Death March: The Other View
CSC 1984
SUBJECT AREA History
DEATH MARCH: THE OTHER VIEW
Submitted to
Mr. Rudolph V. Wiggins, Ph. D.
in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements
for Written Communications
The Marine Corps Command and Staff College
Quantico, Virginia
Major G. J. Wright
United States Marine Corps
April 6, 1984
DEATH MARCH: THE OTHER VIEW
OUTLINE
Thesis: The brutality of the Japanese guards as they
moved POWs north along the Bataan peninsula can
not be denied. There were, however, many con-
ditions unknown to most that led to the death of
thousands of prisoners that cannot and should
not be attributed to the Japanese soldier.
I. A Place in History
A. Futility and its aftermath
B. The other view
II. General King's Dilemma
A. The surrender
B. An unfulfilled promise
III. The Death March
A. The undeniable brutality
B. Tragic conditions
1. Training differences
2. Large numbers of prisoners
3. Limited quantities of food, water and supplies
4. Poor physical condition of the prisoners
5. Limited medical facilities
6. High incidene of disease
7. Failure of the Japanese evacuation plan
8. Low prisoner morale
IV. Let the Dead Bury the Dead
DEATH MARCH: THE OTHER VIEW
by Major Gary J. Wright, USMC
A Place In History
Most battles have a place in history. Some are remem-
bered for the tactical genious displayed by a resourceful
general. Still others hold their place in annals for their
daring maneuver of forces snatching victory at the very last
moment. Yet other battles are significant in their futility.
In part, the defense of the Philippines during World
War II falls into this latter category. The invasion force
swept over Luzon is such large numbers and against such an
ill-prepared force that the outcome was known before the
first casualty fell victim. Notwithstanding, the signifi-
cance of the Philippine struggle was its aftermath. The move-
ment of prisoners of war became the historical post-mortem
that separates this battle from all others.
This movement of prisoners became known as the Bataan
"Death March" and was historically infamous for the meaning-
less loss of life. Most considered Japanese inhumanity to
be central to the merciless death of POWs. The brutality
of the Japanese guards as they moved POWs north along the Ba-
taan peninsula cannot be denied. There were, however, many con-
ditions unknown to most that led to the death of thous-
ands of prisoners that cannot and should not be attibuted
to the Japanese soldier.
General King's Dilemma
On 9 April 1942, a very dejected, demoralized General
Edward P. King surrendered his Philippine Luzon Force to
the Japanese. The American-Filipino (Am-Fil) force had,
since 8 December 1941, fought a fight of futility against
the Japanese invaders. General King "felt, he said later,
like General Lee who, on the same day seventy-seven years
earlier, just before meeting with Grant at Appomatox, had
remarked, "Then there is nothing left to do but to go and
see General Grant, and I would rather die a thousand deaths.'"1
What was General King's mission that had failed so drasti-
cally?
The mission of the Am-Fil force was never realistically
thought of in such grand terms as to repulse the invaders;
never to throw them back into the South China Sea from
whence they came. On the contrary, General Douglas Mac Ar-
thur, commander of all U. S. Army forces in the Far East,
decided on a bold course.
He would pull his troops back to the shelter
of Bataan, a small, mountainous jungle penin-
sula that juts out into the mouth of Manila
Bay. From here there was no way out, no es-
cape. Every single one of the defenders
would be doomed to death or capture. But
so long as MacArthur and his men could
hold out...the Japanese timetable for cap-
ture of the Indies might well be drasti-
cally delayed.2
Delay was the key word, and indeed they did. The
Am-Fil force, outnumbered almost 3 to 1, continued to
fall back over the course of 98 days. They attempted
to hold along successive defensive lines but to little
avail. The beleagured forces, however, had a promise
from their even-then famous MacArthur that "help is on
the way from United States. Thousands of troops and hun-
dreds of planes are being dispatched."3 So positive was
MacArthur's message and so contrary was "President Roose-
velt's February 23rd fireside chat"4 write-off of the
Luzon Force, that the effect on morale was devastating.
