Television Coverage Of The Vietnam War And Its Implications For Future Conflicts CSC 1984 SUBJECT AREA Topical Issues TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE VIETNAM WAR, AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE CONFLICTS The Writing Program Command and Staff College Major Cass D. Howell United States Marine Corps April 6, 1984 TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE VIETNAM WAR AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE CONFLICTS Outline Thesis Statement: From the perspective of the U.S. Military, television coverage of the Vietnam War had a detrimental impact on the conduct of that war; policies on television coverage of future conflicts should be revised so as to not repeat past mistakes. I. BACKGROUND A. Questions in Retrospect B. Origination of Vietnam War Television Coverage Policies 1. World War II - Vietnam Press Comparison 2. Media-Government Distrust 3. Growth of Television II. THE MYTH OF OBJECTIVITY A. The Fairness Doctrine B. The Politics of the Press 1. Liberal, Anti-war Disposition 2. Public Perception of Journalists C. Bias in the News 1. Personal Feelings are Reflected in News 2. Documentation by Research D. Molding Perception 1. The Role of Gatekeepers 2. Methods of Manipulation a. Selective Reporting b. Closing Statement c. "Controversial" d. Exaggerated Significance e. Covert Editorials f. Overt (but unlabeled) Editorials III. IMPACT OF TELEVISION WAR COVERAGE, AND THE PRESS IN A FREE SOCIETY A. The Living Room War B. TET, The Turning Point C. The Press in a Free Society D. Impact on the American Psyche IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE CONFLICTS, AND RECOMMENDED REVISION OF CURRENT POLICIES A. Implications 1. Historial Perspective 2. Detriments Will Continue B. Recommended Policy Change 1. Exclude Television from War Zone 2. Don't Repeat Past Mistakes V. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE NETWORKS TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I. Introduction 1 II. Origination of Vietnam War Television 4 Coverage Policies III. The Myth of Objectivity 9 * The Fairness Doctrine 10 * The Politics of the Press 12 * Bias in the News 16 * Molding Perception 29 IV. The Impact of Television War Coverage, 49 and the Press in a Free Society * The Living Room War 49 * TET, The Turning Point 53 * The Press in a Free Society 55 * Impact on the American Psyche 58 V. Implications for Future Conflicts, 63 and Recommended Revision of Current Television Policies Appendix A: A Questionnaire for the Networks 67 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION "You know you never defeated us on the battlefield," said the American colonel. The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment. "That may be so," he replied, "but it is also irrelavent." Conversation in Hanoi, April 19751 This project began with the question, "How could a country win all the battles, and yet still lose the war?" How could a country which is as rich and powerful as our own, superior in every measurable category of military strength, emerge as the loser with one of the world's smallest and poorest countries? Why are our greatest victories remembered as defeats? Why would a Congress that approved the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964 with only two dissenting votes turn its back on its South Vietnamese ally when the North Vietnamese launched a full-scale conventional invasion only eight years later? In seeking answers to these questions it became readily apparent that the American defense of South Vietnam was brought to its unhappy conclusion not by a failure of American arms, but rather by a failure of American will. Former President Nixon said it this way: The War in Vietnam was not lost on the battlefields of Vietnam. It was lost in the halls of Congress ... in the editorial rooms of great newspapers ... and in the classrooms of great universities.2 Surveys abound which document the shift of national sentiment from strongly supportive of the war effort to the point where 65% of the American public believed that U.S. involvement in Vietnam was not just a mistake, but "immoral."3 If this reported shift of support is accurate, and I believe that it is, the question that then arises is "What accounts for this change of beliefs?" And, equally important, why did American resolve evaporate during Vietnam, in contrast to all of our other foreign wars? In short, what was unique about the Vietnam War? It is clear that in virtually every respect the U.S. effort in Vietnam had far more similarities than differences in respect to previous American conflicts. Like almost all of our military engagements it was a foreign war, fought by a citizen army against a dedicated and capable foe. It was not the longest (U.S. Marines fought an anti-guerrilla war in Nicaragua almost continuously for nearly thirty years), bloodiest, or toughest, nor even the most savage. And, for all the exotic weapons that were utilized, it was still primarily the foot soldier's war. No, the great difference between the Vietnam War and its predecessors lay not in its conduct, but its perception, an image that was shaped by a powerful new influence-- television. It was this medium, more than any other single factor, which was instrumental in the shift of American public and Congressional opinion from a position strongly supporting to one strongly condemning the American defense of South Vietnam. The questions that are the subject of this research paper are threefold: 1. Was the television coverage of the Vietnam War fairly done? 2. What was the impact of televised war on the American public? 3. What do the lessons of television coverage of the Vietnam War portend for the ability of United States Armed Forces to prevail in future conflicts? CHAPTER II ORIGINATION OF VIETNAM WAR TELEVISION COVERAGE POLICIES In surveying the Vietnam War as portrayed on television, a logical starting point would be documentation of the evolvement of the military-television relationship in the war zone. Unfortunately, there is a decided lack of information available on this particular subject, partly due to the relative youth of television news, and the feeling on the part of governmental branches that television is just another part of the press. For those reasons, it would be beneficial to briefly review the military-press relationship as a whole in previous decades and compare that to media coverage during the Vietnam era. Although the history of the military-press relationship is long and varied, we shall only examine events since the beginning of World War II. World War II is an important starting point for viewing press coverage in Vietnam, primarily because policies and attitudes contrast so markedly from the former to the latter. In World War II there was a strong degree of cooperation with the government by the press. For example, the Executive News Director of the Associated Press, Byron Price, served as the government's chief censor at the request of President Roosevelt. The press voluntarily established a "Code of Wartime Practices" which was used to help its reporters and editors avoid inadvertent disclosure of harmful information.4 Civilian journalists often became military press information officers for the duration, and those who remained in the employ of civilian radio and newspapers usually wore American military uniforms while deployed with U.S. forces. Reports were often filed that began "Our forces moved ...." or "We began the assault of ...."5 This spirit of unified loyalty carried over into the Korean War, where the press asked for, and received, governmental censorship.6 If the 1940's and 1950's could be called the "era of good feelings," the 1960's could be called the "era of downright animosity." These ill feelings had their roots in the 1960 incident where CIA pilot Francis Gary Powers was shot down in his U-2 while on a reconnaissance mission over the Soviet Union. The State Department issued a release created by the CIA that indicated that the aircraft was a weather plane that had simply strayed off course, and that any border violation was entirely unintentional. This story came crashing down six days later when President Eisenhower was forced to admit the true circumstances of the mission when confronted by documented proof by Premier Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union. That began the celebrated "credibility gap" that was to widen during the following years, and was also instrumental in furthering mistrust of governmental agencies that persists to this day.7 The Kennedy Administration was soon involved in its own debate with the news media when the New York Times and CBS announced the imminent Bay of Pigs invasion of Castro's Cuba. When the attempted invasion was crushed, President Kennedy was furious at the media and urged that the press ask themselves, "Is it in the interest of national security?" before running potentially harmful stories. This plea for self-restraint was rejected by the media.8 "If the press is waiting for a declaration of war," Kennedy fumed, "before it imposes the self discipline of combat conditions then I can only say that no war ever posed a greater threat to our security."9 During this same period American military and State Department representatives in South Vietnam clashed with journalists on a frequent basis. Reporters charged that U.S. agencies were lying about the extent of American involvement in the developing war, the performance of the South Vietnamese army, and especially about the progress that was being made in winning the war. They accused American officials of trying to distort, evade, and manage the news process and ridiculed the daily military briefings for the press as the "Five O'Clock Follies." David Halberstam, of The New York Times, was at the forefront of those who held U.S. officials and their views in contempt, and was vociferous in his outspoken criticism of the conduct of the war effort.10 Not surprisingly, the U.S. officials, convinced of their honesty and faithful to the American cause, branded these critics as irresponsible, inexperienced cynics whose prime concern was promoting their own self- image and reputation by generating controversy and disputing official U.S. pronouncements at every opportunity. John Mecklin, who was Chief of U.S. Information Service (U.S.I.S.) during this period said, "The root of the problem was that what newsmen believed to be lies was exactly what the mission geniunely believed and was reporting to Washington."11 So began a long running feud that was to characterize government and military press relations for much of the Vietnam War.* It was against this background that television began its first significant coverage of the Vietnam War. Unlike World War II and the Korean War, coverage of this conflict would *Ironically, the war against the Viet Cong was, on the whole, being won to the extent that North Vietnam finally despaired of an internal overthrow of the government and sought a solution in traditional military terms. South Vietnam fell to a North Vietnam conventional army invasion that swept the length of the South in 1975. be unconstrained by virtually any kind of official government censorship, making it the most openly reported war (at least in South Vietnam) in modern times, perhaps ever. Not only was there not military censorship, but the military went to great lengths to provide transportation, lodging, meals, and briefings to a U.S. press corps that eventually grew to battalion-size strength. As the size of the media in Vietnam expanded, so did its impact back home. In 1963, NBC and CBS doubled the length of their national news coverage (from 15 to 30 minutes) and in that same year Americans reported that, for the first time ever, most of them received the majority of their news from television instead of newspapers and magazines.12 Technology kept pace during this period also, with a steady increase in the number, size, and quality of color television sets in American homes. Transportation time of news footage was originally about twenty hours from Vietnam to New York, although this would be decreased dramatically with the availability of communications satellites later in the war. It was these factors--a doubting, often critical press, expanding and increasingly powerful television networks, and unparalleled access to a war zone that set the stage for the decisive event of the American defense of South Vietnam-- the erosion of the willpower of the American people. CHAPTER III THE MYTH OF OBJECTIVITY Of all the myths of journalism, objectivity is the greatest.13 ABC Commentator Bill Moyers One of the most cherished notions of corporate television is that T.V. news is a factual, unbiased account of the happenings of the world, in which all sides of issues are equally and fairly presented. Walter Cronkite proclaims it so in this statement about the objectivity of newscasters: But we are professional journalists .... We are trying to reach an objective state, we are trying to be objective. We have