Ground Air Defense In the Marine Air-Ground Task Force
CSC 1985
SUBJECT AREA Warfighting
GROUND AIR DEFENSE
IN THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE
FEBRUARY 1985
MAJOR R. R. BLACKMAN, JR., USMC
MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT iv
LIST OF FIGURES vi
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION 1
2. THE THREAT 3
Introduction 3
Helicopter Capability 4
Fixed-Wing Capability 9
Missions and Tactics 14
Summary 19
3. ORGANIZATION FOR AIR DEFENSE IN THE MARINE AIR-
GROUND TASK FORCE (MAGTF) 21
Introduction 21
Marine Air Command and Control System
(MACCS) 23
Marine Fighter Attack (VMFA) Squadrons 25
Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC) 26
Antiaircraft Operations Center (AAOC) 27
Light Antiaircraft Missile (LAAM) Battalion 27
Direct Air Support Center (DASC) 31
Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) Battery 32
Small Unit Active Air Defense 36
Chapter Page
4. U. S. ARMY AND SOVIET ARMY AIR DEFENSE
CAPABILITY 37
U. S. Army 37
Soviet Army 39
5. ANALYSIS OF THE AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY OF THE
MAGTF 44
Introduction 44
Analysis 45
6. THE REQUIREMENT AND THE SOLUTION 52
Requirement 52
Analysis of Alternative Air Defense
Systems 52
Mix 58
Mass and Integration 60
Command and Control 61
Alternatives for the Division's Air Defense
Organization 64
Comparative Analysis 71
Additional Recommendations 76
7. CONCLUSIONS 79
NOTES 82
BIBLIOGRAPHY 88
ABSTRACT
Author: Blackman, Robert R., Jr. Major USMC
Title: Ground Air Defense in the Marine Air-Ground Task Force
Date: February 1985
Air attack against U. S. Marine Corps units, whether during
an amphibious landing or subsequently during operations ashore,
is not just a probability - it is a certainty. As many aspects
of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) become increasingly
more capable with costly improvements in weapons and combat
service support systems, ground air defense becomes more
critical. Of concern to every Marine is whether the MAGTF has
sufficient air defense to protect itself against aircraft that
have penetrated to its vital areas or are in contact with its
maneuver elements.
The paper analyzes the premise that the MAGTF's capability
for ground air defense is inadequate and, with confirmation of
that, analyzes alternatives for improving this aspect of the
MAGTF.
The initial analysis examines Soviet aviation and
concludes with a determination of the greatest threat facing each
element of the MAGTF. Threat information was drawn from a
variety of unclassified sources published by the Defense
Intelligence Agency and the U. S. Army.
Next the MAGTF's organization and capability for air defense
were determined from a review of applicable Marine Corps Fleet
Marine Force Manuals and U. S. Army Field Manuals as well as
interviews with Marine Corps air defense officers and staff
noncommissioned officers.
The threat analysis and the examination of existing ground
air defense form the basis for a comparison that leads to the
determination that the MAGTF lacks the ground air defense
capability to counter the threat. The comparative analysis as
well as that particular conclusion were drawn subjectively by the
author.
Recommendations include initiatives for improving the mass,
mix, mobility, and integration of the MAGTF's air defense
weapons. Procurement of the Setter air defense weapons system;
establishment of an air defense company of the headquarters
battalion of the division; establishment of an air defense
platoon in the headquarters company of the infantry regiment; and
enhancing and restructuring the air defense units in the wing,
are strongly recommended.
Fulfilling these initiatives will bolster the capability of
each element of the MAGTF to counter the air threat it will face
when confronting a Soviet or Soviet-styled opponent.
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1. Mi-24/HIND D 5
2. Mi-8/HIP 6
3. Mi-2/HOPLITE 8
4. Organization of Soviet Frontal Aviation 11/12
5. Su-17 and Su-20/FITTER-C, -D 13
6. Su-25/FROGFOOT A 14
7. Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS),
Deployed 25
8. Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion 28
9. Hawk Missile 30
10. Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) Battery 32
11. Stinger Missile System 33
12. Gun, Air Defense Artillery, Self-Propelled,
20-mm, Vulcan 38
13. Chaparral Weapon System (M48A1) 39
14. SA-9/GASKIN 40
15. 23-mm SP Antiaircraft Gun ZSU-23-4 41
16. SA-7/GRAIL 42
17. SA-6/GAINFUL 43
18. Setter 56
19. Option W 66
20. Option X 67
21. Option Y 68
22. Option Z 69
23. Division Air Defense Structure Options 70
24. Proposed Air Defense Group, Marine Air Wing 78
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Air attack against U. S. Marine Corps units, whether during
an amphibious landing or subsequently during operations ashore,
is not just a probability - it is a certainty. Of concern to
every Marine is whether the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
has sufficient air defense to protect itself against aircraft
that have penetrated to its vital areas or are in contact with
its maneuver elements.
The focus of this paper is an analysis of the premise that
the MAGTF's capability for ground air defense is inadequate. The
analysis begins with an examination of Soviet aviation featuring
an initial conclusion regarding the greatest threats facing the
various elements of the MAGTF. Threat information was drawn from
a variety of unclassified sources published by the Defense
Intelligence Agency and the U. S. Army.
Next the MAGTF's organization and capability for air defense
were determined from a review of applicable Marine Corps Fleet
Marine Force Manuals and U. S. Army Field Manuals as well as
interviews with Marine Corps air defense officers and staff
noncommissioned officers.
The threat analysis and the examination of existing ground
air defense form the basis for a comparison that leads to a
determination that the MAGTF lacks the ground air defense
capability to counter the threat. The comparative analysis as
well as that particular conclusion were drawn subjectively by the
author.
Identifying a problem without proposing a solution is a
fruitless, wasted effort. In this regard, specific initiatives
have been proposed for improving the mass, mix, mobility, and
integration of the MAGTF's air defense weapons to include:
selection of an additional weapons system, an increase in the
number of weapons system, and establishment and restructuring of
air defense units within the MAGTF.
The Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) air defense variant was not
addressed for two reasons. The first is that the program is
currently in development and has yet to be approved. Most
importantly, however, the LAV air defense variant is being
developed, not for general air defense support of the MAGTF, but
as an exclusive air defense capability of the LAV battalion.
Chapter 2
THE THREAT
Introduction
Historically, one of the most important tasks of Soviet
aviation has been support of ground forces. The Soviets achieved
substantial success during World War II with a combined-arms
concept which dictated that the preponderance of aviation assets
be assigned to provide air support for ground troops.1
Since World War II Soviet tactical air forces have remained
strong, with aircraft that number more than five times the number
of nonstrategic interceptor type aircraft in use with the air
defense forces.2 In particular, a marked increase in the number
of aircraft routinely expected to support ground forces has been
noted over the past few years.3 The missions of Soviet tactical
aviation remain virtually unchanged from the final days of World
War II. They are to secure and maintain local air superiority
over battle zones, attack and destroy enemy troops and equipment,
limit supplies to enemy forces in the battle area, and assist
friendly forces during offensive action and in the process of
pursuit of the enemy.4
The most significant event in the development of Soviet
aviation over the last two decades has been the reorganization of
command and control structures. This initiative began in the
late 1970's. The most notable impact of this reorganization is a
vastly improved capability to conduct massed offensive air
operations. Of further significance is the increased
experimentation shown by the Soviets over the past five years
with new tactics in a variety of missions including air
accompaniment of ground forces.5
The Soviets consider air superiority as the "necesssary and
obligatory condition" for attainment of success in combat and
overall victory in a war.6 Soviet doctrine espouses the
requirement for massive offensive air action and, specifies, that
all things being equal, the greatest chance for victory lies with
the force most effectively employing the element of surprise. In
the NATO scenario, the Soviets boast a capability to launch a
thousand aircraft in a coordinated non-nuclear air operation. 7
Although it is unlikely the Marine Corps would face even a
portion of such an attack, it points out the Soviet desire to
conduct mass air operations whenever possible.
Helicopter Capability
The Soviets consider air strikes an integral element of
combined-arms tactics, yet only as an extension of artillery.
They prefer the use of artillery and helicopters for the support
of maneuver forces along a line of contact, leaving the fixed
wing aircraft free to attack reserves and support forces.8
The role of helicopters has increased concurrently with the
rapid expansion of their numbers. Attack helicopters, primarily
the antitank guided missile equipped Mi-24/HIND and Mi-8/HIP, are
employed to provide immediate fire support to motorized rifle and
tank regiments and battalions (Figures 1 and 2). In addition to
a variety of logistics, intelligence, liaison, and communications
functions, helicopter support for airmobile operations has
received increasing emphasis as a role of Soviet helicopter
aviation.9
Click here to view image
The Soviets expect to use airmobile forces to assist
attacking forces by flying over obstacles and large areas of NBC
contamination; to prevent our forces from closing gaps created by
nuclear strikes; to seize and hold important objectives in our
rear until the arrival of advancing troops; to conduct raids to
destroy command and control facilities, radar sites, and
communication centers; and to provide a highly mobile antitank
capability.10 Until recently, small specially trained units were
used to conduct air assault operations. Emphasis now appears to
be on preparing motorized rifle battalions for this mission.
There is, however, an air assault battalion resident in each
combined-arms and tank army, and an air assault brigade and an
airmobile assault brigade subordinate to the front commander.11
The threat to our rear areas posed by air assault operations,
supported by attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, should
be one of great concern.
The rapid expansion of rotary-wing aviation in the Soviet
forces has wrought significant organizational changes. The most
important is establishment of an organic helicopter squadron in
the motorized rifle and tank divisions. Each squadron consists
of 18 helicopters, six each of the Mi-24/HIND D/E, the Mi-8/HIP
C, and the Mi-2/HOPLITE. Each HIND and HIP may be armed with
various combinations of weapons with up to four antitank guided
missiles and four 32-round rocket pods. The HIP C may be used
for medium transport in either its armed or unarmed configuration
and the HIND has a troop-carrying capacity as well. The HOPLITE
is considered a light helicopter by Soviet standards and is used
primarily as a utility aircraft.12 (Figure 3).
