LCAC And The Over-The-Horizon Amphibious Assault
CSC 1985
SUBJECT AREA Warfighting
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: LCAC AND THE OVER-THE-HORIZON AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT
I. Purpose: To develop a concept for using the Landing
Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) to conduct an amphibious assault
from beyond the horizon.
II. Problem: Amphibious assault techniques must be devel-
oped to exploit the capabilities of the LCAC, reduce the
vulnerability of the amphibious task force to shore-based
weapons systems, and enable the landing force to achieve
tactical surprise and avoid enemy coastal defenses.
III. Data: The traditional amphibious assault, charac-
terized by ships stationed close to the coastline
discharging slow-moving landing craft and assault amphibian
vehicles (AAVs) toward easily predictable beaches, offers
little hope of achieving tactical surprise, and is
vulnerable to modern defensive weapons. The LCAC can
transport heavy equipment, including tanks and AAVs, at
speeds up to fifty knots directly to inland landing sites.
It is capable of negotiating about seventy-three percent of
the world's coastlines as compared to about seventeen
percent for displacement-type craft. The LCAC can be
carried by all well-deck ships. However, until current
shipbuilding programs are completed, some shortfalls will
exist in the number of LCACs that can be embarked to support
amphibious landings. Employment of the LCAC with existing
and programmed ships, craft, and vehicles to launch an
assault from an amphibious task force stationed beyond the
horizon will present a number of challenges. Naval gunfire
ships will be largely out of range to support the initial
assault. The build-up of combat power ashore will be slow
because the turn-around time for LCACs launched from beyond
the horizon is lengthy. Tank landing ships (LSTs) and
displacement-type landing craft organic to LKAs and MPS
ships must be integrated into the landing plan without
compromising the advantage gained by a high-speed surprise
LCAC assault. Finally, the question of what to do with the
AAVs must be addressed. Assault infantry units landed by
LCACs without AAVs will have limited mobility ashore and no
armored protection. If LCACs are used to land AAVs with the
assault infantry units, the availability of LCACs to land
TOWs, tanks, and artillery in scheduled and on-call waves
will be significantly reduced.
IV. Conclusions: Until the assault elements of the landing
force are established ashore, the amphibious task force must
remain beyond the horizon, not only for its own protection,
but to deceive the enemy as to the location of the attack.
The capability of the LCAC to cross heretofore unassailable
beaches at high speed must be exploited to avoid enemy
defenses and gain surprise. Assault infantry units must
have the necessary mobility ashore to seize deep objectives,
link-up with helicopterborne forces, and exploit the
advantage gained by a surprise landing. The momentum of the
attack must be maintained by accelerating the offloading of
ships, to include using displacement-type craft, to hasten
the build-up of combat power ashore.
V. Recommendations: Future amphibious assaults should be
launched from twenty to twenty-five miles offshore. Es-
corted by attack helicopters, LCACs should carry scheduled
and on-call waves of infantry mounted in AAVs, TOWs, tanks,
and artillery to inland landing sites. Once the leading
elements of the landing force are established ashore, the
amphibious task force should move closer to the coastline to
accelerate offloading by reducing LCAC turn-around time, and
open conventional beaches to accommodate displacement-type
landing craft.
LCAC AND THE OVER-THE-HORIZON
AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement: Future amphibious assaults will be
conducted by using LCACs launched from ships stationed well
beyond the horizon to carry scheduled and on-call waves of
infantry mounted in AAVs, TOWs, tanks, and artillery to
inland landing sites, whereupon the amphibious task force
will move closer to the coastline to accelerate offloading
by LCACs and, if necessary, open conventional beaches for
displacement-type landing craft.