The entire text of MacArthurs's message is footnoted.5
It was out of this feeling of betrayal that the nickname
"the battling bastards of Bataan" arose. In fact, the
"battling bastard" line was a part of a song that reflec-
ted this sense of hopelessness and betrayal.
We're the battling bastards of Bataan;
No momma, no pappa, no Uncle Sam
No aunts, no uncles, no nephews, no nieces
No rifles, no guns or artillery pieces
And nobody gives a damn....."6
On the island of Corrigidor, Major General Wainwright
upon learning of General King's surrender, sent the fol-
lowing message to General MacArthur:
At six o'clock this morning (9 April 1942),
General King, commanding Luzon Force without
my knowledge or approval, sent a flag of
truce to the Japanese commander....Enemy on
the east had enveloped both flanks....Physical
exhaustion and sickness due to a long period
of insufficient food is the real cause of this
terrible disaster.7
The death and misery that followed the surrender was
in no way envisioned by either side. General Homma, Com-
mander of the victorious Japanese 14th Army "spoke
warmly to Americans of how well they would be treated.
But the actions of many Japanese officers and men belied
these statements."8
THE DEATH MARCH
The 14th Army staff upon Am-Fil surrender, was faced
with a dual dilemma. On the one hand, it had to continue
to press the attack on to Corregidor Island just off the
coast of Bataan, where several thousand American forces
and General Wainwright's headquarters had fled. And, on
the other hand, General Hommas's staff was faced with a
massive evacuation of prisoners to POW camps. There was
no way to know how many prisoners who started the POW
evacuation, failed to live through the ordeal. Suffice
to say, the numbers were excessive. But was Japanese
brutality the only cause? If not, what else?
Well, there were many factors in addition to Japanese
inhumane treatment that contributed to what became known
as the Death March. Those factors included training dif-
ferences; unanticipated large number of prisoners; limited
quantity of food, water and vehicles; poor physical condi-
tion of prisoners; limited medical facilities; high inci-
dence of disease; failure of the Japanese evacuation plan;
and low prisoner morale. Even under the most humane con-
ditions, thousands of prisoners would not have survived.
A closer examination reveals why.
Training Differences.
The post war and pre campaign training of the Am-Fil
force was not rigorous. With the exception of a few long
hikes, the soldiers defending the Philipines had not ex-
perienced the hardship or deprivation that is required for
battle. As one survivor of Bataan reflected "Our pre-war
training...lacked reality most of all. The way to train
troops for the rigors is...not only in making thirty or
forty miles on foot, but in doing it hungry....Make our
troops tough and hard...by putting into training as close
to battle experience as possible."9
The Japanese forces, on the other hand, were well
trained and highly disciplined. The result was a tena-
cious warrior capable of performing under extremely ad-
verse conditions. "The brutality of the Japanese soldiers'
training and the rough discipline of his army did not in
any way excuse the harsh treatment of the prisoners."10
This regimen did however lead to greater expectations of
the prisoners. When the prisoners did not do what was ex-
pected of them, the Japanese soldiers naturally reverted
to what they had experienced.
Another aspect of cultural training differences that
contributed to the horrors of the Death
March....(was) the...unquestioning obedience
to orders with which the Japanese soldier
was inculcated...the crowded assembly areas,
the packed warehouse at Lubao and the jammed
boxcars are ready examples. The guards were
probably told to place their charges in a
given area or building. It mattered not
that there were soon too many prisoners for
the space provided.11
Large Number of Prisoners
Prior to the surrender, General Homma's staff was
unsure as to the size of the enemy force. One of the
initial estimates placed the Am-Fil force at 25,000.
"General Homma thought this very low and ordered another
estimate whereupon his staff came up with the number 40,000.
It was this figure that was settled on and upon which evacu-
ation plans were based. In actuality the number of
soldiers and civilians trapped forward of Japanese lines
exceeded 104,000. Thus, what little food, water and trans-
portation resources that were available, was drasticaly
short of what was required."12
The 14th Army faced with the problem of the attack
on Corregidor, could not spare the guards needed to escort
such large numbers of prisoners. Consequently, it was
commonplace to have two or three guards escorting over one-
hundred prisoners.13 As mentioned previously, the Japanese
soldier was not trained to be tolerant or understanding.
