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Employment Of The Future Landing Vehicle 
Tracked, Experimental And Variants
CSC 1984
SUBJECT AREA Warfighting
                         VEHICLE TRACKED, EXPERIMENTAL
                                 AND VARIANTS
                 			   Submitted to
                           Rudolph V. Wiggins, Ph.D
                    In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements
                          for Written Communications
                  The Marine Corps Command and Staff College
                              Quantico, Virginia
                               Major M. R. Nance
                          United States Marine Corps
                                 April 3, 1984
                         VEHICLE TRACKED, EXPERIMENTAL
                                 AND VARIANTS
Thesis sentence:  The LVT(X) family of amphibious vehicles is
                  the most viable alternative in the 1990-
                  2000 year time frame which will permit
                  operations in a weapons heavy environment.
  I.  Requirement for LVT(X)
      A.  Advantages of the LVT(X)
          1.  25mm Bushmaster Cannon
          2.  Improved TOW
          3.  Three machineguns
          4.  Armor protection
          5.  NBC protection
          6.  Smoke capability
          7.  Troop capacity
      B.  Disadvantages of the LVT(X)
          1.  Water speed
          2.  Tow firing exposure
          3.  Night vision
          4.  Smoke grenade range
          5.  Vision for troops
      C.  Tactical Concepts for Employment of LVT(X)
          1.  Functions of the vehicle
          2.  Tactical integrity
  II. LVT(X) Variants
      A.  LVTR-X
          1.  Capability
          2.  Tactical employment
          3.  Advantages
      B.  LVTC-X
          1.  Improvements
          2.  Tactical employment
          3.  Advantages
      C.  LVTE-X
          1.  Requirement of 18 vehicles
          2.  Tactical employment
          3.  Needed improvements
      D.  LVTAG-X
          1.  Requirement for Assault Gun Company
          2.  Weight to Surface Assault
          3.  Capabilities
   III.   Mission of the Marine Corps
		A.  Ground Combat Mobility
		B.  LVT(X) meets all MOE requirements 
      The LVT(X) required operational capability (ROC) was
established and promulgated 14 July 1982.  This requirement
documented the need for a family of amphibious assault vehicles
for the mid 1990 time frame which must embody not only normal
amphibious quantities, but also land fighting vehicle quanti-
ties which will permit operation in the weapons heavy environ-
ment of the time period.  The ROC defines a land fighting
vehicle as a light armored vehicle that will provide protected
cross-country/water fording mobility with a vehicular mounted
fire power capability, able to support mechanized infantry
operations in mounted and dismounted combat.  The LVT(X) family
of amphibious vehicles is the most viable alternative in the
1990-2000 year time frame.  The LVT(X) will be able to operate
world wide and within the full spectrum threat likely to be
encountered by U.S. amphibious forces to include a defended
      The LVT(X), a low-water-speed amphibian, is now being
pursued to replace the LVTP-7A1, also a low-water-speed
amphibian.  Because of apparent vehicle similarity, and in the
interest of economy, analytical effort is being aimed at
ensuring that the LVT(X) would be a quantum improvement over
the vehicle it will replace.
      The projected threat for the 1990's is being analyzed in
detail to include both the ship-to-shore and subsequent-
operations-ashore phases of the assault.  The concept of
operations for the LVT(X) is being derived within the overall
context of the Marine Corps amphibious operations.  Variant
vehicles designed for specific functions such as communications,
recovery, maintenance, firepower and mine clearance are being
considered.  Mission profiled for individual vehicles were
formulated to facilitate the identification of requisite
characteristics, capabilities and crew skill levels.  These
profiles have encompassed representative combat actions set in
the projected threat environment and employed the formulated
tactical concepts.2
      The advantages and disadvantages of the Marine Corps'
utilization of the LVT(X) as a replacement for the LVTP-7A1
amphibious assault vehicle have been identified.  An advantage
to the LVT(X) family will be in the main armament, the 25mm
Bushmaster automatic cannon, turret-mounted, which will provide
a high kill probability against lightly armored vehicles,
bunkers, beach defenses, and other troop emplacements.  Its
rapid fire capability provides excellent suppression in support
of dismounted infantry operations.  The LVT(X) can deliver
heavy covering fires on the beach with its 25mm cannon while
it is swimming in water.  This advantage will contribute
significantly to the early buildup of firepower ashore.