I. The requirement for an over-the-horizon amphibious
assault capability
II. The Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC)
A. Introduction into the fleet
B. Operational characteristics
C. Payloads
D. Compatibility with ships
E. Limitations and vulnerabilities
III. The problems associated with an over-the-horizon
amphibious assault
A. Amphibious ready group configuration
B. Naval gunfire support
C. Ship-to-shore movement distance and time
D. Integration of LCACs, displacement-type landing
craft, and AAVs
1. Displacement-type landing craft
2. AAVs
IV. The concept for conducting an over-the-horizon
amphibious assault
A. Composition of scheduled and on-call waves
1. AAVs in LCACs
2. TOWs, tanks, and artillery in LCACs
B. Control of ship-to-shore movement
1. Approach and retirement routes
2. Landing sites
C. Movement inshore of amphibious task force
D. Opening of conventional beach
E. Concept of fire support
LCAC AND THE OVER-THE-HORIZON
AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT
It is hard to envision, in 1985, an amphibious assault
against a defended beach. Sufficient naval gunfire ships to
obliterate fortifications and pound enemy defenders sense-
less no longer exist. Lumbering amphibious ships standing
three to five miles offshore are easy prey to modern,
precision-guided, shore-based weapons. Landing craft and
amphibious assault vehicles, remarkably similar to their
1942 predecessors, churning toward an easily predictable
beach at eight miles per hour are themselves vulnerable to
shore-based fires, and offer little hope of attaining
tactical surprise. To be sure, the helicopter permits the
rapid and unexpected landing of light infantry. However,
existing means for landing heavy combat support and combat
service support elements essential for the build-up of
credible combat power ashore have improved little since the
1940's, and arc restricted by reefs, tides, beach gradient
and beach trafficability. Any surprise achieved by heli-
copterborne assault is soon compromised by a ponderous
surface assault.
Because of the vulnerability of all types of ships,
craft, and amphibious vehicles to modern weapons systems,
the modern amphibious assault must be launched from beyond
the range of shore-based target acquisition systems.
Tactical surprise must be achieved to permit the rapid
landing of heavy combat and combat support elements across
undefended beaches before the enemy can react to the as-
sault. Until these parameters are met, many will doubt the
continued practicality of the amphibious assault.
The introduction of the Landing Craft Air Cushion
(LCAC) will make possible surprise landings across unde-
fended beaches, and will prove to be the most revolutionary
development in amphibious warfare since the advent of the
helicopter. In conjunction with helicopterborne assaults,
LCACs launched from twenty to twenty-five miles offshore
will cross undefended segments of coastline at high speed
and land infantry mounted in assault amphibian vehicles
(AAVs), TOWs, tanks, and artillery at sites up to one mile
inland. The ability of an LCAC-equipped amphibious task
force to paralyze enemy defenders by striking unexpectedly
with speed and power promises to rejuvenate the utility and
effectiveness of the amphibious assault.
The first production LCACs have already been delivered
to the fleet. By the summer of 1986, six LCACs will be
operational with Assault Craft Unit Five at Camp Pendleton,
California. During Fiscal Year 1987, Assault Craft Unit
Four, based at Little Creek, Virginia, will begin receiving
the LCAC. By 1992, a total of ninety LCACs will have been
delivered. Assault Craft Unit Five and Assault Craft Unit
Four will each be assigned forty-five LCACs.1 Ultimately,
most conventional landing craft will be replaced with
LCACs.2
The LCAC employs hovercraft technology to skim across
the ocean surface on a cushion of air. It has a range of
two hundred nautical miles.3 With a full payload, it will
exceed speeds of fifty knots in sea state two, and forty
knots in sea state three. Overloaded, it will still achieve
thirty knots in sea state two.4 Unconstrained by winds,
tides, reefs, underwater obstacles, mines, beach gradient
and beach trafficability,5 the LCAC can cross the shoreline
and proceed inland at speeds up to thirty-five knots.6
Ashore, it will cross twenty-foot ditches7 and five-foot
vertical obstacles,8 knock down small trees,9 and climb
gradients up to thirteen percent.10
The most significant operational characteristics of the
LCAC are its ability to cross beaches that heretofore have
been unassailable, and its speed. The LCAC will cross
approximately seventy-three percent of the world's coast-
lines, as compared to about seventeen percent for conven-
tional craft,11 enormously complicating a defender's task.
Conventional landing craft and vehicles travel at speeds of
eight to eleven knots, and must be launched from three to
five miles offshore. The fifty-knot speed of the LCAC
permits the amphibious task force to remain over the hori-
zon, beyond the reach of shore-based target acquisition
systems. The vulnerability of the amphibious task force is
reduced, and the specific location of the landing is not
disclosed by the presence of ships close offshore.