been taught from the day we went to school, when we began to know we wanted to be journalists, integrity, truth, honesty, and a definite attempt to be objective. We try to present the news as objectively as possible, whether we like or don't like it.14 Certainly an admirable standard, and also one that is the official position of the major network news agencies. Richard Salant, Mr. Cronkite's superior at CBS said: "We believe in objective coverage. Our reporters do not cover stories from their point of view. They are presenting them from nobodies point of view." And at ABC, former news president James Hagerty stated: "We're trying to be objective. We are reporters! We get interpretations from other people and present them. If anyone on this network is expressing his own opinion--well if I catch him I won't permit it."15 The fact is that scores of reporters, writers, editors and newsmen were, and still are, expressing opinions every day in a multitude of ways. And those opinions were almost invariably against the American defense of South Vietnam. Before we examine the process of perception management by the television news industry, it is important to understand why the official position of the national networks is that they are unremittingly objective and unbiased. The Fairness Doctrine Unlike newspapers and magazines, which may openly consider themselves to be "liberal," "conservative," "communist," or otherwise, and may editorialize and write accordingly, the electronic media is held to a more narrow standard by the Federal Government. Rationalizing that the number of broadcast channels is finite and that use of them is an expensive undertaking possible by only a wealthy few, the Federal Communications Commission (F.C.C.) imposed a set of standards known collectively as the Fairness Doctrine, which regulates the airwaves to ensure they will be used "in the public interest." A key element of the Fairness Doctrine concerning objectivity of reporting is that a television licensee is not permitted "to distort or suppress the basic factual information upon which any truly fair and free discussion of public issues must necessarily depend." It further states that a station would be "abusing his position" by slanting the presentation of such news.16 However, the Fairness Doctrine does allow for editorializing by television, if it provides a forum for "robust debate" about the issues raised, and that the broadcaster has an "affirmative duty" to seek out contrasting opinions and present them. The television code of the National Association of Broadcasters affirms the principles of the Fairness Doctrine, and adds: "Commentary and analysis should be clearly identified as such."17 It is now easy to see why network executives maintain that their station's news coverage is fair and objective; to state otherwise would be to place at risk the broadcast license during its next renewal period. Does all of this mean that television news is in fact unbiased, or that all opinions expressed are clearly labeled as such? Most assuredly not. The Politics of the Press In order to understand how bias creeps into the news, it is first necessary to understand why it happens. News, of course, is collected, edited, and broadcast by human beings, people who have likes and dislikes, political preferences, and all the other normal human characteristics. Journalists are, as a group, traditionally idealistic, opinionated, and proven to be committed to what is commonly accepted as "the liberal agenda." A recent survey of 240 editors and reporters from the three commercial networks, as well as P.B.S., The New York Times, The Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report, and Time, indicated that: 48% believed that the Government should guarantee jobs, 68% argued that the Govern- ment should narrow the income gap between rich and poor, and 88% that the U.S. legal system favors the wealthy. On social issues, 90% believed that women should have a right to abortion, and only 25% considered homosexuality morally wrong.18 In a separate survey, researchers who developed and improved the Strong Vocational Interest Blank also devised a scale to measure the political orientation of various occupations. They report that " ... on the 'liberalism' scale, journalists were 'one of the very top scoring occupations'"19 ABC Interviewer, Barbara Walters agrees: "The news media in general is liberal. If you want to be a reporter, you are going to see poverty and misery, and you have to be involved in the human condition."20 While the aforementioned surveys and opinions do not directly address attitudes towards U.S. involvements in overseas wars, it takes no great leap of imagination to surmise that an anti- war position would be consistent with a liberal orientation during the Vietnam era. It is this liberalism that flavors national network news, and the other major news organizations, i.e., The New York Times, The Washington Post, Time and Newsweek. It infiltrates every step of the news gathering, selection and reporting process and was a powerful influence in shaping American attitudes towards the Vietnam War. Edith Effron, a professional television watcher for T.V. Guide, in her 1971 book The News Twisters, bluntly states: There isn't a man on the network staffs who is not aware that the overwhelming majority, if not 100%, of the network reporters are liberals. And it is precisely with the staff--the individuals whose judgements will culminate in news stories--that the selective processes start. The liberal composition of network staffs renders it impossible for network news departments to be anything but liberal news agencies--with the full regalia of characteristic liberal biases.21 Mrs. Effron comments on the response to this charge, raised initially by Vice-President Agnew in 1969: Network defenders, did point out that ABC's Howard K. Smith and NBC's Chet Huntley supported the war, in contrast to their collegues. This "defense proved to be the sole exception anyone could dredge up to the rule of network conformity on major issues.22 What are some of the other perceptions about journalists? Current public opinion was vividly revealed in the aftermath of the Grenada operation, when an overwhelming number of citizens supported the exclusion of the press from the invasion. Max Frankel, Editorial Page Editor of The New York Times was struck by readers who discerned what they believed to be the press' true reason for access to the rescue operation: "The most astounding thing about the Grenada situation was the quick, facile assumption by some of the public that the press wanted to get in, not to witness the invasion on behalf of the people, but to sabotage it."23 Washington Post Executive Editor Ben Bradlee comments, perhaps a bit parochially, about the nature of T.V. reports: "Television has changed the public's vision of the reporter into someone who is petty and disagreeable, who has taken cynicism an unnecessary extra step."24 Time magazine, in its post-Grenada wrap-up issue was right on target when it stated: The dispute over Grenada seemed to uncork a pent-up public hostility. It reinforced a perception that journalists regard themselves as utterly detached from, and perhaps even hostile to, the Government of their country. Another factor in provoking distrust is the suspicion that journalists care little about accuracy.25 And a Los Angeles Herald-Examiner reader spoke for the bulk of citizen commentators when she wrote: "Journalists are so out of touch with majority values, such as honor, duty and service to country, that they are alienated from the very society that they purport to serve."26 It is exceedingly significant that the public's current perception of the media is a result of twenty years of observation of it, primarily television, at work. Although the National Opinion Research Center in 1983 found that the percentage of the American population which had "a great deal of confidence in the press" had sunk to a new low of 13.7%, this was not the case during most of the Vietnam War. During that time, when Walter Cronkite closed with "And that's the way it is," there was a great faith in the honesty and integrity of the newsmen and what was broadcast. It has only been after repeated exposure to the true nature of the media that this shift of opinion has occurred. This is noteworthy, because it has occurred in the face of the media's ability to present itself in the best light possible, including always having the last word. As one might expect, journalists react in righteous indignation if their patriotism or lack of objectivity is called into question. They reason that, whatever their political or ideological beliefs, they can fairly present controversial issues without bias or prejudice. Their success at doing so (or, more accurately, the lack of it) is examined in the next sub-chapter. Bias in the News "The proposition that T.V. News is biased should be about as con- troversial as the law of gravity," [Dr. Weaver stated,] adding that the real question is: "How are the media biased, and what is the consequent effect on your interests and values." Dr. Paul H. Weaver, quoted from T.V. and National Defense 27 The question remains, "Can the individuals who present television news place aside their liberal dispositions and report world and national events in a dispassionate and objective manner?" The answer to this question, and many similar to it has been the topic of debate, speculation, and professional research for about twenty years. The answer is a resounding "No." This is the keystone for understanding how our perceptions of the American defense of South Vietnam were molded. From virtually every perspective, including the media itself, comes the finding that news is often colored to suit the beliefs of the individuals involved in its collection and presentation. NBC anchorman David Brinkley, in an appearance on National Educational Television in 1968 said: "If I were objective, or if you were objective, or if anyone was, we would have to be put away in an institution because we'd be some kind of vegetable. Objectivity is impossible to a human being. ABC's anchor Frank Reynolds said: "I think your program has to reflect what your basic feelings are. I'll plead guilty to that."28 These admissions by leading networks newsmen are certainly buttressed by independent research. As the subject of his doctoral dissertation, Robert Howard of the University of Florida analyzed the objectivity of national network news broadcast in 1972. In his dissertation, Bias in Television News, a Content Analvsis, he presented the following conclusions: (1) Almost forty-seven percent of the stories were unbalanced. (2) Almost two-thirds of the stories contained elements of bias. (3) Forty percent of the stories were directional, favoring one side or the other of an issue Of those directional stories, almost twice as many were unfavorable as favorable to the referent. (4) All three networks were equally biased, with NBC being the most balanced and most neutral, while ABC was the least balanced and least neutral.29 Mr. Howard's study was conducted utilizing 107 under- graduate students to identify and classify bias in the newcasts. Lest anyone perceive that these "coders" were an assemblage of right wing idealogues, Mr. Howard provides the following profiles, gleaned from responses provided by the coders themselves:30 Coder Political Philosophy Liberal 65% Conservative 6% Other 29% Political Philosophy by Major Issue Vietnam Policy Approve 13% Disapprove 78% No Opinion 9% In his book entitled T.V. and National Defense Dr. Ernest Lefever analyzes CBS news coverage during the final period of the American defense of South Vietnam. His research documents how CBS consistently and overwhelmingly undermined the U.S. position on the war. The following chart is a content analysis of network news broadcasts from 1972 and 1973 reflecting material that CBS chose to broadcast about the war during that period: Click here to view image The most common themes for the three countries examined were: United States: U.S. involvement is wrong because the war is cruel, expensive, or senseless. (254 times) South Vietnam: Regime is an obstacle to peace, or other criticism. (88 times) North Vietnam: Armed Services are doing well. (56 times)31 Dr. Lefever also charted the direct expressions of opinion by CBS newsmen themselves. He broke the viewpoints expressed down into three broad categories: Viewpoint A holds that "the threat to U.S. security is more serious than that perceived by the government or that the United States ought to increase its national security elements." Viewpoint B holds that "present government threat perception is essentially correct, or that U.S. military and foreign policy efforts are adequate." Viewpoint C holds that "the threat to U.S. security is less serious than perceived by the government or that U.S. national security efforts should be decreased." Examples of these positions, as they would be stated about the Vietnam War, are as follows: Viewpoint