The Horn of Africa
CSC 1984
SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues
ABSTRACT
Author: GOMEZ, Arthur, Major, USMC
Title: The Horn of Africa
Publisher: Marine Corps Command and Staff College
Date: 2 April 1984
The Horn of Africa includes the countries of Ethiopia, Somalia, and the
Republic of Djibouti. It is considered a strategically important area because
of its proximity to the Persian Gulf and the fact that it forms a chokepoint on
the sea lanes that pass through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.
Throughout its history, the Horn of Africa has been a scene of conflicts
which have often involved the most powerful countries of the world. Since the
end of World War II, its conflicts have involved both the Soviet Union and the
United States. This superpower connection has exacerbated the basic conflicts
of the Horn which involve Ethiopian attempts to counter many ethnic separatist
movements and to preserve Ethiopia's current borders.
This paper, which is based on readily available English language sources,
is a brief historical survey of the conflicts currently facing Ethiopia. The
paper begins to set a stage for addressing these conflicts by presenting some
background information concerning the land, peoples and history of the region.
It traces the progress of the 1974 military coup which overthrew the imperial
government of Ethiopia and thereby intensified the conflicts. The paper then
addresses each of the major conflicts which includes the Eritrean secession
movement, several other regional and ideological insurgencies, and the long
standing dispute with Somalia over the Ogaden region which erupted into the
Somali-Ethiopian War in 1977. The final part of the paper presents a number of
conclusions concerning: differences between Soviet and American anti-guerrilla
tactics; the probable reasons for many of the key actions of the major partici-
pants in the Somali-Ethiopian War; an assessment of the current status of each
country in the horn; and the author's recommendations for future United States
actions in the region.
WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR
The Horn of Africa
Major Arthur Gomez
2 April 1984
Marine Corps Command and Staff College
Marine Corps Development and Education Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134
PREFACE
Americans have a tendency to want to solve problems much as Alexander the
Great solved the Gordian knot, slicing through all of the intricacies with one
clean stroke of the sword. We like to divide things up into tidy packages of
right and wrong, or black and white. We are often not content to sit back and
patiently wait for a situation to develop as we strive for quick offensive
action to "resolve it, one way or the other!"
The Horn of Africa is a place where we have an interest and where the
Soviets are even more heavily involved. It is an area that most Americans know
little about where simple knee-jerk reactions and rash actions could easily
endanger world peace. It is also an area where that abounds in complexities
and in many, many shades of grey.
The purpose of this research paper is to present a survey of the conflicts
on the Horn of Africa and to explore some of those complexities. I intended
originally to research the Somali-Ethiopian War but soon found a dearth of
material on the actual campaign and a wealth of material on the background to
the war and its many connections with all the many conflicts that continue to
rage in that area.
Having too little information on just the war, I decided to try and tie
together the major conflicts into one survey. The result is a paper that is a
bit oversize in number of pages and hopes to be a satisfactory introduction to
the conflicts of the Horn.
In any study of this nature, the product is constrained by the time,
references, and abilities of the author. I would like to thank all the members
of my family for putting up with the many hours of what would have been their
time that I was allowed to spend on this project. I would also like to extend
specal thanks to my wife, Louise, for tracking down many of the references and
making the hundreds ot xerox copies that were used to speed the documentation
effort. With any less support, the effort could have proved too much.
In regards to the references, they were often difficult to obtain and
some were not identified as possibly significant until it was very late, thus
making it difficult to obtain them or to blend them into the text. The lack of
some references may therefore be a weakness in this study.
And finally, while this study is based on the works listed, the interpre-
tations and naturally, all errors or omissions herein are the responsibility of
the author.
Arthur Gomez
2 April 1984
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
List of Maps v
Chapter
1. Introduction 2
Notes 7
2. Background 8
The Land 8
The People 18
Notes 34
3. History 37
Early Ethiopia 39
Modern Ethiopia 47
The Other Countries of the Horn 65
Notes 86
4. Conflicts 92
Coup of 1974 92
Eritrea 101
Regional Revolts 107
The Somali-Ethiopian War 112
Notes 121
5. Conclusions 126
Soviet Anti-Guerrilla Tactics 126
Somali-Ethiopian War Questions 130
Current Status 137
U.S. Policy Options 147
Notes 152
Bibliography 156
List of Maps
Page
Map
1. The Horn of Africa 1
2. Africa 3
3. Ethiopia 9
4. Somalia 13
5. Djibouti 16
6. Peoples of Ethiopia 22
7. Somali Tribes 28
8 Early Ethiopia 40
9. Ethiopia, 1800 44
10. Ethiopia, 1900 50
11. Ethiopia, 1935 57
12. Somali Borders 67
13. Eritrea 79
14. Regional Revolts 93
15. Eritrean Rebels 104
16. The Somali-Ethiopian War 115
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CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION
The Horn of Africa is a term given to the northeast corner of Africa that
juts into the Indian Ocean (see Map 1). The Horn shapes the southern portions
of the Rea Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the very important Bab el Mandeb (Gate of
Sorrow), which controls access to the Red Sea and therefore, the Suez Canal.
As the Horn of Africa is only a metaphorical term, it has no precise de-
finition. Broadly defined, the Horn includes all of Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti,
Ethiopia and Sudan.(2) Narrowly defined, it is only that area populated
by the Somali people including Somalia, Djibouti, the northern part of Kenya
and the Ogaden part of Ethiopia.(3) A compromise, used in this study, is to
limit the definition to include only Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti.(4)
This area is interesting for a number of reasons. First, it is a critical
geopolitical area in relation to the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian
Gulf(see Map 2). As such, it is a scene for conflicts between the superpowers,
their proxies, and other countries of the area. It is an area where the super-
powers are increasingly investing their resources and prestige. Therefore, it
has the potential of breeding a new conflict out of the tangled conflicts of
the past that could escalate into tragic consequences for the entire world.
Second, it is a region of many bitter ironies and political contraditions.
Long, bloody struggles have been waged for barren and almost worthless areas.
Thousands have died because of imaginary borders that were haphazardly drawn
over the past century. Many of these borders were unknown and even today are
incomprehensible to the nomadic peoples that have wandered the Horn for many
centuries. They had no part in developing the borders and ironically, they are
now the ones killing and being killed because of them.
These areas were arbitrarily divided by the colonial powers without much
concern for local tribal, religious, or ethnic factors. Because they were so
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THE HORN OF AFRICA
poorly drawn in all parts of Africa, one key principle of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) is that these colonial boundaries will not be changed by
force of arms. This principle helps to protect many African countries that
fear disintegration into many tiny pieces (balkanization) because of a lack of
nationalism for the newly created nations and the extremely strong, but very
narrow, tribal loyalties. At the same time, opposing groups are attempting to
liberate themselves under the banner of self-determination, which is also a key
OAU and United Nations (UN) principle. The result is conflict with both sides
basing their cause on OAU principles.
Other ironies include a number of cruelly humorous scenes. One of these
scenes saw the United States (US) stressing human rights and freedom while at
the same time, supporting an increasingly oppressive, Marxist revolutionary
government with arms. These arms were being used to consolidate the Marxists'
power by openly and brutally terrorizing the population. The Marxists were
taking the arms; were executing hundreds, often without even the pretense of
trials; were asking for more arms; and simultaneously, were denouncing the US.
Another bitterly ironic scene saw the Soviets, who had armed and trained
several guerrilla forces, actively participating in the destruction of their
former Marxist proteges.
The complex web of interests in the Horn of Africa has found Israelis, Cu-
bans, Soviets and some Arabs on the side of a Christian elite against various
Moslem insurgencies supported by other Arabs, the US and many Western powers.
It even had the spectacle of both superpowers clumsily switching sides during
the height of the struggle.
A third reason for interest is that this area includes Ethiopia which has
often captured the attention of the world. Ethiopia, also known as Abyssinia
(the European version of its Arab name, "El Habesha"(6)), is a country that
traces its origins to a legendary union of Solomon and the Queen of Sheba and
THE HORN OF AFRICA
claims an unbroken history of thousands of years. It was known to the ancient
Greeks and the Roman Empire. During the middle ages, Ethiopia was a Christian
bastion that held out against many waves of Moslem conquest.
For anti-imperialists, it was the only part of black Africa that avoided
the clutches of the colonial powers by inflicting a humiliating defeat on the
Italians at Adowa in 1895. This defeat was significant as it was the first
major defeat of a colonial European power by a non-white, non-western nation
and was also a basis for the Italians later invasion in 1935.
Ethiopia's Emperor, Haile Selassie I, whose official titles included the
Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, the Elect of God, and the King of Kings,
was forced to flee the country during the second Italian invasion. However, he
made a very dramatic appeal against the Italian aggression and called for an
immediate, armed response by the League of Nations based upon the provisions of
their charter. The appeal received worldwide publicity but did nothing to stop
the Italians. However, it did burn Ethiopia into the collective conscience of
the Western world.
After the war, Haile Selassie used Western memories of his appeal to lead
Ethiopia back into the spotlight of world politics. Ethiopia became a member
of the United Nations (UN), sent battalions to fight in the Korean War, and
supported most US positions. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia's capital, became the site
of the OAU headquarters. The Emperor, in addition to being a popular world
leader, also gave the impression of trying to modernize his feudal country.
The erratic, largely unplanned, and almost slow motion overthrow of Haile
Selassie's long and colorful regime came as a shock to the rest of the world.
The bloody course of the revolution and the brutality of the successor regime
appalled many. Finally, the unexpectedly huge and quick intervention by the
Soviet Union on the side of Ethiopia quickly drew the entire area into the
scope of world interest.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
The Horn of Africa is an interesting subject of study. There naturally
exists a very large mass of documentation in many languages dealing with all
aspects of its history, culture and politics. However, this study is limited
to readily available English sources concerning the conflicts of interest and
does not attempt to be a complete, or exhaustive treatment of the subject.
In doing any research at all into this area one is quickly struck by the
differences in spelling of the names of the people and places. This results
from languages such as Amharic, Somali, French, Italian, and Arabic, that were
in use in the area, being translated into English. To reduce confusion I have
attempted to stay with those forms that are most used in the general
literature. The only exceptions to that attempt are found in a few quotations
where I chose not to change that author's spelling and trusted that the reader
will be able to properly connect the two spellings.
Another point that can be confusing is that of the various Ethiopian
titles that are used along with a name such as "Negus" Tasfari or "Ras" Yasu.
While there are many different titles used to denote all the different levels
of the government and military, I have limited mention of all except these
three: Negus Neghest (king of kings, or Emperor), Negus (king), and Ras
(duke). In order to simplify further, I have translated these titles in the
text to their equivalents.(7)
THE HORN OF AFRICA
NOTES - CHAPTER 1
1. Central Intelligence Agency, Maps of the World's Nations, Volume II,
Africa, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Publication GC 77-10038, 1977),
cover page.
2. "Ethiopia: Conquest and Terror," Horn of Africa, 4, No. 1, (1981), p. 8.
See also:
Marina Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa, (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 2.
3. Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive
for Unity in the Horn of Africa, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1963), p. 5. See also:
I. M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland fron Nation to State, (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), p. 1.
4. This is the most common definition used in the literature:
Tom J. Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Widening Storm, 2nd
rev. ed., (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979), p. 1.
Bereket Habte Selassie, Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa,
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980), p. 1.
Robert Gorman, Political Conflict on the Horn of Africa," (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1981), p. 21.
Yohannes Abate, "Africa's Troubled Horn: Background to Conflict," Focus,
28, No. 3 (Jan-Feb, 1978), p. 1.
5. CIA, op. cit., p. 2-1.
6. Nathaniel T. Kenney, "Ethiopian Adventure," National Geographic, 127, No 4
(1965), p. 577.
7. Richard Greenfield, Ethiopia, A New Political History, (New York: Fred-
erick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), Appendix II, pp. 461-463 contains a good
discussion of some of the Ethiopian titles often found in the literature.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
CHAPTER 2.
BACKGROUND
This chapter begins the process of setting the stage for addressing the
modern conflicts on the Horn of Africa by presenting its land and people.
SECTION I - THE LAND
The Horn of Africa is a harsh and often beautiful land. There are lush
jungles; steep, rugged, often inaccessible highland plateaus and mountains;
hot, humid coastal plains; incredible volcanic deserts still bubbling with
volcanic activity; hot, dusty and extremely dry grasslands; and excepting
parts of Ethiopia, little arable land. Many authors share the following view:
That hostility should be so stubborn between the Ethiopian and
Somali peoples over a land as climatically inhospitable as the Horn
is one of the small mysteries of human behavior. Covering some
750,000 square miles--most of which is forbiddingly hot, dry and
often very rugged--the Horn of Africa leaves a good deal to be de-
sired as a piece of real estate.(1)
One key to the Horn of Africa is rainfall. When the rains come on time
and in sufficient quantity, both the nomadic tribesmen and the farmer prosper.
However, the rainfall in this area is erratic and unpredictable. Droughts have
affected the Horn and seem to be occuring with greater frequency. Droughts
combine with increasing populations and wider conflicts to impose heavy burdens
of suffering on the entire area.
The Horn has long been a crossroads between Africa and the Middle East.
Coastal lowlands provide ports which support its trade and prosperity. The
same ports which provided prosperity also have provided access for the Horn's
many invaders. The nature of the coastal lowlands made them easy to control
and almost guaranteed that they would not stand against the waves of seaborne
invaders. In contrast, the mountainous highlands have always made control of
that area much more difficult. This terrain has acted very much like the many
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THE HORN OF AFRICA
islands and mountains of Greece to divide and localize the large Ethiopian pop-
ulation into pockets of distinct, highly independent ethnic groups. Unlike the
Greeks, the Ethiopians are more isolated from contacts with the rest of the
world. Yet, this same condition made the invaders' conquest of the highlands
more difficult and certainly helped Ethiopia resist colonization.
Facts of geography help to explain why the outer periphery of the Horn has
known so many invaders, why colonial powers often seized the sea coast, and why
the Ethiopians were successful in denying the interior to the colonial powers
until the twentieth century. They also help to explain why the pull of separ-
atism is so strong in Ethiopia and perhaps, why central governments must often
use so much force to impose control.
Ethiopia
Ethiopia is the largest and most varied country on the Horn of Africa (see
Map 3). Roughly triangular in shape it contains about 1,221,900 square kilo-
meters which is about three times the size of California or, twice the size of
Somalia. With the exception of permanent snow covered peaks, Ethiopia contains
representative examples of every climatalogical condition found in Africa.(3)
The world's most extensive fault which extends from Mozambique to the
Jordan valley, the Great Rift Valley, cuts through the center of Ethiopia and
neatly divides the 6000 to 8000 foot highlands which comprise two thirds of the
country. To the west of the Rift, the Ethiopian Plateau rises in an extremely
rugged, mountainous region that drops very sharply near the western border with
Sudan. To the east of the Great Rift Valley is a lower and more level area
that is known as the Somali Plateau which slopes gently to the east to form the
arid, semidesert area known as the Ogaden.(4) The highlands are often referred
to as a tableland.
Frequent reference to the Ethiopian "tableland" obscures the
real nature of the terrain, which is carved up by canyons and gorges
thousands of feet deep. The net effect is captured in a remark at-
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tributed to one member of the 1867 British Expeditionary Force:
"They tell us this is a tableland. If it is, they have turned the
table upside down and we are scrambling up and down the legs."(5)
As the Great Rift Valley cuts through the highlands in the southern part
of Ethiopia it forms a series of large fresh or salt water lakes.(6) In the
north, the Great Rift intersects with two other rift valleys to form the highly
unstable, volcanic area known as the Danakil Depression. The area as first
described by a British explorer is "A landscape of terror, of hardship, of
death." It is up to 381 feet below sea level and is famous for being one of
the hottest areas on Earth. Its only economic benefit is derived from mining
the dried salt lakes, some of which are up to 1500 feet deep.(7)
There is also a large coastal plain along the Red Sea in the northern part
of Ethiopia that ranges from about 10 to 50 miles in width. This plain is hot,
humid, mostly treeless, and has an annual rainfall of less than 10 inches.(8)
It contains the two main ports of Mitsiwa and Aseb that together have histor-
ically handled a smaller portion of Ethiopian trade than Djibouti. However, as
the railroad to Djibouti has often been cut by guerillas, the road net in the
north was improved and this situation has changed.(9)
Ethiopia also has a number of small islands in the Red Sea that are known
as the Dahlac Archipelago. These were not considered important until the So-
viet fleet was allowed to develop military fleet anchorage facilities there.
Facilities include the floating drydock from Berbera, floating piers, barracks
and other improvements. The Soviets visit this site about 80 times a year.(10)
All of Ethiopia's rivers rise in the highlands and flow outward. The
largest of these is the Blue Nile which has it source in Lake Tana and provides
two thirds of the water in the Nile below Khartoum. Others such as the Juba
and the Shabellee are very important to Somalia. The Awash River drains the
central highlands around Addis Ababa and then flows into the Danakil Depression
where it disappears into salt lakes. While the rivers of Ethiopia are not
THE HORN OF AFRICA
navigable, they do provide the potential for a great deal of hydrolectric power
which has yet to be exploited.(11)
There has been very little economic development in Ethiopia. There are
two railroads and few all weather roads. One railroad, no longer in service,
connected the port of Mitsiwa with the interior. The other railroad is very
important as it connects the capital, Addis Ababa with the port of Djibouti.