The capabilities of the LCAC facilitate tactical
deception to achieve surprise and project forces across an
undefended beach. To illustrate, an LCAC-equipped amphi-
bious force approaching Norfolk, Virginia, at dusk, can
launch a dawn assault anywhere between Long Island, New
York, and Myrtle Beach, South Carolina!12 Put another way,
with a ship-to-shore transit time of under fifty minutes, an
amphibious task force twenty miles offshore can project
forces ashore anywhere across a forty-mile front!
The LCAC carries a standard sixty-ton payload or an
overload seventy-five ton payload on a sixty-six foot by
twenty-six foot four inch rectangular cargo deck. It is
equipped with bow and stern ramps that will permit drive-
through loading and off-loading of any vehicle organic to
the landing force.13 Typical LCAC loads are shown in Figure
1.
TYPICAL LCAC LOADS
4600 Cubic feet cargo
250 Combat-equipped Marines
3 Assualt amphibian vehicles (AAVs)
4 Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs)
1 Tank and 1 LAV
2 M198 howitzers with prime movers
12 High mobility multipurpose wheeled
Vehicles (HMMWV)
Figure 1*
The LCAC is designed to operate from the well decks of
amphibious ships. On its air cushion it measures eighty-six
feet nine inches in length, forty-seven feet in width, and
twenty-three feet six inches in height.15 It can enter or
depart the flooded or dry well deck of all existing well-
deck ships while the ship is underway or at anchor.16 Newer
classes of amphibious ships, such as the LSD-41 and the LHD,
are being designed specifically to accommodate the LCAC.
Ships capable of carrying LCACs are shown in Figure 2.
LSD-class ships will normally carry one LCAC less than
capacity to provide room for shipboard maintenance.17
Because of the height of the LCAC, LSDs with mezzanine decks
installed will be further limited in the number of LCACs
they can carry.
*Footnote 14.
SHIPS CAPABLE OF CARRYING LCACs
LHD 3 LCACs
LHA 1 LCAC
LSD-28 class 3 LCACs
LSD-36 class 4 LCACs
LSD-41 class 5 LCACs
LPD 2 LCACs
Figure 2*
If current shipbuilding programs are continued, the
amphibious force will be able to lift all ninety programmed
LCACs by the mid-1990's.19 Until then, shortfalls will
occur. Studies have shown that sixty-nine to eighty-three
LCACs will be required to support a Marine Amphibious Force
(MAF) amphibious assault.20 The amphibious force of 1986
will be capable of lifting just sixty-four LCACs.21
Thirty-five to forty-two LCACs will be required to support a
Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB).22 A representative mix of
ships available to embark a MAB might include three LHAs,
seven LPDs, one LSD-41 class ship, three LSD-36
class ships, and one LSD-28 class ship, with a total capa-
city to lift only thirty-three LCACs. Six to nine LCACs
will be required to support a Marine Amphibious Unit
(MAU).23 Typical amphibious ready groups (ARGs) used to
deploy MAUs are configured with one LHA, one LKA, and one
*Footnote 18
LST, with a total capacity of one LCAC; or one LHA, one LPD,
and one LST, with a total capacity of three LCACs; or one
LPH, one LPD, one LSD, and two LSTs, with a total capacity
of five or six LCACs, depending on the class of LSD.
Like any other vehicle, the LCAC has limitations and
vulnerabilities that must be recognized prior to considering
its employment. It is a big, noisy craft that displays a
characteristic "rooster tail" of sea spray or dust.24
Although tests have shown that it can sustain considerable
damage and continue to operate,25 it is nonetheless an
unarmored craft.26 Essentially a flatland vehicle, its
speed and maneuverability ashore is constrained. It is
particularly difficult to maneuver in reverse.27 Finally,
the LCAC weighs eighty-seven and one-half tons, empty.28 If
disabled ashore, it will be extremely difficult to extract.
In fact, no landing force vehicle is capable of towing it.29
Employment of the LCAC with existing and programmed
amphibious ships, craft, and vehicles to conduct an amphib-
ious assault from beyond the horizon will present a number
of challenges. Configuration of amphibious ready groups
(ARGs), naval gunfire support, time-distance factors
affecting the ship-to-shore movement, and the integration of
LCACs and displacement-type craft are issues which must be
addressed.
