Revolt Revisited--A Study Of The Hungarian Revolution Of October, 1956 CSC 1984 SUBJECT AREA History THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION ABSTRACT The Hungarian Revolution erupted on the night of October 23, 1956, when a group of peaceful protesters were fired on by the hated Hungarian Secret Police, the AVH. The revolution continued for several days and it appeared to the world that the Hungarians had done the impossible--cut their tether with the Soviet Union against the latter's wishes. The Revolution had its roots in the independence movements of 1849 when Hungary tried to free itself from the Austro- Hungarian Empire. The effort was thwarted by the reinforecment of Austria by Russia. But the spark of independence, ignited then, smoldered for over a hundred years for the conditions to be ripe again. The Second World War created those conditions. The Soviet Union "liberated" Hungary along with much of Eastern Europe. The Communists exported their Moscow-style ideology into what would become the Warsaw Pact. In 1944-45, "Moscow-style" meant Stalin, and it was in his image that most of the East European Communist leaders were cast, with the one exception of Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia. Hungary was not an exception. Matyas Rakosi, strong-arm boss of Hungary, was as ruthless as his mentor in Moscow. And his rule was sustained by Soviet forces stationed in Hungary to ostensibly protect lines of communication to Soviet forces in Austria. A series of events in the early 1950's changed the equation in East Europe. In 1953 Joseph Stalin died creating a void in Soviet leadership. That void was filled by committee and the posts of Soviet Premier and Party Secretary, heretofore filled by one man were separated. This then became the rule throughout the Soviet bloc. In Hungary, it meant Rokosi must share his power with another--in this case it was Imre Nagy--a Moscow-trained communist but not of the Rakosi mold. Nagy became Prime Minister and immediately announced some sweeping changes designed to place Hungary on an economic "New Course." Implied in the changes were some liberalization of Hungarian political and intellectual life. For two years Rakosi, Party First Secretary fought to neutralize the changes created by Nagy. Finally, coincident with Khrushchev's consolidation of power in Moscow, Rakosi moved with vigor against Nagy, forcing him to "retire." During his tenure however, Nagy had sparked the imagination of intellectuals who slowly awoke to the stifling effect that Rakosi had had on intellectual freedom. In fact, Nagy became somewhat of a hero as he lived quietly in Budapest. Through the media and in Hungarian literature, the intellectuals slowly started attacking the Rakosi regime. In February 1956 Khrushchev lambasted the "cult of personality" directed against Stalin's memory. This attack shattered the foundation upon which Stalin clones had been operating in East Europe. Throughout the Soviet bloc there were demonstrations against Soviet occupation and against the brand of leadership that was Stalin's legacy. A new wave of communism based not on the Soviet model but on local conditions was sweeping East Europe. In Hungary Rakosi's days were numbered as his effectiveness wavered. In July he was forced to resign. But his replacement, Erno Gero, was from the same school as Rakosi. Hungarian intellectuals from all walks of life were now openly antagonistic toward the Hungarian Party and Government. In September, university students joined the protest and added their exuberant demands to those of the intellectual elite. Finally, while the students tried to get thier demands read over Radio Budapest, with over 200,000 of their countrymen in the streets, the AVH opened fire on them and the revolt began. Moscow's envoys replaced the Hungarian leadership and Imre Nagy was snatched from retirement to head the government. But by the 24th, the government was in the streets with the freedom fighters. Soviet tanks and troops, called in with the opening shots, fought bitter battles against Hungarian freedom fighters throughout Budapest. The Hungarians held firm however and Soviet withdrawal from the city was complete by the end of October. The Nagy government had meanwhile begun to consolidate power and negotiate with the Soviets for their withdrawal of all forces from Hungary. But for the Soviets, the Hungarians went too far when they stared discussing neutrality for Hungary and repudiation of the Warsaw Pact. A local brand of communism closely aligned with Moscow may have been acceptable to the Soviets. What the Nagy government was proposing was not. By deft diplomatic maneuvering combined with a massive Soviet military buildup inside the borders of Hungary, the Soviets were able, on the morning of November 4th, to crush the Hungarians. Casualties were estimated as high as 25,000. Now the Soviets were able to accomplish this feat, and why, was a study in self interest and Machiavellian politics. The aftermath left Hungary actually stronger than it was before the revolution. Corruption and inefficiency were exposed and needed reforms, refused before the fighting, were slowly emplaced by the government of the incumbent Party leader, Janos Kadar. WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR Revolt Revisited A Study of the Hungarian Revolution of October, 1956 Major Charles Christopher Johnson 2 April 1984 Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico, Virginia 22134 INTRODUCTION Nearly thirty years have passed since the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have altered only slightly since then, but a new force, the Third World, has emerged to complicate the equation of nations. But the world still observes the Presidential electorial process just as it did in 1956. And similarly, all therhetoric generated during that process seldom anticipates or even addresses the real events of significance as they unfold. The Hungarian Revolution was such an event. The United States' response was sympathy for the freedom-loving people of Hungary. The United Nations, which seems less and less likely to fulfill its charter and the role it was originally intended to have, did address the Hungarian issue, but just as it fails to act today, so it failed in 1956. Even some of the key persons of those late fall days of 1956 are with us still. Certainly in fresh memory is Yuri Andropov, then Soviet Ambassador to Hungary, who recently died as leader of the Soviet Union. And Janos Kadar, who played a most interesting role in the Revolution, is currently head of the Hungarian Communist Party. They were on the winning side. Those fortunate enough to make it out of Hungary fared as well as one violently displaced from home can expect. Others, perhaps 25,000, died in the frantic effort that was the Hungarian Revolution. The specific events of the Revolution cover only a few days and with that in mind, an attempt was made to weave analysis into the facts and opinions that formulate the "story" of the revolution. Much of the story is based on either eye-witness western news accounts or on books written by those who escaped to the west. The problem with telling a story of a glorious struggle against the Soviet Union is that it proved difficult to find unbiased reporting. Certainly the Soviet statements quoted in the press either proved to be misleading or were clearly propaganda aimed against the United States. Most of the books were from the Hungarian perspective. And given the unalterable facts of the Revolution, it seems obvious that Soviet accounts would not abound, and if they did, they would be justification rather than fact. Finally, there exists a paucity of military analysis of these events. And this is not surprising given that Soviet forces never engaged the Hungarian military and engagements that did develop between the Soviet forces and the freedom fighters were not fully documented. The effort that went into this paper was clearly justified from the author's perspective. This is a compelling story, one that tugs at the heartstrings of everyone who has ever rooted for the underdog. And when the freedom of a people is at stake, the sacrifices made are even more moving. All the while another drama unfolded, this at the diplomatic level. The twisted outcome could never have been sold as a novel. In learning all this, the author, and hopefully the reader, will appreciate that relations with the Soviet Union, regardless of appearances, can never be taken for granted. Table of Contents Abstract Introduction i - ii Chapters I In the Beginning 1 - 35 II The Revolution 36 - 71 III The Aftermath 72 - 75 IV Conclusions 76 - 90 Appendices A A Chronology of Events B Key Personnel C Fold out operational map Footnotes Bibliography CHAPTER I IN THE BEGINNING Any study of the Hungarian Revolution must take into account the fabric within which was weaved the complex threads that culminated in the violent and absolute crushing of Hungary's five days of freedom. Contrary to the nostalgia buffs, the 1950's were not carefree times of plenty. Specifically, 1956 was a year of significant worldwide tension focused in Eastern Europe and in the Middle East, especially the Suez Canal area. A reading of any newspaper of the period shows that. October and November were watershed months that culminated in a Presidential election, the Olympic Games in Melbourne and the crisis in the Suez, not to mention the revolution in Hungary and the generally rising tide of national communism throughout the satellite nations. It is against this backdrop that this paper will be written. It is hoped that the reader will have a fuller appreciation of an event of national will against insurmountable odds that should serve as a reminder of the value of freedom. The Hungarian Revolution has been characterized as a demon- stration that grew into a revolt, then a national rebellion and finally a war. While it probably never reached the final stage, it clearly was a movement that bears examination. The revolt has its roots in 1848. In that year Lajos Kossuth led Hungary in a revolution directed against the Austrian Crown. With the aid of Nicholas I of Russia, the rebellion was suppressed, but the event reflected the feeling of the Hungarian people for freedom. A direct link between that movement and the one in 1956 can be appreciated by the simple fact that the great Hungarian poet Sandor Petofi served as the namesake for one of the Societies (the Petofi Circle) that advanced the concept, prior to the October revolt, that greater independence and free- dom of expression were necessary in an otherwise repressive Hungarian society. His words from the grave stirred the souls of Hungarians in 1956: Magyars, rise, your county calls you! Meet this hour, whate'er befalls you! Shall we free men be, or slaves? Choose the lot your spirit craves!1 A second, significant "connector" between the freedom move- ment of 1848 and the October revolution of 1956 was the develop- ment of the Populist movement during the 1930's. The Populists were an ill-defined admixture of writers, scholars and peasant intelligentsia that essentially searched for the answers to the social problems of the day. They "went to the people" with a platform of land reform but disagreed on the solutions to other problems.2 Basically they divided into three factions: the Populists represented on the right the Anti-Semitics, in the middle the Hungarian Nationalists, and on the left the more articulate but less chauvanistic intelligentsia who embraced the "radical" ideas of democracy, "Danubian Confederism" and an ill-defined Communism.3 In 1937 the Populist writers founded the March Front. The Front took the form of "an intellectual club rather than a political party."4 A recurring pattern of societies and clubs providing a political forum will reappear. It was the Front that attracted the attention of Hungarian Communists residing in the Soviet Union; their chief spokesman, Jozsef Revai, challenged a basic concept of the Populist movement that it only represented the peasants and not the workers. The political expression of the left-wing Populists was the National Peasant Party founded by one of the March Fronters, Imre Kovacs. The press of events in the late 30's and the Second World War precluded much attention to any political movement in Hungary with the exception of the Government-approved Peasant Alliance formed in 1941, which was in fact a front for the Smallholders Party headed by Bela Kovacs.5The Hungarians fought with the Germans during the war but near the end, the Horthy Government considered suing for peace with just the United States and Great Britain. As the policy was unconditional surrender, negotiations with Russia were also required. By late 1944, the Soviets were closing in from the east and in fact by August caused the Roman- ians to defect to the Allied side. The Germans were unable to respond in that country, but made it clear to Horthy that Hungarian attempts to do the same would be met by German occupa- tion as in the Italian situation. As a result, by September 1, Russian and Romania forces invaded Hungary from the east which led to the demise of the Horthy government on October 15 and the formation of a National Council in December. By April, 1945, all of Hungary was "liberated". Occupation was agreed among the Allies to have been the responsiblity of the Soviets. After the war, the Soviet Army remained in the country to guard the lines of communication to the Soviet Army in Austria. Along with the Soviet Army came the Hungarian Communists trained in Moscow, the two most prominent of whom were Matyas Rakosi and Erno Gero. These two proceeded to organize the Communist Party and took the reins from the small underground communist movement headed by Hungarian leader Lazslo Rajk.6 The policy from Moscow was not the direct takeover of "liberated" countries such as Hungary, but rather to develop a symbolic national government from the ruins of the War. In this vein, the occupying forces called for a coalition government composed of the four most prominent parties. The Smallholders, National Peasants, Communists and Social Democrats formed in Debrecen in December 1944 a National Council which took control from the defeated Hungarian Government of Admiral Horthy, who went into exile. While the National Council represented the government, the communists actually had only one post of significance: Imre Nagy, a Moscow-trained Communist, but not in the Rakosi clique, held the post of Minister of Agricul- ture.7 In fact, in October 1945, when Hungary hosted open elections, the first in Soviet occupied Europe,8 the communists only received 17% of the vote.9 However, the thin veil of "coalition" was soon to be exposed as a communist ploy to gain ligitimacy. In 1946 the Communists, supported by the occupation army and more importantly by the Hungarian Secret Police, started in earnest their maneuvers to consolidate power. "There was only one organization over which our Party had control from the very first, and which was never influenced by the political coalition: that was the AVH. (The Secret Police)."10 The communist drive against the coalition was centered on the Smallholders Party. Using false charges of being "anti-democratic", the leader of the Smallholders, Secretary General Bela Kovacs, was arrested and jailed.11 The remainder of the Smallholder Party leadership either left to subverted themselves to the Communists.12 In fact the Smallhold-ers, who had been so prominent in the election of 1945, were outmaneuvered by the Communists whose success was due as much to the single-mindedness of communist ideological purpose as to the more eclectic nature of the Smallholders. The latter simply were not astute enough to recognize the danger posed by the Communists who actually kept their obviously subver- sive tactics from the nation at large.13 A measure of success that the Communists enjoyed can be seen in the results of the election of August 1947 when the Smallhold- ers polled but 15.4% of the vote.14 Splinter parties part- icipated in the election and represented generally where the 1945 Smallholder votes went. In any case, for the Communists this was the last attempt at political finesse; all opposition parties were eleminated shortly after the 1947 elections.15 Within the Communist Party the purge of "the opposition" occurred. Emboldened by Stalin's spectacular attack on Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia in the summer of 1948, the Muscovite Communists of Hungary, led by Matyas Rakosi, turned against "nationalist deviation" embodied by the Hungarian Lazslo Rajk. While Rajk had been instrumental in the development and employ- ment of the secret police and their terror tactics while in the Ministry of the Interior Rakosi recognized Rajk as the same sort of nationalist as Tito and forced him from his post in August 1948. Whether Rajk and Tito were connected either personally or in terms of their brands of Communism is uncertain.16 In any event he represented a threat to Rakosi and in June 1949 Rajk was arrested and during his trial he confessed to a variety of crimes against the state. He was hanged in September 1949. Rajk's death marked the beginning of a general Party purge which evolved into be the most "vicious of all Satellite intra-Party purges."17 These purges were generally directed at the indiginous members of the Party. This held true throughout the satellites.18 Hungary at this time was undergoing, to a lesser or greater degree, the same transformations as were other Soviet satellite states. Each, Poland, Czechoslovokia, Romania, and East Germany, could relate similiar tales. The most significant unifying factor in each would have to be relations that each had with the Soviet Union, and more specifically, its ruler Joseph Stalin. Certainly in Hungary Rakosi followed Stalin's lead. However, in July 1953, Stalin died. The period between that critical event and the assumption of Soviet leadership by Nikita Khrushchev was one of repudiation of terror tactics and an intro- duction of "collective leadership" in the Soviet Union; in this process many purge victims were released throughout the Communist bloc. These victims included those who had suffered at the hands of the Hungarian Secret Police. In an "anti-purge" purge19 the AVH was shaken up and many of its leaders arrested. In any event, the real losers in the softening of the Soviet hard-line were those throughout the satellites who had sided with Stalin. In recognition of this, and in the wake of the 1953 East German riots in Pilsen, Rakosi was called to Moscow to be told how Hungary would be run. He was directed to introduce collective leadership. This meant he could not hold both Party leadership and the office of Premier.20 As long as collective leadership was in vogue, Rakosi followed orders. As directed by Moscow, Rakosi appointed Imre Nagy, formerly Minister of the Agriculture and long time critic of Rakosi, to the post of