A: U.S. should take war to enemy. Viewpoint B: U.S. should withdraw as Saigon takes responsibility for fighting. Viewpoint C: U.S. should withdraw as fast as possible regardless of effect on South Vietnam. Tapes of CBS news broadcast were then reviewed to extract statements of explicit opinion by newsmen themselves. The result was an overwhelming preference for the liberal, anti-war viewpoint.32 Click here to view image As might be readily expected, this bias was often expressed covertly as well, in many different forms. Dr. Lefever goes on to document numerous other findings of a lack of objectivity and fairness on the part of CBS and concludes: All evidence suggests that CBS evening news employed various techniques of selective reporting and presentation to advocate a position opposed to U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. It failed to present a full or fair picture of opposing viewpoints on the issues of peace negotiations, the problem of American POW's, the nature of the U.S. military presence, or on a larger canvas - the significance to the United States of the struggle between Communist and non- Communist forces in Southeast Asia.33 When more than 80% of a network's coverage of an event casts the U.S. position in a negative light can that network claim that it is not favoring a position? In other words, that it is objective and unbiased? Nor is CBS alone in its partisan coverage--or for that matter, even the most opinionated. In her 1971 book, The News Twisters, Edith Effron recounts the results of her own independent study of national network news reporting. She chose the 1968 presidential campaign for the basis of her study and analysed about 300,000 spoken words during that period. Like Mr. Lefever's study, Mrs. Effron found that the national network news agencies were marked in their opposition to the American defense of South Vietnam. Using a content analysis approach, Mrs. Effron made the following findings:34 The number of words spoken for and against U.S. policy on the Vietnam War on the networks combined. Click here to view image Even a cursory examination of the above data should place the following remarks by NBC anchorman, David Brinkley into perfect clarity. In a post-war interview, Mr. Brinkley was asked to contrast the reporting of co-anchor Chet Huntley and himself concerning the Vietnam War. Mr. Brinkley's response: "We are two different people. Neither of us is a machine. Huntley's view and my view of the war are somewhat different. I always thought it was an atrocity. I don't think he thought that." Mr. Brinkley was then asked if his view of the war did in fact come through in his news stories. His reply was: "Yes it did come out very clearly."35 It is apparent also that as reporters and corporate entities change, there is also a varying degree of partisanism through the years. This was throughly documented in George Arthur Bailey's dissertation, The Vietnam War According to Chet, David, Walter, Harry, Peter, Bob, Howard and Frank, and accounts in large part for the varying degrees of advocacy during the long war. Another researcher, author-analyst Dr. Edward J. Epstein, says that the three national network news programs are "loaded with bias," due in large part to the liberal views of a small group of men who have final authority about what is actually broadcast. He makes the following points: 1. Virtually all our national news is filtered through and controlled by a group of men in one city, New York. 2. Most national-news footage is drawn from just four metropolitan centers - New York, Washington, Chicago, Los Angeles. 3. National "news" is, in fact, routinely created by starting with general hypothesis rather than actual happenings. 4. Events that are visually exciting are more likely to get air time than others which may be equally or more significant.36 These are some of the same themes that Vice-President Agnew commented on in November 1969. In the midst of the Vietnam War, Mr. Agnew accused the three national networks with biased coverage on a number of subjects, including the Vietnam policies of the United States Government. The networks were also denounced as being biased against Richard Nixon and in favor of war protestors, by virtue of their own broadcast opinions and those of others selected for transmission.37 As might be expected, the networks are not eager to concede to unbalanced and partisan reporting--especially after Mr. Agnew's pointed criticism and the strong public support that followed. But before Mr. Agnew's speech NBC producer Shad Northshield was willing to admit: "Bias is on everybody's mind. We've claimed we don't have it. And the viewers say: 'Yes, you do.' I was stunned by the public reaction to (television coverage of the anti-war riots in) Chicago. We all were. I was stunned, astonished, hurt. It was the key thing that opened my eyes to the cleavage between newsmen and the majority."38 Afterward Mr. Agnew's charges however, only ABC commentator Howard K. Smith was willing to go to record supporting those contentions. In February, 1970 interview in T.V. Guide, Mr. Smith made the following indictments: On the Vietnam War: The networks have never given a complete picture of the war. For example: That terrible seige at Khe Sanh went on for five weeks before newsmen revealed that the South Vietnamese were fighting at our sides, and that they had higher casualties. And the Viet Cong's casualties were 100 times ours. But we were never told that. We just showed pictures day after day of Americans getting the hell kicked out of them. That was enough to break America apart. That's also what it did. Ho Chi Minh: Many have described Ho Chi Minh as a nationalist leader comparable to George Washington. But his advent to power, in 1954, was marked by the murder of 50,000 of his people. His consistent method was terror. He was not his country's George Washington--he was more like his country's Hitler or Stalin .... I heard an eminent T.V. commentator say: 'It's an awful thing when you can trust Ho Chi Minh more than you can trust your President.' At the time he said that, Ho Chi Minh was lying! He was presiding over atrocities! And yet an American T.V. commentator could say that! The Viet Cong: The Viet Cong massacred 3,000 Vietnamese at Hue alone - a massacre that dwarfs all allegations about My Lai. This was never reported on. 39 Documentaries are a form of news, and are often presented to provide indepth coverage of topics too complex to be fully aired during the nightly thirty minute broadcasts. The descriptive title "documentary" strongly implies a treatment of a subject in an objective fashion. Random House Dictionary defines it as "portraying and interpreting an actual event, life of a real person, etc., in a factual, usually dramatic form." In reality, however, documentaries "factual" basis is woven into a theme intended to convey a particular point of view. The many means of doing this are the subject of the sub-chapter to follow, but consider these evaluations from observers of the television industry, such as Robert F. Wagner, writing in Audio-Visual Review: "it grows naturally and inevitably out of the beliefs and feelings of someone involved in the production - a writer, the director, the producer, the editor"40 (italics mine). This is hardly a definition of "objectivity." Gerald V. Flannery, in an article entitled, "The Documentary as Essay," discussed the evolution of the documentary into the Vietnam War era: "The documentary thus became the vehicle for the essayist to broaden his communication with the general public."41 And Author Barron, in a 1969 examination entitled, "Traditions of Documentary," concluded: "Finally, these films advocate; they take a position 'for' or 'against' something .... Sometimes the advocacy is muted, cloaked in subtle pretension of 'balance' or 'objectivity.' Sometimes the films are openly propagandistic."42 The CBS documentary, "The Selling of the Pentagon," is generally regarded as the nadir of fair, objective reporting, although it may yield that distinction in the yet-to-be-litigated libel trial of General William Westmoreland versus CBS. In this documentary, The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception, even CBS' own management had to conclude that the network's charge of "conspiracy" by Westmoreland was unfounded, that unfair advantage had been given to Westmoreland's accusers, and that material supportive of the General's position had been suppressed.43 The Uncounted Enemy is an example of a "compilation of facts" that are skillfully arranged to "prove" a point. Jay Leyda, who has researched this type of documentary, has this to say about the objectivity of this form of news: No doubt, though, that "documentary"; and "compilation" have one element in common: manipulation of actuality. This manipulation, no matter what its motive --art, propaganda, instruction, advertise- ment--usually tries to hide itself so that the spectator sees only "reality"--that is, the especially arranged reality that suits the film-maker's purpose.44 So the question remains--not is television news slanted, but how? Molding Perception News is what I say it is. Its something worth knowing by my standards. NBC Anchorman David Brinkley TV Guide Interview, April 11, 1964 Mr. Brinkley's comment, arrogant though it may be, is nonetheless candid and educational. It is vivid reminder that the 7:00 o'clock news is not a pure rendition of events, but is in fact a product of the efforts of a large number of human beings, many of them highly opinionated. Recalling that the Fairness Doctrine and the Television Code of the National Association of Broadcasters place significant restrictions on the ability of the networks to proselytize openly, how then can the individuals who convey the news influence public perception in a direction of their choice? Before that question is answered, it is useful to review a few fundamentals of news gathering and reporting are in order. Edith Effron places the process into a human perspective: The event selected for coverage is a matter of choice; the issues covered are a matter of choice; the facts isolated are a matter of choice; the number and kinds of participants in the event who are interviewed are a matter of choice; the authorities and experts cited in the story are a matter of choice; the number and extent of their opinions included in the story are a matter of choice; the interpretation and explanations of the event are a matter of choice; the theories about the causes of the event and any proposed solutions to problems are a matter of choice.45 The people who make these choices are often referred to as "gatekeepers," a term first used during the 1940's by social-psychologist Kurt Lewin to describe those individuals who controlled a channel through which items flowed. These gatekeepers made decisions at various points about which items would continue to the ultimate destination, which would get shunted aside, and generally exercised judgement about the shape the final product would take. Lewin's concept was primarily about the movement of food and other types of supplies, but he also mentioned its application to the flow of news items through the media process.46 It is vitally important to remember that these gate- keepers are the reporters, editors, writers and anchormen of the television news industry; and that these individuals were, in the main, more liberal and anti-war than the general public; and by their choices were profoundly affecting the public's perception of national and inter- national events. A textbook example of this is presented in Mark Fishman's 1980 book, Manufacturing the News. In the chapter entitled "Assembling a Crime Wave," Mr. Fishman recounts how the media in New York City went about creating a public perception of a crisis in "crime against the elderly" that lasted for about seven weeks. During that time all the media gave almost daily accounts of frightening and brutal assaults against senior citizens, mostly by violent juveniles. The various types of media picked up the theme from each other and vied to give the most thorough coverage of this new phenomona that seemed to have sprung up suddenly in their midst. Naturally, all of this did not go unnoticed by the public: The public outcry against these crimes was almost immediate. The Mayor of New York vowed to make the streets safe for the elderly. He denounced the Juvenile Justice System and allocated more man- power to a special police squad focusing on elderly victimization. Bills were introduced to the state legislature to increase punishment for violent juvenile offenders. Community meetings were held on the problem. Months later, a nation- wide poll showed that fear of this new kind of crime was widespread.47 Of course, the aforementioned were given extensive coverage also. All of this occurred even though there had been no change in official crime statistics, and by some accounts this type of crime had actually decreased from the previous year. What had happened was that like-minded people had picked up a theme, had given it widespread coverage, mutually reinforced it, and soon had everyone convinced that New York was in the midst of a major crime wave. There are two critical elements to this event: 1. Everything the media reported was true (even though the great majority of what they presented was a result of their own publicity). 