	Secondary armament, the improved tow antitank guided
missile (ATGM) when selectively utilized on the pintle mount,
provides an armor "killing" stand-off capability against the
Sagger missile of the BMP and the 135mm gun of the T-72 tank.
The LVT(X) also has three turret-mounted machineguns, a 7.62
coaxial with the 25mm cannon and two 5.56mm machineguns on
the top rear (port and starboard).  These weapons make a
significant firepower (suppression) contribution in built-up
areas and in battles when the enemy infantry positions are
penetrated or overrun.
      Sufficient front and side armor provide protection
against small arms (7.62mm armor piercing (AP)) at muzzle
velocity (0 meters range).  This permits the penetration of
the enemy's forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) by the
LVT(X)s before the infantry is dismounted in those engagements
where the enemy's antiarmor capability dictated a dismounted
attack.  The LVT(X) top armor is sufficient to prohibit pene-
tration of airburst fragments from 152mm artillery shells.
In addition, LVT(X) belly armor is sufficient to provide pro-
tection against M14 and M16 mines.
      The LVT(X) has an adequate nuclear, biological and chem-
ical (NBC) protection system.  There is a vehicle chemical and
radiac alarm system, an overpressure system and filtered ven-
tilation system for the troop compartment, and protective masks
and clothing for the crew.  This permits operation within a
toxic or radioactive environment of all vehicle systems except
the pintle-mounted TOW.
      The LVT(X) has a smoke making capability.  The exhaust
smoke generator combined with the turret-mounted smoke grenade
launcher can be successfully employed.  This is especially
true in river crossings and in desert operations.
      The troop carrying capacity of the LVT(X) assures the
continuous integrity of the embarked infantry "fighting team"
for mounted and dismounted operations.  The rifle squad pro-
vides the backbone for the team which also includes a machine-
gun section, a Dragon team, and (selectively) a Stinger team.
A smaller vehicle would necessitate forming this same team on
the ground, as a separate action after dismounting, or the
reorganization of the infantry into squads that "fit".3
      Some of the disadvantages of the LVTP-X that will still
exist after initial fielding of the vehicle are that the water
speed of the vehicle is insufficient.  Increased speed in the
water (over the designed 8.4mph capability) is required.  This
would reduce exposure time, and resultant losses, in the ship-
to-shore movement of the amphibious assault.
      The pintle-mounted TOW system reduces availability and
effectiveness of that antiarmor system.  TOW gunners can
become ineffective during fire fights because of exposure
while operating the pintle mounts.  In addition, only turret-
mounted firepower systems are accessible while operating
"buttoned-up" in a toxic environment.
      The LVT(X) has inadequate night vision equipment.  The
driver has the AN-VVS-2 and the gunner has thermal enhance-
ment equipment.  However, the vehicle commander, who makes
the critical decision whether or not to engage the enemy
during reduced visibility, has no vision enhancement except
for the use of the AN/TAS-4 night sight mounted on the TOW.
      The LVT(X) has an inadequate smoke grenade launcher
range.  The smoke grenade launcher range of 100 meters does
not provide adequate stand-off capability.  A 300 meter range
would provide more flexibility in the use of smoke grenades
to inhibit RPG-7s and Sagger missile guidance.
      The LVT(X) has inadequate troop vision capability from
the troop compartment.  The single vision block in the rear
ramp does not provide the opportunity for immediate orienta-
tion by small unit leaders just prior to dismount.  Two
additional troop vision blocks, one on each side, are consid-
ered necessary.4
      The tactical concepts for the employment of the LVT(X)
family as elements of a MCATF in the 1990 time frame are
those related in OH9-3A with some exceptions.  The exploita-
tion of bodies of water as avenues of attack and withdrawal
should be emphasized.  Training should be expanded to assure
that this extremely valuable and unique capability is
utilized to its greatest advantage.