As shown above, amphibious ships likely to be available
in the near term to embark the assault echelons of a MAF or
MAB have the capacity to carry a significant number of
LCACs, although slightly fewer than desired. Configuration
of ARGs used to forward-deploy MAUs will have to be
specifically tailored with the capacity to carry the minimum
six LCACs determined to be adequate to support a MAU land-
ing. Of the three ARG configurations in use today (LHA,
LKA, LST; LHA, LPD, LST; and LPH, LPD, LSD, LST, LST), only
the LPH, LPD, LSD, LST, LST configuration will carry six
LCACs, and then only if the LSD is an LSD-41 class.
Introduction of the LHD, capable of carrying three LCACs, to
replace the LPH will significantly improve the situation, as
will the continued production of the LSD-41 class. However,
programmed LCAC deliveries will be completed long before the
last LPH or LSD-36 class ship is retired. In the interim,
LCAC-equipped ARGs will have to be configured with an LPH,
LPD, and an LSD-41 class ship, or with an LHA, LPD, and an
LSD-36 or LSD-41 class ship.
The traditional concept of using naval gunfire for
preparatory fires and to support the amphibious assault
until landing force artillery is ashore will not work for an
assault launched from twenty to twenty-five miles offshore.
Ships armed wish 5"/54 caliber guns will not be able to
reach targets without moving to within visual range of the
coastline, and by doing so will compromise the surprise
achieved by retaining the amphibious task force beyond the
horizon. Even the battleship, with its sixteen-inch guns
effective to twenty-four miles, will have limited utility if
stationed beyond the horizon. The LCAC-borne amphibious
assault launched from beyond the horizon will have to be
supported by alternative means, because naval gunfire ships
will be largely out of range.
Once launched, it is essential that the momentum of an
amphibious assault be maintained by the rapid and continuing
build-up of combat power ashore. Sufficient landing craft
will never be available to land all desired combat, combat
support, and combat service support elements in one lift.
Each craft must make many trips to the beach. This will
remain true with the LCAC. Additional consideration,
however, must be given to the distance the LCAC must transit
in the ship-to-shore movement, and the relatively limited
endurance of the craft as applies to maintaining the momen-
tum of the assault.
Launched from twenty miles offshore, LCAC transit time
to the beach will be about thirty minutes. Ten minutes will
be required to offload in the landing site. Thirty minutes
transit time back to the ship, twenty minutes to enter the
well deck, load, and depart the well deck, and thirty more
minutes transit time back to the beach, all works out to an
hour and a half between the time an LCAC makes its initial
landing and returns with a second load! Turn-around time
for a third trip to the beach will be further increased
because the LCAC must be refuelled after every second trip
ashore!30
Undoubtedly the biggest dilemma facing the amphibious
planner is the integration of fifty-knot LCACs with nine-knot
displacement-type landing craft and eight-knot AAVs into the
ship-to-shore movement plan. The LCAC is designed to
replace the venerable Landing Craft, Utility (LCU), and
Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM-8). However, LKAs carry
organic LCM-8s, and MPS ships will carry organic LCM-8s, and
causeways.31 The LST is designed to beach itself, or
offload by causeway. These type ships will remain in the
fleet long after the introduction of the LCAC and will
almost assuredly be found in any amphibious task force.
Ship-to-shore movement plans must be designed to capitalize
on the speed and range of the LCAC, yet still provide for
the landing of considerable quantities of supplies and
equipment by displacement-type craft across conventional
beaches.
The assault amphibian vehicle (AAV) is designed to
provide armored protection to the assault elements of the
landing force during the ship-to-shore movement. It pro-
vides mobility ashore, which is particularly critical during
the initial stages of an assault when surface-landed ele-
ments seek to achieve a rapid link-up with helicopterborne
forces. The problem is, it only travels eight miles per
hour in the water, and the follow-on to the current AAV is
not expected to have a significantly greater water speed.32
It is impractical to launch AAVs from twenty miles offshore.
On the other hand, bringing ships to within fice miles of
the coast to launch AAVs compromises the advantage of an
LCAC-equipped force to launch an assault from beyond the
horizon. Hence the dilemma: What to do with the AAVs?
