Employment Of The Future Landing Vehicle Tracked, Experimental And Variants CSC 1984 SUBJECT AREA Warfighting EMPLOYMENT OF THE FUTURE LANDING VEHICLE TRACKED, EXPERIMENTAL AND VARIANTS Submitted to Rudolph V. Wiggins, Ph.D In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for Written Communications The Marine Corps Command and Staff College Quantico, Virginia Major M. R. Nance United States Marine Corps April 3, 1984 EMPLOYMENT OF THE FUTURE LANDING VEHICLE TRACKED, EXPERIMENTAL AND VARIANTS Outline Thesis sentence: The LVT(X) family of amphibious vehicles is the most viable alternative in the 1990- 2000 year time frame which will permit operations in a weapons heavy environment. I. Requirement for LVT(X) A. Advantages of the LVT(X) 1. 25mm Bushmaster Cannon 2. Improved TOW 3. Three machineguns 4. Armor protection 5. NBC protection 6. Smoke capability 7. Troop capacity B. Disadvantages of the LVT(X) 1. Water speed 2. Tow firing exposure 3. Night vision 4. Smoke grenade range 5. Vision for troops C. Tactical Concepts for Employment of LVT(X) 1. Functions of the vehicle 2. Tactical integrity II. LVT(X) Variants A. LVTR-X 1. Capability 2. Tactical employment 3. Advantages B. LVTC-X 1. Improvements 2. Tactical employment 3. Advantages C. LVTE-X 1. Requirement of 18 vehicles 2. Tactical employment 3. Needed improvements D. LVTAG-X 1. Requirement for Assault Gun Company 2. Weight to Surface Assault 3. Capabilities III. Mission of the Marine Corps A. Ground Combat Mobility B. LVT(X) meets all MOE requirements EMPLOYMENT OF THE FUTURE LANDING VEHICLE TRACKED, EXPERIMENTAL AND VARIANTS The LVT(X) required operational capability (ROC) was established and promulgated 14 July 1982. This requirement documented the need for a family of amphibious assault vehicles for the mid 1990 time frame which must embody not only normal amphibious quantities, but also land fighting vehicle quanti- ties which will permit operation in the weapons heavy environ- ment of the time period. The ROC defines a land fighting vehicle as a light armored vehicle that will provide protected cross-country/water fording mobility with a vehicular mounted fire power capability, able to support mechanized infantry operations in mounted and dismounted combat. The LVT(X) family of amphibious vehicles is the most viable alternative in the 1990-2000 year time frame. The LVT(X) will be able to operate world wide and within the full spectrum threat likely to be encountered by U.S. amphibious forces to include a defended beach.1 The LVT(X), a low-water-speed amphibian, is now being pursued to replace the LVTP-7A1, also a low-water-speed amphibian. Because of apparent vehicle similarity, and in the interest of economy, analytical effort is being aimed at ensuring that the LVT(X) would be a quantum improvement over the vehicle it will replace. The projected threat for the 1990's is being analyzed in detail to include both the ship-to-shore and subsequent- operations-ashore phases of the assault. The concept of operations for the LVT(X) is being derived within the overall context of the Marine Corps amphibious operations. Variant vehicles designed for specific functions such as communications, recovery, maintenance, firepower and mine clearance are being considered. Mission profiled for individual vehicles were formulated to facilitate the identification of requisite characteristics, capabilities and crew skill levels. These profiles have encompassed representative combat actions set in the projected threat environment and employed the formulated tactical concepts.2 The advantages and disadvantages of the Marine Corps' utilization of the LVT(X) as a replacement for the LVTP-7A1 amphibious assault vehicle have been identified. An advantage to the LVT(X) family will be in the main armament, the 25mm Bushmaster automatic cannon, turret-mounted, which will provide a high kill probability against lightly armored vehicles, bunkers, beach defenses, and other troop emplacements. Its rapid fire capability provides excellent suppression in support of dismounted infantry operations. The LVT(X) can deliver heavy covering fires on the beach with its 25mm cannon while it is swimming in water. This advantage will contribute significantly to the early buildup of firepower ashore. Secondary armament, the improved tow antitank guided missile (ATGM) when selectively utilized on the pintle mount, provides an armor "killing" stand-off capability against the Sagger missile of the BMP and the 135mm gun of the T-72 tank. The LVT(X) also has three turret-mounted machineguns, a 7.62 coaxial with the 25mm cannon and two 5.56mm machineguns on the top rear (port and starboard). These weapons make a significant firepower (suppression) contribution in built-up areas and in battles when the enemy infantry positions are penetrated or overrun. Sufficient front and side armor provide protection against small arms (7.62mm armor piercing (AP)) at muzzle velocity (0 