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Nicaragua 1984: Swirl In The Eye Of The Storm
CSC 1984
SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues
                                 ABSTRACT
     The   strife   in   Nicaragua,  while  originating   in
legitimate    grievances   against   the   corrupt    Somoza
dictatorship, had ceased early  after the 1979 revolution to
be  a strictly internal affair.  Successfully  applying  the
six  historical  lessons  of  communism  in  Latin  America,
Nicaragua became a new ally in the Third World in the Soviet
offensive against the West.  This was accomplished by direct
Cuban and Soviet sponsored military involvement, and massive
arms transfers  to  achieve political goals through military
violence.  Nicaragua  as  a  result,  possesses  a  military
capability  superior to  all  its  neighbors  combined.  The
novel application of  this  strategy  was  the  use of proxy
forces   which    enables    Moscow   to   disclaim   direct
responsibility, and to avoid confrontation  with  the United
States.  Arms deliveries, which play a  significant  role in
furthering  Soviet  hegemony,  have  been  accompanied  with
thousands  of  Cuban, Soviet,  and  surrogate  revolutionary
advisors, in military, educational, technical,  and  medical
capacities.   Many  of these personnel have a direct bearing
on the daily command and management decisions  in Nicaragua,
and  on the exportation of violence to neighboring countries
such as El Salvador.
     The  United  States  has  been   waging  political  and
economic  warfare  to force  Nicaragua  to  embrace  a  more
pluralistic  form  of  government.  The Central Intelligence
Agency  is also waging a "not so secret" war  by  backing  a
loose   coalition   of  counterrevolutionaries  which   have
achieved only  limited  success  because  of  the  lack of a
coherent  strategy,  internal  strife,  and  absence   of  a
unifying and charismatic leadership.
     The Report of the Bipatisan Commission on Latin America
has  recommended   an  $8.9  billion  "Marshall  Plan"  (75%
economic   and   25%   military  aid)  to  promote  regional
stability.   Liberal critics call for negotiated settlements
with leftist  guerillas  and Marxist juntas.  They decry the
bipartisan  report   as   being   an   extension  of  Reagan
administration policy that will lead to direct U.S. military
involvement.  Both Liberals and  Conservatives agree that if
immediate  action  is  not  accomplished to  ameliorate  the
position of the Sandista Regime in Nicaragua, the  U.S. will
be plummeted into  a  costly  and long Vietnam type war that
could result  in 5,000 killed, 18,000 wounded, and still not
accomplish long term objectives of peace.
                            WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR
                                Nicaragua 1984:
                         Swirl in the Eye of the Storm
                           Major J. W. Wilson, USMC
                                 2 April 1984
                    Marine Corps Command and Staff College
                Marine Corps Development and Education Command
                           Quantico, Virginia  22134
Click here to view image
                                 INTRODUCTION
     Nicaragua,  285  miles from the strategic Panama  Canal
and 1085  miles  from Brownsville, Texas, prepares daily for
invasion by  United  States military forces.  Latin American
advocacy  groups  in  the  nation's  Capitol subscribe to  a
poster which reads, "No Mas Vietnams en Centro-America Y  El
Caribe"  (No  more  Vietnams  in  Central  America  and  the
Caribbean).  The U.S. Congress contemplates a  massive  $8.9
billion  "Marshall   Plan"   submitted   by  The  Bipartisan
Commission on Latin America, headed by former  Secretary  of
State,  Henry  Kissinger.  Fervent  Catholic and  Protestant
religious  groups  under  a  wave  of  "liberation theology"
influence,  call  for dramatic  and  sometimes  non-pacifist
involvement  to  protest  social,  economic,  and  political
injustices  suffered  by  a  majority  of  Latin  Americans.
Interest groups, members of Congress, clergy, and even wives
of aspiring presidential candidates, make fact-finding trips
and contribute to information and  misinformation  campaigns
to  shape  U.S. public and world opinion.  Defense  analysts
meet weekly  in  the  White House to discuss Central America
and  assess  the  threat  of  infectious  communism  on  our
borders,  and  funding  requirements  for  guerrilla  groups
operating against the  Sandinist  Regime  of Nicaragua.  and
assuredly,  military  operation  plans are  being  intensely
studied and readied in  the  Pentagon and U.S. Army Southern
Command, to halt Soviet and Cuban designs  on  the Caribbean
Basin and the "soft underbelly" of the U.S..
     The 25 October, 1983 invasion of Grenada by U.S. Marine
and Army  personnel,  demonstrated  U.S.  resolve to prevent
further communist political ascendency,  in and around a sea
described  by  Alfred  Thayer   Mahan,   as   "the  American
Mediterranean."  Another vital interest threatened by Soviet
and Cuban  hegemony  is  the interoceanic canal, about which
President  Hayes  theorized as the great ocean  thoroughfare
between the  Atlantic  and Pacific, and "virtually a part of
the coastline of the United States."
     The  Marxist junta in Nicaragua is presently enjoying a
lull but is  still running scared.  They realize more fully,
that with little warning, history could repeat itself.  Over
the  horizon,  feared  U.S.  Marines  with  battleships  and
screaming  dive  bombers,  may  come  as before, to  restore
"orderly government" and regional tranquility.  So Nicaragua
waits,  training physically and psychologically for the next
invasion.
     If  more  than  a  hint  of urgency is apparent, it  is
because the dynamics of the situation demand agressive near-
term action in the social, economic, political  and military
arenas.  One thing is  certain  --  Nicaragua,  El Salvador,
Honduras, Guatamala, Costa Rica, and Panama will become more
common household words during the next year.
                           SCOPE
     The  primary  scope  of  this  paper  is  to sketch the
significant events  in  Nicaragua  since 19 July, 1979, when
leftist    guerrillas    overthrew    the   corrupt   Somoza
dictatorship,  to  March  of 1984.   Although  the  original
intent was to analyze unconvential  warfare  tactics of U.S.
supported   counterrevolutionaries,   one    cannot    fully
appreciate Nicaragua's  current  history,  without embracing
the complexities of  its past.  The issues are sometimes gut
wrenching  and   cut    deeply  into  moral,  political,  and
religious  sentiments.   Current   literature,   most  of  it
liberal, carries a bias that would lead one  to believe that
the  U.S.  should  acquiesce to communist regimes because of
past   sins  which  promoted   economic   exploitation   and
oppressive    dictatorships.  On  the  other  hand,  official
government   publications,    supported    by    substantive
intelligence  reports, contend that the presence of  another
Marxist-Leninist  regime in  our  Southern  borders,  is  a
deliberate  and  strategic  ploy  of  the  Soviet  Union for
eventual global domination.
     What will  be  provided  in  this  brief  thesis, is an
appreciation for  Nicaragua's  history,  U.S.  presence, the
rise  and  maintenance  of  a  43  year  Somoza  dynasty,  a
revolution, a  CIA  backed insurgency, and potential options
for conflict resolution.  It  is  at  best,  a  chronicle of
events which have not yet reached  a  climax.  It  is  hoped
that this paper will serve as  a  "pin prick" for the reader
to  encourage  more   exhaustive  reading,  and  to  gain  a
comprehensive  understanding  of  the  United  States'  next
battleground.
                                  Disclaimer
     The  opinions presented herein are solely those of  the
author  and  in  no  way  represent  official views  of  the
Department of Defense, the United States Navy, or the United
States Marine Corps.
                         Table of Contents
                                                        Page
Introduction                                              ii
Scope                                                     iv
Disclaimer                                                 v
Table of Contents                                         vi
List of Figures                                         viii
Chapter
     1.  Nicaragua Facts                                   1
     2.  A Tortured History                                7
         The Military Caste System                         9
         An Era of Intervention                           11
         Zelaya - Champion of Nationalism                 17
         U.S. Marines - First Occupation                  20
         U.S. Marines - Second Occupation                 22
         General Augusto Cesar Sandino - Folk Hero        22
         Somoza - Vestige of Marine Presence              24
         The Second Somoza                                25
         The Third Somoza - The Last Marine               26
         The Final Offensive                              31
    3.   A Cog in the Wheel of Soviet Hegemony            35
         The Three Tendencies                             37
         A Revolution Betrayed                            39
         U.S. Vital Interests in the Caribbean            40
         Six Lessons of Communism for Latin America       44
         The Militarization of Nicaragua                  57
         PLO Connections                                  62
         Cubans, Cubans, Everywhere                       65
    4.   The Not So Secret War                            71
         Contra Organizations                             73
         Nicaragua Democratic Force (FDN)                 75
         Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE)         79
         MISURASATA                                       83
         Congressional Limits on Covert Aid               87
         U.S. Presence in Honduras                        89
    5.   Options for the Future                           95
         The Kissinger Report                             97
         The Report of the Carnegie Endownment
            for International Peace                      105
         The Military Option                             106
Conclusion                                               112
Epiloque                                                 115
Endnotes
   Chapter One                                             6
   Chapter Two                                            33
   Chapter Three                                          68
   Chapter Four                                           92
   Chapter Five                                          114
Bibliography
   Books                                                 116
   U.S. Government Documents and Contract Reports        117
   Magazine and Periodical Articles on Nicaragua         119
   Unpublished Sources                                   122
   Newspaper Articles                                    123
   Interviews                                            124
                                LIST OF FIGURES
                                                        Page
Chapter One
   Figure 1-1  Map of Central America                      2
   Figure 1-2  OAS Map of Nicaragua                        3
   Figure 1-3  Ethnic Composition and Population
      Distribution                                         5
Chapter Three
   Figure 3-1 Organization, Command and Control
      of the Armed forces                                 56
   Figure 3-2  Major Central American Arms
      Routes                                              58
   Figure 3-3  The Sandinista's Arsenal                   61
   Figure 3-4  PLO Connections                            64
Chapter Four
   Figure 4-1  Contra Pressure Points                     74
              CHAPTER ONE: NICARAGUAN FACTS 1/
     Nicaragua  is the largest country  in  Central  America
(57,143 square  miles  --  slightly larger than Iowa) and is
the  geographic  center  of  the  region.  (See Figure 1-1.)
Straddled   between   the   Pacific  and  Caribbean  Oceans,
Nicaragua  is  bordered  on  the  north  by  El Salvador and
Honduras, both  contending  with leftist insurgents.  To the
south  lies  politically  neutral  Costa  Rica, which has no
military and is the  only  land buffer between Nicaragua and
Panama.  (See  Figure  1-2.)  Both Honduras and  Costa  Rica
provide sanctuaries  to  Counterrevolutionary forces seeking
to topple the Marxist junta in Nicaragua.  Nicaragua, on the
other  hand,  provides  sanctuary  for  communist insurgents
operating throughout Central America.
     Of  Nicaragua's total 1980 population of 2.67  million,
715,000 or approximately 27%, resided in the capital city of
Managua.  Nicaragua's  population   has  traditionally  been
unevenly  distributed  and in 1980, 61% of  the  inhabitants
resided in  the fertile plains and nearby Pacific highlands,
about 30% lived in the Central highlands, and the  remaining
10% dwelt in the Atlantic coastal province  of  Zelaya.  The
median  age of the populace is 30 years.  The annual  growth
rate is projected at 2.8 percent.
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     The predominant cultural heritage of the  western urban
and highlands areas is Spanish,  with Spanish as the primary
language and Roman Catholicism adhered to by 85-90%  of  all
inhabitants.  The  population  centered around Bluefields on
the eastern coast, retains some native Indian influence, but
its past was shaped by European and  western  traditions, as
well  as  by  black  minorities originating from Jamaica and
other  Caribbean  islands.   Protestantism,  especially  the
Moravian denomination,  is  most  influential in this region
where  English is  the  primary  language.  Miskito  is  the
predominant Indian language, also spoken in the East.   (See
Figure    1-3  for   Ethnic  Compositon    and    population
distribution.)
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     There   are  three  major  geographical   regions.  The
Pacific  region  is  characterized by a line of still active
volcanoes, which intrude from  a  large structural rift that
forms  a  long  narrow depression from the Gulf  of  Fonseca
shared by Honduras and El Salvador in the northwest, to the
Rio San Juan drainage into  the  Caribbean.  Lake  Nicaragua
and  Lake  Managua,  the  two  largest  freshwater lakes  in
Central America,  are  located  in  this  rift  valley.  The
Atlantic  Coast   region   encompasses   half  the  national
territory and is characterized as a lowland region abounding
in tropical savannas and numerous rivers which flow eastward
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to the sea.  In between the  eastern and western regions are
the  Central  Highlands,  which  are  more  extensive in the
north.
     Nicaragua's  chief  products  are cotton, coffee, beef,
and sugar.
                            NOTES
                Chapter One:  Nicaragua Facts
          1.  U.S. Department of  State.  Background  Notes:
Nicaragua.  Bureau  of  Public Affairs.   DOS   Pub.  7772.
Washington, D.C.:  U.S. GPO, January 1983.
              CHAPTER TWO:  A TORTURED HISTORY
     The  Report  of  the  National Bipartisan Commission on
Central America headed by Dr. Henry Kissinger, was tasked by
President Reagan to  develop "long term United States policy
that  will   best  respond  to  the  challenges  of  social,
economic, and democratic development  in  the  region and to
internal  and  external   threats   to   its  security  and
stability. " 1/  The  "Kissinger Commission" in its report of
10  January  1984,  provided  both   long   and  short  term
recommendations  which   will   be   discussed  later.  Most
importantly, the commission deduced  that  the  problems  of
Central America  are  extremely complex and cannot be simply
reduced to black and white, East and West, North  and South,
or  rich and poor  issues.  The  problems are  inextricably
woven  together  and  do not require U.S. imposed solutions.
They demand Central American solutions to long  problems  of
social injustice,  corruption,  and  repression.  Obviously,
the  U.S.  has vital interests  at  stake  in  any  regional
resolution and must exercise its will in a manner which will
not distance  the  possibility  of long term stability.  The
U.S. must also learn from past failures in  the region, most
stemming  from  self-serving   interests  of  strategic  and
economic  enhancement  that  ignored  the  volatile  welfare
issues of the Central American people.
     The entrenchment of a communist government in Nicaragua
did  not have its genesis in the past several decades.   The
seeds  of  revolution  have   germinated  for  centuries.  A
century and a half relationship with Nicaragua has witnessed
a U.S. policy which has "alternated erratically  between the
obsessive  and  the  negligent."  2/  Obsessive  policy  has
culminated in active Marine Corps intervention to  establish
client-governments,  without  regard to the exploitation and
corruption these  governments  generated.  Negligent  policy
has resulted in sending U.S. Ambassadors who could not speak
Spanish  and   who  insulated  themselves  from  fundamental
cultural  and  sociological  ills  as well as the unique and
dynamic impact of Latin  America  military institutions upon
society.  Neglect  has  meant  focusing significantly on the
Atlantic and the Pacific alliances as  the  centerpieces  of
strategic  interests,  and only intermittently concentrating
on   relationships   with   southern  neighbors.   And   for
Nicaragua,   neglect in policy resulted in the Somoza family
dictatorship becoming  the longest lasting in Latin America.
Although staunchly pro-U.S., the dictatorship systematically
developed the machinery for graft and corruption which would
eventually lead  to chaos and revolution in Nicaragua.  Many
members of Somoza's National Guard, following the example of
their leader, turned positions in customs, immigration,  and
police    into    wholesale    smuggling    operations   and
opportunities  for self-enrichment.   Even  at  the  private
soldier level,  extortion  of  peasants  had become a way of
life.   Those  without  power,  social  affluence,  or money
always bear  the  brunt  of  exploitation.  Nicaragua was no
exception and  the average citizen paid the price, having no
redress for that which the Guardia expropriated from them or
their  homes.  As  Somoza's  guard  alienated  more  of  the
civilian  population, they evolved into  a  distinct  social
caste.  The deeds they exercised were merely an extension of
traditions grounded in the cultural past.
The Military Caste System
     A major  flaw of U.S. foreign policy has been a failure
to recognize the heritage of Central American armed  forces,
and the military organization's contribution to violence and
complex political issues.  The power vested in the Nicaragua
Guardia National, complicated pressures by the U.S. to force
Somoza  to  end  or modify his repressive style.   Professor
Richard Millett, analyst  of Nicaraguan politics, succinctly
describes Somoza and the National Guard:
     They   are   plagued   by  conflicting  and  often
     contradictory   trends,    a    situation    which
     consistently frustrates the efforts to control the
     power  which   they  possess.  The  armies  are  a
     bulwark against Communism but at  the  same  time,
     their  corruption  and  abuses  of   human  rights
     provide invaluable propaganda and recruits for the
     radical left.  Deeply  rooted  in regional history
     and tradition, the  military  is  also  one of the
     most modern  institutions  in each nation.  Highly
     dependent on external support, it is also strongly
     nationalistic and even xenophopic. 3/
     An  enduring  concept,  surviving  from  18th   century
Spanish  colonialism,  was that  of  "fuero  militar"  which
provided  exemption  of  armed  forces   members   from  the
jurisdiction of  civil  courts.  It was this principle which
gave rise to the military and emergence of Somoza's National
Guard  as  an  elite  class.  Military service  provided  an
opportunity  for   individuals   to   gain  power,  superior
positions, and to advance personal  interests without regard
for  civil  law.  This  process was facilitated as  officers
gathered immense wealth through  corruption,  and surrounded
themselves with loyalists who  were  given  a  "share of the
pie."  This  was accomplished with relative civil  immunity.
Those  Nicaraguans  abused,  notably  the  poor  and  Indian
populations,  had  no  recourse  for legal  grievances.  The
colonial emphasis  on  class  also  nurtured a patron-client
relationship  between officers and men, a relationship which
exists  today among many Latin American armies.  Instead  of
soldiers  being loyal to civil officials  or  their  nation,
they were loyal to local commanders.  Commanders  controlled
pay, discipline, promotion, and participation in  schemes of
graft   and   corruption.  Officers   who  revolted  against
government  authorities   could,  therefore,  count  on  the
support of their subordinate commanders  and  men.  In order
to  win  military allegiance,  governments  were  forced  to
negotiate  with  officers who controlled considerable  power
bases.  Officers, frequently from prominent families, became
in reality  armed  partisans  of  the  power  in  party, and
assured perpetuation  of family interests. 4/  Elite sectors
of  the  society  also  wooed  their  own  military  allies,
influencing  them through family ties and promises  for  key
positions in new governments.   The  "Coup  de Force" became
the normal  means  of  transferring  power  in  the national
sector,  rather  than by civil means such as  elections.  To
the poor and disenfranchised,  this meant replacement of one
repressive regime with another just as repressive.
     Incorporated into  Central  American  struggles was the
philosophy gained   from the American Revolution -- that any
people  had  the  right  to  choose  their  own  government.
Independence and liberty became the cry of Latin America  as
nations  revolted   to  free  themselves  from  Spanish  and
Portuguese  domination.   New  governments  were,  in  part,
copied after  that of the U.S..  While neither endorsed full
pluralism, the  distinctive  difference in Latin America was
the influence of "fuero militar" into political struggles of
the region.
An Era of Intervention
     Internal  conflict  in  Nicaraguan  history facilitated
foreign  intervention.   With   revolutions  fomenting,  and
imminent  loss  of  Spanish colonial rule in the early  19th
century,  there was a loss of the external stabilizing force
that tended  to keep the elites and their armies at bay.  By
1838,  chaos  and  interregional  power  struggles   erupted
between the principal Nicaraguan cities of Leon and Granada.
Historically,  the   conservatives   or   aristocrats   were
associated with the cultural  center  at  Granada, while the
Liberals of Leon represented the successful  middle  classes
of artisians  and  businessmen.  The  strong Catholic church
hierarchy  considered  the  people  of  Leon  as  culturally
inferior  and   sided  with  the  leaders  of  Granada.  The
Catholic  church  as  one of the most stable institutions of
society,  continued  to  play   a   primary  role  in  power
struggles.  The church served as a vehicle of appeal for the
influential  as well as for mobilizing popular  support  for
various causes.  Strife  bred  strife,  and  interest groups
pitted their private armies against one another  until power
disputes were resolved. 5/
     The British, who had maintained a protectorate over the
Miskito Indians on the Atlantic coast, took  early advantage
of internal strife  and  sought to consolidate a position in
Nicaragua which was considered the  key  to Central America.
Of no less importance was  the  objective  of dominating the
potential interoceanic transit  routes between the Caribbean
and  Pacific  via Lake Nicaragua.  Such a passageway offered
the prospects for exploiting the still vast wealth of Meso --
and South America, securing new trade routes to a world that
was  rapidly growing smaller, and  bolstering  economies  at
home through  colonization.  When  the  British  seized  the
mouth  of  the San  Juan  River,  the  eastern  leg  in  the
transisthmian  route,  the  United States reacted  strongly.
They too had an interest in a  canal  as  the 1840's saw the
frenzy of the California gold rush and expanionist fever for
extending  America  to  the  Pacific  coast.  To  diffuse  a
potentially  volatile  situation  and  avoid  confrontations
resulting in war, a negotiated settlement was reached in the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850.  Both signators agreed not to
unilaterally  colonize   Central  America  or  dominate  any
transisthmian  canal  route.  6/  This  settlement   was  to
demonstrate  U.S.  interests  in  the hemisphere which  were
outlined in four key points of The Monroe Doctrine of 1823:
     (1)  The  American  continents  were  not  to  be
     considered as  subject  for future colonization by
     European powers.
     (2)  The  European political system was different
     from America's system and any  attempt  to project
     the  European  system  into the Western Hemisphere
     would  be considered dangerous to  the  peace  and
     safety of the United States.
     (3)  The  United  States would not interfere  with
     any existing colonies or dependencies of  European
     powers.
     (4)  The United States had never taken any part in
     the wars  of  European nations in matters relating
     to  themselves,  nor  does  it  agree  to  in  the
     future. 7/
     Even   while   negotiations   are  proceeding  between
Secretary of  State  John  Clayton  and Sir Henry Bulwer, an
American   transportation   company   headed   by  Cornelius
Vanderbilt sought  its  own agreement with Nicaragua for use
of a  Nicaraguan  route to transport Americans to California
gold  fields.  Through   intensive  business  struggles  and
competition, Vanderbilt's Accessory Transit  Company gained
about one third the business ferrying passengers by a system
of steamers  and  coaches.  In  1853, control of the company
was secured  by  rivals  and  U.S.  Marines  were  landed at
Greytown  to  protect the transit  company's  property.  The
next  year  the U.S. minister was attacked, and  Nicaraguans
refused to provide an  apology  and  reparations.  The  U.S.