Ethiopia, in 1977, had 10,520 kilometers of all weather roads of which a total
of 3230 kilometers were paved.(12) As Tom Farer stated in 1979:
The depth of Ethiopian misery is pretty much invulnerable to
exaggeration. By virtually any measure of social welfare or econ-
omic development, Ethiopia is one of the world's poorest countries.
Its per capita gross national product is somewhere in the vicinity
of $90, which places it among the bottom twenty nation-states. It
is one of the eight states with an average per capita daily caloric
intake of less than 1,600...Its transportation network is so exig-
uous that the average peasant must walk eight hours in order to
reach a road on which wheeled vehicles of any kind can move. That
is one, but only one, reason why tens of thousands can die of star-
vation while their government exports grain.(13)
Ethiopia borders Sudan, Kenya, Somalia and Djibouti however, most of these
borders are not defined by natural features. The border with Djibouti was de-
termined by the Franco-Italian agreement of 1935. The border with Kenya was
defined by Great Britain and Ethiopia prior to Kenyan independence. The long,
2,400 kilometer border with Sudan was delimited in 1902 and is not a matter of
current dispute. The border with Somalia is based on various treaties signed
by Great Britain, Italy and Ethiopia that have been the subject of many varying
opinions. Only about half of it was ever demarcated and even that part of the
line is officially not recognized by Somalia.(14) The entire question of bor-
ders is but one of many roots in the multi-faceted Somali-Ethiopian conflict.
Somalia
Somalia is shaped in the form of a large number "7" and is bordered by
Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. It has a
total land area of about 637,540 square kilometers which is roughly comparable
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THE HORN OF AFRICA
to the size of the state of Texas (see Map 4) . There is also a rather long
coast line of 2,960 kilometers which has yet to be properly exploited as the
Somalis have long had a strong aversion to fishing.(16)
Somalia's terrain is mostly a jumble of plateaus and plains. A single
range of mountains with an average height of about 1800 meters runs east to
west in the northern portion of the country. Also in the north is a maritime
plain of between two and eighteen kilometers. This is a semiarid region with
no permanent rivers called the "guban" (burnt land). Rains turn this area into
a temporary grazing area for nomadic herds. South of the mountains is a lower
plateau that has very arid portions in the east and less arid areas in the
west. The western plateau slopes down into the excellent grazing region known
as the "Haud" which extends into Ethiopia's Ogaden provinces.(17)
Southwestern Somalia is the location of the only permanent rivers, the
Juba and the Shabeelle, which water the majority of Somalia's farm land. As a
point of interest, both of these "permanent" rivers ran dry in the drought of
1980 for the first time in the memory of the local population.(18) These ri-
vers originate in Ethiopia and travel through arid regions of Ethiopia that
could benefit if they were diverted for irrigation. This action would disrupt
Somalia's agriculture and is another possible Ethiopian weapon.(19)
Somalia is an extremely poor country, even in comparison to Ethiopia. A
total of only 15 percent of the land in Somalia is arable. About 60 percent of
the population is nomadic, 15 percent are farmers and the rest are urban.(20)
In 1978, the government reported only 19,380 kilometers of roads in the entire
country. Of this total, about 11 percent were hard-surfaced, 36 percent were
gravel or dirt surfaced, and the rest were dirt tracks. Almost all roads in
Somalia were built through various aid programs such as Red China's 1,045
kilometer hard-surfaced road begun in 1973 and completed in 1978.(21)
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In spite of the long coast line, there are only four main ports. These
include three deep water ports: Berbera, located on the Gulf of Aden, and Mo-
gadishu and Kismaayo, both of which are located on the Indian Ocean. A fourth
port, Marka, located on the Indian Ocean, requires lighterage. Berbera was the
site of a Soviet built, military port facility that is now being expanded to
support US interests. Live animals and bananas compose most of Somalia's ex-
ports and together account for 90 percent of its export income. Imports con-
tinually exceed exports and the country suffers from a chronic trade deficit
compounded by its defense expenditures.(22)
Somalia's borders with all of its neighbors are strongly disputed. The
basis of these disputes is Somali nonrecognition of several European treaties.
These treaties allowed some Somali-inhabited areas to be incorporated into the
territory of its neighbors. The goal of reunification and the actions taken to
achieve that end are part of the "Greater Somalia" movement. An example of the
strength of this movement can be seen in the design of Somalia's flag. It has
a five-sided star as its main design. Each point of the star represents a part
of the Somali people. Two points represent British and Italian Somaliland,
which became Somalia. The other three points represent the "lost territories"
that are outside the borders of Somalia which include most of Djibouti, the
northern part of Kenya and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Somali attempts to
gain these areas generate the major conflicts on the Horn.(23)
The Republic of Djibouti
Djibouti is the former French Territory of the Afars and Issas. It exists
because of its harbors on the Gulf of Tadjoura (see Map 5) and the fact that it
dominates the Bab el Mandeb which controls access to the Suez Canal.(24) Its
port is the the best on the entire Horn of Africa and can handle up to 12 ocean
going ships at one time.(25)
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THE HORN OF AFRICA
At various times Djibouti has been referred to as "a valley of hell" or "a
country whose landscape is a nightmare." However, on the Horn of Africa, it is
not unique nor different from adjacent territories in Somalia or Ethiopia.(27)
Djibouti is a tiny country of about 8,500 square miles, about the same size as
the state of Massachusetts. It is a land of barren rock, volcanic material,
and dry salt lakes, some of which is as much as 600 feet below sea level.(28)
Djibouti is bordered only by Somalia and Ethiopia. But both covet its
territory seeking to deny it to the other. In addition, the port and major
city, Djibouti, serves as the terminus for the only operational railroad in the
Horn of Africa connecting Addis Ababa with the sea. As much as 60 per cent of
Ethiopia's foreign trade uses this railroad. Other than the railroad and port,
Djibouti is composed of coastal lowlands with little to offer economically.
About 1 percent of the land is arable which provides for little agriculture and
some small grazing areas for the nomads. There are 100 miles of paved roads in
the entire country. About 90 percent of the population is illiterate and about
85 percent of it is unemployed. The country's main support is an annual French
contribution that is equal to its previous colonial support contributions.(29)
Djibouti is an area of concern for both Somalia and Ethiopia. Somalia
does not recognize the borders of Djibouti as just over half the population of
Djibouti is Somali. Besides the pull of nationalism, ownership of the port of
Djibouti would be both a large economic plum for the extremely poor Somalis and
another strong anti-Ethiopian weapon. Ethiopia also has vital interests in
Djibouti because of the economic factors outlined above and the 40 percent of
the Djibouti population that are Afars. The Afar tribes have long been a part
of Ethiopia.
France granted Djibouti its independence in 1977, and it still has a
number of strategic interests in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. It main-
tains these interests and the base at Djibouti which complements them, by
THE HORN OF AFRICA
"protecting" Djibouti from the Somalis and the Ethiopians. While this is done
at the "request" of the Djibouti government, the significant costs of keeping
5,000 French military and administrative personnel there, and of making its
annual contribution of support to Djibouti, are borne at least in part, because
of those strategic interests.
SECTION II - THE PEOPLE
The people who inhabit the Horn of Africa comprise a mosiac of religions,
races, languages, and tribes that have a long history of conflict with each
other. The condition of the people can be summed up as follows:
The life of the vast bulk of its people is nasty, brutish, and
short, with wars adding periodically to the chronic decimation by
disease and malnutrition.(30)
In dealing with the figures given for population, as well as the others
used throughout this paper, it must be remembered that the vast majority of
them are highly suspect. As long as numbers are tied to aid or used in other
political and ideological ways, they will often be "adjusted" to suit the
purposes at hand. Therefore, they are not trustworthy.
Ethiopia
The country of Ethiopia could be described as a seething mass of divergent
groups competing and clawing their way towards a goal of either dominating, or
of removing themselves from the modern fiction that is Ethiopia. This boiling
mass is tended by those that enforce their concept of Ethiopia using the tools
of power which include fear, greed and violence.
The competition between the forces of centralization and separatism is the
central theme of Ethiopian history. From the very creation of the empire when
small areas were first brought under central control, these two forces have
struggled against each other. Each time that it seems that separatism would
destroy Ethiopia, strong leaders have risen to champion centralization and to
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preserve the empire. Being a primitive land, the methods of the proponents of
both sides usually involve pain, suffering and death.
Ethiopia is the largest country on the Horn of Africa with an estimated
population of at least 30 million and perhaps as many as 33 million. Examples
of the problems of control of the country abound. A complete census of the
country has never been taken and more than a million and a half Ethiopian ref-
ugees are now living outside the country.(31) The refugee problem is a large
and continual one that is caused by the many conflicts in the region.
Ethiopia's large population, third largest in Africa after Nigeria and
Egypt, can be divided into many different groups by considering such things as
age, religion, language, tribes, or occupation. None of these are necessarily
exclusive and various individuals can be members of many different divisions.
These many times opposing divisions show the underlying fragmented nature of
the population. They dramatically increase the physical problems imposed by
the terrain and help to explain why it has been so hard to govern Ethiopia
effectively, or sometimes, even to hold the country together.
In contrast to our own more evenly distributed population, Ethiopia's is
heavily skewed towards youth. According to 1980 UN statistics, almost half of
the population (45 percent) was under the age of fifteen. In fact, the median
age for the population was only seventeen. Given the growth rate of 2.5 per-
cent a year, the population will exceed 55 million by the year 2000.(32)
The naturally volatile nature of, and the greatly raised expectations of
this part of the population has been been an explosive force in Ethiopian pol-
itics. Idealism (naivete?) finds outlets in Marxism, opposing autocratic rule
and attacking capitalism. This has added the dimension of ideological conflict
to the struggles of Ethiopia.
Ethiopia's peoples are greatly divided by religion. While most are Moslem
or Christian, there is also a significant minority composed of other religions
THE HORN OF AFRICA
such as pagans, Falasha Jews and others. The almost equal division of the vast
majority of the population into Christians and Moslems adds a religious element
to most contentious issues afflicting the Horn. Given a lack of education, the
absence of many distractions found in more modern societies, and the endemic
poverty of the region, the elemental strength of this division is much greater
than it is in our own society. While we in the US might consider religion to
be a matter of sometimes strong and heated debate, in the Horn of Africa it can
easily be a matter of life and death as wars often rage between the two groups.
The Ethiopian Orthodox (or Coptic) Church has long been a bulwark or agent
of the Empire. As a result of the mutual support between it and the ruling
class, the Church has often been the target of conflict. When the ruling class
conquered new areas, they brought the Church along. They provided conquered
lands and slaves to support the Church and it became a part of the process of
enforcing control over the conquered peoples.(33)
The Coptic Church was not the only religion that was forcibly introduced.
Islam developed the idea of "jihad," (holy war) aimed at converting unbelievers
by the sword. Over the centuries, there have been many "jihads" of varying
success aimed at the peoples of the Horn and often, specifically at the Coptic
Church. The ebb and flow of these religious struggles over the last several
hundred years are well remembered by the population and are an important con-
tinuing source of conflict. It has often been said of the dominant Christians
of central Ethiopia, that they think of themselves as an isolated island of
Christianity in a hostile Moslem sea.(34)
An example of the impact of religion which is still vividly remembered by
both Christians and Moslems took place in the late 1890's:
. . .The walled city of Harar was considered a holy city by the
Muslims and its capture by Christians thus added religious animosity
to anti-Ethiopian sentiment. The French traveler and writer Henri
de Monfreid, who worked for Menelik, tells a story that illustrates
this: when Menelik received an emissary from Abdullahi on the eve
of Chelenko, the emissary brought a Muslim turban, along with the
message that if Menelik wore the turban, the emir's troops would not
THE HORN OF AFRICA
harm him; if not, then--by Allah!--the emir would tie up him and his
men with ropes and dispose of them as he saw fit. Menelik replied
that he would wear the turban until the good Lord Medhane Alem (the
savior of the world) granted him victory, and he would then stand on
the top of the minaret on the central mosque, urinate on it, demo-
lish the mosque, and there build the church of Medhane Alem in its
place. Menelik was a man of his word, for the church stands there
today.(35)
Language is another divisive factor. The official language of Ethiopia is
Amharic, yet it is the natural tongue of only a third of the population. There
are more than 70 different languages, most with several dialects, spoken in
Ethiopia.(36) These languages are often the only difference between many of
the ethnic groups. As they are a means of identifying with a romanticised or
non-Ethiopian past, they can be a source of ethnic pride opposed to central
control. The many languages tend to preserve and accentuate the differences
between groups and help complicate and hinder effective communication that
could blend them all together.
Another important factor that is related directly to both the religious
and language issues mentioned above, is the tribal or ethnic composition of the
country. As Ethiopia grew it became a melange of the various peoples (see Map
6) that were to varying degrees absorbed, intermingled, overrun, or ghettoized.
Many of these ethnic or tribal differences have been blurred to the point where
they are hardly distinguishable by the outsider, but are still critical to the
peoples themselves. The traditional loyalties owed to these groups can stand
in the way of Ethiopian nationalism and often can form a basis for insurgency.
The leading ethnic group is the Amhara who have long dominated the central
government in Ethiopia. They were administrators and leaders who settled in
the conquered territories in order to pacify and control them for the empire.
As the dominant group, they were convinced of their innate superiority over the
other groups. They actively enforced various forms of discrimination and per-
secution such as prohibiting the use of local languages in the Coptic Church,
government, courts and schools.(37)
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THE HORN OF AFRICA
The Oromo (also known as Galla) are a large ethnic group that may number
from 15, to as many as 18 million. They are composed of 5 clans or tribes that
range from the central highlands of Ethiopia to the Ogaden and into Kenya. The
Oromo were conquered by a slow process of absorption, war, and diplomacy that
played on local differences. This process partially blended the Oromo into the
ruling Amhara elite. Many adopted the Ethiopian faith while others adopted
Islam as a kind of negative response to the Amhara domination.(39)
The Oromo are related to the Somali and the Afar as they all speak closely
related languages. Because of their diversity they have not been formed into a
single majority movement against the central government. Like the Somali and
the Afar, their opposition to the central government was fairly intermittent
until recent times. Some support the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which is
one of the many current revolts in Ethiopia.(40)
In 1970, there were over 900,000 Somalis living in the Ogaden region of
Ethiopia. While Somalis have often opposed the central government, many have
also taken sides with the Amhara against other Somalis. This process was used
to advantage by the Amhara to occupy the Somali lands.(41) Only recently has
the idea of Somali nationalism grown to the point where most Somalis support
the revolt against the present central government.
The Afar (also known as the Danakil) number about 200,000 and occupy the
lands between the Red Sea and the highlands. Changes to their formerly semi-
autonomous status, an attempt at land reform, and heavy handed repression by
the ruling Ethiopian revolutionary government drove many of this Moslem and
largely nomadic group into revolt. This small group's revolt is important as
the Afars threaten the port of Aseb and the vital railroad to Djibouti.(42)
The Tigrean people, located in the north of Ethiopia and on both sides of
the Eritrean border, number almost 5 million. They trace their descent back to
the early kingdoms of the area. The Tigreans were one of the main rivals of
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the Amhara in the competition for control of Ethiopia during its development.
Their interests have not been fully met by the new revolutionary government and
they too, have insurgencies in progress.(43)
The last major group are the Eritreans, who like other groups, are some-
what difficult to distinguish from the rest of Ethiopia. They have both Moslem
and Christian elements as well as other divisions. Many feel that they are
Ethiopian, while others fight for Eritrean independence. Their opposition to
the central government has been active since the early 1960's. Harsh Ethiopian
repressive measures have forced more and more Eritreans to take up arms against
the central government.(44)
The last divisive factor to be considered is the trade or occupation of
the people. Fully 85% of the population has been classified as rural dwellers
with about one fifth considered to be at least partly nomadic and the vast ma-
jority of the rest, farmers. The urban dwellers are growing at the fastest
rate as more and more rural people go to the cities in search of jobs.(45)
Of the relatively small in number urban dwellers, the petty governmental
workers, students, union workers and other professional people have provided
much of the leadership and the pressure for change. They have had a large im-
pact on the course of the revolution which overthrew Haile Selassi in 1974.