meters range). This permits the penetration of the enemy's forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) by the LVT(X)s before the infantry is dismounted in those engagements where the enemy's antiarmor capability dictated a dismounted attack. The LVT(X) top armor is sufficient to prohibit pene- tration of airburst fragments from 152mm artillery shells. In addition, LVT(X) belly armor is sufficient to provide pro- tection against M14 and M16 mines. The LVT(X) has an adequate nuclear, biological and chem- ical (NBC) protection system. There is a vehicle chemical and radiac alarm system, an overpressure system and filtered ven- tilation system for the troop compartment, and protective masks and clothing for the crew. This permits operation within a toxic or radioactive environment of all vehicle systems except the pintle-mounted TOW. The LVT(X) has a smoke making capability. The exhaust smoke generator combined with the turret-mounted smoke grenade launcher can be successfully employed. This is especially true in river crossings and in desert operations. The troop carrying capacity of the LVT(X) assures the continuous integrity of the embarked infantry "fighting team" for mounted and dismounted operations. The rifle squad pro- vides the backbone for the team which also includes a machine- gun section, a Dragon team, and (selectively) a Stinger team. A smaller vehicle would necessitate forming this same team on the ground, as a separate action after dismounting, or the reorganization of the infantry into squads that "fit".3 Some of the disadvantages of the LVTP-X that will still exist after initial fielding of the vehicle are that the water speed of the vehicle is insufficient. Increased speed in the water (over the designed 8.4mph capability) is required. This would reduce exposure time, and resultant losses, in the ship- to-shore movement of the amphibious assault. The pintle-mounted TOW system reduces availability and effectiveness of that antiarmor system. TOW gunners can become ineffective during fire fights because of exposure while operating the pintle mounts. In addition, only turret- mounted firepower systems are accessible while operating "buttoned-up" in a toxic environment. The LVT(X) has inadequate night vision equipment. The driver has the AN-VVS-2 and the gunner has thermal enhance- ment equipment. However, the vehicle commander, who makes the critical decision whether or not to engage the enemy during reduced visibility, has no vision enhancement except for the use of the AN/TAS-4 night sight mounted on the TOW. The LVT(X) has an inadequate smoke grenade launcher range. The smoke grenade launcher range of 100 meters does not provide adequate stand-off capability. A 300 meter range would provide more flexibility in the use of smoke grenades to inhibit RPG-7s and Sagger missile guidance. The LVT(X) has inadequate troop vision capability from the troop compartment. The single vision block in the rear ramp does not provide the opportunity for immediate orienta- tion by small unit leaders just prior to dismount. Two additional troop vision blocks, one on each side, are consid- ered necessary.4 The tactical concepts for the employment of the LVT(X) family as elements of a MCATF in the 1990 time frame are those related in OH9-3A with some exceptions. The exploita- tion of bodies of water as avenues of attack and withdrawal should be emphasized. Training should be expanded to assure that this extremely valuable and unique capability is utilized to its greatest advantage. The fighting vehicle functions of the LVT(X) in concert with the other vehicles of the MCATF needs to be emphasized. The effectiveness of the fighting force relies heavily on proper organization, control, and employment of all assigned combat and combat support vehicles when conducting mounted operations. The assignment of vehicles and the ability to command and control them at all levels to permit quick, often innovative and self-initiated reaction to the changing situation is critical. The perfection of teamwork is essential to the degree that maximum shock effect of supporting arms, tanks, LVT(X)s and other MCATF vehicles is assured at the crucial moment of infantry dismount, whenever dismount assault is required. For example, an infantry reinforced platoon of a given number of LVT(X)s should comprise a fighting unit which would in turn be comprised of single LVT(X)s, each carrying a fighting team consisting of a reinforced infantry squad. This must be taught and practiced so that it becomes second nature to the commanders and their subordinates. Any delay, traffic jam, or immobilized concentration of vehicles in the initial assault would almost certainly result in greatly increased losses from threat artillery and mortars. To prevent this from occurring, all enemy antiarmor weapons, and particularly those that are hand-held or operated from ground mounts on key terrain, must be eliminated. This