paper backing is rolled and
the light behind it turned off, allowing more action and new shots
to be scored.  Accuracy as well as the proper use of deadly force
can be exercised realistically."
    "Sounds interesting, General, but it must be expensive."
    "Not really, Chief.  One complete system costs about 12K.  But
let me tell you about a type of training that I really like because
it strikes at the heart of this mind set problem I've been
addressing.  Chief, what would you say to a practical combat pistol
course where you had your 45 caliber pistol loaded with one round
in the chamber and seven in the magazine at all times, and the
hammer on full cock?"
    There was a rush of noisy murmurs throughout the entire room at
this sacrilege.
    "I'd say you were looking for a lot of knee and foot injuries
to start with, General."
    "Scares hell out of you doesn't it?  Would anyone in this room
ever attempt to run a range in this manner?  Hell, no!  We're
trained that the 45 goes off by itself.  We're so afraid of the
accidental discharge that we've lost the capability to use the
weapon.  The 45 is about the safest weapon around.  Even with the
hammer cocked, there are still two more positive safety features on
the weapon, the grip and thumb safeties.  We just don't practise
enough with any of our weapons to be confident in their handling.
   "This point is aptly demonstrated by an Ex-FBI agent running a
practical combat pistol course in Jacksonville, FL.  For three full
days he is expected to have his weapon fully loaded and cocked at
all times.  If he is shooting on the course, he's expected to keep
track of his expended rounds at all times.  The idea is to never
let the slide become locked to the rear.  Before that happens he
reloads a fresh magazine.  If he is moving from one position to
another, he always inserts a fresh magazine first.  When he gets to
a new location, he may be very happy to have a full eight shots
available rather than two or three.
    "This particular course presents a theory on mind sets as
well.  Mind sets are divided into four categories.  They are
identified by the colors white, yellow, orange, and red.  White is
kind of a mindless state where you are not really aware of any
threat nor most of what goes on around you.  It's kind of like the
state you get into when you drive along Shirley Highway every day.
You go through the motions of driving, but you may be thinking of a
million other things and your kind of surprised when you come back
to conscious thought and wonder how you got to work because you
can't really remember much of the trip.
    "Yellow is a little more alert.  You are at least aware of what
goes on around you.  But in this condition you are still pretty
much at ease.  Your body functions and rates are at rest.
   "Orange is the state that most policemen on the street
maintain.  They are acutely aware of their surroundings and the
threat that exists there.  Their heart rate is increased and they
perspire more.  The stress factor is great.
    "Lastly, there is the red condition.  This is the condition
found in a fire fight.  Stress is at the highest level.  Men have
been known to lose control of their bodies in this state.  From
urinating on themselves to just collapsing into a ball, stress is
great enough to cause one to lose conscious thought patterns.  In
this state, according to the theory, only training will pull you
through.  Just as repetition does along Shirley Highway.  This
course tries to instill in the shooter confidence in his weapon and
his ability to function in the red.  Both the double tap and the
Weaver shooting techniques are taught.  Supposedly, instructors are
capable of holding a group of one inch at 25 yards.
    "These are just some ideas off the top of my head on how we
might improve training and enhance our counterterrorism
capabilities.  Our current concept is based on the assumption that
Marines know how and when to shoot.  We may have that capability
when we're at war and the enemy is in uniform and in front of us.
But in the era of terrorism, we've got to adopt new methods of
training to ensure we can defend ourselves and carry out regular
missions.  Look at the Brits.  Before deploying to Northern
Ireland, they do a lot of preparatory training consisting of
maximizing threat indoctrination and constant shooting situations.
A soldier's awareness level is stepped up to the orange level, on
the Jacksonville, FL model.  We have to do the same kind of
training whether we're deployed in another Beirut or standing guard
on an ammo dump at Camp Pendleton.  We would have a much more
combat ready Marine, no matter what the mission.
    "Another thing we'll have to do is get the accidental discharge
restrictions lifted.  Initially we may have an increase in
accidents.  But I believe this will change for the better once
familiarity and respect for capability is realized.  If an
individual has problems being unsafe, then take action against
him.  But don't punish all Marines by issuing strict discharge
rules.  Pretty soon you could have commanders wiring shut .45
slides to keep them from firing.  Ridiculous, but a symptom of the
mind set we've established.
    It is very easy to be a Monday morning quarterback and tear
down someone else's hard work, but as I see it, MCO 3302.1 and OH 7-
14 are suppose to be the Marine Corp's definitive guidance on
combatting terrorism.  However, they don't address deployed FMF
units and counterterrorism capabilities and responsibilities.
After all, the documents were generated as a result of the loss of
Marine lives on foreign soil.  Additionally, they do do nothing for
integrating terrorism into the spectrum of war.  No guidelines are
given for combatting terrorism on a wartime footing.
    "The documents may be a first step, but if we don't do
something about the individual Marine's training and mind set, 241
Marines may have died in vain.  Without an honest attempt to
correct deficiencies in these areas, MCO 3302.1 and OH 7-14 are
just paper drills to cover somebody's tail."
   A young lieutenant in the back of the room leaned over to his
associate and whispered, "Why the heck is he telling us.  Why not
Headquarters Marine Corps?"
    His fellow lieutenant thought about the question for a moment
before forming his reply.  "I guess he feels we are the ones who
can make the difference."  Then touching the shining bar on his
collar, "It's what these are all about."