Click here to view image
The Soviets are also organizing an increasing number of
independent attack helicopter regiments subordinate to both the
combined-arms and tank armies. Each regiment consists of a
mixture of antitank guided missile equipped HIND's and HIP C's
totaling about 60 helicopters.13 Additionally, each army has a
general purpose helicopter squadron consisting of 20 assorted
helicopters.14
At the front level there is a transport helicopter regiment
with 24 heavy lift and 32 medium lift helicopters and a general
purpose helicopter squadron of 20-30 aircraft.15
In total there are currently over 4,000 Soviet helicopters,
primarily HIP's and HIND's, assigned to active units. In
addition, the Warsaw Pact countries possess another 720
helicopters.16
Fixed-Wing Capability
A common belief among the Soviet military is that use of
supersonic combat aircraft mainly for direct air support is
wasteful. Although fixed-wing aircraft can be expected to attack
along the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA), they will be
used primarily to destroy targets in their enemy's rear.
The Soviets recognize four stages of support by fixed-wing
aircraft for offensive operations: support for movement forward;
air preparation; air support; and air accompaniment. Support for
movement forward is to protect units as they move up from
assembly areas. Air strikes in the preparation phase generally
are conducted no farther than the enemy's immediate operational
depth and for a duration of from ten minutes to over an hour.
Targets for preparation are those that conventional artillery and
missiles cannot destroy because of their distance, mobility, or
hardening. The air support stage commences as ground forces
begin an offensive. A majority of the strikes are preplanned
against enemy nuclear weapons, command and control systems, and
reserves. As with air preparation, these targets are generally
beyond the capabilities of artillery and missiles. Immediate
missions are requested by ground force commanders against
specific centers of resistance. Air accompaniment commences as
Soviet ground forces penetrate deeply into enemy defenses. Air
cover for airborne and airmobile operations is the mission most
often anticipated in the air accompaniment stage. 17
The Soviets carefully integrate air support into an overall
defensive fire plan. The primary task of Soviet air support in
the defense is counterpreparation, designed to launch a powerful,
surprise, concentrated strike of short duration to disrupt an
enemy's attack plans. Targets for counterpreparation include
nuclear warheads and delivery systems; artillery in firing
positions; aviation on airfields; armored or mechanized forces
preparing to attack; major command and control facilities;
communications centers; rivercrossing sites and equipment; and
ammunition and fuel dumps. The Soviet defensive fire plan also
calls for air strikes against attacking forces that are out of
range of artillery and tactical rockets, and concentrated fire by
all fire support weapons on forces reaching or penetrating
forward defensive positions. 18
Soviet tactical aviation is organized on a
functional/mission-related basis. Soviet ground forces do not
have organic fixed-wing assets. Air units that support
combined-arms and tank armies are found at the front level, where
their strength and composition vary considerably. Front aviation
generally consists of assets allocated by the supreme high
command and tailored to meet the aviation support requirements of
the front for a particular operation or period of time. Front
aviation may include two or three air divisions and independent
regiments of reconnaissance aircraft. Air divisions may be
either fighter, fighter-bomber, or fighter-interceptor (Figure
4).
Click here to view image
Each type of air division normally consists of 118 aircraft.19
Soviet tactical aircraft assigned to operational units total
approximately 6,280 of which almost 2,500 are specifically
designed for ground attack. The comparatively unsophisticated
aircraft in the Soviet inventory during the early 1970's have
been replaced over the course of the last decade by dual-role
aircraft offering double the tactical radius and triple the
ordnance potential. The varied assortment of Soviet
air-to-ground ordnance include laser-guided bombs,
electro-optical and laser-guided missiles, cluster munitions, and
specialized airfield attack weapons. The great majority of
attack aircraft are Su-7/17 FITTER's which have strike and
interdiction capabilities at night and in adverse weather (Figure
5).
Click here to view image
There is also an ever increasing number of Su-25 FROGFOOT's, a
specifically designed ground attack aircraft very similar to the
USAF A-10 (Figure 6).
Click here to view image
Missions and Tactics
The Soviets view centralized control and mass as corollary
principles. Strict centralized control is considered one of the
critical elements for the successful conduct of air combat
operations. Through centralized control aviation assets can be
rapidly concentrated to deliver massive strikes against the
enemy's main attack or in support of their own main attack after
initial dispersion to avoid destruction by an enemy's nuclear or
massive conventional strikes. Centralized control also allows
the Soviets to enhance the planning and execution of surprise
strikes, to maintain a strong air reserve; and to simplify
coordination among aviation assets performing different missions
in the same air space. In a rapidly changing combat situation,
centralized control expedites the reallocation of assets to
accomplish important missions that arise suddenly, such as
destruction of nuclear weapons, aviation, or reserves. It would
seem that decentralized control of aviation assets, on the other
hand, especially attack helicopters, is advantageous when combat
operations are conducted on separate, disconnected axes. In such
situations, combined arms commanders control and employ allocated
aviation assets according to the needs of their maneuver
forces.20
Primary targets for Soviet ground attack aircraft are troop
concentrations, tactical missile sites, reserves, airfields,
logistics facilities, and lines of communications; while
primary tasks for fighters include air intercept/air combat and
the ultimate attainment of air superiority. Soviet emphasis on
dual role capability for fighters and fighter-bombers is
reflected in crew training. Fighter-bomber crews spend about a
quarter of their training time flying air-intercept and
air-to-air combat missions, while fighter pilots spend one
quarter of their training time on ground attack missions.21
Specific targets are those which do not change positions
over a prolonged period. Supporting aircraft usually operate in
small groups of four to eight planes, in pairs and, often,
individually. This allows them to fly at high speeds, at low
altitudes, and in close combat formations for overcoming
antiaircraft defenses. Such tactics do not exclude massing, but
in fact aid in concentrating aviation assets along decisive
attack corridors for accomplishing main ground force missions.
The Soviets believe excessive massing on a single target to be
unnecessary and dangerous, because of its vulnerability to enemy
nuclear strikes and antiaircraft defenses.
The ever increasing Soviet air support capability is a
function of constantly improving methods for overcoming enemy
antiaircraft defenses. A portion of the air strike would be
assigned to neutralize and destroy antiaircraft defense weapons
on the ground. To this end, extensive use will be made of
surprise attacks from different directions, complex aerial
maneuvers, decoys and diversionary tactics, and evasive actions
designed to hamper antiaircraft defenses. Though the low
altitude attack (50 to 100 meters) is a main method for getting
through an antiaircraft defense, the Soviets recognize that
aircraft flying at low altitude can suffer losses from modern
low-altitude antiaircraft defense weapons and from small arms
fire by ground troops. Therefore, they consider the use of armor
on aircraft essential. Stereotyped low-altitude tactics are
avoided. They rely heavily on complex maneuvers and
extensive use of radioelectronic jamming equipment as well as the
destruction of enemy antiaircraft weapons by ground forces.22
The Soviets have long sought aircraft that could operate
from small, unpaved airfields and insure reliable air support to
their ground forces. To help fulfill this need, the combat
helicopter, as the Soviets refer to it, has emerged as an ideal
weapons system for providing adequate support in both offensive
and defensive operations. Missions for the combat helicopter
include destruction of enemy tanks, other armored vehicles,
antitank weapons, personnel, artillery, and missiles. They are
also considered effective against enemy helicopters in the air
and on the ground and fixed-wing aircraft on the ground. The
Soviets appear to see air support for ground forces in the
meeting engagement as the most important role of the combat
helicopter by restricting the enemy's maneuvering room and
supplying real-time reconnaissance to ground commanders. In
this role against preplanned targets, combat helicopters provide
additional fire to support artillery during fire preparation and
helicopterborne operations. In the later, they escort troop
carrying helicopters and destroy enemy fire means en route to and
at the landing site.23
Combat helicopters also operate on call for ground
commanders, available to destroy newly discovered targets, attack
counterattacking enemy tanks, reinforce artillery fire, and
provide direct air support in meeting engagements and in pursuit
of the enemy.24
The search and destroy role is likely to be employed during
periods of limited visibility; when information about the enemy
is incomplete; or when the enemy's flanks are exposed. Among the
targets sought during a search and destroy mission would be
missiles on the move or in firing positions; radars, command and
control facilities; antitank weapons; and enemy helicopters on
the ground and in the air. Ambush techniques are used employing
combat helicopters in forest clearings, on broken terrain, in
built-up areas, and in river deltas to gain surprise. The Soviets
consider a two to four aircraft flight the most efficient combat
formation for this type of mission.25
The Soviets consider the following to be a viable scheme of
maneuver for combat helicopters:
They would approach the target, concealed by taking
advantage of the variations in the terrain, pop-up
suddenly for 20 to 30 seconds, aim, strike, and quickly
withdraw. After firing on the target, a quick
reduction in altitude is recommended by a sideslipping
maneuver and then withdrawl to a safe area. Soviet
combat helicopters practice delivering attacks against
targets from horizontal flight, from a gentle dive,
from a pitch-up, from a hovering (pop-up) position, and
from the ground. In employing these tactics, several
launching positions could be prepared ahead of time
where the helicopters secretly mass. The helicopters
would rise up from behind their cover on the request of
the combined-arms commander, identify the targets,
engage them, and then disappear behind cover.26
The Soviets are developing systems and tactics to improve
the effectiveness of air support in poor weather and at night.
At present, Soviet air operations slow considerably under these
conditions because of inadequate aircraft and ground-based
equipment and shortcomings in crew training. Also a portion of
the Soviet mutual identification and target designation systems
used during complex weather conditions and for night flying are
unsophisticated by U. S. standards. In an attempt to correct
these shortcomings the Soviets have equipped about 20 percent of
the third-generation, fixed-wing jet aircraft introduced during
the 1970's and their combat helicopters with radio-electronic and
infrared instruments. Even with increased availability of
modern, sophisticated equipment that allow the Soviets to search
for, detect, and destroy targets at night and in poor weather at
low altitudes, they continue to believe that - for air support of
ground troops - it is important to train pilots to navigate by
landmarks, to search for targets visually, and to determine the
distances to targets without technical aids.27
Summary
The increase in the number of Soviet ground attack aircraft,
especially combat helicopters, in the last decade, and the
concurrent improvement in range, armaments, and avionics
have been remarkable. In a future conflict with the Soviets or
Soviet-styled forces the Marine Corps will face a formidable air-
threat.