clearly dictates seizure of the initial objectives in a MCATF amphibious assault by dismounted forces. This require- ment in turn dictates the employment of infantry-heavy mechanized elements as lead units in the beach assault and in initial operations ashore. Tactical integrity of a vehicle's mounted infantry must be emphasized. The 1990 threat and the advent of the MCATF do not reduce the importance of the dismounted fighting tactics and techniques. On the contrary, the increased threat of antiarmor capability combined with the uniqueness of amphibious operations dictates the requirement for dismounted assault in the majority of MCATF actions. The tactical integrity of fighting units must be maintained while in the vehicles, so that the embarked forces are under close command and control and are fully integrated, effective, and mutually supporting immediately upon debarkation.6 The type of organization most likely to survive and succeed against the 1990 threat, Soviet or third world, must be more heavily armored than the current dismounted, lightly armored landing teams. A representative MAF, such as the baseline MAF depicted in the Marine Corps Midrange Objectives Plan (MMROP) is the ideal force for the Fleet Marine Force and Marine Corps planning.7 It can be expanded to make it capable of engaging stronger threat forces. Based on doctrine and tactics a concept of operations has been recommended for the LVT(X). Land in a single lift the infantry and control elements of a regimental level MCATF including three battalion level tank/infantry maneuver elements. To provide to the MCATF fighting vehicle capability, armored troop mobility, and armored vehicle support in operations ashore including combat assault operations beyond the FBH/FEBA.8 It is recognized that certain special mission/functions are required to be performed during, and subsequent to, the ship-to-shore movement by the combat units and the LVTs that support them. Such needs have been demonstrated since the early amphibious operations of World War II. The advent of mechanized combined-arms task forces (MCATFs), mandated by the capabilities of prospective threat forces, dramatically emphasizes the importance of the special mission/functions required for units of the MCATF and the armored vehicles which support it. Identification of those needs and identi- fication of the advantages and needed improvements as a result of evaluating employment of the LVT(X) family of amphibious assault vehicles (AAV's) against the 1990 threat is required. The Landing Vehicle Tracked, Recovery-Experimental (LVTR-X) is a postulated vehicle mounted on an LVT(X) chassis and strengthened as necessary to withstand stresses imposed by its special mission functions. It has the capability of recovery/salvage operations afloat. This capability consists primarily of repair or towing inoperative or damaged amphibious vehicles but does not include a lift function while waterborne. It also has the capability to perform recovery/salvage opera- tions ashore. This capability primarily involves minor and temporary repairs (such as track repair) which would render a damaged vehicle towable. The LVTR-X must be also capable of transporting a replacement engine or transmission to the vehicle site, lifting the engine or transmission out of the inoperative vehicle and inserting the new assembly. A limited number of repair parts are carried. The LVTR-X will be particularly suited to recovery operations performed under fire. Minor repair on such non-amphibious vehicles may be required in order to make them towable or render them oper- able.9 It is anticipated that in low-intensity situations, normal breakdowns and casualties to other LVTs can be responded to in a reasonable time. The LVTR-Xs assigned to mechanized combined-arms task force (MCATF) Headquarters in reserve can then be assigned where needed in a rapidly developing situa- tion. LVTR-Xs would initially be employed to ensure that as many LVTB reach the beach as possible and subsequently to keep as many LVTs operable as possible. The LVTR-Xs may travel with the CSS trains but normally, and especially initially, will travel farther forward in the mechanized element. They should be positioned as far forward as the situation will permit and as necessary to permit rapid retrieval or repair of damaged LVTs and at the same time not interfere with the battle. Their source of supply and additional maintenance capability is located in the CSS train. When a vehicle cannot be repaired on site, and cannot be towed without sacrificing speed, mobility and mission, it may be cannibalized and destroyed in place. Normally damaged/inoperable vehicles which cannot be repaired on site will be towed to the CSS train or mobile CSS detachment (MCSSD). It is concluded that the LVTR-X would be a very efficient vehicle. Anticipated characteristics would give it consid- erably greater effectiveness. This is especially true