Nicaragua 1984: Swirl In The Eye Of The Storm CSC 1984 SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues ABSTRACT The strife in Nicaragua, while originating in legitimate grievances against the corrupt Somoza dictatorship, had ceased early after the 1979 revolution to be a strictly internal affair. Successfully applying the six historical lessons of communism in Latin America, Nicaragua became a new ally in the Third World in the Soviet offensive against the West. This was accomplished by direct Cuban and Soviet sponsored military involvement, and massive arms transfers to achieve political goals through military violence. Nicaragua as a result, possesses a military capability superior to all its neighbors combined. The novel application of this strategy was the use of proxy forces which enables Moscow to disclaim direct responsibility, and to avoid confrontation with the United States. Arms deliveries, which play a significant role in furthering Soviet hegemony, have been accompanied with thousands of Cuban, Soviet, and surrogate revolutionary advisors, in military, educational, technical, and medical capacities. Many of these personnel have a direct bearing on the daily command and management decisions in Nicaragua, and on the exportation of violence to neighboring countries such as El Salvador. The United States has been waging political and economic warfare to force Nicaragua to embrace a more pluralistic form of government. The Central Intelligence Agency is also waging a "not so secret" war by backing a loose coalition of counterrevolutionaries which have achieved only limited success because of the lack of a coherent strategy, internal strife, and absence of a unifying and charismatic leadership. The Report of the Bipatisan Commission on Latin America has recommended an $8.9 billion "Marshall Plan" (75% economic and 25% military aid) to promote regional stability. Liberal critics call for negotiated settlements with leftist guerillas and Marxist juntas. They decry the bipartisan report as being an extension of Reagan administration policy that will lead to direct U.S. military involvement. Both Liberals and Conservatives agree that if immediate action is not accomplished to ameliorate the position of the Sandista Regime in Nicaragua, the U.S. will be plummeted into a costly and long Vietnam type war that could result in 5,000 killed, 18,000 wounded, and still not accomplish long term objectives of peace. WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR Nicaragua 1984: Swirl in the Eye of the Storm Major J. W. Wilson, USMC 2 April 1984 Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico, Virginia 22134 Click here to view image INTRODUCTION Nicaragua, 285 miles from the strategic Panama Canal and 1085 miles from Brownsville, Texas, prepares daily for invasion by United States military forces. Latin American advocacy groups in the nation's Capitol subscribe to a poster which reads, "No Mas Vietnams en Centro-America Y El Caribe" (No more Vietnams in Central America and the Caribbean). The U.S. Congress contemplates a massive $8.9 billion "Marshall Plan" submitted by The Bipartisan Commission on Latin America, headed by former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Fervent Catholic and Protestant religious groups under a wave of "liberation theology" influence, call for dramatic and sometimes non-pacifist involvement to protest social, economic, and political injustices suffered by a majority of Latin Americans. Interest groups, members of Congress, clergy, and even wives of aspiring presidential candidates, make fact-finding trips and contribute to information and misinformation campaigns to shape U.S. public and world opinion. Defense analysts meet weekly in the White House to discuss Central America and assess the threat of infectious communism on our borders, and funding requirements for guerrilla groups operating against the Sandinist Regime of Nicaragua. and assuredly, military operation plans are being intensely studied and readied in the Pentagon and U.S. Army Southern Command, to halt Soviet and Cuban designs on the Caribbean Basin and the "soft underbelly" of the U.S.. The 25 October, 1983 invasion of Grenada by U.S. Marine and Army personnel, demonstrated U.S. resolve to prevent further communist political ascendency, in and around a sea described by Alfred Thayer Mahan, as "the American Mediterranean." Another vital interest threatened by Soviet and Cuban hegemony is the interoceanic canal, about which President Hayes theorized as the great ocean thoroughfare between the Atlantic and Pacific, and "virtually a part of the coastline of the United States." The Marxist junta in Nicaragua is presently enjoying a lull but is still running scared. They realize more fully, that with little warning, history could repeat itself. Over the horizon, feared U.S. Marines with battleships and screaming dive bombers, may come as before, to restore "orderly government" and regional tranquility. So Nicaragua waits, training physically and psychologically for the next invasion. If more than a hint of urgency is apparent, it is because the dynamics of the situation demand agressive near- term action in the social, economic, political and military arenas. One thing is certain -- Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatamala, Costa Rica, and Panama will become more common household words during the next year. SCOPE The primary scope of this paper is to sketch the significant events in Nicaragua since 19 July, 1979, when leftist guerrillas overthrew the corrupt Somoza dictatorship, to March of 1984. Although the original intent was to analyze unconvential warfare tactics of U.S. supported counterrevolutionaries, one cannot fully appreciate Nicaragua's current history, without embracing the complexities of its past. The issues are sometimes gut wrenching and cut deeply into moral, political, and religious sentiments. Current literature, most of it liberal, carries a bias that would lead one to believe that the U.S. should acquiesce to communist regimes because of past sins which promoted economic exploitation and oppressive dictatorships. On the other hand, official government publications, supported by substantive intelligence reports, contend that the presence of another Marxist-Leninist regime in our Southern borders, is a deliberate and strategic ploy of the Soviet Union for eventual global domination. What will be provided in this brief thesis, is an appreciation for Nicaragua's history, U.S. presence, the rise and maintenance of a 43 year Somoza dynasty, a revolution, a CIA backed insurgency, and potential options for conflict resolution. It is at best, a chronicle of events which have not yet reached a climax. It is hoped that this paper will serve as a "pin prick" for the reader to encourage more exhaustive reading, and to gain a comprehensive understanding of the United States' next battleground. Disclaimer The opinions presented herein are solely those of the author and in no way represent official views of the Department of Defense, the United States Navy, or the United States Marine Corps. Table of Contents Page Introduction ii Scope iv Disclaimer v Table of Contents vi List of Figures viii Chapter 1. Nicaragua Facts 1 2. A Tortured History 7 The Military Caste System 9 An Era of Intervention 11 Zelaya - Champion of Nationalism 17 U.S. Marines - First Occupation 20 U.S. Marines - Second Occupation 22 General Augusto Cesar Sandino - Folk Hero 22 Somoza - Vestige of Marine Presence 24 The Second Somoza 25 The Third Somoza - The Last Marine 26 The Final Offensive 31 3. A Cog in the Wheel of Soviet Hegemony 35 The Three Tendencies 37 A Revolution Betrayed 39 U.S. Vital Interests in the Caribbean 40 Six Lessons of Communism for Latin America 44 The Militarization of Nicaragua 57 PLO Connections 62 Cubans, Cubans, Everywhere 65 4. The Not So Secret War 71 Contra Organizations 73 Nicaragua Democratic Force (FDN) 75 Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) 79 MISURASATA 83 Congressional Limits on Covert Aid 87 U.S. Presence in Honduras 89 5. Options for the Future 95 The Kissinger Report 97 The Report of the Carnegie Endownment for International Peace 105 The Military Option 106 Conclusion 112 Epiloque 115 Endnotes Chapter One 6 Chapter Two 33 Chapter Three 68 Chapter Four 92 Chapter Five 114 Bibliography Books 116 U.S. Government Documents and Contract Reports 117 Magazine and Periodical Articles on Nicaragua 119 Unpublished Sources 122 Newspaper Articles 123 Interviews 124 LIST OF FIGURES Page Chapter One Figure 1-1 Map of Central America 2 Figure 1-2 OAS Map of Nicaragua 3 Figure 1-3 Ethnic Composition and Population Distribution 5 Chapter Three Figure 3-1 Organization, Command and Control of the Armed forces 56 Figure 3-2 Major Central American Arms Routes 58 Figure 3-3 The Sandinista's Arsenal 61 Figure 3-4 PLO Connections 64 Chapter Four Figure 4-1 Contra Pressure Points 74 CHAPTER ONE: NICARAGUAN FACTS 1/ Nicaragua is the largest country in Central America (57,143 square miles -- slightly larger than Iowa) and is the geographic center of the region. (See Figure 1-1.) Straddled between the Pacific and Caribbean Oceans, Nicaragua is bordered on the north by El Salvador and Honduras, both contending with leftist insurgents. To the south lies politically neutral Costa Rica, which has no military and is the only land buffer between Nicaragua and Panama. (See Figure 1-2.) Both Honduras and Costa Rica provide sanctuaries to Counterrevolutionary forces seeking to topple the Marxist junta in Nicaragua. Nicaragua, on the other hand, provides sanctuary for communist insurgents operating throughout Central America. Of Nicaragua's total 1980 population of 2.67 million, 715,000 or approximately 27%, resided in the capital city of Managua. Nicaragua's population has traditionally been unevenly distributed and in 1980, 61% of the inhabitants resided in the fertile plains and nearby Pacific highlands, about 30% lived in the Central highlands, and the remaining 10% dwelt in the Atlantic coastal province of Zelaya. The median age of the populace is 30 years. The annual growth rate is projected at 2.8 percent. Click here to view image The predominant cultural heritage of the western urban and highlands areas is Spanish, with Spanish as the primary language and Roman Catholicism adhered to by 85-90% of all inhabitants. The population centered around Bluefields on the eastern coast, retains some native Indian influence, but its past was shaped by European and western traditions, as well as by black minorities originating from Jamaica and other Caribbean islands. Protestantism, especially the Moravian denomination, is most influential in this region where English is the primary language. Miskito is the predominant Indian language, also spoken in the East. (See Figure 1-3 for Ethnic Compositon and population distribution.) Click here to view image There are three major geographical regions. The Pacific region is characterized by a line of still active volcanoes, which intrude from a large structural rift that forms a long narrow depression from the Gulf of Fonseca shared by Honduras and El Salvador in the northwest, to the Rio San Juan drainage into the Caribbean. Lake Nicaragua and Lake Managua, the two largest freshwater lakes in Central America, are located in this rift valley. The Atlantic Coast region encompasses half the national territory and is characterized as a lowland region abounding in tropical savannas and numerous rivers which flow eastward Click here to view image to the sea. In between the eastern and western regions are the Central Highlands, which are more extensive in the north. Nicaragua's chief products are cotton, coffee, beef, and sugar. NOTES Chapter One: Nicaragua Facts 1. U.S. Department of State. Background Notes: Nicaragua. Bureau of Public Affairs. DOS Pub. 7772. Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, January 1983. CHAPTER TWO: A TORTURED HISTORY The Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America headed by Dr. Henry Kissinger, was tasked by President Reagan to develop "long term United States policy that will best respond to the challenges of social, economic, and democratic development in the region and to internal and external threats to its security and stability. " 1/ The "Kissinger Commission" in its report of 10 January 1984, provided both long and short term recommendations which will be discussed later. Most importantly, the commission deduced that the problems of Central America are extremely complex and cannot be simply reduced to black and white, East and West, North and South, or rich and poor issues. The problems are inextricably woven together and do not require U.S. imposed solutions. They demand Central American solutions to long problems of social injustice, corruption, and repression. Obviously, the U.S. has vital interests at stake in any regional resolution and must exercise its will in a manner which will not distance the possibility of long term stability. The U.S. must also learn from past failures in the region, most stemming from self-serving interests of strategic and economic enhancement that ignored the volatile welfare issues of the Central American people. The entrenchment of a communist government in Nicaragua did not have its genesis in the past several decades. The seeds of revolution have germinated for centuries. A century and a half relationship with Nicaragua has witnessed a U.S. policy which has "alternated erratically between the obsessive and the negligent." 2/ Obsessive policy has culminated in active Marine Corps intervention to establish client-governments, without regard to the exploitation and corruption these governments generated. Negligent policy has resulted in sending U.S. Ambassadors who could not speak Spanish and who insulated themselves from fundamental cultural and sociological ills as well as the unique and dynamic impact of Latin America military institutions upon society. Neglect has meant focusing significantly on the Atlantic and the Pacific alliances as the centerpieces of strategic interests, and only intermittently concentrating on relationships with southern neighbors. And for Nicaragua, neglect in policy resulted in the Somoza family dictatorship becoming the longest lasting in Latin America. Although staunchly pro-U.S., the dictatorship systematically developed the machinery for graft and corruption which would eventually lead to chaos and revolution in Nicaragua. Many members of Somoza's National Guard, following the example of their leader, turned positions in customs, immigration, and police into wholesale smuggling operations and opportunities for self-enrichment. Even at the private soldier level, extortion of peasants had become a way of life. Those without power, social affluence, or money always bear the brunt of exploitation. Nicaragua was no exception and the average citizen paid the price, having no redress for that which the Guardia expropriated from them or their homes. As Somoza's guard alienated more of the civilian population, they evolved into a distinct social caste. The deeds they exercised were merely an extension of traditions grounded in the cultural past. The Military Caste System A major flaw of U.S. foreign policy has been a failure to recognize the heritage of Central American armed forces, and the military organization's contribution to violence and complex political issues. The power vested in the Nicaragua Guardia National, complicated pressures by the U.S. to force Somoza to end or modify his repressive style. Professor Richard Millett, analyst of Nicaraguan politics, succinctly describes Somoza and the National Guard: They are plagued by conflicting and often contradictory trends, a situation which consistently frustrates the efforts to control the power which they possess. The armies are a bulwark against Communism but at the same time, their corruption and abuses of human rights provide invaluable propaganda and recruits for the radical left. Deeply rooted in regional history and tradition, the military is also one of the most modern institutions in each nation. Highly dependent on external support, it is also strongly nationalistic and even xenophopic. 3/ An enduring concept, surviving from 18th century Spanish colonialism, was that of "fuero militar" which provided exemption of armed forces members from the jurisdiction of civil courts. It was this principle which gave rise to the military and emergence of Somoza's National Guard as an elite class. Military service provided an opportunity for individuals to gain power, superior positions, and to advance personal interests without regard for civil law. This process was facilitated as officers gathered immense wealth through corruption, and surrounded themselves with loyalists who were given a "share of the pie." This was accomplished with relative civil immunity. Those Nicaraguans abused, notably the poor and Indian populations, had no recourse for legal grievances. The colonial emphasis on class also nurtured a patron-client relationship between officers and men, a relationship which exists today among many Latin American armies. Instead of soldiers being loyal to civil officials or their nation, they were loyal to local commanders. Commanders controlled pay, discipline, promotion, and participation in schemes of graft and corruption. Officers who revolted against government authorities could, therefore, count on the support of their subordinate commanders and men. In order to win military allegiance, governments were forced to negotiate with officers who controlled considerable power bases. Officers, frequently from prominent families, became in reality armed partisans of the power in party, and assured perpetuation of family interests. 4/ Elite sectors of the society also wooed their own military allies, influencing them through family ties and promises for key positions in new governments. The "Coup de Force" became the normal means of transferring power in the national sector, rather than by civil means such as elections. To the poor and disenfranchised, this meant replacement of one repressive regime with another just as repressive. Incorporated into Central American struggles was the philosophy gained from the American Revolution -- that any people had the right to choose their own government. Independence and liberty became the cry of Latin America as nations revolted to free themselves from Spanish and Portuguese domination. New governments were, in part, copied after that of the U.S.. While neither endorsed full pluralism, the distinctive difference in Latin America was the influence of "fuero militar" into political struggles of the region. An Era of Intervention Internal conflict in Nicaraguan history facilitated foreign intervention. With revolutions fomenting, and imminent loss of Spanish colonial rule in the early 19th century, there was a loss of the external stabilizing force that tended to keep the elites and their armies at bay. By 1838, chaos and interregional power struggles erupted between the principal Nicaraguan cities of Leon and Granada. Historically, the conservatives or aristocrats were associated with the cultural center at Granada, while the Liberals of Leon represented the successful middle classes of artisians and businessmen. The strong Catholic church hierarchy considered the people of Leon as culturally inferior and sided with the leaders of Granada. The Catholic church as one of the most stable institutions of society, continued to play a primary role in power struggles. The church served as a vehicle of appeal for the influential as well as for mobilizing popular support for various causes. Strife bred strife, and interest groups pitted their private armies against one another until power disputes were resolved. 5/ The British, who had maintained a protectorate over the Miskito Indians on the Atlantic coast, took early advantage of internal strife and sought to consolidate a position in Nicaragua which was considered the key to Central America. Of no less importance was the objective of dominating the potential interoceanic transit routes between the Caribbean and Pacific via Lake Nicaragua. Such a passageway offered the prospects for exploiting the still vast wealth of Meso -- and South America, securing new trade routes to a world that was rapidly growing smaller, and bolstering economies at home through colonization. When the British seized the mouth of the San Juan River, the eastern leg in the transisthmian route, the United States reacted strongly. They too had an interest in a canal as the 1840's saw the frenzy of the California gold rush and expanionist fever for extending America to the Pacific coast. To diffuse a potentially volatile situation and avoid confrontations resulting in war, a negotiated settlement was reached in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850. Both signators agreed not to unilaterally colonize Central America or dominate any transisthmian canal route. 6/ This settlement was to demonstrate U.S. interests in the hemisphere which were outlined in four key points of The Monroe Doctrine of 1823: (1) The American continents were not to be considered as subject for future colonization by European powers. (2) The European political system was different from America's system and any attempt to project the European system into the Western Hemisphere would be considered dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States. (3) The United States would not interfere with any existing colonies or dependencies of European powers. (4) The United States had never taken any part in the wars of European nations in matters relating to themselves, nor does it agree to in the future. 