Although the USSR is capable of attacking at night and under
adverse weather conditions, on the FEBA and to the rear, with
great numbers of both combat helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft,
Marine Corps units should be able to anticipate the when, what,
and how of air attacks they might receive. Specifically, the air
threat facing Marine Corps units on the FEBA will be from combat
helicopters making surprise daylight attacks of short duration in
two to four aircraft formations. Units in areas farther to the
rear, such as those at combat service support areas, airfields,
MAGTF command and control facilities, and amphibious task force
objective-type targets will come under daylight, high speed, low
altitude attack primarily from fixed-wing aircraft performing
complex maneuvers, conducting extensive radio-electronic jamming,
and employing "Iron Hand" type support tactics. "Iron Hands is a
U. S. tactic directed against surface-to-air missiles utilizing
specially equipped aircraft armed primarily with anti-radiation
missiles such as SHRIKE.
Air defense tactics and weapons employed by the MAGTF should
be sufficiently flexible to defend against Soviet attack, but
should be specifically oriented to the most likely threat.
Chapter 3
ORGANIZATION FOR AIR DEFENSE IN THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK
FORCE (MAGTF)
Introduction
In the Marine Corps, the antiaircraft or air defense mission
has been historically associated with ground warfare.
Conventional gun-type antiaircraft weapons were organic to
ground units and received secondary missions as ground support
weapons. The advent of guided missiles has negated traditional
surface-to-surface employment possibilities while significantly
complicating coordination with fixed wing operations. As a
result, the air defense capability of the MAGTF is primarily
resident in the Marine Air Wing (MAW). In fact, one of the six
functions of Marine aviation is antiair warfare. That
term is defined by the United States Navy and Marine Corps as:
That action required to destroy or reduce to an
acceptable level the enemy air and missile threat. It
includes such measures as the use of interceptors,
bombers, antiaircraft guns, surface-to-air and
air-to-air missiles, electronic countermeasures, and
destruction of the air or missile threat both before
and after it is launched. Other measures which are
taken to minimize the effects of hostile air action
are: cover, concealment, dispersion, deception
(including electronic), and mobility.28
All Marine Corps antiair warfare operations fall into two
categories, air defense and offensive antiair warfare. Air
defense is defined as:
All defense measures designed to destroy attacking
enemy aircraft or missiles in the earth's envelope of
atmosphere, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness
of such attacks.29
Offensive antiair warfare is defined as:
Combat operations conducted against the enemy air or
air defense system before it can be launched or assume
an attacking role. Offensive antiair warfare
operations in or near thc objective area consist mainly
of air attacks to destroy or neutralize hostile
aircraft, airfields, radars, air defense systems, and
supporting areas.30
This paper will be limited to the air defense portion of antiair
warfare operations.
Air defense is divided into two types, active and
passive. Active air defense is defined as:
Direct defensive action taken to destroy attacking
enemy aircraft or missiles, or to nullify or reduce the
effectiveness of such attack. It includes such
measures as the use of aircraft, interceptor missiles,
air defense artillery, nonair defense weapons in an air
defense role, and electronic countermeasures and
counter-counter measures.31
Passive air defense on the other hand is defined as:
All measures, other than active defense, taken to
minimize the effects of hostile air action. These
include the use of cover, concealment, camouflage,
deception, dispersion, and protective construction.32
Again, the scope of this discussion will be limited further to
the active aspects of air defense.
There are many organizations throughout the MAF that
contribute to the air defense effort. Only those making
larger contributions will be reviewed in detail.
Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS)
The wide range of speeds and types of aircraft supporting
the MAGTF makes it paramount that the controlling commander
communicate directly with various aircraft flights through a
centralized control system. In response to this need for very
rapid transmission of orders, coordination and control of air
operations over a relatively broad area by a single commander is
essential. MACCS permits centralized coordination and
supervision of air operations at the highest level, while
incorporating decentralization of control authority to
subordinate agencies.
Disparate roles, missions, and characteristics of aircraft
dictate a functional, rather than an area of responsibility
approach to control. Once aircraft assignments are made by
organizational commanders, authority for mission execution rests
with the functional control agency. Overall supervision,
coordination, and general control of all tactical air operations
in the MAGTF is the responsibility of the Tactical Air Command
Center (TACC), the senior MACCS agency. The TACC draws
personnel from the Marine Air Control Group (MACG), Marine Air
Wing (MAW) and exercises control through agencies established
from assets both organic and nonorganic to the MACG. These
agencies include the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) and Air
Support Radar Teams (ASRT's) from the Marine Air Support Squadron
(MASS); one or more Tactical Air Operations Centers (TAOC's) from
the Marine Air Control Squadrons; the Antiaircraft Operations
Center (AAOC), the Battery Control Centers (BCC's), and the
Platoon Command Posts (PCP's) of the Light AntiAircraft Missile
(LAAM) battalion, the Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) platoons of
the FAAD battery, the Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP's) of
the Marine Division, and one or more of the air traffic control
units from the Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron (MATCS).33
(Figure 7). The agency and organizations with the greatest roles
in the air defense effort, including the TAOC, AAOC, LAAM
battalion, DASC, and the FAAD battery, will be discussed in
greater detail later.
Click here to view image
Marine Fighter Attack (VMFA) Squadrons
Fighter aircraft are the primary and longest range Marine
Corps air defense weapons. VMFA squadrons are equipped with F-4
and F/A-18 aircraft and a variety of air-to-air weapons and
radars to accomplish the air defense mission. Fighter aircraft
are employed at the outer limits of the air defense destruction
area. Their success is absolutely critical to the accomplishment
of the MAF's air defense mission. VMFA's in conjunction with the
MACCS form a potent air defense system. Fighter capability is
not in question. The scope of this paper will finally narrow to
examine ground air defense.
Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC)
Control of the Marine Corps air defense system is exercised
through the TAOC, a subordinate agency of the TACC. The role of
the TAOC is to detect, identify, and control to intercept both
hostile aircraft and missiles. TAOC's also provide navigational
assistance and mission advisories to friendly aircraft. A TAOC
is designed and equipped to detect and identify all aircraft
within an air defense sector, control en route air traffic,
select and assign weapons to meet the enemy threat, and control
the engagement of enemy air threats by interceptors or
surface-to-air missiles. The TAOC has surveillance radar
capabilities and is the primary source of radar control for all
aircraft in its sector of responsibility. It detects, acquires,
and tracks targets in an assigned area and provides an up-to-date
display of aviation activity, including the employment and
weapons status of interceptor aircraft and surface-to-air missile
batteries and dissemination of appropriate information to
designated agencies. The TAOC provides interface between
adjacent and higher air defense agencies through the exchange of
tactical data by means of digital and/or voice communications
with interceptors and friendly aircraft, SAM fire units, adjacent
TAOC's, the TACC, and joint and combined air defense agencies.34
Antiaircraft Operations Center (AAOC)
The AAOC, an agency subordinate to the TAOC, is formed from
LAAM battalion assets and provides control of subordinate LAAM
units as well as serving as the primary control agency for FAAD
teams organic to the LAAM battalion. The AAOC possesses a
short-range surveillance radar that provides a search capability
in excess of LAAM battery acquisition radars.35
Light Antiaircraft Missile (LAAM) Battalion
The LAAM battalion is organized and equipped to provide air
defense for an antiair warfare area vital to a MAF. A vital area
is considered to contain critical facilities, units, or
installations necessary for the landing force to accomplish its
mission. Its specific mission is:
To provide surface-to-air missile defense of assigned
areas of operation, or installations and vital zones,
against hostile low and medium altitude air attacks.
The battalion is equipped with improved Hawk
surface-to-air missile systems, medium and low altitude
acquisition radars, fire control radars, missile
launchers, and equipment for the maintenance,
transport, and loading of missiles.36
The battalion's 37 officers and 651 enlisted Marines are
organized into a headquarters and service battery and three
missile firing batteries (Figure 8).
Click here to view image
Each firing battery maintains an autonomous capability to detect,
identify, and evaluate threat aircraft; and to receive, assemble,
test, load, and fire the improved Hawk surface-to-air missile.
Each battery is divided into the battery (minus) and an assault
fire unit, each with three launchers. The LAAM battalions are
currently undergoing programmed organizational changes that by
October 1986 will add a fourth battery to each battalion and
distribute each battery six launchers into three assault fire
units. This change to a triad organization will provide a
significant increase in air defense capability to the MAF and
will allow each battery to disperse over a larger area for better
coverage and increased survivability.37
The Improved Hawk system employs two types of acquisition
radar. A continuous-wave acquisition radar provides
low-to-medium altitude detection and a pulse acquisition radar
provides medium-to-high altitude, medium range coverage.
Following detection, the system allows for target identification,
friendly or foe; selection of targets for engagement; and
assignment to a firing unit. A high-power illuminator radar
tracks the targets and provides a reference signal to the
missile. In the electronic countermeasures environment a range
only radar provides ranging data for target engagement.
The missile itself weighs 1,400 pounds, is supersonic with
semiactive homing, and is driven by a solid propellant motor.
The launcher weighs 8,813 pounds with three missiles.38 (Figure
9).
Click here to view image
The Improved Hawk is an excellant weapon at about one-half
its unclassified ranage of 40 kilometers. Past the midpoint of
the range missile performance falls off significantly.39 The
missile also has a minimum range problem. The specified minimum
range is approximately 3 kilometers; but adding this to the
distance a jet aircraft can travel during the system's 30 seconds
of reaction time, the missile cannot be fired at a target within
about 10 kilometers of itself. This results in a belt of only 10
kilometers where the missile functions at its greatest level of
performance. The Improved Hawk has limited operational
mobility, but the system has specific site characteristics and
requirements. For example, it takes a minimum of one and
one-half hours to transition a battery from movement to a fully
ready for firing status. The Improved Hawk is best employed when
defending permanent or semi-permanent installations
from fixed sites.