     1Personal interview with Lt Col Neubauer, Head Provost Marshal
Section, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps (Code MHL) Washington,
D.C., 2Jan. 1985.
     2Marine Corps Order 3302.1. Combatting Terrorism.
Headquarters,  U.S. Marine Corps (Code POC), Washington, D.C., 23
Nov. 1984, p. 2.
     3CG, MCDEC, Operational Handbook (OH) 7-14.  Terrorism
Counteraction.  Quantico, VA.: FPO, Dec 1984, p. 6-3.
     4OH 7-14, p. 6-6.
     5OH 7-14, p. 8-9.
     6OH 7-14, p. 7-4
     7OH 7-14, p. 3-2.
     8Dept of the Army, Headquarters U.S. Army Europe and Seventh
Army.  Lessons Learned Analysis--Hostage Incident, Leighton Barracks,
Wuerzburg, West Germany. AEAPM-PSB APO New York.:  17 Mar 1981, p. 6.
     9Headquarters, Dept of the Army.  Countering Terrorism on U.
S. Army Installations.  Training Circular 19-16, Washinton, D.C.:
GPO, 25 Apr 1983, p. 9-5.
    10LtCol Neubauer, Interview.
    11Prichard, Joe D. Rescue Assault Forces--Intergrated Strategic
Role in National Security.  Master's Thesis. Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, Jun 1982, p. 114.
    12Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Position Paper. Special
Reaction  Teams. Code MHL, Washington, D.C., 23 Aug 1984, p.1.
    13LtCol Benson and LtCol James Riley. European Terrorism: The
U.S. Military Command Crisis Management Process. Naval War College.
Newport, R.I., June 1981, p.24.
    14Army Times, 28 Sep 1981.
    15Major Wright, Jeffrey. "Terrorism: A Mode of Warfare."
Military Review, October 1984, p. 43.
    16Wright, p. 36.
    17Wright, p. 43.
    18Kupperman, R. "The Challenge of Terrorism to the Military."
Army Science Board Report. OASA(RDA), Washington, D.C., Mar 1982,
    19OH 7-14, p. 6-8.
    20Personal interview with Captain Hunter, Officer-in-Charge
Marine Corps Scout Sniper School, Quantico, VA, 10 Dec 1984.
    21Captain Hunter, 10 Dec 1984.
    22Captain Hunter, 10 Dec 1984.
    23Koppel, Ted. ABC Nightline. New York: ABC News, 23 Nov 1984.
    24Personal interview with reliable source in counterterrorism
wishing to remain anonymous.
    25Personal interview with LtCol B. Quist, Instructor
Counterterrorism, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico,
VA, 15 Nov 1984.
    26Personal interview with Mr. R. Taubert, Head FBI's Special
Operations And Research unit, Quantico, VA, 21 Sep 1984.
    27OH 7-14, p. B-3.
    28LtCol Zinni, T. "USMC Policy/Plan on Terrorism." Quantico,
VA, 29 Jan 1985. Address presented at the Marine Corps Command and
Staff College.
    29LtCol Kline. "The Terrorist Threat." Quantico, VA, 29 Jan
1985. Address presented at the Marine Corps Command and Staff
    30LtCol Zinni, 29 Jan 1985.
    31Personal interview with Col Mabry, USMC, Commanding Officer,
Marine Security Guard Battalion, Quantico, VA., 3 Jan 1985.
    32Col Mabry interview, 3 Jan 1985.
    33Col Mabry interview, 3 Jan 1985.
    34MCO 5500.6D, P. 2a.
    35Omang, Joanne. "Shultz Bids Public Aid Terrorism Fight."
Washington Post, 26 Oct 1984, p. 1e.
    36LtCol Hensman, J. "European Perspectives." Quantico, VA. 13
Feb 1985. Address presented at the Marine Corps Command and Staff
    37CNN Headline News. New York: CNN-TV TBS, 14 Feb 1985.
    38Jenkins, Brian  Combatting Terrorism Becomes a War. A Rand
Paper. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., May 1984.
    39Personal interview with Col Pat Collins, Coordinator, MCDEC
Study on Marine Corps Concepts and Doctrine for Countering
Terrorism, Quantico, VA. 12 Oct 1984.
Personal interview with Colonel P. Collins, Special Advisor on
     Terrorism to the Director, Education Center, MCDEC,
     Quantico, VA., 12 Oct. 1984.  Col. Collins was extremely
     helpful in  providing a general understanding of
     terrorism, points of contact in the counterterrorism
     field, and a huge reference library on terrorism and low
     intensity conflicts.
Personal interview with Lieutenant Colonel Fox, Faculty
     Advisor, Marine Corps Command and Staff College,
     Quantico, VA., 4 Jan 1985.  LtCol Fox provided insight
     into why run of the mill Marines would not be good at the
     surgical mission required for counterterrorism
Personal interview with Lieutenant Colonel Hensman, R.M.
     Exchange Officer to MCDEC, Quantico, VA., 2 Oct 1984.
     LtCol Hensman provided specific insight into the type of
     training that Royal Marines undergo before being placed
     into Northern Ireland for duty.
Personal interview with Major Dave Hunt, U.S. Army, Marine
     Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA., 3 Dec
     1984.  Major Hunt provided insight into Special Forces'
     role in counterterrorism as well as special operations
     planning and training.
Personal interview with Captain Hunter, Officer-in-charge
     Marine Corps Scout Sniper School, Quantico, VA., 6 Jan
     1985. Captain Hunter was extremely helpful in providing
     information on sniper selection and training techniques
     as well as combat shooting techniques.