In addition the situation itself, given the guard to pri-
soner ratio, was untolerable. So therefore the movement
of prisoners became the proverbial powder keg. "All the
Japanese soldier knew was that he was responsible for
moving a large number of prisoners a certain distance,
probably within a given time and that he would be severly
punished if any captives escaped."14 Over and over again
the powder keg was lit. Prisoners fell out of formation
or questioned orders and, true to training, the guards
dealt with the problem. The guards could not risk the
escape of other captives which was very likely given the
guard to prisoners ratio. Thus swift and brutal treatment
was the most expedient, efficient and unavoidable means of
handling such an overwhelming number of the prisoners.
Limited Quantities of Food, Water and Supplies
General Wainwright, in a message to General Marshall,
MacArthur's Chief of Staff, stated "that disaster was im-
minent unless supplies arrived soon...at one-third ration,
poorly balanced and very deficient in vitamins...the
troops will be starved into submission."15 The short quant-
tity of food prior to surrender seemed an abundance after
surrender. Now at the mercy of the Japanese supply system,
which by itself was limited and overtaxed, the prisoners
faced actual starvation. "The Americans soon learned that
hunger is a great leveler and sought the meat of dogs,
iguanas and monkeys...One officer: 'I recommend mule...
Iguana is fair...I never had snake...monkey meat is all right
until the animal's hands turn up on the plate.'"16
While the above seems drastic, the Am-Fil soldier
probably would have resorted to such a diet prior to the
surrender if he did not have to worry about a bullet. The
caloric intake fell rapidly,
the January ration had provided approximately
2,000 calories a day. The next month the
figure declined to 1,500 and during March it
was 1,000 calories daily, only one-fourth that
required to sustain the average working man...
(on) March 25...the men received (for the en-
tire day) 8 1/2 ounces of rice, 1 1/2 ounces of
flour and salt, slightly more than one ounce
of canned meat and canned milk and one-half
ounce of sugar."17
The prisoners also had to contend with thirst. April
began the dry months in the Philippines. To compound the
problem, the heat was almost unbearable. All of this added
to a long march with harsh treatment made men resort to any-
thing to quench their thirst.
So desperate were the men that they did not
hesitate to drink...They held their noses
to seal off the sickening odor, but they
drank all the water they could. Some were
so thirsty that even the sight of swollen
bodies floating in the water could not keep
them from drinking. More than one man drank
his fill, and then vomited in disgust at
the sight and smell.18
As with food and water, all other classes of supply
were virtually non-existent. As one officer of the Quar-
termaster Corps said "The story of the Philippine and Ba-
taan Quartermaster Depots is a saga of 'too little, too
late'- a saga of supply when adequate supplies simply
did not exist."19 The Am-Fil depots were drained. Soldiers
fought over items that years before would have been con-
sidered unserviceable. One of the items least essential
but most in demand was cigarettes. "The demand for cigar-
ettes was never met...For smokers the loss was a heavy one,
and created a real moral problem...In the three months the
men were on Bataan, they received on the average less than
one cigarette a day."20
Cigarettes were not as critical as were other supplies.
"As time pased uniforms became...threadbare, offering
little protection agains the cold night, the rain, and
the cruel thorns so abundant on Bataan."21
The Am-Fil force could not "march on its stomach" as
the saying goes and likewise, it could not march on its
feet. "Fully one quarter were without footgear; the rest
wore shoes so badly worn that under normal conditions they
would have been unfit for use...(In some units) less than
25 percent of the enlisted men...had blankets, shelter
halves or raincoats."22
Finally the item that would have greatly lesssened the
impact of the Death March - vehicles - were also not avail-
able. "General King had ordered all supplies less trans-
portation be destroyed. As indicated above, destroying
all supplies must have been an easy task. But, as always
happens, the 'word' was not clear, so all supplies were
destroyed to include transportation. The Japanese had only
half the vehicles they needed and the Japanese supply of-
ficers' motto was 'a drop of gasoline is as precious as a
drop of blood.'"23
Everything was in demand but nothing was in supply!