Based on the premise that the assault will be launched from
beyond the horizon, two solutions are apparent, each with
advantages and disadvantages.
First, assault infantry units can be landed without
AAVs. Each LCAC can carry up to 250 Marines, providing the
potential for an incredible swift build-up of infantry
strength ashore, while retaining the preponderance of the
LCAC force to transport pre-loaded TOWs, tanks and artillery
ashore in on-call waves. This concept also provides an
opportunity to alter the doctrinal precept of landing
two-thirds of the assault force by helicopter and one-third
by surface assault.
Landing assault infantry elements without AAVs has
disadvantages. Once ashore, the infantry will have only
limited mobility and no armored protection. More impor-
tantly, the loss of a single LCAC carrying 250 Marines in
the initial assault would be a significant loss to almost
any size force, and might very well jeopardize the mission.
The other alternative is to mount the assault infantry
units in AAVs and carry the AAVs ashore in LCACs. Each LCAC
can carry three AAVs. Infantry strength is not concentrated
on a few LCACs, lessening the impact of losing an LCAC.
Once ashore, the infantry is provided with mobility and
armored protection.
Carrying the AAVs ashcre in LCACs constrains the
landing force commander to a surface assault by the doc-
trinal one-third of his assault force, and significantly
reduces the number of LCACs available to carry TOWs, tanks,
artillery, and other combat support and combat service
support units ashore in scheduled or on-call waves. For
example, five of six LCACs supporting a MAU would be
required to land the fourteen AAVs normally assigned.
Sixteen of thirty-three LCACs supporting a MAB would be
required to land forty-seven assigned AAVs. If all ninety
programmed LCACs were embarked to support a single MAF,
sixty-nine would be required just to land 208 assigned AAVs!
Needless to say, it is unlikely that LCACs would be
available for floating dumps or free boats, and alternate
techniques for emergency resupply and landing command groups
must be developed. By landing the AAVs with the assault
infantry units, the infantry is provided with mobility and
armored protection, but is left with little combat support.
Remembering that an hour and a half will elapse before the
first LCAC will return to the beach with its second load, a
significant delay in the build-up of tank and artillery
strength ashore could occur.
The characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of
the LCAC, and some of the problems associated with an
amphibious assault launched from beyond the horizon have
been discussed. How, then, will an over-the-horizon amphib-
ious assault be conducted? Capitalizing on deception and
speed to achieve tactical surprise, LCACs launched from
twenty to twenty-five miles offshore will carry scheduled
and on-call waves of infantry mounted in AAVs, TOWs, tanks,
and artillery to landing sites up to one mile inland. Once
the assault elements are established ashore, the amphibious
task force will move closer to the beach to reduce LCAC
transit time and accelerate the build-up of combat power
ashore. If required, a conventional beach can subsequently
be opened to accommodate LSTs and other displacement-type
landing craft.
Except in unusual circumstances, it will be necessary
for the LCACs to transport AAVs ashore with the assault
infantry units. The surface assault will be limited to just
one-third of the landing force assault elements, and the
number of LCACs available to pre-load and land TOWs, tanks,
and artillery in scheduled and on-call waves will be
dramatically reduced. Nonetheless, it is essential that the
infantry have the mobility to quickly seize inland objec-
tives, link-up with helicopterborne forces, and exploit the
surprise gained by a high-speed assault launched from beyond
the horizon.
Expecting a delay of an hour and a half until the first
LCAC returns to the beach with a second load, the early
landing of combat support units is mandatory. All available
LCACs not used to transport AAVs will be used to land TOWs,
tanks, and artillery in scheduled or on-call waves. There
will be no requirement for LCACs to carry heavy beachmaster
or landing support equipment ashore in on-call waves. The
capability of the LCAC to move heavy equipment across the
beach to inland landing sites virtually eliminates any need
for the early introduction of landing support units.
The requirement to use every available LCAC to get the
assault elements ashore with as much combat support as
possible in the first lift leaves no suitable craft for
floating dumps or free boats. Floating dumps and free boats
will become a thing of the past. Emergency supplies for
units landed by LCACs will be prepositioned on ships and
brought ashore by helicopter. Command groups will have to
land in scheduled or on-call waves, or use helicopters to go
ashore when desired and link-up with command vehicles landed
with early waves.