Premier. However, he retained the more important position of Party leader. While Minister of Agriculture, Nagy had fallen from Rakosi's grace in that he opposed Rakosi on the collectivization of agriculture and the over-emphasis on industrialization. It appears that Nagy was simply recognizing that the economic condi- tions in Hungary were different than elsewhere, and therefore some form of private enterprise system for agriculture and consumer goods might be more effective.21 From 1949 to 1951 Nagy was actually removed from the Politburo and in every sense, other than physical, was just another purge victim. During that period of internal exile, Nagy worked as a professor of agrarian economics, became a common sight around Budapest, and may have been more generally "approachable" than other leading Communists. In any event, when rioting broke out in 1956, it was Imre Nagy whose name was on the lips of thousands of young Hungarians. Nagy, as Premier, initiated a "New Course" for Hungary which went farther in its reforms than any other East European Satel- lite. Nagy's anti-collectivism, for which he suffered in 1949, was now condoned by Moscow; as a result, Nagy's opening remarks to Parliament on July 4, 1953 reflected his reinforced position. Attacking Rakosi in nearly all areas, he called for significant changes: "We have to realize and admit openly before the country that the objectives of the increased Five Year Plan in many respects go beyond our forces, that to pursue them puts an undue strain upon our resources and...has brought about a decline in our standard of living...Excessive in- dustrialization...are in no way justified, especially since we lack the raw materials. We must...put much great- er emphasis on...producing consumer goods, so as to be able to satisfy the growing needs of the population." Nagy then continued: "the government will make it possible for kolkhoz (collec- tives) members to withdraw from the kolkhozes after the harvest if that is their wish. In addition to this, the government will also permit the dissolution of the kolkhozes if the majority desire it."22 Similarly, Nagy opened the door for writers and intellec- tuals to express themselves more freely and allowed many of those unjustly exiled to return to Hungary. Furthermore, he promised police reform and freed many political prisoners. The sum total of the speech to Parliament and the reforms initiated by Nagy was to create within Hungary the first faint rays of enlightenment since before the war. The ascendency of Imre Nagy bears closer examination. As will be seen, his role in the uprising was a significant one, but one which was clouded by his political isolation and his reputa- tion for liberalism that he may not have intended. The mere fact that Nagy was launched into the premiership did not cause his programs to be placed into effect. He had a very powerful opponent--whether Nagy appreciated it or not--in Rakosi. The latter had made a career of reading Moscow and his instincts apparently told him that once the Soviet leadership situation became stabilized, things would be back to "normal". Therefore, he was not about to hand over power to someone such as Nagy on the word of a confused Moscow leadership. Rakosi was determined to make the ruling of Hungary as difficult as possible for Nagy until he could regain both the party and government leadership for himself. From the outset, Rakosi used the Party to obstruct Nagy. The Parliamentary Speech would normally have been well publicized in advance through the Party press. This was especially true in the case of an address of such great import as was delivered by Nagy. The broadcast, therefore, took the Party by surprise and appeared to many that Nagy was exercising significant power to go outside the Party and, in this case, directly to the listening public.23 This perception of power ascribed to Nagy would become a common problem for Nagy during the uprising. In that the speech had not been editorialized and interpreted beforehand, remarks directed to kolkhozes caused many to leave the collectives before the end of the harvest and threw the countryside into chaos. In order to calm the fears of the Party leadership, Rakosi called a meeting on July 11, 1953 of the Greater Budapest Party organization to "interpret" Nagy's remarks. In essence, Rakosi assured the Party faithful that all was well, that real changes were not occurring, and that the power still lay within the Party. Throughout the meeting, Nagy supported Rakosi's views and lashed out at those who would wreck the collective system by urging peasants to leave it early.24 Nonetheless, Nagy was bound to press on for the reforms he felt were necessary. He did this not as a right-wing reactionary but as a good Communist. The Hungarian economy, the object and potential benefactor of Nagy's reform effort, suffered under the terms that Nagy tried to implement. The "New Course" required that all citizens, the workers, the peasants and the general populace, understand and work together in order to bring about economic reform. When Nagy downplayed the use of police terror, the population reacted as probably could have been expected. They demanded more and pro- duced less; hence thousands of peasants left the collectives to work their own plots. In the city, worker absenteeism increased and productivity declined. Labor problems, added to the basically weak economic base of the Hungarian economy which had been further weakened by the super industrialization of the Communists, caused significant shortages throughout the country. Meanwhile, the Rakosi-Nagy dualism continued. Rakosi was the more politically astute and watched Moscow for the signals he needed to make his move. After Stalin's death in 1953 Beria, the head of the Secret Police, who had lobbied against Rakosi's brand of leadership, was arrested and subsequently executed; this elim- inated in Moscow a staunch Rakosi opponent. Beria's removal gave Rakosi a convenient "reason" why he was ousted from Government power in June. Since Beria opposed him, and since Beria was shown to be a traitor, Rakosi could believe that he was right all along and that he was only checked by Beria's treachery and that he would soon be back in total power.25 After June, 1953, other satellite states also reflected the duality of the leadership in the party and state. In essence, they were all tiny reflectors of the Malenkov (Premier)-Khrushchev (First Secretary) relation- ship in the Soviet Union. As such, Nagy found himself closely aligned with and supported by Malenkov.26 Not only were they both in the same respective position, but they both opposed the program of heavy industrialization. But Nagy's association with Malenkov became a weakness which would unseat him. By October 1954 Nagy was at the height of his influence and popularity. Although he suffered criticism from some Party members who opposed him, he still could be satisfied that at least some of his programs were beginning to show results. Earlier, in May, Nagy had hinted at the formation of a People's Patriotic Front which would form a close alliance between Party and non-Party members for the betterment of Hungary. But Rakosi, while somewhat humbled, was far from defeated. His inuendos insinuated that the People's Front was being taken over by right- wing troublemakers and that a "hostile right-wing wave was sweeping the country"27 Furthermore the general public was becoming disillusioned with the Prime Minister because they felt that he was just a pawn in Kremlin politics and any progress he could make would be discarded when it was felt his services were no longer required by Soviet leadership. Rakosi visited Moscow in the winter of 1954 and personally ascertained in which direction the political currents were going within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Well briefed by his Moscow associates, Rakosi recognized that the anti-Malenkov forces led by Khrushchev would probably be successful; thus upon his return to Hungary, Rakosi launched renewed attacks on Nagy as a "rightist deviator."28 By late December, the Rakosi-Nagy feud was an open topic. Rakosi repeatedly attacked the "New Course" while Nagy, with his group of supporters (mostly writers and intellectuals), could offer only bland counterattacks. Either Nagy was too politically immature to appreciate power politics, or he simply chose not to engage in them. In either case, clearly the Party was gathering around Rakosi and against Nagy. Meanwhile, in Moscow, the anti-Malenkov forces struck. In the Soviet Union (and Hungary) the arguments were phrased in ideological form. In a speech delivered to the Central Committee in January 1955; while not naming Malenkov, Khrushchev attacked the light industry enthusiasts, clearly meaning Malenkov. In order to save himself and perhaps rectify his "mistakes", Malenkov, heretofore a Nagy supporter, turned on him and denounced the Hungarian leader. The attacks were directed not only against the economics of the "New Course", but also against Nagy's anti-Party comments and writings, the basic theme of which was that general Party membership should help formulate policy-- obviously a rightist-deviant point of view. In trying to defend himself in front of the Soviet Presidium, Nagy was continually shouted down. However, rather than deprive Nagy of the Premier- ship then, he was simply directed by the Party to correct the "errors" of the "New Course".29 Surprisingly, Nagy refused to engage in the Communist art of self-criticism; but he would have enjoyed the chance to openly discuss some of the economic difficulties of his program, to include Rakosi's subversive activities, but this was not acceptable to his opponent.30 Nagy was already marked for removal, however and this occurred a few months after the removal of his former patron Georgi Malenkov, who "requested" to be relieved df his duties in February 1955. With pressure from Rakosi and dwindling support, Nagy re- fused to resign, desiring instead to be removed. Throughout March and April, Rakosi cajoled Nagy to recant and resign due to health. Nagy refused. Finally Rakosi charged Nagy with a number of specific crimes, including attempting to form an opposition party to the Communist Party, trying to put himself above the Party, nepotism and "clericalism", for his daughter had married a Calvinist.31 On April 18, 1955 the National Assembly met and discharged Nagy from his post. Further, he was removed from the Vice-Presidency of the Patriotic Front and expelled from the National Assembly. Within months he was also expelled from the Communist Party. Nagy was not arrested, however, but instead moved into isolated retirement. Rakosi had thought that Nagy was all but dead and that the retirement would be permanent. With Nagy conveniently retired due to "ill health," Rakosi was free to re-establish control of both the Hungarian party and government. He appointed Andras Hegedus as Premier and restacked the Politburo with his supporters. Rakosi then reinstituted the collectives and the placed renewed emphasis on heavy industry. He was determined to bury the "New Course", but did allow for the rehabilitation of some political prisoners and continued the practice of private enterprise among some artisans. But Rakosi could not have predicted the international turn of events that made his method of leadership no longer in vogue. International tensions decreased and, probably much to Rakosi's chagrin, Soviet-Yugoslav antipathy softened considerably, culminating in Khrushchev's May 1955 rapprochement. The apparent acceptance on the part of Moscow of a Communist variant was a significant threat to Rakosi and his brand of Stalinist-Soviet Communism for Hungary, a country not at all like Russia. It was Rakosi, after all, who had lead the Stalin inspired attacks on Tito in 1949-50 and as a result had incurred Tito's undying antipathy. The result in Hungary was a rejuvenation of national communism which was applauded in intellectual circles.32 Mean- while, Rakosi realized that he had made Tito a personal enemy by accusing him of being a "fascist, a Western spy and a murderer"33 and had used the trial of Lazslo Rajk to bring these implications to light. The trend of the tide was not lost on Tito, who in late July lashed out at Rakosi, accusing his regime of using terror tactics and staging false trials to implicate Yugoslavia.34 Rakosi was in a box and knew it. The "Hungarian Stalin" well understood that his mentor's method was no longer popular and that he was soon to be left in an exposed position. In order to avoid being isolated, he needed a new scapegoat. Should the truth about the Rajk trial become common knowledge, Rakosi, could have been exposed as a murderer and would probably have to be removed from office. On the international scene, a series of events moved Hungary toward an impasse. On May 15, 1955 the Great Powers signed the Austrian State Treaty. Heretofore, the Soviets had kept troops stationed in Hungary to safeguard their lines of communication to their occupation forces in Austria. The treaty called for the removal of Soviet troops from Austria and this was done. How- ever, the Soviets engineered the Warsaw Pact, conveniently signed the day before, to provide a legal basis for keeping their forces in Hungary and other East European countries. On the other hand, the Geneva Summit in July 1955 gave hope that, with the easing of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, the East European nations might achieve the enviable position of Austria, that of a neutral country. From the Russian perspective, however, the Western overtures in that direction were recognized and defeated. Poland, apparently, was especially a target for removal from the Soviet Bloc, as was the reunification of Germany.35 In any event, Hungarians perceived this event with anticipation of better things to come.36 This climate of rapprochement with the West and the easing of tensions between Yugoslavia and Hungary conflicted with the one that Rakosi was trying to recreate. Erroneously misreading the Moscow tea leaves, Rakosi moved with vigor against any vestiges of the "New Course". This time it was the writers who suffered. While Nagy was Premier, they had been allowed more freedom of expression and enjoyed it. They exercised their newly won freedoms in discussions and in newspapers such as Szabad Nep and Irodalmi Ujsag by supporting Premier Nagy's programs.37 Furthermore they realized that the show trial of Rajk was in fact a "tissue of lies".38 In any event, Rakosi moved against both papers by dismissing editors and journalists and replacing them with his benchmen.39 However, as no arrests were made, the writers and journalists continued to move ever so cautiously against Rakosi. The momentum of the intelligentsia was gathering. Those who had nearly unanimously supported the Nagy initiatives, who had learned the truth of the Rajk trial, and who had been stung with the passion of free thought and expression were not about to be subverted again. Their fomentations would lead directly to open rebellion. To more fully understand the role of the literary intelli- gentsia and its relation to the people, the government and the Party, it is important to understand more about this group. Throughout its history Hungary suffered the invasions and occupa- tions of innumerable tribes, hordes and nations that kept Hungary a feudal state until well into the 19th century. Much earlier, other European nations had enjoyed nation status while the "feudal organization of land, society and wealth"40 was the norm in Hungary. In that case the ideas of nationhood became more than a political evolution, it became a "cause-celebre" for the writers and poets who embodied the whole concept in myth and glory and the plight of the peasant.41 The communists appreciated that the role of the literary intelligentsia as a group was to probe and question, and some- times even bolster, the views of the party and state. Therefore, during the early Rakosi years not all writers were surpressed. Some could be found to sing the praises of the Rakosi regime and even participate in the villification of those accused by the Party of "crimes" like those of Rajk. Many writers however, even the good Communists, were not tolerated and were routinely arrested and sentenced to long, often unjust, prison sentences. Just as Rakosi had feared, however, when released they did come back to haunt him. When Imre Nagy announced his "New Course", the writers were strongly encouraged. Those in journalistic and editorial posi- tions were the first to feel the warm glow of freer expressions. Others soon emerged from their intellectual hibernation and sang the praises of the "New Course". As those who had been impri- soned were released and rejoined their former intellectual circles, they found a new and different atmosphere. More and more revelations concerning the fate of their comrades in prison, and others equally innocent whom many of the officially sanc- tioned writers had helped send to prison, were becoming known. Slowly it dawned on the collective body of writers that the system that they had allowed to go unscathed was truly unjust and simply the personal, Stalinist interpretation of Hungarian Communism embodied in Matyas Rakosi. The guilt they collectively shared is mentioned in several books. Several examples of this self-criticism emerged shortly after Nagy's July 4 speech. One poet simply mused about his lack of perceptiveness to see the plight of the peasant, while another developed the theme of the peasants leaving the collectives and turning on the Party committee chairman.42 Slowly the evolution toward more truth and openness in writing occurred--not without set-backs, but progressively nonetheless. More and more writers engaged in the rite of self-criticism through their works. For example, That's how we are Sandor, 43 You were sent to Hell by a lying accusation, And I am now addressing you from the Hell of my guilt, Since I had believed you guilty.44 "Disillusioned, sharing a deep sense of guilt, the intellectuals turned to the future."45 The future in this case would be the rectification of the past sins and lies, and a continued search for the truth. The truth exposed the flaws in the system, and with this moral reinforcement, the intelligentsia began in earnest resuming their traditional East European role and "bonds between the intellectuals and the people were restored and a new national unity forged."46 Now emboldened, articles appeared that systematically attacked the Rakosi regime. In September 1955, the non-Party literary magazine Irodalmi Ujsag was confiscated (after half its issues were already sold) and the editor dismissed. Thus began the Revolt of the Writers. The Writers Association, which had evolved after the demise of the "New Course" into a cult of intra-Party opposition,47 forwarded a criticism48 of Party leadership in the area of artistic freedom. It was signed by the most prominent