Yet, they lost control of the revolt to that most important group now leading
the revolution--the Army. This revolt was stimulated by many local complaints
and slowly grew into a vicious movement to destroy the imperial system.(46)
Related to occupation and the key to the imperial system was the ownership
of the land. A complex system of land ownership produced economic power, de-
termined social class, and provided the basis for the development of the Ethi-
opian state. Land rights were hereditary or were awarded for loyal and faith-
ful service to the Emperor. The expansion of the country and the building of
the centralized authority came at the expense of conquered territory in the
THE HORN OF AFRICA
south that was divided up among the new ruler's trusted advisors, soldiers and
favorites. These rights were also used to obtain cooperation from opposing
ethnic factions and to build the imperial bureaucracy.(47)
While the system was based on two basic land rights that are called "rist"
and "gult", the application of these basic rights was not uniform as it varied
most significantly in the older lands of the north and the newly conquered
lands of the south. In fact, as these rights grew out of local practice, the
application of these rights actually varied somewhat between the provinces and
sometimes, within a province. To help complicate matters further, the names
were sometimes reversed, the type of rights modified, and both names were
sometimes used together.(48)
"Rist" ownership was an inherited interest in the land that could be
claimed by anyone, male or female, yet was often tied to the nobility. It was
passed from generation to generation based on descent from a particular ori-
ginating individual. It was accepted that the tenant of the land would pay the
"rist" holder a portion of the produce of the land.(49)
The second right was "gult", which was a grant of imperial rights over the
land, given as a reward, or in lieu of a salary, to imperial appointees. The
"gult" holder was entitled to a portion of the produce of the land in the name
of the ruler and supposedly passed a portion of this on to his superiors. In
addition to this, the residents also "owed" labor, special taxes, fees for
court decisions and "gifts" on special days to the "gult" holder. The "gult"
holder also had a duty to support his leaders by supplying troops and himself
as the need arose.(50)
The Coptic Church received a similar right known as "semon" which was not
usually subject to "gult" as their lands were considered separate from the
normal lands in a region. This was a perpetual right to the land which was to
support the church and supplement the fees "donated" for Church services.(51)
THE HORN OF AFRICA
Both types of rights could exist on the same land, the person who worked
that land would simply pay a portion of his produce to each holder of rights.
A person could be entitled to both basic types of rights on the same land, or
to complex combinations of either type tied to many pieces of land in many
parts of the country. Over time, the rights became a heavier and heavier bur-
den on the rural peasants and were a factor in the process that finally des-
troyed the old regime.(52)
In summary, the population of Ethiopia is a large one that includes many
separatist factors such as religion, language and tribal origins that all tend
to break it into many smaller, often hostile groups. The central government
under the Amharas was first able to overcome these factors through the liberal
use of force. The base that sustained the force and helped to extend itself
throughout the empire was the feudal system of land rights. These rights also
helped to destroy the system as they added the weight of the majority of the
people to the many groups opposed to the central government on religious,
ethnic, ideological, or other grounds. The new revolutionary government which
took advantage of these divisions to gain power, now has to face many of these
divisive forces as well as others stirred up by the change in government.
Somalia
After looking at the many divisions within Ethiopia, a first impression of
Somalia would indicate amazing uniformity. About 95 percent of the population
of Somalia is ethnic Somali. These share the same history, culture, language
and religion. However, while divisions are not so great as those of Ethiopia,
there are many factors such as clan rivalries, economic pressure and political
stress that tend to fragment Somalia.(53)
The Somali government has attempted to justify the claims against its
neighbors citing the "facts" of Somali unity and an historic notion of Somali
nationalism. Ethiopians, quite naturally, view the Somali peoples as a loose
THE HORN OF AFRICA
group of scattered tribes without the necessary ingredients to form a nation.
There is some truth in both points of view. The Ethiopian view was dominant as
it had the force of the status quo behind it. That view has tended to slowly
lose favor as the actions of the Somalis have shown a surprising willingness to
pay the high, grim costs of uniting the Somali people. Sacrifice has convinced
many of the validity of the Somali viewpoints and may have converted what was
only rhetoric into reality.
The origins of the Somali people are unknown. What is known begins with
an Ethiopian song that celebrates the victories of the King Yeshaq (1414-1429)
over a Moslem kingdom. This song mentions the Somalis for the first time. A
later Ethiopian chronicle written around 1550 mentions them quite often.(54)
Records show that war between the two has extended over 500 years.
The Somali are composed of six main clan-families that traditionally trace
their descent back to two members of the tribe of Muhammad, Samaal and Sab.
Almost 75 percent of the population are members of the Dir, Issa, Darod and
Hawiye clan-families which trace descent from Samaal. Another 20 percent are
members of the Digil and the Rahanweyn, which trace descent from Sab. Those
not in either group include those of Arab and former slave descent.(55)
The Samaal were nomadic and were widely dispersed throughout the Horn (see
Map 7) of Africa while most of the Sab lived more settled lives in the riverine
area of southern Somalia. The nomadic life helped to scatter the Samaal and
bred an almost constant, war-like tradition of conflict over water rights and
grazing lands. The Sab, originally nomadic, slowly dominated the peoples that
already lived in their area and relied on them as slaves to work the land. Sab
wars were fought over trade, religion, or against the nomadic incursions.(56)
An Ethiopian critic of the Somalis, Mesfin Wolde Mariam, presents this
biased, yet also somewhat accurate, view of the nomadic Somalis:
The fact is that even the Somalis themselves are torn into a
number of tribes, sub-tribes, and "rers", or family groups. It is
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THE HORN OF AFRICA
the smallest unit, the "rer", made up up a number of families, that
is important and that exercises whatever authority there is over the
individual. The tribe and the sub-tribe hardly exist in practical
terms. Extreme individualism and utter lack of discipline are char-
acteristic traits attributed to Somali nomads. The acute struggle
for existence in this harsh environment often expresses itself in
group conflicts over wells or grazing land, with almost yearly loss
of life. . . 58)
The Samaal have a tradition of democratic participation for males of their
own group except those in despised occupational groups. They relate prestige
to the number of generations between the ancestors and themselves. Alliances
and confederations between the various subdivisions are common which makes for
very complex relationships between family groupings. In addition, the Samaal
consider themselves to be superior to all farmers and especially to the Sab,
who are considered guilty of mixing with foreigners. This feeling is strong
enough to cause the word "sab" (meaning "low") to be officially frowned upon by
the current government.(59)
The Sab have fewer generations between the ancestors and themselves. They
have developed the idea of territoriality to a greater extent than the Samaal.
Thpy also accepted Arab and other foreign elements into their clan structure.
Being settled, they were more affected by the colonial presence and took better
advantage of the educational opportunities to form many of the administrative
elites in the country. Their noble class was more pronounced since the land
simply produced more wealth. When slavery was abolished, it forced nobles into
economic ventures in order to preserve their wealth.(60)
Some anti-Somali authors declare that the Sab are not really Somalis. A
more accurate appraisal is presented by I. M. M. Lewis:
Thus the division between the Sab and Samale, which is the wid-
est cleavage in the Somali nation, depends not only on the different
economic interests of the two groups but also upon their cultural
divergencies. Traditionally these distinctions are entrenched by
the nomad's assumption of proud superiority and contempt for his
southern countrymen, and the latter's corresponding resentment and
isolation. Yet despite this, the gulf between the two communities
is not so wide as might at first appear, or as insuperable as each
sometimes likes to suggest. As has been said, many of the Sab are
THE HORN OF AFRICA
in reality of northern pastoral origin; many speak both dialects of
Somali. Moreover there is much that draws the two groups together
economically. . . .
This sense of a commonality of interests, over and above the
cultural and historical features which divide the two halves of the
nation, is traditionally repre- sented in the national genealogy in
which ultimately every Somali group finds a place. Here Sab and
Samale are represented as brothers of common descent from a line of
ancestors which eventually links the Somali as a whole to Arabia and
proclaims their single origin. . . .(61)
A factor, important to all Somalis, was the "dia"-paying group. This was
a form of alliance where groups bound themselves together to share the rights,
burdens and receipts of blood compensation. In this manner, the other members
of a group would either revenge or collect compensation from those that harmed
a member. The Samaal "dia" groups were much smaller than those of the Sab.
The "dia" system added greatly to the internal warfare and divisions of the
Somalis as it directly supported blood feuds and caused the formation of very
strong group ties for very narrow interests.(62)
While the "dia" groups have tended to divide and fragment the Somalis, it
did not preclude broader alliances. When the larger groups such as the family
or clan were threatened, Somalis rallied to their support. The problems of the
past had not directly threatened the six clan-families and that level alliance
had not been exercised. Modern forces such as education and propaganda have
made this higher level much more important. This level has given rise to
Somali nationalism and caused many of the conflicts in the area.(63)
When nationalism was directed at the goal of independence, it tended to
overshadow most other divisions that pull the Somalis apart. Independence soon
tested this unity, as Farer explains:
Aggravating these tensions is the inevitable disillusion which
follows the consummation of independence. The oppressor leaves, yet
so many of those problems of poverty and inequality, of personal and
group animosity, once attributed (in many cases justly) to him, hang
on. The celebrants wake up with a coppery taste in their mouths.
The streets are still dusty and potholed. The same twisted-limbed
beggars haunt the corners. There is too little work and too little
money. Independence has come, but the texture of life feels the
same. That was the postindependence story of Somalia.(64)
THE HORN OF AFRICA
Union of the former Italian and British colonies formed Somalia. Union
was a goal of most Somalis but was also the cause of many problems that still
affect the country. Tribal divisions were accentuated by differences in the
colonial administration of the two former colonies. Not the least of these
differences was language, with English being the language of the educational
and civil service systems in the north and Italian being used in the south.(65)
Other problems included differences in: court systems based on English and
Italian law; currencies, based on the pound and the lira; basic equipment of
the police and army; tarrif concepts and goals; and many more. These problems
could not be solved prior to independence as the decision to unite the colonies
was made just before the mandatory date of Italian withdrawal.(66)
Once independence arrived, it was found that the style of administration
of the government and Army officials in each area varied greatly. In addition,
the smaller numbers of the north, poor lines of communication between the two
parts of the country, decline of the former northern capital and a lack of
northern agriculture and industry were bases for northern anger and fears of
southern domination. These factors were strong enough to trigger an abortive
coup just after independence.(67)
Problems of diversity in Somalia have resulted in elections where over 60
political parties competed. Most of these parties were based on the narrow
interests outlined above. The existence of so many parties and conflicting
interests convinced Somali leaders that they had to strive for unity. The
natural and easiest way to reach that goal was to use the "Greater Somalia"
concept.(68) While this tactic was effective in uniting them, it has caused
many years of war, hundreds of thousands of refugees and countless deaths.
In summary, while Somalia has a homogeneous appearance, it also contains
many divisive elements which exert fragmenting influences on the country.
While these elements are not so great as those found in Ethiopia, they could
THE HORN OF AFRICA
have easily torn the more fragile and newly independent Somalia apart. The
focus on Greater Somalia and attempts to regain lost territories have submerged
the divisive elements and united the people. Should this effort to unify all
of the Somalis be permanently frustrated, or if most Somalis decide that it
cannot succeed, then all the divisions will again be released. If the Greater
Somalia attempt has not in itself melded the tribes together, then these forces
forces will, most likely, destroy Somalia.
Republic of Djibouti
Djibouti is an interesting area because of two factors. First, it is a
natural scene of conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. Second, it is a nation
lacking a true nationality. Both factors have played their part in forming a
tiny republic that sits very uneasily at a vital crossroads guarded by its for-
mer colonial owner.
The population of Djibouti is estimated at about 250,000 of which almost
half are Somali and 40 percent are Afars. The actual numbers are in dispute
for a number of reasons. These reasons include the fact that many residents
are nomadic and may arrive and depart as they wish. The country is also very
poor which makes administration, much less census taking, difficult outside of
the main city. Finally, the exact numbers may be a danger to some officials as
the political system is based on previous estimates of population.(69)
The Afars and the Issa (a main Somali clan-family) are related by factors
such as language, life-style and religion. Differences between the two have
been increased in Djibouti as a result of French policies. Differences exist
because the Afars have held more closely to their traditions and have not moved
as aggressively as the Somalis into the economic life of the port. Somali ac-
ceptance of economic and cultural opportunities caused more of them to settle
permanently and for the French to previously favor them. However, the growth
of Somali nationalism shifted French favor to the Afars.(70)
THE HORN OF AFRICA
French administrative and military personnel provide most services as well
as defense of the country. The rest of the population includes Arab, Greek,
Indian and other minorities that make up a merchant class. Of these, the Arabs
have a history of using their position and religion to keep the less educated
Afars and Somalis from going into business, becoming too educated, or losing
their dependence on the Arabs.(71)
The population of Djibouti compounds the economic interests of Ethiopia
and Somalia as it gives both sides a valid claim to the port. Djibouti is
therefore another possible prize in the conflicts of the Horn of Africa.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
NOTES - CHAPTER 2
1. Gorman, loc. cit.
2. Adapted from National Geographic Atlas of the World, (Washington, D.C.:
National Geographic Society, 1981), p. 209.
3. Michael Milan Ferguson, "The Horn of Africa: Historical Patterns of
Conflict and Strategic Considerations," (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,
1978), p. 21.
4. Harold D. Nelson and Irving Kaplan, eds., Ethiopia, A Country Study
(Washington D. C.: GPO, The American University,1981), pp.62-63.
5. Farer, op. cit., p. 11.
6. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit. p. 63.
7. Victor Englebert, "The Danakil: Nomads of Ethiopia's Wasteland" Na-
tional Geographic, 137, No. 2 (1970), pp. 187-195.
8. Richard Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution, (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1980), p. 1.
9. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 176-177.
10. Norman L. Dodd, "African Navies South of the Sahara," Proceedings, 110,
No. 3, (1984), p. 55.
11. Ibid., pp. 60-66.
12. Ibid., pp. 172-173.
13. Farer, op. cit., p. 12.
14. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 61.
15. Harold D. Nelson, ed., Somalia, A Country Study. 3rd ed. (Washington
D.C.: GPO, The American University, 1982), p. xx.
16. Robert Paul Jordan, "Somalia's Hour of Need," National Geographic, 159,
No. 5 (1981), p. 752.
17. Nelson, op. cit., p. 68-73.
18. Jordan, op. cit., p. 775.
19. Mesfin Wolde Mariam, "The Background of the Ethio-Somalian Boundary
Dispute," The Journal of Modern African Studies, 2, No. 2 (1964), p. 191.
20. Jordan, op. cit., pp. 750-751.
21. Nelson, op. cit., pp. 164-166.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
22. Ibid., pp. 167-171.
23. Abate, op. cit., pp. 10-13.
24. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Djibouti and the Horn of Africa,
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. ix-x.
25. Thomas A. Green, "Strategic Implications for the Republic of Djibouti of a
Conflict Study of the 1974-1977 Period of the Ethiopian-Somolia War in the Horn
of Africa," (Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1981), p. 47.
26. Thompson, op. cit., p.10.
27. Ibid., p. 3.
28. Green, op. cit., p. 46.
29. Marion Kaplan, "Djibouti, Tiny New Nation of Africa's Horn," National
Geographic, 158, No. 4 (1978), pp. 519-527
30. Farer, op. cit., p. 1.
31. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 68-69.
32. Ibid.
33. Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 24-37.
34. Farer, op. cit., pp. 14-15.
35. Bereket op. cit., p. 100.
36. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 72-74.
37. Ibid., pp. 86-88.
38. Ibid., pp. 76-77.
39. Bereket, op. cit., pp. 76-82.
40. See "Oromia Speaks," The Horn of Africa, 3, No. 3, (1980), pp. 24-28, and
"Ethiopia's Hidden War: The Oromo Liberation Struggle," The Horn of Africa, 5,
No. 1, (1982), pp. 62-67, for the views of the OLF leaders.
41. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 80.
42. Farer, op. cit., pp. 64-65.
43. Bereket, op. cit., pp. 86-91.
44. This revolt is extremely well documented. See Bereket, Farer, Gorman, and
Sherman for the start of an extensive list of other sources.
45. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 69-72.
46. Colin Legum and Bill Lee, Conflict in the Horn of Africa, (New York:
Africana Publishing Company, 1977), pp. 37-41.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
47. Glen Bailey, An Analysis of the Ethiopian Revolution, (Athens: Ohio
University, Center for International Studies, 1980), pp. 12-14.
48. Ibid.
49. Patrick Gilkes, The Dying Lion: Feudalism and Modernization in Ethiopia,
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975), pp. 104-107.
50. Ibid., pp. 107-108.
51. Ibid. p. 109.
52. Ibid. pp. 25-29.
53. Nelson, op. cit., pp. 67-68.
54. Touval, op. cit., p. 9.
55. Nelson, op. cit., pp. 81-84.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid., p. 85.
58. Mariam, op. cit., p. 193.
59. Nelson, op. cit., pp. 82-89.
60. Ibid., pp. 89-91.
61. Lewis, op. cit., pp. 14-15.
62. Nelson, op. cit., pp. 88-94.
63. Lewis, op. cit., pp.13-14.
64. Farer, op. cit., p. 93.
65. Lewis, op. cit., pp. 166-170.
66. Touval, op. cit., pp. 115-117.
67. Lewis, loc. cit.
68. Ottaway, op. cit., p. 36.
69. Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 519-522.
70. Thompson, op. cit., pp. 23-28.
71. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
CHAPTER 3.
HISTORY
The Horn of Africa is like that of any other area that has been contested;
drenched in the suffering, pain and blood of both sides. The migration of new
peoples into any area is often resisted by those that have preceeded them. In
most cases, the land is limited and barely supports those living on it. Owners
of the land are aware of the threat from the immigrants and have the choice of
fighting, or of migrating to another area where they can seize the land of a
weaker power. Both sides also know that their struggles are not just friendly
competition, they are a matter of life and death for the warriors and for their
families. All of the forces of both sides which include strength, strategy,
skill, tactics, deceit, and hate are brought to bear. This was true of the
migration of the twelve tribes of Israel into Palestine, or of the movements of
the Goths against the lands of Rome, or of the American expansion to the west.