Personal interview with Colonel Mabry, Commanding Officer,
     Marine Security Battalion, Quantico, VA., 3 Jan 1985.
     Very informative interview on the aspects of Embassy duty
     and the restrictions that are placed on Marines by the
     Chief of Mission.
Personal interview with Major G. Nance, Australian Special Air
     Service, Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA., 6 Dec
     1984. Major Nance has had extensive experience in
     counterterrorist training and operations.  He offered a
     vast amount of information on the techniques, training
     and selection process needed for a successful
     counterterrorism reaction force.  He is of the opinion
     that although small unit training and individual
     expertise are the key, that units can not be trained for
     counterterrorism operations and be expected to fulfill
     conventional roles as well.
Personal interview with Lieutenant Colonel Neubauer, Head
     Military Police Division, Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps
     (Code MHL), Washington, D. C., 8 Jan 1985.  LtCol
     Neubauer is a firm believer in a more active role for the
     Military Policeman in counterterrorism.  He cites the
     Army's reliance on MPs in its TC 19-16.  He provided much
     information on police training methods and the fact that
     many MP organizations already have units trained in SWAT
                     ADDRESSES/TV PROGRAMS
Cousteau, Jacque. Snowstorm in the Jungle. Atlanta, Ga: TBS-
     TV, 15 Jan 1985.  This documentary depicts leftist
     guerrillas in Central and South America trafficking in
     drugs to finance their terrorist actions.  It is hinted
     that Castro was the man that blessed this tactic for its
     lucrative aspects as well as the debilitating effects on
     the U. S. population.
Marsh, John O. Sec of the Army. Quantico, VA., 25 Jan 1985.
     Address presented at the Marine Corps Command and Staff
     College.  The Secretary indicated that there were 22 full
     blown insurgencies ongoing in the world today. The
     likelihood of U. S. involvement in low intensity
     conflicts in the future is great.  He further inferred
     that the East Germans are the experts at populace
Owens, M. T. Dr. "Appeal of Marxism/Leninism to Emerging
     Nations." Quantico, VA. 16 Jan 1985. Address presented at
     the Marine Corps Command and Staff College.  Dr. Owens
     provided an interesting reason for the rise of urban
     terrorism.  His theory is contrary to Claire Sterlings.
     He believes that countries like Nicaragua learned from
     Che's mistakes in Bolivia and no longer conduct
     indiscriminate terrorism.  Each act of terrorism is now
     considered for its maximum effect on the media.
Parks, H. Prof. "Vietnam Revisited."  Quantico, VA. 24 Jan
     1985.  Address presented at the Marine Corps Command and
     Staff College.  Prof Parks believes that the failure of
     Dessert One in Iran was a blessing in disquise for the
     nations counterterrorism program.  He feels it drove home
     the fact that the U. S. needed a dedicated
     counterterrorism unit and that such and undertaking could
     not be done so inexpensively.  Prof Parks also inferred
     that the Posse Commitatus Act may have to be relaxed to
     allow the new militay national level assets (Delta) to
     conduct conterterrorism operations in the U. S.
Stamper, B. and Dick Sullivan.  "Naval Investigative Service's
     Counterterrorism Capabilities."  Quantico, VA. 10 Dec
     1984.  Address to selected faculty and staff of the Marine
     Corps Command and Staff College.  Both gentlemen
     provided their audience with a general command
     presentation on the capabilities of NIS to assist the
     Marine Corps in counterterrorism situations.  The
     presentation was beneficial not only for its information,
     but also because the agents didn't know that
     Headquarters, Marine Corps had formed a working group
     that met weekly on terrorism planning and that the NIS
     point of contact on that working group was MHL.
Anderson, Jack. "Anti-Terrorism Advice Mimics TV Fare."  The
     Washington Post, 28 Nov 1984, pp.C11.  Like much of Mr.
     Anderson's trash, this article was of no value.
Andrews, Walter. "U.S. Commando Force To Have Submarines."
     Washington Times, 3 Jan 1985, pp. 1.  This article
     reports an NBC News source as stating Delta Force is 2000
     men strong.  It provides interesting information on the
     use of Delta worldwide and some information on Delta's
     employment.  The article never does explain the submarine
     link.  Overall, a useful document for background.
Colby, William.  "Taking Steps to Contain Terrorism."  New York
     Times, 8 Jul 1984, pp.2.  This ex-CIA director thinks
     there is too much emphasis on terrorism in the media and
     that it is given too much credit.  He doesn't feel that
     terrorists have really accomplished very much.  He
     outlines a three pronged plan for successful CT ops.  The
     include intelligence, security practices (antiterrorism)
     and popular support.
Friedman, Thomas L. "Israel Turns Terror Back on the
     Terrorists.  But Finds No Political Solutions."  New York
     Times, 4 Dec 1984, pp. 12.  Good view of the Israeli
     history of CT.  Israel nomal reaction starts with a
     general retaliation toward the host country in which
     terrorists work.  Their tactics changed in 1972 after the
     Munich massacre of their athletes.  Israel then turned
     to surgical assassinations and car bombings.  A good
     account of countering terror with terror.
Getler, M. "Irish Border Is Escape Route For Northern
     Ireland's Terrorists."  The Washington Post, 2 Nov 1984,
     pp. A29.  Details the problem along the Northern Ireland
     border.  Examines "safe havens" for terrorists and how
     important they are.  Good background, but not directly
     pertinent to my subject.