2. There was no great conspiracy among the media outlets to create this event. What we have seen here is simply a matter of selectivity (choice) being exercised. The power of this authority to "set the agenda" cannot be underestimated. Although the networks are almost required to report on such "obligatory" events as a major battle, a presidential election, an assassination, and other consensus news events, there is still a very great degree of flexibility in overall selection. And it is this flexibility which allows a subtle expression of viewpoint to be aired. Consider these statements on selectivity by some of the gatekeepers themselves. John Secondari, ABC: "Its absolutely impossible to write a broadcast or put together pictures without having a point of view." Gerald Green, NBC: "It's impossible not to have a point of view. Once you start selecting facts and choosing what and whom to put on the air, a point of view is implicit." Quincy Howe, former President of the Association of Radio - TV News Analysts: "All news presented on radio and TV editorializes. The newscaster editorial- izes in what he emphasizes and what he plays down in what he omits and what he includes."48 Even the seemingly "obligatory" events are open to manipulation. One might think that commonly observed events would result in a unanimity of coverage. That is probably correct were it not for the human element. As an illustration, the following chart indicates the number of stories on Vietnam read by CBS and ABC anchormen each week for a year and half period:49 Click here to view image Was the level of activity in Vietnam increasing during a particular month? Or decreasing? Take your pick, its all a matter of how a network chose to depict the war at any given point. How extreme is this one sided coverage? During 1972-1973, when the Soviet Union was engaged in an unprecedent peacetime buildup, CBS Evening News presented only one minute to the comparative military situation between the United States and the U.S.S.R. But CBS did, in this same period, manage to find time to present 141 minutes of problems within the U.S. military--including 1:50 minutes devoted to missing tableware at Pentagon cafeterias. Small wonder that even an openminded viewer would develop an anti-military sentiment and question the value and effectiveness of the Armed Forces as a whole.50 Not only is the amount of coverage selected for broadcast a critical factor in molding the news, but the type of news selected is of equal importance. Television is essentially an action medium and strongly favors combat scenes over a dry recitation of facts and figures. In Vietnam this came to be called "shooting bloody," a preference for footage of dramatic engagements, even though they were often irrelevent or uncharacteristic of the total event. Thomas M. McNulty, in his Doctoral Dissertation on documentaries of the Vietnam War, described it this way: On the basis of interview evidence it appears that while there were no overt demands for battle footage, subtle pressures from editors indicated a preference for this type of coverage. As Morely Safer and William Small of CBS characterized the pattern, if another network aired exciting battle footage, the Vietnam correspon- dent for the network that missed the event inevitably received a cable inquiry as to his whereabouts at the time of the battle.51 The impact of these bloody scenes will be the subject of a subsequent chapter. When the military chooses to include or exclude a particular scene from broadcast, it is called "censorship." When the media does the same thing, it is called "editing." Closely related to selectivity of subjects is the selectivity of opinions. Since the networks are primarily "chroniclers of controversy," there is an enormous opportunity to sway perceptions by the opinions that are aired on any given subject. Opinion sampling can take a number of different forms. Most common are the opinions of individuals who are reacting to a particular issue. In another method, reporters often summarize the thoughts of unnamed but opinionated people, usually groups, with comments that typically begin with such phrases as "Insiders here today believe ...." or "Veteran obervers feel that the outcome is only a matter of time .... "; less common is an overt opinion ventured by the reporter or anchorman himself, for taking an easily identifiable position is hampered by the restrictions (although not prohibitions) of the Fairness Doctrine of the F.C.C.. How effective is selectivity of opinion in molding perceptions? Edith Effron comments: Freedom in the realm of opinion coverage is the single most powerful weapon in the editorial armament, because it is the most hidden weapon. It is the only editorial device that allows a news agency or reporter to proselytize freely, even passionately while saying nothing directly.52 Thus we find such situations as CBS devoting an unknown Yale graduate student six sentences on the Evening News to accuse South Vietnam President Thieu of involvement in heroin trade, with no rebuttal from the other side. Or, during the 1972 bombing campaign, Jane Fonda was given thirteen sentences to denounce U.S. policy, while Bob Hope, who supported the bombing was given no opportunity to present his opinions.53 There are hundreds of more examples in the literature that document the use of this covert editorial device. Dr. Lefever concludes, after extensive and detailed analysis, that the subject of his study, CBS, "sought out spokemen at home and abroad who expressed similar (anti-war) views and that CBS News ignored or failed to seek our opposing views."54 And there is no indication that the other networks were any more fair. Other techniques for slanting the news are many and varied. Edith Effron, in The News Twisters, identifies 33 different methods for introducing bias into reporting. To document them all, plus others which are just as common would be worthy of a book in itself, but some of the more influential are worthy of exposition. The Closing Statement. One of the favorite techniques of broadcasters is to try to mold opinions by leaving the audience with a statement or scene that reflects the reporter's real feelings. An excellent example occurred recently during the U.S. Marine withdrawal from Beirut in February of 1984. SCENE: After documenting an ongoing deterioration of cease fires in the Lebanese factional fighting, switch to domestic news. Present footage of the various activities of President Reagan on a day when the White House was open to the press. Conclude with photo of Reagan in mock arm wrestling contest with visiting body-builder in Oval Office--comment: "Meanwhile, in an adjacent room, aides grappled with the problems of how to extricate the Marines from Lebanon." Pause for effect, fade to commercial. The message could not have been plainer if it had been written in foot high letters: "Reagan fiddles while Rome (Lebanon) burns." Notice that all events depicted were true. The slanting is simply in the arrangement and presentation, along with the final, guiding statement. Not all reports are slanted, but if you want to find out how the journalist really feels on the subject, watch the closing comments carefully. "Controversial." A common technique to undermine the confidence and credibility of the public in an individual, policy, institution or device is to label it "contro- versial." This is a pejorative word that stigmatizes the subject of the discussion in the public mind and causes a loss of faith in it. Examples: "this controversial new weapons system ....", "the controversial strategic hamlets program ...." Let us pause for a moment--everything which is important enough to get air time on national TV is controversial. There is simply no subject or person worthy of network news which does not make some portion of our 230 million citizens irate. This is ignored by the news media, which labels as "controversial" only those subjects or people to whom it is ideologically opposed. It then seeks to build upon that label by seeking out those opinions which illustrate controversy, often by use of reaction interviews. ("What is your reaction to the President's announcement that he intends to renew the bombing of North Vietnam?") These people do not line up uninvited down at the television studio to give interviews; they are sought out and used to justify the network's definition of controversial. Exaggerated Significance. During the Vietnam War it was routine for the networks to enlarge the significance of events or people so as to further anti-war sentiment or drama. Thus, if Hubert Humphrey or Richard Nixon gave an hour long speech, two minutes of which was interrupted by the jeering of a small number of dissidents, you could be certain that those would be the two minutes chosen by the networks for the news that night. With the events all out of context and no corrective interpretation offered, it would appear that the unpopular speaker was surrounded by a public overwhelmingly opposed to him. There are only 22 minutes of news in each networks prime time news broadcasts; the spoken words, if written, would not even fill the front page of The New York Times. The public, although probably not specifically aware of the two aforementioned facts, does know that air time is extremely limited and valuable, and therefore does not expect it to be devoted to aberrations. When it is, these anomalies are given vastly more import and attention than they deserve. The distinguished military historian S.L.A. Marshall said about typical Vietnam coverage: Today's average correspondent prefers a piece that will make people on the home front squirm and agonize. Never before, in any war, has there been so much concentration on the offbeat yarn to the exclusion of a balanced accounting of how operations are being conducted.55 A M.A.C.V. Public Affairs Officer saw it, too: "Out of 315 successful bombing sorties one hung bomb causing casualities in a school yard meant a sure headline with little or no reference made to the success of the others."56 This predilection to exaggerating the frequency or degree of the war's uglier sidelights led to a gross distortion of the public's perception. Covert Editorials. A number of newsmen have previously been quoted admitting that their personal opinions were interjected into the news. One of their favorite ways of doing this is by the "covert editorial," usually only a sentence or two phased within a newscast, designed to influence the viewer's judgement on a particular piece. In purely factual terms, they are almost always true--but are they relevant and objective? Examine this carefully worded segment by Chet Huntley on August 14, 1969. Last week, before the resumption of the fighting, the number of American men killed in Vietnam fell to the lowest level in two years. 