Sloop "Cyane" was dispatched and shelled the Caribbean coast
town of  Greytown.  Marines were again landed to destroy the
remaining  buildings.  Tensions  between  the U.S.  and  the
British also continued to escalate as  foreign  interference
and  interregional  warfare  became  the  dominant theme  of
Nicaraguan   domestic  politics.   The   British   generally
supported  the  Conservatives  and  the  Americans  --   the
Liberals, as both became entangled  in  Nicaraguan political
struggles.  In   1854   the  Liberals,     who    had     been
unsuccessfully  trying to unseat the Conservatives, enlisted
the help of U.S. soldier of fortune William  Walker.  Walker
enjoyed delusions  of  becoming  the  President  of  Central
America, and  enticed  by funds and generous land grants, he
formed a small force of Americans to come to  the aid of the
Liberals.   8/  He    landed,   and   after  initial  military
setbacks,  Walker    took   Granada.  He    gained  additional
followers and to the dismay of the Liberals, entered into  a
coalition   government   with   Conservatives,  establishing
Patricio Rivas  as  head of a puppet government while really
manipulating the strings of  power  himself.  He  encouraged
foreign   investment   and   exploitation   of   Nicaragua's
resources.  In  July 1856, Walker declared himself President
after holding a  farcical  election.  Walker became a threat
to all  parties  and  was probably responsible for the first
display of Nicaraguan "nationalism," -- all directed against
him.  Both  the  Liberals and  Conservatives,  opposed  him.
Vanderbilt opposed him when Walker sided  with rivals of the
Transit Company.  The British opposed him as a means to curb
U.S. influence.   Other  Central  American countries and the
U.S. finally  opposed  him  fearing  that  Walker's plans to
annex regions of Central America  as new slave states, would
thrust the area into unmanageable  conflict.  Walker and his
army were  defeated  eventually  at  great  cost through the
efforts of  Vanderbilt,  the  British Navy, and the combined
forces of all of Central America. 9/  As morale and strength
of alker's troops dwindled, a U.S. ship sent to Nicaragua to
protect  America  interests  dispatched  more  Marines   and
escorted Colonel Walker and his remaining followers to ships
which returned  them to the United States.  Walker attempted
twice more to take over Central America, late in  1857  when
he  was  thwarted  by  U.S.  Naval forces, and in 1860, when
after he surrendered  to  the  British Navy, he was promptly
turned over  to  Honduran  authorities and shot.  The Walker
affair and  mounting  business ventures to exploit Nicaragua
were to provide a basis for long-lasting suspicions  of U.S.
intervention and regional interests.
     Decline  of  passengers  and  revenue,  along  with the
completion  of a railroad in  Panama,  caused  the  eventual
closing  of  the  transit  business  in  1868.  Nonetheless,
negotiations for  a canal route continued and became intense
as the French vied for the same business interests.  A rumor
that  U.S.  Marines  would land to reopen  the  canal  route
caused alarm  and Nicaragua and Costa Rica submitted a joint
petition to  place  their  nations  under  the protection of
England, France,  and  Sardinia.  Eventually, in 1868, a new
treaty  was  ratified  but U.S. interest in  the  canal  had
diminished by then. 10/  No doubt reconstruction of a nation
recently torn by Civil War was a more pressing matter.
     The  face  of  Nicaraguan  politics  was soon to change
again.   Associations   with   William   Walker   and   U.S.
intervention caused  the Liberals to lose public favor.  The
Conservatives ascended  to  power  and  ruled  until 1893 in
relative peace.  The  British  still maintained an influence
in the Miskito Coast  and  there  was  an effort to revive a
Central  American Federation.   In  the  1880's,  the  major
disturbance  was an Indian uprising in the Matagalpa region.
This  resulted  from  conscripting  Indian  labor to  expand
telegraph lines, construct roads, and provide the labor pool
for other modernization projects.  The rebellion was quickly
crushed  and   the  Conservatives,  generally  pro-clerical,
blamed the agitation on Jesuit priests who were subsequently
expelled.  U.S.  interest  in the canal project revived  and
the  Freylinghuysen-Zavala Treaty  of  1884  was  concluded.
This  treaty expanded previous agreements and  provided  for
joint Nicaragua-U.S.  ownership, a perpetual alliance and a
military  guarantee  of  Nicaraguan  territorial  integrity.
Although Nicaragua ratified the treaty, President Chester A.
Arthur inexplicably withdrew it from Senate consideration in
1885.  Roberto Sacasa succeeded to the presidency after  the
death  of  the  elected  incumbent in 1889 and  by  his  own
election in 1891. 11/
Zelaya - Champion of Nationalism
     In 1893, Liberals under  the leadership of General Jose
Santos  Zelaya,   took   advantage   of   dissidence   among
Conservatives  and a rather long sixteen  year  dictatorship
resulted.  Zelaya was a  champion  of Nicaraguan nationalism
and used  whatever   tyranny  necessary  to  keep  himself in
power.  Censorship   of  the   press  and  social  injustices
persisted  and   anti-U.S.   attitudes   were   increasingly
fostered.   Zelaya's   efforts   for   a   Central  American
Federation  failed  despite  pacts  with   Costa   Rica  and
Honduras, and abandonment of Britains claims  to the Miskito
region.   Zelaya did, however, enjoy popular support because
of his  pursuits  to modernize Nicaragua.  Among significant
reforms were:
     Abolition of the death penalty
     Amnesty to captured insurgents
     Separation of church and state
     Freedom of religion and free secular education
     Government financing of schools and education
     for Nicaraguans abroad
     Increase in production of export commodities
     of coffee, bananas, timber, and gold which
     brought capital to the economy. 12/
     Zelaya also was the first  to  attempt modernization of
the   military.  In  the  1890's,  a  military  academy  was
established  and  staffed  primarily  by  foreign  officers,
notably  German  and  Chilean.  New  technology  of the 20th
Century and weapons such as the machine gun,  demanded  that
officers acquire  expertise  in  the full time profession of
conducting   war.  A   detailed   set  of  regulations  (The
Ordenanza Militar) was  developed  for  the organization and
employment   of   the   armed   forces.  Another   important
requirement in the professionalization process, and a key to
social  mobility, was a literacy  program  for  the  troops.
General officers  were  also  required  to  master  subjects
ranging  from  mathematics  and   military   statistics,  to
geography.  Appointment to high rank, however, still smacked
of  the  old colonial and cultural  influences.  Strong  men
emerged  who   had   the   support   of  cronies  and  armed
partisans. 13/
     Despite  conscription  of  peasants,  the  army   still
achieved  a marked degree of effectiveness as it  suppressed
any opposition  through  exile,  imprisonment,  torture  and
murder.  Human rights  violations were prolific, but as long
as these were  targeted  at  rebellious  opposition or those
considered socially inferior, there was no excitement in the
regional or  international  community.  There was no instant
media impact  by  which  opinion  might  form powerful moral
pronouncements.  The   U.S.,   like   most   other  nations,
considered  economic   and   strategic  interests  a  higher
priority than human rights issues in countries distant  from
its borders.
     Zelaya's expanded power seemed to pose a threat to U.S.
regional  influence and Zelaya's contention that  Washington
should  keep  out of Central America's business, fanned  the
coals   of   future   conflict.  Further   deterioration  in
relationships was to occur when President Teddy Rosevelt and
lobbyists convinced Congress that  a Panama Canal was in the
U.S.' best interest.  This was a letdown to  Nicaraguans and
was  to  have  far-reaching  consequences  on  future  U.S.-
Nicaragua  relations.   With   rumors   that  Nicaragua  was
attempting to negotiate its own canal with Japan or Britain,
and  Zelaya's  increasing  opposition to  U.S.  presence  in
Central America,  an  era of U.S. intervention loomed on the
horizon.  In 1909, U.S. Marines  were  landed  at Bluefields
ostensibly to  protect  U.S.  property  and  lives,  but  in
reality  to  show  support  for  General Juan  Estrada,  who
rebelled against the Zelaya government.
     Two American demolition experts  working for the rebels
were  executed and Secretary of State Knox  broke  relations
with Nicaragua.  Fearing U.S. wrath, Zelaya resigned and his
appointed successor, Dr.  Jose Madriz, attempted to continue
the conflict against the Conservative rebels.  U.S. presence
prevented his success and  after  failing  to  gain  British
support,  Madriz  resigned  and  was  replaced  by   General
Estrada.  The  U.S.  promptly  recognized  this  new  puppet
government and special agent Thomas Dawson was dispatched to
assist in government reorganization.  A coalition engineered
by   Dawson  lasted  only  several   months.  Personal   and
political rivalries prevailed and with pressure from General
Luis Mena, his Secretary of War, Estrada resigned and turned
the  presidency  over  to  his  vice-president.  The  United
States continued efforts to reorganize the  finances  of the
country, arranged for $15 million in loans from two New York
banks,  and  established customs receiverships.  Plans  also
included moderinzation of the railroad and reorganization of
the  police  to maintain civil control.   Saber-rattling  of
aspiring generals and their followers threatened  all  these
projects  as  factions  led  by  Liberal  General  Mena  and
Conservative Party Leader General Emiliano-Chamarro vied for
the presidency.   The  U.S.  came   to  the  aid  of the Diaz
government in August 1912.   Over   2,700  U.S.  Marines  and
sailors landed at Corinto and Bluefields.   General Mena was
forced to  withdraw and the Liberals were finally driven out
of  Leon.  Another   Liberal   force   commanded  by  General
Benjamin   Zeledon  offered  more  stubborn  resistance until
eventually, a joint force of Marines and Nicaraguans subdued
his army, captured and then executed Zeledon.
U.S. Marines - The First Occupation
     For the next two decades, Nicaragua  was  to experience
direct U.S. intervention  and  occupation  by  U.S. Marines.
From 1912 to 1925, called the first occupation, the  country
had a  series of Conservative presidents.  The government of
the U.S.  and  Nicaragua  enjoyed  a symbiotic relationship.
The  Conservatives  who lacked sufficient military forces of
their own, needed  the U.S. for backing, and the U.S. needed
the  Conservatives  who Supported U.S. presence and business
interests  in  their  country.  Important negotiation during
this period concluded  in  the  Bryan-Chamorro  treaty which
provided for:
     -  Exclusive  U.S.  right  to  build  a  canal  in
     perpetuity
     -  Ninety-nine year renewable leases for  military
     bases in  the Gulf of Fonseca and Corn Islands for
     payment of $3 million
Since the Panama Canal  had  now  opened,  the  U.S.  treaty
ensured that no one else  could  seek designs on a competing
route  through   Nicaragua.  El   Salvador  and  Costa  Rica
appealed to the Central American Court of  Justice  over the
issue of U.S. naval  bases  in areas they had long contested
with Nicaragua.   By  ignoring  the court's decision in these
countries favor,  the U.S. undermined the judicial system it
helped create.  This  was  only  one of many instances where
regional and local agreements served nothing more than noble
rhetoric.  They  were   effective  only  if  enforced  by  a
powerful military machine.  The U.S.  essentially  dominated
the scene with the control of  banks, customs receiverships,
and the presence of the "machos" (he-men), U.S. Marines. 14/
     During  the  1920's,  the  U.S.  sought  to upgrade the
professionalism of  Central American armies and to establish
non-partisan constabularies trained by American instructors.
It was  expected  that a disciplined force could replace the
armies tainted by  corruption  and  local  oppression,  thus
removing principal  contributors to social turmoil, disorder
and financial disorganization.   The  U.S.  also  wished  to
eliminate  foreign   influence,   principally   German   and
Bolshevik,  from   seizing   opportunities  to  exploit  the
corrupted Central American armies.  The Guardia Nacional was
created in  Nicaragua,  trained  by U.S. Marines, and was to
become a dreaded symbol of interventionist policies.
U.S. Marines - The Second Occupation
     U.S. troops were withdrawn in 1925, with the assessment
that the propped up government was  stable  enough.  Shortly
after   withdrawal,   Conservative  factions  in  historical
fashion  returned  to  internal  power  struggles,  and  the
Liberals   again   seized  an  opportunity  for   rebellion.
Washington rallied to  the ailing government and the Marines
returned.  A  truce  between  the Conservatives and Liberals
was engineered  and  a  free,  U.S.  supervised election was
provided for in 1928.  Liberal Jose Maria  Moncada  won  the
election,  but  the  United  States  continued  to  dominate
Nicaraguan  affairs  applying  leverage through the American
Embassy,  military  presence,  control   of   money  supply,
railway, custom houses, and the U.S. trained Guardia. 15/
General Augusto Cesar Sandino - Folk Hero
     Earlier,  in  1927,  one Liberal General, Augusto Cesar
Sandino,  refused  to  accept  the   political  arrangements
proffered by the United States and retreated with his men to
the  mountains of Nuevo Seqovia.  Sandino had formulated his
own ideas and opinions about Nicaraguan politics.  Driven by
fervent nationalism,  he  supported  rights  for  indigenous
Indian populations, land reform and establishment of peasant
cooperatives.  His  goal  was   to  rid  Nicaragua  of  U.S.
domination and to eject the  foreign  military, the Marines.
Sandino declared Moncada a traitor and  on  July  16,  1927,
attacked the  Marine  outpost in Ocotal.  This was the first
of many classical guerrilla actions lasting until 1933.  The
mountain and  jungle  fighting was extremely frustrating for
the  Marines. Sandino quickly adapted to a hit-and-run type
warfare and gained much popular support  in  his  desire  to
prevent further "imperialistic" aspirations of the U.S.  The
war  was  a  ostly one that could  not  be  won  militarily.
Sandino had captured the hearts and  mind of the people, and
with  few  exceptions,  the   Marines  and  government  were
ineffective  in  fighting  an   unconventional  war.  Public
opinion at home was mounting against continued occupation of
Nicaragua.  The Marines hard drinking, brawling, womanizing,
and  especially their ability  to  fight,  earned  both  the
disrespect  and   fear   of  many  Nicaraguans.  The  aerial
bombardments  of  suspected guerrilla strongholds and forced
resettlement  of the poor, increased  support  for  Sandino,
whose  guerrilla  activities  and  strength  fluctuated.  In
1933, he continued to elude defeat even at the hands of some
of  the  most famous Marine Corps tacticians.   The  Marines
finally departed  after  training  a  fairly  effective  and
disciplined Guardia Nacional  in  charge  of  protecting the
Sacasa government.
Somoza - Vestige of U.S. Marine Presence
     The command  of  the Guard was left to Anastacio Somoza
Garcia, who  with his family, was to systematically plunder,
degrade, and agonize the Nicaraguan people until 1979.  As a
staunch U.S.  ally  and  rabid  anti-communist,  he would be
tolerated.  Considered a  vestige of the Marine intervention
which allowed his accession to  power,  Somoza, his Guardia,
and U.S. policy  would become despised by Nicaraguans.  This
ill-will would sow the seeds of future insurrection.
     Immediately after  the  Marines  departed  in 1933, the
undefeated Sandino  ceased  hostilities  and entered into an
agreement  with the Sacasa  government.  In  this  agreement
were provisions  for  amnesty  for him and his men.  Sandino
was recognized as a threat to Somoza's base of power and had
to  be  eliminated.  It  is interesting to note that Sandino
was honored by  a  special  resolution  at  the  1928  Sixth
Congress of  the  Communist International in Moscow.  Moscow
viewed Sandino as a patriot fighting against the  forces  of
"imperialism."  Sandino, however, avowed  that  he  owed  no
debts to any foreign ideology  and  declared his distrust of
communism.  For the Marxist-Leninist of the 1979 revolution,
he would  be remembered for his guerrilla victories, and his
disdain for U.S. intervention. 16/
     Somoza   worked   hard  to  consolidate  his  power  as
commander of the only military force in Nicaragua.  A system
was devised that required citizens to pay  bribes  to engage
in any activities, legal  or  otherwise.  Many  of  Somoza's
men,  extended  their   own  influence  into  vice  such  as
gambling,  prostitution,   and  smuggling.  Because  of  the
Guardia's power and infusion into Nicaragua politics, Somoza
successfully rigged the 1936 election and became President.
     Somoza became astute in his political dealings with the
U.S.  He  generally  received backing because of  his  anti-
communist stand  and  his obsequious support of U.S. foreign
policy.  In exchange  for  his  loyalty, Somoza was granted
Lend-Lease funds  to modernize the Guard and perpetuate his
power base. There  was growth in exports markets as well as
development of  an economic infrastructure primarily because
of U.S.  banking  interests.  Economic wealth, however, was
distributed  only  to the family and privileged  cronies  of
Somoza.  It is estimated that Somoza  added  $50 million to
his personal  wealth  during his tenure.  The plight of the
common Nicaraguan remained a festering sore, a reminder that
the dictatorship survived only because of U.S. support. 17/
The Second Somoza
     In  1956,  as  he was manipulating another campaign  to
ensure his fourth presidential term, Anastacio Somoza Garcia
was assassinated.  His  oldest  son, Luis, U.S. educated and
President  of  the  Congress,  filled  the  vacancy.   Luis'
younger  brother, Anastacio, head  of  the  National  Guard,
seized and  imprisoned  any opponents who might have offered
resistance to  his  brother's  succession.  During  the next
decade, democracy was just  a  convenient  fascade to ensure
consolidation of  greater  power  and  wealth.  Ffor  four of
these  years  martial  law  was  imposed.  For those Guardia
officers  and   men   associated   with   the   vast  Somoza
enterprises,  there  always  remained  the  opportunity  for
"extra   income."  Strong   opposition  still  existed,  but
rebellions  by outspoken  critics  and  youthful  university
nationalists were easily crushed.
     The  most serious confrontation for the Somozas was the
adversarial  role of the new Castro regime in  Cuba.  Castro
had  attempted  to topple  the  Somoza  government  and  was
training  Nicaraguan  students  in  Cuba  for  that purpose.
Several  uprisings failed, but Somoza retaliated by  lending
Nicaraguan support for  the  U.S.  sponsored  "Bay  of Pigs"
invasion  which  was launched  from  Puerto  Cabeza  on  the
Miskito Coast.  Castro in turn encouraged the formation of a
new elitist guerrilla organization, the  Sandinista National
Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberacion - FSLN) in
1961 which  was  to  spearhead popular uprisings in 1978 and
1979.  The  FSLN's original  founders  included  two  avowed
Marxists, Tomas  Borge  Martinez  and Carlos Fonseca Amador.
Fonseca chose the term Sandinista to signify both indigenous
Nicaraguan tradition and hatred of U.S. interventionism.
The Third Somoza - The Last Marine
     Somoza  responded  to  these  subversive  activities by
declaring a  state  of seige which helped consolidate power,
censor   the   press,  and  increase  his  counterinsurgency
capabilities through  U.S. assistance.  Luiz died of a fatal
heart attack in 1967, but true to form and with the powerful
Guardia behind him, Anastacio "Tacho," gained the presidency
through another rigged election,  a  hallmark  of Nicaraguan
politics and power transferral.
     During  his  first  term  (1967-1972), Anastacio relied
heavily on his military power.  The principles and abuses of
"militar  fuerar"   were   rampant.  "Militar   fuerar"  was
demonstrated  time   and   again  as   Guardia  officers  who
perpetrated  crimes against civilians were exiled with  full
pay and allowances, or  remained  immune  from  prosecution.
The constitution was amended at Somoza's insistence in order
for him  to succeed himself "legally."  Tacho's true motives
reflected those  of  his  family  predecessors, using public
office to make himself one  of the richest men in the world.
He,  his  family,  and  friends  owned  most  of  the  major
industries, and  over  20%. of the arable land.  His holdings
by 1972 were estimated to be at $300 million. 18/
     A severe earthquake in Managua in  1972  killed  10,000
people, devastated  the  city,  and left thousands homeless.
He  turned this national disaster into  short-term  personal
advantage.  The  National  Guard  was  allowed  to  sell the
international relief  supplies  that streamed in and to loot
and plunder the  devastated city.  Somoza and his associates
awarded business contracts to themselves for reconstruction,
financed  predominantly  by   international   relief  funds.
Emergency housing funds  were used to build luxury homes for
National  Guard  officers,  while  the  poor  received  sub-
standard wooden  shacks.  Somoza  declared  emergency taxes,
but  exempted  himself.  Somoza provided all the  incentives
necessary to alienate the people, further drive young people
to  join the FSLN, and encourage  some  elite  and  business
sectors  to financially support the FSLN guerrilla  movement
to topple Somoza.
     After a spectacular FSLN raid in December  1974,  which
was a  personal  affront  to  his  dignity,  Somoza declared
martial  law  and  unleashed  his  Guard  to  root  out  the
terrorists.  Arbitrary     imprisonment,    rape,    summary
execution, torture and extensive pillaging  were the tactics
used against the Nicaraguan people.  Somoza's flagrant abuse
of  human  rights  was  observed by Catholic and  Protestant
missionaries and  as  a  result  became  a  subject  for the
international  press   and  hearings  before  the  House  of
Representatives  Sub-committee on  International  Relations.
Human   rights   violations  became   a   focal   point   of
international relations  in  1977 for the newly elected U.S.
President, Jimmy  Carter.  Military and humanitarian aid was
used as an enticement by  the  U.S. for Somoza to modify his
dictatorship  to  acceptable  levels  of  tolerance.  Somoza
responded by  lifting  press censorship, the state of seige,
and  ordering  the  National  Guard to stop terrorizing  the
peasants.  During July of  1977,  Somoza suffered his second
heart attack and  was  evacuated  to Miami where he remained
for one-and-a-half months.  Many  hoped  that  he would die.
Others  pondered  the  political   future  of  Nicaragua  as
Somoza's  aides  began  looting the national treasury.  Upon
his return, Somoza was  forced  to  purge  his own political
household.   The  free  press  La  Prensa  carried  vehement
charges of corrupt government, chipped away at the  regime's
popular image,  and  gave  encouragement  to the opposition.
FSLN  attacks on Guard outposts increased  and  a  group  of
prominent  citizens  appeared,  known  as  "Los  Doce"  (The
Twelve).   Comprised   of  professionals,  businessmen,  and
clergy, this group called for a national solution and an end
to the  dictatorship.  Assassination  of La Prensa's editor,
Pedro  Joaquin  Chamorro,  precipitated  a  final  18  month
offensive in what the opposition called "a war  of  national
liberation in which an externally created dictatorial system
supported almost exclusively by  a  foreign trained personal
army, was  overthrown  by  all  classes."  Somoza was simply
"the last  Marine."  18/ The  two week strike that followed
was 80-90% effective, but  the Guard, which could not afford
to  lose  its sponsor, was able to  hold  out  despite  more
spectacular  raids and attacks  by  the  FSLN,  intermittent
labor  strikes, and  civil  uprisings  in  urban  areas.  An
Indian prising in a Masaya neighborhood was countered with 2
tanks, 3 armored cars, 5 50-caliber machine  guns, 2 planes,
2 helicopter  gunships, and 600 heavily armed men.  19/  The
lightly  armed people were easily defeated and  their  homes
were completely destroyed.