7/ Even while negotiations are proceeding between Secretary of State John Clayton and Sir Henry Bulwer, an American transportation company headed by Cornelius Vanderbilt sought its own agreement with Nicaragua for use of a Nicaraguan route to transport Americans to California gold fields. Through intensive business struggles and competition, Vanderbilt's Accessory Transit Company gained about one third the business ferrying passengers by a system of steamers and coaches. In 1853, control of the company was secured by rivals and U.S. Marines were landed at Greytown to protect the transit company's property. The next year the U.S. minister was attacked, and Nicaraguans refused to provide an apology and reparations. The U.S. Sloop "Cyane" was dispatched and shelled the Caribbean coast town of Greytown. Marines were again landed to destroy the remaining buildings. Tensions between the U.S. and the British also continued to escalate as foreign interference and interregional warfare became the dominant theme of Nicaraguan domestic politics. The British generally supported the Conservatives and the Americans -- the Liberals, as both became entangled in Nicaraguan political struggles. In 1854 the Liberals, who had been unsuccessfully trying to unseat the Conservatives, enlisted the help of U.S. soldier of fortune William Walker. Walker enjoyed delusions of becoming the President of Central America, and enticed by funds and generous land grants, he formed a small force of Americans to come to the aid of the Liberals. 8/ He landed, and after initial military setbacks, Walker took Granada. He gained additional followers and to the dismay of the Liberals, entered into a coalition government with Conservatives, establishing Patricio Rivas as head of a puppet government while really manipulating the strings of power himself. He encouraged foreign investment and exploitation of Nicaragua's resources. In July 1856, Walker declared himself President after holding a farcical election. Walker became a threat to all parties and was probably responsible for the first display of Nicaraguan "nationalism," -- all directed against him. Both the Liberals and Conservatives, opposed him. Vanderbilt opposed him when Walker sided with rivals of the Transit Company. The British opposed him as a means to curb U.S. influence. Other Central American countries and the U.S. finally opposed him fearing that Walker's plans to annex regions of Central America as new slave states, would thrust the area into unmanageable conflict. Walker and his army were defeated eventually at great cost through the efforts of Vanderbilt, the British Navy, and the combined forces of all of Central America. 9/ As morale and strength of alker's troops dwindled, a U.S. ship sent to Nicaragua to protect America interests dispatched more Marines and escorted Colonel Walker and his remaining followers to ships which returned them to the United States. Walker attempted twice more to take over Central America, late in 1857 when he was thwarted by U.S. Naval forces, and in 1860, when after he surrendered to the British Navy, he was promptly turned over to Honduran authorities and shot. The Walker affair and mounting business ventures to exploit Nicaragua were to provide a basis for long-lasting suspicions of U.S. intervention and regional interests. Decline of passengers and revenue, along with the completion of a railroad in Panama, caused the eventual closing of the transit business in 1868. Nonetheless, negotiations for a canal route continued and became intense as the French vied for the same business interests. A rumor that U.S. Marines would land to reopen the canal route caused alarm and Nicaragua and Costa Rica submitted a joint petition to place their nations under the protection of England, France, and Sardinia. Eventually, in 1868, a new treaty was ratified but U.S. interest in the canal had diminished by then. 10/ No doubt reconstruction of a nation recently torn by Civil War was a more pressing matter. The face of Nicaraguan politics was soon to change again. Associations with William Walker and U.S. intervention caused the Liberals to lose public favor. The Conservatives ascended to power and ruled until 1893 in relative peace. The British still maintained an influence in the Miskito Coast and there was an effort to revive a Central American Federation. In the 1880's, the major disturbance was an Indian uprising in the Matagalpa region. This resulted from conscripting Indian labor to expand telegraph lines, construct roads, and provide the labor pool for other modernization projects. The rebellion was quickly crushed and the Conservatives, generally pro-clerical, blamed the agitation on Jesuit priests who were subsequently expelled. U.S. interest in the canal project revived and the Freylinghuysen-Zavala Treaty of 1884 was concluded. This treaty expanded previous agreements and provided for joint Nicaragua-U.S. ownership, a perpetual alliance and a military guarantee of Nicaraguan territorial integrity. Although Nicaragua ratified the treaty, President Chester A. Arthur inexplicably withdrew it from Senate consideration in 1885. Roberto Sacasa succeeded to the presidency after the death of the elected incumbent in 1889 and by his own election in 1891. 11/ Zelaya - Champion of Nationalism In 1893, Liberals under the leadership of General Jose Santos Zelaya, took advantage of dissidence among Conservatives and a rather long sixteen year dictatorship resulted. Zelaya was a champion of Nicaraguan nationalism and used whatever tyranny necessary to keep himself in power. Censorship of the press and social injustices persisted and anti-U.S. attitudes were increasingly fostered. Zelaya's efforts for a Central American Federation failed despite pacts with Costa Rica and Honduras, and abandonment of Britains claims to the Miskito region. Zelaya did, however, enjoy popular support because of his pursuits to modernize Nicaragua. Among significant reforms were: Abolition of the death penalty Amnesty to captured insurgents Separation of church and state Freedom of religion and free secular education Government financing of schools and education for Nicaraguans abroad Increase in production of export commodities of coffee, bananas, timber, and gold which brought capital to the economy. 12/ Zelaya also was the first to attempt modernization of the military. In the 1890's, a military academy was established and staffed primarily by foreign officers, notably German and Chilean. New technology of the 20th Century and weapons such as the machine gun, demanded that officers acquire expertise in the full time profession of conducting war. A detailed set of regulations (The Ordenanza Militar) was developed for the organization and employment of the armed forces. Another important requirement in the professionalization process, and a key to social mobility, was a literacy program for the troops. General officers were also required to master subjects ranging from mathematics and military statistics, to geography. Appointment to high rank, however, still smacked of the old colonial and cultural influences. Strong men emerged who had the support of cronies and armed partisans. 13/ Despite conscription of peasants, the army still achieved a marked degree of effectiveness as it suppressed any opposition through exile, imprisonment, torture and murder. Human rights violations were prolific, but as long as these were targeted at rebellious opposition or those considered socially inferior, there was no excitement in the regional or international community. There was no instant media impact by which opinion might form powerful moral pronouncements. The U.S., like most other nations, considered economic and strategic interests a higher priority than human rights issues in countries distant from its borders. Zelaya's expanded power seemed to pose a threat to U.S. regional influence and Zelaya's contention that Washington should keep out of Central America's business, fanned the coals of future conflict. Further deterioration in relationships was to occur when President Teddy Rosevelt and lobbyists convinced Congress that a Panama Canal was in the U.S.' best interest. This was a letdown to Nicaraguans and was to have far-reaching consequences on future U.S.- Nicaragua relations. With rumors that Nicaragua was attempting to negotiate its own canal with Japan or Britain, and Zelaya's increasing opposition to U.S. presence in Central America, an era of U.S. intervention loomed on the horizon. In 1909, U.S. Marines were landed at Bluefields ostensibly to protect U.S. property and lives, but in reality to show support for General Juan Estrada, who rebelled against the Zelaya government. Two American demolition experts working for the rebels were executed and Secretary of State Knox broke relations with Nicaragua. Fearing U.S. wrath, Zelaya resigned and his appointed successor, Dr. Jose Madriz, attempted to continue the conflict against the Conservative rebels. U.S. presence prevented his success and after failing to gain British support, Madriz resigned and was replaced by General Estrada. The U.S. promptly recognized this new puppet government and special agent Thomas Dawson was dispatched to assist in government reorganization. A coalition engineered by Dawson lasted only several months. Personal and political rivalries prevailed and with pressure from General Luis Mena, his Secretary of War, Estrada resigned and turned the presidency over to his vice-president. The United States continued efforts to reorganize the finances of the country, arranged for $15 million in loans from two New York banks, and established customs receiverships. Plans also included moderinzation of the railroad and reorganization of the police to maintain civil control. Saber-rattling of aspiring generals and their followers threatened all these projects as factions led by Liberal General Mena and Conservative Party Leader General Emiliano-Chamarro vied for the presidency. The U.S. came to the aid of the Diaz government in August 1912. Over 2,700 U.S. Marines and sailors landed at Corinto and Bluefields. General Mena was forced to withdraw and the Liberals were finally driven out of Leon. Another Liberal force commanded by General Benjamin Zeledon offered more stubborn resistance until eventually, a joint force of Marines and Nicaraguans subdued his army, captured and then executed Zeledon. U.S. Marines - The First Occupation For the next two decades, Nicaragua was to experience direct U.S. intervention and occupation by U.S. Marines. From 1912 to 1925, called the first occupation, the country had a series of Conservative presidents. The government of the U.S. and Nicaragua enjoyed a symbiotic relationship. The Conservatives who lacked sufficient military forces of their own, needed the U.S. for backing, and the U.S. needed the Conservatives who Supported U.S. presence and business interests in their country. Important negotiation during this period concluded in the Bryan-Chamorro treaty which provided for: - Exclusive U.S. right to build a canal in perpetuity - Ninety-nine year renewable leases for military bases in the Gulf of Fonseca and Corn Islands for payment of $3 million Since the Panama Canal had now opened, the U.S. treaty ensured that no one else could seek designs on a competing route through Nicaragua. El Salvador and Costa Rica appealed to the Central American Court of Justice over the issue of U.S. naval bases in areas they had long contested with Nicaragua. By ignoring the court's decision in these countries favor, the U.S. undermined the judicial system it helped create. This was only one of many instances where regional and local agreements served nothing more than noble rhetoric. They were effective only if enforced by a powerful military machine. The U.S. essentially dominated the scene with the control of banks, customs receiverships, and the presence of the "machos" (he-men), U.S. Marines. 14/ During the 1920's, the U.S. sought to upgrade the professionalism of Central American armies and to establish non-partisan constabularies trained by American instructors. It was expected that a disciplined force could replace the armies tainted by corruption and local oppression, thus removing principal contributors to social turmoil, disorder and financial disorganization. The U.S. also wished to eliminate foreign influence, principally German and Bolshevik, from seizing opportunities to exploit the corrupted Central American armies. The Guardia Nacional was created in Nicaragua, trained by U.S. Marines, and was to become a dreaded symbol of interventionist policies. U.S. Marines - The Second Occupation U.S. troops were withdrawn in 1925, with the assessment that the propped up government was stable enough. Shortly after withdrawal, Conservative factions in historical fashion returned to internal power struggles, and the Liberals again seized an opportunity for rebellion. Washington rallied to the ailing government and the Marines returned. A truce between the Conservatives and Liberals was engineered and a free, U.S. supervised election was provided for in 1928. Liberal Jose Maria Moncada won the election, but the United States continued to dominate Nicaraguan affairs applying leverage through the American Embassy, military presence, control of money supply, railway, custom houses, and the U.S. trained Guardia. 15/ General Augusto Cesar Sandino - Folk Hero Earlier, in 1927, one Liberal General, Augusto Cesar Sandino, refused to accept the political arrangements proffered by the United States and retreated with his men to the mountains of Nuevo Seqovia. Sandino had formulated his own ideas and opinions about Nicaraguan politics. Driven by fervent nationalism, he supported rights for indigenous Indian populations, land reform and establishment of peasant cooperatives. His goal was to rid Nicaragua of U.S. domination and to eject the foreign military, the Marines. Sandino declared Moncada a traitor and on July 16, 1927, attacked the Marine outpost in Ocotal. This was the first of many classical guerrilla actions lasting until 1933. The mountain and jungle fighting was extremely frustrating for the Marines. Sandino quickly adapted to a hit-and-run type warfare and gained much popular support in his desire to prevent further "imperialistic" aspirations of the U.S. The war was a ostly one that could not be won militarily. Sandino had captured the hearts and mind of the people, and with few exceptions, the Marines and government were ineffective in fighting an unconventional war. Public opinion at home was mounting against continued occupation of Nicaragua. The Marines hard drinking, brawling, womanizing, and especially their ability to fight, earned both the disrespect and fear of many Nicaraguans. The aerial bombardments of suspected guerrilla strongholds and forced resettlement of the poor, increased support for Sandino, whose guerrilla activities and strength fluctuated. In 1933, he continued to elude defeat even at the hands of some of the most famous Marine Corps tacticians. The Marines finally departed after training a fairly effective and disciplined Guardia Nacional in charge of protecting the Sacasa government. Somoza - Vestige of U.S. Marine Presence The command of the Guard was left to Anastacio Somoza Garcia, who with his family, was to systematically plunder, degrade, and agonize the Nicaraguan people until 1979. As a staunch U.S. ally and rabid anti-communist, he would be tolerated. Considered a vestige of the Marine intervention which allowed his accession to power, Somoza, his Guardia, and U.S. policy would become despised by Nicaraguans. This ill-will would sow the seeds of future insurrection. Immediately after the Marines departed in 1933, the undefeated Sandino ceased hostilities and entered into an agreement with the Sacasa government. In this agreement were provisions for amnesty for him and his men. Sandino was recognized as a threat to Somoza's base of power and had to be eliminated. It is interesting to note that Sandino was honored by a special resolution at the 1928 Sixth Congress of the Communist International in Moscow. Moscow viewed Sandino as a patriot fighting against the forces of "imperialism." Sandino, however, avowed that he owed no debts to any foreign ideology and declared his distrust of communism. For the Marxist-Leninist of the 1979 revolution, he would be remembered for his guerrilla victories, and his disdain for U.S. intervention. 16/ Somoza worked hard to consolidate his power as commander of the only military force in Nicaragua. A system was devised that required citizens to pay bribes to engage in any activities, legal or otherwise. Many of Somoza's men, extended their own influence into vice such as gambling, prostitution, and smuggling. Because of the Guardia's power and infusion into Nicaragua politics, Somoza successfully rigged the 1936 election and became President. Somoza became astute in his political dealings with the U.S. He generally received backing because of his anti- communist stand and his obsequious support of U.S. foreign policy. In exchange for his loyalty, Somoza was granted Lend-Lease funds to modernize the Guard and perpetuate his power base. There was growth in exports markets as well as development of an economic infrastructure primarily because of U.S. banking interests. Economic wealth, however, was distributed only to the family and privileged cronies of Somoza. It is estimated that Somoza added $50 million to his personal wealth during his tenure. The plight of the common Nicaraguan remained a festering sore, a reminder that the dictatorship survived only because of U.S. support. 17/ The Second Somoza In 1956, as he was manipulating another campaign to ensure his fourth presidential term, Anastacio Somoza Garcia was assassinated. His oldest son, Luis, U.S. educated and President of the Congress, filled the vacancy. Luis' younger brother, Anastacio, head of the National Guard, seized and imprisoned any opponents who might have offered resistance to his brother's succession. During the next decade, democracy was just a convenient fascade to ensure consolidation of greater power and wealth. Ffor four of these years martial law was imposed. For those Guardia officers and men associated with the vast Somoza enterprises, there always remained the opportunity for "extra income." Strong opposition still existed, but rebellions by outspoken critics and youthful university nationalists were easily crushed. The most serious confrontation for the Somozas was the adversarial role of the new Castro regime in Cuba. Castro had attempted to topple the Somoza government and was training Nicaraguan students in Cuba for that purpose. Several uprisings failed, but Somoza retaliated by lending Nicaraguan support for the U.S. sponsored "Bay of Pigs" invasion which was launched from Puerto Cabeza on the Miskito Coast. Castro in turn encouraged the formation of a new elitist guerrilla organization, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberacion - FSLN) in 1961 which was to spearhead popular uprisings in 1978 and 1979. The FSLN's original founders included two avowed Marxists, Tomas Borge Martinez and Carlos Fonseca Amador. Fonseca chose the term Sandinista to signify both indigenous Nicaraguan tradition and hatred of U.S. interventionism. The Third Somoza - The Last Marine Somoza responded to these subversive activities by declaring a state of seige which helped consolidate power, censor the press, and increase his counterinsurgency capabilities through U.S. assistance. Luiz died of a fatal heart attack in 1967, but true to form and with the powerful Guardia behind him, Anastacio "Tacho," gained the presidency through another rigged election, a hallmark of Nicaraguan politics and power transferral. During his first term (1967-1972), Anastacio relied heavily on his military power. The principles and abuses of "militar fuerar" were rampant. "Militar fuerar" was demonstrated time and again as Guardia officers who perpetrated crimes against civilians were exiled with full pay and allowances, or remained immune from prosecution. The constitution was amended at Somoza's insistence in order for him to succeed himself "legally." Tacho's true motives reflected those of his family predecessors, using public office to make himself one of the richest men in the world. He, his family, and friends owned most of the major industries, and over 20%. of the arable land. His holdings by 1972 were estimated to be at $300 million. 18/ A severe earthquake in Managua in 1972 killed 10,000 people, devastated the city, and left thousands homeless. He turned this national disaster into short-term personal advantage. The National Guard was allowed to sell the international relief supplies that streamed in and to loot and plunder the devastated city. Somoza and his associates awarded business contracts to themselves for reconstruction, financed predominantly by international relief funds. Emergency housing funds were used to build luxury homes for National Guard officers, while the poor received sub- standard wooden shacks. Somoza declared emergency taxes, but exempted himself. Somoza provided all the incentives necessary to alienate the people, further drive young people to join the FSLN, and encourage some elite and business sectors to financially support the FSLN guerrilla movement to topple Somoza. After a spectacular FSLN raid in December 1974, which was a personal affront to his dignity, Somoza declared martial law and unleashed his Guard to root out the terrorists. Arbitrary imprisonment, rape, summary execution, torture and extensive pillaging were the tactics used against the Nicaraguan people. Somoza's flagrant abuse of human rights was observed by Catholic and Protestant missionaries and as a result became a subject for the international press and hearings before the House of Representatives Sub-committee on International Relations. Human rights violations became a focal point of international relations in 1977 for the newly elected U.S. President, Jimmy Carter. Military and humanitarian aid was used as an enticement by the U.S. for Somoza to modify his dictatorship to acceptable levels of tolerance. Somoza responded by lifting press censorship, the state of seige, and ordering the National Guard to stop terrorizing the peasants. During July of 1977, Somoza suffered his second heart attack and was evacuated to Miami where he remained for one-and-a-half months. Many hoped that he would die. Others pondered the political future of Nicaragua as Somoza's aides began looting the national treasury. Upon his return, Somoza was forced to purge his own political household. The free press La Prensa carried vehement charges of corrupt government, chipped away at the regime's popular image, and gave encouragement to the opposition. FSLN attacks on Guard outposts increased and a group of prominent citizens appeared, known as "Los Doce" (The Twelve). Comprised of professionals, businessmen, and clergy, this group called for a national solution and an end to the dictatorship. Assassination of La Prensa's editor, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, precipitated a final 18 month offensive in what the opposition called "a war of national liberation in which an externally created dictatorial system supported almost exclusively by a foreign trained personal army, was overthrown by all classes." Somoza was simply "the last Marine." 