      The fighting vehicle functions of the LVT(X) in concert
with the other vehicles of the MCATF needs to be emphasized.
The effectiveness of the fighting force relies heavily on
proper organization, control, and employment of all assigned
combat and combat support vehicles when conducting mounted
operations.  The assignment of vehicles and the ability to
command and control them at all levels to permit quick, often
innovative and self-initiated reaction to the changing
situation is critical.  The perfection of teamwork is essential
to the degree that maximum shock effect of supporting arms,
tanks, LVT(X)s and other MCATF vehicles is assured at the
crucial moment of infantry dismount, whenever dismount assault
is required.  For example, an infantry reinforced platoon of
a given number of LVT(X)s should comprise a fighting unit
which would in turn be comprised of single LVT(X)s, each
carrying a fighting team consisting of a reinforced infantry
squad.  This must be taught and practiced so that it becomes
second nature to the commanders and their subordinates.
      Any delay, traffic jam, or immobilized concentration
of vehicles in the initial assault would almost certainly
result in greatly increased losses from threat artillery and
mortars.  To prevent this from occurring, all enemy antiarmor
weapons, and particularly those that are hand-held or
operated from ground mounts on key terrain, must be eliminated.
This clearly dictates seizure of the initial objectives in a
MCATF amphibious assault by dismounted forces.  This require-
ment in turn dictates the employment of infantry-heavy
mechanized elements as lead units in the beach assault and in
initial operations ashore.
      Tactical integrity of a vehicle's mounted infantry must
be emphasized.  The 1990 threat and the advent of the MCATF
do not reduce the importance of the dismounted fighting
tactics and techniques.  On the contrary, the increased threat
of antiarmor capability combined with the uniqueness of
amphibious operations dictates the requirement for dismounted
assault in the majority of MCATF actions.  The tactical
integrity of fighting units must be maintained while in the
vehicles, so that the embarked forces are under close command
and control and are fully integrated, effective, and mutually
supporting immediately upon debarkation.6
      The type of organization most likely to survive and
succeed against the 1990 threat, Soviet or third world, must
be more heavily armored than the current dismounted, lightly
armored landing teams.  A representative MAF, such as the
baseline MAF depicted in the Marine Corps Midrange Objectives
Plan (MMROP) is the ideal force for the Fleet Marine Force
and Marine Corps planning.7   It can be expanded to make it
capable of engaging stronger threat forces.  Based on doctrine
and tactics a concept of operations has been recommended for
the LVT(X).  Land in a single lift the infantry and control
elements of a regimental level MCATF including three battalion
level tank/infantry maneuver elements.  To provide to the
MCATF fighting vehicle capability, armored troop mobility, and
armored vehicle support in operations ashore including combat
assault operations beyond the FBH/FEBA.8
      It is recognized that certain special mission/functions
are required to be performed during, and subsequent to, the
ship-to-shore movement by the combat units and the LVTs that
support them.  Such needs have been demonstrated since the
early amphibious operations of World War II.  The advent of
mechanized combined-arms task forces (MCATFs), mandated by
the capabilities of prospective threat forces, dramatically
emphasizes the importance of the special mission/functions
required for units of the MCATF and the armored vehicles
which support it.  Identification of those needs and identi-
fication of the advantages and needed improvements as a result
of evaluating employment of the LVT(X) family of amphibious
assault vehicles (AAV's) against the 1990 threat is required.
      The Landing Vehicle Tracked, Recovery-Experimental
(LVTR-X) is a postulated vehicle mounted on an LVT(X) chassis
and strengthened as necessary to withstand stresses imposed by
its special mission functions.  It has the capability of
recovery/salvage operations afloat.  This capability consists
primarily of repair or towing inoperative or damaged amphibious
vehicles but does not include a lift function while waterborne.