Direct Air Support Center (DASC)
The DASC is directly subordinate to the TACC and is the
principal air control agency responisble for the conduct of
tactical operations supporting ground forces. The DASC
disseminates friendly and enemy aircraft information to FAAD
units, and performs a variety of other functions involving close
air support and assault support. The DASC and the ground combat
element's Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) are ideally
collocated to facilitate detailed and contiuous communications
and coordination between the cooperating agencies.40
Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) Battery
The mission of the FAAD battery is to provide close-in air
defense protection for elements of a MAF in forward combat areas
or vital areas, and for units engaged in independent operations
by destroying hostile aircraft and drones, particularly in areas
not defendable by other elements of the antiair warfare system.41
The FAAD battery is organized into a battery headquarters, a
service platoon, and five missile platoons (Figure 10). Each
platoon consists of a headquarters section and three firing
sections, each of which is composed of five two-man firing
teams.42
Click here to view image
FAAD support for a MAF will be provided by the FAAD battery,
a FAAD platoon will generally support a Marine Amphibious Brigade
(MAB), and a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) will be supported by a
FAAD section. Marine Corps doctrine calls for command and
control of FAAD weapons to be exercised through the MACCS agency
(either TAOC or DASC) that can best provide rapid early warning
information and weapons control conditions depending on the
tactical situation and stage of the operation.43
The Redeye missile that has been in service in the Marine
Corps since 1966 is currently being replaced in FAAD batteries by
the Stinger missile system. The single most important
advantage of the Stinger is the addition of an Identification
Friend or Foe (IFF) feature which aids in identifying friendly
aircraft. Other improvements include increased range and
intercept capability.44
The Stinger is a short range man-portable (29 pounds),
shoulder-fired, infrared-homing (heat seeking), guided missile
capable of engaging aircraft at very-low-to-low altitude
operating at ordnance delivery speeds (Figure 11). The missile
requires no control by the gunner after firing. The unclassified
range of the Stinger is in excess of 4 kilometers.45 Again, as
with the Hawk missile, the Stinger's performance peaks at
one-half its maximum range.
Click here to view image
The Stinger missile system consists of five major
components, the launch tube assembly, missile, battery/coolant
unit (BCU), separable gripstock, and IFF interrogator.
The BCU contains a thermal battery to provide power for
preflight operation and for "spinning up" the missile's internal
gyroscopes and a supply of argon gas to cool the infrared
detector in the missile seeker. The BCU supplies electrical
power and seeker coolant to the weapon until launch or for a
maximum of 45 seconds. Because a BCU is considered expended as
soon as it is inserted in the weapon, there are three packed with
each missile.46
The IFF component consists of an IFF interrogator worn
externally by the gunner and an interconnecting cable. The
interrogator operates in either mode 3 or 4. Mode 3 is a
standard IFF used on commercial as well as military aircraft.
Mode 4 is used by U. S. military aircraft but no other NATO
countries. Once programmed with an interrogation code, the
interrogator can operate in Mode 4 secure mode for 4 days.
Within 4 days, the battery must be replaced and the unit
reprogrammed. The unit automatically shifts from Mode 4 to Mode
3 if the unit is not reprogrammed and will remain in Mode 3 until
reprogrammed. Reprogramming requires a freshly charged battery
pack.47
The gunner's sequence of system operation is as follows:
identifies target and centers in the sight range ring;
interrogates target and listens for an IFF response; continues
tracking if foe; operates a safety and actuation when target is
in range; presses and holds the uncaging switch when a distinct
acquisition tone is heard; superelevates the weapon and places
the target in the proper lead reticle; squeezes and holds firing
trigger if tone is still distirict; continues to track the target
until the missile is launched; and removes BCU in less than 3
minutes to prevent damage to the reusable gripstock.48
The Stinger is an excellent weapon and is certainly superior
to the Redeye, but it has some weaknesses that must be
considered. The Stinger is not a system that an untrained Marine
can pick up and use to knock down an enemy aircraft. In fact the
training, especially that required to identify the various tones
heard by the gunner, is extensive. It is not a weapon with which
to take a "hip" or "snap shot". The system takes approximately 5
seconds once actuated for the gyroscopes to spin up and the
infrared detector to be cooled before serious tracking can begin.
With jet aircraft travelling at 200-250 meters per second, the
Stinger must be positioned where it has long range observation
and time to prepare for an engagement. Although man-portable,
the Stinger has significant logistics requirements that are
exacerbated when located with units distant from the battery
headquarters. Lastly, the Stinger makes a highly visible
signature that precludes shooting at a passing target if there is
any concern with revealing a unit's position. Basically the
Stinger should not engage a target unless there is a direct
threat to the supported unit.
Small Unit Active Air Defense
Organic air defense in the Marine Corps division is limited
to small arms. This is the last line of air defense for ground
forces, but it is not considered an exercise in futility. During
the Vietnam War the United States lost over 400 fixed-wing
aircraft and over 2,000 helicopters to small arms ground fire.49
The effectiveness of small arms in disrupting a pilot's
concentration as he flies into a hail of tracers can cause missed
targets or abandoned attacks. The tactic should not be
underestimated. The effort required to coordinate a unit's
response and the techniques involved must be thoroughly
practiced.
Chapter 4
U. S. ARMY AND SOVIET ARMY AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY
In order to provide a basis for comparison with the MAGTF, a
limited description of the air defense capability organic to
U. S. Army and Soviet divisions will be provided.
U. S. Army
There are a variety of air defense organizations in the
U. S. Army based on the supported unit. They run the gamut from
the 32d Air Defense Command in Europe featuring thirteen air
defense artillery battalions organized into four brigades, to
sole organic air defense artillery battalions in each division.50
Armored, infantry, and mechanized divisions have a
Chaparral/Vulcan battalion consisting of two Vulcan batteries and
two Chaparral batteries. Each of the 4 batteries has 4 platoons
of which 1 is a Stinger platoon with 4 sections for a total of 72
teams.51 Air defense for the airborne division is provided by
four Vulcan batteries each consisting of three Vulcan platoons
and a Stinger platoon. The air assault division's air defense
consists of a Vulcan battery with two platoons and two Stinger
batteries of three platoons each.52
The Vulcan is a short-range (1,200 meters) air defense gun
system. The 6-barrel 20mm canon, range only radar, and fire
control system are configured in either a self-propelled or towed
version. The Vulcan is also capable of providing effective
ground fire against troops and lightly armored vehicles to 2,200
meters as a direct fire weapon and to 4,500 meters in an indirect
fire mode. The Vulcan in the armored, infantry, and mechanized
divisions is mounted on fully tracked, lightly armored vehicle,
while the Vulcan assigned to the air assault and airborne
divisions is a towed version weighing approximately 3,500
pounds.53 (Figure 12).
Click here to view image
The Chaparral is a highly mobile, surface-to-air missile
system fielded only on a fully tracked, lightly armored vehicle.
The 9 foot long, 190 pound missile is guided by passive infrared
homing and has a range beyond 5,000 meters (Figure 13).
Chaparral is a fair weather system capable of operation only
during periods of good visibility and is designed to protect
stationary critical assets within the U. S. Army division against
low-flying enemy aircraft.54
Click here to view image
Soviet Army
The air defense systems organic to a Soviet motorized rifle
division are extensive. Each of three motorized regiments (both
BTR and BMP) have 4 SA-9/GASKIN's, 4 ZSU-23-4's, and 30
SA-7/GRAIL's; the tank regiment has 4 SA-9/GASKIN's, 4
ZSU-23-4's, and 3 SA-7/GRAIL's; the surface-to-air missile
regiment has 20 SA-6/GAINFUL's and 21 SA-7/GRAIL's; and the
division headquarters has 6 SA-7/GRAIL's.55
The SA-9/GASKIN is a short-range, low-altitude,
surface-to-air missile with a passive infrared seeker. It is
mounted in detachable, box-like launch canisters on a modified
BRDM-2 amphibious armored scout car.56 (Figure 14).
Click here to view image
The ZSU-23-4 is a self-propelled, gun system mounting four
23mm cannons with an effective range of 2,500 meters on a fully
tracked, lightly armored vehicle. It has the capability to both
acquire and track low-flying aircraft and is capable of firing on
the move because of its integrated radar/gun stabilization
system.57 (Figure 15).
Click here to view image
The SA-7/GRAIL is a man-portable, shoulder-fired,
low-altitude, surface-to-air missile system similar to the U. S.
Redeye or Stinger.58 (Figure 16).
Click here to view image
The SA-6/GAINFUL is a two-stage, solid-fuel, low-altitude,
surface-to-air missile mounted three to a fully tracked vehicle
resembling the ZSU-23-4 chassis. The system utilizes
surveillance and target acquisition radars and has a slant range
of 24 kilometers and a kill zone from 50 to 12,000 meters in
altitude. 59 (Figure 17).
Click here to view image
Chapter 5
ANALYSIS OF THE AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY OF THE MAGTF
Introduction
Air defense planning is based on four basic principles
governing employment of air defense weapons: mass, mix,
mobility, and integration.60 Mass, a concentration of air
defense weapons, is achieved by assigning enough assets to
successfully defend a generic target against attack. Mix goes
hand in hand with the principle of mass, and is achieved by
combining complementary weapon systems. Employment of a variety
of air defense weapons in sufficient mass complicates the
targeting problem for an attacker. An array of air defense
weapons, each with different characteristics and capabilities
that compensate for the limitations of one another, is far more
difficult for an attacker to defeat than an equal or even greater
number of a single system. Air defense weapons must be mobile to
permit the application of the principles of mass and mix on the
modern battlefield. Air defense weapons should be no less mobile
than the unit they are supporting. Integration is a close
coordination and unity of action among operating forces. It
occurs with air defense weapons on two levels; first, air defense
units must coordinate with each other to enhance their
capabilities and to avoid interference; secondly, air defense and
supported units must coordinate their efforts and respond to each
others needs.61
Analysis
MAGTF ground air defense weapon systems fail to meet even
one of the principles of mass, mix, mobility, and integration.
One possible reason for this failure is the consolidation of air
defense weapons in an air wing. The primary and most effective
air defense weapon is the fighter-interceptor aircraft. But an
air wing's leader -- naval aviator -- may often rely on the
fighter system to the exclusion of often ignored ground air
defense weapons systems. In regards to mass, the MAF simply does
not have enough air defense weapons to defend itself against a
Soviet style air attack. Defense in depth of vital areas over
600 square miles of beachhead, to include widely dispersed
amphibious task force objectives, landing force aviation, combat
service support areas, and command and control centers, with any
degree of defense-in-depth or mutual support, would be virtually
impossible. All available MAF assets, the LAAM battalion and
five FAAD platoons, would have to be utilized in defense of air
wing and force service support group assets with nothing left to
be allocated to the division (especially infantry units). For
the Stinger system, mass is normally not achieved at a particular
target with units smaller than a platoon.62 Without question,
the FAAD platoon and Hawk battery for a MAB could not even
provide necessary coverage for a Marine air group or a brigade
service support group.