     Somoza remained determined  to  complete his term which
expired  in  1981.   The   U.S.,   realizing   the   serious
circumstances  that   Somoza   now   confronted,   tried  to
ameliorate  the  situation  by  promoting  elections.  These
actions  were  viewed  as  manipulation  by  Nicaraguans who
already sensed a victory was near.  A private letter sent by
President  Carter, congratulating Somoza on his promises  to
improve  human  rights,  infuriated the FSLN which concluded
that they  had  misjudged  the U.S.'s waning support for the
dictator.   On  22 August, a daring raid was launched on the
National Legislative Palace, led  by  Eden Pastora.  Twenty-
five  FSLN  guerrillas  impersonating  the  elite  guard  of
Anastacio  III,  Somoza's  son,  burst  into the palace  and
immediately seized  1,500  hostages,  mostly legislators and
bureaucrats.  Intense negotiations  netted the FSLN $500,000
ransom, safe passage, release  of  59  political  prisoners,
concessions to striking health workers,  and  a  humiliating
defeat for Somoza.  Pastora, who  took  the "nome de guerre"
of  "Commandante Zero" because of the number 0 on  his  dog
tags,  became the national hero of the revolution.   Massive
acts of defiance were triggered within a restless population
that saw Somoza's power easily challenged.  Nonetheless, the
Guardia  fought  ferociously  and with vengeance, bombarding
and  strafing insurgent cities.  Government forces moved  in
for "mop up" operations.  Males who were of fighting age and
thousands   of   non-combatants  were  summarily   executed.
Sensing that the end was near,  Somoza  and  his  associates
began liquidating assets and a capital flight commenced that
was to leave the treasury depleted.  U.S. support  had  been
withdrawn, and  arms  sales  frozen,  despite  arguments  by
Somoza's  U.S.  friends that  Cuban-backed  communists  were
about to defeat a long-time ally.
The Final Offensive
     The  FSLN  prepared  itself  for  one  final offensive,
enlisting  several  thousand  young  men  and  women, mostly
students  from  urban  areas.  They  were  armed  with light
western weapons, purchased on the international arms  market
with funds donated by sympathetic Latin  American countries,
notably Panama, Venezuela, and Cuba.  Finances for arms also
came from the social democratic parties of  western  Europe,
leftist groups in the U.S., and undoubtedly from Soviet bloc
and  other  revolutionary governments. 20/   In  June  1979,
barricades were  erected   in poor neighborhoods and Somoza`s
control  gradually shrank as the FSLN systematically overran
National Guard outposts throughout the provinces.   With the
prospect of near certain defeat of Somoza, the U.S. proposed
to the Organization  of American States that a peace keeping
force be sent to Managua.  This was unanimously rejected and
the  U.S.  began  dealing  with  the FSLN which had declared
itself    the    Provisional    Government    of    National
Reconstruction.
     The U.S. proposals for the FSLN to include "moderates,"
members  of Somoza's Guard and party were  flatly  rejected,
and the  U.S.  was  forced to accept Somoza's inevitable and
total defeat.  Arrangements were made to fly Somoza to Miami
on 17 July.  On 18 July, the provisional junta took the oath
of office in Leon, and on  19  July, greeted by enthusiastic
supporters,  the new government marched  into  Managua.  The
following   day,   they   celebrated   their   unconditional
insurrectionist victory and pledged to restore democracy and
freedom  to  a  war-torn Nicaragua.  The events of the  next
four years  demonstrated  that  the  revolution  was not yet
complete, but a beginning of greater crises yet to come.
     Somoza's violent finale came  just  a  year later.  His
net worth was then estimated at $600 million. 21/  After his
escape  to  Miami,  he  settled  into  a  palatial estate in
Asuncion,  Paraguay with  his  mistress  of  18  years.  One
morning his chauffer-driven Mercedes was attacked by bazooka
and  machine  gun  fire,  and  Somoza  was assassinated.  An
Argentine  revolutionary   group   was  implicated.  In  the
streets of Managua, people danced and rejoiced. 22/
                            NOTES
              Chapter Two:  A Tortured History
          1.  Henry A. Kissinger.  Cover Letter to Report of
the  National  Bipartisan  Commission  on  Central  America,
commonly referred to as the "Kissinger Report."  Washington,
D.C.:  U.S. Executive Dept., 10 January, 1984.
          2.  Ibid., p. 12.
          3.  Richard L. Millett.  Guardians of the Dynasty.
(Maryknoll, N.Y.:  Orbis Books 1977) p. 198.
          4.  ____________.  "Praetorians  or  Patriots?   The
Central American  Military" in Central America, Anatomy of a
Conflict.  Ed.  by  Robert  S.  Leiken  (New York:  Pergamon
Press, 1984) pp. 69-70.
          5.   Ibid.
          6.  Thomas  W.  Walker.  Nicaragua,  The  Land  of
Sandino.  (Boulder, Co.:  Westview Press, 1982) pp. 10-12.
          7.   The   Monroe    Doctrine  as    outlined   in
Encyclopedia   Brittanica.     15th  ed.  vol.  12.  (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1980) pp. 388-389.
          6.  Richard L.  Millett.  "Historical  Settings" in
Nicaragua:   A Country Study.  Ed. by  Rudolph.  (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1982) pp. 11-12.
          9.   Walker, p. 14.
         1e.   Millett, A Country Study.  p. 14.
         11.   Ibid.
         12.   Walker, p. 16.
         13.   Millett, Guardians, p. 21.
         14.   _________.  A Country Study, pp. 19-20.
         15.   Walker, p. 21.
         16.   Millett, A Country Study, p. 28-9.
         17.  Walker,  p.  28.  Any figures of Somoza family
wealth are estimates  at  best,  and probably exaggerated by
Walker.   There  is  no doubt, however, that all the Somozas
were immensely  wealthy  from  their monopoly of Nicaragua's
industry.
         16.  Ibid, p. 34.
         19.  Ibid, p. 35.
         20.  Millett, A Country Study, p. 52.
         21.  _________.  p.  58  and  Walker  p.  43.  Net
worth of  the  last Somoza range from $100-500 million, with
total  capital   flight  from  Nicaragua  at  $1.5  billion.
Logically,  much of his wealth  was  in  land  and  business
holdings that could not be liquidated.
         22.  "Somoza's   Violent   Death."   Newsweek,   29
September, 1980.  pp. 34-36.
    CHAPTER THREE:  A COG IN THE WHEEL OF SOVIET HEGEMONY
     On 13  May,  1983,  the  Permanent  Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives issued a report
which concluded that  Cuban  and  Nicaraguan  insurgents had
escalated aid to leftist guerrillas in Honduras with massive
Soviet bloc support.  El Salvador, Guatamala, and Costa Rica
were also targeted for revolution.  The  explicit  goals  of
these  actions were to consolidate control of the Sandinista
regime  in  Nicaragua  and,  through  politically  motivated
violence, to  exacerbate  demands for more democracy, social
justice,  and  economic   development.  Under   this  guise,
extreme leftist groups might  be brought to power in Central
America. 1/ Several weeks earlier, on 27 April, 1983, in an
address  to  a  joint  session of Congress, President Reagan
declared that:
     The national  security  of  all the Americas is at
     stake in Central America.   If  we  cannot  defend
     ourselves  there,   we  cannot  expect  to  prevail
     elsewhere.    Our  credibility  would collapse, our
     alliances crumble,  and the safety of our homeland
     would be put at jeopardy.
     The  potential  for  crises   in  Central  America  was
recognized as  early  as  1954,  when  President  Dwight  D.
Eisenhower believed that Latin America would become a battle-
ground    against    communism.  In    documents    recently
declassified as part of  the  State Department's series "The
Foreign Relations  of  the  United  States,"  Eisenhower was
quoted as saying to  his  Secretary  of  State,  John Foster
Dulles, that "you must think  of our policy in Latin America
as  chiefly  designed to play a part in the Cold War against
our enemies. ... Russia would shortly step into any vacuum if
we  allowed  one to develop in  Latin  America.  The  United
States is not merely doing business in Latin America, but is
fighting  a  war  there against communism." 2/  Two  decades
later,  a  senior U.S. military advisor to  Nicaragua  would
assess in his debriefing report that the threat of communist
insurgency was minimal in Nicaragua, but that the  dominance
of General Somoza  and  his  family  in  all  the  country's
functions ranging from  economics  to  politics,  misuse  of
authority by  the  National Guard officers and men, monopoly
of reconstruction  jobs  and  contracts  by Somoza after the
earthquake of 1972, and a potential pool of insurgents among
university students  and  construction laborers, constituted
all  the volatile ingredients necessary for  an  insurgency.
The  only  significant  insurgent  group  at  the  time  was
considered   to  be  the  Frente  Sandinista  de  Liberacion
Nacional  (FSLN).  "They   were   poorly  organized,  lacked
leadership, and appeared to have little  external  communist
assistance."   3/   The    briefing   officer's   assessment
underestimated  the  FSLN  completely.  On  July  19,  1979,
Eisenhower's prophetic insight was to be borne out again and
suddenly another "Cuba" had arrived in  the hemisphere.  The
victorious  Sandinista  revolutionaries  were  in  power  in
Managua,   and  they  had  deposed   the   most   long-lived
dictatorship   in   the  history  of   Latin   America.  The
Sandinista  ideology had  grown  around  cult  hero  General
Augusto  Sandino.  The  name  and the myth surrounding  this
man signified  blind  patriotism  and  a guerrilla stalemate
against U.S. Marines in a 6 year Vietnam-type war.  In 1959,
a  group of students, long  frustrated  at  their  inability
through legal means to rid the country f the Somoza dynasty,
turned their efforts towards insurrection.  The organization
was called   Frente   de   Liberacion   Nacional  (The  National
Liberation   Front).   It   was  their  Marxist leader,  Carlos
Fonseca  Amador,  who   added   "Sandinista"  as  previously
mentioned to stress both indigenous Nicaraguan tradition and
a strong position against United States intervention.
 The Three Tendencies
     The   Frente   Sandinista   de  Liberacion  (FSLN)  was
officially founded in Honduras on  the symbolic date of July
26, 1961 (the eighth anniversary of Fidel Castro's attack on
Moncada  Barracks that launched the  Cuban  Revolution).  4/
The Sandinista National Liberation Front was to wage several
unsuccessful  guerrilla  battles  in  the 1960's against the
guardians of Somoza's  dynasty,  the National Guard.  In the
1970's, the  FSLN concentrated its efforts on organizing the
peasants and with "land for the poor" as one of its platform
objectives,  began  to   rally  support.  There  were  three
distinct factions or tendencies which formed the  FSLN.  The
Prolonged  Popular  War  tendency had  its  roots  in  "Che"
Guevara's  "foco"   theory   which  initiated  revolutionary
movement through  the  armed  action  of  a  rural guerrilla
vanguard.  This movement essentially  mimicked  the rhetoric
and tactics  of the Cuban revolution to mobilize the masses.
Because  the foco theory had  essentially  failed  in  Latin
America  due to  its  predominant  rural  emphasis,  Fonseca
modified   the  military  strategy  slightly.  He  theorized
that war should still be fought primarily in the  Nicaraguan
countryside and mountains, but logistical  support  must  be
provided from the cities.   In  the beginning of the 1970's,
the Proletarian tendency evolved as a novel Marxist faction.
Its leaders  had  received  their ideological foundations in
Chile during the Allende years.  Their  theories  favored  a
total break with western centers of capitalism, and movement
of   revolution   from   the   countryside   to   the  city.
Proletariats would be organized from  the Nicaraguan working
class and the  rural  proletariats from the cotton fields of
Leon  and   Chinandega,   the   only   regions  where  rural
proletariats  rather than  peasants  existed  in  Nicaragua.
Between the ideological divisions  of  the  Proletarian  and
Popular   War  Tendencies   emerged   the   "insurrectionist
tendency" or  the  "tercerista"  (third  way) faction.  This
tendency  was   more  pragmatic  and  envisioned  a  gradual
transition  to socialism, incorporating a broad  concept  of
class   alliances  including  middle-class  businessmen  and
professional groups.  Without  the  catalytic  Fidel  Castro
advocating the  unification of the three tendencies, and the
efforts of Panama's Torrijos and Carlos Andres Perez, social
democrat  and  former  president  of  Venezuela,  a unity of
effort might  not  ever  have  been  achieved.  5/  The  new
coalition came  to  a  basic agreement for a broad political
program  and  developed  a  unified  military  strategy  and
command  structure.  Thousands of men, women, young boys and
girls barely in their teens, allied to the cry of "Sandino,"
and with the concurrent tactics of  guerrilla insurgency and
massive  labor  strikes,  Nicaragua  became  paralyzed.  The
retaliatory   and  indiscriminant  bombings  and   excessive
counterattacks   that   left   50,000   dead   and   100,000
homeless, 6/ were not sufficient  deterrents to a people who
desired the platforms of  the  Sandinista Party.  These were
democracy, development  and  transformation  of the economy,
improved  social  welfare  programs,  and   the   rights  of
sovereignty and self-determination for Nicaraguan people.
A Revolution Betrayed
     The betrayal of the revolution of 1979 which led to the
dominance  of  a  Marxist-Leninist regime is attributable to
three   primary  causes.  Ffirst  was  the  history  of  U.S.
interventionism   and   endorsement   of   pseudo-democratic
governments backed by strong military factions.  Second  was
the  insensitivity   of   U.S.   policy  makers  to  chronic
sociological and economic  problems  in  Nicaragua.  And the
third  was  the adroit manner in which the Soviet Union  has
assessed the  U.S.  self-created  "vacuum in the region and
fostered  promotion  of  its  own  strategic interests.  The
Soviet projection  of power moved from subtle to crude power
plays  using Cuba and now Nicaragua as linch pins  in  their
efforts  to hegemonize the Caribbean region and undercut the
strategic  "backdoor" of the United States.  This  has  been
accomplished by  fomenting  wars  of  national liberation to
free  "the  long  suppressed  masses,"  infiltration  of the
Catholic clerical  heirarchy,  and  radicalization  of small
political bases  among  revolutionary  leaders  who  were to
become major  proponents of isolating Latin America from the
U.S.  and  its  western allies.  A review of Soviet strategy
and   pragmatic   communist  doctrine  is   appropriate   to
analyze historically the Sandinista rise  to  power, and the
employment of  Cuban  and  other  Soviet aligned Third World
governments to achieve Soviet objectives.
U.S. Vital Interests in the Caribbean
     On the  grand  scale of strategy, the Soviet aim in the
Caribbean region is  to achieve both a military and economic
balance of  strength  over  that  of the United States.  The
increased  presence   of   Soviet   might,  utilizing  Cuban
surrogates as recently as Grenada, illustrates an attempt to
establish and consolidate footholds in a region vital to our
welfare.  This  is  to  be  accomplished  while  U.S.  power
concentration is  in  the mid-East and western Pacific.  The
vitality  of the entire region lies in the crossing  of  the
sea lines  of  communication  (SLOC)  and  aerial-skyways of
transport  and resupply (ASTAR),  as  well  as  other  vital
checkpoints  through which  critical  logistic  supplies  of
petroleum and minerals, and U.S. military forces  must  pass
in order to quickly respond  to  global  crises.  The Soviet
goal is to restrict, and eventually cutoff these air and sea
routes.  An  analysis  of the  logistics  make-up  of  items
traversing  the  SLOC and  ASTAR  will  readily  make  their
importance apparent.
     The United States depends upon foreign sources for over
fifty  percent  of the  thirty-two  minerals  essential  for
industrial  and  military  applications.  Also,   the   U.S.
imports over one-third of its oil supplies.   Control of the
Caribbean and Central America are critical for protection of
logistic  pipelines.  Arabia  and Africa have been described
as the petroleum pump for oil  resources,  the  Indian Ocean
and Atlantic Ocean  as  the  sea hoses of communication, and
finally the Caribbean and Central America as the nozzles for
the petroleum l feline. 7/
     The  limited  number  of  entrances  and  exits  to the
Caribbean make  t a closed continental  sea.  The  Caribbean
basin is encirc ed by the  Bahamas, Puerto Rico, the Virgin,
Leeward, Windward and Grenadine Islands on the eastern edge.
North, Central and  South  America  complete  the perimeter.
The Panama  Canal  currently remains the only passage to the
Pacific.   It  has been described as the juggler vein of the
region.  The  Greater  Antilles  grouping  of  Puerto  Rico,
Hispanola,  Jamaica  and  Cuba dominate the ocean basin  and
also form  a  barrier  between  the  continents of North and
South America.  The  Mona,  Windward,  and  Yucatan channels
provide  north  and south routes through the  chain  to  the
Americas, while the straits of Florida and Santaren passage,
provide outlets from the Gulf of Mexico to the Atlantic.  To
the  east  and  south  of the Caribbean Basin lie Mexico and
Venezuela, major  world  oil producers.  The petroleum super
tankers  of the Mid-East, Alaska and Ecuator pulsate through
the  Caribbean   and  Antilles  channels.  Additionally,  the
Bahamas, Virgin   Island,  Trinidad,  and  Curacao-Aruba have
ports where the  super   tankers  emanating  from the Persian
Gulf, transfer   their  petroleum  to  smaller tankers before
further transport of Gulf and Atlantic coast refineries.
     The Panama Canal also is a critical key for U.S. energy
supply  as  both  Alaskan  crude  and  oil from Ecuador  are
transported through the canal or pumped overland through The
Republic  of  Panama  to  augment  the  present  volume.  In
perspective, approximately  seventy-five percent of all U.S.
oil  imports  are  either  produced  on  the  shores  of the
Caribbean Basin,  or  transit its straits or periphery.  The
power that controls the region and  Central  America,  could
easily interdict and cutoff the U.S. petroleum pipeline.
     As  previously  indicated, strategic minerals essential
for high technology defense and industrial systems also pass
through  this  vital  region.  Examples follow:  Mexico  and
Brazil  are  significant  suppliers of manganese  (the  U.S.
imports 97% of its requirement).   Guatamala possesses large
nickel  reserves  and became a major supplier in  1978  (the
U.S. imports  76 percent).  The major U.S. supply of bauxite
(93 percent is imported) is  mined  in the Caribbean nations
of  Jamaica, Haiti,  Surinam,  Guayana,  and  The  Dominican
Republic.   Much of the iron ore critical for the U.S. steel
industry originates from  Brazil  and  Venezuela,  and  like
petroleum must  transit  the  chokepoints and passageways of
the Caribbean. 8/
     The current revolutionary upheaval in Meso-America, and
specifically  Nicaragua  and  neighboring El Salvador, is no
coincidence; it  is a blatant projection of Soviet and Cuban
power.   Such  a  strategy  mandates  that the U.S. assume a
permanently increased defense burden in a time of burgeoning
national debt,  or  compels  already overcommitted forces to
the regions closer to our borders.  This could only occur at
great  expense,   and   by  reducing  important  commitments
elsewhere  in  the  world.  In  addition  to  petroleum  and
strategic  minerals,  approximately  fifty percent and forty
percent of  total  shipping  tonnage  for  European and East
Asian  scenarios  respectively,  would  also  have  to  pass
through  the Caribbean Basin.  The exportation of communist-
inspired   insurgency   from   Cuba   and  Nicaragua,  poses
significant problems  to our security interests, and if such
a   threat  is  not  countered,  would  further   serve   to
demonstrate U.S. impotence.  The Kissinger  Panel summarized
our  direct  national security interests  in  the  American-
Caribbean region as preventing:
     -- developments which  would require commitment of
     large resources to defend our southern approaches
     -- threats to our Caribbean SLOC's
     --   increased  violence,  dislocation  of   Meso-
     Americans,  regional   repression  generated  from
     Marxist-Leninist regimes
     --  further  erosion  of  the  U.S.'   ability  to
     influence  events  worldwide as perceived from our
     impotence to solve problems close to home. 9/
Six Lessons of Communism for Nicaragua 10/
     Historically the  Soviet  strategy  has  been developed
through trial and error application since  the  1930's.  The
lessons  of  revolutionary  warfare have been reduced to six
fundamental  principles.  A  general  review  of  Sandinista
actions  since   1979,   corroborate  a  similar  scheme  in
Nicaragua.
I.  While the middle class can be manipulated to gain power,
    it is only by revolutionizing the  masses  that Marxists
    can maintain power.
     The Sandinistas expanded their powerbase rapidly in the
mid-to-late 1970's period with  wide popular support.  Their
revolutionary   movement   promised   extensive   political,
military, social and economic changes.   After  1979,  these
changes  were made suddenly and with significant short  term
success with  which  the  masses  could identify.  The Robin
Hood bravado of expropriating the goods of the rich, notably
Somoza's and his families properties, to  feed,  clothe, and
house the poor,  served  to radicalize the popular base even
further.   The   middle  class-liberals,  social  democrats,
conservatives, church hierarchy who were  all manipulated to
assist  in  he  overthrow  of Somoza, were quickly edged out
after the  revolution and proved to be no match against what
had  become  a disciplined, organized communist  cadre.  The
masses  continued  to observe tangible results  while  being
inculcated  with  massive doses of revolutionary propaganda.
The  literacy  program, implemented predominantly  by  2,000
Cuban teachers, served not only to teach people how to read,
but  cultivated and nourished an anti-imperialist, anti-U.S.
attitude.  Agrarian  reform,   National   food   and  health
services programs,  though positive and initially effective,
all carried  the unmistakeable mark of developing loyalty to
the one-party system of the Sandinistas.
II.   A  Marxist-Leninist  nation  in  Latin America such as
      Nicaragua  must  reduce  economic dependence upon  the
      U.S.  and integrate economically with the Soviet Union
      or other communist bloc countries.
     After July 1979, Fidel Castro counseled the Sandinistas
that  they   should   modify   this  tenet  and  trade  with
industrialized democracies to  ensure the safety and success
of  the  revolution.  From  his own mistakes in Cuba, Castro
essentially derived  Lenin's  dictum  that  "the capitalists
will fight among themselves to sell us the rope to hang them
with." 11/  Castro  experienced,  as  would  Nicaragua,  the
difficulty delivering promises of prosperity for the-poor in
a war-torn economy, particularly when much of  the expertise
in the industrial and business sector had fled  in  the face
of state appropriation,  or  to  escape  the consequences of
prior associations with Somoza.