We in the US have been extremely lucky. Since our civil war, we have been
largely spared from the full experience of war. We are also fortunate to be a
country that has led the world in economic development and military strength.
We have been educated to believe that right makes might and that actions should
be based on justice and fairness for all sides. We have been so secure that we
nurture ideas that may be impractical such as pacifism, anarchism and the like.
A combination of our unique benefits, our education system, and our dis-
tance from many of the unpleasant realities of life make up a part of the
American consciousness. We live in our own version of an ivory tower as most
of us no longer kill our own food, or worry about starving to death, or have
real contact with the baser actions of our fellow man. We also make the
mistake of attributing our own unique values to those who do not share them.
Examples of our special outlook can be seen in many areas. We recently
canceled the development of a laser weapon that would blind and not kill our
THE HORN OF AFRICA
enemies because it would be inhumane. In many situations, we have restricted
our allies and ourselves from using certain weapons such as napalm, cluster
bomb units, poison gas, or neutron bombs because of our belief that they were
inhumane. We stress that we should always fight fair, take prisoners, and re-
strain ourselves from violating the various warfare conventions. We cannot
understand why Cubans (and, or Grenadans) would kill one of our Cobra pilots
attempting to surrender. Or, how the Soviets could shoot down a 747-load of
civilians. We read of atrocities in various battles and cannot understand how
they could occur and so we tend to discount, or ignore them and continue to
assume that everyone "is really a nice person, just like us."
The sad truth is that other people are not just like us and that we, when
threatened, have also proved our own ruthless nature. Those that live with the
constant evidence and threat of death, or who have almost nothing have a very
much different outlook than we do. These cruel realities are shown in our own
long history which includes many instances of deceit, barbarism, cruelty, and
murder. Examples include: settlers knowingly giving Indians disease infected
blankets; or, many instances of the killing of Indian women and children when
overrunning their villages; or, Mormons, out of fear, posing as Indians and
killing all adult members of a wagon train; or, the Marines often not taking
Japanese prisoners during World War II. All of these are closer to the harsh
realities of life than rich American housewives chartering an airplane to fly
to Central America in order to protest human rights violations.
The purpose of the remarks above is not to dwell on man's cruelty to man,
or to spotlight lurid historical examples in order to "spice up" an otherwise
dull study. Instead, it is to highlight the fact that in the Horn of Africa,
like most other places in the world, pain, suffering, and sudden death have
been and are still, the norm and not the exception. Killing another person
because he may be a threat, is different, or has something that you want, is
THE HORN OF AFRICA
much more common on there than it is in our country. For example:
Until recent times, it has been mandatory evidence of the man-
liness of certain Galla tribesmen to prove they have killed a man by
presenting his testicles to the killer's bride-to-be.(1)
In the Horn of Africa, the absolute power of life and death is exercised
to excess by those in power and without many of the constraints of our laws or
customs. Because these things, harsh and unpleasant as they may be, are true
and are to be found throughout the entire world, we cannot make the mistake of
ignoring their importance in generating hate, bloody reprisals, and long dirty
wars that cannot easily be solved by some quick, clean negotiations. Eritrea,
the Ogaden, the West Bank, Beirut, Afganistan, Iraq-Iran, and most other wars
share these facts making solutions so much more difficult.
SECTION I - EARLY ETHIOPIA
The history of Ethiopia is composed of many waves of migrations which have
moved into the area (see Map 8). The first wave of peoples were the Cushitic-,
or Omotic-speaking peoples that settled in the highlands and were later overrun
by the Semitic-speaking Amhara and Tigreans.(2) Later waves of immigration in-
cluded the Somalis and the Oromo. Millions of refugees are today's immigrants.
One of the earliest kingdoms near present-day Ethiopia was that of Meroe
which was at its height in the sixth century B.C. The people of Meroe may be
the ones that the Greeks called "burnt faces" (Ethiopian) yet, this kingdom was
more Egyptian than Ethiopian. The ancestors of modern Ethiopia were the small
kingdoms that were seeded in the area by the Sabeans, a people from southern
Arabia, at about this same time.(3)
An important, official legend of Ethiopia was that its rulers were direct
descendents of the union of Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. There are many
versions of the legend throughout the region. Research indicates that the le-
gends originated in Arabia. The Sheba (or Saba) of the Bible and which is also
mentioned in Assyrian inscriptions may have been located in the northern part
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THE HORN OF AFRICA
of Arabia while a kingdom called Saba also existed in southern Arabia. But,
it was not Ethiopia. The legend, although false, has been used by Ethiopian
rulers as a means of legitimizing their rule.(5)
One of the Sabean kingdoms that was pushed off the coast and into the in-
terior by the Greek conquests of Egypt was Aksum. It grew in strength and
eventually regained the coast. It is considered the first Ethiopian kingdom.
Its rulers spoke Greek while the population developed the classical Ethiopian
language, Giiz. Aksum rose to power in the first centry A.D., because of the
sea trade which flowed through its port of Adulis (modern Zula). The kingdom
converted to Christianity during the fourth century at about the same time as
it reached the peak of its power. This peak saw them destroy the more ancient
Meroe, control a good portion of the Red Sea, and conquer parts of southern
Arabia. Their power declined after the sixth century as large migrations from
the north resulted from the Arab invasion of Egypt. These migrations had the
effect of again cutting Aksum off from the sea and pushing it inland.(6)
While Aksum is usually considered the first Ethiopian kingdom, many
Eritreans consider Aksum to be Eritrean. This difference is used to justify
the claim of Eritrea to be a separate country that was only recently conquered
by Ethiopia. More of this argument will be presented below.(7)
After being pushed off the coast, Aksum turned its energy to the south and
expanded in that direction. Rather than a single movement there were actually
a series of advances and withdrawals dependent on the internal strengths and
weaknesses of Aksum. Similar examples of alternating Ethiopian central control
and separatism continue to this day. This time also saw the strengthening of
the power of Islam as Arab merchants converted those living on the coasts.(8)
Around 1137, the Agew were able to seize control of Aksum and to hold it
for over 130 years. They, in contrast to the earlier rulers, did not claim
descent from Solomon. Other peoples such as the Tigreans and Amhara (converted
THE HORN OF AFRICA
to Christianity in about the ninth century), struggled against the Agew and
attempted to gain power for themselves. In 1270, the Amhara were successful as
they played on the ethnic issue of the Agew being alien and on the religious
issue of the Agew not being descendants of Solomon.(9)
Europeans had a legend of a powerful Christian king, called Prester John,
who could aid them against the Moslems. When African traders brought back word
of the existence of Ethiopia, the Europeans thought they had found John's king-
dom. Portugal made attempts to contact the Ethiopians and set up diplomatic
relations in 1509.(10) While the Portugese were looking for help against the
Moslems, they ended up giving assistance as Ethiopia fought the Moslems.
The Moslems of the Horn had a powerful leader, the Iman of Harar, Ahmed
Ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi, also called Ahmed "Gran" (the left handed), who was
leading a jihad against Christian Ethiopia. He was a skillful military leader
who also had the benefit of aid from Turkey in the form of troops and firearms.
(11) The jihad was based on religion and on new Somali migrations which added
population pressures to the Moslem kingdoms of the Horn. The Somalis provided
the bulk of the Moslem army which was very successful as most of the central
highlands were overrun, sacked, converted to Islam, or put to the sword. The
jihad was only checked when the Portugese sent 400 musketeers, under the Dom
Christopher da Gama, a son of Vasco da Gama, to aid the Ethiopians. In 1542,
they helped the Ethiopians defeat Gran and forced him to retreat. Examples of
the animosities of the war included da Gama claiming one of Ahmed's wives as a
part of his share of the spoils of war. When Ahmed returned, he brought 900
Moslem musketeers and more cannon and defeated the combined Christian armies.
He also captured da Gama, had him tortured and then killed. Gran's victory was
so complete, he thought the war was over and released his musketeers. The new
Emperor, Galadewos, surprised Gran and forced a battle where Gran was killed
and his army routed. Battles continued and saw a nephew of Gran defeat Gala-
THE HORN OF AFRICA
dewos in 1559. The nephew returned to Harar with a present for the widow of
Gran, the head of Galadewos.(12)
The importance of the jihad is summarized by Robert Gorman:
Gran's jihad had two important long-term psychological effects.
First, it reinforced the Abyssinian perception that Ethiopia was a
"Christian island in an Islamic Sea," underscoring the religious
nature of much of the conflict that had transpired on the Horn.
Second, though ultimately unsuccessful, Gran is remembered among
Somali as a folk hero and an archetypal national figure despite the
ambiguity surrounding his ethnic origins.
While one should not underestimate the significance of these
psychological factors on the development of subsequent relations
between Ethiopia and Somalia, a more tangible effect of Gran's
exploits was the participation of Turks and other Arabs in the
conquests. This fostered claims by Turkey, and later by Egypt, to
both the Red Sea ports and much of what is now Eritrea. One can
trace the causes of the current Eritrean succession back to these
earlier historical developments.
Finally, there is an eerie, although largely coincidental, re-
semblance between the impact of foreign involvement during the Gran
episode and the Ethiopian-Somali war of 1977/78. In each case the
use of foreign mercenaries and equipment was decisisve to the out-
come. Foreign influences from Gran, through the colonial era to
Grazianni and beyond to the 1977 war, have greatly affected
Ethiopian-Somali relations.(13)
The battles ceased as both sides had to meet a greater challenge, a new
migration by the Oromo. As the Somali expanded into the Horn, they pushed the
Oromo out of their previous areas and set them in motion towards the interior.
The Oromo movements overran some areas, bypassed strong resistance in others,
and spread unevenly throughout the highlands.(14)
The Amhara developed the concept of an Emperor who was thought of as the
"king of kings." His power was based on tribute and personal service from the
"kings" and "dukes" of the provinces. While the Emperor was technically all
powerful, he had to keep the support of the lesser rulers in order to survive.
The Emperors, annointed and crowned at Aksum, would move in a royal caravan
from region to region to live off, and keep an eye on, the local rulers.(15)
Establishment of a permanent capital at Gondar (see Map 9) in the seven-
teenth century tied the Emperor to a single region and helped the lesser kings
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THE HORN OF AFRICA
increase their regional power. A conflict within the Church over the influence
of the Jesuits added to the turmoil of the times. Regional leadership was
allowed to become hereditary and the power of the Emperors declined.(17)
By the next century, the feudal system had deteriorated to the point where
only weak Emperors were allowed to reign. This period became known as the Time
of the Princes. Power was in the hands of the kings and dukes and was used to
strengthen their regions and themselves. The situation was so bad that writers
of the day wrote of "ignorance, debauchery, witchcraft, and drunken orgies"
infecting even the clergy. James Bruce, a Scot serving Egypt, noted the bloody
nature of a ruling class that practiced cruelties and wrote, "Nothing occupied
my thoughts but how to escape from this bloody country." The regions even made
their own alliances with, and obtained arms from, foreign governments.(18)
A former bandit and member of the nobility, Kassa, set up a small kingdom
during the middle of the nineteenth century. He later expanded it to the
point where he could seize the throne of Ethiopia in 1855. As Emperor he chose
the name, Tewodros (Theodore), after the legend of a strong leader who was to
appear and restore Ethiopia to greatness. To accomplish this task, he had to
defeat the various kings and bring them fully under his control. One of the
first and strongest regions to fall was Shewa where the Emperor captured that
region's heir (and future Emperor), Menelik II, and allowed him to live. Tewo-
dros attempted to modernize Ethiopia and had extensive dealings with Europeans.
His attitude can be seen in a quotation attributed to him by the French consul:
I know the tactics of European governments when they desire to
acquire an eastern state. First they send out missionaries, then
consuls to support the missionaries, then battalions to support the
consuls. I am not a Rajah of Hindustan to be made a mock of in that
way. I prefer to have to deal with the battalions straight away!(19)
Tewodros threw anyone, even consuls, into chains if they upset him. He
got angry with some British agents and promptly imprisoned them. The British
tried to get them released through diplomacy. When diplomacy didn't work, they
THE HORN OF AFRICA
used force. They sent General Napier and a British army that included modern
weapons, elephants and a brass band. The Emperor's enemies seized that time to
aid the British and they had little trouble in defeating him. Tewodros saw
that he had no chance. He released the prisoners and attempted to negotiate.
When this offer was refused, he committed suicide.(20)
Tewodros is considered the first modern Emperor. He was a strong military
leader and he set up Ethiopia's first standing army that stressed drill and
discipline in place of the traditional levies of warriors. He tried to reform
both the Church and the imperial system of government. His failures were due
to his being a poor politican. His inclination was to try to settle problems
by using blunt, direct, and usually military methods. As his reforms, military
conquests and internal opposition from the lesser kings increased, he alienated
most of his allies. The lack of this support allowed the British to cross an
otherwise hostile land with little loss and defeat his greatly reduced forces.
However, the idea of a strong empire had taken hold.(21)
One of the Ethiopians that supported Napier was the king of Tigray. After
Napier had defeated Tewodros, he withdrew through Tigray to the coast. As he
embarked aboard the ships that were to return him to India, he left his excess
weapons and munitions as a reward to the king. This modern equipment and the
king's natural ability were used to seize the throne in 1872. As Emperor, he
took the name, Yohannes IV.(22)
Egypt, which was going through a revival of strength, attempted several
invasions, only some of which Yohannes was able to defeat. The Egyptians held
the sea coasts all around the Horn, occupied Harar, and attempted to take the
interior. From his base in Tigray, Yohannes was able to stop the Egyptians in
key battles that preserved his hold on the highlands. Yohannes returned some
of his Egyptian prisoners of war along with this message:
Here are your soldiers Ismail! If you want any more eunuchs
for your harems drive me up the rest of your army."(23)
THE HORN Of AFRICA
In addition to the Egyptians, Yohannes also had to face the Italians who
had taken over Asab and encouraged by the British, were moving inland. The
Italians had made agreements with several of Yohannes' rivals to supply them
with arms in return for aid against the Emperor. One of these was Menelik II,
who supported the Emperor only when it paid to do so. Menelik was concerned
only about using the advanced weapons supplied by the Italians to consolidate
his power in Shewa and to expand his kingdom to the south. The Italians were
temporarily checked by a defeat in Eritrea in 1887, and Yohannes turned to face
a Madist threat from the Sudan. When Yohannes was killed in battle, Menelik's
army allowed him to ignore the line of sucession and seize the crown.(24)
The rule of Menelik II coincides with the European scramble for colonies
and the creation of modern Ethiopia. As such, it will be addressed in the next
section. This section traced some of the main themes of the early development
of Ethiopia. These themes included: the effects of migrations; the beginings
of conflict with the Moslem Somalis; the development of the office of Emperor;
the growth of regional strength and autonomy; and the conquest of new areas.
SECTION II - MODERN ETHIOPIA
A point that was evident in the last section and which will appear again
and again is that the leaders on the Horn of Africa were often willing to ally
themselves with anyone who could be of use. Within the diverse groups there
were always those willing to assist anyone for the right price. Christians,
Moslems, Europeans, Oromo, Amhara, and all the rest sought out alliances even
with enemies in order to further their own interests. Alliances were often
broken and many would work both sides of a conflict until a probable winner
could be determined.
In the nineteenth century, when the British attacked Tewodros, the future
Emperor aided them. When that Emperor, Yohannes, fought the Italians, his
THE HORN OF AFRICA
successor to be, Menelik II, was allied with the Italians. When Haile Selassie
fought the Italians just before World War II, some Ethiopian rulers aided the
Italians. When the revolutionaries overthrew Haile Selassie, similar kinds of
deals were made between factions. When sufficient power was at hand, the deals
and the dealers were often terminated. Power does not rest easily in Ethiopia.
The path to the Ethiopian throne is one marked by intrigue, power brokerage,
and luck. Those that helped to put someone into power were often the ones who
pulled him down. No one could be safe or secure in his position and only the
strong and ruthless could rule in Ethiopia.
A major cause of hatred between the Moslems and the ruling Amhara which
lasted into modern times was slavery. The taking and holding of slaves was a
part of all the cultures of the countries on the Horn. Conquerors of an area
always enslaved parts of the conquered population. The slaves were often sold
to other countries in the Middle East with some going to Saudi Arabia as late
as the 1940's (and perhaps later). Slaves were used by the Amhara for farming,
household, or other duties. High ranking army or governmental officials often
had large numbers of them. A favorite form of slavery involved the castration
of young blacks in order to provide eunuchs to care for the owner's family. As
late as the 1930's, a slave child could reportedly be purchased in Addis Ababa
for about 5 pounds sterling.(25)
Slavery was justified by references in portions of the Old Testament and
to the lack of a slavery prohibition in the New Testament. Church officials
often owned slaves. The early legal code, the "Fetha Nagast", provided for the
treatment of slaves and specifically prohibited the enslavement of Christians.