Except in those situations where LAAM battalion and FAAD
battery assets are tasked to provide air defense of the same
vital area, there is no mix of air defense weapons in the Marine
Corps. In those instances where FAAD assets are available for
allocation to the division, there is no mix at all. This
contrasts with the mix of Vulcan, Chaparral, and Stinger found in
the U. S. Army division; and the ZSU-23-4, SA-6, SA-9, and SA-7
mix found in the Soviet division.
Mobility of Marine Corps air defense weapons is also
inadequate. The Hawk missile system, which requires a minimum of
1 1/2 hours, under ideal conditions, to bring a battery from the
travel mode to a ready-to-fire status, can only be considered for
defense of stationary point targets. The Stinger system relies
on the M151 jeep for its mobility which precludes it from staying
up with mechanized forces unless embarked in the Landing Vehicle
Tracked (LVT) or from reaching over watch positions in rugged
terrain. Whether moving in the jeep or embarked in the LVT,
Stinger gunners must stop the vehicle and dismount before
engaging the target due to the significant backblast.
Integration of Marine Corps air defense weapons is deficient
on both levels, among air defense units and between air defense
and supported units. It is further degraded by their
consolidation in the air wing.
Although both the FAAD battery and LAAM battalion are
commanded and controlled through the MACCS and are
administratively subordinate to the Marine Air Control Group,
they are distinct units with no ties except to a senior unit
which supports a number of functions in addition to air defense.
There is no organization in the MAF dedicated to air defense nor,
is there a focal point for this aspect of warfare.
The type of air defense support provided to the Force
Service Support Group (FSSG), the division, and the wing varies
greatly. Support for the FSSG and wing is primarily defense for
fixed installations and, in the case of the FSSG, an occasional
supply convoy. The division is unique in that support is of
maneuver units. Unit to unit support vice unit to installation,
requires far more coordination, inter-personal contact, and team
building than has been afforded to date.
Integration of air defense units and FSSG and wing units is
less difficult to accomplish and is frankly less critical than
providing the level of integration required between air defense
and division units. Adequate support of the division requires an
integration of air defense units that allows for training that
leads to a thorough understanding of the missions, requirements,
limitations, and capabilities of both the supported and
supporting unit. Every training exercise of battalion-size or
larger should include air defense units and air defense
requirements in the scenario, but does not.
Presently air defense units in support of the division,
specifically Stinger sections, generally participate only in
large scale training exercises in which other air wing assets
participate. They usually arrive shortly before the exercise
commences and therefore have not participated in prior planning.
The unit often receives its mission only minutes before it must
be executed. There is no opportunity for discussion on how or
where to best employ the unit in support of the scheme of
maneuver. The supported unit commanders never get to know, nor
are they able to establish, rapport with members of the Stinger
units because rarely are they the same Marines. Air defense
officers from the FAAD battery rarely come in contact with
officers from the supported unit. They do not have the
opportunity to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of specific
personnel but, most importantly, they never sit down and discuss
tactics and employment techniques and considerations. Another
indication of the complete lack of integration between the
division and air defense units is the absence of special staff
officers for air defense on division staffs. There are special
staff officers for engineering and armor support, but no one
beside the air officer (who as a naval aviator or naval flight
officer is not familiar with the job) is available to advise the
commanding general or G-3 on the employment of air defense
assets.
The uniqueness of the amphibious operation magnifies the
inadequacy of air defense in the Marine Corps. "The primary role
of AAW in an amphibious operation is to ensure that the degree of
air superiority required for a successful operation is achieved
and maintained."63 Air superiority is defined as:
That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force
over another which permits the conduct of operations by
the former and its related land, sea, and air forces
at a given time and place without prohibitive
interference by the opposing force.64
Because of the vulnerability of the landing force during the
initial stages of the operation "the degree of dominance"
necessary for a successful operation must be virtually complete.
The density and organization of the MAF's air defense weapons are
not capable of supporting the overall antiair warfare effort.
The only air defense weapons that can be expected to land in the
first few hours of D-Day are very limited number of Stingers
allocated to support the division.
The Marine Corps force structure study completed in 1981
determined that a MAF's air defense was inadequate and analyzed
four alternative structures for improving that capability. The
first (Option A) was a base option consisting of one LAAM
battalion with four batteries in the triad configuration and one
FAAD battery with five platoons. This represents the currently
programmed air defense structure for the MAF. This option
provides 12 Hawk firing units and 75 Stingers at a cost of 1,124
Marines.
Option B adds a second FAAD battery to the base option and
makes it organic to the division. This option adds 75 Stingers
to the base at a total cost of 1,401 Marines.
Option C retains the LAAM battalion and FAAD battery in the
air wing and adds an air defense battalion to the division. This
battalion would consist of two batteries each of the Army's
Vulcan gun system and Chaparral missile system. This option
provides 24 Vulcan and 24 Chaparral systems additive to the base
option at a total cost of 1,743 Marines.
Option D was similar to Option C except that the Army's
Division Air Defense (DIVAD) gun system replaces the Vulcan in
the Marine division's air defense battalion. Total personnel for
this option is 1,784.
These options were examined in a highly analytical approach
and the study recommended Option B. The study rationalized that
this option provided the greatest gain in effectiveness based on
a comparison of improved firepower, survivability, tactical
mobility, maneuver, and area coverage with increased personnel,
weight, and square footage requirements.
Comments from the Fleet Marine Force regarding this
recommendation were universally in favor of expanding the MAF's
ground air defense capability. The majority of comments
strongly favored an organic air defense capability for the
division. Some commands commented that the capability offered by
Option B was inadequate and made alternate proposals.
It is clear that the FMF recognizes the shortfall in air
defense capability and is strongly in favor of initiatives to
improve it.65
Chapter 6
THE REQUIREMENT AND THE SOLUTION
Requirement
The requirement, simply stated, is to improve the mass, mix,
mobility, and integration of air defense weapons in the MAF, and
especially in the division. An air defense organization should
be developed that addresses the threat and generates maximum
adherence to these principles. The threat can be summarized as
follows: units on the FEBA will be engaged primarily by combat
helicopters; while rear areas, combat service support
installations, airfields, and command and control facilities will
come under attack by high performance jet aircraft.
Improvements in mass, mix, and mobility will be discussed
concurrently. Improved integration as well as general
recommendations for improving the overall air defense effort will
be discussed separately.
Analysis of Alternative Air Defense Systems
Inherent in any effort to improve the mass, mix, and
mobility of Marine Corps air defense weapons is the requirement
to add a complementary weapon to the air defense arsenal. In
order to determine which weapon, relative merits of three U. S.
produced air defense systems, not in service with the Marine
Corps, but either currently available or near production, will be
evaluated as candidates for procurement and integration into the
air defense system. The advantages and disadvantages of each
system, especially as each pertains to Marine Corps use, will be
weighed. A recommendation will follow.
Guns, such as the Army's Vulcan and the Soviet's ZSU-23-4,
will be discussed as a generic system. Gun systems have two
advantages. The first is rapid employment. There is virtually
no delay between identifying a target and engaging it. This is
especially important while engaging helicopters employing
anti-tank guided missiles from pop-up maneuvers. A helicopter
must be brought under fire immediately to disrupt the pilot's
guidance of the missile. Putting fire, especially a stream of
tracers, near the helicopter can be as important, initially, as
actually hitting it. The other advantage is effectiveness of the
gun in its secondary mission against collateral ground targets
such as troops and lightly armored vehicles. The gun, then, is a
versatile weapon that can be brought to bear quickly and is
especially effective in handling meeting engagements with a
helicopter.
There are a number of disadvantages generally associated
with gun systems. A gun, such as the Vulcan, without automated
target acquisition, tracking, and ranging capability is a
daylight, fair-weather only air defense weapon. To gain an all
weather capability requires an array of radars which then become
susceptible to electronic countermeasures. The Soviet ZSU-23-4
possesses an acquisition, tracking, and ranging capability which
gives it an all-weather capability but also makes it more
susceptible to detection and jamming. A high rate of fire and
limited storage space for ammunition limits gun engagement time.
The Vulcan's rate of fire, for example, is 3,000 rounds per
minute. Only 1,000 rounds of ready-to-fire ammunition are loaded
in the gun, with additional storage space for 800 to 1,000 rounds
in the carrier.66 This limits the weapon's engagement time to
approximately 40 seconds before the crew must dismount and
manually reload from boxed ammunition. Although the firing rate
of antiaircraft guns is intentionally high, rounds still arrive
within the dispersion pattern at the target one at a time. This
is an inherent disadvantage of guns. It can be compared to using
an automatic rifle versus a shotgun when hunting game birds. You
are better off with the shotgun, from which projectiles cover the
pattern simultaneously. The last disadvantage is less academic.
Guns are simply old-fashioned. There is little or nothing that
can be done to improve them at this point in their development.
While enemy aircraft and tactics are improving, guns are at an
evolutionary standstill.
The mobility of gun systems varies greatly, from towed
systems to those mounted on wheeled or tracked vehicles. The
cost of gun systems varies proportionately with their style of
mobility since the gun and radar remain virtually unchanged
regardless of the prime mover.
The next air defense system to be discussed is the Setter.
The Setter is currently under joint development by two Army
research and development and procurement organizations, Missile
Command (MICOM) and Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM). The Setter
(named after the gun dog) mounts eight Stinger missiles outboard
on a Remote Electric Drive Turret (RED-T) carried on the 1 1/4
ton 4x4 High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). Inboard on
the turret are mounted 54 Hypervelocity Rockets (HVR) arranged in
six clips of nine rockets. Each HVR is 60 inches long by 1.8
inches in diameter and carries 18 flechette-like tungsten alloy
steel penetrators, 2.8mm in diameter and 112mm long. The
penetrators were originally conceived as a close-in
anti-helicopter weapon, but they now appear to provide Setter
with an equally capable weapon for engaging lightly armored
vehicles. The penetrators are released from the rocket at about
200 meters and reach maximum effective range at 1,500 to 2,000
meters with a velocity of approximately 1,400 meters per second
in four to six mil dispersion patterns. The HVR's can be fired
in volleys of three, six, or nine. A three-round volley will
therefore release a swarm of 54 penetrators.67
Setter carries a two man crew (gunner and driver) in the
lightly armored cab of the HMMWV. The RED-T traverses 360
degrees and elevates from -10 to +60 degrees. It uses a Forward
Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensor for night engagements, a daylight
television for surveillance and target acquisition, and a laser
rangefinder. The gunner's monitor can show either the FLIR or
the TV image. A portable fire control console allows dismounted
operation by the gunner up to 75 meters from the vehicle.