96 Americans ... most of them young men ... were killed. And the enemy, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, are said to have had more than 2,200 men killed, but there is no way of knowing how accurate that count is.57 The term "most of them young men," is no doubt accurate. There is also no doubt it was placed there solely to create and reinforce anti-war sentiment. The phrase "but there is no way of knowing how accurate that count is," was designed to cast doubt on the honesty and accuracy of American military officials. This was also Walter Cronkite's intent on April 25, 1966, when he used the following words: Today North Vietnam accused American planes of strafing the city's suburbs. Despite Washington denials that the United States is escalating the war, Hanoi may interpret differently the bomb bursts on its outskirts.58 On December 19, 1969, ABC anchorman Frank Reynolds decided to stir anti-war passion with this little closet editorial: ... He [Reynolds] said that the weekly casualty scores were "duly recited statistics" which remained "just numbers" to most people. He then introduced a film which showed an American family receiving a dead son back home. After the film Reynolds said, "the numbers mean a little more now, don't they?"59 In March of 1968 a minor committee testimony on alleged corruption by South Vietnamese officials was used by David Brinkley to express his personal sentiments: So the Senate now will investigate, but about all it can do is make the facts public. Beyond that its only power would be to stop sending aid to Vietnam and the only way to do that is to stop the war.60 The last phrase, "stop the war," was not Senate testimony or comments, but was interjected by Brinkley to sway public opinion towards an American withdrawal. It was also effective in strongly implying that the United States was soley the cause and perpetuation of the war. Mr. Brinkley was also well known for casting doubt on the integrity and judgement of American armed forces, as in this report: The U.S. military command, after saying repeatedly for months it would defend the base at Khe Sanh at whatever cost was necessary, said today it was giving it up and moving its operations ten miles to the east to a place called Landing Zone Stud. The reasons given were not anymore clear than those put forward for holding it in the first place.61 The last sentence, of course, is Mr. Brinkley's personal indictment designed to build resentment and doubt about the military. These examples of covert editorials, and countless other unrecorded ones, reached millions of Americans and were a powerful factor in molding sentiment against the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. Overt (but unlabeled) Editorials. Some comments by broadcasters were so strongly opinionated and blatantly pejorative they could scarcely be called anything but editorials. Of course, they never were, but instead were mixed into the "objective" reporting. Walter Cronkite, reporting from Vietnam on February 29, 1968, delivered the following piece: Three weeks ago President Johnson demanded and received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff the assurance that Khe Sanh could be held. In Vietnam no one to whom this reporter talked, including the highest officials were so certain. All without exception hedged on such assurance. And among lower echelons there was great and admirable fortitude. But one sensed little conviction. Since its useful- ness as a roadblock and forward base has been vastly diminished, it can be assumed that Khe Sanh is now mostly a symbol. But of what? Pride? Morale? Bravery? Or administrative intransigence and military miscalculation?62 Hardly encouraging words for America's fighting men hunkered down at Khe Sanh. Keep in mind that this was presented as straight news, with no label of "analysis", "commentary", interpretation", or "editorial" whatever. David Brinkley contributed this unlabeled editorial on June 26, 1969: The President said at his news conference last week that the only thing that had been settled when he came to office was the shape of the [peace negotiations] table. Well, in the five months since then they have used the table in the shape agreed on, settled nothing and in Vietnam the war and the killing continues. Today in Saigon they announced the casualty figures for the week. And though they come out in the form of numbers, each of them was a man, most of them quite young, each with hope he will never realize, each with families and friends who will never see him alive again. Anyway, these are the numbers.63 He then read the numbers. It is difficult to imagine this kind of anti-war sentiment being broadcast nationwide during World War II, for example, but it was not uncommon during the Vietnam War era, and pacifist advocacy journalism is what makes that war unique. Walter Cronkite offered one of the most innovative unlabeled editorials after the TET offensive of 1968. In a forerunner of today's "videos" he played the Kenny Rogers' song "Ruby", about a crippled and dying Vietnam War veteran who had returned home. As a backdrop for such song phrases as "... a man whose legs are bent and paralyzed," and "...that old crazy Asian War," was shown a sampling of every bloody and tragic scence that had occurred in the war to date. The poignancy of the song was hammered home by picture after picture of bleeding American soldiers, children's anguished faces, flattened towns, etc. Mr. Cronkite then closes with a grim expression on his face and the familiar, "And that's the way it is." All very moving and powerful, and included for no other reason than to affect the audience's perceptions and sway their emotions. This was recognized by Lieutenant Colonel Chandler Goodnow, et al, then a student at the U.S. Army War College, in a 1969 research project. He summarizes his findings of media coverage of the TET offensive: There is no evidence of any significant distortion of the facts by the press. However, judgements based on the avail- able facts frequently resulted in inaccurate interpretations of events. All of the media generally reported the truth. Problems arose in the interpretation and judgements about those facts. When the press was correct and the government had erred, the media, of course, called attention to that fact. But in cases where press judgements turned out to be incorrect, these errors were seldom admitted. The most negative interpretations were developed on the editorial pages of newspapers and magazines and by the television networks. Two of the major networks evinced a policy of interpreta- tion as well as reporting the news. Combined with the narrow view of the television camera, this type of editorial policy had a powerful impact on the manner in which the TET offensive was portrayed to the people.64 The tendency for journalists to "interpret" the war news increased as the war went on. Research by George Arthur Bailey of the University of Wisconsin showed clear-cut degradations of straight, unadorned reporting. He writes: ... all three networks increased their interpretive stories as the years passed towards 1970. In the 1965/1966 period, ABC wrote interpretive stories 13% of the time; by the 1969/1970 period 44% of stories were interpretive. CBS showed a less dramatic but constant change from 37% to 48%. NBC doubled its interpretation from 28 to 58% ... The cause for the rise in interpretive writing could only be a change in the actual practice by the anchormen and their writers.65 The replacement of straightforward, objective reporting by "advocacy journalism" is a significant development in the news industry. It is insidious, but no less powerful, when masked by the aforementioned techniques, a blend of "news and views" that unfairly favors anti-war sentiments. And because of its covert character it is much easier for the networks to defend. Only when the total range of methods and frequencies of occurrence are viewed comprehensively does the magnitude of the effort become apparent. To briefly summarize the chapter, we have seen that objectivity is the stated corporate position of the networks; that this goal is routinely subverted; and some of the methods slanting the news were documented. The effect that all of this had on the American population is the subject of the next chapter. CHAPTER IV THE IMPACT OF TELEVISION WAR COVERAGE, AND THE PRESS IN A FREE SOCIETY With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it, nothing can succeed. Consequently, he who molds public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. Abraham Lincoln The Living Room War ... This is the first war in this nation's history that has been fought on television were the actors are real. Where, in the quiet of your living room of your home, or your dormitory, or wherever you may be, these cruel, ugly dirty facts of life and death in war and pain and suffering come right to you; and it isn't Hollywood acting. I've had letters from mothers that have seen their boys shotdown in battle ...66 Vice President Hubert Humphrey In order to assess the impact of television on the war in Vietnam it is important to keep in mind that the chief victim of the war was not the U.S. soldier or America's war fighting capability, but the morale and willpower of the American public. How did this public come to change its collective mind, and where did we get our information? Elected public officials, from the President on down, were almost uniformly optimistic about the prosecution of the war, so a change in public attitude would not seem to be attributable to this source. Military officers and spokesmen were positive about our efforts, and this attitude was prevalent all through the ranks as well. According to a 1980 Veterans Administration study, 71% of those Vietnam vets surveyed said they were glad to have gone to Vietnam; 74% claimed to have enjoyed their tour there; and 66% expressed a willingness to go back again.67 So this would not seem to be the source of disaffection. The war did not pose any great hardships on the home front, indeed, under President Johnson's "Great Society" initiatives, conditions for many Americans actually improved. And, as wars go, casualities were exceptionally light, a year's fatalities far short of approaching the annual deaths caused by automobile accidents. The answer, as must be obvious, is that the public's information about the war was obtained, to a very great degree, from the media, a media that was buttressed for the first time by a new and powerful medium, television. The power and impact of television was the deciding factor in turning American opinion from one of supporting the U.S. defense of South Vietnam to one of opposing it. In an article entitled "Dangerous to Your Health," columnist Michael Novak conveyed his interpretation of the grist of television news: Television does not tell you anything you could not learn more fully and in context from the papers, and the best magazines. What then does television add? In a word, impact. To watch television news is to submit to wallops in the solar plexus. The moving pictures on the news are not pruned from reels of tape for the sake of calmness and object- ivity. They are chosen for power.68 Impact. Without doubt, war was made to order for television. It has all the elements of visual drama: life and death struggles in vivid color, raw emotions readily visible, triumphs and tragedy. The two most famous filmed sequences of the war were the point blank execution by pistol shot to the head of a Viet Cong prisoner during the Battle of Hue, 1968; and the film of the little Vietnamese girl running naked down the road, her clothes burned from her body by napalm from an attacking South Vietnamese plane during the 1972 Communist offensive. Ironically, neither of these incidents involved any American participation, and their impact in Vietnam was minimal. In the United States, however, the impact of these scenes was tremendous, and uniformly negative. Practically everyone old enough to have viewed the news during those years remembers those scenes, and others like them, with a combination of revulsion and disgust. This is the essence of television, impact. Those same scenes described in print would evoke only a fraction of the emotion produced by the vivid footage. The response of the American public ran along the lines of, "We are over there mixed up in all this and its horrible and we have got to get out." Click here to view image TET, The Turning Point Much the same reaction was accorded to the 1968 TET Offensive. If this event had been reported as the great allied victory that it was, it could have significantly bolstered American confidence and undermined Hanoi's morale. Instead, exactly the opposite happened; it was conveyed by the American media as an Allied defeat, undermining American confidence and bolstering the North Vietnamese's morale. Much of this was due to the warped perceptions of the press itself. As General Bruce Clark said, the enemy "took the battle down around the Caravelle Hotel [press billeting], and so, from the standpoint of the average reporter over there, it was like the acorn that fell on the chicken's head and it said 'The sky is falling!'"69 Another General, Harold K. Johnson, then Chief of Staff of the Army summed up the whole TET offensive: ... loss of confidence after the recent TET offensive was just about the reverse of what it should have been. After the dust of battle had settled down, it was very easy to see that we and our South Vietnamese ally fared very well indeed. The young South Vietnamese government held fast--in fact, more erect than even the South Vietnamese expected of a three month old infant. Its army fought generally well, and, in many cases, extremely well. Few defections from the man on the street, and none identified from the Army or the government. The enemy's losses were staggering, and he did not attain a single objective. But what happened here in the United States? We suffered a smashing, catastrophic psychological defeat--a defeat which we imposed on ourselves.70 TET 1968, or at least the televised perception of it, proved to be the watershed event of the Vietnam War. It had immediate political implications in the 1968 Presidential campaign and provided the catalyst for discarding what little remained of the impartiality of the reporters and anchormen covering the war. They were, by the end of TET, cynical and dovish, and they conveyed this to the American public. Walter Cronkite was regarded nationally at the time as the one person in the entire country who most of the public could "trust wholeheartedly" (73%, compared to Nixon and Humphrey at 57% each).71 You cannot underestimate the impact on the American public, including the government and media itself, when Mr. Cronkite, after returning from a first hand assessment of the TET offensive, said: I think that it is time for us