Poor Physical Condition of the Prisoners
The tremendous number of prisoners, coupled with the
lack of food, water and other essentials, caused really the
greatest evil. An evil that again was virtually out of
the hands of the Japanese.
The caloric deficiency, combined with the
lack of important vitamins produced alarming
results. Serious muscle waste and depletion
of fat reserve were evident in the thin
bodies and hollow cheeks of the hungry men.
Night blindness, swelling, diarrhea, and dy-
sentary became common, and beriberi in its
incipient stages was almost universal among
the troops. The men lost the capacity to re-
sist even the most minor ailment, and any
disease...would assume epidemic proportions.24
It was not a minority of the prisoners that were in such
poor physical condition. On the contrary, only a very
small number were not suffering from on sickness or
another. "In the words of Colonel Harold W. Glattly, the
former Luzon Force surgeon, they were 'patients rather
than prisoners!'"25
In addition to those who had everything from malaria
to beriberi, hospital patients were leaving hospitals pre-
maturely.
According to the rumor, the Japanese were
releasing Filipino (hospital) prisoners...
By evening a long line of Filipinos could
be seen trudging from the hospital area...
Many had only recently been operated on
and were still wearing casts or dressings.
Some had undergone amputations or serious
abdominal surgery....Soon the weaker ones
began to fall by the roadside, many to be
shot or bayoneted....'Crippled Filipinos
were strewn along the road,' wrote an Ameri-
can officer. 'I remember going from ward to
ward pleading with Filipino patients not to
leave, recalls one surgeon...but my pleas
were in vain.'26
Most on the march would have found it difficult to
survive in a hospital ward. Yet, they pressed on with
the hope of a haven; a place of rest. Many, instead of
a haven, found their final resting place.
Limited Medical Facilities
The hospitals and field wards were less than adequate
and limited in number prior to the Japanese invasion.
These facilities, however, had not experienced the deluge
of patients that the invasion, malnutrition and disease
caused. Consequently, they were totally unprepared...un-
prepared from beds, bandages, medicine, medical personnel
and virtually every area where a need existed. To make
matters worse, the Japanese lacked much of the same so as
the saying goes, "to the victor belong the spoils".
Japanese forces in the Philippines also
suffered from a shortage of medical sup-
plies, equipment and personnel. Attempts
to alleviate this situation were far from
successful and General Homma's requests
to his superiors for medical aid had no
more luck than his pleas for rice (the
Japanese were also down to half rations)...
The failure of the Japanese high command
to provide the 14th Army with additional
medical supplies meant a constant decrease
in stocks on hand in the Philippines.27
The entire medical situation was, at best, totally
overwhelmed. This was the case on both sides. Those who
survived combat, fell victim to disease. Those who were
victims of combat also fell victim to disease. Many were
very sick yet there were no beds or medication available.
The capacity of the two general hospitals
on Bataan designed to accommodate 1,000
patients each...By the end of March, the
two general hospitals had about 8,500 pat-
ients and another 4,000 were being treated
in a provisional hospital...admission to...
hospitals was finally limited to two types;
those requiring serious medical or surgical
treatment and those in which the period of
disability was expected to exceed 21 days.28
"By the first week in April, there may have been as
many as 24,000 sick and wounded in hospitals and aid sta-
tions on Bataan."29
High Incidence of Disease
As has been alluded to, with the exhausted supply sys-
tem, the large number of physically drained troops and
the minimal medical facilities (in a jungle-tropical environ-
ment) disease was everywhere. "The men lost the capacity
to resist even the most minor ailment, and any disease,
warned the Bataan Surgeon, would assume epidemic proper-
tions."30 The Surgeon's warning turned out to be prophetic.