18/ The two week strike that followed was 80-90% effective, but the Guard, which could not afford to lose its sponsor, was able to hold out despite more spectacular raids and attacks by the FSLN, intermittent labor strikes, and civil uprisings in urban areas. An Indian prising in a Masaya neighborhood was countered with 2 tanks, 3 armored cars, 5 50-caliber machine guns, 2 planes, 2 helicopter gunships, and 600 heavily armed men. 19/ The lightly armed people were easily defeated and their homes were completely destroyed. Somoza remained determined to complete his term which expired in 1981. The U.S., realizing the serious circumstances that Somoza now confronted, tried to ameliorate the situation by promoting elections. These actions were viewed as manipulation by Nicaraguans who already sensed a victory was near. A private letter sent by President Carter, congratulating Somoza on his promises to improve human rights, infuriated the FSLN which concluded that they had misjudged the U.S.'s waning support for the dictator. On 22 August, a daring raid was launched on the National Legislative Palace, led by Eden Pastora. Twenty- five FSLN guerrillas impersonating the elite guard of Anastacio III, Somoza's son, burst into the palace and immediately seized 1,500 hostages, mostly legislators and bureaucrats. Intense negotiations netted the FSLN $500,000 ransom, safe passage, release of 59 political prisoners, concessions to striking health workers, and a humiliating defeat for Somoza. Pastora, who took the "nome de guerre" of "Commandante Zero" because of the number 0 on his dog tags, became the national hero of the revolution. Massive acts of defiance were triggered within a restless population that saw Somoza's power easily challenged. Nonetheless, the Guardia fought ferociously and with vengeance, bombarding and strafing insurgent cities. Government forces moved in for "mop up" operations. Males who were of fighting age and thousands of non-combatants were summarily executed. Sensing that the end was near, Somoza and his associates began liquidating assets and a capital flight commenced that was to leave the treasury depleted. U.S. support had been withdrawn, and arms sales frozen, despite arguments by Somoza's U.S. friends that Cuban-backed communists were about to defeat a long-time ally. The Final Offensive The FSLN prepared itself for one final offensive, enlisting several thousand young men and women, mostly students from urban areas. They were armed with light western weapons, purchased on the international arms market with funds donated by sympathetic Latin American countries, notably Panama, Venezuela, and Cuba. Finances for arms also came from the social democratic parties of western Europe, leftist groups in the U.S., and undoubtedly from Soviet bloc and other revolutionary governments. 20/ In June 1979, barricades were erected in poor neighborhoods and Somoza`s control gradually shrank as the FSLN systematically overran National Guard outposts throughout the provinces. With the prospect of near certain defeat of Somoza, the U.S. proposed to the Organization of American States that a peace keeping force be sent to Managua. This was unanimously rejected and the U.S. began dealing with the FSLN which had declared itself the Provisional Government of National Reconstruction. The U.S. proposals for the FSLN to include "moderates," members of Somoza's Guard and party were flatly rejected, and the U.S. was forced to accept Somoza's inevitable and total defeat. Arrangements were made to fly Somoza to Miami on 17 July. On 18 July, the provisional junta took the oath of office in Leon, and on 19 July, greeted by enthusiastic supporters, the new government marched into Managua. The following day, they celebrated their unconditional insurrectionist victory and pledged to restore democracy and freedom to a war-torn Nicaragua. The events of the next four years demonstrated that the revolution was not yet complete, but a beginning of greater crises yet to come. Somoza's violent finale came just a year later. His net worth was then estimated at $600 million. 21/ After his escape to Miami, he settled into a palatial estate in Asuncion, Paraguay with his mistress of 18 years. One morning his chauffer-driven Mercedes was attacked by bazooka and machine gun fire, and Somoza was assassinated. An Argentine revolutionary group was implicated. In the streets of Managua, people danced and rejoiced. 22/ NOTES Chapter Two: A Tortured History 1. Henry A. Kissinger. Cover Letter to Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, commonly referred to as the "Kissinger Report." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Executive Dept., 10 January, 1984. 2. Ibid., p. 12. 3. Richard L. Millett. Guardians of the Dynasty. (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books 1977) p. 198. 4. ____________. "Praetorians or Patriots? The Central American Military" in Central America, Anatomy of a Conflict. Ed. by Robert S. Leiken (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984) pp. 69-70. 5. Ibid. 6. Thomas W. Walker. Nicaragua, The Land of Sandino. (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1982) pp. 10-12. 7. The Monroe Doctrine as outlined in Encyclopedia Brittanica. 15th ed. vol. 12. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980) pp. 388-389. 6. Richard L. Millett. "Historical Settings" in Nicaragua: A Country Study. Ed. by Rudolph. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1982) pp. 11-12. 9. Walker, p. 14. 1e. Millett, A Country Study. p. 14. 11. Ibid. 12. Walker, p. 16. 13. Millett, Guardians, p. 21. 14. _________. A Country Study, pp. 19-20. 15. Walker, p. 21. 16. Millett, A Country Study, p. 28-9. 17. Walker, p. 28. Any figures of Somoza family wealth are estimates at best, and probably exaggerated by Walker. There is no doubt, however, that all the Somozas were immensely wealthy from their monopoly of Nicaragua's industry. 16. Ibid, p. 34. 19. Ibid, p. 35. 20. Millett, A Country Study, p. 52. 21. _________. p. 58 and Walker p. 43. Net worth of the last Somoza range from $100-500 million, with total capital flight from Nicaragua at $1.5 billion. Logically, much of his wealth was in land and business holdings that could not be liquidated. 22. "Somoza's Violent Death." Newsweek, 29 September, 1980. pp. 34-36. CHAPTER THREE: A COG IN THE WHEEL OF SOVIET HEGEMONY On 13 May, 1983, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives issued a report which concluded that Cuban and Nicaraguan insurgents had escalated aid to leftist guerrillas in Honduras with massive Soviet bloc support. El Salvador, Guatamala, and Costa Rica were also targeted for revolution. The explicit goals of these actions were to consolidate control of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua and, through politically motivated violence, to exacerbate demands for more democracy, social justice, and economic development. Under this guise, extreme leftist groups might be brought to power in Central America. 1/ Several weeks earlier, on 27 April, 1983, in an address to a joint session of Congress, President Reagan declared that: The national security of all the Americas is at stake in Central America. If we cannot defend ourselves there, we cannot expect to prevail elsewhere. Our credibility would collapse, our alliances crumble, and the safety of our homeland would be put at jeopardy. The potential for crises in Central America was recognized as early as 1954, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower believed that Latin America would become a battle- ground against communism. In documents recently declassified as part of the State Department's series "The Foreign Relations of the United States," Eisenhower was quoted as saying to his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, that "you must think of our policy in Latin America as chiefly designed to play a part in the Cold War against our enemies. ... Russia would shortly step into any vacuum if we allowed one to develop in Latin America. The United States is not merely doing business in Latin America, but is fighting a war there against communism." 2/ Two decades later, a senior U.S. military advisor to Nicaragua would assess in his debriefing report that the threat of communist insurgency was minimal in Nicaragua, but that the dominance of General Somoza and his family in all the country's functions ranging from economics to politics, misuse of authority by the National Guard officers and men, monopoly of reconstruction jobs and contracts by Somoza after the earthquake of 1972, and a potential pool of insurgents among university students and construction laborers, constituted all the volatile ingredients necessary for an insurgency. The only significant insurgent group at the time was considered to be the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN). "They were poorly organized, lacked leadership, and appeared to have little external communist assistance." 3/ The briefing officer's assessment underestimated the FSLN completely. On July 19, 1979, Eisenhower's prophetic insight was to be borne out again and suddenly another "Cuba" had arrived in the hemisphere. The victorious Sandinista revolutionaries were in power in Managua, and they had deposed the most long-lived dictatorship in the history of Latin America. The Sandinista ideology had grown around cult hero General Augusto Sandino. The name and the myth surrounding this man signified blind patriotism and a guerrilla stalemate against U.S. Marines in a 6 year Vietnam-type war. In 1959, a group of students, long frustrated at their inability through legal means to rid the country f the Somoza dynasty, turned their efforts towards insurrection. The organization was called Frente de Liberacion Nacional (The National Liberation Front). It was their Marxist leader, Carlos Fonseca Amador, who added "Sandinista" as previously mentioned to stress both indigenous Nicaraguan tradition and a strong position against United States intervention. The Three Tendencies The Frente Sandinista de Liberacion (FSLN) was officially founded in Honduras on the symbolic date of July 26, 1961 (the eighth anniversary of Fidel Castro's attack on Moncada Barracks that launched the Cuban Revolution). 4/ The Sandinista National Liberation Front was to wage several unsuccessful guerrilla battles in the 1960's against the guardians of Somoza's dynasty, the National Guard. In the 1970's, the FSLN concentrated its efforts on organizing the peasants and with "land for the poor" as one of its platform objectives, began to rally support. There were three distinct factions or tendencies which formed the FSLN. The Prolonged Popular War tendency had its roots in "Che" Guevara's "foco" theory which initiated revolutionary movement through the armed action of a rural guerrilla vanguard. This movement essentially mimicked the rhetoric and tactics of the Cuban revolution to mobilize the masses. Because the foco theory had essentially failed in Latin America due to its predominant rural emphasis, Fonseca modified the military strategy slightly. He theorized that war should still be fought primarily in the Nicaraguan countryside and mountains, but logistical support must be provided from the cities. In the beginning of the 1970's, the Proletarian tendency evolved as a novel Marxist faction. Its leaders had received their ideological foundations in Chile during the Allende years. Their theories favored a total break with western centers of capitalism, and movement of revolution from the countryside to the city. Proletariats would be organized from the Nicaraguan working class and the rural proletariats from the cotton fields of Leon and Chinandega, the only regions where rural proletariats rather than peasants existed in Nicaragua. Between the ideological divisions of the Proletarian and Popular War Tendencies emerged the "insurrectionist tendency" or the "tercerista" (third way) faction. This tendency was more pragmatic and envisioned a gradual transition to socialism, incorporating a broad concept of class alliances including middle-class businessmen and professional groups. Without the catalytic Fidel Castro advocating the unification of the three tendencies, and the efforts of Panama's Torrijos and Carlos Andres Perez, social democrat and former president of Venezuela, a unity of effort might not ever have been achieved. 5/ The new coalition came to a basic agreement for a broad political program and developed a unified military strategy and command structure. Thousands of men, women, young boys and girls barely in their teens, allied to the cry of "Sandino," and with the concurrent tactics of guerrilla insurgency and massive labor strikes, Nicaragua became paralyzed. The retaliatory and indiscriminant bombings and excessive counterattacks that left 50,000 dead and 100,000 homeless, 6/ were not sufficient deterrents to a people who desired the platforms of the Sandinista Party. These were democracy, development and transformation of the economy, improved social welfare programs, and the rights of sovereignty and self-determination for Nicaraguan people. A Revolution Betrayed The betrayal of the revolution of 1979 which led to the dominance of a Marxist-Leninist regime is attributable to three primary causes. Ffirst was the history of U.S. interventionism and endorsement of pseudo-democratic governments backed by strong military factions. Second was the insensitivity of U.S. policy makers to chronic sociological and economic problems in Nicaragua. And the third was the adroit manner in which the Soviet Union has assessed the U.S. self-created "vacuum in the region and fostered promotion of its own strategic interests. The Soviet projection of power moved from subtle to crude power plays using Cuba and now Nicaragua as linch pins in their efforts to hegemonize the Caribbean region and undercut the strategic "backdoor" of the United States. This has been accomplished by fomenting wars of national liberation to free "the long suppressed masses," infiltration of the Catholic clerical heirarchy, and radicalization of small political bases among revolutionary leaders who were to become major proponents of isolating Latin America from the U.S. and its western allies. A review of Soviet strategy and pragmatic communist doctrine is appropriate to analyze historically the Sandinista rise to power, and the employment of Cuban and other Soviet aligned Third World governments to achieve Soviet objectives. U.S. Vital Interests in the Caribbean On the grand scale of strategy, the Soviet aim in the Caribbean region is to achieve both a military and economic balance of strength over that of the United States. The increased presence of Soviet might, utilizing Cuban surrogates as recently as Grenada, illustrates an attempt to establish and consolidate footholds in a region vital to our welfare. This is to be accomplished while U.S. power concentration is in the mid-East and western Pacific. The vitality of the entire region lies in the crossing of the sea lines of communication (SLOC) and aerial-skyways of transport and resupply (ASTAR), as well as other vital checkpoints through which critical logistic supplies of petroleum and minerals, and U.S. military forces must pass in order to quickly respond to global crises. The Soviet goal is to restrict, and eventually cutoff these air and sea routes. An analysis of the logistics make-up of items traversing the SLOC and ASTAR will readily make their importance apparent. The United States depends upon foreign sources for over fifty percent of the thirty-two minerals essential for industrial and military applications. Also, the U.S. imports over one-third of its oil supplies. Control of the Caribbean and Central America are critical for protection of logistic pipelines. Arabia and Africa have been described as the petroleum pump for oil resources, the Indian Ocean and Atlantic Ocean as the sea hoses of communication, and finally the Caribbean and Central America as the nozzles for the petroleum l feline. 7/ The limited number of entrances and exits to the Caribbean make t a closed continental sea. The Caribbean basin is encirc ed by the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, the Virgin, Leeward, Windward and Grenadine Islands on the eastern edge. North, Central and South America complete the perimeter. The Panama Canal currently remains the only passage to the Pacific. It has been described as the juggler vein of the region. The Greater Antilles grouping of Puerto Rico, Hispanola, Jamaica and Cuba dominate the ocean basin and also form a barrier between the continents of North and South America. The Mona, Windward, and Yucatan channels provide north and south routes through the chain to the Americas, while the straits of Florida and Santaren passage, provide outlets from the Gulf of Mexico to the Atlantic. To the east and south of the Caribbean Basin lie Mexico and Venezuela, major world oil producers. The petroleum super tankers of the Mid-East, Alaska and Ecuator pulsate through the Caribbean and Antilles channels. Additionally, the Bahamas, Virgin Island, Trinidad, and Curacao-Aruba have ports where the super tankers emanating from the Persian Gulf, transfer their petroleum to smaller tankers before further transport of Gulf and Atlantic coast refineries. The Panama Canal also is a critical key for U.S. energy supply as both Alaskan crude and oil from Ecuador are transported through the canal or pumped overland through The Republic of Panama to augment the present volume. In perspective, approximately seventy-five percent of all U.S. oil imports are either produced on the shores of the Caribbean Basin, or transit its straits or periphery. The power that controls the region and Central America, could easily interdict and cutoff the U.S. petroleum pipeline. As previously indicated, strategic minerals essential for high technology defense and industrial systems also pass through this vital region. Examples follow: Mexico and Brazil are significant suppliers of manganese (the U.S. imports 97% of its requirement). Guatamala possesses large nickel reserves and became a major supplier in 1978 (the U.S. imports 76 percent). The major U.S. supply of bauxite (93 percent is imported) is mined in the Caribbean nations of Jamaica, Haiti, Surinam, Guayana, and The Dominican Republic. Much of the iron ore critical for the U.S. steel industry originates from Brazil and Venezuela, and like petroleum must transit the chokepoints and passageways of the Caribbean. 8/ The current revolutionary upheaval in Meso-America, and specifically Nicaragua and neighboring El Salvador, is no coincidence; it is a blatant projection of Soviet and Cuban power. Such a strategy mandates that the U.S. assume a permanently increased defense burden in a time of burgeoning national debt, or compels already overcommitted forces to the regions closer to our borders. This could only occur at great expense, and by reducing important commitments elsewhere in the world. In addition to petroleum and strategic minerals, approximately fifty percent and forty percent of total shipping tonnage for European and East Asian scenarios respectively, would also have to pass through the Caribbean Basin. The exportation of communist- inspired insurgency from Cuba and Nicaragua, poses significant problems to our security interests, and if such a threat is not countered, would further serve to demonstrate U.S. impotence. The Kissinger Panel summarized our direct national security interests in the American- Caribbean region as preventing: -- developments which would require commitment of large resources to defend our southern approaches -- threats to our Caribbean SLOC's -- increased violence, dislocation of Meso- Americans, regional repression generated from Marxist-Leninist regimes -- further erosion of the U.S.' ability to influence events worldwide as perceived from our impotence to solve problems close to home. 9/ Six Lessons of Communism for Nicaragua 10/ Historically the Soviet strategy has been developed through trial and error application since the 1930's. The lessons of revolutionary warfare have been reduced to six fundamental principles. A general review of Sandinista actions since 1979, corroborate a similar scheme in Nicaragua. I. While the middle class can be manipulated to gain power, it is only by revolutionizing the masses that Marxists can maintain power. The Sandinistas expanded their powerbase rapidly in the mid-to-late 1970's period with wide popular support. Their revolutionary movement promised extensive political, military, social and economic changes. After 1979, these changes were made suddenly and with significant short term success with which the masses could identify. The Robin Hood bravado of expropriating the goods of the rich, notably Somoza's and his families properties, to feed, clothe, and house the poor, served to radicalize the popular base even further. The middle class-liberals, social democrats, conservatives, church hierarchy who were all manipulated to assist in he overthrow of Somoza, were quickly edged out after the revolution and proved to be no match against what had become a disciplined, organized communist cadre. The masses continued to observe tangible results while being inculcated with massive doses of revolutionary propaganda. The literacy program, implemented predominantly by 2,000 Cuban teachers, served not only to teach people how to read, but cultivated and nourished an anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. attitude. Agrarian reform, National food and health services programs, though positive and initially effective, all carried the unmistakeable mark of developing loyalty to the one-party system of the Sandinistas. II. A Marxist-Leninist nation in Latin America such as Nicaragua must reduce economic dependence upon the U.S. and integrate economically with the Soviet Union or other communist bloc countries. After July 1979, Fidel Castro counseled the Sandinistas that they should modify this tenet and trade with industrialized democracies to ensure the safety and success of the revolution. From his own mistakes in Cuba, Castro essentially derived Lenin's dictum that "the capitalists will fight among themselves to sell us the rope to hang them with." 11/ Castro experienced, as would Nicaragua, the difficulty delivering promises of prosperity for the-poor in a war-torn economy, particularly when much of the expertise in the industrial and business sector had fled in the face of state appropriation, or to escape the consequences of prior associations with Somoza. While Nicaragua is still very much dependent upon U.S. and other western markets, its goal has been to achieve solvency through trade with other Third World countries, especially those countries that are pro-soviet. This strategy has been facilitated to a great extent by U.S. economic warfare and an embargo of Nicaraguan goods. The U.S. reduced by 90% its sugar import quota from Nicaragua and redistributed it to other ailing Central American countries friendly to the U.S. Although the January 1984 embargo of meat from Nicaragua 12/ was under the pretense of carcinogen contamination, it is another element of U.S. strategy to constrict Nicaragua's economy. In response to the U.S. sugar embargo, the governments of Algeria and Iran agreed to off-set these actions and to purchase more than the amount embargoed and at higher prices. It is also estimated that 25% of goods such as sugar and coffee, find their way to the Soviet Union while these products are rationed in Nicaragua. 