It also has the capability to perform recovery/salvage opera-
tions ashore.  This capability primarily involves minor and
temporary repairs (such as track repair) which would render a
damaged vehicle towable.  The LVTR-X must be also capable of
transporting a replacement engine or transmission to the
vehicle site, lifting the engine or transmission out of the
inoperative vehicle and inserting the new assembly.  A
limited number of repair parts are carried.  The LVTR-X will
be particularly suited to recovery operations performed under
fire.  Minor repair on such non-amphibious vehicles may be
required in order to make them towable or render them oper-
      It is anticipated that in low-intensity situations,
normal breakdowns and casualties to other LVTs can be responded
to in a reasonable time.  The LVTR-Xs assigned to mechanized
combined-arms task force (MCATF) Headquarters in reserve can
then be assigned where needed in a rapidly developing situa-
tion.  LVTR-Xs would initially be employed to ensure that as
many LVTB reach the beach as possible and subsequently to keep
as many LVTs operable as possible.  The LVTR-Xs may travel
with the CSS trains but normally, and especially initially,
will travel farther forward in the mechanized element.  They
should be positioned as far forward as the situation will
permit and as necessary to permit rapid retrieval or repair
of damaged LVTs and at the same time not interfere with the
battle.  Their source of supply and additional maintenance
capability is located in the CSS train.  When a vehicle cannot
be repaired on site, and cannot be towed without sacrificing
speed, mobility and mission, it may be cannibalized and
destroyed in place.  Normally damaged/inoperable vehicles
which cannot be repaired on site will be towed to the CSS
train or mobile CSS detachment (MCSSD).
      It is concluded that the LVTR-X would be a very efficient
vehicle.  Anticipated characteristics would give it consid-
erably greater effectiveness.  This is especially true from a
repair and recovery standpoint in the 1990 time frame.
      LVTRs have been in the Marine Corps inventory for over
20 years and have performed a very essential service.  With
the advent of the MCATFs, the recovery and repair functions of
the LVTR become far more critical to the survival and success
of the MCATF.  The advantage of the LVTR-X is that it has a
lower silhouette which enhances its survivability and ability
to perform closer to enemy positions.  Improvements in commun-
ications equipment will doubtlessly resolve to a major degree
the communications problem of previous LVTRs.  The improved
portable maintenance shelter that is capable of rapid set-up
and dismantling, and is efficient from the blackout viewpoint,
is a certain necessity.  The shelter, combined with a portable
blackout lighting system, greatly expands the capability of
the LVTR crew to effect field repairs.11
      The Landing Vehicle Tracked, Command-Experimental
(LVTC-X) is a postulated vehicle considerably improved over the
LVTC-7A1,  a product improvement of the LVTC-7.  The LVTC-7
has proved to be a very valuable asset to infantry commanders
over the period and has performed a function which must be
continued and improved upon to meet the envisioned threat of
the 1990 time frame.
      LVTCs are almost entirely utilized by infantry, tank,
or supporting arms commanders and staff.  However LVTCs
should continue to be carried in the tables of equipment
(T/Es) of the assault amphibian battalions.  The using units,
should not be assigned the added burden of operating and
maintaining these vehicles.
      The LVTC has the same armor, mobility, and survivabil-
ity as the basic LVT(X) vehicle.  It has a pintle-mounted
M-60 machinegun instead of the 25mm Bushmaster cannon.  It
also has a 7.62mm machinegun.
      The most prevalent use of the LVTC is at the battalion
level.  The battalion commander and his executive officer
operate from separate LVTCs, the former in the Alpha or primary
command vehicle and the latter in the Bravo or alternate
command vehicle.  Each is supported by appropriate staff
officers and communications personnel.  The trace (escort)
vehicles (LVTXs) also carry rations, water, individual equip-
ment, spare parts, and other necessities.11
      The advantages of the LVT(X) also improved the effec-
tiveness and survivability of the LVTC-X.  Improved communi-
cations equipment in LVTCs will reduce jamming, ECM-EMI
degradation and breakdowns from heat and jarring/concussion.