Beriberi, almost unheard of, became very common. As
one medical officer explained. "The only thing we could do
when someone had dry beriberi was to get him on his feet and
off the bed. The minute he grew fast to a mattress, he was
dead. .Anybody who just got too sick to get out of bed was
on his way to die."31
As one POW states, "...what knocked the devil out of
us was malaria. Oh, boy, that killed a lot of people."32
Malaria, another killer. "A minimum of 3,000,000 quinine
tablets a month was needed and the supply depots had only a
six day supply by the end of March...In the days that fol-
lowed (malaria patients were admitted at)...the fantastic
figure of 1,000 admissions daily."33
Dysentery! "So many died of dysentery. If you had it,
you needn't bother pulling up your pants. You'd just
go, go, go...Of course everyone was emaciated as well...
suffering from malnutrition...no one had enough to eat
to match anywhere near what they used."34 Another quote
from a POW medical officer to attest to the disease pla-
gued status of the prisoners.
Disease is now added to the list of factors which the
Japanese had no control over. In this case, Bataan was
the "leveler" for the Japanese suffered the same diseases
along with their captives.
Failure of the Japanese Evacuation Plan
General Homma had anticipated the need for an evacu-
ation plan. As commander of the 14th Army, he had many
critical issues. The evacuation was the least of his con-
cerns.
As has been previously stated, the miscalculation of
the number of prisoners caused the greatest problem. The
Japanese were also uninformed on the physical condition
of the Am-Fil force. "Homma and his staff had no real
knowledge of just how bad the food situation actually was
in southern Bataan...(if he had known), he would simply
have sat back and waited for an offer of surrender when
General King's food ran out."35 In addition, Homma's force
had no incidence of disease until they broke into the Ba-
taan peninsula. Therefore, they had no idea that the Luzon
force was disease ridden.36
The final planning failure dealt with Homma's overes-
timation of the Luzon force to continue the fight. Homma
thought that, at the beginning of April, it would take one
month before final victory. This was not to be.
The fall of Bataan less than one week after
the start of the Good Friday offensive
brought the 14th Army face to face with a
completely unexpected situation. It was
suddenly required to take care of twice
the number of prisoners expected - a large
percentage of them too weak or sick to make
the journey out of Bataan on foot - three
weeks before it was ready to accommodate
even the number and type of captives origi-
nally anticipated.37
Low Prisoner Morale
It is not difficult to understand what the captives'
frame of mind was during the evacuation. To have lost in
battle; to have been promised reinforcements from on high
only to be told from on "higher" (by the fireside) that
there would be no reinforcements; in a jungle with virtually
no food, water, transportation and death from some foreign
disease or bayonet; morale was non-existent. Soldiers just
saw no reason to continue. They gave up...life! POW state-
ments include the following;
I knew one guy, and there were a lot, who
wouldn't eat...He died gradually because he
gave up eating.
I know one kid from our outfit, God we slap-
ped him, kicked him,...Anything to try to
make him want to fight. But I found out
when a man gives up, you're not going to
get him back.
Not everyone that died, died because they
gave up, buy many did.
Some of our men seemed able to give up and
die in three weeks or less.38
Let the Dead Bury the Dead
At the onset the Bataan prisoner evacuation was doomed.
With or without Japanese brutality, it was destined to earn
its infamous title, Death March. It becomes apparent that
conditions were so desperate that many would have died
even if the Japanese had continued on to their next conquest
and simply left the defeated behind.
For the American and Filipinos of the Luzon Force
who suffered through the difficult fighting on Ba-
taan, April was indeed "the cruelest month"
Sick, starving, exhausted, they entered the vale
of captivity and met a horror they never foresaw.
The agony they endured, the death they often
welcomed, were not deviously and maliciously plan-
ned. Instead they were the result of tragic con-
ditions.39
NOTES
1Louis Morton, "The Battling Bastards of Bataan,"
Military Affairs, Summer 1951, p. 113
2Stanley Falk, The Battling Bastards (New York:
W.W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1962) p. 27
3T. Parker, "The Epic of Corregidor-Bataan, Dec-
ember 24, 1941-May 4, 1942." U.S. Naval Instituted Pro-
ceedings, January 1943, p. 13.