Greve, F. and Ellen Warren.  "Secret Army Unit Allegedly Flies
     in Latin America."  Philadelphia Inquirer, 16 Dec 1984,
     pp. 1.  Extremely interesting allegations that  a special
     helicopter unit at Fort Campbell, Ky has been flying 
     special ops missions in Salvador and Nicaragua.  No real
     tie into CT except mention that the unit is used by 
Guidry, Vernon A. "Anti-terror Forces Get Low Billing." -
     Baltimore Sun, 16 Dec 1984, pp.7.  Describes the
     reluctance with which the Army is attempting to place
     piority on rebuilding its Special Forces units.  Not of
     any use to this study.
Harwood, R. et al. "U. S. Ponders Morality of Striking Back." -
     The Washington Post, 12 Feb 1984, pp. A1.  This article
     was useful due to its exploration into a middle eastern
     terrorist's background.  A psychological profile is
     attempted based on interviews of convicted terrorists.
Hunter, Robert E. "Can U. S. Muster the Will, Master the Ways
     to use Force?"  Los Angeles Times, 4 Nov 1984, part III,
     pp. 5.  Examines whether or not the U. S. will unleash its
     military might too quickly.  Terrorism is talked about as
     a side issue.  Specifically, Sec of State Schultz's use of
     preemtive strikes is discussed.  The author's thesis is
     that the U. S. is held to higher standards than most
     countries and that we cannot go off half cocked.
     Although interesting, the article was not particularly
     germane to my topic.
Jones, Mel. "Corps Wide Battle Plan laid Out to Prepare to
     Combat Terrorism."  Navy Times, 21 Jan 1985, pp. 15.
     Heralds the promulgation of MCO 3302.1.  It explains the
     views of the USMC Special Ops/Counterterrorist officer,
     LtCol Zinni. A good thumbnail sketch of the order.
Kwitny, J. "Book on Israeli Assassination Team Stirs Debate
     Over Its Authenticity."  Wall Street Journal, 4 Jun 1984,
     pp. 29.  The article reports on the turmoil surrounding
     a book published by Simon and Schuster titled
     "Vengeance."  The author's identity is never given, but he
     claims to have headed an Israeli hit team that  killed
     various Arab terrorisits in reprisal for the 1972 Munich
     slaughter.  Not much historical content, but when coupled
     with other documents, a picture starts to emerge of some
     pretty brutal Israeli counterterrorism doctrine.
Omang, Joanne.  "Shultz Bids Public Aid Terrorism Fight."  The
     Washington Post, 26 Oct 1984, pp. A1.  Very helpful
     article which examines Sec of State Shultz's request for
     a national consensus against terrorism.
Smith, Terrence. "U. S. Learning How to React if Terror
     Threatens." New York Times, 2 Dec 1984, pp. 1.  Article
     examines a spin off of the Beirut Embassy bombings, the
     galvanizing of Congress to devote funding to
     counterterrorist organizations.  Some CT experts like
     Jenkins and Kupperman are also quoted advising caution on
     the quick draw of George Shultz's preemptive strike
Taubman, Philip.  "U. S. Military Tries to Catch Up in Fighting
      Terror." New York Times, 5 Dec 1984, pp. 8.  More
      interesting information on Delta and other special
      counterterrorist units.  The article claims that Delta has
      been involved overseas in such incidents as the General
      Dozier rescue and a recent Venezuela airliner
      hijacking. It also gives a good listing of the FBI' most
      dangerous terrorist units in the U. S.
Thorton, M. "FBI Probing 19 Terrorist Gangs Alleged in the
      U.S.." The Washington Post, 7 May 1984, pp. A1.  Article
      examines the current terrorist groups operating in U.S.
      and of most concern to the FBI.  An excellent source.
Thorton, M. "U. S. Investigation the Smuggling of Weapons to
      Irish Terrorists."  The Washington Post, 2 Nov 1984, pp.
      A28.  This article reports on the seizure of a fishing 
      boat off Irish waters containing U. S. weapons bound for
      the IRA.  The real information however, lies in the
      examination of the U. S. as a source of equipment,
      weapons and funds for Irish terrorists.  Interesting
      stuff, but not related directly to my study.
"Why Holland's South Moluccans Aren't Hijacking Trains Any
      More."  Wall Street Journal, 24 May 1984, pp. 1.  The only
      printed word I found during my research that addressed 
      attacking and eliminating the cause of a social or
      economic discord within a terrorist group.  In this case,
      the government of Holland sent dissident Moluccans on a 
      free trip back to Molucca.  The visitors found that the
      life they'd been led to believe was worth fighting for
      was in fact a rather squalid existence and not the 
      fault of the Dutch.
"18 Women Learn to Fight Terrorists."  Air Force Times, 14 Mar
      1977, pp. 43.  Dated and useless material from the
      viewpoint of my paper.
African American Liberation Army.  On Organizing Urban Guerilla
      Units.  Washington, D.C., 8 Oct 1970.  A captured field
      manual published by the AALA.  The document was dedicated
      to Carlos Marighella and provides guidance on recruiting
      cell members for terrorists acts.  Detailed instructions
      for creating time bombs and exploding Molotov cocktails
      are also given.  A good document for insight into the
      violent thinking of urban terroists.  It was also my
      first lead to Carlos Marighella.
Alter, J. "Taking On Terrorism."  Newsweek, 30 Apr 1984, pp.