Additional storage is provided in the HMMWV for four
Stingers and four nine-round HVR clips. Development is due to be
completed in October 1985.68 (Figure 18).
Click here to view image
The greatest advantage of Setter is the mix of air defense
weapons inherent in the system. The HVR, an ideal weapon for
immediate engagement of helicopters, and the longer range Stinger
missile make an excellent combination. Like the air defense gun,
the Setter can be employed effectively against ground targets,
especially lightly armored vehicles. Unlike the
gun, the HVR places its projectiles on target simultaneously
ensuring hits if the target is in the dispersion pattern. The
Setter lacks acquisition and tracking radars, but the
characteristics of the weapons systems do not require them to
make it effective. Setter is ideally suited for employment on
the FEBA where the HVR would be used in rapid engagements against
helicopters at close range (less than 2,000 meters) and the
Stinger against visually acquired jet aircraft and helicopters at
longer ranges (to 4,000 meters). The combination of FLIR, TV
imaging, and a laser rangefinder provides state of the art fire
control while rendering electronic countermeasures ineffective.
The capability to remotely control the weapons systems enhances
crew survivability. The Setter is helicopter transportable by
both the CH-46 and CH-53. It's ground mobility, limited to that
of the HMMWV, is sufficient to support most infantry operations
but will be deficient in support of mechanized operations.
The last new system to be evaluated is the Saber. Saber is
a hand-held, man-portable, laser guided, surface-to-air missile.
Once fired, the missile adjusts its course to or "rides" a laser
beam that the gunner places on the target. Saber was Stinger's
competition in determining a successor for the Redeye.69 The
Saber's greatest strength is its quick response. The missile can
be fired immediately upon identifying a target within range. In
fact, within a specific envelop, the missile can be fired at a
point away from an aircraft and then brought back on target by
putting the laser beam on the aircraft and drawing the missile to
it. Two advantages of the Saber are related to the fact it is a
laser-riding missile and not infrared-homing like the Stinger.
The first is that it cannot be countered or distracted by flares
dropped from the target or other aircraft. The other is its
effectiveness against ground targets. The Saber is highly
accurate in engaging moving vehicles or bunkers and its warhead
is effective against such targets. The major disadvantage of the
Saber is that it is not a fire and forget weapon. The gunner
must hold the weapon sight on target throughout the engagement.
This is the primary reason for Saber's loss to Stinger in the
competition for Redeye's replacement. Saber's lack of an IFF
system is another disadvantage, but in it's anticipated role the
defect is not disqualifying. The man-portability of the Saber
has both advantages and disadvantages, on one hand it is limited
to the mobility of the supported unit and therefore will always
be in a position to support, but on the other, without being
externally mounted on a dedicated vehicle, the gunner will have
to disembark and acquire the target, increasing the engagement
time.
Mix
The first step in overcoming the weaknesses in the MAGTF's
air defense capability is to select a system that will improve
the mix of weapons. Of the systems previously discussed, Setter
is the best alternative for providing the MAGTF and especially
the ground combat element with a weapon to complement
the Hawk and Stinger surface-to-air missiles. Although the Saber
and Stinger have very different guidance systems, they are
similar weapons. The Saber's unique advantages, notably its
capability against ground targets and invulnerability to infrared
distractors do not outweigh its lack of a fire and forget
feature. At this point in the development of air defense weapons
and missiles in general, adoption of an other than fire and
forget system is a step backwards. The length of the average
hand-held missile engagement, projected to last 9.2 seconds,
combined with the very distinct signature left by such missiles
makes the Saber gunner extremely vulnerable to suppressive
fire.70
Air defense gun systems are simply outdated. At the current
state of technology the gun has no where to go and has no
distinct advantage over a missile system. As with Saber, any
system without a fire and forget feature is a step backwards.
Like the Setter, they are quick to engage the target and
effective against ground targets, but have limited ammunition
storage capacity and even their simple range-only-radars are
susceptible to electronic countermeasures. It is highly
susceptible to suppressive fire and its projectiles reach the
target in a stream rather than simultaneously which is
substantially more effective.
The inherent mobility of the Setter is a vast improvement
over the Stinger and Hawk systems. It allows for target
engagement without dismounting and is capable of supporting a
great majority of the ground missions.
Mass and Integration
Enhancements in mass and integration will be discussed
concurrently. Improvement in the mass of air defense weapons,
brought about by procurement of Setter, would necessitate
organizational changes that will, in turn, have an impact on
integration. Furthermore, discussion of enhanced integration and
organizational changes dictates a detailed analysis of command
and control requirements. Before embarking on any discussions of
command and control, it will be useful to
define these terms:
Command includes the authority and responsibility for
effectively using available resources; planning the
employment of assigned forces; and directing,
controlling, and coordinating the employment of those
forces to accomplish assigned missions.
Control is authority, less than command, delegated by
the commander to designated agencies to direct,
control, and coordinate specific functional activities
during combat operations.71
The key to these definitions, as far as this discussion is
concerned, is that the commander employs forces, but may delegate
the authority to designated agencies to control and coordinate
specific functional activities.
The first question that arises is whether the division
should have an organic air defense organization. Organic air
defense within the division is not unknown, even in the missile
age. The Redeye missile system was first introduced into the
Fleet Marine Force as an integral part of each division in
September 1966. The FAAD battery was moved to its present place
in the air wing in February 1969 in order to group all antiair
warfare assets under the command and control of the MACCS.72 The
change was brought about by members of the aviation community who
expressed concerns over the increased possibility of shooting
down one of our own aircraft. This is certainly a valid concern,
but one that requires a hard look. Aviation's greatest concern
in this regard should be from missile systems, such as the Hawk,
that acquire, track, and intercept targets by radar only. The
Hawk must be closely controlled to prevent inadvertent engagement
of friendly aircraft. Stinger and Setter, on the other hand, ace
terminal air defense weapons employed after visual acquisition of
targets by units under air attack.
Command and Control
At this point it is necessary to digress and synopsize the
current doctrine for weapons control and coordination of FAAD
units:
Fire direction of FAAD units includes target assignment
and its relationship to zones of fire and is the
responsibility of the TAOC. The TAOC considers zones
of fire, early warning, and target assignment when
coordinating the fire of LAAM and FAAD units. Air
defense warnings and weapons control conditions are
established by the Commander Amphibious Task Force
(CATF) and Commander Landing Force (CLF) and
disseminated over the MACCS communications nets. Air
defense warnings are defined as follows:
- Red: Attack is imminent or in progress.
- Yellow: Attack is probable.
- White: Attack is not probable.
Weapons control conditions are as follows:
- Weapons Free: Fire may be opened on all
aircraft, except helicopters, not recognized as
friendly. FAAD gunners may engage high speed
aircraft not positively identified as friendly.
Engagement of helicopters requires positive
identification.
- Weapons Tight: This command means do not open
fire, or to cease firing on any aircraft (or on
bogey specified, or in section indicated) unless
a target(s) known to be hostile. FAAD gunners
may engage any aircraft positively identified as
hostile.
- Hold Fire: This command means do no open fire
or to cease firing on raid/track designated.
FAAD gunners do not fire unless directly under
attack by aircraft.
In the event of loss of communications, FAAD units
go to weapons tight condition. If the previous
condition was weapons free, the weapons tight condition
is assumed immediately. If prior to the communications
loss, the weapon was in a hold fire status, FAAD units
will maintain hold fire for a period of ten minutes and
then assume weapons tight. Authority to change the
FAAD weapons control conditions is vested in the CLF
and is normally exercised through the MACCS. It is
anticipated that the normal weapons control condition
will be weapons tight and that changes will be
infrequent.73
It would seem on first impression that the command and
control procedures just described apply more to defense of fixed
installations than to fluid situations expected along the FEBA.
In actuality, because of the limited ranges, visually acquired
targets, and the fact that units will more than likely be under
attack once Setter or Stinger are employed, the execution of the
air defense command and control system as it applies to air units
on FEBA is not overly restrictive.
What is severely limited by the current organization is
integration of air defense units with supported units and the
capacity of supported commanders to exercise control in the
employment of a weapons system. There is a unique requirement
for integration in the division that can only be satisfied by
establishment of an organic air defense organization. The
control of air defense units on the FEBA is by necessity flexible
and is exercised primarily through establishment of weapons
control conditions. Responsibility for the establishment of the
ground commander's air defense priorities and the command
necessary to employ assets to support prioritization should
reside with the supported maneuver unit. That by no means
precludes control by MACCS and detailed coordination between
MACCS and division air defense units. In fact the MACCS would
remain the senior air defense agency. A TACC would continue to
pass air defense warnings, and would have responsibility for
setting weapons control conditions. But, an air defense unit
simply does not have to be administratively part of the MACG to
be controlled by MACCS or to ensure acceptable safety levels for
friendly aircraft. Establishment, then, of an air defense
organization organic to the division would improve both mass and
integration of air defense weapons in the MAF without
degrading command and control effectiveness.
Alternatives for the Division's Air Defense Organization
Realistic options for the structure of the air defense
battalion proposed for the division must use as their basis the
Stinger and Setter systems. These weapons have the
characteristics, capability, and mobility that make them the most
effective available to satisfy the specific requirements for air
defense in the division. The first two options provide each
infantry regiment with an organic air defense platoon as well as
an air defense organization at the division-level. One option
consolidates divisional organic assets in an air defense
battalion, and the final option also establishes an air defense
battalion but provides each infantry battalion with an organic
air defense capability as well.
Option W. This option establishes an air defense
company within the division's headquarters battalion. This
company would have three Stinger platoons and one Setter platoon.
It also provides the infantry regiment an organic air defense
capability in the form of a platoon within the headquarters
company. This platoon would consist of 4 Stinger sections and
one Setter section (Figure 19).
Option X. This alternative is similar to Option W but
consolidates the Setter assets at the division-level. The
division's air defense company would have two Stinger platoons
and two Setter platoons, while the regiment's air defense platoon
would have four Stinger sections (Figure 20).
Option Y. This option consolidates tbe division's air
defense assets in a battalion consisting of two Stinger companies
and a Setter company (Figure 21).
Option Z. The last option adds to Option Y a Stinger
section to be incorporated into the weapons company of each
infantry battalion (Figure 22).
Figure 23 provides an overview of the four options.