to face the facts in Vietnam--that we are in a no-win situation and it is time for us to get out ... We came here with the best of intentions--and we failed.72 Not "lets exploit our victory", or "press the advantage," but "get out ... we failed." His statements, and others like them, were not lost on America. From then on there would be no talk of "winning" in Vietnam, only arguments over the best way of getting out. General William Westmoreland, surveying the war in retrospect, wrote in disgust: "Press and television created an aura not of victory but of defeat, which, coupled with vocal anti-war elements, profoundly influenced timid officials in Washington."73 There are a number of lessons to be learned from all of this. One is that there is no reason to suspect that the media will abandon its anti-military mentality and slanted reporting. Short of a full-scale invasion of the United States, it will continue its traditional and self-generated adversary relationship. In peacetime this is mostly bearable, but as has been shown previously, it will have a profound impact on the American public during conflicts yet to come. Expect the worst and you won't be far wrong, if the military's victimization in Vietnam is any guide. The Press in a Free Society We are all familiar with scenes of corruption and profiteering in Vietnam as is typically described here: About thirty thousand tons of freight are landed daily. But roughly half of it is stolen or left to rot on the warves. During my visit there, I saw crates that had been unloaded upside down or broken, and equipment rusting from neglect. The components of a complete French cement plant, still in their containers, had been languishing on a dock for two years. The congestion is ghastly--and deliberate. Customs and harbor officials require bribes. Ships must also bribe the authorities to discharge their cargoes, and the illicit tariff is fixed. Japanese vessels, which can afford the top fee of five thousand dollars, usually turnaround in three or four days. The less affluent linger for a month, sometimes six months.74 Corruption of this type was a regular and common staple of the media's coverage of the Vietnam War. Only in the case above, it was not South Vietnam being described but North Vietnam, by Stanley Karnow in an 1980 visit. It is educational and instructive to learn that graft and corruption is, and had been, endemic and pervasive in North Vietnam. Unfortunately for the American public's benefit, this news is coming about fifteen years too late. This is one of the learning points of the Vietnam War. American journalists scurried hither and yon about the South, reporting innumerable instances of corruption, inefficiency, drug use and prostitution, as well as any military blunders or accidents. All of this served to paint a very negative image of a corrupt and repressive society aided and abetted by the U.S. presence, an image that was conveyed not only to the American public, but around the world. North Vietnam, of course, had no such image problem, because its tightly controlled media wasn't allowed to film or print anything damaging to their war effort. And when foreign correspondents were allowed into North Vietnam, it was only after they, and their previous writings, had been carefully scrutinized and deemed acceptable. This, plus the average journalist's gratitude about being granted almost an exclusive privilege of admission to the country virtually assured favorable foreign press coverage. Of course, while not allowing free and open press coverage in their own country, totalitarian governments do not hesitate for a moment to blast the U.S. military and American policies. A closed society, as our opponents so often are, can count on a free and unfettered media such as ours to "shoot our own wounded"--while they reap the benefits on the international stage. Barry Rubin, writing in International News and the American Media describes the image change of South Vietnam: After the last U.S. reporters were forced out of South Vietnam, coverage changed quickly. Throughout 1974, front page stories focused on the Thieu regime's repression and corruption. Following the September 1975 expulsions, there were fewer and smaller stories playing up peace, prosperity, and unity under Communist rule. The reason for this was the lack of correspondents on the scene and the absence of demonstrations or even of a semi-free Saigon press to provide "negative news." The most ironic fact was that total and efficient suppression has proven to be the most reliable way to convey an image of freedom through the media.75 So the foibles of America and her allies remain in the spotlight of her own and the enemy press, while those our opponents are largely cloaked in darkness. Small wonder that the American public would doubt the soundness of U.S. positions in foreign conflicts. Impact on the American Psyche. Unique among America's conflicts, the War in Vietnam was widely perceived as an "immoral" war, a belief held by 65% of the American public by the end of our involvement. This was due in large part to any number of questionable activities that went on there. But was it "immoral?" Evaluate these vignettes: The American advisor was with his unit on a long range patrol deep into guerrilla controlled territory. They halted on the banks of a river to make preparations to cross. As the American advisor and his provincial counterpart stood and conferred, a local peasant astride a handsome white horse appeared on the opposite shore. The American Captain remarked aloud, "A wonderful horse. I'd surely like to have him." The advisor's counterpart spoke a few words in the local dialect, and a shot rang out. The peasant toppled from the horse and splashed into the river in a pool of blood. The stunned advisor turned and said, "Did you order that man shot?" The reply: "Hell, sir. You said you wanted the horse. Anything the Captain says is our command. We have discipline here, sir."76 Another scene, this time with American Marines on a search and destroy mission deep in the jungle: It was only twenty miles by air, but it seemed like hundreds on the rough trail. The C.O. kept the pace fast and the men were constantly wet from rain or sweat. The few enemy they found were diseased and crippled wretches who were too weak to pull themselves off the trail. The Marines bayoneted them all, not wasting any bullets. The C.O. wrote later in his after action report: "The pig-sticking was fine."77 It can scarcely be argued that the aforementioned incidents reflected any great concern for morality. Horrible as they might be, however, these incidents did not occur in the Vietnam War, but during U.S. Marine campaigns in Haiti in the 1920's, and on Cape Gloucester, New Guinea, during World War II. The American leader in both cases was Lewis B. (Chesty) Puller, winner of five Navy Crosses and a future Lieutenant General. The point of relating all of this is that nothing happened in the Vietnam War that had not occurred, either in degree or frequency, in any other war in which Americans had fought. What then, accounts for this perception of the Vietnam War being immoral? To many civilians it is axiomatic that the Vietnam War was the cruelest ever waged. To those of us who experienced war first hand, this is hard to understand. To the evidence of Vietnam cruelty port- rayed by the horrible picture of the little girl running down the road seared with napalm, one asks about the tens of thousands of little girls incinerated in the fire bomb raids on Dresden and Tokyo in World War II only to be told, "But that was different." To the terrible picture of the Saigon police chief shooting the Viet Cong terrorist, one asks about the summary justice of the French Maquis or the Italian partisans and their photo- graphs of Mussolini and his mistress strung up by their heels, only again to be told, "That was different." To those condemning the remark of the Army captain in the Delta that "We had to destroy the town in order to save it," one quotes the Continental Congress's orders: "If General Washington and his council of war should be of the opinion that a successful attack may be made on the [British] troops in Boston, he [may] do it in any manner he may think expedient, notwithstanding the town and the property in it may thereby be destroyed." Yet again the answer, "That was different." And the critics were right. It was different .... We had concealed from the American people the true nature of war at precisely the time that television brought its realities into their living rooms in living color. As a result, to many Americans Vietnam became the most destructive, the most horrible, the most terrible war ever waged in the history of the world. This viewpoint had persisted in the face of all historical evidence to the contrary.78 The Vietnam War certainly was different. Television had changed, not the nature of war, but the perception of it. More than any other factor it was the television camera that brought home the reality of war that shocked the nation and broke its will. America has not had a war fought on its soil since the Civil War ended in 1865. Its population, save the five percent or so that actually saw combat first hand, had never experienced the tragedy and unspeakable cruelties of war, unlike many of the nations of the world. When the true face of war unfolded before them they watched with growing revulsion and horror. Now, in your living room and in vivid color, this is what napalm really does when it hits someone; this is what happens to a person when he steps on a land mine; this is what dead children look like when collected and stacked up after a rocket attack. This is what war is all about, and the American public was sickened and repulsed by it. War had not changed, but now everyone could see it for what it was. Vice President Humphrey's words revisited: ... this is the first war in this nation's history that has been fought on television were the actors are real. Where, in the quiet of your living room of your home, or your dormitory, or wherever you may be, these cruel, ugly dirty facts of life and death in war and pain and suffering come right to you; and it isn't Holly- wood acting. I've had letters from mothers that have seen their boys shot down in battle .... CHAPTER IV IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE CONFLICTS, AND RECOMMENDED REVISION OF CURRENT TELEVISION POLICIES One wonders if in the future a democracy which has uninhibited television coverage in every home will ever be able to fight a war, however just .... The full brutality of the combat will be there in close up and in color, and blood looks very red on the color television screen.79 BBC Commentator Robin Day It would be of some benefit to speculate what the outcome of the American Civil War might have been had there been a color television in every home in the land, especially in the North. What would have been the impact of seeing firsthand the panicked Union forces running from the enemy at the Battles of Bull Run? What would have been the effect on the support for the war if the draft riots of New York City had reached into as many homes as the Vietnam era March on the Pentagon? Would full visualization of General Sherman's scorched earth march through Georgia, including the "zippo raid" on Atlanta make him remembered as a hero? Or a war criminal? What would have been the effect of vividly portraying even such a relatively minor battle such as Cold Harbor, where 6,000 Union soldiers were cut down in twenty minutes? How much enthusiasm for the war effort would have been left after watching Army surgeons saw off mangled arms and legs, without benefit of anesthesia? It should be clear that these scenes--even if they are fairly and objectively done--would nonetheless have a terrific impact. An we cannot even be guaranteed a fair and unbiased portrayal. The impact that television can convey poses some crucial problems that will inevitably have to be faced at some unknown but foreseeable date. Have we hamstrung overselves, to the enemy's advantage? What if Chesty Puller had had a TV crew along filming the scenes described earlier? Would he have gone on to be the Marine Corps' greatest hero, legendary leader and scourge of the enemy? Most likely he would have gotten cashiered or court-martialed, to the enemy's infinite advantage. This is not to excuse wrongdoing, but serve notice that the advent of massive television coverage on the battlefield will affect not only the lives and careers of our men, but also the public's perception of our forces on an unprecedented scale. Where does all of this leave us? Is it enough just to recognize the leanings of the media and its power? In retrospect, it is easy to see that the unlimited and biased reporting of the Vietnam War severely limited the military's prosecution of it by undermining public support for the cause. It is not a possibility but a probability that this will occur again should the United States go to the defense of another ally. Television is too