Some point to that prohibition as a reason for the Amhara often not trying to
convert their Moslem and pagan populations. In addition to large scale slaving
operations of the various conquerors, a smaller scale effort has existed into
modern times. Kidnappings of vulnerable individuals and raids on towns, tribes
THE HORN OF AFRICA
and caravans provided a continual source of income and naturally, a continual
source of fear, reprisals and hate. Once taken, those slaves that resisted or
were a problem were killed.(26)
Emperors participated in the taking and using slaves. Each also published
proclamations against slavery in order to appease Western (mostly British) sen-
sitivities to obtain trade, aid, or other agreements (entry into the League of
Nations). Proclamations did not stop the Emperors from slaving campaigns which
provided some of the funds needed to purchase modern arms from Europeans.(27)
The Italians used slavery as another propaganda justification to support
their second invasion of Ethiopia. Haile Selassie abolished slavery in 1942,
while the British were in actual control of the country. He later paid lip
service to the anti-slavery movement by setting up and sometimes strengthening
anti-slavery bureaus.(28) The holding of slaves of other religions and races
added to the many forms of discrimination practiced by the population.
The history of modern Ethiopia includes the reigns of two strong Emperors,
Menelik II and Haile Selassie. Most historians agree that "In its extent, its
government and its problems, present-day Ethiopia is largely the creation of
Emperor Menelik II."(29) The second strong Emperor, Haile Selassie, ruled the
empire for more than half a century. He tried to centralize the government and
to modernize the country. These efforts eventually set in motion the forces
needed to destroy him and the imperial government of Ethiopia. The actions of
both Emperors are important in terms of creating the conflicts of the Horn.
Menelik, as king of Shewa, made agreements with Yohannes that gave himself
a free hand in the south. He started the pattern of conquest that as Emperor
soon doubled the size of Ethiopia (see Map 10). in the south, he made allies
out of some conquered Oromo and used them to help conquer other Oromos. He
built a new capital at Addis Ababa (New Flower) which was further evidence of
the southern shift of the empire. He also used the lands of the south as a
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THE HORN OF AFRICA
means of securing his rule by rewarding his forces with it (using land rights
described in Chapter 2). He seized the important Moslem town of Harar when the
Egyptians pulled out. Later, he claimed lands bordering the Indian Ocean.(31)
The Italians used their previous alliance with Menelik to arrive at the
Treaty of Uccialli. Menelik signed the treaty in order to receive more Italian
arms and to reduce the Tigrean lands of Yohannes' relatives. The treaty was
used to make his new crown more secure and to aid his expansion to the south.
The additional southern conquests then provided coffee, gold, ivory and slaves
which were sold to obtain more European arms. The treaty gave Eritrea to the
Italians and, according to their interpretation of Article 17, made Ethiopia an
Italian "protectorate." When Menelik continued to deal with other Europeans,
the Italians protested. His position was that the phrase in the Amharic
version of the treaty (the only one he signed), was that Ethiopia "may" use the
offices of Italy. The Italian version stated that Ethiopia "shall" use those
offices. This difference resulted in the battle of Adowa.(32)
As the Italians advanced into Ethiopia, they attempted to obtain support
from those local rulers that they had dealings with. All of Menelik's leaders
except one had been in contact with the Italians as they advanced. The most
important of theses, Duke Markonnen, actually apologized to the Italians after
his troops had attacked them because the troops had attacked without orders!
Markonnen and his forces did join Menelik at Adowa.(33)
As the battle unfolded the Italians were severely handicaped. Their army
was heavily outnumbered and far from its supply bases. They did not know that
Menekik had new French weapons or even how many troops opposed them. They had
to attack uphill in rough country using very inaccurate maps. To make matters
worse, Menelik's agents had convinced the Italians that many of the Emperor's
troops would be away on 1 March for religious reasons. The Italians, extremely
confident and perhaps trusting in the "superiority" of Europeans over natives,
THE HORN OF AFRICA
or even remembering Napier's easy time against Tewodros, attacked on 1 March.
All three of their attacking columns were surrounded, the generals in charge of
the columns were killed and the entire army routed.(34) Over half of the army
was killed and many were captured. What happened to the prisoners is the
subject of some disagreement.
The Italian Government said later that all of them had been mu-
tilated and most of them castrated, but careful examination of the
records has indicated that most of the survivors were in good health,
and only thirty of the Europeans had been mutilated. The native Eri-
trean soldiers fared worse; many of them had a hand and a foot cut
off since they were regarded as traitors rather than enemies. Mutil-
ation had been a traditional treatment for Ethiopians' prisoners of
war--in contrast to the treatment adopted by the British under Kit-
chener when, two years later, he reoccupied the Sudan and allowed his
prisoners to starve to death. Menelek and his generals, however, had
issued stringent orders to abandon the practice of mutilation, and
most of the captors obeyed.(35)
European armies had suffered losses before, yet this battle was to be a
triumph for the natives that wasn't quickly avenged. It is not clear why this
battle should have had such a strong effect on the Italians and the rest of the
world. While it is true that the Italians were decimated, European armies such
as Gordon's in Khartoum or those in the Afgan wars had been beaten more badly.
It may have been the improved communications that quickly passed the word of
the humiliating defeat to the world that gave it an excessive impact. It may
have been the Italian over-reaction that convinced the other Europeans that
Ethiopia was now a true power. Or, it may have had something to do with the
history of Ethiopia and its legendary past which predisposed the Europeans to
accept Ethiopia as one of them. Perhaps all of these factors played a part.
The fact that Menelik did not militarily press his advantage after Adowa
may have aided this mysterious process. A quick follow up of the victory had
the potential to drive the Italians out of Eritrea. But, had he made the at-
tempt, Italian public opinion could have been angered enough to put additional
forces into the field. With that type of determination, the Ethiopians would
have been beaten. Even if he didn't anger the Italians, attack of the Italian
THE HORN OF AFRICA
held cities was risky. Had the cities repulsed the Ethiopians, as some small
forts had already done, the myth and value of supposed Ethiopian invincibility
would have evaporated. Once the Ethiopians proved vulnerable, this weakness
could have been exploited and again, the Ethiopia would have been defeated.
Lastly, in a longer war, the Italians could apply "diplomatic" pressure on
Menelik's supporters and bribe away from him. Italians already had contacts
with all of them and many had wavered until the day of the battle. After the
thrill of victory wore off, they would have been ripe for this type of action.
The result of Adowa was that all of a sudden, all of the European powers
were beating at the door of the Ethiopians in order to negotiate borders and to
give the Ethiopians arms and other aid. Menelik was suddenly on a par with the
rulers of Europe and Ethiopia assumed a status that its real strength and power
didn't warrant. Menelik played the situation well. He found that he had won
the hearts of the common Ethiopians, the modern arms left by the Italians, and
the respect of foreign governments. He used these new assets to cement his
position, expand his empire, and reduce the power of the local kings.
After the battle, Menelik turned his attention to borders.
Frontiers were no less urgent a need. Political borders were
vague and sometimes meaningless in Africa, where the European idea of
sovereignty was strange and where huge spaces, empty and unmapped,
separated nomads and tribal centers. The idea of a frontier, of a
sort of wateright state that could be shown in a separate color on a
map, was not very old in Europe itself, and Europe's innumerable
frontier problems were an inheritance from the recent past when it
had not mattered whether a province was the fief of a French or of a
German ruler. But now frontiers were essential in Europe, and if
Ethiopia were to survive as a modern state surrounded by European
colonies, it too must have them. The legalistic and often meaningless
task of defining the borders was undertaken through interminable
negotiations with the governments that controlled neighboring terri-
tories--Britain, France, Italy, Egypt. Lines of a sort were drawn,
but many of them were unsurveyed and the territories they ran through
unexplored.(36)
The first to negotiate were the Italians who had just been defeated. In
1896, they signed the Addis Ababa Peace Treaty which surprisingly, gave them a
an even larger colony in Eritrea! They renounced the Treaty of Uccialli and
THE HORN OF AFRICA
paid reparations. The fact that Menelik did not take control over the area is
one more factor in Eritrea's claim to a non-Ethiopian history.(37)
In 1897 and 1902, Menelik signed treaties with the British which defined
borders with British Somaliland and Sudan.(38) He also signed treaties with
the Italians in 1897 and 1908 which clearly defined part of the border between
Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland. The areas gained by Ethiopia hadn't normally
been under Ethiopian control. But, because of Adowa, the Europeans recognized
Menelik's claim to them. All of the treaties were purposely vague and subject
to varying interpretations (since future negotiations were always accompanied
by "payments" to Menelik). Differing treaty interpretations were the basis for
the next war between Ethiopia and Italy.(39)
In 1906, Menelik suffered a stroke that began his physical deterioration.
In 1908, another stroke left him almost totally paralysed. Regional rulers,
court factions, and European powers all plotted and schemed with each other as
Menenlik's health failed. The Europeans even signed the Tripartite Treaty to
define their spheres of influence on the Horn of Africa.(40) Menelik learned
of the treaty which divided up the Horn and his empire and issued a statement:
We have received the arrangement made by the Three Powers, we
thank them for their communication, and their desire to keep and
maintain the independence of our Government. But let it be under-
stood that this arrangement in no way limits what we consider our
sovereign rights.(41)
This was a rather tame response for the victor of Adowa and probably reflected
his physical deterioration.
The strongest power in Ethiopia during the decline of the Emperor was Ras
Mikael. Mikael, the duke and later king of Wollo, was a former Moslem who had
converted to the Ethiopian Church so that he could join the ruling elite. His
career was a long one that included dealings with all the modern Emperors. He
fought beside Tewodros in the battle against Napier. He supported Yohannes
until Yohannes was killed by the Madhists. Mikael supported Menelik and mar-
THE HORN OF AFRICA
ried Menelik's daughter. Mikael's son, Lij Yasu, later ruled as an uncrowned
Emperor until the future Haile Selassie defeated both the father and son.(42)
With Menelik largely paralyzed, the kings began to maneuver to gain the
throne. A regent was appointed to run the country until Lij Yasu could take
the throne, but the regent also had a stroke and died. The kings reacted by
moving armies to Addis Ababa. A sixteen year old Lij Yasu arrived in Addis
Ababa and with the support of his father, took control of the government. One
his supporters was Ras Tafari, who then became the Governor of Harar.(43)
Lij Yasu ruled as an uncrowned Emperor and developed a reputation for both
cruelty and perversions which the British consul reported. One report was:
. . . But his most considerable crime so far had been committed in
April, 1912, in the Danakil desert, whither he had gone with two
ostensible purposes--to shoot lion and to bring to heel a number of
Danakil tribes which had been raiding Ethiopian settlements. The
news of the approach of Yasu and his troops preceded him and the
tribesmen disappeared into the fastness of the desert. Thereupon,
the prince decided that he would not be cheated of blood and ordered
his horsemen to put to the sword the inhabitants of three villages,
none of which had any connection with the raiders. About one hun-
dred Danakil maidens, who are famed for their looks, were reserved
for the attentions of Yasu and his officers before being sold on the
slave market, but the rest of the inhabitants of the villages were
massacred--3,000 in all. . .(44)
Menelik died in 1913, and Lij Yasu's rule continued. The Germans and the
Turks became allies of Lij Yasu. The mistake which provided the means to over-
throw him (which excesses had not), was conversion to Islam, the old religion
of his father. While this helped him gain new support from the Moslem elements
of the Horn, it alienated the powerful Christian rulers of the highlands. A
coup, led by Ras Tafari, removed Lij Yasu from power. Disagreements after the
coup as to a replacement resulted in the Emperor's daughter, Zauditu, being
crowned Empress, Duke Tafari being designated regent, and Habte Giorgis, a war
minister of Menelik, being left in charge of the army.(45)
Duke Tafari was an extremely patient man and carefully strengthened his
power as regent from 1916 to 1930. Overcoming opposition from the Empress, he
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put down several rebellions as others attempted to take control of the country.
His power rose to the point where the Empress was forced to make him a king.
After the former husband of the Empress rebelled and was defeated, she soon
died and Duke Tafari was crowned as Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia.(46)
Haile Selassie was a master of diplomacy and the use of all of its tools.
After each victory he took pains to make sure that his opponent could not harm
him. Duke Mikael, after being defeated, was imprisoned until he died. The
Empress lived until the day after Haile Selassie defeated her former husband in
a decisive battle. Lij Yasu was also imprisoned, in gold chains as befits a
royal heir.(47) Later, when the Italians threatened, the imprisoned Lij Yasu
became a potential weapon to be used by them and he died. His death was offi-
cially a "natural" death, however, a former slave of Lij Yasu gives this story:
. . .but later a second car came and the two occupants
waited until dark. They crept up to the cell room. There were
holes in the door and His Highness must have seen their guns poking
through them for he spat at the peep holes. He could spit well! He
gripped the window bars as they shot him. He was a great powerful
man and he shook the whole building until I thought it would fall
and then I heard him slide to the floor. The two assassins seemed
to dance over the body in accordance, I think, with certain witch-
crafts before it was carried out at night and sent by train to Addis
Ababa.(48)
Haile Selassie, as regent, had visited Europe was able to get Ethiopia
accepted into the League of Nations. He accepted aid and technical expertise
from Europe in order to continue the process of modernization.(49) As Emperor,
he issued a constitution, set up a national bank and currency, sent Ethiopians
abroad to study, established schools and expanded the use of electricity and
the telephone. He continued Menelik's policies of reducing the power of the
local kings, centralizing the power of the government and attempting to tie
those in his service to him by grants of land, positions and power. He also
built up the army and established the Imperial Bodyguard.(50)
The expansion of Italian Somaliland (see Map 11) into Ethiopian territory
led to a battle at Wal Wal. The Emperor attempted to use the League of Nations
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THE HORN OF AFRICA
to defuse the situation. The Italians used it as a pretext that they had been
looking for to avenge their defeat at Adowa by invading Ethiopia. The Italians
had already scouted the country and had made agreements with some local rulers
to gain their support. They attacked with modern arms, aircraft, and poison
gas. In spite of Ethiopian bravery, Italian strength soon proved to be too
much. They overran Ethiopia and Haile Selassie fled.(52)
Haile Selassie personally addressed the League of Nations. His speech was
halted by a number of Italian and pro-Italian newspapermen who created a loud
disturbance until they were thrown out. His address included:
I, Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, am here today to claim
that justice which is due to my people. . . .
I assert that the problem submitted to the Assembly today is a
much wider one than the removal of sanctions. It is not merely a set-
tlement of Italian aggression. It is collective. It is the very
existence of the League of Nations. It is the confidence that each
State is to place in international treaties, it is the value of pro-
mises made to small States that their integrity and independence be
respected and ensured. It is the principle of the equality of states
on the one hand or, on the other, the inevitability that they will be
forced to accept the bonds of vassalship. In a word, it is interna-
tional morality that is at stake. . . .It is us today. It will be
you tomorrow.(53)
The Italians consolidated their areas on the Horn and renamed them Italian
East Africa. They brought in Italian settlers, expanded the road network and
made a number of other economic improvements. However, they were faced with
continual resistance. The Italian answer was terror:
. . . On June 6 it was ordered from Rome that all rebels be immediate-
ly executed. Graziani interpreted that instruction in the broadest
possible way, to include mass executipn of suspects. No consideration
at all was given to the proposition that men fighting in organized
troops should be treated, when captured, as prisoners of war. The
killers of Magliocco and his companions, who were in fact imperial
cadets in uniforms, were apprehended. Three hundred of them--not all
300, obviously, were guilty of the murders--were shot.(54)
To celebrate the birth of an heir to the Italian crown, the Italians had
3,000 poor Ethiopians gather to receive a gift of money and refreshments. A
grenade attack from the crowd sparked "three hours" of firing by the Italian
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police and three days of reprisals in the empire. Women and children were
machine gunned and left to rot. The Italians began "cleaning up" parts of the
city by spraying occupied homes with gasoline and setting them afire.(55)
Later, the military ruler of Ethiopia, Graziani, came up with a plan:
Graziani evidently formally submitted the program for exter-
minating Ethiopian intelligentsia to Rome for approval. And Rome
formally approved it, with the provision that it should be carried
out in secrecy with as few witnesses as possible. The viceroy
specified the classes of people who were to be killed: holders of
university degrees and high school diplomas; members of the Young
Ethiopia Party; officers and cadets of the imperial military
academy.
This wholesale readjustment of the mechanism of Ethiopian so-
ciety was begun, but the extent to which it was completed is con-
jectural. . . . It appears to be true that (considering that the
intelligentsia was very small in 1936) that there was literally a
lost generation of educated Ethiopians.(56)
The effects of the occupation on Ethiopia were deep and long lasting. The
Italians instituted many harsh racial separation procedures and made it policy
to favor the Moslem Oromo and Somali over the hostile, Christian Amhara. This
added to the conflicts that were to rage after the Italians left.(57) While
they provided economic improvements to Ethiopia, their attacks on the educated
class left few to administer it after the war. This destruction insured that
any changes to the feudal system would come slowly as the educated opposition
to, or support for the Emperor, would have to be regrown. Reformers would find
it more difficult to overcome the more deeply entrenched imperial system.
Once Italy joined the war against the Allies, Haile Selassie was aided by
Britain. He returned to Sudan to help lead a guerrilla movement in Ethiopia.