Improved ride quality, ventilation, and noise level will
reduce fatigue and increase personnel effectiveness.  Improved
equipment mounting and hardening will enhance efficiency when
the vehicle is on the move.  Maintenance will be made easier
and faster by equipment design.  All nets can now be secure.
The chemical warfare (CW) protection for the vehicle will have
a chemical sensor/detector/alarm system, a vehicle over-
pressure system and a filtered ventilation system.  The
vehicle will also have external and internal CW agent resis-
tant paint and a decontaminating apparatus for the vehicle
interior to augment individual decontaminating equipment.
      The Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Engineer-Experimental
(LVTE-X) is a postulated vehicle.  The characteristics and
capabilities of the vehicle were derived from the use of
manning and techniques of employment of the LVTE-1 (1960 era)
vehicle, the hull of the LVT(X), and modifications to align
its capabilities with the requirements of the 1990 time frame.
Employment techniques of the vehicle vary in order to adhere
to the equipment and tactics of the time frame.  For example,
they incorporate use of the fuel air explosives (FAEs), not
available in the LVTE-1 era, and the employment of LVTEs as
elements of mechanized combined-arms tasks forces (MCATFs) of
recent practise in the Marine Corps.
      A study of Marine Corps needs based primarily on
discussions with Fleet Marine Force (FMF) engineers, assault
amphibian vehicle personnel, and combat unit commanders,
determined a requirement of a platoon of 18 LVTEs be assigned
to an AAV Battalion in order to support an infantry division/
MCATF.  This number of vehicles permits the assignment of six
LVTEs to each of three battalion landing teams (BLTs) of the
surface assault regimental landing team (RLT) or to each of
three maneuver elements of a regimental-sized initial surface
assault force.  It is envisioned that the six LVTEs assigned
to the maneuver element would be designated to land in the
first wave, positioned in pairs with one pair in the center
of the wave and one pair near each wave flank.  One vehicle
in each pair would be equipped with three line charges and
one with FAEs.  The latter would carry the majority of the
engineer squad and engineer equipment such as demolitions,
pioneer equipment and tools.
      The vehicles would be employed initially upon landing in
a mine/obstacle countermeasures role.  This is to assure rapid
egress of the other MCATF vehicles from the beach and back
beach area.  The LVTEs would then breach other obstacle fields
enroute to the initial objectives.
      Subsequent operations ashore would involve mine and
obstacle clearing, mine emplacement, and assisting in prepa-
ration of defensive positions for MCATF elements.  The LVTE
could be attached to MCATF mobile obstacle detachments (MODs)
tasked with providing flank security for the MCATF or slowing
down enemy penetration forces.  The assault engineer mission
as part of a MOD includes minelaying, destroying bridges,
creating roadblocks and other obstacles and a variety of
demolition uses designed to delay penetrating threat force
      Another MCATF task for the LVTE is attachment to MCATF
obstacle clearing detachments (OCDs) whose primary function
is to reduce the effect of obstacles, thus improving MCATF
maneuverability.  The OCDs can permit accomplishment of quick
assault breaches to provide several lanes for the maneuver
elements to pass through.  The LVTEs then resume their
position in trace of the lead platoons.  Follow-on engineers
in LVT(X)s improve and mark the routes for the main body.12
The ability of the LVTE to move closer to the objectives and
obstacle emplacements mutually supported by the LVT(X) will
reduce vehicle and personnel casualties, sustain momentum
and speed up the rate of advance.
      Some needed improvements have been identified for the
LVTE-X.  They are to improve the mine detection capability,
improve lane marking, and provide directional smoke.  The
LVTE-X will also improve the ability to lay wire entanglements,
and expand the capacity for increased numbers of line and FAE
      The Landing Vehicle Tracked, Assault Gun Experimental
(LVTAG-X) is a postulated vehicle.  In analyzing the ship-to-
shore movement it has become quite apparent that the avail-
ability in the assault waves to have a direct fire capability
with a large caliber gun would weigh heavily in favor of the
      During World War II, the need for the capability to
deliver suppressive and destructive fire on the beach and
back beach and from the assault waves was accommodated by the
development and production of increased numbers of "armored
amphibious vehicles".  These were assault gun LVTs mounting
large caliber weapons.  In the latter operations in the
Pacific, the first waves consisted almost entirely of assault
gun type vehicles.