powerful--it has too much impact, first tending to rally support for Presidential initiatives, but undermining and reversing that support in the long haul. It is clear that if we accept this erosion of public willpower our cause, however just and necessary, is doomed. The enemy knows that he does not have to win the battles to win the war, may in fact lose everyone of them as long as he keeps the war on the television and drags it out interminably. What an enviable position! It is not necessary, however, that we inflict an arbitrary defeat upon ourselves. What we need, contrary to the failed policies of Vietnam, is not Freedom of the Press, but Freedom from the Press. Or, more specifically, freedom from the television camera and its interference. Censorship during war is an established, tried and true method of preventing the enemy from gaining advantage; what is needed is not censorship in its pure sense, though, but an adaptation to fit the times. In our next war the television cameras must stay home. The television reporters themselves can go, along with their print brethren, they just cannot take their cameras with them. They can file written dispatches to the networks or depart from the country to give a filmed account, sans war related footage. Just as jury in a courtroom is not allowed to view inflamatory color blowups of a murder victim due to the irrationalities that this provokes in the minds of the panel, the American public should not use gory battle scenes as the basis for judging the U.S. defense of an ally. It is noteworthy that our Federal court systems prohibit television coverage of their courtroom proceedings entirely. If we can afford these privileges to accused criminals, can we not give these same benefits to America's fighting men? The Fairness Doctrine has already established that television is a unique medium, subject to more stringent rules and restrictions than print journalism; excluding it from the battlefield is simply an extension of that principle. One thing is certain. If we fail to act, if we continue unlimited media coverage in a war zone, something that no other nation on earth permits, America will inevitably suffer from it. We must not fail to learn from the real lesson of the Vietnam War. APPENDIX A A QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE NETWORKS In the course of conducting research for this project I became interested in a number of topics about which there was little or incomplete information available. Accordingly, to satisfy these questions, and to obtain a perspective from the media itself, I composed a question- naire relevant to the subject of this paper and directed it to the three national television networks for completion. ABC and NBC responded, with CBS choosing not to participate. In the questionnaire I addressed, for the most part, specific issues that had occurred to me early in the research project and therefore many of the topics that were developed as this paper progressed were not covered. Although I constructed the questions to elicit measurable and yes/no answers as often as possible, it became apparent that there was a decided reluctance on the part of the networks to answer in that fashion. And finally, I requested that all answers represent the official corporate positions of the network, rather than the opinions of individuals within their bureaucracy. Here then are the questions and responses, with my additional comments. 1. Does the Network have a code of ethics for its coverage of the U.S. military, especially in combat situations? (Prohibitions against showing the faces of dead U.S. servicemen, names of casualities before next of kin are notified, etc.) What I was interested in here was what sort of self- restraint could the military count on from the media itself, not so much in the censorship of national security items, but on a more mundane level. In the aftermath of the media's disgraceful handling of the Beirut bombing incident, this question is of no small consequence. What I had hoped to obtain was a set of printed guidelines that were composed and issued by the news agencies for use by their reporters, editors, and anchormen. Apparently no such Code of Ethics exists. NBC: There is no specific code of ethics for coverage of the U.S. military, other than the general principles we strive to adhere to in all our coverage, i.e., accuracy and fairness. As for combat situations, we do not identify casualties before next of kin are notified and our identification always comes from official military sources. I do not believe we have shown faces of dead U.S. servicemen. ABC: ABC adhered to the guidelines set down by the U.S. Military Command in Vietnam regarding the showing of faces of dead U.S. servicemen and naming of casualties before the next of kin were notified. In any future military operation, I would expect that those same guidelines would be promulgated by the Department of Defense and ABC News would, of course, respect them. The learning point here is that the networks are going to set as limits only that which is externally imposed upon them. 2. Does the Network utilize film reports from news crews of foreign countries or other sources not affiliated with CBS news? If so, what specific measures are taken to insure the authenticity and accuracy of these products? This question comes to mind from reading Stanley Karnow's book Vietnam, A History, in which he relates that a Time magazine staff correspondent, Phan Xvan An, had been a clandestine Viet Cong agent all throughout the war--unknown to Karnow, and also, to his superiors at Time. Hardly the source of an objective news report. It is a common occurrence to see and hear foreign photo-journalists collecting our news. What mechanisms are utilized to ensure the veracity of these men and their products? Apparently, not many. NBC: We have on occasion utilized film reports from crews of foreign countries but these are normally from countries where we have arrangements with broad- casting entities such as the BBC, etc. If we have doubts about the authenticity of the reports, we would not air them but we have not found any reason to be suspicious. I should point out that we are dealing with professionals, not amateurs. ABC: Many employees of ABC news are not native- born Americans. This is particularly true of the staffers in our foreign news bureaus. They are supervised by management persons in the same way that any other employee is supervised and they adhere to the same high standards of accuracy we impose on all our employees. We have considerable experience with employing foreigners as staff photo- journalists and have never had an occasion to question their accuracy. It should be noted that Time never questioned the accuracy of Phan Xvan An's dispatches either. 3. What support and/or information does the Network desire from U.S. authorities in a war zone? (Transportation, food, briefings, etc.) Do you believe the U.S. military is legally bound to provide these services? In this case I was interested in what the media actually wanted from the military beyond simple admission to the war zone, and what they perceived as mandatory services. NBC: I do not know whether the U.S. military is legally bound to provide services such as food, briefings, etc. I doubt that it is but I would suspect that you would find very few people in the Pentagon who would find something wrong in providing briefings or information. That is the traditional way of getting information to the public. Our major combat zone requirement is one of communications logistics, i.e., a means of transmitting material. Obviously, we pay for whatever charges are billed including food, lodging, etc. ABC: In regard to Question 3, ABC requires no logistical support from U.S. authorities in a war zone. Ideally we wish to provide our own transportation, food and lodging and we did this to a large degree in Vietnam. Occasionally it was necessary or desirable to look to the military to help with trans- tion, particularly helicopters. In covering Naval operations, of course, it is impractical to travel aboard anything but a U.S. ship but we pay for what assistance is provided to us and would expect to do so in any battle- field environment. We do not believe the U.S. military has any legal obligation to provide logistical support to anyone but their own members. It is of some comfort to learn that the networks do pay for services received. 4. Concerning television coverage of United States forces in combat: A. Censorship by U.S. government officials while American armed forces are in combat is justified: (1) Never (2) Only if the safety of U.S. troops is jeopardized. (3) If important advantage will be gained by the enemy, not directly related to the safety of U.S. troops. (As determined by an impartial panel) (4) Always (5) Other B. Does the Network employ censorship? If so, what specific standards are utilized? Here I wanted to take a moral measure of the networks, to see if they held anything more dear than freedom of the press. If they do, they are not willing to admit it. This has very serious implications for the country's security if we find ourselves in another conflict where no government censorship is imposed. ABC: The answer to Question 4 takes far more than checking on a multiple choice form. Censorship is anathema to any news organization. We are in the business of providing information to the public, not withholding it. NBC: The media have always abided by military censorship when imposed for national security reasons. I should point out that censorship historically has not meant denying all media access. And censorship should be imposed only when there is a statutory basis for its use. The only censorship employed by NBC is on the basis of good taste. In regards to the last comment by NBC, one has only to recall the 1980 news film of an Iranian with the charred skull of an American soldier in his lap picking away at it with a pocketknife. So much for "good taste." 5. Concerning Network television news crews: A. What criteria are used to select those news crew members who are sent into combat zones? B. Do correspondents/news crews receive special remuneration or other incentive awards for footage actually utilized on network broadcasts? Since one of the frequent complaints about coverage of the Vietnam War was that many of the journalists were ill qualified and didn't understand what they were seeing, I used this question to determine on what basis correspondents were selected. Apparently there are no set standards other than the judgement of the network management. NBC: (a) Combat zone coverage is voluntary and we do not assign any news crew which does not wish to go. (b) There are no awards, incentives, or bonuses for anybody in any position at NBC for footage actually utilized on newscasts. There is increased insurance and combat zone pay for working in combat zones but nothing else. ABC: Question 5(A) is difficult to answer in that each combat situation is some- what different. We have attempted to send Spanish-speaking journalists to El Salvador, for example, because we feel that a language ability is important in that part of the world. In the Middle East different criteria are used. In general we attempt to send people who are in good physical condition, who are experienced in covering combat situations and who have a language ability appropriate to the area in which they are operating. There is no incentive award for footage used on network broadcasts. Part B of this question was prompted by reports in my research that news crews received a bonus for footage actually broadcast during the Vietnam War. Evidently this was not, or no longer is, the case. 6. Due to the immense amount of often conflicting footage from a combat zone and the very limited amount of time available for broadcast, what policies or guidelines are used to determine what material is actuall shown? Here I wanted to find out something about how the networks selected the news actually broadcast, specifically, were there any corporate guidelines promulgated relating to selection/rejection of material shown. Or are the reporters, writers, and editors free to exercise their judgement as to what is and what is not newsworthy? NBC: Question 6 rests on a faulty premise. The amount of footage available from a combat zone on any given day is very limited for a variety of reasons. Normal news judgement is exercised in assembling an account of the activities of the units we have been covering. The criteria brought to bear on military situations is no different from a news judgement situation than in any other news story. ABC: On a daily basis, there is never an immense amount of footage from a combat zone. I do not know what you mean by "conflicting" footage. As for determining what material is shown, these judgements are based on the news value of the particular story, its relation in news value to other stories, and nothing else. These answers were somewhat surprising, since an evening news broadcast is only 22 minutes long, with few pieces running longer than 3 to 5 minutes. The major networks invariably have multiple correspondents in any war zone involving Americans, plus access to foreign news reports, so it would certainly seem they would have large selection of news to choose from. Probably a poorly framed question. 