from a repair and recovery standpoint in the 1990 time frame. LVTRs have been in the Marine Corps inventory for over 20 years and have performed a very essential service. With the advent of the MCATFs, the recovery and repair functions of the LVTR become far more critical to the survival and success of the MCATF. The advantage of the LVTR-X is that it has a lower silhouette which enhances its survivability and ability to perform closer to enemy positions. Improvements in commun- ications equipment will doubtlessly resolve to a major degree the communications problem of previous LVTRs. The improved portable maintenance shelter that is capable of rapid set-up and dismantling, and is efficient from the blackout viewpoint, is a certain necessity. The shelter, combined with a portable blackout lighting system, greatly expands the capability of the LVTR crew to effect field repairs.11 The Landing Vehicle Tracked, Command-Experimental (LVTC-X) is a postulated vehicle considerably improved over the LVTC-7A1, a product improvement of the LVTC-7. The LVTC-7 has proved to be a very valuable asset to infantry commanders over the period and has performed a function which must be continued and improved upon to meet the envisioned threat of the 1990 time frame. LVTCs are almost entirely utilized by infantry, tank, or supporting arms commanders and staff. However LVTCs should continue to be carried in the tables of equipment (T/Es) of the assault amphibian battalions. The using units, should not be assigned the added burden of operating and maintaining these vehicles. The LVTC has the same armor, mobility, and survivabil- ity as the basic LVT(X) vehicle. It has a pintle-mounted M-60 machinegun instead of the 25mm Bushmaster cannon. It also has a 7.62mm machinegun. The most prevalent use of the LVTC is at the battalion level. The battalion commander and his executive officer operate from separate LVTCs, the former in the Alpha or primary command vehicle and the latter in the Bravo or alternate command vehicle. Each is supported by appropriate staff officers and communications personnel. The trace (escort) vehicles (LVTXs) also carry rations, water, individual equip- ment, spare parts, and other necessities.11 The advantages of the LVT(X) also improved the effec- tiveness and survivability of the LVTC-X. Improved communi- cations equipment in LVTCs will reduce jamming, ECM-EMI degradation and breakdowns from heat and jarring/concussion. Improved ride quality, ventilation, and noise level will reduce fatigue and increase personnel effectiveness. Improved equipment mounting and hardening will enhance efficiency when the vehicle is on the move. Maintenance will be made easier and faster by equipment design. All nets can now be secure. The chemical warfare (CW) protection for the vehicle will have a chemical sensor/detector/alarm system, a vehicle over- pressure system and a filtered ventilation system. The vehicle will also have external and internal CW agent resis- tant paint and a decontaminating apparatus for the vehicle interior to augment individual decontaminating equipment. The Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Engineer-Experimental (LVTE-X) is a postulated vehicle. The characteristics and capabilities of the vehicle were derived from the use of manning and techniques of employment of the LVTE-1 (1960 era) vehicle, the hull of the LVT(X), and modifications to align its capabilities with the requirements of the 1990 time frame. Employment techniques of the vehicle vary in order to adhere to the equipment and tactics of the time frame. For example, they incorporate use of the fuel air explosives (FAEs), not available in the LVTE-1 era, and the employment of LVTEs as elements of mechanized combined-arms tasks forces (MCATFs) of recent practise in the Marine Corps. A study of Marine Corps needs based primarily on discussions with Fleet Marine Force (FMF) engineers, assault amphibian vehicle personnel, and combat unit commanders, determined a requirement of a platoon of 18 LVTEs be assigned to an AAV Battalion in order to support an infantry division/ MCATF. This number of vehicles permits the assignment of six LVTEs to each of three battalion landing teams (BLTs) of the surface assault regimental landing team (RLT) or to each of three maneuver elements of a regimental-sized initial surface assault force. It is envisioned that the six LVTEs assigned to the maneuver element would be designated to land in the first wave, positioned in pairs with one pair in the center of the wave and one pair near each wave flank. One vehicle in each pair would be equipped with three line charges and one with FAEs. The latter would carry the majority of the engineer squad and engineer equipment such as demolitions, pioneer equipment and tools. The vehicles would be employed initially upon landing in a mine/obstacle countermeasures role. This is to assure rapid egress of the other MCATF vehicles from