      22.  Short article arguing that though talk and Sec of
      State Shultz's preemptive strike threat will not be
      enough to combat terrorism. Relies on Italian
      counterterrorist quotes that say terrorist groups must be
      destroyed from within.
"America, Next Target for Terrorists?"  U. S. News and World
      Report, 9 Jan 1984, pp. 24-29.  Report furthers Rand
      Corporation's Brian Jenkins' theory that America is the
      next target for international terrorists.  This theory is
      further backed by Prof Paul Wilkinson of Aberdeen Univ in
      Scotland, a renowned expert on international and
      transnational terror groups.  A very helpful document.
Beaumont, Roger A. "Military Elite Forces:  Surrogate  War,
      Terrorism and the New Battlefield." Parameters, Mar 1979,
      pp. 17-29.  Scholarly article on the growing trend among
      governments to employ elite military forces for political
      means.  The growth of surrogate war (used in the same
      sense as Brian Jenkins theory) and terrorism make the
      continued use of such forces likely.  The author warns of
      the break down in the "soldierly ethic" when clear cut
      means for warfare evaporate.
Bonn, Udo Philipp.  "Combatting Terrorism in Federal Germany."
      International Defense Review, Jun 1979, pp. 999 et
      passim.  Good description of GSG-9.  How they come into
      existence and their organization.  Excellent description
      of what it takes to be member of this elite unit.
Bornmann, Karl G. "Modern Weapons and Equipment Increase the 
      Striking Power of Counterterrorist Groups."  Military
      Technology (MILTECH), Jun 1982, pp. 155 et passim.  Good
      description of state of the art weaponry employed by
      counterterrorist units in West Germany.  The emphasis is
      on GSG-9.  Handguns, automatic sub-machine guns, sniper
      rifles and 40mm weapons are highlighted.  Other special
      equipment such as ladders and snap links are also
      covered.  Good background information, and shows that
      conventional equipment may not do the trick in all cases.
Del Grosso, C. S. and John C. Short.  "A Concept for
      Antiterrorist Operations."  Marine Corps Gazette, June
      1979, pp. 54-59.  A somewhat dated argument for the
      Marine Corps to get involved in a formalized
      Counterterrorist role.  This article was obviously
      written before the Army was made Executive Agent for CT
      within DOD.  The authors arguments are based on the
      Marine Corps' flexibility.
"Fat Man, Tailor, Soldier, Spy." Time, 28 Feb 1983, pp. 32.
      Intriguing thesis that the Italian and American
      governments used Mafia help to locate kidnapped American
      General Dozier in Feb 1983.
"The FBI's Hurt Team."  Newsweek, 19 Mar 1984, pp.34. Almost a
      news release of the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team, whose
      introduction to the public was timed to warn potential
      terrorists to stay away from the 1984 Summer Olympics in
      Los Angeles.
Flynn, D. J. "An Antiterrorist Mission for the Reserve." 
      Marine Corps Gazette, Aug 1983, pp. 56f.  Proposal for
      establishing antiterrorist teams (the author means
      counterterrorists in today's jargon) in major urban
      centers composed of memebers of the Armed Forces Ready
      Reserve.  Interesting but somewhat dated material.
Friedman, Thomas L.  "The power of the Fanatics."  The New York
      Times, 7 Oct 1984, pp. 32 et passim.  The author offers 5
      reasons why extremists are gaining popularity.  His 
      premise is that counterterrorism must eradicate the
      reasons for unrest.  He paints a vivid picture of why the
      middle east is so violent and why it is apt to stay that
      way.  Good general background stuff.
Gibbs, George.  "Equipments for Internal Security and
      Antiterrorist Operations." Asian Defense Journal, Oct
      1981, pp. 87-91.  An early shopping list of security
      weapons and devices available to thwart the terrorist.
      Of interest was mention of an SAS "shock stick" and its
Gibbs, George.  "Internal Security Equipments."Asian Defense
      Journal, July 1983, pp. 55-87.  Details new equipments to
      help CT forces.  Not particularly germane to my topic,
      but provides a good look at the wide assortment of CT
      unique equipments being manufactured and marketed.
Goldie, L. F. E."Combatting International Terrorism:  The
      United Nations Developments." Naval War College Review,
      Winter 1979,pp. 49 et passim.  Provides the historical
      performance of the United Nations in dealing with
      international terrorism.  The article indicates how
      ineffective the U.N. has been in dealing with this
      matter.  The Israeli raid at Entebbe and the indecision
      as to classification as an invasion or a rescue is a case
      in point.
Hayden, T. H. "Antiterrorist Contingency Readiness." -
      Proceedings, Mar 1979, pp. 100-103.  Uses El Toro's SWAT
      trained Military Police to argue that FMF Marines should
      adopt a counterterrorist mission.
Hensman, J. R. LtCol Royal Marines. "Combatting Terrorism, the
      Way Forward." Operational Overview. MCDEC Newsletter,
      Quantico, VA., Apr-Jun 1984.  The RM solution to
      combatting terrorism.  It is built around education on the
      threat and rules of engagement.  LtCol Hensman believes
      that there is little difference between terrorists and
Horchem, Hans-Josef Dr. "Learning the Lessons of
      Counterterror, West Germany's Experience." Defense and
      Foreign Affairs Digest.  July 1979, pp. 17-29.  Good
      description of German terrorist groups, Red Army Faction,
      2 June Movement, and Revolutionary Cells.  The
      Government's actions to defeat the groups is also
      studied.  The author's conclusion is that the government
      must not act as the terrorists expect.  A very useful
      article to my study.