13/ Although the economic outlook is precipitous at best, foreign credits from sympathetic governments, rescheduling of almost $3 billion in debt, and expansion of trade with anti-western countries will assist in reducing dependence on U.S. trade. But it will be a long struggle that will require Nicaraguans many years of "tightening their belts" for the sake of the revolution, and promises that will never be fulfilled. III. A socialist state in Latin America cannot expect help from the Orqanization of American States (OAS) and any appeals should be made directly to the United Nations where the Soviet Union sits on the Security Council. Nicaragua has consistently ignored the OAS forum as a means to solve regional conflicts or to protest the U.S. backing of Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries working out of Honduras. The OAS, criticized as being too "U.S. oriented," has experienced a gradual erosion in its influence and has been ineffective in voicing the concerns of its thirty-one member nations. Nicaragua bypasses the OAS and uses the more sympathetic United Nations arena to capitalize on USSR backing. Here it castigates the U.S. for interventionist and subversive activities. This elevated attention serves to further polarize the crisis into an East-West confrontation, and alienate world opinion against the U.S.. Meanwhile, the Soviets smugly sponsor wars of national liberation by both direct and surrogate means. Although the U.N. Security Council is the primary means for Nicaragua to gain international recognition and legitimize their revolution, another group has evolved to the status of neutral mediator. The Contadora group (taken from meetings on the Panamanian resort isle of Contadora and composed of Mexico, Venezuela, Panama, and Columbia) is seeking to become the power broker in negotiating or encouraging bilateral and multilateral agreements to avoid further turmoil in the region. The political clout of this group rests in the primary fact that both Mexico and Venezuela are major suppliers of U.S. oil and wield considerable influence. Also, Panama and Columbia play significant roles in maintaining a secure trans-isthmian canal. The relative stability of these nations and their quasi-independence from U.S. domination, also lend credibility to Contadora's "neutral" status. The resurgent interest in reviving the effectiveness of the OAS body will be viewed merely as an opportunity for the U.S. to renew its historically manipulative influence in the affairs of Central and South America. The Soviets will strongly insist that the Sandinista government continue the "status quo" to further enhance Soviet strategic goals. IV. Political rights should only be exercised by the com- munists, and a dictatorial one-party system must be established to eliminate any opposition. The Sandinista platform also contained promises of a pluralistic government, a new constitution, and free elections after the takeover. As previously stated, the revolution had the support of many broad factions. The government initially installed by the FSLN reflected the pluralistic, multi-class representation of the revolution. The cabinet included FSLN militants, Christian democrats, Liberals, Conservatives, and representatives from the Catholic hierarchy. The Junta of National Reconstruction also reflected a diverse range of interests -- militants Daniel Ortega Saavedra and Moises Hassan, author-educator, Sergio Ramirez Mercado, prominent businessman, Alfonso Robelo Callejas, and the wife of martyred La Prensa editor, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. Despite the diverse character of the new government, the only real power was the nine-man directorate of the FSLN party. All other groups were politically dwarfted by the FSLN which continued to gain support from the profileration of "popular organizations" that were established in every hamlet and neighborhood in the country. Among the ass organizations were the Sandinist Youth, the grass-roots Sandinist Defense Committees (CDS), the Sandinist Workers Central (CST) which would soon dominate industry and labor unions, the Rural Workers Association (ATC), and the Luisa Amanda Espinosa Association of Nicaraguan Women (AMNLAE). The Nicaraguans never had such freedom of association or participation in government organizations and while membership swelled, the FSLN continued to consolidate, propagadize, and further radicalize their one-party system. The FSLN dominated the television and radio networks, operated the national newspaper Barricada while allowing the independent La Prensa to publish, but only under restrictive censorship rules which would not tolerate government criticism. Among the elements of pluralism that remained were the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), representing owners of 60% of the economy that had not been nationalized after the revolution, the Social Christian Party, the Conservative Democratic Party, and the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement. Collectively, these groups commanded as little as 20% of the popular support. COSEP did retain some political leverage because of its influence over the private sector. COSEP's existence was in reality spared because the FSLN had neither the means nor the technical expertise to nationalize any greater amount of property than what was seized after the revolution. As early as six months after the overthrow, however, COSEP members were wary of further encroachment by the Sandinistas into economic decisions and deliberate FSLN attempts to dilute their power. In I980, COSEP withdrew from the Council of State and began drawing smaller organizations into a non-Marxist coalition critical of Sandinista initiatives. The Sandinistas countered by reviving their own pre- revolutionary coalition, and by directing attacks at any opposition, forcing many to flee and others to remain, stripped of any political means to voice their dissent. The completion of this lesson is still underway in Nicaragua although militant dissidents and social reformists still seek options for a pluralistic form of government 14/ V. The Church must be infiltrated and stripped of its power, discredited, or won over to eliminate a rallying point for anti-communists. The Sandinistas manipulated the church to accomplish revolutionary goals and now continue to capitalize on the most liberal elements of both Catholic and Protestant denominations to influence world opinion. The various churches achieved unity in the struggle to topple Somoza and to end the corruption of his National Guard. Participation by Christians ran the gamut from those who joined the FSLN and the armed struggle for radical change, to those who sought non-violent solutions. There were communists and anti-communists, both united in their single cause. The Catholic church had strongly denounced the abuses of Somoza. The most vehement protests came after the 1972 earthquake when mass relief assistance intended for homeless victims, was confiscated by the government and appropriated for Somoza's and his associates' personal profit. The church became a haven of refuge during the massive destruction caused by Somoza, and because of the church's outright criticism, it too came under attack and reprisal. Numerous priests and nuns supported the guerrillas and some took up arms themselves. The role of the church had begun a gradual transformation since the Vatican Council of Pope John XXIII in 1962, which called for a socially active dimension to minister to the needs of the poor. The church had long been criticized for its patronage to the elite in Latin America, while ignoring the oppressed and downtrodden. Out of this movement was to evolve "liberation theology" to counter the economic assault of the poor, i.e., low standards of living, and on an ideological level, to articulate the dignity and rights of the indigent and oppressed minorities. Liberation theology called for the active participation by Christians to correct these social ills. Unfortunately, this movement attracted radicals with an insurrectionist bent for violence. Many of the Catholic hierarchy, profoundly influenced by Marxist thought, translated this into armed struggle by leading guerrilla movements or by endorsing wars of national liberation. Those radical extremists, considered Christianity and Marxism as mutual vehicles to cultural and political revolution. Nestor Paz Zamora, a Bolivian student involved in the guerrilla movement in his country Proclaimed: Greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends ... . That is why we take up arms to defend the illiterate and undernourished majority from exploitation by a minority and to give back dignity to the dehumanized person. 15/ Another proponent added that: There can be authentic development for Latin America only if there is liberation from the domination exercised by the great capitalist countries, and especially by the most powerful, the United States of America. 16/ In Jose Miranda's book, Communism in the Bible, published by Maryknoll, the foreign missionary service of the American Catholic Church (and source of many clergy under Marxist influence), the author states that Jesus Christ was the first Sandinista, an avowed communist, who as a hardened revolutionary engaged in revolutionary activity, was executed for sedition. His revolution collapsed because it was a "communist island in an economic sea characterized by exploitation of the poor." 17/ Among the first events staged by the Catholic hierarchy after the revolution were church masses to celebrate Somoza's overthrow. At least two dozen clergymen accepted key positions within organizations or ministries, and other important government posts. Father Miquel Escoto Brockman, a Maryknoll priest, Father Ernesto Cardenal Martinez, a Trappiest Monk, and Franciscan Father Edgardo Dorrales Castillo received ministerial posts. A subsequent directive issued from Pope John Paul II in 1980 and a pastorial letter by Nicaragua's bishops in 1981 called for their resignation. Their refusal led to a compromise that allowed the Marxist priests to continue in their governmental positions but they were not allowed to perform the Sacraments. The church became divided over the issues of the revolution, and opposition led by Archbishop Miquel Obando y Bravo, charged that the government was manipulating religious sentiment, denigrating religious education, and moving away from the pluralistic objectives originally espoused by the government of National Reconstruction. Priests and Protestant clergy critical of the Sandinistas have been deported, maligned, and have had religious services disrupted by Sandinist supporters. The overall effect of continued repression has been to divide the church and undermine the popular support and power base which it formerly enjoyed. This has been accomplished not without extensive support from leftist interest groups in the U.S. VI. The old army must be liquidated and replaced with a Red Militia. Somoza's National Guard was quickly dismantled. Many former Somoza loyalists fled the country to avoid retribution for the atrocities they had committed. Some formed the nucleus of counter-guerrilla groups to wage hit and run operations against the new "de facto" government. Summary executions were common if captured Guard members could be associated with atrocities, torture, and murder committed during their tenures. Others were linked to the military operations that were overreactions to FSLN guerrilla activities before the fall. These operations, mostly indiscriminant reprisals by the Guard, resulted in 50,000 civilian dead, 100,000 wounded, and over 150,000 homeless or orphaned. The jails soon swelled to 11,000 persons, mostly Somoza supporters and National Guard. 18/ During the final days of war before the victory, the Sandinista strength grew exponentially as urban insurgents liberated weapons from surrendering guardsmen. Although this army was largely untrained, it provided a base from which police and emerging service organizations could be mobilized. During the first year, undisciplined adherents were weeded out. The remainder became politically and socially indoctrinated supporters of the Sandinista revolution. 19/ Throughout 1980, these rebel and urban militia were transformed into an official armed forces. Military advisors from Cuba, the Soviet Union, European Bloc Countries, and other revolutionary governments provided technical expertise to complete this transformation into an FSLN army. The armed forces were comprised of three branches -- the Sandinist Popular Army (EPS) of approximately 25,000 strength, the Sandinista Police (PS), comprised of several thousand urban police officers, and a lightly armed volunteer force of about 100,000 civilians in the Sandinist Popular Militias (MPS). A thorough program of political education was implemented in all branches. The ultimate control of all decisionmaking and policy formulation was vested with the National Directorate which was the collective leadership of the FSLN. The FSLN Directorate consisted of nine members who were the senior veterans of the revolution. A three-man military committee was formed consisting of Tomas Borge, Commander of the Revolution, Humberto Ortega Saavedra, Minister of Defense, and Luis Carrioni, Vice Minister of Interior. Borge rose to preeminent power as the most influential of this group whose mission was responsibility for all military affairs. Figure 3-1 depicts organization, command and control of the Nicaraguan armed forces. Forces are moved freely within this command structure depending upon the mission or perceived threat. The unifying factor, however, is that the military force is totally dominated by the FSLN to ensure that the one-party revolutionary government remains in power. Lesson number six was accomplished in consonance with communist doctrine and Nicaragua emerged with a red militia. Once this was concluded, the stage was set to tip the balance of strength in the region through a massive weapons buildup. To avoid greater visibility and insulate itself from negative world criticism, Cuba was used as the Click here to view image major instrument by which the Soviets would ply its strategies in Nicaragua, and export future revolution to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. Moscow has openly professed that its efforts in Nicaragua have been successful in promoting anti-western attitudes with a long range goal of creating pro-Soviet satellites. 20/ The Militarization of Nicaragua The flow of arms has steadily upgraded Nicaragua's defensive and offensive capability. (See Figure 3-2 - Major Arms Routes.) Sophisticated weaponry is passed to leftists in El Salvador and Honduras. At Somoza's height, he commanded less than 12,000 ill-equipped troops, supplied mostly with older vintage U.S. arms and a proliferation of weapons purchased from the international arms market. Today the characteristic weaponry in Nicaragua is distinctly Soviet. Currently, over 5,000 Cuban, Soviet and East European military advisors, coupled with Soviet military aid which exceeds the total U.S. military aid to all Latin America countries combined, has placed Nicaragua in a position of overwhelming military superiority over its neighbors. 21/ Tanks and fighter aircraft had never before been dominant in the region. Now, arms flow through Cuba (from USSR) at three times the volume of arms shipments in any year preceding the 1979 revolution n Nicaragua. Estimates are that the Soviets are providing ten times the military aid to Cuba and Nicaragua (65,000 tons by 1981) as the U.S. is providing to all of Latin America and that Soviet advisors in Cuba and Nicaragua out number U.S. military advisors twenty to one in the Caribbean region. 22/ Such massive build up and aid has been an incentive for extreme left unity and has provided for an increase in communist unsurrectional activity. The chronicle of events and activities that follow, serve to demonstrate a Click here to view image legitimate recognition of concern and a rallying point for U.S. resolve to counter the strategic threat at our borders. February 1982. Soviet ships delivered 270 mili- tary vehicles to the Nicaraguan port of Corinto, raising the total Soviet bloc truck inventory to more than 1,000. April 1982. Four Soviet heavy tank ferries, one small patrol boat, and 12 BM-21 mobile, multiple rocket launchers were delivered. The tank ferries provide Sandinista forces an offensive water-crossing capability, to rapidly reinforce insurgent successes in El Salvador across the Bay of Fonseca, to support forces by traversing either Lake Managua or Lake Nicaragua, or even to boldly interject forces against Costa Rica, which has no army. The rocket launchers provide fire power capabilities unparalleled in the region. Mid-1982. Evidence of increasing military construction activities, such as a new garrison for Soviet T-54/55 tank battalion outside Managua, completion of two new infantry battalion garrisons and commencement of another around Managua to assist in fortification of Managua. Overflight photos depict that all installations possess layout designs similar to Cuban garrisons or those constructed by Cuban engineers in other countries. Mid-1982. Cuban Defense Minister Raul Castro visited Nicaragua with a high level military delegation. Soon thereafter, 2,000 Cuban construction workers were dispatched to commence military projects. November 1982. An additional 25 T-54/55 tanks were delivered by a Soviet bloc ship. This occurred shortly after Defense Minister Daniel Ortega's visit to Moscow. Also, to enhance the Sandinista Army's mobility, the Soviets supplied MI-8 helicopters, AN-2 aircraft, and BTR armored personnel carriers. December 1982. Eight new 122mm howitizers were delivered to augment the 12-152mm guns delivered in 1981. Total estimates of both howitzers is over 100. December 1982. Initial deliveries of sophisti- cated electronic gear commenced, including a high frequency/direction intercept facility similar to ones installed in Cuba. The purported application of this equipment is to intercept signals throughout Central America and to keep tabs on Honduran military communication sites and troop movements. Additionally, there has been improvement of lines of communication and logistic routes by construction of a road between Puerto Cabezas on the Eastern Coast and the interior to facilitate the flow of Cuban supplies to Sandinistas operating in the troubled northeast border area. 23/ The above information was part of a massive education campaign that began in March of 1982 to heighten public awareness of the Nicaraguan buildup. A host of former high level officials from Secretaries of State and Defense, to defense policy analysts, considered data presented by the Reagan administration as "highly convincing." From the thirty-six new military installations built during the previous two years since the revolution, to lengthened airstrips capable of launching MIG-21 and MIG-23 aircraft, the message was extremely clear -- Nicaragua had become an anti-western fortress. (See Figure 3-3.) Much of the information gained by the U.S. intelligence agency was via U-2 over flights, an activity that had been greatly reduced in Latin America because of CIA budget constraints. Other data were secured by electronic- intelligence gathering equipment aboard Spruance-class destroyers posted off the Nicaragua Coast. Intelligence information was corroborated with infrared and side-looking radar-satellite photography as well as CIA operatives within Click here to view image Nicaragua. The intelligence effort has been aimed at tracking arms shipments to El Salvador through the Gulf of Fonseca, to pinpointing Sandinista and Salvadoran command and control facilities near Managua. Agents on the ground have confirmed the presence of Cuban and Soviet advisors at these facilities. 24/ Not only has there been a gradual increase in weaponry, but also the enhancement of technical sophistication of equipment. For air defense, the Sandinistas have received large stockpiles of shoulder fired SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles, four barreled ZPU-4 and 37mm anti-aircraft guns, with anticipated shipments of larger Soviet anti-aircraft missiles and guns. Of even graver concern to U.S. intelligence analysts is the lengthening of runways which can accommodate Soviet MIG- aircraft. Pentagon officials have feared the arrival of a MIG squadron which would give Nicaragua the most powerful air fleet in the region. Over 80 Sandinista pilots have been trained in Bulgaria and there is speculation that the aircraft are staged in Cuba. The advent of such aircraft would provide the leftist regime another means to intimidate its neighbors and Honduras, whose 24 F-86's, A-37's, and French Super Mysteres, would be no match for the MIGs. 25/ In addition to outright grants from Soviet and Eastern Bloc countries, Nicaragua sealed a $17 million arms deal with France including ammunition, 100 rocket launchers, 2 Alouette-3 helicopters, two patrol boats, and 45 trucks. France had also offered to train an unspecified number of Nicaraguan Air Force pilots and Naval officers in France. 