Click here to view image
Comparative Analysis
Option W offers a wide variety of alternatives for task
organizing in support of the division's units. The regiment's
air defense platoon can support each of the battalions with a
Stinger section, with the fourth section employed in defense of
the regiment's command post and logistics support or to reinforce
one of the battalions. The Setter section could be used in a
number of ways; support for attached or supporting tanks used as
a fourth maneuver element, in support of a motorized or
mechanized battalion, to reinforce a Stinger section, and convoy
protection. The air defense company, in particular the Stinger
platoon, is capable of providing task organized support
throughout the division to include: the division's command post,
Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC), Direct Air Support
Center (DASC), logistics support, and maintenance facilities;
artillery units; and large scale engineer operations. The Setter
platoon could be tasked with support of a Mechanized Combined
Arms Task Force (MCATF) up to regimental-size, providing a
responsive defense against enemy helicopterborne operations in
the division's rear, convoy security, or reinforcing other air
defense units.
In consolidating the Setter assets, Option X provides for
more efficient maintenance management and allows the division
commander greater flexibility in reinforcing and supporting
MCATF's, rear area defense plans, and the general outpost. On
the other hand, with the variety of missions that would routinely
require Setter assets at the regimental level, permanent
assignment would improve integration.
Consolidation of all air defense assets into an air defense
battalion as depicted in Option Y has distinct advantages and
disadvantages. The arguments for and against consolidation boil
down to advocacy for integration or efficiency. Maintenance and
training are enhanced through consolidation as is the division
commanders ability to mass assets and weight a specific unit in
either offensive or defensive operations. The battalion also
provides the division a ready-made special staff officer for air
defense in the form of the battalion commander. Unlike a company
commander, the battalion commander would have the staff to free
him for such an assignment and would have the clout to do the
job. Integration suffers increasingly the farther the supporting
unit is in the chain of command from the supported. With
complete consolidation, integration is sure to suffer. There are
steps, however, that can be taken to improve it, specifically
along the lines of the traditional relationships established
between artillery and infantry units.
Option Z improves integration with the maneuver elements
where it is most critical, but task organizing air defense assets
to the regimental level and below will still be required.
Although all the options have advantages and disadvantages,
each would be a quantum improvement over the present situation.
The reasoning behind selecting an option must address the basis
of the overall analysis: improving mass, mix, mobility, and
integration without being impractical. Improving mass and
integration for example, must be tempered with a realistic
appraisal of the most limited and costly of Marine Corps assets -
Marines. A quick look at Figure 23 will point out that
establishing an air defense battalion is very costly
personnel-wise. Option Y for example is 41% larger than Option W
while providing only 2% more weapons systems. Option Z, the
largest in structure being almost twice as large as Option X, the
smallest, gives the division only 50% more weapons systems.
Option W is the favored structure for the division's air
defense assets. It provides the greatest flexibility and
improvements in mass, mix, mobility, and integration in relation
to the cost in personnel. This option gives the division 105
Stingers and 36 Setters which is considered adequate. Only
Option Z, at a cost of 320 more Marines, provides significantly
more weapons. All options satisfy the requirement for mix but
the preferred option is the only one that mixes weapons at more
than one level of command. Again, in terms of mobility, Option W
alone structures the highly mobile Setter below the
division-level. With this organic mobility each regiment would
not have to compete for assets to support missions such as the
combat outpost, defense against enemy helicopterborne operations,
motorized or mechanized movements, and rapid reinforcement.
Except for Option Z which provides an air defense capability
directly to the battalion, Option W best integrates air defense
units throughout the division. There are disadvantages
associated with this option, but they are outweighed by the
advantages and can be minimized through other employment
techniques. Training and maintenance can not be conducted with
as much economy as they might be in a consolidated structure.
But the picture is brighter than one might believe. First a
case could be made to consolidate every crew-served weapon in
support of infantry units based on the training and maintenance
argument. The recent restructuring of the infantry regiment to
include an organic TOW platoon sets a precedent for
decentralizing a previously consolidated capability. Company
grade officers all over the Marine Corps are tasked with training
units in a decentralized environment. Air defense should be
treated no differently. By combining centralized coordination,
decentralized execution and appropriate means, training can be
conducted effectively and with reasonable economy. Likewise,
maintenance of the Stinger and Setter systems can be accomplished
at the regimental level. The systems are so highly sophisticated
that maintenance at the unit level is, at best, preventive in
nature. Stinger and Setter are equipped with built-in test
equipment to pinpoint malfunctioning subsystems. Once
identified, that part is replaced and shipped to a higher level
of maintenance for repair. With this replacement type of
maintenance, consolidation is of little or no advantage.
Without an air defense battalion there is no readily
available officer to serve as a special staff officer for air
defense to the commanding general. The air defense company
commander, without a staff, will be too actively involved in
commanding his company to serve in such a capacity. The
requirement is a real one and the answer is to assign a major or
lieutenant colonel with MOS 7204 (Air Defense Officer) to the
division G-3 as part of the existing air-ground exchange program.
Before closing the discussion on the preferred option,
command and control of the organizations must be addressed. In
all cases the supported ground commander establishes priorities
for air defense and plans the employment of his assets. The
MACCS continues to pass weapons control conditions through the
FSCC/DASC interface on existing nets such as the fire support
coordination net, tactical net, or tactical air request net. The
fact that the division's assets are terminal, point, self-defense
weapons, with a mission to destroy enemy aircraft attacking the
unit they are supporting, not simply passing through the area,
makes simplified command and control arrangements perfectly
acceptable. For this reason there is no requirement for the
division's air defense weapons to be integrated into the system
whereby the TAOC establishes zones of fire and makes target
assignments when coordinating the fires of the air wing's LAAM
battalion and FAAD battery. Based on the mission of the
division's air defense units and the weapons tight condition
(gunners only engage aircraft positively identified as hostile)
that they will normally operate under, Marine aviation in general
should have no concern with being engaged by friendly
weapons because those weapons are not commanded through the
MACCS.
Additional Recommendations
The next step in improving mass and integration is
consideration of the current air defense organization in an air
wing. With an air defense organization organic to the division,
the FAAD battery can concern itself primarily with point defense
of the rear areas, generally air wing and FSSG assets. The LAAM
battalion will continue to provide longer range, medium altitude,
all weather air defense umbrellas from fixed positions over the
MAF as a whole. The FAAD battery's five platoons are not
sufficient to provide point defense around the numerous vital
areas in the MAF's rear. Simply adding more platoons to the
existing battery would put an added strain on an already
overloaded organization. The battery's size (Table of
Organization of eight officers and 269 enlisted Marines) combined
with the fact it is subordinate to the MACG and co-equal with
squadrons, yet has no staff, puts an unusual burden on it. Mass,
mix, and integration can all be improved by establishing a mobile
air defense battalion with two Stinger batteries of three
platoons each and a Setter battery of three platoons. This would
nearly double the assets in the current FAAD battery, develop an
easily expandable structure, and provide an organization to
effectively and efficiently command and control the assets. Most
importantly the battalion has the depth to provide adequate point
defense to the predominantly static facilities of the air wing
and FSSG with the Stinger and the mobility for convoy protection,
defense of engineer operations, and rear area defense with the
Setter.
Taking the reorganization a step further, the new battalion
and the LAAM battalion should be joined to form an air defense
regiment/group (Figure 24). This consolidation will
significantly improve integration between MAF level air defense
units by establishing an organization that has as its sole
function and focus, air defense. Using the same argument as
formulated in support of the proposal for organic divisional air
defense, that air defense units do not have to be
administratively assigned to the MACG or anywhere in the air wing
to receive control information from and be integrated with MACCS,
a case can be made that the newly formed air defense regiment
belongs in the FSSG. There is historical precedent as well as
logical arguments for this restructuring. Upon introduction of
the Hawk missile to the Marine Corps the newly formed LAAM
battalion was placed in the Force Support Regiment (FSR), the
forerunner of the FSSG.
The FSSG is tasked, however, with providing sustained combat
service support to a division and an air wing. Air defense is
not combat service support. Although the new air defense group
supports all the components of a MAGTF, it most appropriately
belongs in the air wing. Control of this organization will not
differ from that currently exercised over the LAAM battalion and
FAAD battery; the assets have simply been expanded and
reorganized.
Click here to view image
Chapter 7
CONCLUSIONS
With its current structure, the MAF lacks the ground air
defense to counter the threat posed by enemy aviation. It is
particularly vulnerable to air attack by Soviet forces.
MAF ground assets fail to meet any of the principles of air
defense employment: mass, mix, mobility, and integration.
Specifically, the LAAM battalion and FAAD battery lack mass and
mobility to defend vital areas in the MAF's rear against
expected threats from fixed-wing jet aircraft, leaving precious
few if any FAAD assets to defend the division's ground maneuver
elements against an even greater primary threat, the combat
helicopter. Mix is nonexistent when FAAD assets are in support
of the division, and throughout the MAF limited to those
instances when LAAM battalion and FAAD battery provide assets for
the defense of a single vital area. Integration, between air
defense units and between supporting and supported units is
unsatisfactory.
To satisfy these principles, a number of recommendations
have been made. First is adoption of the Setter system to
improve the mix and mobility of the MAF's air defense weapons.
Next is the formation of air defense units in the division, and a
restructuring of the assets currently in the air wing to include
formation of an air defense group. These initiatives will
substantially improve the mass and integration of air defense
weapons.
For many these would seem to be drastic steps. In light of
the requirement to provide a last resort defense of the MAF's
resources, especially during the very vulnerable early stages of
an amphibious assault, it is by no means drastic, and in fact,
too late in coming. It only appears drastic because the present
capacity for ground air defense is so inadequate. The cost in
terms of dollars, lift, and personnel is significant, but in
comparison with potential losses in fuel, supplies, air support,
command and control, and armor, it is necessary to foot the bill.
Certainly building to the recommended structure will be
sequential but programming should begin immediately.
In addition to restructuring and expanding air defense
units, three other recommendations will have a positive impact on
the MAF's air defense. The first is taking steps to fill one of
the billets in the division's G-3 with an air defense officer who
can function, as an additional duty, as the special staff officer
for air defense. The division air officer, who might be a C-130
pilot or A-6 bombadier-navigator, is simply not prepared to
provide this expertise, as he is expected to now.
Increased emphasis on training the MAF in passive air
defense should include techniques of camouflage, deception,
concealment, dispersion, mobility, and emissions control.