"How Some Are Winning the War With Terrorists." U.S. News and
      World Report, 9 Jan 1984, pp. 31. A comparison of West
      Germany and Turkish tactics to counter terrorists.  Both
      have been successful, but the West German model is based
      on police work and special CT units.  The Turkish model
      includes severe government restrictions on the 
Mace, Don. "Antiterrorism Office Opens at Pentagon." Air Force
      Times, 29 Nov 1982. pp. 7.  Announces the Air Force's
      attempt to establish a centralized antiterrorism effort.
      This is not a counterterrorist effort.  This article was
      of little use on my specific topic, but did provide some
      historical information on DOD's efforts to tackle the
      terrorism problem.
McClellan, R. W. "Role of the U.S. Army in Countering
      Terrorism."  Operational Overview.  MCDEC Newsletter,
      Quantico, VA., Apr-Jun 1984.  Brief compilation of TC 19-
      16.  Not much new information.  Appears to support idea
      of locally trained Crisis Management Force that has the
      capability to react "to some degree."
Monahan, M.C. "A Brief History of Terrorism."  Operational -
      Overview.  MCDEC Newsletter, Quantico, Va., Apr-Jun 1984.
      Good, but brief, sketch of modern terrorism.
Morelli, D. and Michael M. Ferguson. "Low Intensity Conflict:
      An Operational Perspective." Military Review, Nov 1984,
      pp. 2-16.  Focus of the article is on preparing the Army
      to fight low intensity conflicts.  Nothing on terrorism.
Motley, James B. "Terrorism Hits Home, Will the Army Be
      Ready?" Army, Apr 1984, pp. 18-25.  Author offers a good
      thumbnail sketch of the governmental responsibilities for
      a terrorist act in the U.S.  He offers some good thougts
      on what the Army's role ought to be in counterterrorism
      and makes a plea for centralizing CT action at the
      highest level of government.
Muller, Felix.  "Fighting Internal Violence." Armada
      International, Jan 1981, pp. 66-72.  A collection of
      weapons and equipment used by various counterterrorist
      units.  Some rather ingenious ways to carry a weapon on
      board an aircraft and escape detection are discussed.
      For this last reason, a useful article.
Patt, Douglas C.  "The Counterterrorist Mandate." Military
      Intelligence, Jul-Sep 1982, pp. 28 et passim.  The author
      concludes that terrorism is her to stay, either as a
      political forum for radicals, or as a well orchestrated
      adjunct to a conventional invasion.  This article was of
      interest in its description of the SAS rescue in the
      Iranian Embassy in London
Preston, A. "The Changing Balance in the Pacific." Jane's
      Defense Weekly, 29 Sep 1984, pp. 647-650.  Good
      information on distribution of friendly and Soviet forces
      in Asia.  Useless for direct information on terrorism.
"Putting A Price on Security." Newsweek, 15 Oct 1984, pp. 65.
      Depicts security measures for Embassies as a result of
      the attacks on the Beirut Embassy.  The only pertinent
      bit of information in the article was the indication
      that Marine Security Guard posts were to be increased by
      307 next year.
Sheffield, Dick. "T.N.T." Airman, Nov 1977, pp. 21-27.
      Chronicles the activation of Patrict Air Force Base's 
      Tactical Neutralization Team (TNT).  It is a SWAT team of
      Air Police trained by the civilian SWAT of Orange County,
      Fl.  A good listing of the qualifications and training in
      a SWAT course
Simpson III, Charles M. "Paranoia, As A Weapon in
      Unconventional Warfare." Army, Apr 1984. pp. 30-33.
      Thoughts on  how to prepare a military unit for an
      unconventional of terrorist attack.  The article is
      geared toward using sound guerrilla fighting techniques
      learned in Viet Nam by Special Forces to combat modern
      urban terrorists.
Simpson, H. R. "Organizing for Counter-Terrorism."  Strategic
      Review, Winter 1982, pp. 30-33.  The author offers his
      views on how to organize at the federal level to fight
      terrorists.  Centralization is his suggestion and West
      Germany is the example favored.  Formation of a Special 
      Unit and the areas that are vulnerable to the terrorists
      are discussed.
"Strike Four."  The New Republic, 15 Oct 1984, pp. 2-3.
      Commentary on how the U.S. has not taken adequate
      security on our embassies.  It offers such advice as
      building our embassies below ground and hiring civilian
      guards instead of Marines.  By in large a thoroughly
      useless article.
Wright, J. "Terrorism:  A Mode of Warfare."  Military Review,
      Oct 1984, pp. 35-45.  Thesis is that state supported
      terrorism is not identified well enough in doctrine and
      concepts in the U.S. Army.  Particularly suggests
      revisions of FM 100-1. The Army and FM 100-5,
      Operations.  The bombing in Beirut of Marine headquarters
      and his thesis are examined through the principles of war
      as applied to low intensity conflicts and particularly,
Zakharchenko, V. "Readiness for Action."  Soviet Military
      Review, Oct 1983, pp. 37-38.  The importance the Soviets
      place on "psychological steeling" of their troops in
      preparation for war.  The article has nothing to do with
      terrorism, but reinforces my thoughts on the training for
      combat using combat conditions.  I feel the same is
      necessary in counterterrorism training.  The Soviets have
      accepted the fact that training must be as realistic as
      possible to get the soldier through the shock of combat.
      I feel the same is true for the surgical skill and quick
      thinking needed in CT  operations.