     While  Nicaragua is still very much dependent upon U.S.
and other western markets, its  goal  has  been  to  achieve
solvency  through  trade  with other Third World  countries,
especially  those   countries   that  are  pro-soviet.  This
strategy  has  been  facilitated to a great extent  by  U.S.
economic warfare and  an  embargo  of Nicaraguan goods.  The
U.S.  reduced by 90% its sugar import quota  from  Nicaragua
and  redistributed  it  to  other   ailing  Central  American
countries friendly to  the  U.S.   Although  the January 1984
embargo of meat from Nicaragua 12/ was under the pretense of
carcinogen  contamination,  it is another  element  of  U.S.
strategy to constrict Nicaragua's economy.  In  response  to
the U.S. sugar embargo, the governments of Algeria and  Iran
agreed  to  off-set  these actions and to purchase more than
the  amount  embargoed  and  at  higher prices.  It is  also
estimated that  25%  of goods such as sugar and coffee, find
their way  to  the  Soviet  Union  while  these products are
rationed in Nicaragua. 13/  Although the economic outlook is
precipitous   at  best,  foreign  credits  from  sympathetic
governments, rescheduling of  almost $3 billion in debt, and
expansion of  trade  with anti-western countries will assist
in reducing dependence on U.S. trade.  But it will be a long
struggle  that   will  require  Nicaraguans  many  years  of
"tightening their belts" for the sake of the revolution, and
promises that will never be fulfilled.
III.   A socialist state in Latin America cannot expect help
       from the Orqanization  of American  States  (OAS) and
       any appeals  should be  made  directly  to the United
       Nations where the Soviet Union  sits on  the Security
       Council.
     Nicaragua has consistently ignored the  OAS  forum as a
means to  solve  regional  conflicts  or to protest the U.S.
backing of Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries working out of
Honduras.  The OAS, criticized as being too "U.S. oriented,"
has experienced   a  gradual erosion in its influence and has
been ineffective  in  voicing the concerns of its thirty-one
member nations.  Nicaragua  bypasses  the  OAS  and uses the
more sympathetic United Nations arena to  capitalize on USSR
backing.  Here it castigates the  U.S.  for  interventionist
and subversive activities.   This  elevated attention serves
to  further   polarize   the   crisis   into   an  East-West
confrontation, and alienate world opinion against  the U.S..
Meanwhile,  the  Soviets  smugly  sponsor wars  of  national
liberation by both direct and surrogate means.  Although the
U.N. Security Council is the primary means for Nicaragua to
gain   international   recognition   and   legitimize  their
revolution, another  group  has  evolved  to  the  status of
neutral mediator.  The  Contadora group (taken from meetings
on the  Panamanian  resort isle of Contadora and composed of
Mexico, Venezuela,  Panama,  and  Columbia)  is  seeking  to
become  the  power  broker  in  negotiating  or  encouraging
bilateral  and  multilateral  agreements  to  avoid  further
turmoil in the region.  The  political  clout  of this group
rests in the primary fact that both Mexico and Venezuela are
major  suppliers   of   U.S.   oil  and  wield  considerable
influence.  Also, Panama and Columbia play significant roles
in maintaining a secure trans-isthmian  canal.  The relative
stability  of these  nations  and  their  quasi-independence
from  U.S.  domination, also lend credibility to Contadora's
"neutral" status.
     The resurgent interest in reviving the effectiveness of
the OAS body will be viewed merely as an opportunity for the
U.S. to renew its historically manipulative influence in the
affairs  of  Central and South America.   The  Soviets  will
strongly insist  that the Sandinista government continue the
"status quo" to further enhance Soviet strategic goals.
IV.    Political  rights should only be exercised by the com-
       munists, and  a  dictatorial  one-party system must be
       established to eliminate any opposition.
     The Sandinista platform  also  contained  promises of a
pluralistic  government,   a   new  constitution,  and  free
elections  after  the  takeover.  As previously stated,  the
revolution had  the  support  of  many  broad factions.  The
government  initially installed by the  FSLN  reflected  the
pluralistic, multi-class representation of  the  revolution.
The  cabinet  included  FSLN militants, Christian democrats,
Liberals,  Conservatives,  and   representatives   from  the
Catholic  hierarchy.  The  Junta  of National Reconstruction
also reflected  a  diverse  range  of interests -- militants
Daniel  Ortega  Saavedra and Moises Hassan, author-educator,
Sergio   Ramirez  Mercado,  prominent  businessman,  Alfonso
Robelo Callejas,  and the wife of martyred La Prensa editor,
Violeta Barrios de Chamorro.
     Despite  the  diverse  character of the new government,
the only real power was the nine-man directorate of the FSLN
party.   All  other  groups were politically dwarfted by the
FSLN which  continued to gain support from the profileration
of "popular organizations" that were  established  in  every
hamlet  and  neighborhood  in  the country.  Among  the  ass
organizations  were  the  Sandinist  Youth, the  grass-roots
Sandinist Defense Committees (CDS),  the  Sandinist  Workers
Central  (CST)  which would soon dominate industry and labor
unions, the Rural Workers Association  (ATC),  and the Luisa
Amanda Espinosa Association of  Nicaraguan  Women  (AMNLAE).
The  Nicaraguans  never  had  such freedom of association or
participation   in   government   organizations  and   while
membership  swelled,  the  FSLN  continued  to  consolidate,
propagadize, and  further radicalize their one-party system.
The  FSLN  dominated  the  television  and  radio  networks,
operated the national newspaper Barricada while allowing the
independent La Prensa to publish, but only under restrictive
censorship   rules   which  would  not  tolerate  government
criticism.  Among  the  elements of pluralism that  remained
were  the  Superior  Council  of Private Enterprise (COSEP),
representing owners of 60% of the economy  that had not been
nationalized  after  the  revolution,  the  Social Christian
Party, the Conservative Democratic Party, and the Nicaraguan
Democratic Movement.  Collectively,  these  groups commanded
as little as  20%  of the popular support.  COSEP did retain
some political leverage because of  its  influence  over the
private sector.  COSEP's  existence  was  in  reality spared
because  the  FSLN  had neither the means nor the  technical
expertise to nationalize any greater amount of property than
what  was  seized  after  the revolution.  As early  as  six
months after the overthrow, however, COSEP members were wary
of  further  encroachment  by  the Sandinistas into economic
decisions and  deliberate  FSLN  attempts  to  dilute  their
power.  In I980, COSEP withdrew from  the  Council  of State
and began drawing smaller organizations into  a  non-Marxist
coalition   critical    of    Sandinista   initiatives.  The
Sandinistas   countered   by   reviving   their   own   pre-
revolutionary coalition, and by  directing  attacks  at  any
opposition, forcing  many  to  flee  and  others  to remain,
stripped of any political means to voice their dissent.  The
completion  of  this  lesson  is still underway in Nicaragua
although militant  dissidents  and  social  reformists still
seek options for a pluralistic form of government  14/
V.  The Church must  be  infiltrated  and  stripped  of  its
    power, discredited, or won  over to eliminate a rallying
    point for anti-communists.
     The Sandinistas manipulated the  church  to  accomplish
revolutionary  goals  and now continue to capitalize on  the
most  liberal  elements  of  both  Catholic  and  Protestant
denominations  to   influence  world  opinion.  The  various
churches achieved unity in the struggle to topple Somoza and
to  end the corruption of his National Guard.  Participation
by Christians ran  the  gamut from those who joined the FSLN
and the armed  struggle  for  radical  change,  to those who
sought  non-violent solutions.  There  were  communists  and
anti-communists,  both  united  in their single  cause.  The
Catholic church had strongly denounced the abuses of Somoza.
The most  vehement  protests  came after the 1972 earthquake
when mass  relief  assistance intended for homeless victims,
was  confiscated  by  the government  and  appropriated  for
Somoza's  and  his associates' personal profit.   The church
became a  haven  of  refuge  during  the massive destruction
caused by  Somoza,  and  because  of  the  church's outright
criticism, it too came under attack and reprisal.   Numerous
priests  and nuns supported the guerrillas and some took  up
arms themselves.  The role of the church had begun a gradual
transformation since the Vatican Council  of Pope John XXIII
in 1962,  which  called  for  a socially active dimension to
minister to the needs of the poor.  The church had long been
criticized  for its patronage to the elite in Latin America,
while ignoring  the  oppressed and downtrodden.  Out of this
movement was to  evolve "liberation theology" to counter the
economic assault of the poor, i.e., low standards of living,
and on an ideological level,  to  articulate the dignity and
rights of the indigent and oppressed minorities.  Liberation
theology  called for the active participation by  Christians
to correct  these social ills.  Unfortunately, this movement
attracted  radicals  with   an   insurrectionist   bent  for
violence.  Many   of   the  Catholic  hierarchy,  profoundly
influenced by Marxist thought, translated  this  into  armed
struggle by leading guerrilla movements or by endorsing wars
of   national    liberation.  Those    radical   extremists,
considered Christianity  and  Marxism  as mutual vehicles to
cultural  and political revolution.  Nestor  Paz  Zamora,  a
Bolivian student  involved  in the guerrilla movement in his
country Proclaimed:
     Greater love  has no man than this, that a man lay
     down his life for his friends ... .  That  is  why
     we take  up  arms  to  defend  the  illiterate and
     undernourished  majority from  exploitation  by  a
     minority  and   to   give   back  dignity  to  the
     dehumanized person. 15/
Another proponent added that:
     There  can  be  authentic  development  for  Latin
     America  only  if  there is  liberation  from  the
     domination  exercised   by  the  great  capitalist
     countries,  and  especially  by the most powerful,
     the United States of America. 16/
     In  Jose  Miranda's  book,   Communism  in  the  Bible,
published  by  Maryknoll, the foreign missionary service  of
the  American  Catholic  Church (and source of  many  clergy
under Marxist  influence),  the  author  states  that  Jesus
Christ was the first Sandinista, an avowed communist, who as
a hardened revolutionary  engaged in revolutionary activity,
was executed for sedition.  His revolution collapsed because
it was a "communist island in an economic sea  characterized
by exploitation of the poor." 17/
     Among the first events staged by the Catholic hierarchy
after  the  revolution  were  church   masses  to  celebrate
Somoza's overthrow.   At  least two dozen clergymen accepted
key positions within organizations or  ministries, and other
important government posts.  Father  Miquel Escoto Brockman,
a  Maryknoll  priest, Father Ernesto  Cardenal  Martinez,  a
Trappiest  Monk,  and  Franciscan  Father  Edgardo  Dorrales
Castillo received ministerial posts.   A subsequent directive
issued from Pope John Paul II in 1980 and a pastorial letter
by Nicaragua's bishops in 1981 called for their resignation.
Their refusal led to a compromise that  allowed  the Marxist
priests to continue in their governmental positions but they
were not allowed  to  perform  the  Sacraments.  The  church
became divided  over  the  issues  of  the  revolution,  and
opposition led by  Archbishop Miquel Obando y Bravo, charged
that  the  government was manipulating religious  sentiment,
denigrating  religious education, and moving away  from  the
pluralistic objectives originally espoused by the government
of National Reconstruction.
     Priests   and   Protestant  clergy  critical   of   the
Sandinistas  have  been  deported, maligned,  and  have  had
religious services disrupted  by  Sandinist supporters.  The
overall effect of continued repression has  been  to  divide
the church  and undermine the popular support and power base
which  it  formerly enjoyed.  This has been accomplished not
without extensive  support  from  leftist interest groups in
the U.S.
VI.  The old army must be liquidated and replaced with a Red
     Militia.
     Somoza's  National Guard was quickly dismantled.   Many
former  Somoza  loyalists   fled   the   country   to  avoid
retribution  for  the  atrocities  they had committed.  Some
formed the  nucleus  of counter-guerrilla groups to wage hit
and  run  operations  against the new "de facto" government.
Summary executions were common  if  captured  Guard  members
could  be  associated with atrocities, torture,  and  murder
committed during their tenures.  Others were  linked  to the
military  operations   that   were   overreactions  to  FSLN
guerrilla  activities  before the  fall.  These  operations,
mostly indiscriminant reprisals by  the  Guard,  resulted in
50,000  civilian  dead,  100,000 wounded, and  over  150,000
homeless or orphaned.   The  jails  soon  swelled  to 11,000
persons, mostly Somoza supporters and National Guard. 18/
     During  the  final  days of war before the victory, the
Sandinista strength grew exponentially as  urban  insurgents
liberated weapons from surrendering guardsmen.
     Although this army was largely untrained, it provided a
base from  which  police  and emerging service organizations
could  be  mobilized.  During  the first year, undisciplined
adherents were weeded out.  The remainder became politically
and  socially  indoctrinated  supporters of  the  Sandinista
revolution.  19/  Throughout  1980,  these  rebel and  urban
militia  were  transformed  into  an  official armed forces.
Military advisors from Cuba, the Soviet Union, European Bloc
Countries,  and  other  revolutionary  governments  provided
technical expertise to complete this transformation  into an
FSLN  army.  The  armed   forces  were  comprised  of  three
branches  --    the  Sandinist   Popular   Army   (EPS)   of
approximately 25,000  strength,  the Sandinista Police (PS),
comprised of several thousand urban police officers,  and  a
lightly armed volunteer force  of about 100,000 civilians in
the Sandinist Popular Militias (MPS).  A thorough program of
political  education  was  implemented in all branches.  The
ultimate  control   of   all   decisionmaking   and   policy
formulation  was vested with the National Directorate  which
was  the   collective  leadership  of  the  FSLN.  The  FSLN
Directorate consisted of nine members who  were  the  senior
veterans of  the revolution.  A three-man military committee
was  formed  consisting  of Tomas Borge,  Commander  of  the
Revolution,  Humberto Ortega Saavedra, Minister of  Defense,
and Luis Carrioni, Vice Minister of Interior.  Borge rose to
preeminent power as the most influential of this group whose
mission   was   responsibility  for  all  military  affairs.
Figure 3-1  depicts organization, command and control of the
Nicaraguan armed  forces.  Forces  are  moved  freely within
this  command   structure  depending  upon  the  mission  or
perceived threat.  The unifying factor, however, is that the
military force is totally dominated by  the  FSLN  to ensure
that  the  one-party  revolutionary  government  remains  in
power.  Lesson  number six was  accomplished  in  consonance
with communist doctrine and Nicaragua  emerged  with  a  red
militia.   Once this was concluded, the stage was set to tip
the balance  of  strength  in  the  region through a massive
weapons  buildup.  To avoid greater visibility and  insulate
itself from negative world criticism, Cuba  was  used as the
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major  instrument  by  which  the  Soviets   would  ply  its
strategies in  Nicaragua,  and  export  future revolution to
leftist guerrillas in El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and
Guatemala.  Moscow has openly professed that  its efforts in
Nicaragua  have  been successful in  promoting  anti-western
attitudes with  a  long  range  goal  of creating pro-Soviet
satellites. 20/
The Militarization of Nicaragua
     The  flow  of  arms  has  steadily upgraded Nicaragua's
defensive and offensive capability.  (See Figure 3-2 - Major
Arms Routes.)  Sophisticated  weaponry is passed to leftists
in  El  Salvador  and   Honduras.  At  Somoza's  height,  he
commanded  less  than  12,000  ill-equipped troops, supplied
mostly with  older  vintage U.S. arms and a proliferation of
weapons purchased from the international arms market.  Today
the  characteristic  weaponry  in  Nicaragua  is  distinctly
Soviet.  Currently,  over  5,000   Cuban,  Soviet  and  East
European military advisors, coupled with Soviet military aid
which  exceeds  the  total  U.S. military aid to  all  Latin
America  countries  combined,  has  placed  Nicaragua  in  a
position  of  overwhelming  military  superiority  over  its
neighbors. 21/  Tanks and fighter aircraft  had never before
been dominant  in  the  region.  Now, arms flow through Cuba
(from USSR) at three times  the  volume of arms shipments in
any  year  preceding  the   1979   revolution  n  Nicaragua.
Estimates are that the Soviets are providing ten  times  the
military aid to Cuba and Nicaragua (65,000  tons by 1981) as
the U.S.  is  providing  to  all  of  Latin America and that
Soviet advisors  in  Cuba  and  Nicaragua  out  number  U.S.
military advisors twenty to one in the Caribbean region. 22/
Such  massive  build  up  and  aid has been an incentive for
extreme left unity and  has  provided  for  an  increase  in
communist unsurrectional activity.  The  chronicle of events
and  activities   that   follow,   serve  to  demonstrate  a
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legitimate  recognition  of concern and a rallying point for
U.S. resolve to counter the strategic threat at our borders.
     February 1982.  Soviet  ships  delivered 270 mili-
     tary vehicles to  the  Nicaraguan port of Corinto,
     raising the total  Soviet  bloc truck inventory to
     more than 1,000.
     April 1982.  Four  Soviet  heavy tank ferries, one
     small patrol boat,  and  12 BM-21 mobile, multiple
     rocket   launchers   were    delivered.  The  tank
     ferries provide  Sandinista  forces  an  offensive
     water-crossing  capability,  to  rapidly reinforce
     insurgent successes in El Salvador across  the Bay
     of Fonseca, to support forces by traversing either
     Lake Managua  or Lake Nicaragua, or even to boldly
     interject forces against Costa  Rica, which has no
     army.  The  rocket  launchers  provide  fire power
     capabilities unparalleled in the region.
     Mid-1982.  Evidence    of   increasing    military
     construction activities, such  as  a  new garrison
     for Soviet T-54/55 tank battalion outside Managua,
     completion of two new infantry battalion garrisons
     and  commencement  of another  around  Managua  to
     assist  in  fortification of Managua.   Overflight
     photos  depict   that  all  installations  possess
     layout designs similar to Cuban garrisons or those
     constructed by Cuban engineers in other countries.
     Mid-1982.   Cuban  Defense  Minister  Raul  Castro
     visited  Nicaragua  with  a  high  level  military
     delegation.   Soon    thereafter,    2,000   Cuban
     construction workers were dispatched  to  commence
     military projects.
     November  1982.  An  additional 25  T-54/55  tanks
     were   delivered  by  a  Soviet  bloc  ship.  This
     occurred  shortly  after  Defense Minister  Daniel
     Ortega's visit  to  Moscow.  Also,  to enhance the
     Sandinista  Army's  mobility, the Soviets supplied
     MI-8 helicopters, AN-2 aircraft,  and  BTR armored
     personnel carriers.
     December 1982.  Eight  new  122mm  howitizers were
     delivered to augment the 12-152mm  guns  delivered
     in 1981.  Total  estimates  of  both  howitzers is
     over 100.
     December 1982.  Initial  deliveries  of  sophisti-
     cated electronic gear commenced, including a  high
     frequency/direction intercept facility  similar to
     ones installed in Cuba.  The purported application
     of   this   equipment   is  to  intercept  signals
     throughout Central  America  and  to  keep tabs on
     Honduran military communication  sites  and  troop
     movements.
     Additionally, there  has been improvement of lines
     of    communication   and   logistic   routes   by
     construction  of  a road between Puerto Cabezas on
     the Eastern  Coast  and the interior to facilitate
     the   flow   of  Cuban  supplies  to   Sandinistas
     operating   in   the  troubled  northeast   border
     area. 23/
     The above information was part of a  massive  education
campaign  that  began  in  March of 1982 to heighten  public
awareness  of the Nicaraguan buildup.  A host of former high
level officials from Secretaries  of  State  and Defense, to
defense policy  analysts,  considered  data presented by the
Reagan  administration  as  "highly  convincing."  From  the
thirty-six  new  military  installations  built  during  the
previous  two  years  since  the  revolution, to  lengthened
airstrips capable  of  launching MIG-21 and MIG-23 aircraft,
the message was extremely clear -- Nicaragua had  become  an
anti-western fortress.  (See Figure 3-3.)
     Much of the information gained by the U.S. intelligence
agency was  via  U-2 over flights, an activity that had been
greatly reduced  in  Latin  America  because  of  CIA budget
constraints.   Other   data   were  secured  by  electronic-
intelligence  gathering   equipment   aboard  Spruance-class
destroyers  posted  off  the  Nicaragua Coast.  Intelligence
information was  corroborated with infrared and side-looking
radar-satellite photography as well as CIA operatives within
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Nicaragua.   The  intelligence  effort  has  been  aimed  at
tracking arms  shipments  to El Salvador through the Gulf of
Fonseca, to  pinpointing  Sandinista  and Salvadoran command
and control facilities near Managua.   Agents  on the ground
have confirmed the presence  of Cuban and Soviet advisors at
these facilities. 24/
     Not only has there been a gradual increase in weaponry,
but  also  the  enhancement  of technical sophistication  of
equipment.   For  air defense, the Sandinistas have received
large  stockpiles   of  shoulder  fired  SA-7  anti-aircraft
missiles, four barreled ZPU-4 and  37mm  anti-aircraft guns,
with  anticipated  shipments  of larger Soviet anti-aircraft
missiles and guns.
     Of even graver concern to U.S. intelligence analysts is
the lengthening of runways which can accommodate Soviet MIG-
aircraft.   Pentagon  officials have feared the arrival of a
MIG squadron which  would  give  Nicaragua the most powerful
air  fleet  in  the region.  Over 80 Sandinista pilots  have
been trained in Bulgaria and  there  is speculation that the
aircraft  are  staged in Cuba.  The advent of such  aircraft
would provide the leftist regime another means to intimidate
its  neighbors  and  Honduras,  whose 24 F-86's, A-37's, and
French Super  Mysteres,  would be no match for the MIGs. 25/
In addition to outright grants from Soviet and  Eastern Bloc
countries, Nicaragua sealed  a  $17  million  arms deal with
France   including   ammunition,  100  rocket  launchers,  2
Alouette-3 helicopters, two  patrol  boats,  and  45 trucks.
France  had  also offered to train an unspecified number  of
Nicaraguan   Air   Force   pilots   and  Naval  officers  in
France. 26/  Concurrently, hundreds  of Nicaraguans are also
being indoctrinated in  Cuban  and Eastern European military
academies.
PLO Connections
     Up to 50 Libyan and Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO)  advisors  are  also  assisting the Sandinista regime,
with the Libyans providing maintenance  on  helicopters  and
small aircraft used  in  counterinsurgency  operations.  The
PLO   has   been   an   active   ally  of  Central  American
revolutionaries.  As  early  as  1969-70,  Sandinistas  were
fighting   beside   PLO  comrades   in  the  middle-East  and
receiving terrorist  training  in   Algeria  and  Tyre.  On 7
June,  1979,  six  weeks  before the  overthrow  of  Somoza,
Sandinista press spokesman Jorge Mandi stated in Al Watan, a
Kuwaiti newspaper:
     There is a longstanding blood unity between us and
     the Palestinians.  Many  of the units belonging to
     the  Sandinista  movements   were  at  Palestinian
     revolutionary  bases   in  Jordan.  In  the  early
     1970's,  Nicaraguans  and  Palestinian  blood  was
     spilled together in Amman and other  places during
     the Black September battle.