members and detailed their grievances toward their perceived anti- cultural policy of the Central Committee. Furthermore, in an unprecedented step, seeing that there would be no satisfaction forthcoming in regard to reparations and punishment for those responsible in the confiscation of the September Irodalmi Ujsag, the Presidium of the Writers Association resigned. Heretofore one resigned only when the Party wanted or forced such action.49 In any event, this was the proverbial "one step too many" for Rakosi; it may also have been this moment that Khrushchev was thinking about when he said, "If ten or so Hungarian writers had been shot at the right moment, the revolution would never have occurred."50 Intimidated, some members withdrew their signatures but the more prominent refused. Incensed, Rakosi called a meeting of Party functionaries from the Budapest area and in the format so often used for the mock trials, manipulated the assembled multitude to adopt a resolution condemning the writers. The twenty or so writers who were there were thoroughly humiliated. But they were not beaten and more importantly, they were not arrested. The intimidated leadership of the Writers Association continued to exert influence from the sidelines, and while there was a noticeable let-up in devisive articles, they persisted nonetheless. When the government tried to close down Irodalmi Ujsag by cutting off its newsprint allowance, it was fended off by the rejoinder that the paper could not be closed because, "(it) is now making money for the first time."51 Throughout the winter, the writers kept a low profile. Their reprieve, interestingly enough, came when Khrushchev made his famous address to the 20th Party Congress in February 1956. On February 24-25, 1956, in a secret and lengthy address to the Party Congress in Moscow, Khrushchev condemned the "cult of personality" in moving against the Stalin myth--that the latter had been without fault, always correct, a military genius and capable to making all the decisions in running the Party and the country. Exposed were Stalin's methods of coercion and his influence on comments that others wrote about him in the realm of politics, military strategy and tactics, and the economy. While the full text was not published in the United States until June 452 and never published in toto in Hungary,53 the details became public and this caused a sensation. Stalin's methodology, copied throughout the Soviet sphere, was exposed by a new regime for its faults and outright culpability in pogroms tantamount to mass murder. And a surprisingly strong signal was sent regarding Stalin's relation- ship to Marshal Tito. Had any Party members, especially those in the East European Bloc, any questions as to which of the strong personalities was in the end proved correct, the speech sent a significant signal that Moscow was now backing Tito. The volume of the signal increased considerably in May when Khrushchev flew to Belgrade to issue his now famous public apology to Tito. Any accommodation of "Tijoism" was an anathema to the old-line Stalinists like Rakosi. In Bulgaria, Vulko Chervenkov, a Stalin clone, resigned from the post of Party First Secretary.54 Interestingly enough, in Czechoslovakia, while an old-line Stalinist Alexei Cepicka was removed from the Politburo,55 the hand of Antonia Novotny, a tough, uncompromising Stalin-type, was actually strengthened because it drew into more heated debate the politics of his chief rival Antonin Zapotocky, an Imre Nagy type.56 Similarly, in Romania, strongman Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej's regime was in trouble and remained so even after his rapprochement with Tito; however, he would be strengthened after the backlash of the Hungarian Revolution itself.57 In any event, enough trends were apparent for even Rakosi to see the process of events. Rather than submit, he sought to effect his own compromise with Tito. Apparently he felt if he could win over Tito, he could avert disaster from Moscow. In speeches throughout the Spring of 1956, Rakosi sought to show both his support for the new trend from Moscow and for Marshal Tito him- self. Rakosi even pushed for resumption of a stalled economic agreement with Yugoslavia and it was actually concluded in May. Hungary agreed to pay 85 million dollars for Yugoslav war claims.58 The result apparently was not worth the effort. Tito was unmoved on the issue of Rakosi's removal and so commented to the Soviet leaders when he visited them on June 1, 1956. When asked why Tito took a circuitous route, rather than one more direct through Hungary, Tito replied, "It was precisely because of Rakosi that I did not want to pass through Hungary."59 On the subject of Rakosi's leadership, Tito must have been surprised to find that the Soviets still supported him--if for no other reason than that no obvious successor was apparently available.60 Then while Tito visited Moscow, Foreign Minister Molotov, an arch- Stalinist, resigned his post. To further inspire Moscow with his earnest endeavor for reform, Rakosi opened his new Five-Year Plan to public scrutiny. But all he received was criticism by economists of every ilk. In essence they tried to show how the sorry state of the Hungarian economy could be laid at Rakosi's feet for not following their advice,61 and, inferentially, not giving the "New Course" a chance. These economists belonged to a newly influential group roughly classified as the technical-administrative intelligentsia. It attracted intellectuals from all areas: students, professionals, government functionaires, the arts and economists were all drawn together in a loose coalition against Rakosi. Officially sanctioned as a debating club within the auspices of the Federation of Working Youth and given the name The Petofi Circle, it was apparently intended that the club would serve the government by allowing, under its watchful eye, "open" debates of contemporary issues;62it thus functioned as a sort of pressure valve. The Petofi Circle, named after the famous Hungarian Poet of the 19th Century, began to emerge after June as the most significant vehicle for social change in Hungary. The Writers Association, while still active, had a limited sphere of influence. The Petofi Circle, drawing on a much broader base and attracting more vehement views, was much more popular. In fact, by the time the Party realized what kind of monster it had created, it was too late.63 The Circle had a life of its own. In a succession of meetings of The Petofi Circle in June, groups as diverse as philosophers, former college staffers, form- er partisans and Budapest lawyers met to discuss a myriad of topics. In one such meeting Mrs. Julia Rajk delivered a highly emotional condemnation of those who had murdered her husband and called for their ouster (a clear reference to Rakosi). At the end of the speech as Leslie Bain reports it, "Then the unbeliev- able happened. Along with the audience, the Communist officials on the rostrum stood and gave the Widow Rajk a standing ova- tion."64 Of future significance, in the crowd of about 2,000, a third were army officers.65 The Rajk speech on June 19 probably set the stage for the most significant meeting of The Petofi Circle. On June 27 it met for nine hours without a break as a succession of speakers arose and took turns lashing out at the Rakosi regime. Central Commit- tee members present were attacked to their face,66 and when the final speaker, Geza Losonczy, delivered comments on Irme Nagy, many in the audience called "Down with the regime! Long live Irme Nagy."67 Imre Nagy, throughout his quiet "retirement", had been visited by few friends and kept pretty much to himself. As the events of the Spring and Summer developed, however, more and more old associates came around to discuss events of the day. To many, especially the younger students, Nagy embodied the freedoms which the Writers Association, The Petofi Circle and others were demanding. His "New Course" gave many of them the courage to carry on, by now far beyond what Nagy has envisioned. Imre Nagy was a Communist but many of the people in the movements were not just for national communism ala Tito or Nagy-- some were outright anti-communist. Nagy probably would have felt uncomfortable with this crowd of unsolicited admirers. Nonethe- less he became their symbol. This is a key point. A symbol is many things to many people all of whom are wrapped up in the emotion of what the symbol represents. And so it was for Nagy. Various groups wanted what Nagy, the symbol, represented, but which Nagy, the man, couldn't deliver. As for Nagy, he probably never envisioned himself to be anything more than an obedient Party servant. Certainly neither Nagy nor his "flock" had a program (one went too far, the other not far enough) to deal with the removal of Soviet forces from Hungary and a reorganization of the political system. As a result, neither knew how to accept the other when they were thrown together on October 23. The Petofi Circle meeting of June 27 was chastised in the Szabad Nep the following day. That same day, in Poznan, Poland, workers staged a minor rebellion against their government. Things were becoming dangerous for Rakosi. The Poznan develop- ment, following as it had on the heels of his own Petofi Circle bombshell, meant for Rakosi that he needed to retaliate. Police arrests should have been out of the question under the circumstances, but Rakosi, insensitive as always to his own circumstances was appar-ently going to pursue such a course of action. Among those targeted, incredibly enough, was Imre Nagy.68 The Petofi Circle was temporarily, closed down and the Central Committee chastised "bourgeois, counter-revolutionary views...chiefly organized by a certain group which formed around the person of Imre Nagy."69 However, in order to show that he did not intend to resort to the police tactics of his "Stalin" days, Rakosi once again admitted his complicity with the Rajk affair, but in such a way as to shift the true responsibility onto the police. When he addressed AVH leaders in June he was booed.70 Clearly, it was time for Rakosi to go. Erno Gero, Rakosi's Minister of Transportation, attempted to persuade Rakosi to step down, but the First Secretary refused. The issue was to be settled by Rakosi's Mecca, Moscow, which sent Anastas Mikoyan on July 18 to explain to him that his services were no longer needed. Reportedly, Rakosi could not believe it and telephoned Khrushchev in Moscow to get confirmation. But the deed was done. In his remarks of resignation to the Central Committee, Rakosi cited reasons of ill-health. He then explained his mistakes in carrying out Hungary's version of the Soviet "new look" and his lack of quickness in doing what little he did.71 Mikoyan's role was to carry the news of Rakosi's resignation to Tito. Interest- ingly enough, he was dispatched to Hungary when the Hungarian Politburo, alarmed over Rakosi's plans for mass arrests, informed the Soviet Ambassador in Budapest, Yuri V. Andropov, who called the Kremlin.72 Apparently Moscow had finally reached the end of their patience with Mr. Rakosi. The new Party leadership, with Gero at its head, (and Andras Hegedus still as Prime Minister) added some new members, the most important for this study being Janos Kadar, an anti-Stalin victim of the Rakosi regime. The choice of Gero to lead the Party may have been a tactical one on the part of the Soviets, while long range strategy may have been to bring in Nagy. In fact, Nagy met with Mikoyan on his return from Yugoslavia on July 21.73 In any event, Gero was perceived as just another Rakosi. "In place of a bald Rakosi, we got a thin one", was a popular contemporary saying.74 Kadar, who was elevated to the number two man in the party, may have been perceived by some as a milder version of Nagy. If so, this might remove a cog in the pro-Nagy coalition. However, there apparently was no great support for Nagy by Kadar75--an item that will come into sharper focus later. Although a patchwork quilt of former Rakosiites, national communists and pro-Nagyites now held power, with Moscow's blessing, it appeared that the medicine had been taken too late to save the patient. The Petofi Circle was reinstated in September. Nagy himself was readmitted to the Party in October. And dispite a resolution by the Central Committee to generally make the Party more attractive--both to the technical-administra- tive and literary intellegentsia--events moved Hungary closer to the outbreak of the revolution. Interestingly, the parallel events of the Poznan riots and the "little Poznan"76 Petofi Circle meeting of June 27 were handled differently by the Soviets. The Polish Stalinist Boleslaw Bierut's death in March 1956 allowed a milder Stalinist, Edward Ochal, to take over. As a result, the Twentieth Party Congress speech of Khrushchev was received by Polish leaders more enthus- iastically than in Hungary where Rakosi long overstayed his welcome. But even Ochal took significant criticism and along with Rakosi, wrote articles in Pravda trying to strengthen his posi- tions.77 When the events of June 27 and 28 occurred, both the Poles and Hungarians condemned the acts, but the Poles realized that there was something to the violence and endeavored to find the causes. Rakosi, on the other hand, counterattacked. On July 18, the Polish Central Committee reinstated the "Polish Nagy", Wladyslaw Gomulka. That same date in Hungary, even though Rakosi was cashiered, his alter ego replaced him. The Poles recognized a national movement toward greater freedom and the Polish leader- ship accepted it, thus avoiding a major national disaster involving Soviet tanks. The Hungarian leader resisted change. As a result, when both countries experienced similar situations in late October, the Poles had more experience in the transition from Stalin to Khrushchev and handled it better than the Hungarians. On September 8 and 9, delegations headed by Gero and Kadar left Hungary to meet with leaders in Moscow and Peking. The timing could not have been worse. Neither returned to Hungary until October 7. During that month period of time, a new group emerged on the political scene in Budapest. Although they had an organization within which to work, the Communist Leaque of Working Youth (DISZ), and had attended The Petofi Circle meetings, the students did not represent the leading echelons of the liberalization movement. Apparently deciding that the DISZ was no longer representative of their views, many students of Szeged University formed their own student organization.78 Symp- tomatic of their many disaffections were the myriad changes occurring throughout the heretofore stabilized Communist Bloc. Stalinism was a very simple system. Stalin was the "Great General, the Great Scientist and Great Benefactor."79 When that all changed in 1956, so did that which was taught. The confusion at higher Party echelons ultimately had to trickle down to the students through their instructors. What was "correct", what was the truth, and how did one know? The beginning of the fall term of 1956 gave the students the vehicle to come together, en masse, to make their voices heard as a body. Occupying, as they did, a privileged position in Hungarian society, and considering their numbers and relative political acumen, they were a voice that needed to the heard. September was a month where student activty, coincidental with the rein- statement of Nagy and the trip abroad of Kadar and Gero, rapidly moved Budapest to a state of relative distress. It was October, however, that brought with it the final events leading to the revolution itself. On October 6, significantly the day before the return of Gero and Kadar, the opening symbolic shots were fired. On that day, with a crowd of about 200,000 present, Lazslo Rajk was reinterred. At that moment, it became apparent that the multi- tude was far beyond the capability of the government to con- trol.80 It gave the people a feeling of solidarity with one another, with the spirit of their fallen comrades and with those of the revolution of 1848.81 It restored their confidence as a movement, a force to be taken very seriously, and imbued them with a feeling of power.82 It was a "dress rehersal" for the events of October 22.83 A week after the Rajk reinterment, Erno Gero, after having been gone a month and back in Budapest for a week, again left Hungary, this time for Belgrade. With Nagy's reinstatement, and the return of some of his former titles, the press was favorably disposed tot he general trend of events. On October 17, several university groups issued specific demands regarding their curriculum. They were rewarded on the 19th by a Radio Kossuth broadcast which said, "(Minister of Education, Konya) made several announcements...compulsory instruction of Russian language...will cease...national defense training will be reexamined...scholarship students will go to Western countries (not just USSR and Peoples' Democracies)".84 These concessions only resulted in more student demands and the Szeged University break with the DISZ. Both The Petofi Circle and the Writers' Association stepped up their activities. The latter called for a new Party Congress. This act, unprecedented on the part of a minor faction and published in Irodalmi Ujsag, "captured the essence of the Hungarian political situation": bury the past, purge those responsible and start over with a new, forward-looking Party.85 On the 22nd, students at the Building industry Technological University in Budapest, gathered in a huge meeting to draft sixteen points for submission to the government. The first demand, as it was Petofi's demand of 1848, was the removal of Russian troops from Hungary. Other demands included installing Imre Nagy in the post of Prime Minister, general elections, reexamination of Hungarian-Soviet relations and removal of Stalin's statue in Budapest Wood's Stalin Square. Finally, the students proposed to lay a symbolic wreath on October 23 at the statue of polish General Jozef Bem, who along with Sandor Petofi, was a hero of 1848.86 The Polish-Hungarian connection, epitomized by Bem-Petofi, reflected contemporary solidarity with Poland's own mini-revolution and the unrest sweeping eastern Europe. On October 19, Wladyslaw Gomulka was returned to the Polish Politburo and designated Party First Secretary. Jailed as a Titoist, he had been resurrected after the Poznan riots of June. If Gomulka was the Polish Nagy, he got his post in a much differ- ent way. The Party leadership, headed by Ochal, was realy to turn the reins of power over to the "people's choice", Gomulka. Backed by the Army and Internal Police, Gomulka took control without the usual approval of Moscow. Soviet troops were mobilized and Polish border forces reportedly fired on Soviet troops near Stettin on the Polish-German border.87 In his address to the Central Gommittee, Gomulka denounced the "cult of personality", recognized that there were several means to achieving socialism