Training should begin by taking every Marine up in a helicopter
to see how vulnerable a poorly dispersed and camouflaged unit
really is. This point should be stressed on every exercise.
Lastly, Marines must be trained in the active air defense
measures and techniques for shooting back at enemy aircraft. The
effectiveness of such techniques should not be underestimated,
and must be emphasized and regularly incorporated into training
exercises.
NOTES
1 U. S., Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division, Directorate for
Intelligence Research, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense
IntelIigence Report: Soviet Air Support to Ground Troops
(DDB-1300-147-79), June 1979, p. 1.
2 U. S., Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division, Directorate for
Research, Defense Intelligence Agency, Force Structure Summary -
USSR, Mongolia, and Eastern Europe (U) (DDB-2680-170-84), May
1984, pp. 10-16.
3 U. S., Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual
No. 44-3: Air Defense Artillery Employment
Chaparral/Vulcan/Stinger, June 1984, p. 2-1.
4 U. S., Defense Intelligence Report: Soviet Air Support to
Ground Troops, p. 1.
5 U. S., Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, April
1984, pp. 54-55.
6 U. S., Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division, Directorate for
Research, Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Front Fire Support
(DDB-1130-8-82), September 1982, p. 61.
7 U. S., Field Manual No. 44-3: Air Defense Artillery
Employment Chaparral/Vulcan/Stinger, p. 2-2.
8 Ibid., p. 2-3.
9 U. S., Soviet Front Fire Support (DDB-1130-8-82),
pp. 59-61.
10 U. S., Field Manual No. 44-3: Air Defense Artillery
Employment Chaparral/Vulcan/Stinger, p. 2-4.
11 U. S., Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual
No. 100-2-3: The Soviet Army; Troops, Organization and
Equipment, July 1984, p. 4-123.
12 U. S., Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division, Directorate for
Research, Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Divisional
Organizational Guide (DDB-1100-333-82), July 1982, pp. 9-10,
80-81.
13 U. S., Soviet Front Fire Support (DDB-1130-8-82),
pp. 60-61.
14 U. S., Field Manual No. 100-2-3: The Soviet Army;
Troops, Organization and Equipment, p. 4-114.
15 Ibid., pp. 4-123, 4-125.
16 U. S., Force Structure Summary - USSR, Mongolia, and
Eastern Europe (U) (DDB-2680-170-84), pp. 15, 26-33.
17 U. S., Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual
No. 100-2-1: The Soviet Army; Operations and Tactics, July 1984,
pp. 12-8, 12-9.
18 Ibid., p. 12-9.
19 U. S., Soviet Front Fire Support (DDB-1130-8-82), p. 60.
20 U. S., Field Manual No. 100-2-1: The Soviet Army;
Operations and Tactics, p. 12-6.
21 U. S., Defense Intelligence Report: Soviet Air Support
to Ground Troops (DDB-1300-147-79), p. 8.
22 Ibid., pp. 9-12.
23 Ibid., pp. 19-20.
24 Ibid., p. 20.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 U. S., Field Manual No. 100-2-1: The Soviet Army;
Operations and Tactics, p. 12-3.
28 U. S., Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine
Force Manual 5-1: Marine Aviation, February 1983, p. 6.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p. 7.
31 Ibid., p. 6.
32 Ibid., p. 7.
33 Ibid., pp. 47-49.
34 Ibid., pp. 50-51.
35 Ibid., pp. 51-52.
36 Ibid., pp. 43-44.
37 Interview with Master Sergeant Michael W. Joneas, USMC,
Development Center, MCDEC, 24 January 1985.
38 U. S., Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual
No. 44-1-2: Air Defense Artillery Reference Handbook, June 1984,
p. 2-12.
39 Interview with Major John E. Ryan, USMC, Development
Center, MCDEC, 16 January 1985.
40 U. S., Fleet Marine Force Manual 5-1: Marine Aviation,
pp. 53-54.
41 U. S., Marine Corps Development and Education Command,
Instructional Publication 5-7: Fleet Marine Force Aviation,
September 1984, p. 6.
42 U. S., Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine
Force Manual 5-SC: Employment of Forward Area Air Defense
Battery, January 1980, pp. 14-16.
44 U. S., Field Manual No. 44-1-2: Air Defense Artillery
Reference Handbook, p. 1-12.
45 Ibid., p. 1-14.
46 U. S., Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual
No. 44-18: Air Defense Artillery Employment Stinger, September
1981, p. 2-3.
47 Ibid.
48 U. S., Field Manual No. 44-1-2: Air Defense Artillery
Reference Handbook, pp. 1-12 to 1-13.
49 U. S., Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine
Force Manual 5-5: Antiair Warfare, July 1980, p. 34.
50 U. S., Field Manual No. 44-1-2: Air Defense Artillery
Reference Handbook, pp. A-1 to A-2.
51 U. S., Field Manual No. 44-18: Air Defense Artillery
Employment Stinger, p. 3-3.
52 U. S., Field Manual No. 44-1-2: Air Defense Artillery
Reference Handbook, p. 6-6.
53 Ibid., pp. 1-4 to 1-7.
54 Ibid., pp. 1-14 to 1-17.
55 U. S., Field Manual No. 100-2-3: The Soviet Army;
Troops, Organization and Equipment, pp. 4-34, 4-109.
56 Ibid., p. 5-103.
57 Ibid., P. 5-93.
58 Ibid., p. 5-101.
59 Ibid., p. 5-100.
60 U. S., Field Manual 44-3: Air Defense Artillery
Employment Chaparral/Vulcan/Stinger, p. 6-3.
61 Ibid., pp. 6-3 to 6-4.
62 Ibid., p. 6-3.
63 U. S., Fleet Marine Force Manual 5-5: Antiair Warfare,
p. 43.
64 U. S., Fleet Marine Force Manual 5-1: Marine Aviation,
p. 104.
65 U. S., Marine Corps Development and Education Command,
Marine Corps Force Structure (1980-1989) Study, December 1980,
pp. 11-57 to 11-69.
66 U. S., Field Manual 44-3: Air Defense Artillery
Employment Chaparral/Vulcan/Stinger, p. 4-4.
67 "Setter Proposed for Light Divisions," Defence Minister
and Chief of Staff, No. 5/1984, p. 57.
68 Ibid.
69 Interview with Major John E. Ryan, USMC, Development
Center, MCDEC, 16 January 1985.
70 Interview with Master Sergeant Leland K. Deuel, USMC,
Development Center, MCDEC, 24 January 1985.
71
U. S., Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine
Force Manual 10-1: Communications, October 1980, p. 3-1.
72 U. S., Fleet Marine Force Manual 5-5C: Employment of
Forward Area Air Defense Battery, p. 3.
73 Ibid., pp. 17-19.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. PRIMARY SOURCES
1. Responses by Major Commands to the CG, MCDEC Request for
Comments on Marine Corps Force Structure (1980-1989) Study
CG, First MarBde msg 202017Z February 1981.
CG, First MarDiv msg 160058Z October 1980.
CG, FMFLant ltr 3:JRB:alw 1000 of 24 February 1981.
CG, Fourth MarDiv ltr 5:LBM:ewb 1000 of 10 October 1980.
CG, MCAGCC ltr 3/RES/cls 1000 of 13 February 1981.
CG, Second MarDiv ltr 3/BEG/pjr 3900 of 11 February 1981.
CG, Third MAW ltr 38:HMW:sls 5000 of 8 October 1980.
2. Interviews
Schessler, Lieutenant Colonel John, USMC. HQMC.
Interview, 15 January 1984.
Clymer, Major Sylvester P., USMC. MCDEC Liaison Officer, U. S.
Army Missile Command. Interview, 24 January 1984.
Ryan, Major John E., USMC. Development Center, MCDEC.
Interview, 16 January 1984.
Deuel, Master Sergeant Leland K., USMC. Development Center,
MCDEC. Interview, 24 January 1984.
Joneas, Master Sergeant Michael J., USMC. Development Center,
MCDEC. Interview, 24 January 1984.
3. Document
Setter Weapon System Specification, Prepared for Contract:
DAAE07-83-C-R048, 31 May 1984.
B. SECONDARY SOURCES
1. Study
Marine Corps Force Structure (1980-1989) Study, December 1980.
2. Text of Briefing
Mobile Weapon System (MWS), 11 May 1983.
3. Pamphlets
Avenger, Boeing Corporation.
Improved Hawk, Raytheon Company.
Setter, U. S. Army Missile Command.
25mm Air Defense Turret for Light Armored Vehicle, General
Electric Corporation.
4. Periodical
"Setter Proposed for Light Divisions." Defence Minister and
Chief of Staff, No.5/1984, p. 57.
5. Newpapers
"Light Division Air Defense Weapon Debuts." Army Times.
10 December 1984, p. 30.
"Vulcan Gun to Get New Fire Control System." Army Times.
3 December 1984, p. 26.
6. Manuals
U. S., Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, April 1984.
U. S., Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual No.
44-1-2: Air Defense Artillery Reference Handbook, June
1984.
U. S., Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual No.
44-3: Air Defense Artillery Employment Chaparral/Vulcan/
Stinger, June 1984.
U. S., Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual No.
44-8: Small Unit Self-Defense Against Air Attack,
December 1981.
U. S., Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual No.
44-18: Air Defense Artillery Employment Stinger,
September 1981.
U. S., Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual No.
100-2-1: The Soviet Army; Operations and Tactics,
July 1984.
U. S., Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual No.
100-2-3: The Soviet Army; Troops, Organization and Equip-
ment, July 1984.
U. S., Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual
5-1: Marine Aviation, February 1983.
U. S., Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual
5-5: Antiair Warfare, July 1980.
U. S., Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual
5-5C: Employment of Forward Area Air Defense Battery,
January 1980.
U. S., Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual
10-1: Communications, October 1980.
U. S., Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division, Directorate for Research,
Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Divisional
Organizational Guide (DDB-1100-33-82), July 1982.
U. S., Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division, Directorate for Research,
Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Front Fire Support
(DDB-1130-8-82), September 1982.
U. S., Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division, Directorate for Research,
Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Air Support to Ground
Troops (DDB-1300-147-79), June 1979.
U. S., Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division, Directorate for Research,
Defense Intelligence Agency, Force Structure Summary - USSR,
Mongolia, and Eastern Europe (U) (DDB-2680-170-84), May
1984.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