     It  is natural, therefore, that in our war against
     Somoza we received PLO aid for our revolution.
It was  Fidel  Castro  who  introduced  the  PLO  into Latin
America  and   supported   their  terrorist  activities  and
training of revolutionaries.  Since  opening its first Latin
American office  in  Havana  in 1974, the PLO has cultivated
ties  with  over  half the  regional  revolutionaries.  (See
Figure 3-4.)
     Thomas   Borge,   Minister  of  Interior,  has   openly
professed that  he  and other Sandinist leaders received PLO
terrorist training prior to 1970.  He also worked for Castro
in the 1970's shuttling between Cuba and the Mid-East, using
PLO assistance and Libyan funds to purchase arms for Central
America's guerrilla  movements.  The PLO-Sandinista alliance
was  officially confirmed in Mexico City in February,  1978,
when both factions issued a joint communique affirming  ties
of solidarity and united in their anti-Semitic hatred of the
"Zionist  state  of Israel." 27/  Immediately following  the
victory in 1979, the PLO arranged for  loans  to support the
new   revolutionary   government  and  a  PLO  mission   was
established  in  Managua.  The  Sandinistas  refer  to  this
mission as  an  embassy  and  the  ranking  PLO  official is
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accorded full status as an ambassador.
     On the first anniversary of the Sandinista  victory  in
July  of  1980,  not  only  were  Fidel  Castro  and  Soviet
dignitaries  present, but Yasser Arafat himself participated
in the celebration as an honored guest.  Thomas Borge stated
that  the  PLO  and  Sandinista  causes were synonymous, and
Arafat  is reputed to have responded, "The links between  us
are not new ... your enemies are our enemies." 28/
     In April of 1983, Brazil detained 4 Libyan cargo planes
that supposedly contained medical supplies.   Because pilots
could  not   produce   cargo   manifests,  officials  became
suspicious and  initiated a search.  Discovered were 42 tons
of mostly Soviet arms.   Varied  reports  included 5 tons of
U.S.  made  bombs,  a  light  training plane, 8 Soviet anti-
aircraft guns, 8 multiple rocket launchers, 2 dismantled jet
fighters,   wire   guided  missiles,  rifles,  achine  guns,
mortars, bazookas, and  90mm  cannons.  All these items were
destined for Nicaragua.   The  seizure  of the above weapons
served to  add  "fuel  to  the  fire"  when President Reagan
presented  to a joint session of Congress a report outlining
the arms traffic in Central America, much of  which has been
sketched previously. 29/
Cubans, Cubans Everywhere
     To  further  confirm  the  rapid  build-up in Nicaragua
beyond  a  defensive  posture,  Cuba  sent  its  top  combat
commander,  General Ochoa, to Nicaragua in June of  1983  to
bolster  the  Sandinista  government  and  promote  Castro's
revolutionary image in the Caribbean region.  Ochoa, a close
friend of Castro's, had received  special  training  in  the
Soviet Union  in  1976,  and  went directly to Angola, where
Cuban forces were increased from 3,000 to  20,000 in defense
of the Marxist Luandan government.   In  December,  1977, he
was transferred to  Ethiopia  as  head  of  Cuban combat and
support forces and increased their  strength from 2,000 to a
strength of  17,000  men.  Since  1981,  he was in charge of
military combat training in Cuba.  His presence in Nicaragua
is a strong indication that  a  similar  momentum  of  force
build-up, with Cuban aid, will continue there.
     Although estimates vary,  in  1983,  there  were  up to
8,000 Cubans in Nicaragua, a fact which the Sandinistas have
not denied.  Today they are engaged in not only military and
security affairs, but there are also 500-700 doctors, and up
to several thousand  teachers  involved  in  propaganda  and
literacy training.  There  are  1,000  construction workers,
erecting  bridges  and  facilities,  and  maintaining hydro-
electric  plants   and  state-owned  telecommunication  com-
panies. 30/  Cuban Ambassador Julian Lopez is considered the
most influential diplomat in Nicaragua, and policy makers in
the U.S.  fear that Cuba and Soviet entrenchment is so deep,
that nothing short of a military solution will eliminate the
Nicaraguan menace.  Since  the  U.S.  invasion  of  Grenada,
little information has been publicized about  the continuing
arms  build-up   in   Nicaragua.  That   data  has  remained
classified.   But  the  preponderance  of evidence cannot be
cast aside   lightly  and considered a massive misinformation
program   designed    to    support    a    muscle   flexing
administration.  The threat is a  cogent  one  and  must  be
understood not  as  an  isolated revolution of independence,
but part of a larger scheme  to  control  the entire region.
It is an active war  that  is creeping northward.  Our vital
SLOC's and ASTAR's  are  threatened presently along with our
critical  petroleum and  mineral  supplies.  The  political,
economic, and military strategies that the U.S.  pursues  or
ignores  in  the  next  decade  will determine the  ultimate
victor.   If  some  successes  are  not  achieved soon, this
generation will be drawn into a  conflict that will not only
be at our borders, but will cross them.
	Some  of the U.S. public has been misled into believing
that the  Sandinista  revolution  was  grounded  in a unique
Nicaraguan  nationalism   rather  than  in  Marxist-Leninist
doctrine.  Whatever the debaters may conclude, Nicaragua and
its  blatant  militarization  will   remain  an  irrevocable
reminder of a failed U.S. policy.
	In  1981,  after  realization that  the  revolution  in
Nicaragua had  gone  completely  stale,  the  U.S. planned a
three-fold  offensive   to   regain   lost  influence.  This
included  economic   and   political   pressure,   and   CIA
sponsorship   of   counter-guerrillas   to  destabilize  the
Sandinista   government.  This   group   would   be   called
"contras."
                            NOTES
    Chapter Three:  A Cog in the Wheel of Soviet Hegemony
          1.   U.S.  Departments    of  State  and  Defense.
"Background  Paper:  Central  America".  (Washington,  D.C.:
U.S. GPO, 27 May, 1983) p. 1.
          2.  Jim  Anderson.  "Eisenhower Saw Latin Struggle
on Communism."  Washington Post.  4 January 1984.  A-12.
          3.  K.E.   Murphy,  Colonel,  U.S.A.  "COMUSMILGRP
Senior Officer Debriefing Report  for Nicaragua" (RCS-CSFOR-
74)  for  the  period  20  July  1971  -  20 December, 1973.
Department of the Army Ofc. of  Adjutant  General  HQDA Ltr.
525-74-13.  (Washington, D.C.:  21 March 1974) pp. 1-4.
          4.  Frank Aker.  "Tactics, The Theory and Practice
of   Revolutionary   Warfare."   Unpublished   paper.  Aker
personal files Quantico, VA, 1983.  p. 67.
          5.  Arturo   Cruz   Sequeira.  "The   Origins   of
Sandinista  Foreign Policy," in Central America, Anatomy  of
Conflict.   ed.  by  Robert S. Leiken.  (New York:  Pergamon
Press, 1984) p. 95.
          6.  Jan Kippers Black.  "Government  an  Politics"
in  Nicaragua:  A  Country  Study.  ed. by James D. Rudolph.
(Washington, D.C.:  1982) pp. 146-7.
          7.  Lewis  A. Tambs.  "Guatemala, Central America,
and the Caribbean:  A Geopolitical Glance."  Senior National
Security Council Consultant  paper  delivered  to  the  U.S.
House  of  Representatives  Sub-Committee on  Inter-American
Affairs.  (Washington, D.C.:  30 July 1981) p. 1.
          8.  Ibid, pp. 2-3.
          9.  Kissinger Report, p. 93.
         10.  Tambs,  p. 2.  Dr.  Tambs  analysis  has  been
applied to The Nicaraguan Revolution.
         11.  Nikolai  Lenin,  as  quoted  by  Tambs  in  "A
Geopolitical Glance," p. 2.
         12.  "U.S.  to  Bar  14 Nations Meat."   Washington
Post, 28 December 1983.  A-4.
         13.  "Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica, Panama."   Quarterly
Economic Review.  The  Economist  Intelligence Unit, London,
1983, p. 11.
         14.  Walker, p. 41.
         15.  Nestor  Paz  Zamora,  quoted  in  Esther  and
Mortimer Arias.  The Cry of My People:  Out of Captivity  in
Latin America.  (New York:  Friendship Press, 1980) p. 139.
         16.  Arias, p. 139.
         17.  Teofilo  Cabestrero.  "La   Revolucion  y  los
Cristianos:  La  Iqlesia  Catolica  en  los  3  anos  de  Ia
Revolucian.   Translated   by   James   and  Margaret  Goff.
Amancer.  (Managua) No. 10-11 - June-July, 1982) pp. 22-23.
         16.  Julian C. Heriot.  "The Economy" in Nicaragua:
A Country Study, p. 109.
         19.  Walker, pp. 93-96.
         20.  Soviet    Military    Power,    2nd    edition
(Washington, D.C.:  U.S. GPO, March 1983) pp. 87-90.
         21.  Alex  Alexiev.  Soviet  Strategy  in the Third
World and Nicaragua.   U.S.  Dept.  of State Contract Paper.
(Santa Monica:  Rand Corporation, March 1982) pp. 7-9.
         22.  Fred  C.  Ikle.  "The  Three  Elements  of Our
Caribbean Strategy," Defense 83.  December, 1983, pp. 10-15.
         23.  "Background Paper," pp. 15-17.
         24.  "Taking  Aim  at   Nicaragua."  Newsweek,   22
March, 1982, p. 9.
         25.  "Nicaragua, A Whole New  Universe,"  Time,  12
January, 1982, p. 36.
         26.  Guy Gugliotta.  "France Offers Central America
Another Choice."  Miami Herald, 15 February, 1982.  9-A.
         27.  White House Digest, 20 July, 1983, pp. 2-3.
         26.  Ibid, p.5.
         29.  Richard House.   "Brazilians Study Libyan Arms
Cargo:  Reports  Vary  on  Contents,"  Washington  Post.  26
April,  A-14,  and  Michael  Getler.  "Grounding  of  Libyan
Planes In  Brazil  a Tremendous Gift."  Washington Post.  26
April, 1983, A-14.
         30.  "Cuba's  Top Combat Commander 13 Reported Seen
in Nicaragua."  New York Times, 19 January 1983, p. l.
             CHAPTER FOUR:  THE NOT SO SECRET WAR
     Night  after night in Managua, Nicaraguans get the same
two  government   television   announcements.  One  provides
detailed instructions on how to clean firearms and the other
how to dig trenches and build bomb  shelters.  Between these
announcements   is  depicted   the reason for  acquiring  such
skills --  a   caricature  of  Uncle Sam carrying a carpetbag
labeled  "C.I.A."  skulking across a  map  of  Nicaragua.  A
baritone voice  reminds  the  audience  that  it is the U.S.
imperialists   who   are   supporting   the   "Contras"   or
revolutionary forces against the Sandinista regime. 1/
     One  of  the  rationalizations  for   the  Sandinista's
massive defense buildup was that following a National war of
liberation,  there   are   always  displaced  factions  that
immediately  seek  to  restore  the   old  government  which
provided their livelihood through vice and exploitation.  In
December  of  1981, congressional oversight committees  were
informed by the Central Intelligence Committee (CIA) that it
was training  a small band of about 500 Latins to serve as a
strike force  to  harass  the  Marxist  regime in Nicaragua.
Sixteen months later, the ranks had swollen to 7,000 men and
the CIA feared that control and  the original purpose in the
Contra's  creation,   i.e.   limited  objectives,  might  be
replaced  by  a   direct   overthrow   of   the   Nicaraguan
government. 2/  The   sudden   growth  of  the   guerrillas'
strength, forced the  U.S.  to acknowledge at least tacitly,
that  it  was  carrying  on  a  "not  so  secret  war."  The
administration  was  to  come under increased scrutiny, both
congressional  and public, for its controversial  supporting
role.  In February 1984,  after  over two years of concerted
fighting, the  leaders  of the "Contras" have been forced to
curtail their military and political objectives.  There were
numerous attempts  to  seize  a  border  area  and declare a
provisional  government   that   would   be   recognized  by
conservative  Central  American governments  and  the  U.S..
Hampered  by   logistic   problems,   internal  strife,  and
surprising resistance, the Contras  are  re-evaluating their
next   strategy.   The    1983   Christmas    offensive   was
discouraging  as  the  Sandinistas  hurled  7,000 government
troops at  3,000  counter-guerrillas  who were attempting to
carve  out  an enclave around the town of  Jalapa  in  Nuevo
Seqovia province.  For the first time, the government troops
used Soviet mobile multiple rocket launchers acquired during
its massive  militarization  campaign.  Also  employed  were
large mortars, cannons, artillery, and mines in a display of
firepower that is an omen for future confrontations.  During
the same week, RPG 2 rocket launched  grenades,  most likely
supplied by  Nicaraguans,  brought down two U.S. helicopters
in  El  Salvador.   The   sobering  military  might  of  the
Sandinistas has  forced the contra leadership to drastically
reassess its  objectives,  and  to  concentrate  on  binding
relations  with  their  internal   factions,  a  key  cause
contributing to military ineffectiveness. 3/
Contra Organizations
     The Contras are a loose, sometimes  divergent coalition
of U.S. backed insurgents who represent the grave robbers of
a deceased Monroe Doctrine.  They apply  pressure  on  three
Fronts.  (See Figure 4-1.)  Within  this  coalition are five
factions, each with their own agenda, but loosely united for
the purpose of ending communist  domination  by  the FSLN in
Nicaragua.  The    organization    represents    views    of
revolutionary, restorational, and reformist insurgents.  The
revolutionary   insurgent  seeks  to  mobilize  the  masses,
generally victims of repression, and  to radically transform
the  social  structure  into  a new and centrally controlled
regime.  The  restorational  insurgent  identifies  with   a
recent regime, in  this  case  the  Somoza dictatorship, and
represents  elitist  values  and  an  obligarchic  political
structure, with  minimal  participation for the masses.  The
reformist  insurgent  is usually a member of a discriminated
sector  of  society, for example, Indians,  who  seeks  more
political, social,  and economic freedom without necessarily
displacing the  authority in power. 4/  Because organization
is  critical  for  an  elite group trying  to  mobilize  the
masses, the divergent philosophies  cutting  across all five
factions have served to confuse potential  enlistees  within
Nicaragua  and  denied  the  Contras two key  principles  of
warfare, unity  of  command and mass.  The coalition is also
Click here to view image
confusing to would-be supporters and  sympathizers  external
to Nicaragua.
     Initially,  the Reagan administration characterized the
Contras  as  a  harassment  and  interdiction  force.  Their
mission was  to  disrupt  the exportation of arms to leftist
guerrillas  in  El Salvador  and  to  force  the  Sandinista
government towards  more pluralistic aims at the negotiating
table.  The Sandinists claim  on  the  other  hand, that the
Contras are nothing more than displaced elements of Somoza's
regime  and  Guardia.  The  FSLN  uses  this  suspicion   of
lingering  "Somoscisma" to justify a state of emergency  and
propagandize   their   cause.  They   also  argue  that  the
revolution was  necessary  to rid Nicaragua of the brutality
and   corruption   that   these   factions   represent.  The
"Contras,"  conversely,  insist  that the  Sandinistas  have
betrayed  all the promises of the revolution, and turned the
country into a Soviet-Cuban client state.
Nicaragua Democratic Force (FDN)
     Adolfo Calero is a rebel leader who  sits on the seven-
man directorate  of  the  Nicaragua  Democratic Force (FDN),
the largest and most  organized  of the Contra factions.  He
stated:  "We are fighting for the establishment of a Western-
type democracy in  Nicaragua  ...  .  We're  talking about a
democracy without  the Sandinistas in power.  Sandinistas in
power  and  democracy   are  opposites."  5/  The   FDN  was
initially financed and  encouraged  by  affluent  Nicaraguan
exiles   in   Florida,  California,  and   elsewhere.  While
conclusive  evidence has not been published, the  fact  that
Somoza was buried in Florida after  his  assassination, that
family  members  fled  there,  and  that  there  are  active
training  bases  for Contras in Southern Florida, would lead
one to believe that much of the wealth that disappeared from
Nicaragua's national  treasury  is  financing  a significant
portion of the counter-revolutionary activities.  Within the
FDN  are  two  groups,  the  National Liberation Army (ENL),
formed primarily from  former  members  of Somoza's National
Guard, and the Nicaraguan Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARN).
The nucleus of the ENL  began  resistance  fighting  in 1979
after the revolution.   A  few hundred guardsmen who escaped
before  the   final   FSLN  victory  fled  to  Honduras  and
established a  base  at a refugee camp near Choluteca, about
20 miles from  the  border.  They  launched what they called
"pinprick" operations against Sandinista border troops.  One
tactic was to fire from concealed positions on both Honduras
and  Nicaragua   guards  in  hopes  of  starting  a  war.  A
communications  relay system was  set  up  between  the  two
governments to avert a  regional  escalation of conflict. 6/
The  guerrilla  forces  settled  down  in  jungle  camps  in     
Honduras,   close   to  the  500  mile  common  border  with
Nicaragua.   The  Sandinista  junta gave this last group the
name   "Contras"   or  counter-revolutionaries,  "the   most
derogatory expression in the communist book." 7/
     The  leadership  of  the  FDN  is comprised  mainly  of
business and  professional  people whose property was seized
or  whose businesses were nationalized after the revolution.
While there  were  members  no  doubt allied with the Somoza
regime, there are many others (including Calero) who opposed      
the dictator and  were  incarcerated for their disageements.
Today the composition is described as:
     freedom  fighters,  patriots  from  all  political
     parties  and  democratic  groups,   thousands   of
     Miskito  Indians, former officers and enlisted men
     of the extinct National Guard, who never  partici-
     pated or  condoned  the  crimes  of  the Somocista
     dictatorship,  and  members  of   the   Sandinista
     Popular Army  and People's Militia who have joined
     us because  they  do  not  want  to  belong to the
     imposed communist tyranny. 8/
While no  exact  percentage  of  former  Guardia  members is
known, the CIA attempted to purge main-line Guardia early on
to  rid the  Contras of the Somoza stigma. 9/  The  FDN  is
highly   organized and its leaders travel  freely  throughout
the   U.S.   raising  funds,  gaining  public  support,  and
providing  lobbyist  and  congressional  sub-committees  the
tenets of their counter-revolution.   These  principles  and
objectives are published as follows:
     I.  Repudiation of  any  connection  with  the  corrupt
Somoza dictatorship.
    II.  Adherence   to   the  nationalistic  and  patriotic
principles  of  the  revolutionary  hero  --  Augusto  Cesar
Sandino,  and refutement of communism  as  the  vehicle  for
political expression of Nicaragua.
   III.  Endorsement  of  pluralistic  government and honest
and free elections.
    IV.  Creation    of    a  representative     provisional
government, where all democratic groups will have a voice.
     V.  Non-inclusion  of  any  persons  who have committed
crimes  or participated in the communist conspiracy in  con-
junction with Marxist-Leninist foreign "invaders."
    VI.  A guarantee of human and civil rights.  A review by
jurists  of  civil  rights  violated in the confiscation  of
property and restoration of religious freedom.
   VII.  Reestablishment  of  the  autonomous  character  of
universities and educational institutions  at  all levels in
consonance with  democratic  traditions,  cultural heritage,
and fundamental national belief.
  VIII.  Guarantee  of  free  labor  unions   for  laborers,
skilled workers, and professional associations.
    IX.  Revision  of the Marxist agrarian  reform  program,
granting  provisional  titles  to  farmers  until  permanent
titles are issued, and an open market.
     X.  A balanced national budget.
    XI.  Recuperation  of  the  national economy, through  a
policy of fiscal austerity and production incentives.
   XII.  Diplomatic  relations based upon mutual respect for
national sovereignty,  and  respect  for  principles of non-
intervention in  internal  affairs.  An international policy
based upon primary  obligations  within  the  inter-American
Community of States, without  effecting commitments to other
countries and the United Nations.
  XIII.  Municipal   and   national   constituent   assembly
elections within  a  year  that  will  provide  a  basis for
establishing a new Nicaraguan Constitutional System.  Assis-
tance of O.A.S. and other democratic national  sectors  will
be used to guarantee free and honest elections. 10/
     On the  13th  of  January,  1983,  the  FDN published a
widely distributed Peace  Initiative  which  was essentially
ignored by the Sandinistas.   Outlined  in it were proposals
for general amnesty for dissidents, with full guarantees for
rights as citizens, revocation of the National Emergency Law
which places Nicaragua in a "state of siege," abolishment of
repressive institutions, cessations of religious oppression,
creation  of   a   national  army  vice  a  one-party  army,
disbandment  of  the  Sandinista  Peoples  Militia,  drastic
reduction in  armament  which is consuming a disproportinate
amount of  scarce  national  resources, separation of public
administration  from   partisan  political  and  ideological
activities,  establishment  of  free  speech,  free   press,      
abolishment of all forms of censorship and  state control of
the media, and cessation of persecution and extermination of
the  Miskito   population.   11/  The   demands  were  many,
particularly  to  come from a group of  rebels  who  neither
enjoyed the  political  solidarity nor the military might of
the Sandinistas.  In an effort to seize the  initiative, the
Sandinistas  have  loosened censorship restrictions  on  the
only private  press,  La Prensa, although everything must be
proofed  by the Sandinistas before  publication.  There  has
been  public  admission  of  crimes  --  excesses  committed
against  the  Miskito  tribes relocated from their villages.
Other  Sandinista  proposals for modifying their government,
include elections in  1985,  which  will pose no problems as
lack  of any opposition strength will  assure  a  Sandinista
victory.  The FDN now claims that it has more enlistees than
weapons  and  estimates  of its seize range from  10,000  to
17,000 including teenagers of both sexes.   For now however,
their problem still remains the Somoza  stigma,  and concern
that   elusive   military  successes  will  threaten  future
"covert" aid  from the United States.  Resupply problems and
the  new  firepower  of  the  Sandinistas  make  a  military
solution for the Contras appear highly remote.
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE)
     The  next  most   influential   Contra   group  is  the
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance  (ARDE)  whose  troops are
led  by  Eden Pastora,  the  Sandinista  hero  of  the  1979
revolution, and  Alfonso  Robelo,  former moderate member of
the Sandinista junta.  Both  defected  because of increasing
repression by the Sandinists and growing influence of Cubans
and Soviets in governmental decisions.  Robelo had  formally
been  the  head  of  COSEP (Consejo Superior de  Ia  Enpresa
Private --  Higher  Council of Private Enterprise) which was
the  umbrella  oganization  that  linked  the  chambers  of
industry and commerce together.  Robelo played a key role in
the general  strikes  organized  against Somoza in 1978, and
after his overthrow, became one of the original five members
of the Sandinista junta.  Robelo left Nicaragua on 24 March,
1982, when he realized that  total  censorship of the press,
FSLN ownership of  most  newspapers,  radio  and  television
stations,  and  restriction  of  any  political disagreement
offered  no  chance  for  emergence of democratic pluralism.