A primary control ship will be designated to control
the movement of LCACs from the ships to inland landing
sites. Loaded LCACs will be formed into waves. The LCAC
waves will follow designated routes, very similar to heli-
copter approach and retirement lanes, to and from inland
landing sites. Alternate routes and alternate landing sites
will be designated. Designated rendezvous points, departure
points, penetration control points, control points, and
initial points will be used to control the movement of LCAC
waves to arid from landing sites.
Primary and alternate LCAC landing sites will be
selected to facilitate the seizure of initial landing force
objectives, but will not normally be located more than one
mile inland. The limited overland speed and maneuverability
of the LCAC, and its size, noise, and "roostertail" signa-
ture make it a vulnerable target for enemy gunners ashore.
If the LCAC must travel several miles inland to reach a
landing site, ship-to-shore transit time will be increased,
and it will take a longer time for each LCAC to return to
the landing site with a second load. The importance of
reducing the LCAC turn-around time to maintain a rapid and
continuous build-up of combat power ashore will dictate that
landing sites be located not more than about one mile
inland.
Special consideration must be given to the size and
trafficability of potential landing sites. Landing sites
should be big enough to permit LCACs to easily maneuver in
and out, preferably without having to reverse direction,
Ideally, each site should accommodate three or more LCACs,
so that one or two disabled craft won't obstruct the whole
site. Landing sites should provide good trafficability for
tracked and wheeled vehicles to permit rapid offloading and
reduce landing support requirements.
After scheduled and on-call waves have landed and
initial objectives have been seized, it will no longer be
necessary to conceal the presence of the amphibious task
force. Emphasis must be placed on rapidly landing addi-
tional combat, combat support, and combat service support
units necessary to sustain the momentum of the attack. To
speed offloading and hasten the build-up of combat power
ashore by reducing the LCAC ship-to-shore transit time, the
amphibious task force will close to within three to five
miles of the coast. Minesweeping operations, initiated
after scheduled and on-call waves have been landed by LCACs,
will clear lanes for ships to move closer to the coast.
If the amphibious task force includes LSTs or LKAs and
MPS ships with organic displacement-type landing craft, a
conventional beach will be opened. These type ships will
approach the coast preceded by the ships being offloaded by
LCACs and the minesweeping operations. Underwater and beach
obstacle clearance operations to support the landing of
displacement-type craft will be initiated after scheduled
and on-call waves have been landed by LCACs.
An amphibious assault launched from beyond the horizon
will present unique fire support problems. Because naval
gunfire ships will be out of range to support the initial
landings, the necessity of achieving tactical surprise is
doubly important. The initial assault will be supported by
ship-launched surface-to-surface missiles and air strikes.
Attack helicopters will escort the LCACs across the beach
and into landing sites, and will provide close-in fire
supression and anti-tank fires in support of assault infan-
try elements.
The inability of naval gunfire ships to support the
initial assault will make the early landing of TOWs, tanks,
and artillery highly desireable. If the early landing of
TOWs, tanks, and artillery is restricted by limited LCAC
assets and a lengthy ship-to-shore turn-around time, even
greater reliance will be placed on close air and attack
helicopter support. Once scheduled and on-call waves have
been landed by LCACs, naval gunfire ships will move inshore
to fire-support stations within range of landing force
objectives ashore.
The vulnerability of ships and slow-moving landing
craft to modern weapons systems has made the traditional
concept of amphibious assault almost obsolete. The
incorporation of LCACs into the amphibious forces will
permit the resurgence of the amphibious assault as a daring
but highly practical form of offensive warfare. The
capability of the LCAC to be launched from well beyond the
horizon and carry assault forces across the coastline at
high speed will again place the amphibious attacker in a
position of advantage. Avoiding enemy defenses, and seeking
to achieve tactical surprise, future amphibious assaults
will be launched from twenty to twenty-five miles offshore.
Scheduled and on-call waves of infantry mounted in AAVs,
TOWs, tanks, and artillery will be carried to inland landing
sites by LCACs escorted by attack helicopters. Once the
leading elements of the landing force have been established
ashore, the amphibious task force can safely move inshore to
speed offloading and maintain the momentum of the attack.