26/ Concurrently, hundreds of Nicaraguans are also being indoctrinated in Cuban and Eastern European military academies. PLO Connections Up to 50 Libyan and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) advisors are also assisting the Sandinista regime, with the Libyans providing maintenance on helicopters and small aircraft used in counterinsurgency operations. The PLO has been an active ally of Central American revolutionaries. As early as 1969-70, Sandinistas were fighting beside PLO comrades in the middle-East and receiving terrorist training in Algeria and Tyre. On 7 June, 1979, six weeks before the overthrow of Somoza, Sandinista press spokesman Jorge Mandi stated in Al Watan, a Kuwaiti newspaper: There is a longstanding blood unity between us and the Palestinians. Many of the units belonging to the Sandinista movements were at Palestinian revolutionary bases in Jordan. In the early 1970's, Nicaraguans and Palestinian blood was spilled together in Amman and other places during the Black September battle. It is natural, therefore, that in our war against Somoza we received PLO aid for our revolution. It was Fidel Castro who introduced the PLO into Latin America and supported their terrorist activities and training of revolutionaries. Since opening its first Latin American office in Havana in 1974, the PLO has cultivated ties with over half the regional revolutionaries. (See Figure 3-4.) Thomas Borge, Minister of Interior, has openly professed that he and other Sandinist leaders received PLO terrorist training prior to 1970. He also worked for Castro in the 1970's shuttling between Cuba and the Mid-East, using PLO assistance and Libyan funds to purchase arms for Central America's guerrilla movements. The PLO-Sandinista alliance was officially confirmed in Mexico City in February, 1978, when both factions issued a joint communique affirming ties of solidarity and united in their anti-Semitic hatred of the "Zionist state of Israel." 27/ Immediately following the victory in 1979, the PLO arranged for loans to support the new revolutionary government and a PLO mission was established in Managua. The Sandinistas refer to this mission as an embassy and the ranking PLO official is Click here to view image accorded full status as an ambassador. On the first anniversary of the Sandinista victory in July of 1980, not only were Fidel Castro and Soviet dignitaries present, but Yasser Arafat himself participated in the celebration as an honored guest. Thomas Borge stated that the PLO and Sandinista causes were synonymous, and Arafat is reputed to have responded, "The links between us are not new ... your enemies are our enemies." 28/ In April of 1983, Brazil detained 4 Libyan cargo planes that supposedly contained medical supplies. Because pilots could not produce cargo manifests, officials became suspicious and initiated a search. Discovered were 42 tons of mostly Soviet arms. Varied reports included 5 tons of U.S. made bombs, a light training plane, 8 Soviet anti- aircraft guns, 8 multiple rocket launchers, 2 dismantled jet fighters, wire guided missiles, rifles, achine guns, mortars, bazookas, and 90mm cannons. All these items were destined for Nicaragua. The seizure of the above weapons served to add "fuel to the fire" when President Reagan presented to a joint session of Congress a report outlining the arms traffic in Central America, much of which has been sketched previously. 29/ Cubans, Cubans Everywhere To further confirm the rapid build-up in Nicaragua beyond a defensive posture, Cuba sent its top combat commander, General Ochoa, to Nicaragua in June of 1983 to bolster the Sandinista government and promote Castro's revolutionary image in the Caribbean region. Ochoa, a close friend of Castro's, had received special training in the Soviet Union in 1976, and went directly to Angola, where Cuban forces were increased from 3,000 to 20,000 in defense of the Marxist Luandan government. In December, 1977, he was transferred to Ethiopia as head of Cuban combat and support forces and increased their strength from 2,000 to a strength of 17,000 men. Since 1981, he was in charge of military combat training in Cuba. His presence in Nicaragua is a strong indication that a similar momentum of force build-up, with Cuban aid, will continue there. Although estimates vary, in 1983, there were up to 8,000 Cubans in Nicaragua, a fact which the Sandinistas have not denied. Today they are engaged in not only military and security affairs, but there are also 500-700 doctors, and up to several thousand teachers involved in propaganda and literacy training. There are 1,000 construction workers, erecting bridges and facilities, and maintaining hydro- electric plants and state-owned telecommunication com- panies. 30/ Cuban Ambassador Julian Lopez is considered the most influential diplomat in Nicaragua, and policy makers in the U.S. fear that Cuba and Soviet entrenchment is so deep, that nothing short of a military solution will eliminate the Nicaraguan menace. Since the U.S. invasion of Grenada, little information has been publicized about the continuing arms build-up in Nicaragua. That data has remained classified. But the preponderance of evidence cannot be cast aside lightly and considered a massive misinformation program designed to support a muscle flexing administration. The threat is a cogent one and must be understood not as an isolated revolution of independence, but part of a larger scheme to control the entire region. It is an active war that is creeping northward. Our vital SLOC's and ASTAR's are threatened presently along with our critical petroleum and mineral supplies. The political, economic, and military strategies that the U.S. pursues or ignores in the next decade will determine the ultimate victor. If some successes are not achieved soon, this generation will be drawn into a conflict that will not only be at our borders, but will cross them. Some of the U.S. public has been misled into believing that the Sandinista revolution was grounded in a unique Nicaraguan nationalism rather than in Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Whatever the debaters may conclude, Nicaragua and its blatant militarization will remain an irrevocable reminder of a failed U.S. policy. In 1981, after realization that the revolution in Nicaragua had gone completely stale, the U.S. planned a three-fold offensive to regain lost influence. This included economic and political pressure, and CIA sponsorship of counter-guerrillas to destabilize the Sandinista government. This group would be called "contras." NOTES Chapter Three: A Cog in the Wheel of Soviet Hegemony 1. U.S. Departments of State and Defense. "Background Paper: Central America". (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 27 May, 1983) p. 1. 2. Jim Anderson. "Eisenhower Saw Latin Struggle on Communism." Washington Post. 4 January 1984. A-12. 3. K.E. Murphy, Colonel, U.S.A. "COMUSMILGRP Senior Officer Debriefing Report for Nicaragua" (RCS-CSFOR- 74) for the period 20 July 1971 - 20 December, 1973. Department of the Army Ofc. of Adjutant General HQDA Ltr. 525-74-13. (Washington, D.C.: 21 March 1974) pp. 1-4. 4. Frank Aker. "Tactics, The Theory and Practice of Revolutionary Warfare." Unpublished paper. Aker personal files Quantico, VA, 1983. p. 67. 5. Arturo Cruz Sequeira. "The Origins of Sandinista Foreign Policy," in Central America, Anatomy of Conflict. ed. by Robert S. Leiken. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984) p. 95. 6. Jan Kippers Black. "Government an Politics" in Nicaragua: A Country Study. ed. by James D. Rudolph. (Washington, D.C.: 1982) pp. 146-7. 7. Lewis A. Tambs. "Guatemala, Central America, and the Caribbean: A Geopolitical Glance." Senior National Security Council Consultant paper delivered to the U.S. House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Inter-American Affairs. (Washington, D.C.: 30 July 1981) p. 1. 8. Ibid, pp. 2-3. 9. Kissinger Report, p. 93. 10. Tambs, p. 2. Dr. Tambs analysis has been applied to The Nicaraguan Revolution. 11. Nikolai Lenin, as quoted by Tambs in "A Geopolitical Glance," p. 2. 12. "U.S. to Bar 14 Nations Meat." Washington Post, 28 December 1983. A-4. 13. "Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama." Quarterly Economic Review. The Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 1983, p. 11. 14. Walker, p. 41. 15. Nestor Paz Zamora, quoted in Esther and Mortimer Arias. The Cry of My People: Out of Captivity in Latin America. (New York: Friendship Press, 1980) p. 139. 16. Arias, p. 139. 17. Teofilo Cabestrero. "La Revolucion y los Cristianos: La Iqlesia Catolica en los 3 anos de Ia Revolucian. Translated by James and Margaret Goff. Amancer. (Managua) No. 10-11 - June-July, 1982) pp. 22-23. 16. Julian C. Heriot. "The Economy" in Nicaragua: A Country Study, p. 109. 19. Walker, pp. 93-96. 20. Soviet Military Power, 2nd edition (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, March 1983) pp. 87-90. 21. Alex Alexiev. Soviet Strategy in the Third World and Nicaragua. U.S. Dept. of State Contract Paper. (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, March 1982) pp. 7-9. 22. Fred C. Ikle. "The Three Elements of Our Caribbean Strategy," Defense 83. December, 1983, pp. 10-15. 23. "Background Paper," pp. 15-17. 24. "Taking Aim at Nicaragua." Newsweek, 22 March, 1982, p. 9. 25. "Nicaragua, A Whole New Universe," Time, 12 January, 1982, p. 36. 26. Guy Gugliotta. "France Offers Central America Another Choice." Miami Herald, 15 February, 1982. 9-A. 27. White House Digest, 20 July, 1983, pp. 2-3. 26. Ibid, p.5. 29. Richard House. "Brazilians Study Libyan Arms Cargo: Reports Vary on Contents," Washington Post. 26 April, A-14, and Michael Getler. "Grounding of Libyan Planes In Brazil a Tremendous Gift." Washington Post. 26 April, 1983, A-14. 30. "Cuba's Top Combat Commander 13 Reported Seen in Nicaragua." New York Times, 19 January 1983, p. l. CHAPTER FOUR: THE NOT SO SECRET WAR Night after night in Managua, Nicaraguans get the same two government television announcements. One provides detailed instructions on how to clean firearms and the other how to dig trenches and build bomb shelters. Between these announcements is depicted the reason for acquiring such skills -- a caricature of Uncle Sam carrying a carpetbag labeled "C.I.A." skulking across a map of Nicaragua. A baritone voice reminds the audience that it is the U.S. imperialists who are supporting the "Contras" or revolutionary forces against the Sandinista regime. 1/ One of the rationalizations for the Sandinista's massive defense buildup was that following a National war of liberation, there are always displaced factions that immediately seek to restore the old government which provided their livelihood through vice and exploitation. In December of 1981, congressional oversight committees were informed by the Central Intelligence Committee (CIA) that it was training a small band of about 500 Latins to serve as a strike force to harass the Marxist regime in Nicaragua. Sixteen months later, the ranks had swollen to 7,000 men and the CIA feared that control and the original purpose in the Contra's creation, i.e. limited objectives, might be replaced by a direct overthrow of the Nicaraguan government. 2/ The sudden growth of the guerrillas' strength, forced the U.S. to acknowledge at least tacitly, that it was carrying on a "not so secret war." The administration was to come under increased scrutiny, both congressional and public, for its controversial supporting role. In February 1984, after over two years of concerted fighting, the leaders of the "Contras" have been forced to curtail their military and political objectives. There were numerous attempts to seize a border area and declare a provisional government that would be recognized by conservative Central American governments and the U.S.. Hampered by logistic problems, internal strife, and surprising resistance, the Contras are re-evaluating their next strategy. The 1983 Christmas offensive was discouraging as the Sandinistas hurled 7,000 government troops at 3,000 counter-guerrillas who were attempting to carve out an enclave around the town of Jalapa in Nuevo Seqovia province. For the first time, the government troops used Soviet mobile multiple rocket launchers acquired during its massive militarization campaign. Also employed were large mortars, cannons, artillery, and mines in a display of firepower that is an omen for future confrontations. During the same week, RPG 2 rocket launched grenades, most likely supplied by Nicaraguans, brought down two U.S. helicopters in El Salvador. The sobering military might of the Sandinistas has forced the contra leadership to drastically reassess its objectives, and to concentrate on binding relations with their internal factions, a key cause contributing to military ineffectiveness. 3/ Contra Organizations The Contras are a loose, sometimes divergent coalition of U.S. backed insurgents who represent the grave robbers of a deceased Monroe Doctrine. They apply pressure on three Fronts. (See Figure 4-1.) Within this coalition are five factions, each with their own agenda, but loosely united for the purpose of ending communist domination by the FSLN in Nicaragua. The organization represents views of revolutionary, restorational, and reformist insurgents. The revolutionary insurgent seeks to mobilize the masses, generally victims of repression, and to radically transform the social structure into a new and centrally controlled regime. The restorational insurgent identifies with a recent regime, in this case the Somoza dictatorship, and represents elitist values and an obligarchic political structure, with minimal participation for the masses. The reformist insurgent is usually a member of a discriminated sector of society, for example, Indians, who seeks more political, social, and economic freedom without necessarily displacing the authority in power. 4/ Because organization is critical for an elite group trying to mobilize the masses, the divergent philosophies cutting across all five factions have served to confuse potential enlistees within Nicaragua and denied the Contras two key principles of warfare, unity of command and mass. The coalition is also Click here to view image confusing to would-be supporters and sympathizers external to Nicaragua. Initially, the Reagan administration characterized the Contras as a harassment and interdiction force. Their mission was to disrupt the exportation of arms to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador and to force the Sandinista government towards more pluralistic aims at the negotiating table. The Sandinists claim on the other hand, that the Contras are nothing more than displaced elements of Somoza's regime and Guardia. The FSLN uses this suspicion of lingering "Somoscisma" to justify a state of emergency and propagandize their cause. They also argue that the revolution was necessary to rid Nicaragua of the brutality and corruption that these factions represent. The "Contras," conversely, insist that the Sandinistas have betrayed all the promises of the revolution, and turned the country into a Soviet-Cuban client state. Nicaragua Democratic Force (FDN) Adolfo Calero is a rebel leader who sits on the seven- man directorate of the Nicaragua Democratic Force (FDN), the largest and most organized of the Contra factions. He stated: "We are fighting for the establishment of a Western- type democracy in Nicaragua ... . We're talking about a democracy without the Sandinistas in power. Sandinistas in power and democracy are opposites." 5/ The FDN was initially financed and encouraged by affluent Nicaraguan exiles in Florida, California, and elsewhere. While conclusive evidence has not been published, the fact that Somoza was buried in Florida after his assassination, that family members fled there, and that there are active training bases for Contras in Southern Florida, would lead one to believe that much of the wealth that disappeared from Nicaragua's national treasury is financing a significant portion of the counter-revolutionary activities. Within the FDN are two groups, the National Liberation Army (ENL), formed primarily from former members of Somoza's National Guard, and the Nicaraguan Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARN). The nucleus of the ENL began resistance fighting in 1979 after the revolution. A few hundred guardsmen who escaped before the final FSLN victory fled to Honduras and established a base at a refugee camp near Choluteca, about 20 miles from the border. They launched what they called "pinprick" operations against Sandinista border troops. One tactic was to fire from concealed positions on both Honduras and Nicaragua guards in hopes of starting a war. A communications relay system was set up between the two governments to avert a regional escalation of conflict. 6/ The guerrilla forces settled down in jungle camps in Honduras, close to the 500 mile common border with Nicaragua. The Sandinista junta gave this last group the name "Contras" or counter-revolutionaries, "the most derogatory expression in the communist book." 7/ The leadership of the FDN is comprised mainly of business and professional people whose property was seized or whose businesses were nationalized after the revolution. While there were members no doubt allied with the Somoza regime, there are many others (including Calero) who opposed the dictator and were incarcerated for their disageements. Today the composition is described as: freedom fighters, patriots from all political parties and democratic groups, thousands of Miskito Indians, former officers and enlisted men of the extinct National Guard, who never partici- pated or condoned the crimes of the Somocista dictatorship, and members of the Sandinista Popular Army and People's Militia who have joined us because they do not want to belong to the imposed communist tyranny. 8/ While no exact percentage of former Guardia members is known, the CIA attempted to purge main-line Guardia early on to rid the Contras of the Somoza stigma. 9/ The FDN is highly organized and its leaders travel freely throughout the U.S. raising funds, gaining public support, and providing lobbyist and congressional sub-committees the tenets of their counter-revolution. These principles and objectives are published as follows: I. Repudiation of any connection with the corrupt Somoza dictatorship. II. Adherence to the nationalistic and patriotic principles of the revolutionary hero -- Augusto Cesar Sandino, and refutement of communism as the vehicle for political expression of Nicaragua. III. Endorsement of pluralistic government and honest and free elections. IV. Creation of a representative provisional government, where all democratic groups will have a voice. V. Non-inclusion of any persons who have committed crimes or participated in the communist conspiracy in con- junction with Marxist-Leninist foreign "invaders." VI. A guarantee of human and civil rights. A review by jurists of civil rights violated in the confiscation of property and restoration of religious freedom. VII. Reestablishment of the autonomous character of universities and educational institutions at all levels in consonance with democratic traditions, cultural heritage, and fundamental national belief. VIII. Guarantee of free labor unions for laborers, skilled workers, and professional associations. IX. Revision of the Marxist agrarian reform program, granting provisional titles to farmers until permanent titles are issued, and an open market. X. A balanced national budget. XI. Recuperation of the national economy, through a policy of fiscal austerity and production incentives. XII. Diplomatic relations based upon mutual respect for national sovereignty, and respect for principles of non- intervention in internal affairs. An international policy based upon primary obligations within the inter-American Community of States, without effecting commitments to other countries and the United Nations. XIII. Municipal and national constituent assembly elections within a year that will provide a basis for establishing a new Nicaraguan Constitutional System. Assis- tance of O.A.S. and other democratic national sectors will be used to guarantee free and honest elections. 10/ On the 13th of January, 1983, the FDN published a widely distributed Peace Initiative which was essentially ignored by the Sandinistas. Outlined in it were proposals for general amnesty for dissidents, with full guarantees for rights as citizens, revocation of the National Emergency Law which places Nicaragua in a "state of siege," abolishment of repressive institutions, cessations of religious oppression, creation of a national army vice a one-party army, disbandment of the Sandinista Peoples Militia, drastic reduction in armament which is consuming a disproportinate amount of scarce national resources, separation of public administration from partisan political and ideological activities, establishment of free speech, free press, abolishment of all forms of censorship and state control of the media, and cessation of persecution and extermination of the Miskito population. 11/ The demands were many, particularly to come from a group of rebels who neither enjoyed the political solidarity nor the military might of the Sandinistas. In an effort to seize the initiative, the Sandinistas have loosened censorship restrictions on the only private press, La Prensa, although everything must be proofed by the Sandinistas before publication. There has been public admission of crimes -- excesses committed against the Miskito tribes relocated from their villages. Other Sandinista proposals for modifying their government, include elections in 1985, which will pose no problems as lack of any opposition strength will assure a Sandinista victory. The FDN now claims that it has more enlistees than weapons and estimates of its seize range from 10,000 to 17,000 including teenagers of both sexes. For now however, their problem still remains the Somoza stigma, and concern that elusive military successes will threaten future "covert" aid from the United States. Resupply problems and the new firepower of the Sandinistas make a military solution for the Contras appear highly remote. Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) The next most influential Contra group is the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) whose troops are led by Eden Pastora, the Sandinista hero of the 1979 revolution, and Alfonso Robelo, former moderate member of the Sandinista junta. Both defected because of increasing repression by the Sandinists and growing influence of Cubans and Soviets in governmental decisions. Robelo had formally been the head of COSEP (Consejo Superior de Ia Enpresa Private -- Higher Council of Private Enterprise) which was the umbrella oganization that linked the chambers of industry and commerce together. Robelo played a key role in the general strikes organized against Somoza in 1978, and after his overthrow, became one of the original five members of the Sandinista junta. Robelo left Nicaragua on 24 March, 1982, when he realized that total censorship of the press, FSLN ownership of most newspapers, radio and television stations, and restriction of any political disagreement offered no chance for emergence of democratic pluralism. The FSLN had tolerated Robelo's Democratic Coordinating Committee (MDN) as an outward show that pluralism existed, but only manipulated the organization and world opinion in the process. 12/ The other leader of the ARDE, Pastora, is perhaps the only person among all the various Contra factions that has any charisma. Pastora claims to be the true defender of Sandinista ideals and claims much support from within Nicaragua. Pastora and the ARDE, unlike the FDN, have avoided being closely associated with the Reagan administration and the CIA. Pastora would consider U.S. intervention as against the nationalistic aims of the revolution. Pastora had operated from a small camp outside the Costa Rican capital of San Jose, where he operated a clandestine radio station beaming anti-Sandinista propaganda into Nicaragua. The ARDE claims to have 2,000 - 4,000 members but could potentially draw from 20,000 Nicaraguan refugees who fled after 1979 and still reside in camps in Northern Costa Rica. Pastora's ultimatum to the Cubans in April 1983, was that they had 15 days to get out, or he warned them, "They will end up like all who have dared to interfere here; expelled or dead!" 13/ While the ARDE has resisted direct U.S. assistance, or ties to the FDN, reality has forced them to accommodate both in meeting their $600,000 monthly budget. The ARDE remains chronically short of funds and equipment and after a temporary suspension in military operations in 1983, resumed activities again with an infusion of aid from Israel, Columbia, Panama, Venzuela, and other South America and European groups. While ARDE has greater political credibility and associations with a more radical revolution, disagreements between Robelo and Pastora have weakened their unity. 14/ Neither is Costa Rica as receptive as Honduras to allowing the ARDE Contras to conduct their spectacular raids and then retreat into the sanctuary of Costa Rican jungles. Costa Rica, without an army, and with only a small police force, can ill-afford to invoke the wrath of the powerful Sandinistas. President Luis Monge has vowed to maintain Costa Rica's permanent neutrality in regional conflicts. To complicate matters, the Costa Rican attorney general's office filed homicide and kidnapping charges against all the leaders of the ARDE, including Pastora and his cousin Orion, Robelo, Brooklyn Rivera, and Jose Davila. This may be a reaction to increasing pressure and terrorist activities originating from the Nicaraguan embassy in Costa Rica, 15/ and a gesture to discourage an attack on Costa Rica in retaliation for Pastora's activities. While Contra activities have not been closed down completely, the Costa Rican government has severely restricted the ARDE. It is noteworthy to reflect upon purported Cuban efforts to promote negotiations between Pastora and the Sandinistas, possibly to weaken Contra efforts or further divide the ARDE and FDN. A discussion of Pastora's personality may offer some understanding why he may be subject to Cuban influence, and why his revolutionary motives are considered suspect. Pastora admits that his ideology is Sandinismo, or at least that it approximates social democracy. He also admits admiration for Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. He organized his own Sandino Revolutionary Front in 1959 and later gravitated to another group that eventually became the FSLN. After three prison terms and torture in Somoza jails, he left for Costa Rica. In 1976 he again joined the Sandinist movement, and after the 1979 revolution, he was passed over for top government and military jobs. Just before the second anniversary of the Sandinista victory, Pastora departed without saying a word. He left behind a letter which stated: "I am going to discharge my revolutionary gun powder against the oppressor in whatever part of the world in which he is found, without it mattering whether they call me Quixote or Sancho." 16/ Thomas Borge attributed Pastora's defection to ego and not ideology. When Pastora became the most beloved war hero of the revolution because of his daring raid on the Palace, an instant cult arose around him. After Pastora acquired world- wide fame, he wanted a position in the FSLN commensurate with his new found status. Because of what the Junta assessed as "personal limitations," Pastora did not get the job he wanted. Disgruntled, he said he would join the revolution in Guatamala. He defected and joined Robelo, who was strongly denounced by Pastora only a year earlier. 17/ Pastora's true motives remain an enigma. The ARDE's limited activities, internal dissent, and pressure from Costa Rica serve to nullify large scale mobilization from a southern front. That Pastora is perceived as a threat to the FSLN junta, however, remains a reality. In October 1983, a member of the Basque Terrorist Organization, [Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA)] was arrested in Costa Rica. He stated that he had been sent by Nicaragua to assassinate Eden Pastora and other exile leaders. 18/ MISURASATA The third major group of Contras is the MISURASATA (an acronym taken from Miskito, Sumo, and Rama -- three Nicaraguan Indian tribes, and Sandinista) a coalition of Indians and Creoles of about 2,000 strength that operates in the jungles of Northeastern Nicaragua. When the Sandinists toppled the Somoza dynasty in 1979, the main demand of the Miskitos on the isolated Atlantic Coast was for legal titles to their communal lands that they had occupied for hundreds of years. The revolutionaries were more interested in turning the Indians into party members. They attempted to integrate the 100,000 Miskitos too hastily into the larger population. Miskitos and smaller group of Sumos and Ramas, soon became disenchanted with the FSLN's national literacy campaign. They desired to learn how to read and write in English, their customary language, rather than in Spanish, which was initially taught. They rebelled against Sandinist efforts to supplant the authority of their native leaders. The Miskitos' leader was a young lawyer, Steadman Fagoth Muller. In an attempt to clear a neutral zone some 50 miles deep along the vulnerable Northeast border, the Sandinistas began forced evacuation of Miskitos, destroying between 25 to 40 villages, killing an estimated 200 inhabitants and evacuating 10,000 more. This was the Sandinistas first attempt to neutralize the Miskito minority which comprised some 4-5% of Nicaragua's population. 19/ The forced resettlement was designed to prevent them from providing food, shelter, and intelligence to the FDN operating from Honduran sanctuaries. As the population became more disgruntled with ideology taught by Sandinista volunteers and Cuban cadres, the FSLN became concerned about a separatist movement. Thirty-three Indian leaders were arrested including Fagoth Muller who was accused of being an official of Somoza's hated security apparatus. This move elicited strong reaction as 5,000 Indians occupied a town in northern Zelaya province for a month until their leaders were freed. Upon their release, Fagoth immediately fled to Honduras where he made contact with the FDN, and started beaming broadcasts to the Indians on the exiles radio. Initially, 200 Indians were provided training by the Honduran Army and by December, 1981, had already initiated their own independent attacks against Sandinista outposts along the border. Reprisals by Sandinistas have caused an exodus of as many as 15,000 - 20,000 Indians to camps across the border where they presently rely upon the FDN for military and logistics support and international aid agencies for basic sustenance. This organization, for all practical purposes, has been integrated into the FDN Contra network. 20/ Another Miskito group is led by Brooklyn Rivera, and is more closely aligned with Eden Pastora's radical ARDE. Because Riveria reportedly hates Fagoth, the MISURASATA effort is also inefficiently divided. Rivera's band of several hundred Indians, primarily work the Eastern Coast between the ARDE and the FDN. Another group of Contras, the Revolutionary Nicaraguan Armed Forces led by Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro, a former Sandinista general, splintered off the ARDE and has openly cooperated with the FDN in Honduras. Chamorro gained international attention in 1979, when he climbed to the top of Managua's Hotel International and initiated a one-man bazooka attack against the heavily fortified bunker personally belonging to Somoza. Alfonso Robelo states that Chamorro was expelled from Costa Rica and lost contact with the ARDE leadership. Chamorro's account is that he was "tired of Pastora mouthing off" and that Pastora and his men continue to display the Sandinista colors and sing their anthem (in which the U.S. as cited as being the enemy). 21/ Basically, at the close of 1983, the FDN remains the dominant group, with the ARDE and MISURATA - splinter group led by Riveria, playing out secondary rules and without a cohesive strategy. A liberal view is that support for the Contras has served more to produce negative domestic and international criticism of U.S. policies, than in curbing the militaristic growth of Nicaragua. In fact, the pressure cooker that they have been placed in, has allowed the Sandinistas extension of their state of emergency, curtailment of constitutional rights and censorship of the press. One European diplomat stated, "Sometimes I think they must be very happy with the attacks of the Reagan administration. ... It helps them justify their [totalitarian] policies." Jaime Wheelock, minister of agriculture, and another comandante of the Sandinist Party agreed that, "This sense of danger and tension has helped consolidate the revolution." 22/ On the U.S. home front, during November 1983, 20,000 persons marched in an anti-war demonstration in Washington, D.C. The demonstrators gathered outside the offices of Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Department of Human Services, the State Department, and finally the White House. They carried signs protesting U.S. support for anti- government guerrillas in Nicaragua and for the government of El Salvador. 23/ Collective U.S. strategies have not been without significant impact. Because of severe economic destabilization, harassment by Contras, and increasing internal dissension calling for more moderation, the Sandinistas proposed four security accords to the U.S. in October 1983. These were non-aggression treaties between Nicaragua and the U.S., between Nicaragua and Honduras, a broader non-aggression treaty to be signed by all Central America governments, and a draft accord to contribute to the peaceful solution of the armed conflict in the Republic of El Salvador. 24/ Three weeks later, the United Nations General Assembly adopted, by consensus, a resolution which called for an end to aggression against Nicaragua and condemned attacks launched from outside Nicaragua against the country's strategic installations. 25/ Congressional Limits on Cover Aid Resistance and debate in Congress to limit or abolish covert aid to the Contras has also been dynamic. Since 1974, members o Congress insisted on being informed about such intelligence operations. In 1980, new legislation was passed to centralize oversight responsibilities in both the Senate and House intelligence committees. This legislation called for the President to keep these congressional committees fully advised and currently informed of intelligence activities. As the "secret war" became more publicly visible, and it became apparent that the "Contras" sought total victory over the Sandinistas, members of Congress feared wholesale escalation as well as the long range impacts of regional and U.S. intervention. Edward Boland (D-Mass), Chairman of The House Intelligence Committee, attempted to limit chances for a larger war by attaching to the fiscal year 1983 intelligence authorization bill, a prohibition on any provision of "military equipment, military training or advice, or other support for military activities, for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras." 26/ This bill was finally passed as (Boland-Zablocki Bill - H.R. 2760 28 July 1983) to end U.S. covert operations and to authorize $38 million for FY83 and $50 million for FY84 for overt arms interdiction. Boland again proposed a rider bill with similar language for the intelligence authorization for fiscal year 1984, and the House again confirmed their opposition to covert aid. The Republican-controlled Senate sought a less stringent limitation of "Contra" actions -- "getting Nicaragua to cease exportation of revolution to its neighbors." A compromise was struck which approved $29 million for the administration to continue operations, with no statutory limit on objectives, and no back door funding -- until June 1984. Then the administration must ask for more. 27/ A primary factor in getting legislators to extend aid was the overwhelming positive response by constituencies after the invasion of Grenada, and the clear evidence of Soviet-Cuban involvement in the Caribbean area. 28/ In the final analysis, though, the CIA concluded that there are no circumstances under which the Contras can achieve either a military or political victory over the hard- lined Marxists. The Reagan administration has begun to explore other possible solutions that would provide amnesty for the "Contras." As a confirmation of at least other nations' support (in addition to the Contadora Group) to find alternative solutions, Argentina`s new democratically elected President, Raul Alfonsin, advised the U.S. that he was withdrawing advisors from the Contras. This alignment with other countries, critical of U.S. policy, is a clue that a regional settlement, coordinated by Latin American countries is a more desirable objective and more palatable to Central Americans. 29/ U.S. Presence in Honduras Heightened tensions between Nicaragua and Honduras, which continues to provide sanctuaries for the FDN and MISURASATA, are very real. Exacerbating this is the increase of U.S. exercises, notably Big Pine II (Ahuas Tara II), the construction and negotiation of U.S. military bases in Honduras, and the presence of 5,000 - 7,000 U.S. military personnel. It is generally believed that the Hondurans desire the Contras to stay because it not only bolsters their defensive capabilities along the southern border, but also insures U.S. support in case of a Nicaraguan attack. 30/ The biggest obstacle to success for the Contras remains the internal division and competition between the FDN and the ARDE. Without cooperation, there cannot exist the tactical advantage of employing multiple pressure points. While there is talk of mutual support, a wide gulf exists between the primary factions. There do not appear to exist any brighter prospects for resolution in the future. The Contras had gambled on a short and decisive war, a "knockout punch," to restore the revolution to its original goals. They worked very hard to win "the hearts and minds" of the people, especially the Indians and peasants. Using Mao Tse-Tung's Code of Conduct as their model, they were trained to respect people and property. All food and logistical supplies obtained from villages were paid for with cash. The Sandinista patrols on the other hand, took what they needed and gave receipts which are seldom honored. The Contras used psychological warfare methods to exploit discontent over the wrecked economy, repression, compulsory participation into cooperatives, conscription, and required attendance at political lectures held by the Sandinistas in respective neighborhoods. 31/ Frequent clashes between the Contras and Sandinista militias remained inconclusive, and no significant control over any provinces was achieved. The two-pronged offensive from Honduras and Costa Rica never materialized. That is where the Contras remain today, divided and waiting the outcome of a crucial 1984. The success of the Contras is invariably tied to continued monetary and logistical support from the U.S. But this is an election year, and the defeat of incumbent U.S. President Ronald Reagan may dash the hopes of the Contras for continuing any kind of large scale counter-guerrilla operations. In the meantime, training in Camp Cuba- Nicaragua in Florida continues, and Adolfo Calero stumps the U.S. in his three-piece suit, telling his story of a revolution betrayed, and keeping the hopes of a Nicaraguan democracy alive. NOTES Chapter Four: The Not So Secret War 1. Brenton R. Schlender and Gerald F. Seib. "Up in Arms, Resisting Pressure from U.S., Nicaragua Grows More Militaristic." Wall Street Journal, 31 May, 1983, p. 1. 2. Don O'Berdorfer. "U.S. Backed Nicaraguan Army Swells to 7,000 Men." Washington Post, 8 May 1983. A-11 3. "Anti-Sandinista Rebels Curtail Some Ojbectives." Washington Post, 20 February 1984. A-1, A-24 4. Bard E. O'Neill. "Insurgency: A Framework fro Analysis" in Insurgency in the Modern World, ed. by Bard O'Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980) p. 3. 5. Adolfo Calero, quoted in Washington Post, 8 May 1983. A-11 6. "Taking Aim at Nicaragua." Newsweek, 22 March, 1982, pp. 24-5. 7. Edgar O'Ballance. "The Nicaraguan Domino." Military Review, October, 1983, p.6. 8. Pronouncement of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force - Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense (FDN), delivered by Adolfo Calero to Ad Hoc Committee on Democracy for Nicaragua, Washington, D.C.: 19 July, 1983, p. 2. 9. Christopher Dickey. "Rebel Odyssey, Foes of Sandinistas Seek to Purge Somoza Stigma." Washington Post, 4 April, 1983. A-1, A-22. 10. Pronouncement, pp. 2-4. 11. Nicaraguan Democratic Force Peace Initiative, submitted to OAS and Junta of Reconstruction, Managua, 13 January, 1983, p. 1. 12. "Nicaraguan Resistance Leader Voices Optimism." Alfonso Robelo as quoted in West Watch, A Report on the Americans and the World. Council for Inter-American Security, ed. by Roger Reed. (Washington, D.C.: Inter- American Press, Vol. VI, No. 2, May 1983), 4 pp. 13. "Nicaragua's Zero Option," Newsweek, 18 April, 1983, p. 40. 14. Christopher Dickey. "Pastora Renews Battle Against Sandinistas in Nicaragua." Washington Post, 3 July, 1983. A-1, A-27 15. "Costa Rica Charges Pastora and Others in Killing, Kidnap." Washington Post, 3 December, 1983. A-13 16. "Commander Zero's Resolve." Chicago Tribune, 14 August, 1983. B-1 17. Tomas Borge, as quoted by Claudia Dreifus in "The Sandinistas" Playboy Interview. July, 1983. 18. Jay Mallin. "Basque's Arrest Embarrasses Sandinistas." Washington Times, 3 October, 1983. 6A 19. "Moving the Miskitos." Time, 1 March, 1982, p. 22. 20. Ibid. 21. Brenton Schlender. "Nicaraguan Exile Unites Feud With Each Other As Well As Sandinistas." Wall Street Journal, Vol. CCII, No. 18, 27 July, 1983, p. 1. 22. Wall Street Journal. Vol. CCI, No. 103, 31 May, 1983, p.1. 23. "20,000 Protest U.S. Intervention." Washing- ton Post, 13 November 1983. B-8 24. "Sandinistas Propose Four Security Accords to U.S." Washington Post, 21 October, 1983. A-1 25. Christian Science Monitor, 14 November, 1983, p. 1. 26. I.M. Destler. "The Elusive Consensus: Congress and Central America" in Central America, Anatomy of Conflict, p. 327. 27. Ibid, p. 329. 28. Joanne Omang. "Reagan Gains Bulk of Latin American Goals." Washington Post, 20 November, 1983. A-11 29. John M. Goshko. "Argentina Ends Contra Aid." Washington Post, 19 January, 1984. A-1 30. Fred Hiatt. "U.S. Plans New Latin Maneuvers." Washington Post, 2 February, 1984. A-1, A-23 31. O'Ballance, pp. 8-9. CHAPTER FIVE: OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE Formulating a national strategy to counter the direct Soviet challenge in Nicaragua is difficult. Any strategy must be dynamically derived. What really are U.S. vital interests? Basically they are defense of our homeland, U.S. economic well being, world order (favorable to the U.S), and promotion of American values abroad. The United States has a number of interests in Central America. Among the primary interests are preventing Central America and the Caribbean from becoming an armed base for the Soviet Union. Also, the protection of vital sea and logistic routes makes the security of the Panama Canal a key interest, as well as the security of the biggest domino to our South, Mexico. The U.S. has an interest in supporting the growth of democratic institutions in the region rather than military or revolutionary dictatorships. There is also an interest in earning the good will of the people despite thirty-four American military interventions in the Caribbean and Central America over the last ninety years. And finally, a significant interest which impacts upon our policy formulation is the issue of human rights. 