and mentioned Soviet and Yugoslav styles, and ended with the warning that Poles "will defend themselves with all means."88 The Polish events brought strong Soviet reaction. Pravda condemned the Polish press expressing shock that "anti- Soviet utterances resound in this hoarse choir of slander".89 While the Yugoslaves cheered, Messrs. Khrushchev, Molotov, Mikoyan and Kaganovich flew to Warsaw to influence the action. Gomulka held firm against the stong line-up and the Soviets retired on October 21, apparently convinced of Gomulka's support for the Soviets. But in Hungary Gero was no Ochal. Meanwhile, in Budapest, a key issue was whether hungary's movement toward liberalization would be subject to Soviet influence. John MacCormac, writing in the New York Times, speculated probably not because Rakosi was out and Gero in, and because 1) Hungary was far less strategically important than Poland, 2) Hungary would be a sub- stantial economic drain on the Soviets, and 3) the Kremlin ap- peared to have reconciled itself to letting Tito have more in- fluence with Yugoslavia's immediate neighbors. Interestingly enough, the campaigning Eisehower, spoke for all America when he said, "our hearts go out to the Polish People," but was vague on the issue of specific aid to the Poles. The Republican Party Platform, formulated in August in San Francisco, called for the liberalization of Poland and other satellites, but no definition of "liberalization" was offered. While there is, on the surface, a stong parallel in the Polish crisis and the Hungarian one, a key point is worth men- tion. In Poland, even though the masses supported the move, it was the Polish Central Committee which defied the Soviets by placing Gomulka at its head without Soviet approval. In Hungary the masses revolted not only against the Soviets, but their own Party leadership as well. Had Imre Nagy been reinstated into the Hungarian Politburo when Wladyslaw Gomulka was returned to the Polish counterpart, there is room to argue that the Hungarian Revolution might never have started. The face-off won in Poland against the Soviet first string stirred the souls of Hungarian students, intelligentsia, and workers alike. Emboldened by the events, The Petofi Circle published its list of ten demands in Szabad Nep on October 23. Much like the student demands of the previous day, those of The Petofi Circle were not concise but reformist in a general sense. Imre Nagy was again mentioned as a requisite to Communist Party reform. Also stressed were questions of relations with the Soviet Union, the state of the economy, foreign trade, factory self-administration and worker democracy.90 Meanwhile the Hungarian Trade Union Council debated the decentralization of the economy and establishment of a profit-sharing system. Meanwhile the student wreath-laying at the statue of General Bem was advertised as a silent, peaceful event. In fact they sought official sanction of their event. Originally granted, the gathering was later denied by the Minister of the Interior, Laszlo Piros, citing the need to "assure public order".91 By mid- afternoon92 the ban was lifted and the crowds, already in the streets in groups, gathered as one to shout their demands. An estimated 200,000 students, workers and army personnel gathered in huge clusters at various parts of the city. A very large crowd was at Lajos Kossuth Square, in front of the Parliament Building, demanding to hear Imre Nagy. Elsewhere in Hungary, speakers openly demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the release of staunch anti-Communist Cardinal Mindszenty. When the march was finally approved around 2:30, it was also announced also the Erno Gero would address the nation that evening at 8:00 p.m. After the formal events of the day, the crowds, growing more restive, awaited Gero's words and chanted stronger anti-Soviet slogans. Those at the Parliament building, probably unaware that Nagy was not there, increased their demands to hear him. In fact, Nagy had just returned to Budapest after his vacation. What the crowd wanted to hear probably was some stirring anti-Stalinist, pro-Hungarian diatribe that would satisfy its mood. At the end of such remarks, there would be some more Hungarian songs, a few "Russians go home!" and the crowd may have dispersed satisfied it had had a good day. In any event, Nagy was fetched from his home by a friend, Tamas Aczel, and driven to the Parliament Building. Aczel's accound of the event reflected a dawning realization on the part of Nagy and his closest associates that they were already behind the pace of events in the city and out of sync with the demonstrators.93 When he finally reached the balcony overlooking the square, he looked out on an estimated quarter of a million of his countrymen who had waited for hours in the growing cold after a day full of stiring poems, songs speeches and general Hungarian chauvanism. They doubtlessly were in the palm of Magy's hand and their hero and leader was about to speak. In Soviet jargon, the old cliche' "comrade" was the standard term that recognized one's affiliation in the Party. To address someone other than "Comrade" was a severe chastisement, epitomised in a Pravda attack on the young Polish writer Florcak (who was arguing against the use of the catch-words "Workers of the World, Unite!") when it addressed him as "Mr." Florcak be- cause he did not deserve the title "Comrade".94 Imra Nagy, reportedly extremely nervous and unsure of his position and what the Party would say if he was too daring in his remarks, opened his mouth and out came the Communist greeting, "Comrades!".95 The mood of the crowd instantly changed and throughout the remainder of Nagy's brief remarks he was booed and rejected by the crowd.96 This appears to be a very key point. Imre Nagy was bouyed to the leadership of this loose coalition and had, in essence, no plan to lead it. Nor did the writers or students or workers seem to have any specific governmental plan that accepted the realities of political life in Eastern Europe in 1956, realiza- tion that the West would not rescue Hungary, or aware that the Soviets were in every conceivable sense firmly enmeshed in Hungarian political life. The Poles recognized these facts. Hence, despite their very close ties with the Hungarians and the parallel developments of their respective "independence" move- ments, could only sympathize with their Hungarian brothers. The contrast of events was readily apparent: "The outcome of the Hungarian Revolution was to convince the Polish people that their course of not counting on the West and of striving for a 'modus vivendi' with the Soviet Union was correct."97 After Nagy's fumbled opportunity, the crowd was drawn to the next event in the bizarre sequence of events that evening. At 8:00 p.m., Erno Gero addressed the nation. Perhaps intentional- ly,98 Gero's speech inflamed the throngs throughout the city. Its tone, its stultified Communist jargon, and its accusatory message drove the people into acts far beyond the original intent of the day.99 In his remarks, Gero showed an even greater lack of affinity for the events surrounding him, but unlike Nagy who simply disappointed the masses Gero attacked them. Calling them enemies who slandered the Soviet Union and condemning those who "spread the poison of chauvinism among our youth", he succeeded in a violent provocation.100 Those near the Radio Building decided to get their own air time to broadcast the sixteen demands of their fellow students. (Leaflets had distributed The Petofi Circle's demands and those of the students, plus several other groups throughout the city the day before). The Radio Building was guarded by a detachment of the AVH. When the crowd began to threaten the building after a student delegation was detained within, the AVH opened fire on the demonstrators; this action killed several and wounding many more. This was the moment when the unrest and frustration of thousands of people turned from peaceful protest to revolution.101 The Hungarian Revolution followed the classic phases through which all revolutions pass. In this case, however, the phases were compressed in time and there for some comment needs to be made regarding how this revolution moved from the elite level to that of the mass. The elite refers to those Party members who could articulate discontent. They were the writers of party affiliation who, although they were severely chastised and in many cases imprisoned, still operated with iii the party system and as such were less vulnerable than those non-party elements who remained sympathetic but blase' towards the movement. With the students, because of their diverse origins and the need to remain inconspicuous or risk jeopardizing their special status as students, it was difficult for them to find an appropriate forum to express their discontent. In fact, it was within the auspices of the party that they were given such fora: the DISZ and the party-sanctioned Petofi Circle. Finally, the workers were basically incapable of expressing any criticism until very late in the pre-revolutionary stage. The intra-party conflicts were an alien manifestation to which the workers felt either distrust (for any shakeup in the party would ultimately adversely affect them) or apathy.102 The "connector" between the elite movement at the high Party levels and at the mass level was the students. The students had had the luxury of never having been "purged" as the writers had, and had not had to suffer the agonizing self-criticism and guilt mentioned earlier as a trait of the writers' movement. In essence, they represented a youthful exuberance, a sort of invul- nerable innocence, or idealist naivetee, that, once mobilized, became a significant force with its own momentum. If the masses could not find any commonality with the intra-party struggles, they could find it in the chauvinistic exuberance of the student-led demonstrations on October 23d.103 CHAPTER II THE REVOLUTION The revolution commenced when the AVH fired on the demonstrators at the Radio Building. The AVH were trapped inside and were virtually under seige. Hungarian tanks arrived but the officers and men soon joined the students.1 Within hours, the students acquired arms from local armories while chants of "Death tog the AVH" spread among the crowd. Elsewhere, at Stalin Square, the huge bronze statue of Stalin was toppled and cut to pieces by blowtorch. Everywhere throughout Budapest there were acts of violence directed primarily against the AVH and the symbols of Soviet domination. A favorite target was the removal of the Russian star in the center of the Hungarian colors. Everywhere there appeared flags with holes cut in the middle. The Hungarian Politburo was in session all evening and approached a momentus decision. It is unclear exactly when and who decided to contact the Soviets and request their military intervention, or even whether it was asked for at all, but this occurred on the night of October 23 .2 At the outbreak of the fighting, the Soviets had two mechanized divisions stationed in Hungary, the 2d at Cegled located 82 kilometers southeast of Budapest and the 17th at Szekesfehervar, located 65 kilometers southwest of Budapest.3 Their combined strength was about 20,000 men with 600 tanks and armored vehicles. The Hungarian Army consisted of ten divisions, two of which were mechanized, and others consisting of heavy artillery, antiaircraft and airborne troops.4 The Hungarian Army was officered by many who were trained in the Soviet Union, and it was built on the Soviet model and used Soviet arms and equipment, but the Army remained above all an Hungarian one. It consisted mainly of young draftees and when they were confronted with the spectre of firing on their countrymen to defend an uninvited outsider and an unpopular government, they either threw in with the crowd or remained passive. If the Hungarian forces considered passivity a help to the revolution (by perhaps not provoking the Soviets) they may have miscalculated. By being passive they may actually have aided the Soviets. This point will be developed later. The role of the Army in any revolution is generally a key factor in its success for failue; if outside intervention had not occurred, the revolution might have succeeded. Certainly without Soviet aid, the Gero government would have been toppled and the Nagy govern ment installed in its stead. The Hungarian Politburo's request for the use of Soviet intervention is one of many cloudy events surrounding the first days of the revolution. But, the Soviets actually needed no formal invitation to send troops, and some argue that had no official request been made, the Soviets would have been reluctant to do in Hungary what they did not do in Poland5 It may have been that when the events got to the point of open fighting, the Soviet Ambassador, Yuri Andropov, simply set in motion some preconceived plan.6 It is known that Soviet troops had moved toward Hungary at the outbreak of trouble in Poland, and that floating bridges were constructed at Zahony on the Soviet- Hungarian border. Further, on October 21, Soviet officers were recalled from leave in Romania and those reserve officers speaking Hungarian were mobilized.7 Whatever the true sequence of events that evening, what is known is that the Soviets received the Politburo's request in the Kremlin on October 24, while at 0200 on that date in Hungary, Soviet tanks had already deployed in Budapest. At the outset, the Hungarian Army either joined the freedom fighters, or simply disintegrated into passivity. The police, both those in Budapest and the Frontier Guards were in sympathy with the movement and aided with arms and equipment where possible. These arms generally consisted of small arms but in some instances actually included tanks and heavy machine guns. The only armed element to remain clearly on the side of the government and the Soviets was the AVH; they probably realized that even to attempt surrender would have invited reprisals against them from either former prisoners or friends and families of prisoners, for AVH terror had touched many lives throughout Hungary. The battle lines then were drawn very early in the revolu- tion. The freedom fighters, composed of students, workers and general populace, aided by some individuals from the Hungarian Army and the police, were fighting against the AVH and Soviet tanks. Initially the freedom fighters were an uncoordinated col- lection of pockets of resistance scattered throughout the city. While coordination and intelligence sharing was probably done among the larger groups, they were primarily neighborhood oriented, receiving support from the local population, and were extreniely suspicious of anyone not known to them or who had not fought with them.8 There was no pre-revolutionary underground planning to organize the freedom fighters. They were simply a spontaneous outgrowth of the chain of events.9 They occupied certain buildings, not necessarily the most tactically suited for the over-all defense of a built-up area, but ones that represented strongpoints, easily defended against tanks.10 Leaders emerged based on the given composition of the group and its dynamics. Major leaders did emerge such as Gugely Pongracz from around the 8th Budapest District, Colonel Pal Maleter at the Kilian Barracks of the 9th District, "Uncle Szabo" of Buda (the west bank of Budapest) and the various smaller group leaders of Csepel (the 22d District), Jozsef Dudas at the Szabad Nep building and those at Buda Castle Hill.11 If the freedom fighters formed the armed forces of the revolution, then the Revolutionary Councils performed the admini- strative functions, especially outside Budapest. In essence, they supplanted the local Soviet and were variously organized depending on locality. Sometimes they received local Communist support; other times not. In most cases these Councils were formed without resort to bloodshed and some became very powerful indeed. For example, the National Council for Transdanubia centered at Gyor talked about setting up an independant government in Western Hungary. It was only when a delegation from this council met with Imre Nagy on October 31 that they decided finally against so doing.12 The question of introducing Soviet troops into a clearly domestic problem may have caused some concern for the Soviets. By the Warsaw Pact agreement they had the right to keep troops in Hungary, but whether they could use them to quell domestic violence was a stumbling block. On the larger scale, Soviet intervention might show that its leadership in the Bloc countries could only be sustained by force. Furthermore, it could give the impression that the de-Stalinization process had gone too far too fast, thus damaging the rising star of Khrushchev.13 Drew Middleton reported in the New York Times from London, for example, that the British "Wonder whether Khrushchev and Bulganin can survive in office - or on earth - after the episodes that have so clearly demonstrated the danger to the Soviet Union of their 'de-Stalinization' policies in Eastern Europe". Third World perceptions about Soviet intentions hung in the balance. The U.S. had been trying to get India, for example, to recognize the threat of Soviet imperialism, and was satisfied that their action in Budapest strengthened Washington's argument. To complicate the issue, other Bloc governments had told of mounting trouble in their countries. Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia and Romania were a potentially dangerous source of protest. The Poles were clearly supportive of the Hungarian movement. On the other hand, Mao Tse Tung reportedly wanted the "counter-revolutionaries" crushed by the Soviets in quick order.14 This version differs from the Khrushchev account which shows that there was great indecision to crush the uprising with massive force. Mao's representative, Lin Shao-Chi played the messenger. The Chinese had advised against troops in Poland and apparently were satisfied they would not be used in Hungary, until so informed by the Soviets when Lin departed for Peking.15 Meanwhile, informed U.S. sources were reported to have predicted, "there will be no massive intervention by the Soviet Army."16 The inability of the United States to accurately predict events in Eastern Europe was not new in 1956 and has improved only slightly today. Meanwhile, the elements of the Russian 2d and 17th Mechanized Divisions moved into: Budapest. Their mission was unclear and their intelligence faulty; this resulted in the rather haphazard engagement of targets by tank guns. Initially, there was little sustained action against any of the freedom fighter's strongpoints, but casualties mounted on both sides. The Hungarians used "Molotov cocktails", bottles of gasoline whose spout was stuffed with rags which were ignited and which would explode on contact, to destroy tanks. This weapon proved very effective. Apparently the lessons of ingenuity and bravery of the Russian partisans in fighting German tanks were being applied by the students against the teacher.17 Russian tanks were not supported by infantry and therefore were extremely vulnerable in the narrow streets of Budapest. The Russians obviously knew how to conduct combat in built-up areas, and their lack of ap- plying the correct tactics here seems to lend credence to the idea that they were introduced initially to protect Soviet diplo- matic personnel, property and military installations and not to crush the rebellion.18 Politically, the situation became very unstable for the Gero leadership. Several sources comment on arguments taking place between the various players in the Party, with most of the ani- mosity directed at Nagy who had just been reinstated into the Party, and who, because his name was so often chanted by the demonstrators, was associated with the unrest. From the time he had given his maladroit remarks on the evening of the 23rd, Nagy was constantly at Party headquarters. For whatever reason, this appeared to the masses as if Nagy was supporting the Party and doing its bidding. Whether he was a "prisoner" or not is ques- tionable, but there is no doubt that when Radio Kossuth announced on the morning of the 24th at 0813 that a new government had formed with Imre Nagy at its head and Erno Gero as Party First Secretary. The radio then broadcast at 0900 the announcement that the government, in accordance with the Warsaw Pact, had invited the Soviets to intervene to quell the "dastardly armed attack of counter-revolutionary gangs."19 The implication was that it was Nagy who had issued the request for the Soviet Army. Because Nagy was at Party headquarters, he was denied free access to the radio, even as the newly appointed Prime Minister, in order to clarify the situation. So it was on the first full day of the revolution that the "ipso facto" leader of the entire nation, Imre Nagy had been maneuvered by his own inaction and partly by the forces ranged against him (Gero, Hegedus and Kadar) into a position of mistrust by the revolutionary forces he was to have led. The "man of the hour cut a pathetic figure against the heroism of his people."20 The 0900 Radio Kossuth announcement reflected the events of the evening of 23-24 October. In a move to stem the revolution- ary tide, new officials were elected as reported above. However, the hated Gero was still in control of the Party and so one of the causes of discontent, the Communist Party leadership and its paracitic government, was only diluted and not removed. Had IrmeNagy been more dynamic when given his chance, his appoint- ment as Prime Minister might have been much more significant than it was. Cutoff and mistrusted, it would take him days to shake the stigma of cooperating with Gero and calling for Soviet intervention. But as the day progressed, the situation in the streets stabilized and some semblance of normality decended over part of Budapest. People went about their business on one street while one block over a tank-freedom fighter battle may have been taking place. However, the seriousness of the situation had not diminished as reflected by the arrival about mid-afternoon of Messrs. Mikoyan and Suslov from Moscow. They not only were accompanied by Soviet tanks, they actually arrived at Party headquarters inside one! The two Soviet Deputy Premiers found the Politburo haggling amongst itself and virtually incapable of restoring order. Mikoyan is reported to have issued Gero a severe dressing-down, blaming him for all the problems and for prematurely calling in Soviet forces. Sharing the blame appears to have been the Soviet Chief of Counter-espionage, General Tikhonov who favored the request fbr Soviet troops.21 Simultaneous with this meeting Imre Nagy prepared to address the nation as the new Prime Minister. Apparently he requested to disassociate himself with the decision to call in the Soviets, but Mikoyan and Suslov refused.22 Nagy did, however, address the population via Radio Kossuth and promised "the far-reaching democratization of Hungarian public life...in accord with our own National charateristics."23 Further, he authorized an extension of the automatic death penalty for those involved in the fighting. Earlier in the morning, Radio Kossuth proclaimed that all fighting must stop at once and that those who refused would receive an automatic sentence of death. Now, those who surrendered before 1400, "would not be tried by the special tribunals."24 By the evening of the 24th, the revolution had spread to virtually all of the countryside; however bloodshed was minimal. In only a handful of cases was there significant fighting, the most serious being in Mosonmagyarovar near the Czech border; there the AVH reportedly machine-gunned a peaceful crowd inflicting 80 casualties.25 Elsewhere however, Soviet forces and their AVH allies were passive, leading western reporters to feel that in the countryside the revolution had won, and that only the forces in Budapest needed to gain victory for the revolution to have succeeded. Near Nichelsdorf, on the Austrian border, Homer Bigart reported, "the Hungarians seemed fairly confident they had won their revolution. 'All we fear is the Russian tanks,' one said. 'But we won't stop fighting until the Russians leave.'"26 On the 25th an event occurred that caused the ouster of Erno Gero and set in motion a series of maneuvers that resulted in the initial withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest. During a peaceful demonstration in front of the Parliament Building, thou- sands had gathered to hear from Nagy in person--this time in daylight. Soviet tanks were on the scene, but their crews were reported by a number of sources as having been fraternizing with the insurgents. Shots rang out from AVH police located atop the building, which caused general panic--both among the crowd and the Soviet troops who, thinking that they were being ambushed, returned fire into the crowd killing or wounding over 300 men, women and children.27 So repulsed were Mikoyan and Suslov by this act that Gero was immediately replaced as Party First Secretary by Janos Kadar. Gero and Hegedus were then spirited away to the Soviet Union via Czechoslovakia and disappeared from public view. While fighting continued during the next several days, the most intense action was on the 27th. Two freedom fighter strongpoints at Corvin Block and Kilian Barracks were attacked vigorously by Russian tanks. There is speculation that this was a show of force on the part of the Soviets preceeding their withdrawal from Budapest, and in fact this occurred three days later. Meanwhile concessions were being made to the revolution on the part of the government. After prolonging the last chance to surrender to the rebels, the government finally realized that it could no longer steep the revolution in fascist-counter- revolutionary jargon and admitted there was a "fratricidal battle" going on in Budapest.28 The government announced on the 26th sweeping proposals, many of which simply took into account the events that had already taken place such as the establishment of workers' councils. It also announced another amnesty for those who would surrender, but vowed to "annihilate without mercy" those who failed to do so by 2200 on the 26th.29 Significantly, the announcement did not mention withdrawal of Soviet troops. Nor did it mention the removal of those who were held responsible for the basic problems throughout Hungary, the "clique of wicked leaders estranged from the people, who cannot be identified with the Party."30 Unbeknownst to the people, the leaders of this clique were in the act of departing Hungary with Mikoyan and Suslov. As the Communist Party proper started to dissolve, Imre Nagy could finally move from Party headquarters to the Parliament Building, thus giving him, for the first time since his speech there on the 23d, freer access to the situation and to the people. As a result of Mikoyan and Suslov's departure, and with room to maneuver, Nagy announced the formation of a new government on the morning of the 27th. This government contained a significant number of familiar Communist names, but since it also included a number of non-Communists, it appeared to go far in favor of the rebels. Of most significance were the addition of Zoltan Tildy and Bela Kovacs, both former Smallholder leaders. The effect of these changes may have been cosmetic, but internationally they were of some significance. The New York Times headlined, "Budapest reports peace talks underway," and perhaps just as significantly it continued: "West Bids UN Act on Soviet Intervention."31 The paper also reported Secretary of State Dulles had offered economic aid to the satellites that was not dependent on the form of government; this was not intended to bring the satellites into the Western sphere as military allies, but was offered in friendship to signify a no-longer divided Europe. The aid would never reach Hungary. The Soviets used the diplomatic fora to condemn the United States for its role in fostering unrest in Eastern Europe, claiming that Washington's intelligence network had $100,000,000 devoted annually to subvert the Soviet Union. Prophetically, "this broad-side against Western 'intervention' clearly lays down the line of counter- attack the Soviet Union plans to follow in defending its actions."32 To the Soviet charges Dulles replied, "Tommyrot!" The freedom fighters continued to refine their stands on a number of issues. Meanwhile, their demands, and the concessions made by the Nagy government, while still not in sync, were moving in the same direction. The revolutionaries demanded a cease fire and that the government accept the main points of the 23 October demands.33 The Nagy government met these prerequisites and so announced on the radio on October 28. At 1320 on that date, a "general cease fire to stop further bloodshed"34 was announced, and later Nagy broadcast his government's recognition that the movement was not "counter-revolutionary", the government would fully integrate the revolutionary councils into the government, the AVH would be abolished as soon as order was restored, and the Soviets had agreed on an immediate withdrawal of forces from Budapest.35 In fact, the AVH was abolished almost immediately, not after the restoration of order, and was replaced with a "new, democratic police"; this was announced on October 29.36 Much has been made about the Soviet withdrawal from Budapest that was announced by Nagy on the 28th. It probably will never be known if the true Soviet intent was to simply re-deploy the two Hingarian-deployed mechanized divisions (the 2d and the 17th) back to their respective bases, (which would allow the Nagy government time to organize) or to pull them out of the city as a blocking force or mobile reserve in order to help other Russian units coming in from Romania and the Soviet Union. What is known is that the Soviets were moving forces into hungary throughout the period 23-30 October. Reports received in London indicated that the Soviets were reinforcing the two divisions stationed in Hungary with two more from the Soviet Union.37 The preparations in Eastern Hungary of floating bridges and the recall of Hungarian-speaking officers lent credence to these reports. There were other reports as early as October 24 of Soviet movement into Hungary via those bridges at Zahony and thence on to Miskolc and at Nyirbator between Debrecen and the Romanian border. On the 28th, soldiers were identified from the 32d and 34th Mechanized Divisions, previously stationed at Timisoara and Arad in Romania.38 Clearly then, the Russians were reinforcing their original two divisions from the outset; whether this was based on a decision from the outset to crush the revolution, or whether just preliminary maneuvering in accordance with a Soviet operation plan is not known. Whatever the trigger that set these Soviet forces into action, they met no resistance from Hungarian forces,, nor, except in built-up areas, did they experience any ambushes or counter- mobility activities by partisan forces aligned in the countryside with the freedom fighters of Budapest and other cities.39 Once again, the passivity of the Hungarian Army allowed the Soviets freedom to maneuver at will. As a result, the Soviets were in a position to meet whatever diplomatic solution finally was ham- mered out. Return to the status quo would mean merely moving the Romanian and Ukranian Soviet forces back to home bases and the 2d and 17th back to Cegled and Szekesfehervar. The decision to attack in force would equally be facilitated. It is a comment on the lack of coordination exhibited by the revolutionary leaders that allowed the Soviets unimpeded maneuver early in the action. Once in place with their lines of communi- cations secure, it was too late for any Hungarian force--either regular army or revolutionary National Guard--to repulse the strength of Soviet arms. On the other hand, since all sources agree that the revolution just "happened" and was not planned, any coordinated defense beyond what actually took place would have been remark-able, if not miraculous. The period between the 28th and the 30th found the Nagy government trying to convince the country that it was in fact in charge and that the Soviets were withdrawing. But disbelief still existed: a general strike called in all the industrial centers, especially Gyor and Miskolc, was in effect. Autonomous provin- cial governments, especially centered around Gyor, referred to the Nagy government as that "government of Budapest".40 Target of many of these provincial governments was the makeup of the Nagy government, which still contained too many Communists and some old-line Stalinists. However, across the spectrum, there was generally a movement in the same direction toward the same goals from the standpoint of "the government" among all the diverse revolutionary organizations that sprang up after October 23.41 This very diversity marked a change in the composition of the revolutionary leadership. While the intelli- gentsia and university students who spearheaded the changes demanded of the government, when the movement shifted to a mass effort they lost influence due to their fewer numbers than in other councils representating other groups. In fact, the university students were among the first to leave the street fighting, lost cohesiveness, and ceased to be a factor in events.42 The intelligentsia, however, were extremely active throughout the revolution, in greater proportion than any other group.43 Finally, of most significance in this phase, were the young workers and high school students who made up the bulk of freedom fighters. Their motivations may have been questionable. and their military efficacy doubtful, but their bravery was not.44 These were the roving bands who attacked Soviet tanks as targets of opportunity rather than in any concerted effort coordinated by, for example, the leadership of Pal Maletar at Kilian Barracks. Once again, to expect much coordinated effort in the initial stages of the revolution was folly. However, this is not to say that there was never any coordinated effort amongst the freedom fighters at any time during the Hungarian revolution. A period of consolidation and cooperation would come, but only after October 30. That challenge will be discussed later. Meanwhile, it was during this critical period October 28-30 that the United Nations began to debate the Hungarian issue. So significant was the crisis that the Security Council called a special Sunday session for the first time since 1950. The item entitled, "The Situation in Hungary" was introduced by France, Great Britain, the United States and Northern Ireland pursuant to the provisions of Article XXXIV of the Charter. Article XXXIV authorizes the Security Council to investigate any situation or dispute which might "endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."45 This Sunday session voted to add the item to the Security Council agenda at some-undetermined time. It was added over the protest of Dr. Peter Kos, the Hungarian permanent representative to the United Nations, who argued that the situation was "exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the Hungarian People's Republic and consequently did not fall within the jurisdiction of the United Nations."46 Soviet Representative Arkady A. Sobolev cited Article II which prohibits the United Nations to act in "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."47 To say that Kos and Sobolev were operating in concert might be overstating the obvious. In fact, one source says that Kos was actually a Soviet agent, Led Kondirktorov.48 That Kos was totally out of sync with the Nagy government is reflected by the report that Nagy "warmly welcomed" the debate. In any event, the failure of the Security Council to adopt a specific resolution came as a shock to the freedom fighters in Budapest,49although it should not have surprised anyone given the Soviet veto power. All along, the revolutionaries had clung to the hope of either United Nations or Great Power intervention. This hope had no basis in fact. From the outset, Eisenhower had said (as he did for the Poles). "our hearts go out to the Hungarian people".50 Dulles made it clear that the United States did not expect Hungary to be an ally. So emphatic were American officials on the issue of intervention that the Soviets couldn't help but draw the conclusion that unless the United Nations did something, they were free to operate in Hungary as they saw fit.51 The Soviets recognized this but the freedom fighters did not have the same access to diplomatic channels and much of their information came from Radio Free Europe. This institution has been criticized for meddling in the revolution. Paying "pathetic homage" to their cause, it used Hungarian exiles (with their own prejudices) to intrude into the revolutionary events, giving gratuitous advice and questioning the motives of the Nagy government.52 The result was that the freedom fighters were led to believe that the massive might of Western opinion, if not strength, was behind them. In fact, Washington was merely sympathetic but powerless to do anything but offer the aforementioned economic aid to Eastern Europe, an area which did not lie within the United States' sphere of interest. On October 28, another crisis of world-wide importance crowded the Hungarian Revolution out of the headlines. The Hungarian debate at the United Nations got put on the back-burner when the Israelis moved into the Suez. On the 29th, the United States immediately went to the Security Council for action and that situation was debated almost immediately. It is clear that the Suez crisis diverted world attention away from the Hungarian revolution. When Britain and France also landed in Egypt they drew the wrath of President Eisenhower. This split in the U.S.