the beach and back beach area. The LVTEs would then breach other obstacle fields enroute to the initial objectives. Subsequent operations ashore would involve mine and obstacle clearing, mine emplacement, and assisting in prepa- ration of defensive positions for MCATF elements. The LVTE could be attached to MCATF mobile obstacle detachments (MODs) tasked with providing flank security for the MCATF or slowing down enemy penetration forces. The assault engineer mission as part of a MOD includes minelaying, destroying bridges, creating roadblocks and other obstacles and a variety of demolition uses designed to delay penetrating threat force elements. Another MCATF task for the LVTE is attachment to MCATF obstacle clearing detachments (OCDs) whose primary function is to reduce the effect of obstacles, thus improving MCATF maneuverability. The OCDs can permit accomplishment of quick assault breaches to provide several lanes for the maneuver elements to pass through. The LVTEs then resume their position in trace of the lead platoons. Follow-on engineers in LVT(X)s improve and mark the routes for the main body.12 The ability of the LVTE to move closer to the objectives and obstacle emplacements mutually supported by the LVT(X) will reduce vehicle and personnel casualties, sustain momentum and speed up the rate of advance. Some needed improvements have been identified for the LVTE-X. They are to improve the mine detection capability, improve lane marking, and provide directional smoke. The LVTE-X will also improve the ability to lay wire entanglements, and expand the capacity for increased numbers of line and FAE charges.13 The Landing Vehicle Tracked, Assault Gun Experimental (LVTAG-X) is a postulated vehicle. In analyzing the ship-to- shore movement it has become quite apparent that the avail- ability in the assault waves to have a direct fire capability with a large caliber gun would weigh heavily in favor of the attacker. During World War II, the need for the capability to deliver suppressive and destructive fire on the beach and back beach and from the assault waves was accommodated by the development and production of increased numbers of "armored amphibious vehicles". These were assault gun LVTs mounting large caliber weapons. In the latter operations in the Pacific, the first waves consisted almost entirely of assault gun type vehicles. A study of Marine Corps needs determined a requirement for the formation of an Assault Gun Company consisting of 24 LVTAGs, mounting a 75mm gun to be organized within the AAV Battalion in order to support an infantry division/MCATF. The need for a direct fire capability is well demonstrated for both waterborne and subsequent operation phases. The most critical time of any operation, initial or subsequent, is the waterborne and beach assault phase. If this phase if not immediately successful, the entire amphibious operation is likely to fail. Soviet doctrine teaches that, in the case of combined helicopterborne assault and surface assault, the first priority is the destruction of the relatively heavy surface assault force and then destruction at will of the lighter armed and armored helicopterborne forces. Should the surface assault force be delayed in the water or at the beach and threat supporting arms be assed on the stalled forces, the surface assault may very well be turned back or degraded to the point it cannot accomplish the scheme of maneuver, thereby jeopardizing the entire operation. The most probable cause for delay is threat direct shore fire from the beach and back beach area on the vehicles in the water. The AG shooting from the water would provide suppressive fire against the threat direct shore fire. It could shoot into identified minefields from several thousand meters distance. Upon landing it could deliver suppressive fires on the threat weapons that are providing covering fires over obstacles and minefields. This will speed up the obstacle clearing process and the advance of the assault vehicles through the beach and the back beach areas. The most essential capability after armament of the AG vehicle is the ability to shoot from the water and land in the first waves of the assault amphibians. Other capabilities of the AG vehicle include a stabilized day/night firing capa- bility to permit full effectiveness of the main armament system. It will also have the ability to store and carry a large number of rounds of ammunition in the water and increased numbers on land. It will be able to fire the HEAT, HEPD, HE and smoke rounds.14 The United States Amphibious Forces are the nation's only major military organization structured and trained for the stated mission of projecting sustained combat power into hostile territory from the sea. The mission of the Marine Corps is to project naval power ashore. Unique Ground Combat Mobility assets are a major factor for the successful projection of this combat power. These assets must not only