The introduction of the LCAC promises to be the most
significant development in the art of amphibious warfare
since the advent of the helicopter. Innovative and imagina-
tive employment of the LCAC will permit swift, powerful, and
unexpected amphibious strikes across beaches heretofore
unassailable. In the years ahead, the stock-in-trade of the
Navy-Marine Corps team will be the high-speed, over-
the-horizon amphibious assault.
FOOTNOTES
1Marine Corps Association, "LCAC Rollout," Marine Corps
Gazette, 68 (June 1984), p. 10.
2Dov S. Zakheim, "The Role of Amphibious Operations in
National Military Strategy," Marine Corps Gazette, 68 (March
1984), p. 38.
3Roy McLeavy, ed., Jane's Surface Skimmers, Hovercraft
and Hydrofoils 1983, 16th ed. (London: Jane's Publishing
Company, Limited, 1983), p. 126.
4Roy McLeavy, "LCAC: Amphibious Assault at 50 Knots,"
Jane's Defense Review, 4 (August 1983), p. 755.
5Ibid, p. 751.
6Vincent C. Thomas Jr., "A Much-Needed Lift," Sea
Power, 25 (November 1982), p. 30.
7Col R. B. Rothwell, USMC, "Toward a New Amphibious
Tactical Concept," Marine Corps Gazette, 67 (July 1983), p.
66.
8Thomas L. Clancy Jr., "The Floating Shell Game," U. S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, 108 (July 1982), p. 116.
9Rothwell, p. 66.
10Clancy, p. 116.
11Roy McLeavy, "LCAC, Amphibious Assault at 50 Knots,"
Jane's Defense Review, 4 (August 1983), p. 751.
12Col John G. Miller USMC, "LCAC and the Lift Dilemma:
Sandbags...Rice Bowls...and Pandora's Box," Marine Corps
Gazette, 65 (December 1981), p. 49.
13Roy McLeavy, ed., Jane's Surface Skimmers.
Hovercraft and Hydrofoils 1983, 16th ed. (London: Jane's
Publishing Company, Limited, 1983), p. 126.
14Presearch Incorporated, Technical Memorandum No.
82-007. Employment of Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) in
Contingency Amphibious Operations (Arlington, VA: Presearch
Incorporated, 1982), p. 11.
15Roy McLeavy, ed. Jane's Surface Skimmers. Hovercraft
and Hydrofoils 1983, 16th ed. (London: Jane's Publishing
Company, Limited, 1983), p. 126.
16Alan Blunden, "Military Hovercraft," International
Defense Review, 15 (November 1982), p. 1544.
17Presearch Incorporated, Technical Memorandum No.
82-007. Employment of Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) in
Contingency Amphibious Operations (Arlington, VA: Presearch
Incorporated, 1982), p. 30.
18Rothwell, p. 65.
19Rothwell, p. 65.
20Presearch Incorporated, Technical Memorandum No.
82-007. Employment of Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) in
Contingency Amphibious Operations (Arlington, VA: Presearch
Incorporated, 1982), p. 1.
21Roy McLeavy, "LCAC: Amphibious Assault at 50 Knots,"
Jane's Defense Review, 4 (August 1983), p. 129.
22Presearch Incorporated, Technical Memorandum No.
82-007. Employment of Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) in
Contingency Amphibious Operations (Arlington, VA: Presearch
Incorporated, 1982), p. 1.
23Ibid., p. 1.
24Col Joseph H. Alexander USMC, "Amphibious Warfare:
What Sort of Future?" U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
108 (February 1982), p. 66.
25Rothwell, p. 65.
26Alexander, p. 65.
27Rothwell, p. 66.
28Roy McLeavy, ed., Jane's Surface Skimmers.
Hovercraft and Hydrofoils 1983, 16th ed. (London: Jane's
Publishing Company, Limited, 1983), p. 126.
29Rothwell, p. 66.
30Presearch Incorporated, Technical Memorandum No.
82-007. Employment of Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) in
Contingency Amphibious Operations (Arlington, VA: Presearch
Incorporated, 1982), p. 16.
31LtCol John S. Lowery USMC, "MPS Concept Becomes a
Reality," Marines, 13 (December 1984), p. 15.
32Alexander, p. 64.
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