The  FSLN had  tolerated  Robelo's  Democratic  Coordinating
Committee (MDN) as  an  outward show that pluralism existed,
but only manipulated the organization and  world  opinion in
the process. 12/
     The  other  leader of the ARDE, Pastora, is perhaps the
only person among  all  the various Contra factions that has
any charisma.   Pastora  claims  to  be the true defender of
Sandinista  ideals  and  claims  much  support  from  within
Nicaragua.  Pastora  and  the  ARDE,  unlike  the  FDN, have
avoided   being   closely   associated   with   the   Reagan
administration  and  the  CIA.  Pastora would consider  U.S.
intervention  as  against  the  nationalistic  aims  of  the
revolution.   Pastora had operated from a small camp outside
the Costa Rican  capital  of  San  Jose, where he operated a
clandestine radio station beaming anti-Sandinista propaganda
into Nicaragua.  The  ARDE  claims  to  have  2,000 - 4,000
members  but could potentially draw from  20,000  Nicaraguan
refugees  who fled after 1979 and still reside in  camps  in
Northern Costa  Rica.  Pastora's  ultimatum to the Cubans in
April  1983,  was that they had 15 days to get  out,  or  he
warned  them, "They will end up like all who have  dared  to
interfere  here;  expelled or dead!" 13/  While the ARDE has
resisted direct U.S. assistance, or ties to the FDN, reality
has  forced  them  to  accommodate  both  in  meeting  their
$600,000 monthly budget.  The ARDE remains chronically short
of funds and  equipment  and after a temporary suspension in
military operations  in  1983, resumed activities again with
an  infusion of aid from Israel, Columbia, Panama, Venzuela,
and other South America and European groups.  While ARDE has
greater political credibility and  associations  with a more
radical revolution, disagreements between Robelo and Pastora
have  weakened their unity. 14/  Neither is  Costa  Rica  as
receptive  as  Honduras  to  allowing the  ARDE  Contras  to
conduct their spectacular  raids  and  then retreat into the
sanctuary of  Costa  Rican  jungles.  Costa Rica, without an
army, and with  only a small police force, can ill-afford to
invoke  the  wrath  of the powerful Sandinistas.   President
Luis Monge  has  vowed  to  maintain  Costa Rica's permanent
neutrality in  regional  conflicts.  To  complicate matters,
the Costa Rican attorney general's office filed homicide and
kidnapping charges  against  all  the  leaders  of the ARDE,
including  Pastora  and  his  cousin Orion, Robelo, Brooklyn
Rivera,  and  Jose  Davila.   This  may  be  a  reaction  to
increasing  pressure  and  terrorist  activities originating
from the Nicaraguan embassy in Costa Rica, 15/ and a gesture
to discourage an attack on Costa  Rica  in  retaliation  for
Pastora's activities.  While Contra activities have not been
closed  down  completely,  the  Costa Rican  government  has
severely restricted the ARDE.
     It  is  noteworthy  to  reflect  upon  purported  Cuban
efforts  to  promote  negotiations  between Pastora and  the
Sandinistas,  possibly  to weaken Contra efforts or  further
divide  the   ARDE   and  FDN.  A  discussion  of  Pastora's
personality  may  offer  some  understanding why he  may  be
subject  to  Cuban  influence,  and  why  his  revolutionary
motives  are considered suspect.  Pastora  admits  that  his
ideology  is  Sandinismo,  or  at least that it approximates
social  democracy.  He  also  admits  admiration  for  Fidel
Castro  and  Che Guevara.   He  organized  his  own  Sandino
Revolutionary Front in  1959 and later gravitated to another
group that eventually became  the  FSLN.  After three prison
terms and torture in Somoza jails, he left  for  Costa Rica.
In 1976 he again joined  the  Sandinist  movement, and after
the 1979  revolution,  he was passed over for top government
and military  jobs.  Just  before  the second anniversary of
the Sandinista victory, Pastora  departed  without  saying a
word.  He left behind a letter which stated:  "I am going to
discharge my  revolutionary gun powder against the oppressor
in  whatever part of the world in which he is found, without
it mattering whether  they  call  me Quixote or Sancho." 16/
Thomas Borge attributed Pastora's defection to  ego  and not
ideology.   When Pastora became the most beloved war hero of
the revolution  because of his daring raid on the Palace, an
instant cult arose around him.  After Pastora acquired world-
wide fame, he wanted a position  in  the  FSLN  commensurate
with his  new  found  status.  Because  of  what  the  Junta
assessed as "personal limitations," Pastora did not get the
job  he  wanted.  Disgruntled,  he said he  would  join  the
revolution in Guatamala.  He defected and joined Robelo, who
was strongly denounced by Pastora only a year earlier. 17/
      Pastora's  true  motives remain an enigma.  The ARDE's
limited activities,  internal  dissent,  and  pressure  from
Costa  Rica serve to nullify large scale mobilization from a
southern front.  That Pastora is perceived as  a  threat  to
the FSLN junta,  however,  remains  a  reality.  In  October
1983, a member of the Basque Terrorist Organization, [Basque
Homeland and Liberty (ETA)] was arrested  in Costa Rica.  He
stated  that  he  had been sent by Nicaragua to  assassinate
Eden Pastora and other exile leaders. 18/
MISURASATA
     The  third major group of Contras is the MISURASATA (an
acronym  taken  from  Miskito,  Sumo,  and  Rama  --   three
Nicaraguan Indian tribes,  and  Sandinista)  a  coalition of
Indians and Creoles of about 2,000 strength that operates in
the jungles  of Northeastern Nicaragua.  When the Sandinists
toppled the  Somoza  dynasty in 1979, the main demand of the
Miskitos on the isolated Atlantic Coast was for legal titles
to their  communal lands that they had occupied for hundreds
of  years.  The  revolutionaries  were  more  interested  in
turning the Indians into  party  members.  They attempted to
integrate the 100,000 Miskitos  too  hastily into the larger
population.  Miskitos and  smaller group of Sumos and Ramas,
soon  became  disenchanted with the FSLN's national literacy
campaign.  They desired  to  learn  how to read and write in
English, their customary language, rather  than  in Spanish,
which was initially taught.  They rebelled against Sandinist
efforts to supplant the authority of their  native  leaders.
The  Miskitos'  leader  was  a young lawyer, Steadman Fagoth
Muller.  In an attempt to clear a neutral zone some 50 miles
deep  along the vulnerable Northeast border, the Sandinistas
began forced evacuation of Miskitos, destroying  between  25
to 40 villages, killing  an  estimated  200  inhabitants and     
evacuating 10,000  more.  This  was  the  Sandinistas  first
attempt to  neutralize  the Miskito minority which comprised
some  4-5%  of  Nicaragua's  population.   19/  The   forced
resettlement was  designed  to  prevent  them from providing
food, shelter, and intelligence to the  FDN  operating  from
Honduran  sanctuaries.  As   the   population   became  more
disgruntled  with  ideology  taught by Sandinista volunteers
and  Cuban  cadres,  the   FSLN  became  concerned  about  a    
separatist   movement.  Thirty-three  Indian  leaders   were
arrested including Fagoth Muller who was accused of being an
official of Somoza's  hated  security  apparatus.  This move
elicited strong reaction as 5,000 Indians occupied a town in
northern Zelaya province for a  month  until  their  leaders
were freed.  Upon  their release, Fagoth immediately fled to
Honduras where  he  made  contact  with the FDN, and started
beaming broadcasts to  the  Indians  on  the  exiles  radio.
Initially,  200  Indians  were   provided  training  by  the
Honduran Army  and  by December, 1981, had already initiated
their  own independent attacks against  Sandinista  outposts
along the border.  Reprisals  by  Sandinistas have caused an
exodus of as many as 15,000 - 20,000 Indians to camps across
the  border  where  they  presently rely upon  the  FDN  for
military  and  logistics  support   and   international  aid
agencies  for basic sustenance.  This organization, for  all
practical purposes,  has been integrated into the FDN Contra
network. 20/
     Another Miskito group is led by Brooklyn Rivera, and is
more closely  aligned  with  Eden  Pastora's  radical  ARDE.
Because  Riveria  reportedly  hates  Fagoth, the  MISURASATA
effort  is  also  inefficiently divided.  Rivera's  band  of
several  hundred  Indians,  primarily work the Eastern Coast
between the ARDE and the FDN.
     Another  group of Contras, the Revolutionary Nicaraguan
Armed Forces led by Fernando  "El  Negro" Chamorro, a former
Sandinista general,  splintered  off the ARDE and has openly
cooperated  with  the  FDN  in  Honduras.  Chamorro   gained
international attention in 1979, when he  climbed to the top
of  Managua's Hotel International and  initiated  a  one-man
bazooka  attack   against   the   heavily  fortified  bunker
personally belonging to Somoza.  Alfonso  Robelo states that
Chamorro was  expelled from Costa Rica and lost contact with
the  ARDE  leadership.  Chamorro's  account  is  that he was
"tired of Pastora mouthing off" and that Pastora and his men
continue to  display  the  Sandinista  colors and sing their
anthem (in which the U.S. as cited as being the enemy). 21/
     Basically, at the  close  of  1983, the FDN remains the
dominant group,  with the ARDE and MISURATA - splinter group
led by Riveria, playing  out  secondary  rules and without a
cohesive strategy.
     A liberal view  is  that  support  for  the Contras has
served more to produce negative  domestic  and international
criticism of U.S. policies, than in curbing the militaristic
growth of Nicaragua.  In fact, the pressure cooker that they
have been  placed  in, has allowed the Sandinistas extension
of  their state of emergency, curtailment of  constitutional
rights and  censorship  of the press.  One European diplomat
stated, "Sometimes I think they must be very happy  with the
attacks of  the  Reagan  administration.  ...  It helps them
justify  their  [totalitarian] policies."   Jaime  Wheelock,
minister  of  agriculture,  and  another  comandante  of the
Sandinist  Party  agreed  that,  "This sense of  danger  and
tension has helped consolidate the revolution."  22/
     On  the  U.S.  home front, during November 1983, 20,000
persons marched in an anti-war demonstration  in Washington,
D.C.  The  demonstrators gathered  outside  the  offices  of
Immigration  and  Naturalization  Service, the Department of
Human Services, the State Department, and  finally the White
House.  They carried signs protesting U.S. support for anti-
government guerrillas in Nicaragua and for the government of
El Salvador. 23/
     Collective   U.S.  strategies  have  not  been  without
significant    impact.  Because    of     severe    economic
destabilization,  harassment   by  Contras,  and  increasing
internal   dissension   calling  for  more  moderation,  the
Sandinistas  proposed  four security accords to the U.S.  in
October  1983.  These  were  non-aggression treaties between
Nicaragua and the U.S., between  Nicaragua  and  Honduras, a
broader  non-aggression  treaty  to be signed by all Central
America governments, and a draft accord to contribute to the
peaceful  solution  of the armed conflict in the Republic of
El  Salvador.  24/  Three weeks later,  the  United  Nations
General Assembly adopted, by consensus, a  resolution  which
called  for  an  end  to  aggression  against Nicaragua  and
condemned attacks launched from  outside  Nicaragua  against
the country's strategic installations. 25/
Congressional Limits on Cover Aid
     Resistance  and  debate in Congress to limit or abolish
covert aid  to  the  Contras  has  also been dynamic.  Since
1974, members o  Congress insisted on being  informed  about
such intelligence operations.  In  1980, new legislation was
passed to  centralize oversight responsibilities in both the
Senate and House intelligence committees.  This  legislation
called  for  the  President   to  keep  these  congressional
committees  fully   advised   and   currently   informed  of
intelligence activities.  As  the  "secret  war" became more
publicly  visible, and it became apparent that the "Contras"
sought  total  victory  over  the  Sandinistas,  members  of
Congress feared wholesale escalation as  well  as  the  long
range impacts  of  regional  and  U.S. intervention.  Edward
Boland  (D-Mass),  Chairman   of   The   House  Intelligence
Committee, attempted to  limit  chances  for a larger war by
attaching to the fiscal year 1983 intelligence authorization
bill, a prohibition on any provision of "military equipment,
military  training  or advice, or other support for military
activities, for  the  purpose of overthrowing the government
of  Nicaragua  or  provoking  a  military  exchange  between
Nicaragua and  Honduras."  26/  This bill was finally passed
as (Boland-Zablocki Bill  -  H.R.  2760 28 July 1983) to end
U.S. covert operations and to authorize $38 million for FY83
and $50  million  for  FY84  for  overt  arms  interdiction.
Boland again proposed a rider bill with similar language for
the intelligence authorization for fiscal year 1984, and the
House again  confirmed  their opposition to covert aid.  The
Republican-controlled  Senate   sought   a   less  stringent
limitation  of  "Contra"  actions -- "getting  Nicaragua  to
cease  exportation  of  revolution   to  its  neighbors."  A
compromise was  struck  which  approved  $29 million for the
administration to  continue  operations,  with  no statutory
limit on objectives, and  no back door funding -- until June
1984.  Then  the  administration  must ask for more.  27/  A
primary factor in getting legislators to  extend aid was the
overwhelming  positive response by constituencies after  the
invasion of Grenada, and  the clear evidence of Soviet-Cuban
involvement in the Caribbean area. 28/
     In the final analysis, though, the  CIA  concluded that
there  are  no circumstances under  which  the  Contras  can
achieve either a military or political victory over the hard-
lined  Marxists.  The  Reagan  administration has  begun  to
explore other  possible solutions that would provide amnesty
for the "Contras."
     As  a  confirmation  of at least other nations' support
(in  addition to the Contadora Group)  to  find  alternative
solutions, Argentina`s new democratically elected President,
Raul  Alfonsin,  advised  the  U.S.  that he was withdrawing
advisors  from  the   Contras.  This  alignment  with  other
countries,  critical of  U.S.  policy,  is  a  clue  that  a
regional settlement, coordinated by Latin American countries
is a more desirable objective and more  palatable to Central
Americans. 29/
U.S. Presence in Honduras
     Heightened  tensions  between  Nicaragua and  Honduras,
which continues  to  provide  sanctuaries  for  the  FDN and
MISURASATA,  are   very   real.  Exacerbating  this  is  the
increase of U.S.  exercises, notably Big Pine II (Ahuas Tara
II), the construction and negotiation of U.S. military bases
in Honduras, and the presence of 5,000 - 7,000 U.S. military
personnel.  It  is  generally  believed that  the  Hondurans
desire the Contras to  stay  because  it  not  only bolsters
their defensive capabilities along the southern  border, but
also  insures  U.S.  support  in   case   of   a  Nicaraguan
attack. 30/
     The biggest obstacle to success for the Contras remains
the internal division and  competition  between  the FDN and
the  ARDE.  Without  cooperation,  there  cannot  exist  the
tactical  advantage  of  employing multiple pressure points.
While there  is  talk  of mutual support, a wide gulf exists
between the primary factions.   There do not appear to exist
any brighter prospects for resolution in the future.
     The Contras had gambled on a short and decisive war,  a
"knockout punch,"  to restore the revolution to its original
goals.   They worked very hard to win "the hearts and minds"
of the people, especially  the  Indians and peasants.  Using
Mao  Tse-Tung's  Code  of  Conduct as their model, they were
trained  to  respect  people  and  property.  All  food  and
logistical supplies  obtained  from  villages  were paid for
with cash.  The  Sandinista  patrols on the other hand, took
what they needed and gave receipts which are seldom honored.
The Contras  used  psychological  warfare methods to exploit
discontent over the wrecked economy, repression,  compulsory
participation into  cooperatives, conscription, and required
attendance at political lectures  held by the Sandinistas in
respective neighborhoods. 31/  Frequent clashes between  the
Contras and  Sandinista  militias remained inconclusive, and
no significant control over any provinces was achieved.  The
two-pronged offensive  from  Honduras  and  Costa Rica never
materialized.  That  is  where  the  Contras  remain  today,
divided  and  waiting the outcome of  a  crucial  1984.  The
success  of the  Contras is invariably  tied  to  continued
monetary and  logistical  support from the U.S.  But this is
an election year, and the defeat of incumbent U.S. President
Ronald  Reagan  may  dash  the  hopes  of  the  Contras  for
continuing  any  kind  of  large   scale   counter-guerrilla
operations.   In   the  meantime,  training  in  Camp  Cuba-
Nicaragua in Florida continues, and Adolfo Calero stumps the
U.S.  in  his  three-piece  suit, telling  his  story  of  a
revolution betrayed, and keeping the hopes  of  a Nicaraguan
democracy alive.
                             NOTES
             Chapter Four:  The Not So Secret War
          1.  Brenton R. Schlender  and Gerald F. Seib.  "Up
in Arms,  Resisting Pressure from U.S., Nicaragua Grows More
Militaristic."  Wall Street Journal, 31 May, 1983, p. 1.
          2.  Don O'Berdorfer.  "U.S. Backed Nicaraguan Army
Swells to 7,000 Men."  Washington Post, 8 May 1983.  A-11
          3.  "Anti-Sandinista   Rebels       Curtail   Some
Ojbectives."  Washington Post, 20 February 1984.  A-1, A-24
          4.  Bard  E.  O'Neill.  "Insurgency:  A  Framework
fro Analysis" in Insurgency in the Modern World, ed. by Bard
O'Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts, (Boulder,
CO:  Westview Press, 1980) p. 3.
          5.  Adolfo  Calero,  quoted  in Washington Post, 8
May 1983.  A-11
          6.  "Taking   Aim   at  Nicaragua."  Newsweek,  22
March, 1982, pp. 24-5.
          7.  Edgar  O'Ballance.  "The  Nicaraguan  Domino."
Military Review, October, 1983, p.6.
          8.  Pronouncement  of  the  Nicaraguan  Democratic
Force - Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense (FDN),  delivered by
Adolfo  Calero  to   Ad   Hoc  Committee  on  Democracy  for
Nicaragua, Washington, D.C.:  19 July, 1983, p. 2.
          9.  Christopher  Dickey.  "Rebel Odyssey, Foes  of
Sandinistas Seek to  Purge Somoza Stigma."  Washington Post,
4 April, 1983.  A-1, A-22.
         10.  Pronouncement, pp. 2-4.
         11.   Nicaraguan Democratic Force Peace Initiative,
submitted to  OAS  and  Junta of Reconstruction, Managua, 13
January, 1983, p. 1.
         12.  "Nicaraguan     Resistance    Leader    Voices
Optimism."  Alfonso Robelo as quoted in West Watch, A Report
on the  Americans and the World.  Council for Inter-American
Security,  ed.  by  Roger  Reed.  (Washington, D.C.:  Inter-
American Press, Vol. VI, No. 2, May 1983), 4 pp.
         13.   "Nicaragua's  Zero  Option,"  Newsweek,   18
April, 1983, p. 40.
         14.  Christopher  Dickey.  "Pastora  Renews Battle
Against Sandinistas in Nicaragua."  Washington Post, 3 July,
1983.  A-1, A-27
         15.  "Costa  Rica  Charges  Pastora  and  Others in
Killing, Kidnap."  Washington Post, 3 December, 1983.  A-13
         16.  "Commander Zero's Resolve."   Chicago Tribune,
14 August, 1983.  B-1
         17.  Tomas  Borge,  as quoted by Claudia Dreifus in
"The Sandinistas" Playboy Interview.  July, 1983.
         18.  Jay  Mallin.   "Basque's   Arrest  Embarrasses
Sandinistas."  Washington Times, 3 October, 1983.  6A
         19.  "Moving the Miskitos."   Time,  1 March, 1982,
p. 22.
         20.  Ibid.
         21.  Brenton  Schlender.  "Nicaraguan  Exile Unites
Feud With Each Other  As  Well As Sandinistas."  Wall Street
Journal, Vol. CCII, No. 18, 27 July, 1983, p. 1.
         22.  Wall  Street  Journal.  Vol. CCI, No. 103, 31
May, 1983, p.1.
          23. "20,000 Protest U.S. Intervention."  Washing-
ton Post, 13 November 1983.  B-8
         24.  "Sandinistas Propose Four Security  Accords to
U.S."  Washington Post, 21 October, 1983.  A-1
         25.  Christian  Science Monitor, 14 November, 1983,
p. 1.
         26.  I.M.    Destler.  "The   Elusive    Consensus:
Congress and Central America" in Central America, Anatomy of
Conflict, p. 327.
         27.  Ibid, p. 329.
         28.  Joanne  Omang.  "Reagan  Gains  Bulk  of Latin
American Goals."  Washington Post, 20 November, 1983.  A-11
         29.  John  M. Goshko.  "Argentina Ends Contra Aid."
Washington Post, 19 January, 1984.  A-1
         30.  Fred Hiatt.  "U.S. Plans New Latin Maneuvers."
Washington Post, 2 February, 1984.  A-1, A-23
         31.  O'Ballance, pp. 8-9.
             CHAPTER FIVE:  OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
     Formulating  a  national strategy to counter the direct
Soviet challenge  in  Nicaragua  is difficult.  Any strategy
must  be  dynamically derived.  What really are  U.S.  vital
interests?  Basically they are defense of our homeland, U.S.
economic well being, world order (favorable to the U.S), and
promotion of American values abroad.