1/ Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, articulated the three elements of our Caribbean strategy in the December issue of Defense 83. The underlying principles of the strategy are a continuation and stengthening of positive trends towards democratic institutions, economic and social betterment for the people of Central America, and prevention of Leninist totalitarian regimes (complete with Stalinist Police Systems and establishment of Soviet military bases) which become irreversible and export their revolutions. First, the United States desires to foster democratic and economic development by facilitating trade, and by providing advice and aid. The Caribbean Basin Initiative of the Reagan Administration was cited as an implementive example of this aspect of our strategy. Second, in order to accomplish the above, guerrillas with a "rule or ruin" strategy must be effectively neutralized. The guerrillas blow-up bridges, destroy schools, and key economic institutions and installations faster than U.S. economic aid can restore them. The stablized environment necessary for social and economic recovery, or the salvage and revitalization of the Central America Common Market cannot exist without defeating insurgents militarily. Ikle explicitly states the degree to which this is to be accomplished: We do not seek a military defeat for our friends We do not seek a military stalemate We seek victory for the forces of democracy. 2/ Sufficient military assistance must be allocated to defeat organized forces of violence that refuse to accept the democratic will of the people or allow establishment of internal systems that will ensure justice and personal political freedom. Third, the United States must prevent the disintegration of Central America into East-West spheres with one portion linked to the Soviet Union and the other to the U.S., creating further potential for hostile confrontation of military forces that could extend into the next several decades. Economic support, democratic development, and military assistance to the region must succeed in preventing the Sandinistas from further becoming an arsenal for insurgency and a haven for those exporting violence. If these goals cannot be accomplished, the U.S. must expect to see increasing use of violence and U.S. forces to halt Soviet hegemony. 3/ The Kissinger Report The timing of President Reagan appointing a special bipartisan commission to propose solutions to conflict in Central America was no coincidence. The U.S. was clearly losing. The C.I.A. concluded that the Contras could not win. Nicaragua continued to consolidate and militarize despite clandestine military, political, and economic pressures applied by the U.S.. Also, the army in El Salvador was suffering significant defeats at the hands of communist rebels. The one-hundred thirty-two page document recounts the tortured history of Central America, our neglect in policy, and the critical threat imposed by Soviet- Cuban influence in Central America and specifically, Nicaragua. The Commission openly acknowledges that the Sandinista government has made significant gains against illiteracy and disease, but that economic performance has been poor because of disruption caused by the revolution, world recession which more significantly impacts upon mono-economies (countries where two commodities comprise more than 50% of total exports), and mismanagement associated with Marxist- Leninist ideology. The commission also recognized that the history of U.S. intervention both military and private, from soldier of fortune William Walker to monopolies of fruit companies and banks, has profoundly colored the attitude of Central Americans. It has also fostered a perception of U.S. economic and political imperialism, despite significant technological, industrial, social and economic contributions to Latin America. A consensus was reached which considered that our moral and strategic interests coincide and in broad terms outlined those interests as follows: (1) preserving the moral authority of the U.S. (2) improving the living conditions of the Central American people (3) advancing the cause of democracy, broadly defined (4) strengthening the weakness of the hemispheric system (North and South) both socially and economically (5) promoting peaceful change, and resistance to democracy by terroristic forces (6) Preventing hostile forces from expanding on treatening our vital interests (oil, minerals, canal) (7) barring the Soviet Union or its surrogates from consolidating footholds in Central America. 4/ The above reiterates the strategy espoused by Under Secretary Hickle, but also recognizes a tradition of deep rooted social and moral deficiencies. In order for such goals to be successfully achieved, there must be total cooperation and assistance from non- governmental institutions and groups, businesses, voluntary organizations, churches and lay organizations, trade unions, agricultural sectors, peasant leaders and cooperatives. Implicit in such a sweeping and comprehensive strategy are some major problems. The Sandinistas have already capitalized on consolidating power in many of the special interest groups cited. And a dilemma in Nicaragua is what happens when confiscated lands, and businesses now turned into cooperatives or nationalized, become the subject of jurisdictional claims from former owners? Such ends are mutually exclusive and would be a threat to a recalcitrant Sandinista regime. The solution proposed is a buy-or-fight our way out strategy. The price tag is in excess of $8.9 billion over a 5 year period. Through massive economic aid (approximately 75% economic and 25% military assistance), the U.S. hopes to induce "behavior modification" in Central American countries and produce a confederation that will isolate Nicaragua or force them to integrate. Despite current political differences, Nicaragua is recognized as being an essential part of the Central American economy, although it has deteriorated and undermined linkages with the rest of the Central American economic network. Among the current conditions and causes of Central American economic demise are the high cost of energy imports, interregional conflict and political rivalries, extensive foreign debt, and one that the commission does not specify, widespread corruption and the influence of "militar fuerar." In addition to an energy stablization program, the commission recommended eight key elements for an economic recovery program: (1) The U.S. and Central American countries develop a comprehensive plan to reinvigorate the Central American Common Market. (2) Maximum participation by the private sector, i.e. training, technical advice, and new public and private initiatives to foster economic recovery and growth. (3) The U.S. would address the servicing of external debt, lengthening or deferring payment schedules. (4) Immediate increase in bilateral assistance from $628 million in FY83 to $877 million in FY84. (5) Expanded aid for housing projects employing labor intensive methods to provide more jobs. Also improvements in electricity, irriga- tion, roads, bridges and municipal services. (6) Trade credit guarantees and seasonal credits for agricultural concerns. (7) The U.S. would provide energy credits to the Central American Common Market. (6) The U.S. would join the Central American Bank of Economic Integration (CABEI) and provide investment capital for small entrepreneurs and new business ventures. 5/ The ambitious programs, already evaluated by the Reagan administration, have been submitted to Congress. They pose a very expensive solution at a time when U.S. deficits approach an historical record. Constituencies will play an important role in determining final acceptance of these recommendations in an election year. While the commission was chaired by both Republicans and Democrats representing a range of conservative and liberal opinions, the issue of $8 billion plus will be bantered around in campaign rhetoric with each side having the ideal solution. Division and argument, without immediate implementation, will only prolong the agony of Central American problems and inevitably require large scale military intervention. The report maintains that in order for a massive aid program to be effective, assistance must be disbursed on a conditional basis to those countries that can demonstrate strong judicial systems, where individual grievances can be fairly and objectively addressed and resolved, where free elections representing the will of all the people determine national and municipal leadership, where free and democratic trade unions exist, and finally, where there is a significant improvement in the social conditions of the poorest. Nicaragua would be encouraged to participate in a newly created Central American Development Organization (CADO), which would be open to the seven countries of Central America -- Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatamala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama, and to the United States which would serve as chairman. Further associate status would be available to other Latin American democracies willing to allocate resources to accomplish the regional objectives outlined above. The control of all aid would have to rest with the donors and would be conditional upon progress towards economically, politically, and socially defined objectives. This multilateral body would include eminent Central Americans drawn from the private sector primarily, including representatives of democratic trade unions, business or government. A key assessment by the panel is that any institutions tied to regional development and progress, must represent indigenous efforts. If the "hearts and minds" of the people are not enthusiastically captured for programs, they cannot succeed no matter how much the U.S. spends or desires to influence regional stability. In order for economic development to exist, there must be a great reduction in regional violence, which accelerates not only capital flight, but the loss of technical and professional personnel essential for implementation of economic and industrial development. In the areas of human development, the following areas were targeted to improve living conditions and basic nutritional needs: -- Reduction of malnutrition -- Elimination of illiteracy -- Primary education and health care for all -- Reduction in the infant mortality rate -- Improvement in housing conditions and reduction in the population growth rate 6/ The Sandinista government became highly successful when it implemented many of these same health and social reform programs early in its tenure. They were programs badly needed. The legitimate grievances which caused such problems were not invented by the junta, but served to make the insurgency possible. The proliferation of grievances forced the oppressed to seek the social reformist ideology of Marxism without realizing that totalitarianism, not a democratic socialism, would be the final outcome. To promote cultural and educational ties, the Commission recommended expansion of the Peace Corps role in a front-line literacy campaign. (The U.S. is 2,000 Cuban teachers too late in this program for Nicaragua, but in all the other Central American countries, this great need still exists.) Vocational training, strengthening the major universities and judicial systems, are included in recommended educational programs, as well a substantial expansion in scholarships to complete with and exceed those offered by the Soviets. For example, in Fiscal Year 1982, there were only 391 scholarships awarded to Central Americans as opposed to 7,500 by Soviet, Eastern Bloc, and Cuban institutions of higher learning. 7/ The Commission recognized the need for significant increases in military aid to fight leftist guerrillas and also to fund Contra operations "to create conditions under which Nicaragua can take its place as a peaceful and democratic member of the Central American community." There were, however, minority dissents filed with the report which recommended suspension of covert aid to the "Contras" through 1985 so that the Sandinista government can demonstrate its capacity for adhering to election schedules, and movement towards a more pluralistic government. Such a cut-off would be contingent upon Nicaragua modifying their policy of exporting advisors and aid to Salvadoran insurgents, and a decrease in military buildup activities. This, the panel maintains, would in turn decrease the U.S. requirement to provide higher levels of military aid to Honduras and El Salvador. The Kissinger Commission and Reagan Administration also support enforcement of stability in Central America through the Central American Defense Council (CONDECA). This alliance was formed in 1964 by the military dictators of Central America. It encouraged mutual defense provisions, joint maneuvers, and generally provided a military mechanism to ensure that social and economic development could continue. 8/ Because Somoza was a principal figure in this organization, there is reluctance by some Central American nations, notably Panama, to fully accept CONDECA as a means to further isolate Nicaragua. The Report of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Published as a collection of essays by Central American specialists, Central American, Anatomy of Conflict, was released shortly after the Kissinger Report. Its purpose was "to crystallize democratic thinking," to provide additional analyzes of complex issues in Central America and to offer more liberal solutions which diminish the possibility of a U.S. military intervention. While the Kissinger report details that regional crises must be met by a combination of economic, military, political and social measures, the Carnegie report supports political negotiations between warring priorities ahead of an $8.9 billion aid program. Political settlements, editor Robert Leiken argues, would enable revival and growth of the Central American Common market, and without such settlements, a "massive U.S. Marshall Plan for Central America would not be successful and only would lead to further polarization by rewarding friends and punishing enemies." 9/ There exists fear among liberals both in the U.S. and Latin America, that massive aid would only end up in Florida real estate or Miami bank accounts. The Carnegie report also states that the Bipartisan Report only serves to further reinforce current Reagan administration policy, except for recommendations that aid be more stringently tied to human rights reforms as a means of controlling right wing death squads. The report cites Honduras as an example of what would happen if the impacts of U.S. policy are not thoroughly considered. Despite significant military aid and development assistance since 1981, and a strong U.S. military presence through joint exercises, there has been little change in the social conditions in Honduras. A wide disparity still exists between rich and poor, the balance of power has shifted from the civilian government to the military allied with the oligarchy, and there has been an increased possibility of destablizing non-extremist forces in the region. 10/ The Carnegie report concludes that the Sandinista government in Nicaragua should negotiate with their opposition and provide greater participation with middle- class and private enterprise not aligned with the FSLN. Without creating a stable environment with broad base cooperation, the Carnegie report dooms the Nicaraguan economy to continuing failure. Appeals for such accommodations, however, from both Carter and Reagan administrations, have fallen on deaf ears in Managua. The Military Option 11/ Scenario: An Invasion and Occupation of Nicaragua To isolate the struggle in El Salvador, the U.S. moves against Nicaragua. American troops and representative CONDECA contingents establish beachheads and air heads in Nicaragua, take over the principal cities of Nicaragua, extend a presence throughout the countryside, and proceed to deal with sabotage and insurgency after the high-intensity warfare has died down. So reads the proposal by Theodore H. Moran who is a contributor to Central America, Anatomy of Conflict. Moran is currently Landegger Professor and director of the program in International Business Diplomacy at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and formerly a member of the policy planning staff at the U.S. Department of State. Moran in his study, attempts to determine the alternative costs for four different scenarios. Moran does not try to judge which of his 5 year scenarios is best, nor suggest that U.S. policy decisions on Central America will be based only upon economic issues. What he does attempt to do is provide a stimulus for the larger debate on political and security issues for U.S. policy and strategy formulation for 1984 and beyond. Moran draws upon three separate analyses by military experts and consultants, all which call for between two and three divisions of American troops backed by air and logistics support. His assessment recognizes that there exist many uncertainties in trying to estimate American losses, notably, the pace at which an intervention would proceed, and the endurance of Nicaraguan resistance. In the base scenario, U.S. forces conduct the main fighting with perhaps some CONDECA representation. The U.S. forces would be comprised of one Marine Division, one U.S. Army air mobile division, one Army light infantry brigade, and one Ranger battalion. Their mission would be to seize airports and beachheads, conduct a link-up, and occupy the four major Nicaraguan cities in 12 days. For the next 20 days, the U.S. would expand their presence to the countryside seeking out Sandinista insurgents over the next 3 months. Sandinista resistance would be reduced as their logistical supplies are drawn down. One U.S. division would withdraw after 122 days of intense fighting, and over the next 5 year period, the remaining one-and-a half U.S. divisions along with CONDECA contingents, would seek out and destroy the remaining FSLN forces. Exports in the Nicaraguan economy would drop 80% during the initial year of fighting, while import levels would remain constant through American economic aid. American assistance is also required to off-set a 20% reduction in revenues, and $500 million would be allocated for reconstruction and development. Sabotage over the next four years would prevent exports from reaching more than 60% of 1982 levels and an additional $300 million per year would be needed for reconstruction and development aid. An expansion of the above scenario would add Air Force and Navy air support, with appropriate logistics and personnel: (61,000 total with 25,000 direct combatants), three air wings (216 fixed wing aircraft and 734 helicopters) with tanks, trucks, armored personnel carriers would constitute part of the equipment. During the first 32 days of intense fighting, 148 helicopters and 7 fixed wing aircraft would be lost. U.S. casualties would be 50-100 per day killed-in-action (KIA) in built-up areas, with 300-600 wounded-in-action (WIA) during the first 12 days. These figures are based upon statistical records of Vietnam, which reflect a 6 to 1 wounded to dead rate although some military analysts conclude that as high as a 10 to 1 ratio may be more appropriate for application to Nicaragua. American casualties would diminish to 15-30 KIA and 120-180 WIA over the next 20 days. In summary, during initial intense fighting, American KIA's total between 1,061-2,122, WIA's, 5,400-10,800, not including accidental deaths based again upon Vietnam ratios of 1 accidental death per 5.6 killed due to enemy action. A much higher rate of civilian casualties would occur in such an intense environment. In the subsequent 3 months and in presumed lower intensity, the casualty figures would be 15 helicopters, 3 planes, 450-900 KIAS, 2,700-5,400 WIA's, and 81-161 accidental deaths. In the next two year period, 30 helicopters, 6 aircraft, 200-600 KIA's, and 300-900 WIA's, would become casualties, and figures assume that CONDECA troops and Contras implement any pacification programs. For the final two years and eight months, the attrition rate is 15 helicopters, 2 aircraft, 400 U.S. KIA, 600 WIA, all based upon declining resistance and ability to cut-off logistical support from external sources such as Cuba or Soviet bloc countries. The total five year losses recapitulated are: Helicopters 208 Aircraft 18 KIA 2,392-4,783 WIA 9,300-18,600 Total estimated cost of equipment lost is $2,608 million broken down as follows: Helicopters - 2,306 million (75% attack helicopters, Blackhawks at $7 million each, Apaches at $10 million each, 20% observation helicopters at $4 million each, and 5% heavy lift helicopters at $27 million each) Fixed-wing Aircraft - $222 million (70% of losses -- replaced by F-16's at $22 million each, 10% Harriers at $24 million each, 10% F-15's at $27 million each, and 10-A-6E's at $36 million each) Tanks, armored personnel carriers, trucks, etc. - $50 million Tacked on to equipment losses is the incremental operating costs of maintaining an infantry division in combat. The figures of $1.938 million is derived from subtracting the average daily cost of a division in training status in the U.S. ($2.192 million/day) from the average daily cost of maintaining an infantry division during Vietnam ($4.705 million/day in 1983 dollars). Different rates of expenditures are applied relative to the intensity of combat over the 5-year period. Coupled with aid, the economic cost of invasion and occupation of Nicaragua for the 1984-1989 period is: (In Millions) 1. Equipment losses $2,608 2. Operating costs 1,938 3. Economic assistance 6,100 TOTAL $10,646 While such costs are staggering, Moran is quick to point out that there is an inherent danger in trying to project costs based upon the historical experience of Vietnam and by cranking figures through simulation models. There are just too many unknown variables. Such an approach, is aimed only at a segment of total regional problems. Application of any scenario is bound to result in further deterioration in Central America and require long term military and economic initiatives. One thing that the author does allude to, is the level of Sandinista resistance. Since Contra initiatives began on a wider scale in 1981, the leftist regime has been actively preparing for invasion and storing provisions and arms in the rugged mountain country of Nicaragua. The Sandinistas are prepared to wage a long term guerrilla war that would result in much higher casualties and cost. A U.S. invasion would also cause additional popular support for the Sandinistas based solely upon Nicaraguan hatred of U.S. interventionism. Eden Pastora of the ARDE has reiterated on several occasions that the problems of Nicaragua must be solved by Nicaraguans, and the U.S. military action would revive the nationalistic spirit of Sandino in all his countrymen. A criticism of this particular article is that it pays too little attention to the terrain and geography of Nicaragua. It does not address how thinly our air and naval assets would be stretched and what would be the U.S. ability to respond to other world crises where vital interests are at stake. Neither does the analysis fully address the negative consequences of fighting in several major cities where 60% of Nicaraguans live, and where thousands of innocent civilians would be killed. How much more prepared today is the U.S. military to pursue an enemy in extended jungle and mountain warfare where logistical burdens are enormous, while at the same time countering massive acts of sabotage in rear area installations? Will there really exist a rear area? In an environment similar to Vietnam, it was difficult to distinguish between friend and foe. The Spanish and English speaking Nicaraguans, may be grudging tolerators of U.S. presence by day, but guerrillas by night. Conclusion In the final analysis, no solution is going to come cheaply to solve regional conflict and counter Soviet influence. Whether our strategy is a continuation of present policy, a negotiated solution with power sharing by left and right winged factions, a military solution with surrogates, or direct invasion by U.S. forces, the primary emphasis must be to promote long term stablization at least cost of U.S. lives. Not in favor of the U.S. is a chronic history of interventions which has alienated Central Americans. What ultimately is in favor of the U.S., is an honest appraisal of deficiences in the past, and a marriage of both moral and strategic interests for the future. The final test will be the resolve of the American people. Overwhelming support for the Reagan administration after the invasion of Grenada, demonstrated that Americans do not desire a Soviet hegemony on their borders. But Nicaragua is not Grenada. A military victory there will be neither quick nor cheap. Even when U.S. troops eventually prevailed, combat losses, domestic dissent, and a damaged U.S. alliance system could turn tactical victory into strategic defeat. 