- British-French block greatly weakened any condemnation by them of the Soviet Union's action in Hungary. A final fact militating against United States involvement was the pending Presidential election. Election day was November 7 so the late-October uprising placed it on the plates of issues very late indeed. Considering the general lack of interest in the United States as regards the Eastern European region, it is not surprising that the revolution generated so little concern. Candidates usually tread very lightly on specific issues around election day and are reluctant to call for any vigorous action unless public opinion demanded it. Apparently the Suez Crisis was such an issue. Hungary was not. In Budapest, there was ample evidence of Soviet troop withdrawal out of the city. The demands of the revolutionaries, now echoed-more closely than ever by the Nagy government, ap- peared to be fulfilled. By the 30th, fighting had virtually ceased. This day was the key to the revolution: it was the high- point in the Hungarian struggle, but also was the beginning of the end.53 On the 30th, efforts were intensified to consolidate the gains of the revolution and too coordinate efforts of the government, workers' revolutionary councils and the freedom fighters. There was growing confidence that the gains paid for in Hungarian blood would be allowed to stand. Szabed Nep lambasted a critical Pravda editorial by attacking the Soviet organ which had claimed that the revolution was inspired by the west and that it had failed.54 At the United Nations, Shepilov told western reporters that the Soviets would withdraw within the next few days and that Soviet troops were ordered not to shoot. Defense Minister Georgi K. Zhukov, when asked if there had been Soviet troop reinforcement within the pact 48 hours, responded that there had been none in the past 64 hours.55 While technically it may have been true, significant Soviet maneuver in and around Hungary, had already occurred. Nevertheless, Bill Jordan reported from Moscow that the Soviet leaders were preparing their public for concessions to the Hungarian revolution.56 At the governmental level, Nagy reinstated the multiparty system to replace the monolithic old one that the Communists had thrust on Hungary. Accommodation too of the provisional revolutionary councils took place with a key being the aforementioned meeting between Nagy and the representatives of the National Council of Transdanubia (Gyor). When the the latter were satisfied with the direction of the Nagy regime and that their demands would be essentially met, a major hurdle toward reconcilliation was overcome. One of these demands, incidentally, was to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, and this would be called for later by the Nagy Government. There was never a coordinated unity among the various revolutionary councils and the Nagy government, but there were attempts to do so. Jozsef Dudas, leader of the Corvin Block, attempted to establish a coalition of councils under the Hungarian National Revolutionary Committee; he called for delegates to a meeting on November 2 for such a purpose as to rival the Nagy government. Dudas instead was arrested (later released) and nothing came of the move.57 At the military level, consolidation was a matter of life and death for the revolution. The freedom fighters needed to be brought under the auspices of the government, but by an organ devoid of the stigma associated with the Defense Ministry. The Army had to be reorganized. Similarly, the newly formed police and Frontier Guards needed some-thing other than the Ministry of the Interior.58 This new institution was the Revolutionary Council of National Defense (RCND). The RCND was organized on October 28 by a group of freedom fighters and other revolutionary forces from the Army and po- lice. This group was approved by Imre Nagy and elected General Bela Kiraly, formerly Chief of the training centers of the Minis- try of Defense, as its head. Its stated aim was "to organize new armed forces from the Army, police, workers and youth."59 While the authority for the RCND had government approval, the Ministry of Defense, still considered unreliable, had the power to direct the armed forces. To eliminate this duality, at a convention held on October 30-31, the Revolutionary National Defense Cdmmittee (RNDC)60 was established. Held at the Ministry of Defense but under the auspices of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Army, over 250 representatives of several organi- zations attended, including the Revolutionary Insurgent Forces, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Army, the Revolutionary Council of the National Police Command and those of the Frontier Guards. Also invited was the Revolutionary Army Committee of the Third Motorized Army Group (Hungarian) that replaced the Soviet units in Budapest.61 General Kiraly was elected Chairman of this Committee as well as the aforementioned RCND. One of the first moves of the RNDC was to remove several Stalinist Army leaders from high "command positions. Generals Lajos Toth, First Deputy Minister of defense and Chief of Staff, Ieno Hazi, Ferenc Hidvegi both Deputy Directors of the main political department, and Istvan Szabo Deputy Minister of Defense, were removed.62 Secondly, the Committee renamed the Hungarian Army with its traditional title, Honved. Thirdly, the RNDC moved forward in the establishment of a new security force composed of personnel from the Army, police and factory guards to replace the AVH, and to reestablish the National Guard under the command once again of General Kiraly. Kiraly stated that the National Guard was the successor to the "heroic National Guards- men of the glorious revolution....who smashed the forces of aggression at the victorious battles of Ozora and Pakozd...in 1849."63 If the implication was that this new National Guard would do the same, any doubt was removed by a statement issued by the RNDC which said that they would "oppose, with arms, any external or internal enemy which set foot on Hungarian soil," including the Soviets.64 It was apparent that the reorganization of the military forces was fairly complete by November 1, but it certainly was not total. Before being ousted as Chief of Staff, General Toth was able to redeploy Hungarian forces in Budapest to new posi- tions and gave them new assignments. This caused confusion and delay that would not be overcome before the Soviets returned in force. Kiraly says that the positions from which his forces were moved were "highly satisfactory" for defending the capitol against Russian attack.65 He blames the inability to rectify this situation on the pro-Soviet forces still on the RNDC, who included Generals Varadi, Szekely and Kana. Other examples of this so-called sabotage were the division of Budapest into two zones, the inner and outer, and the reinforcement from Moscow of the pro-Soviet Hungarian Army leadership. Nagy approved the divison of Budapest into two zones, but National Guard Commander General Kiraly only had control over the inner zone, while Colonel Andras Marton controlled the outer one. Evidently Kiraly had the idea to strengthen the outer zone in order to prepare a delaying action which would serve a two-fold purpose: to hold the Russians out of the city for up to two days and allow some maneuvering room and allow the government a chance to escape into exile should the outer defenses be breached.66 Regarding the influence of pro-Soviet Hungarian Army lead- ers, apparently the Soviets had a plan of subversion by which Hungarian officers who were in the Soviet Union were sent back to Budapest where the pro-Soviet clique placed them into important positions. Here they were able to keep the Soviets appraised of plans and efforts on the part of the RNDC and National Guard and to create so much confusion that some forces were never maneu- vered into their proper positions. These officers included General Pal Ilker, given command of the political department of the army, General Uszta, liaison with the Soviet Command and Embassy, and the "top spies" General Borbas and Colonel Feher.67 General Kiraly is now a professor at Brooklyn College in New York. General Kiraly stated that there was no overall plan published for the defense of the capital in the sense of an operation plan or order. Nor did he have time to determine his order of battle, so pressed was he to organize the Guard and maintain order. However, he did want to move forces from the inner zone to the defensive perimeter to control tactically important positions. The bulk of the Hungarian Army, with most of its armored corps consisting of two mechanized divisions, (with about 400 tanks) and most of the infantry lay in the immediate locality of Budapest. However, the pro-Soviet officers on the staff were able to severely cripple the available combat power by moving division artillery out of the Budapest area so that it was unable to play a major role in the defense of Budapest and otherwise break up tactical units. As a result, Kiraly probably had no more than a handful of tanks and about 400 troops available to effect his plans.68 Kiraly emphasized that the defense of Budapest was not to be a repeat of Stalingrad. In other words, there would be no orders to hold out at all cost. Budapest had already been destroyed in World War II and no one wanted a repeat of that tragedy; rather a delaying action would occur for the purposes stated above.69 The delaying action that Kiraly wanted to execute was dependent on two factors. First, Imre Nagy would have had to declare war in order for the troops to initiate attacks on the Soviet troops maneuvering in Hungary and, secondly, the unfettered ability to communicate with his tactical forces. Neither factor was present when the second Soviet intervention commenced on the morning of November 4. Nagy was adamant on the point of not provoking the Soviets with any military action and was so concerned with appearances that even something as routine as discussing Soviet deployment and troop strength was forbidden around him. As it became clear that the Soviets were in a position for a final attack on the capital, Nagy still refused to declare war or let Kiraly do so. Only a declaration of war could have mobilized the Hungarian forces into action, so indoctrinated were they not to fire on the Soviets. Attesting to the discipline of the Hungarian forces was the apparently total cessation of fighting within Budapest after the October 30. Considering a bloody revqlution had taken place for several days before, that was no mean feat.70 Command and control was tenuous at best. General Kiraly stated that command channels were far from complete and not secure. Therefore orders issued could be and were subverted by pro-Soviet personnel. This notwithstanding, the influence of the pro-Soviet faction was apparently steadily declining while the government continued to reorganize and the hope grew that the revolution would be free from Soviet domination.71 The period from October 30 to November 3 was one of hope for the revolution and of re-ordering relations with the Soviet Union. On the 30th, Moscow broadcast a statement concerning the withdrawal of Soviet forces from her satellites and, more broad- ly, the overall relationship between Bloc nations and the Soviet Union. It stated that, at the request of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union would consider withdrawing forces from a specific country. By making withdrawal dependent on a Pact endorsement, Moscow shrewdly diluted the ability of any one state to cause actual withdrawal to take place The broadcast further expressed the regret that events had led to bloodshed in Hungary, and concluded with the hope that reactionary forces would not cause the abandonment of the Communist system. John MacCormac reported "Victory is near" in the New York Times and Elie Abel was able to report the release of staunch anti-Communist Cardinal Mindszenty.72 Also on the 30th Mikoyan and Suslov returned to Budapest for more meetings with the government and Hungarian party. The following day Nagy and Minister of State Zoltan Tildy presented the Russians with a new picture of Hungary, one which was significantly different than the one they had left only days before. Not only was there a multiparty government, but the Communist Party had nearly disintegrated. Furthermore, Imre Nagy, now emboldened with the apparent success of the movement and advised by those who felt they no longer needed Moscow's guidance, constituted a new force with which Mikoyan and Suslov hadn't reckoned. To complete the metamorphosis, the reorganization of the armed forces was continuing apace. But it was Tildy who dropped the first bomb. The theme of "Russians go home" was evident in the revolu- tion from the outset. As the movement matured, the theme was refined to specific demands, at first directed to Soviet troops in Budapest but later to all Soviet forces in Hungary. Renunciation of the Warsaw Pact was the vehicle by which the total Soviet troop withdrawal could take place. This move was called for by many different organizations before the 31st, and the Transdanubian Council made it one of its strongest demands. As late as the 30th, a five man delegation from Gyor headed by Attila Szigeti reiterated the importance of repudiating the Pact and intimated that Western Hungary might renew the idea of an independent government should Nagy back down on this issue.73 Even his own RNDC, which was created in the early hours of October 31, adopted repudiation of the Warsaw Treaty, but with the caveat that the signatory Governments assemble as a preliminary step;74this was probably an acknowledgement of the Moscow announcement of October 30 on the subject. Therefore, when Mikoyan proposed withdrawing those Soviet troops introduced as part of the contingency forces (e.g. forces beyond those previously stationed in Hungary as part of the Warsaw Pact) immediately, and those stationed as part of the Pact by mutual agreement of the Pact signatories, Tildy rejected the offer. He countered that all Soviet forces should be withdrawn immediately, and that Hungary would repudiate the Warsaw Pact regardless.75 While it is apparent from a number indicators that the Soviets had conceded the gains of the revolution to Nagy and his government, withdrawal from the Pact and the ensuing declaration of Hungarian neutrality (a la Austria), was the one step too far. Several sources, including General Kiraly, tell of the machinations that the Soviet Politburo underwent in deciding to intervene militarily in Hungary. Above is the account of the maneuvering of Soviet forces. It may have been that these maneu- verings were simply contingency operations against the potential dangers of the Suez situation, but they probably were part of a contingency effort for the occupation of Hungary.76 In either case, Soviet troops were already in position and may have been the key factor in the decision of the Politburo to intervene. In the West some commentators assumed that the Soviet Union would not crush the rebellion because the Hungarians might be joined by other Bloc forces and because Moscow did not want a crisis in both the Middle East and Hungary.77 This thinking was fallacious in the event. Similarly, "world opinion" carried little weight. The Soviets, perceiving a divided West over Suez and little concerned over Third World opinion, realized that the last hope of the rebels was the United Nations. Suez, while not a crisis of Moscow's but of Washington's, provided the perfect cover for Russian intervention into Hungary. Under these circumstances, hindsight leaves little doubt that the revolution would be crushed to preserve Communism and Soviet interests in Hungary, with the blame would be hurled at "fascists" and "agents of foreign espionage services."78 Through the period of October 31-November 1, General Kiraly received reports from railroad stations, considered a reliable source of troop movement, that the Soviet forces were in fact moving out of Hungary. This was the beginning of the ruse, executed by pro-Moscow elements within the government, to allow Soviet domination of the revolution. A second element resulted from the meeting between Janos Kadar, Party Secretary, and Mikoyan and Suslow on November 1. It is generally agreed that this was the point where Kadar agreed to form a separate govern- ment, backed by the Soviets, following the downfall of the Nagy government. Kadar had already accepted what the Soviets must have explained to him was the inevitable and agrteed to become their puppet when he executed his role in the ruse. At the cabinet meeting held to announce Hungarian withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, Kadar launched a diatribe against the Soviets declaring that he would fight tanks with his bare hands if necessary. Andropov only listened~79 Yuri Andropov played a key role on November 1. Nagy had summoned Andropov to protest increasing reports of Soviet troop movements into Hungary, saying they violated the Mikoyan-Suslov agreements.80 Further, he informed Andropov of the decision, made public at the cabinet meeting mentioned above, to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and Hungary's intention to declare neutrality supported by the Big Four and the United Nations.81 Andropov played the deception perfectly. While acknowledging these demands, he obfuscated the picture to gain time and lied. When confronted with the evidence of Soviet movements that began to appear like reinforcements, Andropov commented that these were fresh forces only to relieve only..those who had been part of the intial hostilities. To the news that Soviet troops had occupied Hungarian airfields, thereby negating the usefulness of the Hungarian Air Force, Andropov lied that this was simply a move to facilitate the evacuation of Soviet forces and civilians from the country as a preliminary to a general withdrawal. Finally, after announcing the formation of the new Communist Party, Kadar, last seen in company of Ferenc Munnich at the Soviet Embassy late on the first, disappeared, not to be seen again until after the Soviet invasion. The Soviet deception was nearly complete. On the 2nd, Andropov recommended meeting to negotiate the Soviet withdrawal. Meanwhile, the Soviets moved an estimated 3,000 tanks and supporting arms into Hungary and formed a ring of steel around the city of Budapest. This notwithstanding, Nagy was encouraged by the prospect of negotiations and two delega- tions were chosen to discuss the political situation and the military aspects of Soviet troop withdrawal. The political dele- gation was to meet in Warsaw to discuss political aspects of withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and of Hungarian neutrality. It was to have been composed of Geza Losonczy, Minister of State, Jozef Korago, Colonel Andras Marton, Ferenc Farkas and Vilmos Zentai;82 but this delegation would never meet. The delegation to discuss the military aspects of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary consisted of Minister of State Ferenc Erdei, Major General Istvar Kovacs, Chief of the General Staff, Colonel Miklos Szucs, Operations Section Chief and General Pal Maleter, Minister of Defense. Maleter, hero of the defense of Kilian Barracks, was catapulted to fame during the revolution. A student of General Kiraly's at the Staff Academy, Maleter was a Lieutenant Colonel when dispatched to Kilian Barracks with a section of tanks to put down the uprising. Appreciating that the freedom fighters there were Hungarian patriots, he sided with them, became their leader, and defended the Barracks against some of the fiercest fighting of the first Soviet intervention. On November 3, Soviet troop strength had increased from about five to about 15 divisions in Hungary, sealing most of the Austrian border and severing all lines of communication out of Budapest.83 The ease by which the Soviets were able to move into position was ordained by Imre Nagy's specific orders that E nothing should provoke the Soviets into committing those forces into action. At this point, Kiraly was certain that there was no way to stop the Soviet victory. At best, he hoped that Nagy would at least allow him to commit the outer defense perimeter of Budapest to action to delay the inevitable so as to allow the government a chance to escape. To the Soviet credit goes the ability to implement and execute their plan. Potential obstacles were many, including river crossings, potential Hungarian Army attacks, potential partisan activity and an ill-defined mission, probably to create the environment that would allow the Kadar government to take over. The first two movements of Soviet troops were into Budapest at the outset of hostilities and into strategic centers by which fresh troops according to Andropov were relieving previously committed ones. The second maneuver moved troops out of the city of Budapest, but into Hungary from border areas where they were subjected to less scrutiny from the population. (See Appendix C). They then converged in an area about 150 kilometers from Budapest in a semicircle that included an area south of the Matra mountains around Gyorgos, along the Budapest-Debrecen high- way in the area of Cegled-Szolnok and in the vicinity of the Dunaujvaros-Kecskemet highway about 80 kilometers south of Budapest. While some troops moved into the Transdanubian plain, only in Szekesfehervar was there any consolidation.84 The third Soviet troop movement, started on the evening of November 1-2, rushed in massive forces from Romania, Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine. The latter, at Zahony, was the major avenue of approach but tended to become a bottleneck. The routes through Czechoslovakia, somewhat more developed than others, relieved some pressures on the Zahony route. In the south, Soviet troops moved in from Timisoara, but Romanian routes tended to overextend the Soviet communications and most of the movement was from the north and east. From the Soviet perspective, it was imperative that the operation be executed with alacrity. Should the Soviet forces become bogged down, not only would the Hungarians have a chance to counterattack, but Soviet prestige, already wounded by the events in Hungary and Poland, might suffer severe damage, thereby inviting Western aid, intervention or worse yet, a combination of Western intervention and Bloc support for Hungary. It can be argued that Prime Minister Nagy exercised the height of naivete in not recognizing the Soviet maneuvers for what they turned out to be--the prelude to massive armed intervention. That is per- haps true, but even in the face of this massive Soviet buildup, there was hope that armed conflict could be avoided and Nagy must have known that in the long run a military victory was impossible. Hope lay in two fora. In theory anyway, one was the United Nations. While Hungary moved to the back burner after the Suez crisis started, it received a higher priority when the Nagy government declared its neutrality and its intention to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. This reached the United Nations on November 1 when Nagy requested that Hungarian neutrality be put on the General Assembly's agenda. The general population learned of these events by a bulletin broadcast that evening. Many sources indicated a genuine disappointment on the part of the Hungarians when aid in the form of some sort of United Nations action was not forthcoming. Many hoped that a United Nations delegation would come to Budapest to somehow forestall the im- pending Soviet attack. Some believed that the Secretary-General himself was coming. Still others believed that the armed might of the West was going to freeze the Russians in place. Whatever the case, there is little doubt of the general belief in the United Nations' potential ability to disuade the Soviets. It appears as a case of believing what the populace desperately wanted to believe. The United Nations report of the situation says that any of the above expectations were "not very precise", and "Undoubtedly there was disappointment that the United Nations as not acting with greater speed and determination."85 (Unlike what was done in the Suez situation, a cease-fire and possibility of sending a multinational force). Others, however, would echo the following view of that organization's actions in the Hungarian crisis, "that in the case of Hungary, where UNO finds itself up against a first-class power, the Organization has been able to do nothing, and has not the slightest intention of ever trying to do anything...The truth is that in the present stage of development to refer a crisis to UNO is not to pass the buck but to throw the buck away."86 The belief that the United Nations would act was so strong however, that on November 3, both newspapers and radio carried a story regarding the arrival of a delegation from it. Newsmen who drove out to the airport to meet the flight were told that it had to turn back due to bad weather and land at Bratislava in Czechoslovakia, but that authorities there refused it permission to land in Budapest. There appears to have been not a word of truth to the report. Nagy's other forum for hope was the negotiations for a Soviet troop withdrawal originally agreed to by Suslov and Mikoyan and formally proposed by Andropov. These began on November 3 at the Hungarian Parliament. The Hungarian delegation was headed by General Pal Maleter. The Soviet delegation was led by General of the Army Mikhail Malinin, Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Generals Cherbanin and Stepanov. At 1730 on the 3rd, an agreement was reached on all points. Soviet troops would depart on January 15, 1957, but until then the Soviet forces would be treated as the friends of Hungary and would be fed and transported by Hungarians means. Also, Soviet war memorials, which had in some places been desecrated, would be restored and preserved. These agreements, though concurred in by all parties, were to be signed by the delegations at another meeting to take place at Soviet military headquarters at Tokol at 2200 that evening. The Hungarian Revolution was within hours of being crushed. At Tokol, isolated on an island in the Danube just south of Budapest, the Hungarian delegation was cut off from the govern- ment. Further negotiations proceeded until around midnight when General Serov, Chief of the KGB, entered the meeting with his henchmen and arrested the Hungarian delegation. This occurred despite their status under international law as accredited negotiators for their government. When the Nagy government could no longer contact its negotiators, there must have been some apprehension that a bad situation was about to turn worse. And what of Janos Kadar, unheard from since the evening of November 1? Kadar, who had publicly expressed support for the Revolution and the Nagy government, apparently remained a stead- fast Moscovite. When events of the revolution, between October 26 and 30 , appeared to be leading toward success with the Soviets abandoning the Hungarian Communist Party, even Kadar's pleading could not pursuade Mikoyan and Suslov to request Moscow's intervention. However, after the eventful meeting at which repudiation of the Warsaw Pact was discussed, the Soviet attitude clearly changed. Kadar was convinced that the Soviets would intervene in force and he simply changed sides to the one which he perceived to be the winner in a military confrontation. He left Budapest on the evening of November 1 with Ferenc Munnich via the Soviet Embassy and went to Uzhgarod, the capitol of the Carpatho-Ukraine; there he met with others who joined him and the Soviets in creating a government for Hungary friendly to Moscow's interests. The Soviets were not amateurs in this regard and foresaw the need of a government in place to fill the void created when Soviet forces crushed the Nagy government. While the Soviets may have wanted Ferenc Munnich to serve as Prime Minister in order to uphold the post-Stalin principle that head of government and head of party should not be the same man, Munnich himself recommended Kadar for that post as well as Party Secretary. This was acceptable to the Soviets and the new "regime" was created, taking the name Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government.87 Reportedly, between 0300 and 0400 on November 4, Imre Nagy was told of the existence of the Pro-Soviet Kadar regime operat- ing out of Szolnok.88 Events moved swiftly thereafter. Nagy called a cabinet meeting to discuss the events but at 0505 Munnich broadcast that he and Janos Kadar, Antal Apro and Istvan Kossa had broken away from the Nagy government. They cited one reason, to be given time and time again in concert with Soviet justification for massive intervention: the Nagy government was unable to control the forces of fascism and counter-revolution and that they had "decided to fight...fascism and reaction and its murderous gangs."89 Munnich concluded by appealing to all, especially Communists, to support "the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government and its struggle for the liberation of the People."90 Apparently during the period from November 4-6, no actual representatives of the new government were in Budapest and that Kadar himself may have been on his way to Moscow.91 In any event, there was no evidence of overt support for Kadar, and when the Soviets attacked, the issue was purely Soviet might against whatever Hungarian forces could be mobilized for defense. The Soviet attack began in the vicinity of Kilian Barracks and the Corvin Block at around 0500. The Hungarian Army, accord- ing to General Bela Kiraly, simply dissolved. They had been outmaneuvered and any opportunities to organize a counterattack were long since lost. General Kiraly still attempted to get Nagy to issue a declaration of war to those freedom fighters and Guardsmen who were at least able to offer some resistance, but Nagy refused; the Prime Minister said that the attack was a mistake and that Andropov was with him demanding from Moscow an explanation.92 Kiraly subsequently reported a major breech of outlying defensive positions to which Nagy replied, "I don't need any more reports."93 Finally, at 0520 Nagy broadcast to the Nation that, "Today at daybread Soviet forces started an attack against our capitol, obviously with the intention to overthrow the legal Hungarian democratic government. Our troops are fight- ing. The Government is in its place."94 Those pathetic words were a hollow tribute to the thousands who would continue the fight against overwhelming odds. Once again, within days, Nagy "cut a pathetic figure". The Hungarian Revolutiona was doomed. CHAPTER III THE AFTERMATH General Bela Kiraly feels that from the moment Imre Nagy made his broadcast, the Soviet Union and Hungary were at war. The government may have been in place, but it was not to last. Under the onslought of Soviet armor, the Hungarian Army dissolved and appreciable resistance, uncoordinated and in many cases subverted from within, was over within days. By the November 14, only isolated pockets of guerrilla warfare remained, while as many as 200,000 Hungarians were fleeing for freedom. Imre Nagy had vacated the Parliament Building by the time Soviet forces reached it. He sought, and was given, asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy. In mid-November, the Yugoslav Government approached Kadar with the proposal that Nagy either be allowed to return to his home, or be authorized to go to another country under Soviet influence, or renounce his former beliefs and de- clare for the Kadar government.1 Possibly the Soviets were pushing the last proposal because should Nagy undergo the ritual self-criticism, it would then be possible to add legitimacy to the Kadar government by perhaps placing Nagy in the post of Prime Minister. If that was the case, they didn't understand Nagy very well. He might have vascillated in the rush of events surrounding the Revolution, but he was steadfast in his refusal to "repent". Later, with Kadar's written authorization, Nagy (and others who sought asylum with him) were allowed to return home with immunity. On November 22 when Nagy emerged from the Yugoslav Embassy he was immediately arrested by Soviet military personnel and spirited away to an undisclosed location. Imre Nagy was executed sometime before June 16, 1958, along with General Pal Maleter and others for their alleged crimes. The Soviet Military Command virtually ran the country after the second incursion. Kadar was the Soviet puppet and without Soviet backing, he was powerless. The Nagy abduction was just one example. When Kadar tried to form a coalition government in mid-November, both the Soviet diplomatic and military structure vetoed the idea. When a general strike was called throughout Hungary to protest the Soviet invasion, several groups made withdrawal of Soviet forces a prerequisite for resumption of work. One such group, the Greater Budapest Workers' Council, was told by the Soviet Commander-in-Chief General Grebennick that it was the Soviet Military Command who was in charge and not the Kadar government, and that he had "the power to force the Hungarian workers to return to work."2 In fact, the relations between Workers' Councils and the Soviet Command, over the issue of resumption of work was a key issue for several weeks after the end of the revolution. Workers' Councils were harrassed continually by Soviet troops, with threats of arrest should the Councils not use their influence to get workers back to work. Public administration was the same. Revolutionary Councils, while still in existence, were essentially under control of the Soviet Military Command. Local commanders issued orders throughout the country. Typical was one broadcasts by the Soviet commander of Vas County that "as the local administrative organs have been unable to maintain order and to secure public safety..., the Commanding Officer of the city and county has ordered patrols of Soviet troops to guard public buildings and enterprises."3 The Kadar Government, in an attempt to gain public support for itself, issued promises that were in essence the Nagy plat- form but without mention of neutrality or free elections. Free Socialism as violent revolution. "Ballots were just as effective as bullets." And while Kadar early announced that the first objective of his government was "national independence and sovereignty,"4 it was apparent from the outset that Soviet forces would remain so long as it served their purposes. In March and April 1957 Kadar underscored the point when he stated, "Soviet troops will remain here as long as their presence is needed."5 Other indications of returning to neo-Stalinist days were evident. Kadar dissolved the AVH (which had already been dissolved under Nagy), but replaced it with a new security group known as the "R" group. This group was augmented by other security forces such as the Security Force Regiments, Mixed Action Groups, Factory Guards, Frontier Guards and the Militia, all of which became reinfested with former AVH personnel and served the same purpose as that force.6 Kadar depended upon these organizations, and the Soviet Military Command found former AVH members extremely useful in identifying freedom fighters and those in the army who had sympathized with the revolution. Soviet forces emptied jails containing AVH personnel, who in turn repaid their liberators with enthusiasm. Even without free elections, Kadar, with Soviet permission, could have continued to attempt the establishment of a coalition government. Instead, Hungary returned to the one Party system. In a convenient rewrite of facts, the Communist newspaper Nepszabadsag on April 26, 1957, argued that coalition for coalition's sake was not desireable because it could provide anti-socialist forces a legal smokescreen within which to operate, and added that non-Communist forces were unwilling to participate anyway.7 Other reforms under Nagy which were abrogated by the Kadar regime were compulsory study of Russian and of Marxism-Leninism, and the workers' councils were "reduced to an empty farce."8 The benefitial impact that these councils had on economic growth then was largely negated at a time when Hungary needed a strong economy more than ever. Economic. reforms under the Nagy regime were also set back, for example, the dissolution of many collective farms and industrial worker benefits. Kadar supported these economic reforms initially, in order, probably, to gain support for his government, but within eight months, collective farms were increasing, the tax burden increased and industrial wages cut, and the use of shock-workers and production norms were reintroduced.9 Within a year after the revolution, many of the gains made by the revolution and initially supported by Kadar were gone. Even the AVH was restored to a place of honor, and the "bourgeois decadence" allegedly encouraged by the literary elite under the reform movement was severly restricted. As one author put it, "Hungary has slipped back into relative obscurity."10 CHAPTER IV CONCLUSION In historical perspective, the Hungarian Revolution was just another eruption of the natural human passion for liberty and self-destiny. These freedom movements dot the historical time- line from the moment early man first fought for his territorial rights. Some of these seeds of freedom, conceived by the minds of men capable of entertaining such thoughts, became rooted in the soil of the masses and bore fruit. Such was the case in England and the United States. Sometimes the fruit is perverse and the revoltuion only moves from one form of dictatorship to another. Such was the case of Nicaragua and Cuba. And of course, sometimes the sapling is wrenched from the ground before the buds can open. Unfortunately, this was the case of Hungary. Eastern Europe was thrust into the limelight in 1956 not only for the events in Hungary, but for those in the entire Eastern Bloc. In a sense, Hungary was