     The  United States has a number of interests in Central
America.  Among the primary interests are preventing Central
America and  the  Caribbean  from becoming an armed base for
the  Soviet  Union.  Also,  the protection of vital sea  and
logistic routes makes the security of the Panama Canal a key
interest,  as well as the security of the biggest domino  to
our South, Mexico.   The  U.S. has an interest in supporting
the growth of democratic institutions  in  the region rather
than military or revolutionary dictatorships.  There is also
an interest in earning  the  good will of the people despite
thirty-four American military interventions in the Caribbean
and  Central  America  over  the  last  ninety  years.   And
finally, a  significant  interest  which  impacts  upon  our
policy formulation is the issue of human rights. 1/
     Fred  C.  Ikle,  Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
articulated the  three elements of our Caribbean strategy in
the   December   issue   of   Defense  83.  The   underlying
principles  of   the   strategy   are   a  continuation  and
stengthening   of   positive   trends   towards   democratic
institutions, economic and social betterment for the  people
of  Central America, and prevention of Leninist totalitarian
regimes  (complete   with  Stalinist   Police   Systems  and
establishment  of    Soviet  military   bases)  which  become
irreversible  and  export  their   revolutions.  First,  the
United  States  desires to foster  democratic  and  economic
development by  facilitating  trade, and by providing advice
and  aid.  The  Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  of  the Reagan
Administration was cited as an implementive example  of this
aspect of our strategy.  Second, in order to  accomplish the
above, guerrillas with a "rule or  ruin"  strategy  must  be
effectively  neutralized.  The  guerrillas blow-up  bridges,
destroy   schools,   and   key  economic  institutions   and
installations  faster  than  U.S. economic aid  can  restore
them.   The  stablized  environment necessary for social and
economic recovery,  or the salvage and revitalization of the
Central America Common Market cannot exist without defeating
insurgents militarily.  Ikle explicitly states the degree to
which this is to be accomplished:
     We do not seek a military defeat for our friends
     We do not seek a military stalemate
     We seek victory for the forces of democracy. 2/
     Sufficient  military  assistance  must  be allocated to
defeat organized  forces  of  violence that refuse to accept
the democratic will of the people or allow establishment  of
internal systems  that  will  ensure  justice  and  personal
political freedom.  Third,  the  United  States must prevent
the disintegration of Central America into East-West spheres
with one portion linked to the Soviet Union and the other to
the   U.S.,   creating   further   potential   for   hostile
confrontation of  military forces that could extend into the
next   several   decades.   Economic   support,   democratic
development,  and  military  assistance  to  the region must
succeed in preventing the  Sandinistas from further becoming
an  arsenal for insurgency and a haven for  those  exporting
violence.   If  these goals cannot be accomplished, the U.S.
must expect to  see  increasing  use  of  violence  and U.S.
forces to halt Soviet hegemony. 3/
The Kissinger Report
     The  timing  of  President  Reagan appointing a special
bipartisan commission to propose solutions  to  conflict  in
Central America  was  no  coincidence.  The U.S. was clearly
losing.   The  C.I.A.  concluded  that the Contras could not
win.  Nicaragua  continued  to  consolidate  and  militarize
despite  clandestine   military,   political,  and  economic
pressures  applied  by  the  U.S..  Also,  the  army  in  El
Salvador was  suffering  significant defeats at the hands of
communist rebels.  The one-hundred thirty-two page  document
recounts  the  tortured  history  of  Central  America,  our
neglect in policy, and the critical threat imposed by Soviet-
Cuban  influence  in   Central   America  and  specifically,
Nicaragua.
     The Commission openly acknowledges that the  Sandinista
government has made significant gains against illiteracy and
disease, but that economic performance has been poor because
of  disruption  caused  by  the  revolution, world recession
which   more   significantly   impacts  upon  mono-economies
(countries where  two  commodities comprise more than 50% of
total exports), and mismanagement associated  with  Marxist-
Leninist ideology.   The commission also recognized that the
history of U.S. intervention both military and private, from
soldier of fortune  William  Walker  to  monopolies of fruit
companies and banks, has profoundly colored  the attitude of
Central  Americans.  It  has  also  fostered a perception of
U.S. economic and political imperialism, despite significant
technological, industrial, social and economic contributions
to Latin America.
     A consensus was reached which considered that our moral
and strategic interests coincide and in broad terms outlined
those interests as follows:
          (1) preserving  the  moral  authority of the
     U.S.
          (2) improving  the living conditions of  the
     Central American people
          (3) advancing   the   cause   of  democracy,
     broadly defined
          (4) strengthening  the   weakness   of   the
     hemispheric system (North and South) both socially
     and economically
          (5) promoting    peaceful    change,     and
     resistance to democracy by terroristic forces
          (6) Preventing hostile forces from expanding
     on treatening  our vital interests (oil, minerals,
     canal)
          (7) barring   the   Soviet   Union   or  its
     surrogates from consolidating footholds in Central
     America. 4/
     The above reiterates  the  strategy  espoused  by Under
Secretary  Hickle,  but also recognizes a tradition of  deep
rooted social and moral deficiencies.
     In  order  for  such goals to be successfully achieved,
there  must  be  total cooperation and assistance from  non-
governmental institutions and  groups, businesses, voluntary
organizations, churches and lay organizations, trade unions,
agricultural  sectors,  peasant  leaders  and  cooperatives.
Implicit in such a sweeping and  comprehensive  strategy are
some   major   problems.  The   Sandinistas   have   already
capitalized on consolidating power in  many  of  the special
interest groups cited.  And a  dilemma  in Nicaragua is what
happens when confiscated lands, and  businesses  now  turned
into cooperatives  or  nationalized,  become  the subject of
jurisdictional  claims  from former owners?  Such  ends  are
mutually exclusive and would be  a  threat to a recalcitrant
Sandinista regime.
     The  solution  proposed is a buy-or-fight our  way  out
strategy.  The price tag is in excess of $8.9 billion over a
5  year period.  Through massive economic aid (approximately
75% economic and 25% military assistance), the U.S. hopes to
induce "behavior modification" in Central American countries
and produce a confederation that  will  isolate Nicaragua or
force  them   to   integrate.  Despite   current   political
differences, Nicaragua is  recognized  as being an essential
part  of  the  Central  American  economy,  although it  has
deteriorated and  undermined  linkages  with the rest of the
Central  American  economic   network.  Among   the  current
conditions and  causes  of  Central American economic demise
are  the high cost of energy imports, interregional conflict
and  political  rivalries,  extensive  foreign debt, and one
that the  commission does not specify, widespread corruption
and the influence of "militar fuerar."  In  addition  to  an
energy  stablization  program,  the  commission  recommended
eight key elements for an economic recovery program:
          (1)  The U.S. and Central  American countries
     develop a  comprehensive  plan to reinvigorate the
     Central American Common Market.
          (2)  Maximum  participation  by  the  private
     sector,  i.e. training, technical advice, and  new
     public  and private initiatives to foster economic
     recovery and growth.
          (3)  The  U.S. would address the servicing of
     external debt,  lengthening  or  deferring payment
     schedules.
          (4)   Immediate   increase    in    bilateral
     assistance  from  $628  million in  FY83  to  $877
     million in FY84.
          (5)   Expanded   aid   for  housing  projects
     employing labor  intensive methods to provide more
     jobs.   Also  improvements in electricity, irriga-
     tion, roads, bridges and municipal services.
          (6)  Trade  credit  guarantees  and  seasonal
     credits for agricultural concerns.
          (7)  The  U.S.  would provide energy credits
     to the Central American Common Market.
          (6)  The U.S. would join the Central American
     Bank  of Economic Integration (CABEI) and  provide
     investment capital for small entrepreneurs and new
     business ventures. 5/
     The ambitious programs, already evaluated by the Reagan
administration, have  been submitted to Congress.  They pose
a  very expensive solution at  a  time  when  U.S.  deficits
approach an historical record.  Constituencies will  play an
important role  in  determining  final  acceptance  of these
recommendations in  an  election year.  While the commission
was chaired by both Republicans and Democrats representing a
range of conservative and liberal opinions,  the issue of $8
billion  plus will be bantered around in  campaign  rhetoric
with  each  side having the  ideal  solution.  Division  and
argument,   without   immediate  implementation,  will  only
prolong  the  agony  of   Central   American   problems  and
inevitably require  large  scale military intervention.  The
report maintains that in  order for a massive aid program to
be effective, assistance must be disbursed on  a conditional
basis  to  those   countries  that  can  demonstrate  strong
judicial  systems, where individual grievances can be fairly
and objectively addressed and resolved, where free elections
representing  the  will of all the people determine national
and municipal leadership, where  free  and  democratic trade
unions  exist,  and  finally,  where  there is a significant
improvement in the social conditions of the poorest.
     Nicaragua would be encouraged to participate in a newly
created  Central  American  Development Organization (CADO),
which  would  be  open  to  the seven countries  of  Central
America  --  Belize,  Costa  Rica,  El  Salvador, Guatamala,
Honduras,  Nicaragua,  and Panama, and to the United  States
which  would  serve as chairman.  Further  associate  status
would be  available  to  other  Latin  American  democracies
willing to  allocate  resources  to  accomplish the regional
objectives outlined  above.  The  control  of  all aid would
have to  rest  with the donors and would be conditional upon
progress towards  economically,  politically,  and  socially
defined  objectives.  This  multilateral body would  include
eminent  Central  Americans  drawn  from  the private sector
primarily,  including  representatives of  democratic  trade
unions, business or government.
     A key assessment by  the panel is that any institutions
tied  to  regional development and progress, must  represent
indigenous efforts.  If the "hearts and minds" of the people
are not enthusiastically captured for programs, they  cannot
succeed  no  matter how much the U.S. spends or  desires  to
influence  regional  stability.  In   order   for   economic
development to  exist,  there  must  be a great reduction in
regional   violence,  which  accelerates  not  only  capital
flight, but the loss of technical and professional personnel
essential for  implementation  of  economic  and  industrial
development.
     In the areas of human development, the  following areas
were  targeted  to   improve  living  conditions  and  basic
nutritional needs:
          -- Reduction of malnutrition
          -- Elimination of illiteracy
          -- Primary education and health care for all
          -- Reduction in the infant mortality rate
          -- Improvement in housing conditions and
             reduction in the population growth
             rate 6/
     The Sandinista government became highly successful when
it implemented many of  these  same health and social reform
programs early in  its  tenure.  They  were  programs  badly
needed.  The   legitimate  grievances  which   caused   such
problems  were not invented by the junta, but served to make
the insurgency  possible.  The  proliferation  of grievances
forced  the oppressed to seek the social reformist  ideology
of Marxism without  realizing  that  totalitarianism,  not a
democratic socialism, would be the final outcome.
     To   promote  cultural  and   educational   ties,   the
Commission recommended expansion of the Peace  Corps role in
a front-line literacy  campaign.  (The  U.S.  is 2,000 Cuban
teachers too late in this program for  Nicaragua, but in all
the other  Central American countries, this great need still
exists.)  Vocational   training,  strengthening  the   major
universities   and   judicial  systems,  are   included   in
recommended educational  programs,  as  well  a  substantial
expansion in  scholarships to complete with and exceed those
offered by the Soviets.   For  example, in Fiscal Year 1982,
there  were  only  391  scholarships  awarded   to   Central
Americans  as  opposed to 7,500 by Soviet, Eastern Bloc, and
Cuban institutions of higher learning. 7/
     The  Commission  recognized  the need  for  significant
increases in  military  aid  to fight leftist guerrillas and
also to  fund  Contra operations "to create conditions under
which  Nicaragua  can  take  its place  as  a  peaceful  and
democratic member of the Central American community."  There
were, however, minority dissents filed with the report which
recommended  suspension  of  covert  aid  to  the  "Contras"
through  1985  so  that   the   Sandinista   government  can
demonstrate its capacity for adhering to election schedules,
and movement towards  a more pluralistic government.  Such a
cut-off  would  be contingent upon Nicaragua modifying their
policy   of   exporting   advisors  and  aid  to  Salvadoran
insurgents,  and a decrease in military buildup  activities.
This, the panel maintains, would in turn decrease  the  U.S.
requirement to  provide  higher  levels  of  military aid to
Honduras and El Salvador.
     The Kissinger Commission and Reagan Administration also
support enforcement of stability in  Central America through
the  Central   American   Defense  Council  (CONDECA).  This
alliance was formed in 1964 by  the  military  dictators  of
Central  America.  It encouraged mutual defense  provisions,
joint maneuvers, and generally provided a military mechanism
to   ensure  that  social  and  economic  development  could
continue. 8/  Because  Somoza was a principal figure in this
organization, there is reluctance by  some  Central American
nations, notably  Panama, to fully accept CONDECA as a means
to further isolate Nicaragua.
The Report of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
     Published as a collection of essays by Central American
specialists,  Central  American,  Anatomy  of  Conflict, was
released shortly after the  Kissinger  Report.  Its  purpose
was  "to  crystallize  democratic  thinking,"   to   provide
additional analyzes of complex issues in Central America and
to  offer  more  liberal   solutions   which   diminish  the
possibility  of  a  U.S. military intervention.   While  the
Kissinger report details that regional crises must be met by
a combination  of  economic,  military, political and social
measures,   the    Carnegie    report   supports   political
negotiations between warring  priorities  ahead  of  an $8.9
billion aid program.  Political  settlements,  editor Robert
Leiken argues,  would  enable  revival  and  growth  of  the
Central   American   Common   market,   and   without   such
settlements, a  "massive  U.S.  Marshall  Plan  for  Central
America  would  not be successful and  only  would  lead  to
further  polarization  by  rewarding friends  and   punishing
enemies." 9/   There exists  fear among liberals both in the
U.S. and Latin America,  that  massive aid would only end up
in Florida real estate or Miami bank accounts.  The Carnegie
report also states that the Bipartisan Report only serves to
further  reinforce  current  Reagan  administration  policy,
except for recommendations that aid be more stringently tied
to human rights reforms as a means of controlling right wing
death squads.   The  report  cites Honduras as an example of
what would happen if the impacts  of  U.S.  policy  are  not
thoroughly considered.  Despite significant military aid and
development  assistance   since  1981,  and  a  strong  U.S.
military presence  through  joint  exercises, there has been
little change  in the social conditions in Honduras.  A wide
disparity still exists between rich and poor, the balance of
power has  shifted  from  the  civilian  government  to  the
military allied  with  the  oligarchy, and there has been an
increased possibility  of  destablizing non-extremist forces
in the region. 10/
     The  Carnegie  report  concludes  that  the  Sandinista
government  in   Nicaragua   should   negotiate  with  their
opposition and  provide  greater  participation with middle-
class  and private enterprise not  aligned  with  the  FSLN.
Without  creating  a  stable   environment  with  broad  base
cooperation,  the  Carnegie   report   dooms  the  Nicaraguan
economy   to    continuing    failure.  Appeals   for   such
accommodations,  however,   from   both  Carter  and  Reagan
administrations, have fallen on deaf ears in Managua.
The Military Option 11/
     Scenario: An Invasion and Occupation of Nicaragua
     To isolate the struggle in  El  Salvador, the U.S.
     moves   against  Nicaragua.  American  troops  and
     representative   CONDECA   contingents   establish
     beachheads and  air  heads in Nicaragua, take over
     the  principal   cities  of  Nicaragua,  extend  a
     presence throughout  the  countryside, and proceed
     to  deal  with  sabotage and insurgency after  the
     high-intensity warfare has died down.
So  reads the  proposal  by  Theodore  H.  Moran  who  is  a
contributor to  Central America, Anatomy of Conflict.  Moran
is currently Landegger Professor and director of the program
in  International  Business  Diplomacy   at  the  Georgetown
University School  of Foreign Service, and formerly a member
of  the  policy  planning  staff at  the U.S. Department of
State.  Moran  in  his  study,  attempts  to  determine  the
alternative costs for four  different scenarios.  Moran does
not try to judge which of his  5 year scenarios is best, nor
suggest that U.S. policy decisions on  Central  America will
be based only upon economic issues.  What he does attempt to
do is  provide a stimulus for the larger debate on political
and security issues for U.S. policy and strategy formulation
for 1984 and beyond.
     Moran  draws  upon three separate analyses by military
experts and consultants, all which call for between two  and
three  divisions  of  American  troops  backed  by  air  and
logistics  support.  His assessment  recognizes  that  there
exist  many uncertainties in  trying  to  estimate  American
losses,  notably,  the pace at which an  intervention  would
proceed, and the endurance of Nicaraguan resistance.
     In  the  base  scenario, U.S. forces conduct  the  main
fighting with perhaps some CONDECA representation.  The U.S.
forces would  be  comprised of one Marine Division, one U.S.
Army air  mobile  division, one Army light infantry brigade,
and one Ranger  battalion.  Their  mission would be to seize
airports and  beachheads,  conduct a link-up, and occupy the
four major Nicaraguan cities in 12  days.  For  the  next 20
days,  the  U.S.  would  expand   their   presence   to  the
countryside seeking out Sandinista insurgents over  the next
3 months.  Sandinista resistance  would  be reduced as their
logistical supplies are drawn down.  One U.S. division would
withdraw after  122  days  of intense fighting, and over the
next 5  year  period,  the  remaining  one-and-a  half  U.S.
divisions along with CONDECA contingents, would seek out and
destroy   the   remaining   FSLN  forces.  Exports  in   the
Nicaraguan economy would drop 80% during the initial year of
fighting, while  import levels would remain constant through
American economic aid.  American assistance is also required
to  off-set  a 20% reduction in revenues, and  $500  million
would  be  allocated  for  reconstruction  and  development.
Sabotage over the next four years would prevent exports from
reaching more than 60% of 1982 levels and an additional $300
million per  year  would  be  needed  for reconstruction and
development aid.
     An expansion of the  above scenario would add Air Force
and  Navy  air  support,  with   appropriate  logistics  and
personnel:  (61,000  total  with 25,000 direct  combatants),
three  air  wings  (216   fixed   wing   aircraft   and  734
helicopters) with tanks, trucks, armored personnel  carriers
would constitute part of the equipment.  During the first 32
days of  intense  fighting, 148 helicopters and 7 fixed wing
aircraft would be lost.  U.S. casualties would be 50-100 per
day killed-in-action  (KIA)  in built-up areas, with 300-600
wounded-in-action (WIA)  during  the  first  12 days.  These
figures are based upon statistical records of Vietnam, which
reflect a 6 to 1 wounded to dead rate although some military
analysts conclude that as high as a  10  to  1  ratio may be
more  appropriate  for  application to Nicaragua.   American
casualties would  diminish to 15-30 KIA and 120-180 WIA over
the  next  20  days.  In  summary,  during  initial  intense
fighting,  American  KIA's total between 1,061-2,122, WIA's,
5,400-10,800,  not  including accidental deaths based  again
upon Vietnam ratios of 1 accidental death per 5.6 killed due
to enemy action.  A much  higher rate of civilian casualties
would   occur   in  such  an  intense  environment.  In  the
subsequent  3  months and in presumed lower  intensity,  the
casualty figures would be 15 helicopters,  3 planes, 450-900
KIAS, 2,700-5,400 WIA's, and 81-161 accidental deaths.
     In  the  next  two  year  period,  30  helicopters,   6
aircraft, 200-600  KIA's,  and  300-900  WIA's, would become
casualties,  and  figures  assume  that CONDECA  troops  and
Contras implement  any pacification programs.  For the final
two years  and  eight  months,  the  attrition  rate  is  15
helicopters, 2 aircraft, 400  U.S.  KIA,  600 WIA, all based
upon declining resistance  and ability to cut-off logistical
support from external sources such  as  Cuba  or Soviet bloc
countries.  The total five year losses recapitulated are:
              Helicopters               208
              Aircraft                   18
              KIA                   2,392-4,783
              WIA                   9,300-18,600
     Total  estimated  cost  of  equipment  lost  is  $2,608
million broken down as follows:
                 Helicopters - 2,306 million
(75% attack  helicopters,  Blackhawks  at  $7  million each,
Apaches at  $10 million each, 20% observation helicopters at
$4 million  each,  and  5%  heavy  lift  helicopters  at $27
million each)
             Fixed-wing Aircraft - $222 million
(70% of losses -- replaced by  F-16's  at  $22 million each,
10%  Harriers at $24 million each, 10% F-15's at $27 million
each, and 10-A-6E's at $36 million each)
Tanks, armored personnel carriers, trucks, etc. - $50 million
     Tacked  on  to  equipment  losses  is  the  incremental
operating  costs  of  maintaining  an infantry  division  in
combat.  The  figures  of  $1.938  million  is  derived from
subtracting the average daily cost of a division in training
status  in  the  U.S.  ($2.192 million/day) from the average
daily  cost  of  maintaining  an  infantry  division  during
Vietnam  ($4.705  million/day  in  1983 dollars).  Different
rates of expenditures are applied  relative to the intensity
of combat over the 5-year period.   Coupled  with  aid,  the
economic  cost  of  invasion and occupation of Nicaragua for
the 1984-1989 period is:
                        (In Millions)
             1.  Equipment losses        $2,608
             2.  Operating costs          1,938
             3.  Economic assistance      6,100
                        TOTAL           $10,646
     While  such  costs  are  staggering,  Moran is quick to
point  out  that  there is an inherent danger in  trying  to
project  costs  based  upon  the  historical  experience  of
Vietnam and  by  cranking figures through simulation models.
There  are  just  too  many  unknown  variables.   Such   an
approach, is  aimed  only  at  a  segment  of total regional
problems.  Application of any scenario is bound to result in
further  deterioration  in  Central America and require long
term military  and economic initiatives.  One thing that the
author   does   allude   to,  is  the  level  of  Sandinista
resistance.  Since Contra initiatives began on a wider scale
in 1981, the leftist regime  has been actively preparing for
invasion and  storing  provisions  and  arms  in  the rugged
mountain country of Nicaragua.  The Sandinistas are prepared
to  wage a long term guerrilla war that would result in much
higher  casualties  and  cost.  A  U.S.  invasion would also
cause additional popular  support  for the Sandinistas based
solely upon Nicaraguan hatred of U.S. interventionism.  Eden
Pastora of the ARDE has reiterated on several occasions that
the problems of Nicaragua must be solved by Nicaraguans, and
the  U.S.  military  action  would  revive the nationalistic
spirit of Sandino in all his countrymen.
     A  criticism of this particular article is that it pays
too  little  attention  to  the  terrain  and  geography  of
Nicaragua.  It does not address how thinly our air and naval
assets would be stretched and what would be the U.S. ability
to respond to other world crises  where  vital interests are
at stake.  Neither  does  the  analysis  fully  address  the
negative consequences  of  fighting  in several major cities
where  60%  of Nicaraguans  live,  and  where  thousands  of
innocent civilians  would be killed.  How much more prepared
today is the U.S. military to pursue an  enemy  in  extended
jungle  and  mountain warfare where logistical  burdens  are
enormous, while at  the same time countering massive acts of
sabotage in  rear  area  installations?  Will  there  really
exist a rear area?  In an environment similar to Vietnam, it
was  difficult  to distinguish between friend and foe.   The
Spanish and  English  speaking  Nicaraguans, may be grudging
tolerators of U.S. presence by day, but guerrillas by night.
Conclusion
     In  the  final  analysis,  no solution is going to come
cheaply  to  solve  regional  conflict  and  counter  Soviet
influence.  Whether  our   strategy  is  a  continuation  of
present policy,  a negotiated solution with power sharing by
left and  right  winged  factions,  a military solution with
surrogates, or direct invasion by  U.S.  forces, the primary
emphasis must be  to promote long term stablization at least
cost of U.S. lives.  Not in favor of the  U.S.  is a chronic
history   of   interventions  which  has  alienated  Central
Americans.  What ultimately is in  favor  of the U.S., is an
honest appraisal of deficiences in  the past, and a marriage
of both moral and strategic interests  for  the future.  The
final test  will  be  the  resolve  of  the American people.