7. The Networks believe that the First Amendment is essential to freedom of the press as we know it. Does it also believe that institutions such as the U.S. Armed Forces make possible the continued existence of our form of government? If so, does CBS feel any obligation to support the American military in anyway (other than objective reporting?) I hesitated at length about including this question, since it makes assumptions, asks for conclusions, and is clearly opinionated. Basically, what I wanted to find out was if there was any realization that the Armed Forces and other government institutions which they have castigated and undermined so often for the past twenty years are ultimately the ones who guarantee the safety of the country--and by extension, the media itself. It was somewhat of a fuzzy question and elicited fuzzy responses. ABC (from a speech by Washington Bureau Chief, Ed Fouhy): The press in our system of government is the constant and critical companion of the government official--a nagging presence, often second guessing, self righteous and sometimes irresponsible ... a difficult institution to defend, but one functioning precisely as the authors of the Bill of Rights thought it should function. Sloppy and dissonant, often unfocused and sometimes dead wrong ... The antithesis of the ideals you embrace and which your profession demands, but nevertheless, every bit so patriotic as you are and every bit a part of American society as God, mother- hood and the flag. NBC: I do not know what you mean by "support the military" in any way. As you know, there are a vast number of persons in Congress, for example, who believe the U.S. Marines should be withdrawn from Lebanon. Are they supporting or opposing the military? There are a great number of institutions', the military, the Supreme Court, the Congress, the Free Press, etc., which makes possible the continued existence of our form of government. Surely you are not trying to dismiss the abiding importance of the electorate in this matter. NBC doesn't know what supporting the military means (which comes as no great surprise), asking if those who believed the Marines should be withdrawn from Lebanon are supporting or opposing the military. The answer, which seems abundantly clear, is that opposition to the Commander in Chief's use of the military is, for all practical purposes, opposition to the military itself. To think otherwise would be to rationalize that Jane Fonda was "supporting" our troops by advocating their withdrawal during her visit to North Vietnam. In any event, there seems to be no great realization that we are all in the same boat together and that they should have an interest in a well supported and well respected Armed Forces. It is evident to me that the nation would have to be faced with a crisis of truly immense proportions to bring that point home to media--for the sake of us all, I hope that it is not too late at that crucial juncture. FOOTNOTES 1Col Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1981), p. 1. 2Joseph A. Amter, Vietnam Verdict (New York: Continuum, 1982), p. 349. 3Ibid, p. 184. 4Maj James P. Kehoe, The Impact of the Press on Modern Warfare (Quantico, VA: Unpublished Command and Staff Research Paper, 1967), p. 10. 5Interview with Major Fred C. Lash, Marine Corps Public Affairs, HQMC, 6 Jan 1984. 6Maj James P. Kehoe, Impact of the Press on Modern Warfare (Quantico, VA; Unpublihsed Command and staff Reseach Paper, 1967), p. 10. 7John Hohenberg, The News Media: A Journalist Looks at His Profession (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1968), p. 199. 8Maj James P. Kehoe, The Impact of the Press on Modern Warfare (Quantico, VA. Unpublihsed Command and Staff Research Paper, 1967), p. 11. 9Ibid, p. 7. 10LtCol Chandler Goodnow, et al, News Coverage of the TET Offensive (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1969) p. 16-20. 11Ibid, p. 18. 12William A. Wood, Electronic Journalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 3-5. 13Edith Effron, The News Twisters (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1971), p. 179. 14Ibid, p. 2. 15Ibid, p. 174. 16Ernest W. Lefever, TV and National Defense - An Analysis of CBS News, 1972-1973 (Boston, Virginia: Institute for American Strategy Press, 1974), p. 6. 17Ibid, p. 7, 180. 18William A. Henry, et al, "Journalism Under Fire", Time, December 12, 1983, p. 32. 19George F. Will, ed. Press, Politics and Popular Government (Washington D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972), p. 11. 20William A. Henry, et al, "Journalism Under Fire," Time, December 12, 1983, p. 82. 21Edith Effron, THe News Twisters (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1971), p. 195-196. 22Ibid, p. 196-197. 23William A. Henry, et al, "Journalism Under Fire," Time, December 12, 1983, p. 76. 24Ibid, p. 77. 25Ibid, p. 76. 26Ibid, p. 76. 27Ernest W. Lefever, TV and National Defense - An Analysis of CBS News, 1972-1973 (Boston, Virginia: Institute for American Strategy Press, 1974), p. 14. 28Edith Effron, The News Twisters, (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1971), p. 179. 29Robert Howard, Bias in Television News a Content Analysis, (Florida State University: Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 1972), p. iv. 30Ibid. p. 121-122. 31Ernest W. Lefever, TV and National Defense - An Analysis of CBS News, 1972-1973 (Boston, Virginia: Institute for American Strategy Press, 1974), p. 102-104. 32Ibid. p. 78-79, 95. 33Ibid. p. 131. 34Edith Effron, The News Twisters, (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1971), p. 37. 35George Arthur Bailey, The Vietnam War According to Chet, David, Walter, Harry, Peter, Bob, Howard and Frank, (Ann Arbor Michigan, University Microfilms International, published on demand), p. 358. 36Ernest W. Lefever, TV and National Defense - An Analysis of CBS New, 1972-1973 (Boston, Virginia: Institute for American Strategy Press, 1974), p. 13. 37Edith Effron, The News Twisters, (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1971), p. 135-142. 38Ibid. p. 179. 39Ibid. p. 184-185. 40Steven Cohen, ed, Vietnam: Anthology and Guide to a Television History, (New York: Alfred A. Knoph, 1983), p. xxviii. 41Ibid. p. xxxix. 42Ibid. p. xxxi. 43William A. Henry, et al, "Journalism Under Fire," Time, December 12, 1983, p. 82. 44Steven Cohen, ed, Vietnam: Anthology and Guide to a Television History, (New York: Alfred A. Knoph, 1983), p. xxvi. 45Edith Effron, The News Twisters, (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1971), p. 8. 46Robert Howard, Bias in Television News, A Content Analysis, (Florida State University: Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 1972), p. 16. 47Mark Fishman, Manufacturing the News, (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1980), p. 4-5. 48Edith Effron, The News Twisters, (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1971), p. 177. 49George Arthur Bailey, The Vietnam War According to Chet, David, Walter, Harry, Peter, Bob, Howard, and Frank. (Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Microfilms International, published on demand), p. 152. 50Ernest W. Lefever, TV and National Defense - An Analysis of CBS News, 1972-1973 (Boston, Virginia: Institute for American Strategy Press, 1974), p. 36-37. 51Thomas M. McNulty, Network Television Documentary Treatment of the Vietnam War, 1965 to 1969, (Indiana University: Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 1974), p. 82. 52Edith Effron, The News Twisters, (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1971), p. 25-26. 53Ernest W. Lefever, TV and National Defense - An Analysis of CBS News, 1972-1973 (Boston, Virginia: Institute for American Strategy Press, 1974), p. 125. 54Ibid. p. 127. 55Maj James P. Kehoe, The Impact of the Press on Modern Warfare, (Quantico, VA: Unpublished Command and Staff Research Paper, 1967), p. 13. 56Ibid. p. 23. 57George Arthur Bailey, The Vietnam War According to Chet, David, Walter, Harry, Peter, Bob, Howard and Frank, (Ann Arbor, Michigan; University Microfilms International, published on demand), p. 237. 58Ibid. p. 277. 59Ibid. p. 317. 60Ibid. p. 347-348. 61Ibid. p. 349-350. 62Ibid. p. 307-308. 63Ibid. p. 352. 64LtCol Chandler Goodnow, et al, News Coverage of the TET Offensive, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1969), p. 235-236. 65George Arthur Bailey, The Vietnam War According to Chet, David, Walter, Harry, Peter, Bob, Howard and Frank, (Ann Arbor, Michigan; University Microfilms International, published on demand), p. 261. 66LtCol Chandler Goodnow, et al, News Coverage of the TET Offensive, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1969), p. 141. 67Stanley Karnow, Vietnam - A History (New York: The Viking Press, 1983), p. 466. 68Carl Lowe, ed, Television and American Culture, (New York, The H. H. Wilson Company, 1981), p. 99. 69LtCol Chandler Goodnow, et al, News Coverage of the TET Offensive, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1969), p. 90. 70Ibid. p. 192. 71George Arthur Bailey, The Vietnam War According to Chet, David, Walter, Harry, Peter, Bob, Howard and Frank, (Ann Arbor, Michigan; University Microfilms International, published on demand), p. 77. 72Cleveland Amory, "What Walter Cronkite Misses Most," Parade, March 11, 1984, p. 4. 73Brigadier General Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers, (Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 1976), p. 166. 74Stanley Karnow, Vietnam - A History, (New York: The Viking Press, 1983), p. 31. 75Barry Rubin, International News and the American Media, (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977), p. 64. 76Burke Davis, Marine! The Life of LtGen Lewis B. (Chesty) Puller, USMC (Ret), (Boston, Mass: Little Brown and Company, 1962), p. 35-36. 77Ibid. p. 200. 78Col Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1981), p. 23. 79Barry Rubin, International News and the American Media, (Washington, D.C., Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1978), p. 29. BIBLIOGRAPHY Amory, Cleveland. "What Walter Cronkite Misses Most." Parade, March 11, 1984. Amter, Joseph A. Vietnam Verdict. New York: Continuum, 1982. Bailey, George Arthur. The Vietnam War According to Chet, David, Walter, Harry, Peter, Bob, Howard and Frank: A Content Analysis of Journalistic Performance. Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Microfilms International, 1974 (Doctoral Dissertation, published on demand). Cohen, Steven. Vietnam: Anthology and Guide to a Television History: New York: Alfred A. Knoph, 1983. Davis, Burke. Marine! The Life of LtGen Lewis B. (Chesty) Puller, USMC (Ret). Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1962. Effron, Edith. The News Twisters. Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1971. Fishman, Mark. Manufacturing the News. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1980. Goodnow, LtCol Chandler, et al. News Coverage of the TET Offensive. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1969. Gravel, Major Marcus J. Impact of Television on the Conduct of War. Quantico, VA: Unpublished Command and Staff Research Paper, 1967. Henry, William A., et al, "Journalism Under Fire," Time, December 12, 1983. Hohenberg, John. The News Media: A Journalist Looks at His Profession, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968. Howard, Robert. Bias in Television News, A Content Analysis. Florida State University: Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 1972. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam - A History. New York: The Viking Press, 1983. Kehoe, Maj James P. The Impact of the Press on Modern Warfare. Quantico, VA: Unpublished Command and Staff Research Paper, 1967. Kinnard, BrigGen Douglas. The War Managers. Hanover, New Hampshire: University of New England, 1976. Lefever, Ernest W. TV and National Defense - An Analysis of CBS News, 1972-1973. Boston, Virginia: Institute for American Strategy Press, 1974. Lowe, Carl, ed. Television and American Culture. New York: H. H. Wilson Company, 1981. McNulty, Thomas M. Network Television Documentary Treatment of the Vietnam War, 1965 to 1969. Indiana University: Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 1974. Rubin, Barry. International News and the American Media. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977. Summers, Col Harry G. Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1981. Will, George F., ed. Press, Politics and Popular Government. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972. Wood, William A. Electronic Journalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Interview Lash, Maj Fred C., Marine Corps Public Affairs Division (Code PAM), HQMC, Washington, D. C., 6 January 1984
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