Benson, R. and James Riley. "European Terrorism:  The
      U.S. Military Comand Crisis Management Process." Naval
      War College.  Newport, R.I. Jun 1981.  Good orderly
      presentation. Argues CT as an operational function.  Uses
      the Weurzburg hostage incident in Germany to examine
      installation commander's responsibilities and lessons
      learned.  A very good view of the Status of Forces
      Agreements and how treaties and international will guide
      a commander's decision in a terrorist incident overseas.
California Division of Law Enforcement.  Disguised Weapons.
      Sacramento, CA., Aug 1983.  An assortment of terrorist
      weapons that can be concealed.
Deken, George T. "Role of the Military in Combatting Urban
      Terrorism in the United States."  Diss. Air War College,
      Maxwell AFB, AL., Arp 1976.  Weighs the effect of an
      antiterrorist mission for the Armed Forces.  Looks at
      public support as well.  Main point is that civil police
      will not be able to handle terrorists in the future.
      Military can augment them but must work within Posse
      Commitatus.  The paper also recommends that all nuclear
      weapons transport should be a totally military job.
Department of the Army, Headquarters.  Countering Terrorism on
      U.S. Army Installations TC 19-16.  Washington, D.C.: GPO,
      25 Apr 1983.  The only definitive work on both proactive
      and reactive measures to countering terrorism.  TC 19-16
      was used by the Marine Corps for the basis of both MCO
      3302.1 and OH 7-14.  The bulk of the responsibility for
      CT operations is placed on the Provost Marshall's
      Office.  This is the only concept not borrowed by the
      Marine Corps.  The Corps has chosen instead to place
      responsibility on the S-3.  TC 19-16 provides concepts,
      models and examples  for establishing an entire program
      for CT from scratch.  The only problem I have with the
      document is that it still reeks of the "minimum force"
      mentality and does little to explore the individual
      soldier's contribution to reactive situations.
Department of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe and the
      Seventh Army.  Lessons Learned Analysis--Hostage Incident,
      Leighton Barracks, Wuerzburg, West Germany. AEAPM-PSB.
      APO New York.  17 Mar 1981.  Very detailed account of how
      the Crisis Management Team concept worked in the only
      hostage situation on a military base.  The events in this
      study provide a view on how our own CMT as described in
      MCO 3302.1  and OH 7-14 might work.
Fowler, William W. Terrorism Data Bases:  A Comparison of
      Missions, Methods, and Systems.  A Rand Note.  Santa
      Monica, CA: Rand Corp., Mar 1981.  Author thinks computer
      information data bases could be used more widely in
      terrorist intelligence estimates.  It examines 8 such
      data bases from CIA, DIA and civilian sources and
      indicates current chronology oriented entry isn't all
      that helpful from an analyst's viewpoint.  Should be
      converted to content oriented entries instead.  The idea
      is that then the data could be shared.  The shortfall in
      this study is that it doesn't go one more step and
      explain how the content oriented entries could then be
Hinkle, Philip M. "Terrorism: A Recommended Study
      for Professional Military Officers." Research Report: Air
      War College, Maxwell AFB, AL. Feb 1980.  A thumbnail
      sketch of terrorism from the military operations point of
      view.  Not in depth enough to be pertinent to my paper.
Hewitt, C. "The Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Policies."
      Dept of State, Washington, D.C. Jun 1982.  Examines
      policies for effectiveness against urban terrorists.
      Looks at Northern Ireland (1970-), Spain (1975-), Italy
      (1977-), Uruguay (1968-73), and Cypress (1955-59).
Jenkins, Brian. Combatting Terrorism Becomes a War. A Rand
      Paper.  Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corp, May 1984. Explores
      whether state supported terrorism is in  fact warfare.  If
      it is, what should our response be?  The dilemma of an
      appropriate response is interesting and germane.
Jenkins, Brian. High Technology Terrorism and Surrogate War:
      The Impact of New Technology on Low-level Violence.  A
      Rand Paper.  Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corp, Jan 1975.  An
      early, but still topical guess at what Hi tech has done
      for the terrorist.  Also provides a guess at what
      terrorist may target in the future.
Jenkins, Brian.  Terroriam Works--Sometimes.  A Rand Paper.
      Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corp, Apr 1974.  An outdated
      paper, but projects Jenkins' theories that terrorist
      warfare is the wave of the future.  He feels that
      conventional war is too costly and destructive.
      Governments will continue to employ terrorists if they
      feel their goals can be attained.
Kupperman, R. "The Challenge of Terrorism to the Military."
      Army Science Board Report. OASA (RDA), Washington D.C.:
      Mar 1982.  Project that terrorism is here to stay and
      that the military should take steps to plan for it.
      Defense against attack on our NBC storage sites is 
      stressed as is a new approach to R&D geared toward the
      exotic James Bond type arsenal.
Marine Corps Order 3302.1. Combatting Terrorism. Washington,
      D.C. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (Code POC), 23 Nov
      1984.  Purpose is to provide guidance to commanders
      concerning USMC role in combatting terrorism.  Policy,
      intelligence, internal and physical security, education
      and training, operations, legal considerations, relations
      with the press and employment of USMC forces against
      terrorists are all covered.  The three main points made
      are: 1) S-3/Commander has responsibility, 2) No national
      level asset for CT within the Marine Corps, 3) Copy the
      Army's TC 19-16 as needed.