Overwhelming support for the Reagan administration after the
invasion of  Grenada,  demonstrated  that  Americans  do not
desire a Soviet hegemony on their borders.  But Nicaragua is
not Grenada.  A military victory there will be neither quick
nor  cheap.  Even  when  U.S.  troops  eventually prevailed,
combat losses, domestic dissent, and a damaged U.S. alliance
system   could  turn   tactical   victory   into   strategic
defeat. 12/  Can the  United  States  live with a Sandinista
regime if it does not continue as an instrument of communist
revolution?  Complex questions without easy answers.
     If there is a peaceful solution in the future, the U.S.
must strive  for it with all its collective being.  If there
cannot  be  a  peaceful solution, Americans  will  face  the
prospects of war in the next two years.
     The  biggest  danger is a naivete of an American public
that negotiations will deter the Sandinistas or Soviets from
seeking  their ultimate objective,  strategic  and  economic
defeat  of the United States.  Because of Soviet objectives,
the U.S. must remain physically and morally prepared for the
worst case situation.
                           ENDNOTES
             Chapter Five:  Options For The Future
          1.  "The  Risks in Central  America."  Commonweal,
22 April, 1983, p. 227.
          2.  Ikle.  "Caribbean Strategy," pp. 8-15.
          3.  Ibid.
          4.  "Kissinger Report," p. 37.
          5.  Ibid., pp. 45-60.
          6.  Ibid., p. 68.
          7.  Ibid., p. 72.
          8.  Walker, p. 108.
          9.  Robert S. Leiken.  "Can The Cycle Be Broken,"
in Central America, Anatomy of Conflict, pp. 3-15.
         10.  Ibid.
         11.  Theodore  H.  Moran.  "The Cost of alternative
U.S.  Policies Toward El  Salvador  1984-1989,"  in  Central
America, Anatomy of Conflict, pp. 166-170.
         12.   Joseph   Cirincione  and  Leslie  C.  Hunter.
"Military  Threats,   Actual   and  Potential,"  in  Central
America, Anatomy of Conflict, p. 189.
                          EPILOGUE
     On  13  March, 1983, the Senate Intelligence  Committee
authorized an additional $21 million in  Covert  aid  to the
counterrevolutionary forces  in  Nicaragua.  A Department of
Defense spokesman  the  same  day  admitted  that the United
States has exceeded its self-imposed ceiling of 1,700 troops
and that 2,000 troops  will  be  in  Honduras  by the end of
March.   These  troops are scheduled to conduct "a series of
emergency deployment readiness exercises."
     President  Reagan  has appointed a  new  Ambassador  to
Nicaragua, Harry E. Bergold, Jr.,  and  Congress has not yet
acted on  his  request  for  $1.2  billion  in  economic and
military aid  to  Central  America, the first installment of
the  five-year  $8.9  billion  package  recommended  by  the
Kissinger Commission.  President Reagan has publicly stated,
"As a nation, we can't afford  to  let  this  issue  drag on
while people die in Central America."
     In Nicaragua,  the Sandinista government has dispatched
troops,  artillery  and  tanks to  the  Honduran  border  to
counter  an   expected   rebel  offensive.  Because  of  the
Grenada  experience,  Cuba  has decided to restructure their
corps of  "advisors"  in  Nicaragua  to  better  prepare for
aggression  against  Nicaragua.  Cuba  is  also  considering
withdrawing its  25,000 troops from Angola perhaps they will
end up in Nicaragua.  The United States next war has already
begun.
                        BIBLIOGRAPHY
                            Books
Esther and Mortimer Arias.  The Cry of My People.  New York:
     Friendship Press, 1980.  Recounts the social injustices
     of South America that require radical, and violent if
     necessary, action by Christians.
Gustavo Gutierrez.  A Theology of Liberation, translated and
     edited by Sister Caridad India and John Eagleson.  Mary-
     knoll, New York:  Orbis Books, 1973.  A classic inter-
     pretation of liberation theology with a Marxist bias.
Terry L. Heyns, ed., Understanding U.S. Strategy:  A Reader.
     Washington, D.C:  National Defense University Press,
     1983.  An excellent collection of articles addressing
     the U.S. vital interests during an era of U.S. decline.
*Robert S. Leiken, ed., Central America, Anatomy of Conflict.
     Published in cooperation with Carnegie Endowment for
     International Peace, New York:  Pergamon Press, 1984.
     Liberal counter proposals to the Kissinger Bipartisan
     Report.  Leiken, et al, call for negotiated solutions
     with leftists ahead of military air or U.S. interven-
     tion.
Bard E. O'Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts,
     ed.`s.  Insurgency in the Modern World.  Boulder,
     Colorado:  Westview Press, l980.  Provides a succinct
     framework for analyzing the elements of insurgency and
     provides testbook case studies.
*James D. Rudolph, ed., Nicaragua:  A Country Study.  (Area
     Handbook series:  DA pam. 550-88).  Washington, D.C.:
     U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982.  2nd ed.  A basic
     reference providing history from the colonial period to
     current problems of the FSLN.
*Richard L. Millett.  Guardians of the Dynasty.  Maryknoll,
     N.Y.:  Orbis Books, 1977.  A chronicle of U.S. Marine
     intervention, training of the National Guard, and the
     Somoza family's 44 year dictatorship.
________, and W. Marvin Will, ed., The Restless Caribbean.
     New York:  Praeger Publishers, 1979.
*John J. Tierney, Jr.  Somozas and Sandinistas:  The U.S. and
     Nicaragua in the Twentieth Century.  Published jointly by
     the councils for Inter-American Security and for Inter-
     American Security Educational Institute.  Washington, D.C.:
     1982.  Discusses rise to power of the Sandinistas and
     current problems they pose to the U.S. and Central America.
*Thomas W. Walker.  Nicaragua, The Land of Sandino.  Boulder,
     Colorado:  Westview Press.  Second printing 1982.  Chroni-
     cles the history of Nicaragua and rise of the FSLN.  Pro-
     fuse with leftist rhetoric but does provide many useful
     facts.
*Denotes key references for research
       U.S. Government Documents and Contract Reports
Thomas P. Anderson.  The Two Revolutions:  Nicaragua and
     Cuba - Similarities and Differences.  Prepared for
     Office of Long Range Assessments and Research, Dept.
     of State, Contract No. 1722-320036, Eastern Connecti-
     cut State University, 3 Feb., 1983.  Compares the
     application of communist revolutionary models in both
     countries.
Alex Alexiev.  Soviet Strategy in the Third World and
     Nicaragua.  Santa Monica, Ca.:  Rand Corporation,
     March 1982.  A discussion of Soviet designs on the
     Caribbean and the militarization of Nicaragua.
Edward Gonzales.  Reflections on Nicaragua and the Cuban
     Model.  Dept. of State, Contract No. 1722-320039,
     Santa Monica, Ca.:  Rand Corporation and U.C.L.A.
     3 Feb., 1983.  Similar to Anderson above.
Colonel Kenneth E. Murphy, U.S. Army.  "Senior Officer
     Debriefing Report, Commander, COMUSMILGP, Nicaragua,
     20 July 1971 - 20 December 1973."  (RCS-CSFOR-74).
     APO New York:  U.S. Dept. of Defense, U.S. Military
     Group Nicaragua, letter dated 21 December, 1973.
     File Symbol SCNI-CO.  Military briefiing on Nicaragua
     and cites potential sources for future insurrection.
Bernard C. Nalty.  The United States Marines in Nicaragua.
     Washington, D.C.:  Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
     G-3 Division Historical Branch.  (Revised) 1968.
Harry F. Young.  Atlas of United States Foreign Relations.
     U.S. Dept. of State Bureau of Public Affairs.  Pub.
     9350, Washington, D.C.:  June 1983.  A general re-
     ference work which graphically highlights interna-
     tional treaty organizations.
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
     Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on Inter-American
     affairs.  Assessment of Condition in Central America.
     Hearings, April 29 and May 20, 1980.  (96th Congress,
     2d Session).  Washington, D.C.:  U.S. GPO, 1980.
     Testimonies on suppressive activities in Nicaragua
     and Marxist domination.
_________.   United States Policy Toward Nicaragua.  Hearings
     June 21 and 26, 1979.  (96th Congress, 1st Session)
     Washington, D.C.:  U.S. GPO, 1979.
U.S. Department of Defense.  Soviet Military Power.  Wash-
     ington, D.C.:  U.S. GPO, March 1983.  2nd ed.
___________.  and U.S. Department of State, "Background
     Paper:  Central America."  Following to May 13, 1983
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
     House of Representatives Report on Cuban, Soviet,
     and Nicaraguan Activities in Central America.  Wash-
     ington, D.C.:  U.S. GPO, 27 May, 1983.  A basic re-
     ference which is a collection of CIA evidence on the
     militarization of Nicaragua.  President Reagan went
     public with this information to bolster increased aid
     for Latin America military and economic programs.
U.S. Department of Commerce.  "Foreign Economic Trends and
     Their Implications for the United States - Nicaragua."
     Prepared by the American Embassy in Managua.  FET 82-
     118.  Washington, D.C., December 1982.
__________.  "Labor Trends in Nicaragua."  Prepared by the
     American Embassy in Managua, draft notes dated April,
     1983.  No place or author provided.  Obtained from
     Nicaragua Desk, U.S. Dept. of State.  A sketch of
     Nicaragua's economy, labor unions, and problems.
U.S. Executive Department.  Report of the National Bipartisan
     Commission on Central America.  Chairman, Henry A.
     Kissinger.  Washington, D.C., January 10, 1984.  The
     consensus report which recommended $8.9 billion aid to
     Latin America for the period 1984-1989.
U.S. Department of State.  Background Notes:  Nicaragua.
     Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.:  U.S. GPO,
     January 1983.  A concise document on Nicaraguan facts.
___________.  "Comprehensive Strategy for Central America."
     Current Policy No. 502, Washington, D.C.:  August 4,
     1983.
__________.  "Nicaragua:  Threat to Peace in Central America,"
     Current Policy No. 476, Washington, D.C., 12 April,
     1983.
White House Digest, Office of Media Relations and Planning,
     Four issues.  June 1, July 13, July 20, August 24,
     1983 relating to Central America and Nicaragua subjects.
     An excellent collection of short topics which highlight
     repression and external influence in Nicaraguan affairs.
         Magazine and Periodical Articles on Nicaragua
     Over  250 magazine articles were consulted covering the
period from July 1979  to 10 March, 1984.  Primary reference
materials were U.S. News and  World  Report,  Newsweek,  and
Time Magazines.  Those articles considered most  representa-
tive are listed herein:
"An Evolving Policy:  U.S. Intervention and the Reagan Admin-
     istration."  Coalition for a new Foreign and Military
     Policy, Washington, D.C.  March, 1983, 5 pp:  A left-
     wing Tabloid but gives a good outline of U.S. policy
     decisions.
"A Foreign Policy Emerges."  Newsweek, March 9, 1981.  pp. 22-
     23.
"Arguing About Means and Ends."  Time, April 18, 1983. pp. 30-
     31.
"A Revolution of Disillution."  World Press Review, June 1983.
     pp. 35-38.
Jim Boyce, Major USMC.  "Combat Patrol: Nicaragua."  Leather-
     neck, October, 1982.  pp. 40-44.  A general article which
     gives an appreciation for difficult guerrilla warfare.
"Covert Operations Voting Record."  Campaign Against U.S.
     Intervention.  Legislative Update, Supplement-D.  Coali-
     tion for a New Foreign and Military Policy.  Washington,
     D.C.:  August 10, 1983.  A liberal lobby group but details
     on the evolution of the Boland-Zablocki Amendment are good.
"Crackdown - Sandinistas Fail Businessmen."  Time, November
     2, 1981.  p. 44.
George de Lama.  "Spreading the Marxist Gospel."  Chicago
     Tribune Magazine, 22 August 1982, Section 9.  A satirical
     article recounting that "Jesus was a Sandinista" for
     radical Marxist-Christians in Nicaragua.
"Double or Quits in Nicaragua."  The Economist, 20 March,
     1982.  pp. 55-56.  Recounts Eden Pastora's defection
     from the FSLN.
"Falling Dominoes:  Is Nicaragua Next?"  Nicaragua Information
     Center Bulletin.  Berkeley, Ca.:  November, 1983.  4 pgs.
     A left wing tabloid.
Vincent J. Giese.  "The Church in Nicaragua."  Our Sunday
     Visitor White Paper.  Huntington, IN:  7 November, 1982.
     4 pgs.  Recounts the religious persecution being ex-
     perienced in Nicaragua.
Chuck Henry, SSgt USMC.  "Ahuas Tara II."  Marines, January,
     1984.  pp. 19-22.  A brief article on joint Marine-
     Honduras amphibious operations.
"Hero Unwelcome."  The Economist, 24 April, 1982.  p. 64.
     On Eden Pastora, FSLN defector trying to find his
     identity.
Joyce Hollyday and Jim Wallis.  "Nicaragua; A Fragile Future."
     Sojourners, March 1983.  pp. 8-13.  A liberal appraisal
     of the 1979 revolution in Nicaragua and propaganda for
     the FSLN programs.
Maurice G. Holmes, Captain, USMC.  "With the Horse Marines in
     Nicaragua."  Marine Corps Gazette, February 1984.  pp. 36-
     43.
Fred C. Ikle.  "The Three Elements of Our Caribbean Strategy."
     Defense 83, December 1983.  pp. 10-15.  Excellent and
     crisp statement of U.S. policy for the region.
"In Nicaragua, A Revolution Gone Sour."  U.S. News and World
     Report, 18 October, 1982.  pp. 41-45.
"Inside Communist Nicaragua:  The Miquel Bolanos Transcripts."
     The Backgrounder.  Washington, D.C.:  The Heritage Foun-
     dation.  No. 294, 30 September, 1983.  Bolanos is an
     FSLN defector and was a member of the Government Security
     Apparatus.  Attempts to confirm facts with the Heritage
     Foundation were negative concerning allegations that the
     Soviets are building a trans-istamian canal.
Stephen Kinser.  "Nicaragua, The Beleagured Revolution."  New
     York, Times Magazine, 28 August, 1983.  pp. 22-28, 65-
     66.  Excellent essay and pictorial view of Nicaragua's
     precipitous position and economy.
"Kissinger's Rescue Plan."  U.S. News and World Report, 23
     January, 1984.  pp. 22-25.
James LeMoyne.  "The Secret War Boils Over."  Newsweek, 11
     April, 1983.  pp. 46-7.
"Moving the Miskitos." Time, 1 March, 1982.  p. 22.
"New NSC Chief Inherits a Bag of Troubles."  Time 31
     October, 1983.  p.28.
"Nicaragua's Agonizing Slide."  World Press Review.  July
     1981.  pp. 26-28.
"Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama."  Quarterly Economic Review.
     London:  The Economist Intelligence Unit.  Three issues:
     3rd Qtr. 1981, No. 3 1983, and Annual Supplement.  Various
     pages.  An analysis of Nicaragua's GNR and economic dif-
     ficulties.
"Nicaragua's Contras Face a Rough Road."  U.S. News and World
     Report, 29 August, 1983.  pp. 29-30.
"Nicaragua:  The Contras Set-Up Shop."  Newsweek, 4 April,
     1983.  p.41.
"Nicaragua:  Development Under Fire."  Facts For Action.  Oxfam,
     America.  Boston, Mass. Vol. 8.
"Nicaragua Enjoys a Lull But Still Runs Scared."  U.S. News and
     World Report, 5 March, 1984.  pp. 31-32.
"Nicaragua Nettle."  The New Republic, 9 May, 1983.  pp. 15-16.
"Nicaragua:  Scared of U.S. But Still Talking Tough."  U.S.
     News and World Report, 14 November, 1983.  pp. 26-27.
"Nicaragua:  A Whole New Universe."  Time, 18 January, 1982.
     pp. 36-37.
Nicaragua Update.  By Nicaragua Interfaith Committee for Action.
     San Francisco, Ca.  Vol. 5, Issue 6, December 1983 and
     Vol. 6, No. 1. Jan/Feb - 1984.
Nicaragua:   A Look at the Reality.  Published by Quixote Center.
     Hyattsville, MD:  September 1983, 3d printing.
"Nicaraguan Resistance Leader Voices Optimism."  West Watch.
     Vol. VI, No. 2. May 1973.  pp. 1-8.
"Nicaragua's Zero Option."  Newsweek, 18 April, 1983.  p. 40.
Wallace H. Nutting, General U.S.A.  "A World in Conflict."
     Defense 83, December 1983.  p. 2-9.
Edgar O'Ballance.  "The Nicaraguan Domino."  Military Review,
     October 1983.  pp. 2-l0.
"Perspectives on Nicaragua."  Commonweal, 22 April, 1983.
     pp. 226-244.
"Revolution on a Leash."  The Economist, 3 April, 1982.  pp. 57-
     59.
"The Sandinista War on Human Rights."  The Backqrounder.  No.
     277, Washington, D.C.:  Heritage Foundation.  19 July, 1983.
"The Sandinistas."  Playboy.  Interview with the leaders of the
     Marxist junta in Nicaragua.  July, 1983.  Various pages -
     20 total.  An excellent and candid interview with all
     members of the Nicaragua junta of National Reconstruction.
     Alludes to their internal divisions.
"Somoza's Violent Death."  Newsweek, 29 September, 1980.  pp. 34-
     36.
"Taking Aim at Nicaragua."  Newsweek, 22 March, 1982. pp. 20-29.
John Hoyt Williams.  "Augusto Cesar Sandino:  Was Latin America's
     Romantic Revolutionary the First Sandinista?"  Soldier of
     Fortune, December 1982.  pp. 32-39.
                     Unpublished Sources
Frank Aker.  "Tactics The Theory and Practice of Revolutionary
     Warfare."  Woodbridge, Va.  October 1983.  Dr. Aker is an
     independent State Dept. Analyst.  In this thesis, he
     analyzes application of "foco" theory and other models.
__________.  "The Third World War and Central America:  U.S.
     Strategic and Security Considerations in the Caribbean
     Basin."  Woodbridge, Va.  No date.  Forecast of Soviet
     hegemony creeping towards our borders.
__________. ed.  Treaties, Conventions, Agreements and United
     States Public Laws of the Caribbean Region.  A complia-
     tion of all treaties currently in effect in this region.
Adolfo Calero Portocarrero.  Pronouncement of the Nicaraguan
     Democratic Force Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense (FDN.
     Statement delivered to the Ad Hoc Committee on Democracy
     For Nicaragua, 106 Dirksen Building, Washington, D.C.,
     19 July, 1983.  Obtained from Aker files.
Daniel Ortega Saavedra.  The Philosophies and Policies of the
     Government of Nicaragua.  Delivered to the United Nations,
     New York:  March 25, 1982.  Obtained from the Nicaragua
     Information Center, Berkely, Ca.
James Sensenbrenner, Member - U.S. Congress.  Unedited trip
     notes dated 11 October 1983.  Gives insight into press
     and religious censorship in Nicaragua, as well as state
     of economy.  Obtained from files of Dr. Frank Aker.
     Brief descriptions of war torn economy, presence of
     Soviet weapons observed on Nicaragua fact finding trip.
     Aker files.
L.J. Sklenar, Major, USMC and Major L. Wilson, Jr., USMC.
     Nicaragua:  Revolution Betrayed.  Thesis submitted for
     War Since 1945 Symposium.  Marine Corps Command and
     Staff College, Marine Corps Development and Education
     Command, Quantico, Virginia.  229 pp.  June 1983.
Lewis A. Tambs.  "Guatemala, Central America and the Caribbean -
     A Geopolitical Glance."  Delivered to the U.S. House of
     Representatives Sub-Committee on Inter-American Affairs.
     Dr. Tambs is currently U.S. Ambassador to Columbia and
     was a senior consultant to the National Security Council
     when this paper was delivered.  Dr. Frank Aker above was
     a contributor to this report.  Washington, D.C.:  July
     30, 1981.  Excellent evaluation of our Caribbean vital
     interests and logistics pipelines.
                     Newspaper Articles
"Central American Showdown in Nicaragua."  Chicago - Sun Times,
     1 June 1982.  A-1.
Christian Science Monitor.  9 May 1983 - 15 February 1984.
New York Times.  15 April 1981 - 30 November 1984.
Wall Street Journal.  31 May 1983 - 30 November 1983.
Washington Post.  30 July 1981 - 14 March 1984.
Washington Times.  11 April 1983 - 14 March 1984.
Over  200  Newspaper  Articles   were  consulted.  The  bias
represented by  the  news  articles  ranged  from  the  most
conservative The Washington Times, to the liberal Washington
Post and New York Times.  The Washington Times has generally
been  favorable  to  Reagan  administration  policies  while
writers  of  the liberal papers, have  supported  negotiated
settlements  with  leftist  guerrillas  and  denounced  U.S.
military intervention.   Criticism  has  diminished somewhat
since  the  Grenada  invasion  which  showed  strong  public
support  for  that  action.  Joanne Omange of the Washington
Post  has   consistently   presented  objective  reports  on
Nicaragua.  Key articles have been cited in  the endnotes of
each chapter.
                         Interviews
Dr.  Frank Aker  -  Independent  State  Department  analyst.
Interviews conducted  in  Woodbridge,  VA during October and
November, 1983.  Dr. Aker provided access  to  his extensive
reference files as well as  keen insight into Latin American
affairs.
Stephen McFarlane  -  U.S.  Department  of  State, Nicaragua
Desk.  Various   interviews  during  October  1984.  Helpful
information and official publications were provided on  U.S.
policy towards Nicaragua and an assessment of the Nicaraguan
economy.
Professor Richard  L.  Millett - Visiting Professor, Air War
College, Maxwell AFB,  Alabama.  Dr. Millett is considered a
noted  authority  on  Nicaraguan  affairs  had  has provided
expert  testimony  on  numerous occasions to the  House  and
Senate  Committees  on  Foreign  Relations.   Many   of  the
histories  consulted reference his  works.  During  a  brief
interview in January 1983, Dr. Millett was  able  to suggest
additional  sources  as  well as provide a  flavor  for  the
volatility of the Nicaraguan crisis.  Quantico, VA.
Comandante Topita -  EPS, FSLN, Nicaraguan representative to
the Inter-American Defense Board.   Comandante  Topita  is a
lawyer  who  recently  returned  from  fighting  contras  in
Northern Nicaragua.  His  answers  to pointed questions were
evasive  or  he  regurgitated  the  Sandinista  party   line
concerning  pluralism  and self-determination.   Washington,
D.C. 8 March, 1984.



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