12/ Can the United States live with a Sandinista regime if it does not continue as an instrument of communist revolution? Complex questions without easy answers. If there is a peaceful solution in the future, the U.S. must strive for it with all its collective being. If there cannot be a peaceful solution, Americans will face the prospects of war in the next two years. The biggest danger is a naivete of an American public that negotiations will deter the Sandinistas or Soviets from seeking their ultimate objective, strategic and economic defeat of the United States. Because of Soviet objectives, the U.S. must remain physically and morally prepared for the worst case situation. ENDNOTES Chapter Five: Options For The Future 1. "The Risks in Central America." Commonweal, 22 April, 1983, p. 227. 2. Ikle. "Caribbean Strategy," pp. 8-15. 3. Ibid. 4. "Kissinger Report," p. 37. 5. Ibid., pp. 45-60. 6. Ibid., p. 68. 7. Ibid., p. 72. 8. Walker, p. 108. 9. Robert S. Leiken. "Can The Cycle Be Broken," in Central America, Anatomy of Conflict, pp. 3-15. 10. Ibid. 11. Theodore H. Moran. "The Cost of alternative U.S. Policies Toward El Salvador 1984-1989," in Central America, Anatomy of Conflict, pp. 166-170. 12. Joseph Cirincione and Leslie C. Hunter. "Military Threats, Actual and Potential," in Central America, Anatomy of Conflict, p. 189. EPILOGUE On 13 March, 1983, the Senate Intelligence Committee authorized an additional $21 million in Covert aid to the counterrevolutionary forces in Nicaragua. A Department of Defense spokesman the same day admitted that the United States has exceeded its self-imposed ceiling of 1,700 troops and that 2,000 troops will be in Honduras by the end of March. These troops are scheduled to conduct "a series of emergency deployment readiness exercises." President Reagan has appointed a new Ambassador to Nicaragua, Harry E. Bergold, Jr., and Congress has not yet acted on his request for $1.2 billion in economic and military aid to Central America, the first installment of the five-year $8.9 billion package recommended by the Kissinger Commission. President Reagan has publicly stated, "As a nation, we can't afford to let this issue drag on while people die in Central America." In Nicaragua, the Sandinista government has dispatched troops, artillery and tanks to the Honduran border to counter an expected rebel offensive. Because of the Grenada experience, Cuba has decided to restructure their corps of "advisors" in Nicaragua to better prepare for aggression against Nicaragua. Cuba is also considering withdrawing its 25,000 troops from Angola perhaps they will end up in Nicaragua. The United States next war has already begun. BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Esther and Mortimer Arias. The Cry of My People. New York: Friendship Press, 1980. Recounts the social injustices of South America that require radical, and violent if necessary, action by Christians. Gustavo Gutierrez. A Theology of Liberation, translated and edited by Sister Caridad India and John Eagleson. Mary- knoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1973. A classic inter- pretation of liberation theology with a Marxist bias. Terry L. Heyns, ed., Understanding U.S. Strategy: A Reader. Washington, D.C: National Defense University Press, 1983. An excellent collection of articles addressing the U.S. vital interests during an era of U.S. decline. *Robert S. Leiken, ed., Central America, Anatomy of Conflict. Published in cooperation with Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York: Pergamon Press, 1984. Liberal counter proposals to the Kissinger Bipartisan Report. Leiken, et al, call for negotiated solutions with leftists ahead of military air or U.S. interven- tion. Bard E. O'Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts, ed.`s. Insurgency in the Modern World. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, l980. Provides a succinct framework for analyzing the elements of insurgency and provides testbook case studies. *James D. Rudolph, ed., Nicaragua: A Country Study. (Area Handbook series: DA pam. 550-88). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982. 2nd ed. A basic reference providing history from the colonial period to current problems of the FSLN. *Richard L. Millett. Guardians of the Dynasty. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1977. A chronicle of U.S. Marine intervention, training of the National Guard, and the Somoza family's 44 year dictatorship. ________, and W. Marvin Will, ed., The Restless Caribbean. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979. *John J. Tierney, Jr. Somozas and Sandinistas: The U.S. and Nicaragua in the Twentieth Century. Published jointly by the councils for Inter-American Security and for Inter- American Security Educational Institute. Washington, D.C.: 1982. Discusses rise to power of the Sandinistas and current problems they pose to the U.S. and Central America. *Thomas W. Walker. Nicaragua, The Land of Sandino. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. Second printing 1982. Chroni- cles the history of Nicaragua and rise of the FSLN. Pro- fuse with leftist rhetoric but does provide many useful facts. *Denotes key references for research U.S. Government Documents and Contract Reports Thomas P. Anderson. The Two Revolutions: Nicaragua and Cuba - Similarities and Differences. Prepared for Office of Long Range Assessments and Research, Dept. of State, Contract No. 1722-320036, Eastern Connecti- cut State University, 3 Feb., 1983. Compares the application of communist revolutionary models in both countries. Alex Alexiev. Soviet Strategy in the Third World and Nicaragua. Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand Corporation, March 1982. A discussion of Soviet designs on the Caribbean and the militarization of Nicaragua. Edward Gonzales. Reflections on Nicaragua and the Cuban Model. Dept. of State, Contract No. 1722-320039, Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand Corporation and U.C.L.A. 3 Feb., 1983. Similar to Anderson above. Colonel Kenneth E. Murphy, U.S. Army. "Senior Officer Debriefing Report, Commander, COMUSMILGP, Nicaragua, 20 July 1971 - 20 December 1973." (RCS-CSFOR-74). APO New York: U.S. Dept. of Defense, U.S. Military Group Nicaragua, letter dated 21 December, 1973. File Symbol SCNI-CO. Military briefiing on Nicaragua and cites potential sources for future insurrection. Bernard C. Nalty. The United States Marines in Nicaragua. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps G-3 Division Historical Branch. (Revised) 1968. Harry F. Young. Atlas of United States Foreign Relations. U.S. Dept. of State Bureau of Public Affairs. Pub. 9350, Washington, D.C.: June 1983. A general re- ference work which graphically highlights interna- tional treaty organizations. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on Inter-American affairs. Assessment of Condition in Central America. Hearings, April 29 and May 20, 1980. (96th Congress, 2d Session). Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1980. Testimonies on suppressive activities in Nicaragua and Marxist domination. _________. United States Policy Toward Nicaragua. Hearings June 21 and 26, 1979. (96th Congress, 1st Session) Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1979. U.S. Department of Defense. Soviet Military Power. Wash- ington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, March 1983. 2nd ed. ___________. and U.S. Department of State, "Background Paper: Central America." Following to May 13, 1983 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives Report on Cuban, Soviet, and Nicaraguan Activities in Central America. Wash- ington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 27 May, 1983. A basic re- ference which is a collection of CIA evidence on the militarization of Nicaragua. President Reagan went public with this information to bolster increased aid for Latin America military and economic programs. U.S. Department of Commerce. "Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States - Nicaragua." Prepared by the American Embassy in Managua. FET 82- 118. Washington, D.C., December 1982. __________. "Labor Trends in Nicaragua." Prepared by the American Embassy in Managua, draft notes dated April, 1983. No place or author provided. Obtained from Nicaragua Desk, U.S. Dept. of State. A sketch of Nicaragua's economy, labor unions, and problems. U.S. Executive Department. Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. Chairman, Henry A. Kissinger. Washington, D.C., January 10, 1984. The consensus report which recommended $8.9 billion aid to Latin America for the period 1984-1989. U.S. Department of State. Background Notes: Nicaragua. Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, January 1983. A concise document on Nicaraguan facts. ___________. "Comprehensive Strategy for Central America." Current Policy No. 502, Washington, D.C.: August 4, 1983. __________. "Nicaragua: Threat to Peace in Central America," Current Policy No. 476, Washington, D.C., 12 April, 1983. White House Digest, Office of Media Relations and Planning, Four issues. June 1, July 13, July 20, August 24, 1983 relating to Central America and Nicaragua subjects. An excellent collection of short topics which highlight repression and external influence in Nicaraguan affairs. Magazine and Periodical Articles on Nicaragua Over 250 magazine articles were consulted covering the period from July 1979 to 10 March, 1984. Primary reference materials were U.S. News and World Report, Newsweek, and Time Magazines. Those articles considered most representa- tive are listed herein: "An Evolving Policy: U.S. Intervention and the Reagan Admin- istration." Coalition for a new Foreign and Military Policy, Washington, D.C. March, 1983, 5 pp: A left- wing Tabloid but gives a good outline of U.S. policy decisions. "A Foreign Policy Emerges." Newsweek, March 9, 1981. pp. 22- 23. "Arguing About Means and Ends." Time, April 18, 1983. pp. 30- 31. "A Revolution of Disillution." World Press Review, June 1983. pp. 35-38. Jim Boyce, Major USMC. "Combat Patrol: Nicaragua." Leather- neck, October, 1982. pp. 40-44. A general article which gives an appreciation for difficult guerrilla warfare. "Covert Operations Voting Record." Campaign Against U.S. Intervention. Legislative Update, Supplement-D. Coali- tion for a New Foreign and Military Policy. Washington, D.C.: August 10, 1983. A liberal lobby group but details on the evolution of the Boland-Zablocki Amendment are good. "Crackdown - Sandinistas Fail Businessmen." Time, November 2, 1981. p. 44. George de Lama. "Spreading the Marxist Gospel." Chicago Tribune Magazine, 22 August 1982, Section 9. A satirical article recounting that "Jesus was a Sandinista" for radical Marxist-Christians in Nicaragua. "Double or Quits in Nicaragua." The Economist, 20 March, 1982. pp. 55-56. Recounts Eden Pastora's defection from the FSLN. "Falling Dominoes: Is Nicaragua Next?" Nicaragua Information Center Bulletin. Berkeley, Ca.: November, 1983. 4 pgs. A left wing tabloid. Vincent J. Giese. "The Church in Nicaragua." Our Sunday Visitor White Paper. Huntington, IN: 7 November, 1982. 4 pgs. Recounts the religious persecution being ex- perienced in Nicaragua. Chuck Henry, SSgt USMC. "Ahuas Tara II." Marines, January, 1984. pp. 19-22. A brief article on joint Marine- Honduras amphibious operations. "Hero Unwelcome." The Economist, 24 April, 1982. p. 64. On Eden Pastora, FSLN defector trying to find his identity. Joyce Hollyday and Jim Wallis. "Nicaragua; A Fragile Future." Sojourners, March 1983. pp. 8-13. A liberal appraisal of the 1979 revolution in Nicaragua and propaganda for the FSLN programs. Maurice G. Holmes, Captain, USMC. "With the Horse Marines in Nicaragua." Marine Corps Gazette, February 1984. pp. 36- 43. Fred C. Ikle. "The Three Elements of Our Caribbean Strategy." Defense 83, December 1983. pp. 10-15. Excellent and crisp statement of U.S. policy for the region. "In Nicaragua, A Revolution Gone Sour." U.S. News and World Report, 18 October, 1982. pp. 41-45. "Inside Communist Nicaragua: The Miquel Bolanos Transcripts." The Backgrounder. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foun- dation. No. 294, 30 September, 1983. Bolanos is an FSLN defector and was a member of the Government Security Apparatus. Attempts to confirm facts with the Heritage Foundation were negative concerning allegations that the Soviets are building a trans-istamian canal. Stephen Kinser. "Nicaragua, The Beleagured Revolution." New York, Times Magazine, 28 August, 1983. pp. 22-28, 65- 66. Excellent essay and pictorial view of Nicaragua's precipitous position and economy. "Kissinger's Rescue Plan." U.S. News and World Report, 23 January, 1984. pp. 22-25. James LeMoyne. "The Secret War Boils Over." Newsweek, 11 April, 1983. pp. 46-7. "Moving the Miskitos." Time, 1 March, 1982. p. 22. "New NSC Chief Inherits a Bag of Troubles." Time 31 October, 1983. p.28. "Nicaragua's Agonizing Slide." World Press Review. July 1981. pp. 26-28. "Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama." Quarterly Economic Review. London: The Economist Intelligence Unit. Three issues: 3rd Qtr. 1981, No. 3 1983, and Annual Supplement. Various pages. An analysis of Nicaragua's GNR and economic dif- ficulties. "Nicaragua's Contras Face a Rough Road." U.S. News and World Report, 29 August, 1983. pp. 29-30. "Nicaragua: The Contras Set-Up Shop." Newsweek, 4 April, 1983. p.41. "Nicaragua: Development Under Fire." Facts For Action. Oxfam, America. Boston, Mass. Vol. 8. "Nicaragua Enjoys a Lull But Still Runs Scared." U.S. News and World Report, 5 March, 1984. pp. 31-32. "Nicaragua Nettle." The New Republic, 9 May, 1983. pp. 15-16. "Nicaragua: Scared of U.S. But Still Talking Tough." U.S. News and World Report, 14 November, 1983. pp. 26-27. "Nicaragua: A Whole New Universe." Time, 18 January, 1982. pp. 36-37. Nicaragua Update. By Nicaragua Interfaith Committee for Action. San Francisco, Ca. Vol. 5, Issue 6, December 1983 and Vol. 6, No. 1. Jan/Feb - 1984. Nicaragua: A Look at the Reality. Published by Quixote Center. Hyattsville, MD: September 1983, 3d printing. "Nicaraguan Resistance Leader Voices Optimism." West Watch. Vol. VI, No. 2. May 1973. pp. 1-8. "Nicaragua's Zero Option." Newsweek, 18 April, 1983. p. 40. Wallace H. Nutting, General U.S.A. "A World in Conflict." Defense 83, December 1983. p. 2-9. Edgar O'Ballance. "The Nicaraguan Domino." Military Review, October 1983. pp. 2-l0. "Perspectives on Nicaragua." Commonweal, 22 April, 1983. pp. 226-244. "Revolution on a Leash." The Economist, 3 April, 1982. pp. 57- 59. "The Sandinista War on Human Rights." The Backqrounder. No. 277, Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation. 19 July, 1983. "The Sandinistas." Playboy. Interview with the leaders of the Marxist junta in Nicaragua. July, 1983. Various pages - 20 total. An excellent and candid interview with all members of the Nicaragua junta of National Reconstruction. Alludes to their internal divisions. "Somoza's Violent Death." Newsweek, 29 September, 1980. pp. 34- 36. "Taking Aim at Nicaragua." Newsweek, 22 March, 1982. pp. 20-29. John Hoyt Williams. "Augusto Cesar Sandino: Was Latin America's Romantic Revolutionary the First Sandinista?" Soldier of Fortune, December 1982. pp. 32-39. Unpublished Sources Frank Aker. "Tactics The Theory and Practice of Revolutionary Warfare." Woodbridge, Va. October 1983. Dr. Aker is an independent State Dept. Analyst. In this thesis, he analyzes application of "foco" theory and other models. __________. "The Third World War and Central America: U.S. Strategic and Security Considerations in the Caribbean Basin." Woodbridge, Va. No date. Forecast of Soviet hegemony creeping towards our borders. __________. ed. Treaties, Conventions, Agreements and United States Public Laws of the Caribbean Region. A complia- tion of all treaties currently in effect in this region. Adolfo Calero Portocarrero. Pronouncement of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense (FDN. Statement delivered to the Ad Hoc Committee on Democracy For Nicaragua, 106 Dirksen Building, Washington, D.C., 19 July, 1983. Obtained from Aker files. Daniel Ortega Saavedra. The Philosophies and Policies of the Government of Nicaragua. Delivered to the United Nations, New York: March 25, 1982. Obtained from the Nicaragua Information Center, Berkely, Ca. James Sensenbrenner, Member - U.S. Congress. Unedited trip notes dated 11 October 1983. Gives insight into press and religious censorship in Nicaragua, as well as state of economy. Obtained from files of Dr. Frank Aker. Brief descriptions of war torn economy, presence of Soviet weapons observed on Nicaragua fact finding trip. Aker files. L.J. Sklenar, Major, USMC and Major L. Wilson, Jr., USMC. Nicaragua: Revolution Betrayed. Thesis submitted for War Since 1945 Symposium. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia. 229 pp. June 1983. Lewis A. Tambs. "Guatemala, Central America and the Caribbean - A Geopolitical Glance." Delivered to the U.S. House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Inter-American Affairs. Dr. Tambs is currently U.S. Ambassador to Columbia and was a senior consultant to the National Security Council when this paper was delivered. Dr. Frank Aker above was a contributor to this report. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 1981. Excellent evaluation of our Caribbean vital interests and logistics pipelines. Newspaper Articles "Central American Showdown in Nicaragua." Chicago - Sun Times, 1 June 1982. A-1. Christian Science Monitor. 9 May 1983 - 15 February 1984. New York Times. 15 April 1981 - 30 November 1984. Wall Street Journal. 31 May 1983 - 30 November 1983. Washington Post. 30 July 1981 - 14 March 1984. Washington Times. 11 April 1983 - 14 March 1984. Over 200 Newspaper Articles were consulted. The bias represented by the news articles ranged from the most conservative The Washington Times, to the liberal Washington Post and New York Times. The Washington Times has generally been favorable to Reagan administration policies while writers of the liberal papers, have supported negotiated settlements with leftist guerrillas and denounced U.S. military intervention. Criticism has diminished somewhat since the Grenada invasion which showed strong public support for that action. Joanne Omange of the Washington Post has consistently presented objective reports on Nicaragua. Key articles have been cited in the endnotes of each chapter. Interviews Dr. Frank Aker - Independent State Department analyst. Interviews conducted in Woodbridge, VA during October and November, 1983. Dr. Aker provided access to his extensive reference files as well as keen insight into Latin American affairs. Stephen McFarlane - U.S. Department of State, Nicaragua Desk. Various interviews during October 1984. Helpful information and official publications were provided on U.S. policy towards Nicaragua and an assessment of the Nicaraguan economy. Professor Richard L. Millett - Visiting Professor, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Dr. Millett is considered a noted authority on Nicaraguan affairs had has provided expert testimony on numerous occasions to the House and Senate Committees on Foreign Relations. Many of the histories consulted reference his works. During a brief interview in January 1983, Dr. Millett was able to suggest additional sources as well as provide a flavor for the volatility of the Nicaraguan crisis. Quantico, VA. Comandante Topita - EPS, FSLN, Nicaraguan representative to the Inter-American Defense Board. Comandante Topita is a lawyer who recently returned from fighting contras in Northern Nicaragua. His answers to pointed questions were evasive or he regurgitated the Sandinista party line concerning pluralism and self-determination. Washington, D.C. 8 March, 1984.
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