      A study of Marine Corps needs determined a requirement
for the formation of an Assault Gun Company consisting of 24
LVTAGs, mounting a 75mm gun to be organized within the AAV
Battalion in order to support an infantry division/MCATF.  The
need for a direct fire capability is well demonstrated for
both waterborne and subsequent operation phases.  The most
critical time of any operation, initial or subsequent, is the
waterborne and beach assault phase.  If this phase if not
immediately successful, the entire amphibious operation is
likely to fail.
      Soviet doctrine teaches that, in the case of combined
helicopterborne assault and surface assault, the first
priority is the destruction of the relatively heavy surface
assault force and then destruction at will of the lighter
armed and armored helicopterborne forces.  Should the surface
assault force be delayed in the water or at the beach
and threat supporting arms be  assed on the stalled forces,
the surface assault may very well be turned back or degraded
to the point it cannot accomplish the scheme of maneuver,
thereby jeopardizing the entire operation.  The most probable
cause for delay is threat direct shore fire from the beach
and back beach area on the vehicles in the water.  The AG
shooting from the water would provide suppressive fire
against the threat direct shore fire.  It could shoot into
identified minefields from several thousand meters distance.
Upon landing it could deliver suppressive fires on the threat
weapons that are providing covering fires over obstacles and
minefields.  This will speed up the obstacle clearing process
and the advance of the assault vehicles through the beach and
the back beach areas.
      The most essential capability after armament of the AG
vehicle is the ability to shoot from the water and land in
the first waves of the assault amphibians.  Other capabilities
of the AG vehicle include a stabilized day/night firing capa-
bility to permit full effectiveness of the main armament
system.  It will also have the ability to store and carry a
large number of rounds of ammunition in the water and increased
numbers on land.  It will be able to fire the HEAT, HEPD, HE
and smoke rounds.14
      The United States Amphibious Forces are the nation's only
major military organization structured and trained for the
stated mission of projecting sustained combat power into hostile
territory from the sea.  The mission of the Marine Corps is to
project naval power ashore.  Unique Ground Combat Mobility
assets are a major factor for the successful projection of this
combat power.  These assets must not only be capable of maxi-
mizing strategic and tactical life during amphibious operations,
but also be survivable during subsequent operations ashore.
Additionally, Ground Combat Mobility assets must allow the
landing force commander flexibility in the implementation of
his assault plan.  Assault Amphibious Vehicles, by virtue of
their inherent capabilities to negotiate from the ship to
shore, to transport large numbers of personnel, and ability
to operate inland, provide the unique capability needed by
the Marine Corps.
      Using a set of established Measures of Effectiveness
(MOEs) the current LVT(X) conceptual designs meet all the
stated requirements for a displacement hull amphibious land
fighting vehicle of the 1990 to 2000 time frame.15  While
higher water speed will always be a desirable attribute, the
LVT(X) optimizes fighting vehicle characteristics for sur-
vivability within the weapons heavy environment of the 1990's
      1Addendum to Required Operational Capability (ROC) for
LVT(X), Assault-Gun Equipped Version (LVT(AG) of the Landing
Vehicle Tracked Experimental), pp. 1-2.
      2Major K.T. Brunsvold,."What the future holds for
assault amphibians," Marine Corps Gazette, Marine Corps
Association, March, 1980, p. 63.
      3U.S. Marine Corps.  Potomac General Research Group
(PGRG) for the Marine Corps Development and Education Command.
Analysis of Landing and Employment Ashore of an Advanced
Amphibious Assault Vehicle Family and Specified Alternative
Systems.  Vol I, p. VI-4.