MCDEC OH 7-14. Terrorism Counteraction. Quantico, VA.: FPO, Dec
      1984.  AN expansion on MCO 3302.1.  It is a carbon copy
      of TC 19-16.  However, with the emphasis on the S-3 being
      central, much of the coherent organizational structure of
      TC 19-16 is lost.  As it now stands, 1-14 will be a
      tremendous burden on the operational staff if executed as
      directed.  If not, it will become one more paper drill,
      not really operational at all.  The problem appears to be
      the absence of the PMO in the hierarchy.  TC 19-16 has
      the PMO training the CMT.  OH 7-14 has the PMO acting as
      just another special staff officer, subordinate to the
      new "Public Safety Officer."
Munger, M.D. "The Growing Utility of Political Terrorism.
     Research Memo. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
     College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Mar 1977.  A detailed
     prognosis for continued use of terrorism by most of the
     third world countries in the world.
Pouliguen, G. "Special Operations as a Response to Hostage
     Seizures." Diss. Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL., Feb
     1983.  Good thumbnail sketch of 1964 U.S./Belgium "Dragon
     Rouge" special operations in the Congo, Entebbe, and
     Dessert One.  The author's basic argument is that
     special ops is the best way to get hostages out alive.
Prichard, Joe D. "Rescue Assault Forces--Integrated Strategic
     Role in National Security. Diss. Fort Leavenworth, Kan.,
     Jun 1982.  Spends much time proving why terrorism is the
     wave of the Soviet future.  Argues a need for separate
     service for the combatting of terrorism.  Reasons are C2
     (Israeli model) and the slow PPBS response for
     technological advances and pork barrel of large defense
     programs to the detriment of Special Ops.  Good source
     for background on Soviet involvement and why they'll
     continue to pursue terrorism in the areas of the world
     that the west is dependent upon for critical minerals and
     oil.  A little left field regarding the recommendation
     for a separate service for CT and not up to date now that
     JSOA exists.
Roberts, K. "The Terror Trap." Army War College Strategic
     Studies, Carlisle Barracks, PA., Aug 1975.  Examines
     future terrorism.  Also some good reasons why the Soviets
     might support tightening some restrictions on
     international terrorism.
Shriver, R., John Evans, and Marvin Leibstone. Countering
     Terrorism on Military Installations. Science
     Applications, Inc. Gov't Contract #MDA903-76-C-0272,
     McLean, VA., Jul 1977.  This document could be a beltway
     bandit's forerunner of the Army's TC 19-16.  It assumes
     no state supported terrorism, which is an obvious
     mistake.  It is very well documented.
U.S. Congress. Committee of the House of Representatives. -
     Terrorism. The Government's Response Policy. Address to
     the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of
     the Judiciary, 16 Aug 1978.  Deputy Attorney General,
     U.S. Dept of Justice Benjamin Civiletti tells Congress
     that the U.S. Government's response to terrorist acts is
     proper.  Interesting, but a poor reference for my study.
U.S. Army Aviation Center and Fort Rucker, AL. Anti-Terrorist
     Hostage Rescue Plan. Military Police USAAUNC-ATHORP, Fort
     Rucker, AL.: 1 Mar 1984.  Detailed hostage rescue plan
     written like an Operations Order with specific
     instructions to every player, even negotiators.  A good
     guide to such situations.
U.S. Army Field Circular 19-112. Use of Barriers in Countering
     Terrorism Situations. USAMPS, Fort McClellan, AL., Aug
     1984.  How to construct barriers to stop a speeding
     vehicle (as in Beirut) and foot traffic.
U.S. Army Military Police School. Tips for Countering
     Terrorism. Fort McClellan, AL., 6 Mar 1981.  Extracts
     from DOD C-200.12-11, Handbook for Protecting DOD
     Personnel Abroad Against Terrorist Acts, 23 Jun 1977.
     Good terrorist scenarios presented here.  Provides
     insight into what a terrorist will look for in a
     kidnapping victim.
U.S. Dept of Justice. UPI and CBS Guidelines for Coverage of
     Terrorism. FBD. Charlotte, N.C., GPO, Undated.  Details
     the only two media giants to develop their own
     restrictions for covering terrorist acts.
U.S. Dept of State. International Terrorism: Hostage Seizures.
     Washington, D.C., GPO, Mar 1983.  A good chronological
     history of hostage seizures by terrorists from Jan 68-
     Dec 82.
U.S. Dept of State. Terrorist Bombings. Washington, D.C., GPO,
     Sep 1983.  Statistical overview of international
     terrorist bombings from Jan 77 through May 83.  Germane
     only in a statistical sense for preparing historical
     insight into this type of terrorist action.
U.S. Dept of State. Terrorist Incidents Involving Diplomats.
     Washington, D.C., GPO, Aug 83.  A statistical overview of
     terrorist incidents involving diplomats from Jan 68
     through Apr 83.  A good chronology for historical or
     comparative purposes.
U.S. Dept of State. Terrorist Skyjackings. Washington, D.C.,
     GPO, Jul 1982.  Another statistical overview.  The
     skyjackings from Jan 68 through Jun 82 are provided.  It
     also provides a listing of terrorist groups that
     specialize in this technique.
Horch, P.T. "Terrorism, Selected References, Special
     Bibliography No. 240 (Revised)." Air University Library,
     Maxwell AFB, AL., 36112, Apr 1982.
Sammartano, J. and David Turner. "Terrorism: A Selected
     Bibliography." USAMPS Library, Fort McClellan, AL., 1 Jan

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