An eccentric British officer, Orde Wingate, who had gained fame in Palestine as
a trainer of the irregular Israeli forces that later became the Israeli Defense
Force, led some of the combined forces. Surprisingly successful against the
Italians, by May 1941, they had retaken Addis Ababa. The British were hesitant
to allow the Emperor to resume power but Wingate helped the Emperor stage a
triumphant return to Addis Ababa on 5 May.(58)
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The British were slow to allow Haile Selassie to independently exercise
his control over the country. He was allowed to issue Proclamations concerning
the country which were carried out by the British. Without British approval,
he began appointing governmental officials which forced the British to support
him. He even had the British put down a revolt led by a son of Lij Yasu. By
1942, the Emperor had a signed agreement whereby the British provided financial
support and allowed him to fully reestablish his government in most areas of
Ethiopia. The notable exceptions to the agreement were the Ogaden and Eritrea
which were retained under British control.(59)
In order to make contacts with the US and overcome British controls, the
Ethiopians used many ruses. Once they used the cover of attending a World Food
Conference in the US to obtain aid and their first American advisors. Another
time, a secret early morning plane trip was arranged for Haile Selassie to go
to Suez and meet Franklin Roosevelt. The British ambassador heard the plane
was followed it in the only plane he could find, a biwing. His old plane was
lucky to make it across the desert to Suez and he alerted Churchill of the
secret. Churchill then met with the Emperor and upon learning that the US had
provided jeeps and other vehicles, gave the Emperor a Rolls Royce.(60)
Haile Selassie used internal intrigues in order to consolidate his power.
He favored those leaders that had gone into exile with him and even those that
had aided the Italians over those that had stayed behind to fight because the
fighters had too much local power to be trusted. He made it his practice to
build up one faction, then another and play them against each other. Whenever
anyone became too popular, he would demote or exile him. There were a number
of internal crises that had to be overcome and after each success, the Emperor
emerged in a slightly stronger position.
On the international scene, Haile Selassie traded on his image as an en-
lightened absolute ruler. He joined the UN and advanced his claims against the
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entire the Horn. He courted the US in order to ease Britain out of the picture
on the Horn and to build up his army (a vital tool to ensure his control of the
country). With US support, he was able to have the UN join Eritrea to Ethiopia
in a federal system. He gave the US rights to an important communications and
intelligence gathering base called Kagnew Communications Station. He even pro-
vided troops to the UN forces fighting in Korea and the Congo.(61)
Haile Selassie also became a leader of the African movement as he joined
with the leaders of many African countries in openly denouncing South Africa
and attempting to set up some sort of regional African organization. This was
to result in the OAU which placed its headquarters in Addis Ababa.(62)
In December 1960, while Haile Selassie was on one of his many state visits
abroad, some elements of the government and the army staged a coup. His son,
the Crown Prince, was declared the new ruler and Addis Ababa was secured. The
Emperor learned of the coup, organized a counterattack and quickly returned to
the country. Loyal army troops attacked and the coup was destroyed. The fact
that there was a coup was a sign of the problems that Ethiopia was facing and
was a portent of the future. Haile Selassie survived because the coup had not
gained the support of the people, the Church, or of most of the army. He met
the challenge of the coup by executions and tighter controls which made the old
imperial system that much more vulnerable.(63)
The coup proved the validity of the Emperor's divide and rule tactics.
The Emperor ensured complete separation of the Imperial Body guard and the army
by appointing rivals to command and staff each. While the Imperial Bodyguard
took part in the coup, the army later crushed them. As long as the army failed
to unify, the country's strongest element could not overthrow him.(64)
After the coup, the Emperor attempted to coopt many of those that might be
sympathetic to the coup by speeding up the moderization process. He directed
his attention to the military and more than doubled land grants to military and
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police officers who supported him. To reduce the power of the landed nobility,
he attempted to impose a new form of taxation which would have weakened their
power. This was met by hostility and revolt in some areas and was allowed to
lapse. Reforms were too much for the conservatives; too little for the growing
union, student, and professional groups; and did not get to the heart of the
problem, which was the imperial government and its land tenure system. The end
result was that reforms were limited by the Emperor so as not to give away too
much, were often resisted by conservatives, and turned out to be too little,
too late to stop the move towards massive discontent.(65)
Ryszard Kapuscinski, a modern Polish writer acceptable to the Soviets,
interviewed many of the people that surrounded Haile Selassie before and during
the 1974 coup. His book which is as expected, very biased against the Emperor.
However, there are some insights into the ruling methods used by Haile Selassie
during this time. He tells of the Emperor raising people from the gutter into
power so that they would be loyal only to him. He describes the daily rituals
of office where the Emperor would: hear the reports of spies and confidants,
which were usually directed against each other; listen to and judge problems
that people were addressing to him for decision; personally dole out all funds
for projects, relief, or rewards; and promote and demote government officials
in order to insure his total control over the country.(66) The picture is one
of a typically feudal system and surprises some:
In fact, the contrast that has existed between the world-wide
reputation of Emperor Haile Selassie and the state of affairs within
Ethiopia must strike most forcibly any person interested in the
country. He was widely regarded as an absolute monarch with semi-
divine status. This was far from the case. He always had to con-
tend with a number of conflicting power groups--the Church, the
central and provincial aristocracy and the army. He kept his pos-
ition by balancing these forces and by playing them against each
other, at which he was very competent. But the imperial position,
in spite of all efforts at centralization, was never really strong
enough to ignore them.(67)
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Haile Selassie was not unaware of the problems in Ethiopia. In fact, just
after the coup of 1960, an American advisor, Donald E. Paradis, presented the
Emperor with a memo. In it, Paradis argued that the empire was too complex for
one man to govern and that the country required land reform and a change in ex-
ecutive decision making procedures. He warned that unless power was delegated
to those below the Emperor that the educated classes would revolt "against a
system which has created obstacles and frustrations at every turn, which has
inhibited and prevented progress." This revolt would be "even more horrible"
than the 1960 coup. Speaking of forces of history which could only be delayed,
he said, "We must either move with them or be overwhelmed by them."(68)
G. Mennen Williams, the former governor of Michigan and the Assistant
Secretary of State for Africa, visited Ethiopia in early 1961. He agreed that
changes had to be made if Haile Selassie was to survive. Those changes were
not likely as they "would involve undercutting . . . family . . . friends, and
. . . supporters." However, in April 1961, the Emperor made a speech to his
ministers outlining changes that delegated authority and responsibility for
decisions to that level. This speech cheered the Americans.(69)
The American embassy's political officer, Edward Holmes, writing in late
1961, presented an accurate assessment when he noted that Haile Selassie could
never change. The Emperor's old system of divide and conquer had already re-
turned and there was growing unrest that would explode in revolt. Holmes was
only incorrect in predicting that the change was imminent.(70)
Haile Selassie stayed in power but his power weakened. The army became
aware of its importance and presented demands for higher pay which were granted
in 1961 and 1964. A Oromo political movement had to be broken up in 1966. The
forced, total union of Eritrea to Ethiopia in 1962, resulted in an increasingly
debilitating insurgency.(71) The numbers of educated Ethiopians increased as
the annual count of college students exceeded 2000 for the first time in 1967.
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(72) However, as the newly graduated college students went to work at various
levels within the government, their loyalty to the Emperor was strained by con-
flicts between the nature of the government and the ideals of their education.
As a result, there was more and more student unrest. A Soviet view of the
situation on the eve of the 1974 coup was given in 1981:
By 1974, Ethiopia found itself with a backward agriculture and
very acute social contradictions, and with a number of unsolved eth-
nic, religious and other problems. The per capita income (about $80
in 1973) was one of the lowest in Africa. Economic difficulties
were primarily due to the extremely slow progress of socio-economic
innovations, particularly in the countryside, to excessive spending
for non-productive purposes, and to corruption, which had become a
national disease. These were aggravated by the predatory practices
of foreign companies; chronic deficits in foreign trade; unexplored
natural resources; and so on. Even the most limited economic devel-
opment programmes were either delayed or broke down altogether.
Poverty, the absence of civil rights, cut-backs in production,
and inflation could not but create a critical, pre-revolutionary
situation aggravated by booming prices, unemployment, lumpenisation
of the urban population, and a mass exodus of peasants to the towns.
To these problems were added the catastrophic consequences of a
drought lasting several years and the increasingly arbitrary rule of
officialdom. By 1974, the socio-economic and political contrasts
had reached their limit. Discontent was growing everywhere, includ-
ing among the armed forces.(73)
The begining of the end for Haile Selassie was a 50 percent increase in
the price of gasoline caused by rising oil prices. This triggered a strike by
the taxi drivers of Addis Ababa which crippled the city. Unions, created by
the Emperor in his quest for progress, then staged their first general strike.
The teachers (about half of Ethiopia's professional class) went on strike to
protest a review of the educational system. The army, suffering from defeats
in the war in Eritrea and upset over inadequate living conditions, mutinied.
And finally, the long drought which killed as many as 200,000 people in Tigray
and Wollo, caused public anger. The critical point was not the drought or the
deaths, they were a part of Ethiopian life, but that the government attempted
to ignore it! The government refused to provide emergency relief or to request
aid from international sources. It used censorship to prevent news of the
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drought from reaching the world until a BBC-TV documentary broke the news. As
Ethiopia learned of the drought, the people began to demand action.(74)
The Emperor's government resigned and he appointed a new prime minister to
set up another. The new prime minister proved unable to gain the power base
required to come to grips with the problems and the unrest grew. The army had
elected a number of junior officers and other troops to form a committee that
would present the army's demands and then oversee the process of meeting those
demands. It became known as the Derg ("committee" in Amharic, used from here
on). The Derg began to slowly and hesitantly demolish the imperial power in
what became known as the "creeping coup." It destroyed both the Emperor and
the imperial government.(75)
SECTION III - THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE HORN
This section completes the stage setting for the conflicts by presenting
the histories of the other countries on the Horn.
Somalia
The British became interested in the Somali coast because of the fate of
shipwrecks. It seems that whenever a ship had the misfortune to shipwreck on
their coast, the Somalis murdered the crews and stole the cargos. In 1825, the
British began to make treaties with the Somalis to protect future shipwrecks.
The British interests expanded in 1839 when Aden was established, and again in
1869, when the Suez Canal opened.(76)
When the Madhists became active in the Sudan, Egypt withdrew many of its
garrisons on the Horn and the British felt compelled to take their place. In
1884, the British sent diplomatic notes to the Turks asking them to occupy the
areas vacated by Egypt. When no action was taken by the Turks, , the British
occupied the port of Zeila. They made more treaties with the Somalis and in
1887, declared a protectorate.(77)
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These treaties were worded so that the British would protect the Somalis
from other powers and did not include any loss of Somali rights to the lands.
In other words, the British did not receive actual title to the Somali lands.
This technicality would become important in the eyes of the Somalis in regards
to the later treaties between the British and the Ethiopians.(78) Two other
reasons for Somali willingness to make the treaties were the similarity of the
treaties to the Somali "dia" alliances and the Somali perception of increasing
threats from the Ethiopian highlands.(79)
The Italian interest in the Somali coast was based on trade possibilities
that became evident in the 1880's. With the help of the British in 1889, the
Italians received rights from the Sultan of Zanzibar to towns in the Benadir
region. The Italians established a company to rule and expand this holding.
The company failed and a new one was formed to take its place. This one faced
criticism for the use of forced labor and the Italian government took direct
control of the area in 1905.(80)
The Europeans made agreements among themselves in 1888 and 1894, which set
up their common borders on the Horn of Africa. However, the shocking defeat of
the Italians at Adowa caused them all to rush to Addis Ababa for negotiations.
British goals on the Horn, as given to British Special Envoy Rennell Rodd,
were to: secure supplies for the more important port at Aden; keep the Somali
protectorate as self sufficient as possible; obtain Ethiopian aid against the
Madhists; and clearly define the borders between the two, if possible, in such
a way as to seal off any possible French moves towards the headwaters of the
Nile.(81) After many rounds of negotiation, Rodd produced an agreement (see
Map 12). To obtain Ethiopian approval, he gave them the most fertile lands of
the west and grazing lands of the south. This was done without the knowledge
or notification of the Somalis.(82) It was also technically illegal because
the Somali chiefs had never ceded any of their lands to the British.(83)
Click here to view image
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The Italians were next to negotiate with Menelik. Like the British, they
came away from the negotiations with the impression of having scored a coup in
that they had gained a lot without giving up much. Like the British, they too,
learned that Menelik's interpretations, and more importantly, his actions based
on the agreements, were to prove the opposite. The treaty with Italy to define
the border between Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia was vague. As part of the
treaty, there were two copies of an inaccurate map that had a border drawn on
it. The Italians claimed it ran 180 miles inland from a point of contact with
the British in the north to the lands on the Juba in the south. Menelik said
the line was closer to the coast. As both maps were lost, no one knows which
was right. The Italians returned for several border renegotiations. In 1908,
they paid three million lire for both a clear definition of the border and a
joint border commission to mark it. By 1911, this commission marked out only
30 kilometers from Kenya before it was unable to agree on the 1908 treaty.(85)
The British East India Company had held the port of Kismayu and its sur-
roundings, known as Jubaland, since 1891. The Somali migrations to the south
made any peaceful administration of the area impossible. Frequent attacks,
punitive expeditions and other armed actions resulted in the British government
taking over the area directly in 1895. The British then fought hostile Somalis
and sometimes, slave raids from the Ethiopians. British efforts stopped the
migratory advance of the Somalis at the Tana River. Tiring of the constant war
in the area and involved in World War I, they ceded parts of Jubaland to Italy
in exchange for future support against Germany. The actual transfer took place
in 1925.(86) The fact that only a part of the Somali inhabited land was given
to Italy was a basis for a later Somali conflict as the remaining area became
part of Kenya and is considered one of the three "lost territories."
Another spark for Somali nationalism was the leader who became known as
the Mad Mullah, Mohamed ibn Abdullah Hassan. He was a religious and military
THE HORN OF AFRICA
leader who built up his power and attacked the occupiers of Somali territory
from about 1898 to 1920. He was very successful and his fame spread throughout
the Horn. His exploits were enhanced by his poetic propaganda such as the
message he sent to the English people in 1903:
If the country (Somaliland) was cultivated or contained houses
or property it would be worth your while to fight. The country is
all jungle and that is no use to you. If you want wood and stone you
can get them in plenty. There are also many ant heaps. The sun is
very hot. All you can get from me is war, nothing else. . . . (87)
The Mullah began the revolt by gathering troops and attacking places that
belonged to other Somali tribes such as an Issa watering point at Bura and the
town of Sheikh, where he massacred the inhabitants. He then went to war with
the Ethiopians and the British. The British were concerned with the Boer War
and spent little on fighting him. After four fairly unsuccessful expeditions,
the British negotiated a truce in 1905. Three years later, the Mullah attacked
again. In 1910, the British tried to cut their losses by arming the Somalis
and pulling back to the coast. In 1913, the Mullah wiped out a British-led
local police unit and gained a great deal of public attention in Great Britain.
During World War I, the Germans provided arms and arranged an agreement between
the Mullah and Lij Yasu directed against Britain. After the war, the British
decided to expand their effort to eliminate him. The Somalis had also tired of
the Mad Mullah and his constant warfare which had killed about a third of the
entire male population of British Somaliland. In 1920, he was chased into
Ethiopia where he died of natural causes.(88)
The Mad Mullah used religion to obtain support for his attacks against the
foreign powers and the settled Somalis. He was often cruel and barbarous in
his dealings and could easily be classified as just a more successful, nomadic
bandit leader. However, he is considered an important Somali hero because he
represents a combination of a holy leader striving to purify Islam and an early
Somali nationalist attempting to start a war of national liberation.(89)
THE HORN OF AFRICA
During the 1920's the Italians attempted to expand their territory inland
by arming the Somalis and encouraging them to attack Ethiopian tax collectors.