be capable of maxi- mizing strategic and tactical life during amphibious operations, but also be survivable during subsequent operations ashore. Additionally, Ground Combat Mobility assets must allow the landing force commander flexibility in the implementation of his assault plan. Assault Amphibious Vehicles, by virtue of their inherent capabilities to negotiate from the ship to shore, to transport large numbers of personnel, and ability to operate inland, provide the unique capability needed by the Marine Corps. Using a set of established Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) the current LVT(X) conceptual designs meet all the stated requirements for a displacement hull amphibious land fighting vehicle of the 1990 to 2000 time frame.15 While higher water speed will always be a desirable attribute, the LVT(X) optimizes fighting vehicle characteristics for sur- vivability within the weapons heavy environment of the 1990's threat. FOOTNOTES 1Addendum to Required Operational Capability (ROC) for LVT(X), Assault-Gun Equipped Version (LVT(AG) of the Landing Vehicle Tracked Experimental), pp. 1-2. 2Major K.T. Brunsvold,."What the future holds for assault amphibians," Marine Corps Gazette, Marine Corps Association, March, 1980, p. 63. 3U.S. Marine Corps. Potomac General Research Group (PGRG) for the Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Analysis of Landing and Employment Ashore of an Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Family and Specified Alternative Systems. Vol I, p. VI-4. 4Ibid, p. VI-5. 5U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Educa- tion Command. OH 9-3A Mechanized Combined Arms Task Force (MCATF). Quantico, Virginia. March, 1980, p. 13. 6U.S. Marine Corps. Potomac General Research Group (PGRG) for the Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Analysis of Landing and Employment Ashore of an Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Family and Specified Alternative Systems. Vol I, p. VI-9. 7Commandant of the Marine Corps. Marine Corps Mid-Range Objectives Plan (MMROP). Washington, D.C. 1978, p. 5. 8U.S. Marine Corps. Potomac General Research Group (PGRG) for the Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Analysis of Landing and Employment Ashore of an Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Family and Specified Alternative Systems. Vol I, p. VI-II. 9U.S. Marine Corps. Potomac General Research Group (PGRG) for the Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Analysis of Landing and Employment Ashore of an Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Family and Specified Alternative Systems. Vol III, p. II-4. 10 Ibid, p. II-20. 11U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Educa- tion Command. Amphibious Vehicles, FMFM 9-2 (Quantico, 1981) p. 2-22. 12U.S. Marine Corps. Potomac General Research Group (PGRG) for the Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Analysis of Landing and Employment Ashore of an Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Family and Specified Alternative Systems, Vol III, pp. IV, 7-8. 13Ibid, pp. IV, 31-32. 14Ibid, p. IV, 17. 15Future Surface Assault Vehicle Study, p. 118. BIBLIOGRAPHY Brunsvold, K.T. What the future holds for assault amphibians. Marine Corps Gazette, Marine Corps Association, March 1980. Center for Naval Analyses. Future Surface Assault Vehicle Study. Arlington, Virginia. November 1980. Commandant of the Marine Corps. Marine Corps Long Range Plan (MLRP). Washington, D.C., 1982. Commandant of the Marine Corps. Marine Corps Mid-Range Objectives Plan (MMROP). Washington, D.C., 1982. Commandant of the Marine Corps. Required Operational Capa- bility (ROC) NO. MOB 1.11 for Landing Vehicle Tracked Experimental (LVT(X)) including Variant Vehicles. Washington, D.C., July 1983. Soper, J.B. By Forcible Entry. Marine Corps Gazette, Marine Corps Association, August 1972. U.S. Marine Corps. FMFM 9-2. Amphibious Vehicles. Washington, D.C., April 1981. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Amphibious Instruction Department. Tank and Assault Amphibian Battalion Capabilities, Limitations and Organizations of a Mechanized Force. Quantico, Virginia, 1982. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. OH 9-3A Mechanized Combined Arms Task Forces (MCATF). Quantico, Virginia, March 1980. U.S. Marine Corps. Potomac General Research Group (PGRG) for the Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Analysis of Landing and Employment Ashore of an Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Family and Specified Alterna- tive Systems. Vol I. 28 November 1980. U.S. Marine Corps. Potomac General Research Group (PGRG) for the Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Analysis of Landing and Employment Ashore of an Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Family and Specified Alterna- tive Systems. Vol III. 28 November 1980.
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