the climax of a series of efforts by the various peoples of the region to adjust the yoke of Soviet domination. These efforts can be described as the emergence of national communism which, while equal to and independent of the Soviet Union, was nonetheless communist. The Hungarians took their effort at national communism one step farther and sought neutrality through removal from the Warsaw Pact. Other regional efforts, in Poland and Yugoslavia for example, sought only to be treated as equals with the Soviets. When the fateful decision was made in Hungary to go farther, to move closer to the West and to create a split in the Warsaw Pact, the Soviets reacted in a predictable way. Their suppression of the revolution was swift, violent and decisive. It made a statement to the world, but more importantly to the Soviet Bloc. The Soviets may be willing to accept changes within the Party structure of a satellite. They were even willing to accept greater equality in relations with a satellite. They clearly were not, however, willing to accept the loss of influence that Hungary was forcing on them in an area of vital Soviet interests. Eastern Europe was and remains today a Soviet sphere of influence and there exists no external power that can change that fact. The United States, for all its military power and world influence, will not to go to war with the Soviet Union over the freedom of the Danubian plain. Where the Soviets might look for a challenge to their leadership in the area is a collective effort by several Eastern European countries. Astonishingly enough, the suggested leader of this collective effort would most likely be Hungary. Nearly thirty years after the Hungarian revolution, Hungary has emerged as a potential regional leader. Janos Kadar, once reviled as a traitor and a Soviet puppet, was perceptive enough to realize the inevitability of change and through an evolutionary process has brought Hungary to a strange mixture of communism and capitalism - sort of Marx with a MasterCard - where the profit motive is applied where necessary and bumper crops lead all other satellite countries. In 1970 Hungary was postulated as the potential leader of the Danubian Confederation, a concept not unique in Hungarian history, along with Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Austria. What would the Soviet reaction be to such an event? If the stated aims of such a confederation were simply trade and cultural in nature, the Soviets would be hard pressed to find a reason to subdue it. It would, on the surface, pose no more a threat to the Soviet Bloc than the European Common Market does to NATO. However, given the recent history of the area, of which the Hungarian, Polish and 1968 Czechoslovakian episodes are a part, the Soviets would be forced to find some way to emasculate such a confederation. The Soviets need not fear an outside threat in the region. The resolve of the Soviets, if doubted after 1956, was reconfirmed in 1968 when another fledgling effort at freedom was smashed by the Soviet Army. The circumstances were similar to 1956, world events were similar (presidential election, Olympics and young society had moved from the "Wild Bunch" to the hippies) and the Soviet response was the same. The United States and United Nations inability to influence the action was the same. Only in recent events in Poland, where the West would appear to have even the slightest chance of exerting pressure, do the Soviets, despite all the rhetoric, appear to be moving with caution. In 1956 and in 1981 the Poles were astute enough to deal cautiously with the Soviets because they never expected help from the West. Perhaps that mutual respect allows Solidarity to be as influential as it is. On the other hand, in recent memory, when the Soviets attacked Poland in concert with Nazi Germany and it brought them in to the most devastating war of all time. Possibly the Soviets ascribe to Poland the status of being the symbolic country that, while strongly influenced by Soviet policy, will not be dominated by them and over which the West would be willing to commit forces. Polish forces appeared ready to fight in 1956 (unlike the Hungarian Army) and appear ready to do likewise at this time. And what of the United States? Did its inability to help the Hungarians move it to revamp its foreign and military policy in the region? Not perceptively. What the events of 1956 did do was bring about the Eisenhower Doctrine. But it was not the Hungarian Revolution and Eastern Europe that evoked the January 1957 remarks; it was the concurrent Suez Crisis and the Doctrine was aimed at stemming Soviet influence in that vital area of United States interest. The use of armed force was clearly an option that Eisenhower would entertain. Nearly a quarter of a century later, President Jimmy Carter would make similar remarks and spur the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force. In the final analysis then, it appears that in those areas of economic and strategic interest, the United States is willing to commit force. In those areas where the interest is only mild, Washington is willing to accept the status quo. The Soviets appear to agree in principle, although their subversive methods continually attempt to erode regions which are currently in the United States sphere. What purpose then did the Hungarian Revolution serve? Perhaps it can be argued that it disclosed a chink in the Soviet war machine, that Moscow could never fully count on satellite armies to fight Soviet battles. This is a potentially important discovery when we too often ascribe to the Soviets an invulnerability which they may not deserve. Should war break out in Europe, just how concerned would the Soviets be about their southern flank? Enough to divert combat power to the region like the Germans did in Italy? It is an interesting concept, but one that may not ever be tested. Of more importance, the revolution served as the litmus test to measure United States resolve and Soviet permissiveness. Since that time, with the exception of events in Czechoslovakia, progress in Eastern Europe has been evolutionary. The United States was quick to exercise its might in dealing with its recalcitrant allies, France and England. Both superpowers appreciated that the events of October - November 1956 were tests of strength by subordinate powers. Where the Soviets could act, they did. Where the United States could exert pressure (and keep the Soviets from acting) it did. The Hungarian Revolution then resolved very little. Its major contribution was in revealing the now predictable Soviet response to crisis. However, those thousands who gave their lives in those cold gray days of late autumn 1956 made a statement. Sandor Petofi would have been proud of them, for they chose as their lot freedom over slavery. Click here to view image FOOTNOTES CHAPTER I 1 Melvin J. Lasky, The Hungarian Revolution, A White Book (New York, N.Y.: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957, p. 25. 2 Paul E. Zinner, Revolution in Hungary (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1962), p. 10 3 Ibid., p. 11. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid., p. 13. 6 Lasky, A White Book, p. 15. 7 Paul Kecskemeti, The Unexpected Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), p. 15. 8 Lasky, A White Book, p. 17. 9 Ibid. Other election results were: Smallholders, 57%; Social Democrates, 17%; National Peasants, 7%. 10 Ibid., p. 19. 11 Lasky, A White Book, p. 17. 12 Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, p. 37. 13 Ibid., p. 45. 14 Ibid., p. 48. 15 Ibid., p. 49. 16 Lasky, A White Book, p. 18. 17 Kecskemeti, p. 18. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid., p. 31. 20 Ibid., p. 42. 21 Ibid., p. 35. 22 Ibid., p. 44-45. 23 Zinner, Revolution in Hun ar , p. 165. 24 Ibid., p. 166. 25 Ferenc A. Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 100. 26 Ibid., p. 96. 27 Ibid., p. 153. 28 Ibid., p. 154. 29 Ibid., p. 158. 30 Ibid., p. 161. 31 Ibid., p. 164. 32 Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, p. 179. 33 Vali, Rift and Revolt, p. 179. 34 Ibid. 35 Edward Crankshaw, Khrushchev Remembers, trans. and ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston, Toronto: Little Brown and Company, 1970), p. 394. 36 Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, p. 180. 37 Ibid., p 176. 38 Ibid. 39 Vali, Rift and Revolt, p. 201. 40 Bela K. Kiraly and Paul Jonas, eds. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 In Retrospect (Boulder, Colorado: East European Quarterly, 1977), p. 26. 41 Ibid., p. 27. 42 Kecskemeti, p. 64. 43 Sandor Haraszti, sentenced to death with Rajk, committed to life imprisonment and finally released from prison. Ibid., p. 66. 44 Ibid. 45 Kiraly and Jonas, eds., p. 30. 46 Ibid., p. 31. 47 Kecskemeti, p. 67. 48 Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, p. 192. Interestingly enough, the criticism was written by the same "Sandor" mentioned in footnote 43. 49 Vali, Rift and Revolt, p. 202. 50 Noel Barber, Seven Days of Freedom (New York, N.Y.: Stein and Day, 1974), p. 17. 51 Kecskemeti, p. 69. 52 Paul E. Zinner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1956 (New York, N.Y.: Harper & Bros., 1957), p. 201, footnote 1. 53 Vali, Rift and Revolt, p. 215. 54 Ibid., p. 223. 55 Ibid. 56 Kiraly and Jonas, ed., p. 114. 57 Ibid., p. 96. 58 Vali, Rift and Revolt, p. 222. 59 Lasky, A White Book, p. 37. 60 Ibid. 61 Vali, Rift and Revolt, p. 220. 62 Ibid. 63 Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, p. 196. 64 Lasky, A White Book, inset p. 30. 65 Lasky, A White Book, p. 30. 66 Kecskemeti, p. 73. 67 Lasky, A White Book, p. 32. 68 Kecskemeti, p. 75. 69 Vali, Rift and Revolt, p. 231. 70 Kecskemeti, p. 75. 71 Lasky, A White Book, p. 33. 72 Vali, Rift and Revolt, p. 234. 73 Ibid., p. 235. 74 Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, p. 217. 75 Ibid., p. 218. 76 Lasky, A White Book, p. 33. 77 Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, p. 205. 78 New York Times, October 22, 1956. 79 Leslie B. Bain, The Reluctant Satellites (New York, N.Y. The Macmillan Company, 1960), p. 21. 80 Eyewitness account given to the author by Dr. Paul Zador, then a university student in Budapest. 81 Vali, Rift and Revolt, p. 247. October 6 was the anniversary of the execution of 13 Hungarian Army Generals at the end of Hungary's War for Independance in 1849. 82 Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, p. 227. 83 Vali, Rift and Revolt, p. 247. 84 Lasky, A White Book, p. 42. 85 Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, .p. 229., 86 Vali, Rift and Revolt, p. 266. 87 New York Times, October 21, 1956. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. 90 Lasky, A White Book, p. 47. 91 Ibid., p. 48. 92 Vali, Rift and Revolt, p. 267. 93 Tibor Meray, That Day in Budapest, trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York, N.Y.: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969). p. 165. 94 New York Times, October 21, 1956. 95 Vali, Rift and Revolt, p. 267. 96 Meray, Budapest, p. 170. 97 Kiraly and Jonas, eds., p. 91. 98 Ernest A. Nagy, Crisis Decision Setting and Response: The Hungarian Revolution, National Security Affairs Monograph 78-1 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Research Directorate, 1978), p.3. Nagy likens the Gero speech to the Reichstag fire. 99 John L. Sorenson, "Urban Insurgency Cases" (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Defense Research Corporation, 1965). p. 42. 100 Lasky, A White Book, pp. 51-52. 101 United Nations Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (New York, N.Y.: General Assembly Official Records: Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/3592), 1957), p.6. 102 Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, p. 199. 103 Kecskemeti, p. 80. CHAPTER II 1 UN Report, p. 6. 2 Nagy, Crisis, p. 3. 3 R. B. McConnell, "Conventional Military Force and Soviet Foreign Policy" (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1978), p. 95. 4 Ibid., p. 97. 5 Kiraly and Jonas, eds., p. 58. 6 Vali, Rift and Revolt, p. 277. 7 UN Report, p. 5. 8 Kiraly and Jonas, eds., p. 64. 9 Ibid., p. 66. 10 Vali, Rift and Revolt, p. 322. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid., p. 325. 13 McConnell, NPGS, p. 93. 14 Ibid. 15 Crankshaw,Khruschev, p. 419. 16 New York Times, October 25, 1956. 17 Sorenson, Urban Insurgency Cases, p. 43. 18 Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, p. 256. 19 Lasky, A White Book, p. 58. 20 Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, p. 250. 21 Nagy, Crisis, p. 5. 22 Several sources discussed Nagy's attempts to take his accounts of the issue of calling in Soviet troops to the people. Whether he was forcefully restrained, or persuaded not to do so, he did not explain himself until late in the revolt. 23 Lasky, A White Book, p. 59. 24 Meray, Budapest, p. 339. 25 Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, p. 261. 26 New York Times, October 29, 1956. 27 New York Times, October 27, 1956. 28 Vali, Rift and Revolt, p. 288. 29 Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, p. 268. 30 UN Report, p. 95. 31 New York Times, October 28, 1956. 32 Ibid. 33 Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, p. 271. 34 Lasky, A White Book, p. 109. 35 Ibid., p. 115. 36 UN Report, p. 96. 37 New York Times, October 28, 1956. 38 UN Report, p. 26. 39 John Gellner, "The Hungarian Revolution: A Military Post- Mortum", Marine Corps Gazette, April 1958, pp. 53-57. 40 Vali, Rift and Revolt, p. 294. 41 Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, p. 279. 42 Ibid., p. 272. 43 Kecskemeti, p. 110. 44 Gellner, Marine Corps Gazette, p. 57. 45 New York Times, October 28, 1956. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Kiraly and Jonas, eds., p. 146. 49 Lasky, A White Book, p. 131. 50 New York Times, October 29, 1956. 51 Kiraly and Jonas, eds., p. 147. 52 Meray, Budapest, pp. 335-336. 53 Nagy, Crisis, p. 10. 54 New York Times, October 30, 1956. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Vali, Rift and y.evolt. p. 328. 58 Ibid., p. 316. 59 Bela K. Kiraly, "The Hungarian Armed Forces", East Europe, June 1958, p. 14. 60 Kiraly and Jonas, eds., p. 63. Also referred to as the Revolutionary Committee for the Defense of the Hungarian Republic. 61 UN Report, p. 88. 62 Kiraly, East Europe, p. 14. 63 Kiraly and Jonas, eds., p. 67. 64 UN Report, p. 88. 65 Kiraly, East Europe, p. 14. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 Interview with Bela Kiraly, Brooklyn College, New York, December 21, 1983. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 New York Times, October 31, 1956. 73 Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, p. 319. 74 UN Report, p. 88. 75 Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Tragedyof Hungary: A Revolution Won and Lost" (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 1956). p. 11. 76 Vali, Rift and Revolt, p. 360. 77 New York Times, October 31, 1956. 78 Editor's note, "The Hungarian 'Counterrevolution'", The Problems of Communism, March-April 1957, p. 47. 79 Vali, Rift and Revolt, p. 364. 80 Ibid. 81 Garthoff, "The Tragedy of Hungary", p. 7. 82 UN Report, p. 56. 83 Garthoff, "The Tragedy of Hungary", p. 7. 84 UN Report, p. 27. 85 UN Report, p. 57. 86 E. H. Wyndham, "The Military Situation in Europe", The Army Quarterly, January 1957, p. 139. 87 Vali, Rift and Revolt, p. 373. 88 UN Report, p. 45. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid., p. 47. 92 Kiraly and Jonah, eds., p. 70. 93 Ibid. 94 Lasky, A White Book, p. 228. CHAPTER III 1 Vali, Rift and Revolt, p. 387. 2 UN Report, p. 105. 3 Ibid., p. 101. 4 Paul Landy, "Hungary Since the Revolution", The Problems of Communism, September-October 1957, p. 9. 5 Ibid. 6 UN Report, p. 104. 7 Landy, "Hungary Since the Revolution", p. 9. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid., p. 10. 10 Ibid., p. 8. BIBLIOGRAPHY Barber, Noel. Seven Days of Freedom. New York: Stein and Day, 1974. Easily readable-novel. Not good reference. Crankshaw, Edward. Khrushchev Remembers. Translated and edited by Strobe Talbott. Boston, Toronto: Little Brown and Company, 1970. Good work but of little value in the study of Hungarian Revolution. Editor's Note. "The Hungarian 'Counterrevolution'". The Problems of Communism, March-April, 1957, pp. 47-51. Good insight into East Europe mentality. Garthoff, Raymond L. The Tragedy of Hungary: a Revolution Won and Lost. Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, 1956. Good reference. Gellner, John. "The Hungarian Revolution: A Military Post- Mortum." Marine Cords Gazette, April 1958, pp. 52-57. Interesting attempt at military analysis of Hungarian Revolution. Reflects paucity of Soviet information. Jonas, Paul and Kiraly, Bela K., eds. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 In Retrospect. Boulder: East European Quarterly, 1977. Good short reference for all countries of East Europe. Kecskemati, Paul. The Unexpected Revolution. Sanford: Stanford University Press, 1961. Very good readable work. Kiraly, Bela K. "The Hungarian Armed Forces." East Europe, June 1958, pp. 4-15. Good insight to problems faced by Hungarian military. Kiraly, Bela K. Brooklyn College, New York. Interview, December 21, 1983. Thoroughly enjoyable. Landy, Paul. "Hungary Since the Revolution." The Problems of Communism, September-October 1957, pp. 8-15. Interesting, but must be placed in context. Lasky, Melvin J. The Hungarian Revolution, A White Book. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. Although disjointed, a superb reference. McConnell, R. B. "Conventional Military Force and Soviet Foreign Policy." Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1978. Good reference. Meray, Tibor. That Day in Budapest. Translated by Charles Lam Markmann. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969. Very readable but highly slanted. Nagy, Ernest A. Crisis Decision Setting and Response: The Hungarian Revolution. Washington, D. C.: National Defense University Research Directorate, 1978. Provides good quick reference. New York Times, October 21-31, 1956. Sorenson, John L. Urban Insurgency Cases. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Defense Research Corporation, 1965. Good reference. United Nations Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary. New York: General Assembly Official Records, Eleventh Session, 1957. Good reference, very detailed but easily read. Valid Ferenc A. Rift and Revolt in Hungary. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961. One of the best references read. Wyndham, E. H. "The Military Situation in Europe." The Arms Quarterly, January 1957, pp. 139-143. Of limited use. Zinner, Paul E., ed. Documents one American Foreign Relations, 1956. New York: Harper and Bros., 1957. Limited use. Zinner, Paul E. Revolution in Hungary. Freeport, N. Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1962. One of the best references used.
|Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list|