The Ethiopians responded by sending larger and more frequent expeditions into
the areas. They also began to curry favor with some Somali tribes by providing
arms and encouraging raids on the Italians.(90)
Both efforts often spilled over into the British protectorate and caused
the British to press for a clear definition of the border. They convinced the
Ethiopians that a joint border demarcation should be accomplished and began the
process in 1929. This upset the nomadic Somalis who feared restrictions would
be imposed on their migrations. Britain reassured them by pointing out the
provisions of their Ethiopian treaty which allowed free access to traditional
grazing lands by those on both sides of the border. The joint commission that
had marked the borders was also responsible for defining the grazing limits of
the British Somali tribes and they slowly proceeded to find them.(91)
In 1934, the joint commission and their Ethiopian military escort reached
Wal Wal and found Italian-led Somali forces there. Italians had been at Wal
Wal over four years without an Ethiopian protest despite the border being 100
kilometers or more to the east. When Italian planes buzzed the Ethiopian camp,
the British part of the commission withdrew in protest. Both sides reinforced
their positions and a battle broke out that involved Italian aircraft and tanks
and resulted in several hundred killed and wounded. This incident triggered
the sucessful Italian invasion of Ethiopia.(92)
The next several years saw the growth of Somali nationalism as the Italians
consolidated the Somali parts of their new empire into one unit. They added
British Somaliland to that total when they threw out the British in 1940. When
the British returned to the Horn and defeated the Italians, the British added
the Somali parts of Kenya to form a unified Somali area. They developed the
Bevin Plan which was to form a unified Somalia, under their trusteeship, out of
THE HORN OF AFRICA
all the Somali occupied parts of the Horn. The plan was naturally very popular
with the Somalis and very unpopular with Haile Selassie, who was attempting to
claim both the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean coasts. The plan also seemed to be
an attempt by the British to maintain their empire on the Horn. The Bevin plan
failed. The British then tried to trade the port of Zeila and the construction
of a rail line to connect it to Ethiopia, for the Ogaden. The French, knowing
that their port at Djibouti would suffer from competition, used their rights
under a 1906 agreement to kill the trade. The British later tried unsuccess-
fully, to buy the territory from Ethiopia.(93)
The British had encouraged the Somalis in their nationalism and formed the
Somali Youth Club (SYC) which eventually had 25,000 clubs in operation. SYC
changed into a political form called the Somali Youth League (SYL). SYL had
Somali independence as its goal. It helped to get the Italian Somaliland issue
to the UN, where a 10 year trusteeship was decided.(94)
A SYL flag caused an incident in Jijiga as the British returned the Ogaden:
It had been run up to give offence to the Ethiopians and was in
fact illegal. As the leaders refused to pull down their flag, the
police brought it down with a machine gun mounted on an armoured
car. Disturbances followed, during which a policeman was killed and
another wounded by the explosion of a hand grenade thrown from the
roof of the SYL headquarters. The police opened fire on the crowd,
killing twenty-five of them . . . (95)
The SYL was outlawed in Ethiopia and Kenya. Some of its leaders were also
jailed when the Italians established trusteeship. It became the major party
and controlled the Somali government in Italian Somaliland. Political parties
didn't fire well in British Somali land until 1954, when the British returned
the Haud to Ethiopia. The Somali backlash against the British stimulated
politics and expanded the parties. In April, 1960, the British agreed to an
end of their rule. On 1 July 1960, the two former colonies became Somalia.(96)
Greater Somalia was incorporated into the Somali consttution. The preamble
states that "the Somali Republic promotes by legal and peaceful means, the
THE HORN OF AFRICA
union of the Somali territories."(97) Nonpeaceful means also became evident as
conflict began over the Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya and the
Ogaden in Ethiopia.
The Somalis knew that they might need armed forces to meet their goal of
having a Greater Somalia and tried to obtain them from Western countries. No
one was interested in supplying the quantities of arms that Somalia requested
as the amounts were greater than those necessary for defense. As the US was
supporting Ethiopia, the Soviet Union saw a possible opportunity to upset the
balance on the Horn. Shortly after 1960, it agreed to provide $52 million in
aid.(98) The Soviets agreed to train and equip a 10,000-man force which was
twice the size that any of the western powers was willing to train.(99)
The Somalis began various efforts to obtain the Ogaden. In late 1960,
just after the attempted coup, the Somalis were involved in a border incident
which included the loss of a few hundred lives and heavy fighting. While So-
malia threatened war, they did not have the strength to fight the Ethiopian
army and could only support guerrilla tactics. Diplomatic demands for the
return of the Somali lands were made to the 1963 OAU meeting in Addis Ababa.
Almost all of the OAU members had separatist problems of their own, or were
supporters of Ethiopia and the demands received no action. During the early
part of 1964, fighting broke out in the Ogaden and the reprisals spilled over
into Somalia. This was halted by an OAU truce. In 1965, renewed fighting was
halted by another OAU truce. Before the Djibouti referendum in 1966, Ethiopia
massed troops near Djibouti to counter aggitation to join Somalia.(100)
In the former NFD of Kenya, a large part of the population was Somali
(about 240,000). Somalia tried negotiation with the British in order to have
them detach the NFD from Kenya prior to granting Kenya its independence. The
British sent teams to survey the population and found that almost all of the
Oromo and Somali wanted to join Somalia. However, the British reasoned that a
THE HORN OF AFRICA
federal type government would protect the rights of both the Somalis and the
Oromos and allowed the NFD to remain a part of Kenya. In 1964, just after
independence Kenya adopted a centralized, and not a federal constitution. A
guerrilla war, called the "shifta war," which Kenya said was supported by the
Somalis using Soviet weapons, broke out and lasted four years. In 1964, Kenya
also signed a mutual defense treaty with Ethiopia directed at Somalia. This
pact was later renewed with the current government of Ethiopia.(101)
The Somalis demanded almost a fourth of Kenya which the Kenyans were not
going to give them. The war was a stalemate. Kenya considered an invasion of
Somalia to get at the source of their problems but wasn't strong enough to
attempt it. They did force many people into fourteen fortified villages which
helped to reduce the problem until the war was ended by diplomacy.(102)
In summary, the Somalis pleaded legalities such as not being a party to
the European treaties and never having ceded their lands. They demanded the
right of self-determination for the "lost territories." These arguments got
nowhere. When it came to force, the Somalis were forced to take the cheap
option of supporting guerrilla forces which they did in the Ogaden, the former
NFD, and even in Eritrea, where they hoped to sap the strength of Ethiopia.
Ethiopia, with its very much larger population and heavily supported by the US
was simply too strong for Somalia.
In the September 1967 OAU meeting, Somalia made a dramatic turn away from
conflict and opened a period of detente with its neighbors. The new president
and prime minister of Somalia had decided that Somalia had become too isolated
from the other African countries, needed to develop its economy, and was not
having any success in its conflicts over the Greater Somalia issue. They saw
the conflicts as too costly for a country as poor as Somalia and wanted to have
a period of detente in which Somalia could develop. They did not give up the
Somali claims, but decided to try negotiation again.(103)
THE HORN OF AFRICA
Eased tensions with Ethiopia allowed commercial air and communications
links to be established. Grazing rights in the Ogaden were again allowed and
the almost permanent state of emergency on the borders was relaxed. The lower
level of tensions caused the unity of Somali interests to fragment and there
were 64 parties vying for office in 1969. In October of 1969, the president,
Shermarke, was killed by a member of his bodyguard. When the prime minister,
Egal, returned to the capital to select a new president, the army decided to
act and arrested the politicans. Its leader, Major General Mohamed Siad Barre,
pledged to end tribalism, corruption, and governmental misrule.(104)
Barre and his Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) took over supervision of
the government. They set up military courts for counterrevolutionary cases and
started to decentralize the provinces in order to break clan powers. They
eliminated the "dia" system, attacked tribalism and attempted to resettle some
140,000 nomads in farming and fishing villages. The rhetoric of the coup was
Marxist and its program was called "scientific socialism," however, the Soviet
trained officers that were members of the SRC but were excluded from power.
Barre faced opposition and there have been a number of coup attempts directed
at him since 1969.(105)
The Marxist rhetoric of the new government resulted in an increase in
Soviet aid. Military aid from the Soviet Union doubled the size of the armed
forces in less than five years.(106) This process was accelerated again in
1974, when a Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed. Somalia
became the most important Soviet client in Africa and provided naval facilities
for the Soviet fleet at Berbera. The port was greatly expanded and parts of it
were put under direct Soviet control. By 1976, 650 Cubans and 2,500 Soviet
advisors were in Somalia (107).
While Somalia was gaining strength, Ethiopia was struggling. The problems
with the imperial government, the coup, and a decline in US military support
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because of Kagnew's decreased importance and the increasingly harsh measures
used in Eritrea all aided the shift in power. Diplomatic power within the Arab
world and in the OAU was also shifting from Ethiopia to Somalia. The discovery
of possible natural gas and oil reserves in the Ogaden also added an economic
incentive to the simmering conflict.
The Somalis have long desired the Ogaden, but this area has never been a
profitable area for Ethiopia. Even the temporary promise of natural gas and
oil discoveries of the middle 1970's proved illusionary. Reasons for the
Emperor reasserting claims on the area after World War II may have been tied to
his attempt to obtain all of the Horn. How serious he was in the attempt for
the entire Horn is hard to determine. He desperately needed Eritrea and may
have put forth his Somali claim as a possible trading chip or as a form of
insurance against the possibility of not obtaining Eritrea. Either area would
provide Ethiopia with access to ports and would eliminate total dependence on
Djibouti. As the Eritrea situation developed and the Ogaden was also allowed to
return to Ethiopia, there was no reason to give it up. In fact, he could have
held it in the face of British offers because of a remote chance of convincing
the Somalis to join Ethiopia. When Somalia became independent, Ethiopia had
established firm control of the Ogaden.
Ethiopia met Somali guerrilla pressures in the Ogaden because of three
reasons. First, was national pride which would not accept a threat against its
territory. Second, possibly much more important, was the threat of separatism
which hangs over Ethiopia. If the Somalis were allowed independence, what of
the Afars, Oromos, Moslems, and all the other ethnic and religious divisions
within the empire? And even ignoring these, what about Eritrea, which was
vital to the growth and strength of Ethiopia? Eritrean ports, economy, and
population were much more important than the Ogaden, but if the Ogaden were
lost, then Eritrea might follow. Third, a reason growing out the other two,
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was the force of events. As more and more Ethiopian resources were committed
to the area, the determination of the army and the country turned against the
Somalis. As often happens, the war once started, developed a life of its own
and couldn't be turned off.
Republic of Djibouti
Djibouti has been a stopping point on a trade route from the interior to
the Red Sea for several centuries. Traders took cloth, salt, and their most
popular commodity, firearms, into the interior. They returned with wax, hides,
coffee, and the traders' most desired commodity, slaves.(108)
The French explored the Red Sea early in the nineteen century. Because of
Suez and the need for coaling stations on the route to Indochina, the French
consul in Aden began negotiations with the tribes on the other side of the Gulf
of Tradjourna in 1858. He was murdered a short time later. A French punitive
expedition punished the offenders and reopened negotiations. In 1862, a treaty
resulted that gave France possession of Obock.(109) This involved the raising
a French flag over the village and "A scantily clad Afar was employed to guard
the flag at Obock, and until 1881 this was the only manifestation of France's
presence on the coast . . ."(110)
Rivalry with Britain rekindled interest and more treaties were signed with
the tribes. Both the British and the French signed treaties with the Issa and
their claims overlapped. After almost reaching hostilities, they decided to
negotiate. An agreement was reached in 1888, which clarified the border.(111)
The agreement expanded the French territory and in 1892, they moved their base
to the better harbor, Djibouti.(112) In 1897, the area was officially annexed
and renamed French Somaliland. In the same year, France signed a treaty with
Ethiopia which reduced French territorial claims and defined the borders.(113)
Djibouti was the entry port for most of the arms and ammunition that went
into Ethiopia, some of which helped defeat the Italians at Adowa. The French
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also courted Menelik and received a concession for a railroad to be built into
Ethiopia from the port of Djibouti. It was completed in 1917 and proved very
profitable for both sides. The railroad caused all the Somali ports to lose
business and to decline in importance.(114)
When the Italians overran Ethiopia, Haile Selassie fled to Europe through
Djibouti. However, one of the main reasons given by the Ethiopians for their
defeat was the French arms embargo imposed at Djibouti. After Addis Ababa was
taken by the Italians the railroad was opened to arms shipments for the Italian
war effort and the port porspered. Then, in retaliation for previous French
slights, the Italians made it a policy to develop Asab and built roads to con-
nect it with Addis Ababa. This hurt both the railroad and the port and had a
serious impact on the entire colony.(115)
During World War II, there some skirmishes fought against the Italians and
the Allies. The 8,000 French troops in Djibouti were blockaded by the British
and suffered until the colony surrendered in December of 1942. Djibouti then
supported the Free French forces in Europe.(116)
The situation of Djibouti after the war is summarized by Tom Farer:
Buffered against external forces physically by its interior de-
sert and politically by its size, poverty, passivity, and perpetual-
ly amiable relations with Ethiopia, until recently the territory was
unaffected by the political turbulence swirling around it. Internal
forces also tended toward a seemingly endless stability. Most of
the Afars maintained their politically fragmented, tradition-bound
pastoral existence far from the capital and the political currents
of the modern world. Well over half of the Somalis, on the other
hand, lived in the capital where they filled the lower echelons of
commerce and administration. Although economically deprived rela-
tive to the French and the Levantine trading community, they never-
theless enjoyed a standard of living manifestly superior to that of
their fellow Somalis across the border.(117)
In 1958, a French referendum of African territories resulted in a vote by
Djibouti to remain a colony. Somali nationalism grew stronger and the French
faced pressure to give up the colony. The Somalis and Ethiopians both laid
claims on Djibouti and the situation grew tense when Somalia became independent
THE HORN OF AFRICA
in 1960. By 1965, France agreed to hold another referendum on the issue. They
stacked the deck by forcibly deporting large numbers of illegal residents who
happened to be Somali and by allowind all French administrative and military
personnel to vote. The colony voted to remain a French territory and its name
was changed to the French Territory of Afar and Issas.(118)
Rebel activity directed against the French continued at a low level with
only a few well publicized incidents. The closing of Suez, the decline in rail
traffic from Ethiopia, and the rising level of opposition to the French brought
about another election in 1977. The French allowed greater numbers of Somalis
to vote in this election which was conducted under UN observation. The vote
was for independence and the French accepted the result. On 27 June 1977, the
Repubic of Djibouti was born with few assets and no military forces. France
maintained a presence with a subsidy, administrative and military personnel and
total responsiblity for military defense of the newly independent country.(119)
During the June 1976 OAU meeting in Mauritius, Somalia met an attempt "by
Ethiopia and other states to require all members to guarantee the independence
of the future state" of Djibouti with a 13-hour filibuster. While the OAU
finally adopted the resolution, Somalia did so only with reservations.(120)
Farer, writing in 1979, highlighted the position of Djibouti:
A number of African countries have bad prospects both for
economic development and political serenity. But at this time
Djibouti is singular in having no apparent prospects at all.(121)
Eritrea
Eritrea is tightly interwoven with all the conflicts of the Horn. While
not wanting to enter the debates over whether or not Eritrea is a country, it
is necessary to deal with its history prior to addressing those conflicts.
Eritrea is critical to Ethiopia because its ports (see Map 13). Without
the ports, Ethiopia is totally dependent on Djibouti and that link failed them
against Italy. A landlocked Ethiopia would be of little strategic value to
Click here to view image
THE HORN OF AFRICA
either the Soviets or the the Americans.(123) Eritrea has also served as the
starting point for various invasions of Ethiopia including many that were Mos-
lem supported. Ethiopians fear that if it were to be independent, it could
again become a threat. Another reason is separatism, which forces Ethiopia to
tightly hold on to all parts of the empire in fear that any independence could
bring down the entire empire. Eritrea is an area that was more advanced both
economically and socially than the rest of Ethiopia. It was developed by the
Italians during their long occupation and its economy compliments that of the
rest of Ethiopia. Its population has traditionally provided administrators and
other officials to Ethiopia. And finally, some Eritreans still support Ethio-
pian rule.(124)
The early Aksum kingdom was centered in the provinces that were later to
be known as Eritrea. Islamic forces which pushed Aksum off the coast in the
tenth century began the separation of the area from Ethiopia. Later occupa-
tions by the Turks, Portugese, British, Egyptians, and Italians have completed
that process. Ethiopian politics have also played a part in the separation of
the two areas. The power of Tigray during the reign of the Tigrean Emperor,
Yohannes, forced Shewa, under Menelik to expand to the south. It also made it
much easier for Menelik to trade off Eritrea to the Italians in order to hurt
Tigray and obtain additional modern arms to thus solidify his own hold on
Ethiopia. Even after winning the battle of Adowa, Menelik was disinterested
enough in the area to grant the Italians additional lands to add to Eritrea.
Eritrea played a key part in Italian plans to expand the empire. It was
developed as a base to support the conquest of Ethiopia. It provided an area
to settle Italians and its natural resources were developed to compliment the
Italian economy. These efforts resulted in the building of new roads, many
improvement to the Eritrean ports, a telegraph system, schools, hospitals and
even a railroad. The Italians began exploration for mineral deposits and used
THE HORN OF AFRICA
the local population to provide both low level administrators and large numbers
of auxillary troops. This activity caused the urban areas and the economy of
Eritrea to expand. After conquering Ethiopia, the Italians added Tigray to
Eritrea and began heavy economic development of the entire Horn.(125)
The British occupation of the Horn of Africa brought an economic boom to
Eritrea as manufacturing and other activities were stimulated. However, there
were certain negative elements to the British occupation. The British left the
Italian government largely intact while the British and US used Eritrea as an
important supply point for the war. The British did not want to subsidize the
area so raised taxes. Lands the British found necessry were appropriated. The
Emperor, suspicious of the British, began covert activities to stimulate anti-
British elements and direct them towards supporting the union of Eritrea and
Ethiopia. His strongest weapon in this effort was the Coptic Church. When the
economic boom ended after World War II, it aided him in his efforts.(126)
The victors of World War II were unable to agree on what to do with the
former Italian colonies and passed the problem to the UN. The British proposed
splitting the area in two. The Moslem part, which was the coastal area with
its ports was to go to the Sudan, incidently still a British possession, while
the Christian highland area was to go to Ethiopia. Haile Selassie needed the
Eritrean ports and wanted all of Eritrea. The Italians wanted to restore their
control under a trusteeship. Even the Soviets would have liked to have Eritrea
or any of the former Italian areas for their own trusteeship. These forces fed
internal divisions within Eritrea which supported: trusteeship, union with
Ethiopia, or outright independence.(127)
The UN set up a commission that was to study the problem, try to find out
what the Eritreans wanted and to come up with a plan that would satisfy as many
as possible. The factions tried to influence the UN decision. Just before the
UN Commission arrived in Eritrea, several members of different factions were
THE HORN OF AFRICA
assassinated, Italian farms and cafes were attacked by gunfire and grenades,
and fighting broke out between Christians and Moslems in Asmara that lasted for
five days and caused many casualties.(128) The UN came up with a compromise
plan that would join a locally independent Eritrea with Ethiopia in a federal
union. Eritrea could have its own internal government while Ethiopia would be
responsible for defense, foreign relations and all external functions.(129)
One of the reasons for the union can be seen in John Foster Dulles' speech
as Secretary of State to the UN in 1952:
From the point of view of justice, the opinions of the Eritrean
people must receive consideration. Nevertheless, the strategic in-
terest of the United States in the Red Sea basin and considerations
of security and world peace make it necessary that the country has
to be linked with our ally, Ethiopia.(130)
This federal union took place as the British administration ended on 15
September 1952. A more unlikely combination of two areas is hard to imagine.