4Louis Morton, "The Battling Bastards of Bataan,"
Military Affairs, Sumner 1951, p. 112
5T. Parker, "The Epic of Corregidor-Bataan, De-
cember 24, 1941-May 4, 1942." U.S. Naval Institute Pro-
ceedings, January 1943, p. 13.
FORT MILLS, P.I.
January 15, 1942.
Subject: Message from General MacArthur
To: All Unit Commanders
The following message from Gen. MacArthur
will be read and explained to all troops. Every
company commander is charged with personal re-
sponsibility for the delivery of this message.
Each headquarters will follow up to insure recep-
tion by every company or similar unit.
"Help is on the way from the United States.
Thousands of troops and hundred of planes are
being dispatched. The exact time of arrival of
reinforcements is unknown as they will have to
fight their way through Japanese attempts against
them. It is imperative that our troops hold until
these reinforcements arrive.
"No further retreat is possible. We have more
troops in Bataan than the Japanese have thrown
against us; our supplies are ample; a determined
defense will defeat the enemy's attack.
"It is a question now of courage and determina-
tion. Men who run will merely be destroyed but
men who fight will save themselves and their country.
"I call upon every soldier in Bataan to
fight in his assigned position, resisting every
attack. This is the only road to salvation. If
we fight we will win; if we retreat, we will be
destroyed.
"MacArthur"
"By Command of General MacArthur"
6Harold Baldiwn, "The Fourth Marines at Corregi-
dor", Marine Corps Gazette, December 1946, p. 28
7Duane Schultz, Hero of Bataan: The Story of
General Jonathan M. Wainwright (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1981) p. 244-45.
8Falk, p.222
9M. Hill, "Lessons of Bataan", Infantry Journal,
October 1942, p. 10
10Falk, p. 235
11Ibid, p. 235
12Ibid, p. 57-59
` 13Ibid, p. 234
14Ibid, p. 234
15Morton, p.108
16Ibid, p. 109
17Ibid, p. 110
18Falk, p. 135
19Harold Arnold, "The Lesson of Bataan', Quarter-
master Review, November 1946, p. 12.
20Morton, p. 110
21Ibid, p. 110
22Ibid, p. 120
23Falk, p. 216
24Morton, p. 111
25Falk, p. 213
26Ibid, p. 98
27Ibid, p. 65
28Morton, p. 111
29Falk, p. 38
30Morton, p. 110
31Donald Knox, Death March, (New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1981) p. 222
32Ibid, p. 179
33Morton, p. 111
34Knox, p. 168
35Falk, p. 60
36Ibid, p. 60
37Ibid, p. 62
38Knox, p. 166-168
39Falk, p. 240
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Arnold, H. "The Lessons of Bataan", Quartermaster Review
(November 1946), 12-15, 60, 63
Babcock, C. "Philippine Campaign", Cavalry Journal
(March 1943), 5-7; (May 1943) 28-35
Baldwin, H. The Fourth Marines at Corregidor, Marine Corps
Gazette, (December 1946), 20-29
Dyess, W. E. The Dyess Story. New York: Putnam, 1944
Falk, S. T. Bataan: The March of Death, New York, Norton,
1981
Keats, J. They Fought Alone. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1963
Morton, T. "Bataan Diary of Major Achille C. Tisdelle",
Military Affairs, (Fall 1947), 131-148
Morton, "The Battling Bastards of Bataan." Military
Affairs, (Summer 1951), 107-113
Parker, T. "The Epic of Corregidor-Bataan." U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, (January 1943), 9-22
Schultz, D. Hero of Bataan: The Story of General Jonathan
M. Wainwright, New York: St. Martins, 1981
Wainwright, J. M. General Wainwright's Story. New York:
Doubleday, 1946
Whitehead, A. With the 26th Cavalry in the Philippines,
Cavalry Journal, (December 1941) 7-22
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