      4Ibid, p. VI-5.
      5U.S. Marine Corps.  Marine Corps Development and Educa-
tion Command.  OH 9-3A Mechanized Combined Arms Task Force
(MCATF).  Quantico, Virginia.  March, 1980, p. 13.
      6U.S. Marine Corps.  Potomac General Research Group
(PGRG) for the Marine Corps Development and Education Command.
Analysis of Landing and Employment Ashore of an Advanced
Amphibious Assault Vehicle Family and Specified Alternative
Systems.  Vol I, p. VI-9.
      7Commandant of the Marine Corps.  Marine Corps Mid-Range
Objectives Plan (MMROP).  Washington, D.C.  1978, p. 5.
      8U.S. Marine Corps.  Potomac General Research Group
(PGRG) for the Marine Corps Development and Education Command.
Analysis of Landing and Employment Ashore of an Advanced
Amphibious Assault Vehicle Family and Specified Alternative
Systems.  Vol I, p. VI-II.
      9U.S. Marine Corps.  Potomac General Research Group
(PGRG) for the Marine Corps Development and Education Command.
Analysis of Landing and Employment Ashore of an Advanced
Amphibious Assault Vehicle Family and Specified Alternative
Systems.  Vol III, p. II-4.
      10 Ibid, p. II-20.
      11U. S. Marine  Corps.  Marine Corps Development and Educa-
tion Command.  Amphibious Vehicles, FMFM 9-2 (Quantico, 1981)
p. 2-22.
      12U.S. Marine Corps.  Potomac General Research Group
(PGRG) for the Marine Corps Development and Education Command.
Analysis of Landing and Employment Ashore of an Advanced
Amphibious Assault Vehicle Family and Specified Alternative
Systems, Vol III, pp. IV, 7-8.
      13Ibid, pp. IV, 31-32.
      14Ibid, p. IV, 17.
      15Future Surface Assault Vehicle Study, p. 118.
Brunsvold, K.T.  What the future holds for assault amphibians.
      Marine Corps Gazette, Marine Corps Association, March
Center for Naval Analyses.  Future Surface Assault Vehicle
      Study.  Arlington, Virginia.  November 1980.
Commandant of the Marine Corps.  Marine Corps Long Range Plan
      (MLRP).  Washington, D.C., 1982.
Commandant of the Marine Corps.  Marine Corps Mid-Range
      Objectives Plan (MMROP).  Washington, D.C., 1982.
Commandant of the Marine Corps.  Required Operational Capa-
      bility (ROC) NO. MOB 1.11 for Landing Vehicle Tracked
      Experimental (LVT(X)) including Variant Vehicles.
      Washington, D.C., July 1983.
Soper, J.B.  By Forcible Entry.  Marine Corps Gazette, Marine
      Corps Association, August 1972.
U.S. Marine Corps.  FMFM 9-2.  Amphibious Vehicles.  Washington,
      D.C., April 1981.
U.S. Marine Corps.  Marine Corps Development and Education
      Command.  Amphibious Instruction Department.  Tank and
      Assault Amphibian Battalion Capabilities, Limitations
      and Organizations of a Mechanized Force.  Quantico,
      Virginia, 1982.
U.S. Marine Corps.  Marine Corps Development and Education
      Command.  OH 9-3A Mechanized Combined Arms Task Forces
      (MCATF).  Quantico, Virginia, March 1980.
U.S. Marine Corps.  Potomac General Research Group (PGRG) for
      the Marine Corps Development and Education Command.
      Analysis of Landing and Employment Ashore of an Advanced
      Amphibious Assault Vehicle Family and Specified Alterna-
      tive Systems.  Vol I.  28 November 1980.
U.S. Marine Corps.  Potomac General Research Group (PGRG) for
      the Marine Corps Development and Education Command.
      Analysis of Landing and Employment Ashore of an Advanced
      Amphibious Assault Vehicle Family and Specified Alterna-
      tive Systems.  Vol III.  28 November 1980.

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