The Eritreans were promised democratic rights including political parties, free
elections, and free speech while Ethiopia existed under the autocratic rule of
Haile Selassie. The federal arrangement was not acceptable to the Emperor and
he worked to change it. He used all of his tools which included bribes, force,
intimidation, murder and the skillful playing of one faction against the other.
The process of exerting Ethiopian control saw: the suspension of the Eritrean
constitution shortly after federation; the arrest of newspaper editors; the
suspension and reconstitution of the Eritrean Assemby; Amharic replacing Arabic
and Tigriny as the official Eritrean languages; the discarding of the Eritrean
flag in favor of the Ethiopian one; the adoption of the Ethiopian penal code in
place of the Eritrean; and finally, the official dissolution of the federation
and total union with Ethiopia in 1962.(131)
Eritreans complained to the UN and publicly protested many of the steps
that occured. However, the Emperor had gained the control of the Eritrean As-
sembly and used it to ratify each step on the road to national demise. There
THE HORN OF AFRICA
were several minor incidents of violence such as strikes which were crushed by
Ethiopian troops as the country slid under the total control of Ethiopia.(132)
The opposition to Ethiopia is based on many factors and this has resulted
in factionalizing the movement. The number of factions and splinter groups not
only results in the proliferation of abreviations for resistance groups but,
seems to reflect a diversity as great as that found in the rest of Ethiopia.
Christians, Moslems, urban dwellers, nomads, and Marxists, all with their own
internally opposing factions constantly misdirect much of their attention by
attacking each other and not the Ethiopians. The history of the revolt is full
of examples of this problem.
Those that opposed the Emperor found self-imposed exile to be healthier
than staying in Eritrea. These formed some loose resistance groups in various
Arab countries. One of these formed the largely Moslem, Eritrean Liberation
Front (ELF) in 1961, as a military arm to operate in Eritrea. The factions
within the organization caused it to be divided into five zones of action based
on religious and ethnic lines. These zones later became autonomous regions
which allowed the Ethiopians to attack them one at a time. The support needed
for the ELF came from Arab and Soviet sources. It was funneled from a Supreme
Council outside the area to the ELF. Aid was often used as a weapon by the
Supreme Council to try to gain control of the ELF.(133) Later sources of aid
included the Palestine Liberation Front, Libya, and Cuba which trained the ELF
from 1967 to 1971.(134)
Ethiopia was aided in its fight against the ELF by the US which provided
$147 million in military assistance from 1953 to 1970. Israel was an ally as
it had no desire to see another Moslem state on the Red Sea. The Israelis pro-
vided aid, military training for the Imperial Bodyguard, counterinsurgency
training to Ethiopian commandos, and a military attache for the governor of
Eritrea.(135)
THE HORN OF AFRICA
Sudan was one of the countries that aided the ELF. Haile Selassie was
able to use diplomacy to stop this aid. Because Sudan was aiding the ELF, the
Emperor and the Israelis supported the anti-Moslem factions in the Sudanese
civil war. In 1967, he struck a deal with Sudan in which both sides stopped
supporting the other's revolts. This pact cut off support for the ELF. At the
same time, Ethiopia launched a large military campaign. The final blow came in
the 1967 Israeli war which so devastated the Arabs that most support for the
ELF simply dried up. Ethiopia thought that they had crushed the movement.(136)
The ELF was not dead but spent several months in reorganizing, rearming
and preparing for the next round of the war. In 1969, the ELF began attacking
Ethiopian airliners in order to gain publicity. It also began to receive aid
from new military regimes in Libya and Sudan. Much of this aid came via South
Yemen and proved difficult for Ethiopia to intercept.(137)
The ELF learned lessons from the heavy losses of fighting the Ethiopians
conventionally. Returning to hit and run tactics, they ambushed small units,
raided communications lines, and in the cities, turned to terrorism.(138)
The ELF had many factions and the Supreme Council attempted to unite them
through control of financial aid. This resulted in the Adobha Conference and
an agreement to create a General Command to unify the actions of the various
factions. However, the General Command began a purge and caused another split
to occur. This splinter group became the largely Christian-Marxist, Eritrean
Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF). Another split took place when the Supreme
Council formed a General Secretariat. The groups began a war of words and guns
as an civil war between the revolutionaries took place from 1972 to 1974.(139)
These internal divisions did not stop the Eritreans from becoming a major
problem for Ethiopia. Even the loss of 1200 casualties to their own internal
civil war did not dampen their success against the Ethiopians. The Ethiopians
tried another massive military campaign in 1970, which forced more refugees
THE HORN OF AFRICA
into Sudan. They built armed villiages like those used in Malaya and Viet Nam.
Their provincial military commander was killed in 1971, and martial law was
declared. Yet the Eritrean revolution continued to gain momentum.(140) In
1974, Colin Legum, the noted British expert on African affairs, returned from
the area and said "there can no longer be any serious hope of defeating the
rebels by military force. The only practical question now is what kind of
political settlement is possible."(141)
In the words of another author:
. . .the Eritrean situation presented a fascinating picture. A
divided national liberation movement, one wing predominantly Arab
and the other predominatly Christian-Marxist, was increasingly suc-
cessful. Radical Arab states, particularly the Sudan, Syria, Iraq,
and Libya, and Communist states, particularly Cuba, supported the
divided movement even though the most powerful Communist state, the
Soviet Union, maintained cordial relations with Ethiopia and sup-
ported Ethiopia's territorial integrity. The United States, for its
part, also had close relations with Ethiopia, maintained a major
communications facility at Kagnew Center near Asmara, and secretly
concluded a 1960 agreement with Ethiopia opposing threats to Ethio-
pia's territorial integrity. Although world attention remained
riveted elsewhere, Eritrea was a potential powder keg.(142)
The keg exploded and its victims were the imperial Ethiopian system and
its last Emperor, Haile Selassie. Army mutinies in Eritrea precipitated the
"creeping coup." The troops felt that their leaders did not care about their
welfare as they were forced to drink polluted water and eat rotten food. Many
of the wounded enlisted men were allowed to die without any medical attention
while the officers and the officers' family members received expensive foreign
medical treatment. The successes of the rebels in late 1973 and early 1974,
became the catalyst which triggered the Eritrean army unit mutinies. These
mutinies spread to Addis Ababa and started the military involvement in the
government. This military involvement then formed the Derg.(143) The course
of the revolution, the other regional revolts, the start of the later Somali-
Ethiopian War in the Ogaden and the massive Soviet support of Ethiopia are all
tied to the events in Eritrea.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
NOTES - CHAPTER 3
1. Leonard Mosley, Haile Selassie: The Conquering Lion, (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 22.
2. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 6.
3. Ibid.
4. Greenfield, op. cit., p. 46.
5. Ibid., pp. 41-42.
6. Sherman, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
7. Ibid.
8. Greenfield, op. cit., pp. 31-32.
9. Ibid., p. 41.
10. Ibid.
11. Greenfield, op. cit., pp. 48-52.
12. Ibid., 52-53.
13. Gorman, op. cit., p. 25.
14. Greenfield, op. cit., pp. 54-57.
15. Ibid., pp. 48-49.
16. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 18.
17. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
18. Greenfield, op. cit., pp. 68-70.
19. Ibid., pp. 74-78.
20. Greenfield, op. cit., pp. 79-84.
21. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 20.
22. Greenfield, op. cit., pp. 86-88.
23. Ibid., pp. 88-89.
24. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 20-21.
25. Margery Perham, The Government of Ethiopia, (Evanston, Illinois:
Northwestern University Press, 1969), pp. 217-236.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Greenfield, op. cit., p. 96.
30. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 23.
31. Ibid., pp. 20-23.
32. Sherman, op. cit., pp. 11-13.
33. Greenfield, op. cit., pp. 120-122.
34. Ibid., p. 123.
35. James Dugan and Laurence Lafore, Days of Emperor and Clown: The Italo-
Ethiopian War 1935-1936, (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1973), p 10.
36. Ibid., pp. 30-31.
37. Serman, op. cit., p. 13.
38. Dugan, op. cit., p. 31.
39. Ottaway, op. cit., p. 18.
40. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 25.
41. Quoted in Mosley, op. cit., p. 50.
42. Ibid., pp. 48-49.
43. Ibid., pp. 52-56.
44. Ibid., p. 63.
45. Robert L. Hess, Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy, (Ithaca, New
York: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 62-64.
46. Ibid.
47. Greenfield, op. cit., p. 162.
48. Ibid., p. 182.
49. Hess, op. cit., pp. 64-65.
50. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 28.
51. Ibid., p. 30.
52. Greenfield, op. cit., pp. 192-222. See also: Dugan, op. cit., pp. 85-
354, or Mosley, op. cit., pp. 172-214.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
53. Quoted in Dugan, op. cit., pp. 308-309.
54. Ibid., p. 318.
55. Ibid., pp. 321-322.
56. Ibid., p. 323.
57. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 31.
58. Christopher Sykes, Orde Wingate: A Biography, (Cleveland: The World
Publishing Company, 1959), pp.305-307. For more details of the life of Win-
gate, see: Leonard Mosley, Gideon Goes to War: The Story of Wingate (New
York: Scribner, 1955)
59. Greenfield, op. cit., pp. 271-276.
60. John H. Spencer, Ethiopia, The Horn of Africa and U.S. Policy, (Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, 1977), p. 11.
61. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 45.
62. Ibid., p. 46.
63. Greenfield, op. cit., pp. 402-418.
64. Christopher Clampham, Haile-Selassie's Government, (New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, Publishers, 1969), p. 30.
65. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 38.
66. William R. Brand and Katarzyna Mroczkowska-Brand, trans., The Emperor:
Downfall of an Autocrat, by Ryszard Kapuscinski, (San Diego: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, Publishers, 1983), pp. 3-56. Additional, though less graphic,
substantiation of the emperor's ruling techniques is found in: Clampham, op.
cit., pp. 28-33.
67. Gilkes, op. cit., p. xviii.
68. Harold G. Marcus, Ethiopia, Great Britain, and the United States 1941-
1974) (Berkeley: University of Calfiornia Press, 1983), pp. 170-171.
69. Ibid., pp. 172-173.
70. Ibid., pp. 178-179.
71. Clapham, op. cit., pp. 190-191.
72. Perham, op. cit., p. 1xxi.
73. Joseph Shapiro trans., Ethiopia, by Georgii Lvovich Galperin, (Moscow:
Progress, 1981), p. 15. "Lumpenization" is derived from the lumpenproletariat
which is the lowest, degraded and contemptible part of the proletariat that
has been uprooted, dispossessed, or cut off from its normal social class.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
74. Bereket, op. cit., pp. 23-25.
75. Ibid., pp. 26-29.
76. Touval, op. cit., pp. 32-33.
77. Ibid., pp. 33-37.
78. Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, "The Anglo-Abyssinian Treaty of 1897 and the Somali-
Ethiopian Dispute," Horn of Africa, 3, No. 1, (1980), p. 38-42.
79. Farer, op. cit., p. 73.
80. Touval, op. cit., pp. 40-45.
81. John Drysdale, The Somali Dispute, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Publisher, 1964), p. 26.
82. Ibid., p. 28.
83. Yusuf, loc. cit.
84. Farer, op. cit., p. 68.
85. Drysdale, op. cit., pp. 29-31.
86. Ibid., pp. 36-39.
87. Ibid., pp. 31-32.
88. Nelson, op. cit., pp. 17-19. See also: Touval, op. cit., pp. 51-60;
or, Lewis, op. cit., pp. 63-91.
89. Nelson, loc. cit.
90. Farer, op. cit., p. 81.
91. Drysdale, op. cit., pp. 48-49.
92. Ibid., pp. 49-51.
93. Farer, op. cit., pp. 82-85.
94. Ibid., p. 86.
95. Drysdale, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
96. Nelson, op. cit., pp. 28-35.
97. Ibid., p. 38.
98. Abate, op. cit., p. 13.
99. John A. Frost, et. al., "Soviet Assistance in the Horn of Africa: A
Model for Potential United States Exploitation?," Strategic Studies Project,
The National War College, 1983, p. 24.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
100. Gorman, op. cit., pp. 36-38.
101. Nelson, op. cit., pp. 38-39.
102. Douglas W. Schott. "Potential for Conflict: The United States Vs. The
Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa." Air Command and Staff College Report No.
82-2190, 1982, pp. 17-18.
103. Abate, loc. cit.
104. Nelson, op. cit., pp. 44-45.
105. Ibid., pp. 46-48. See also: Farer, op. cit., pp. 100-115, or, Ottaway,
op. cit., pp. 60-64.
106. Gorman, op. cit., p. 40.
107. Frost, op. cit., pp. 25-27.
108. Thompson, op. cit., p. 5.
109. Touval, op. cit., p. 38.
110. Thompson, op. cit., p. 6.
111. Lewis, op. cit., p. 49.
112. Touval, op. cit., pp. 39-40.
113. Farer, op. cit., p. 101.
114. Thompson, op. cit., pp. 9-10.
115. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
116. Ibid., pp. 15-22.
117. Farer, op. cit., pp. 101-102.
118. Green, op. cit., p. 4.
119. Ibid., pp. 5-7.
120. Spencer, op. cit., p. 29.
121. Farer, op. cit., p. 107.
122. Sherman, op. cit., p. 24.
123. Daniel S. Papp, "Eritrea and the Soviet-Cuban Connection," Military Is
sues Research Memorandum, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
1982, p. 2.
124. Sherman, op. cit., pp. 29-32.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
125. Ibid., pp. 13-16.
126. Ibid., pp. 16-18.
127. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 40.
128. Farer, op. cit., p. 29.
129. Sherman, op. cit, p. 23.
130. Quoted in Bereket, op. cit., p. 58.
131. Sherman, op. cit., pp. 26-29.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid., pp. 42-43.
134. Papp, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
135. Sherman, op. cit., p. 75.
136. Farer, op. cit., p. 35.
137. Ibid. Sudanese aid is extremely variable. Sudan has cut and restored
aid time after time. Actions are usually tied to the level of Ethiopian aid
given to Sudanese guerrillas. Sudan and Ethiopia are currently hostile.
138. Sherman, op. cit., p. 77.
139. Ibid., pp. 44-46.
140. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 43.
141. Quoted in Papp, op. cit., p. 4.
142. Ibid., p. 5.
143. Bereket, op. cit., pp. 23-25.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
CHAPTER 4
CONFLICTS
The coup of 1974 ignited, fed on, or fueled all of the conflicts on the
Horn of Africa (see Map 14). This chapter will therefore address the coup, the
Eritrean secession, regional revolts, and finally, the Somali-Ethiopian War.
SECTION I - COUP OF 1974
Christopher Clapham, writing in 1969, reluctantly ventured a prediction:
. . .The possibility of an army takeover is therefore at least a
very strong one, expecially if the civilian government shows signs
of losing control, and many officers in the armed forces seem to be
aware of its potentialities . . . Military regimes tend to suffer
from an underlying lack of "legitimacy", and a consequent reliance
on force . . . a military government would probably be far more na-
tionalist towards external enemies such as the Somalis, and far more
repressive towards internal opponents such as students, than the
present fairly easy-going regime. The most important question aris-
ing with the military is, however, their ability to maintain nation-
al unity . . . Broadly, three kinds of divisions are possible, . . .
First, there may be divisions between units, like that between the
army and the Imperial Bodyguard which brought the defeat of the 1960
revolt. Second, there may be divisions between the higher ranks,
mostly generals trained in the wartime era with close connections
with the present regime, and the post-war generation of younger
middle-rank officers . . . Third and perhaps most dangerously, there
may be divisions along ethnic or regional lines . . . (1)
The prediction of an army takeover came true during the coup. The divided
nature of the military described by Clapham also resulted in examples of all of
the predicted divisions. Whether the army will continue to hold the country
together is not yet clear. Its efforts to date have been successful but the
cost has been very heavy in terms of lives, property and civil rights. Army
participation in the coup has provided the vehicle for the rise to power of
another strong and ruthless leader, Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam.
He, like the Emperors before him, has seized total control over Ethiopia.
The first phase of the revolution began with an army mutiny in Eritrea.
It ended eight months later when Haile Selassie was dethroned. During this
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THE HORN OF AFRICA
period, it seemed that the transfer of power from the Emperor to a successor
government might take place without violence. It was a time of high expecta-
tions and eagerness for reform throughout Ethiopia. However, there was little
agreement among the many factions as to the types and extent of the required
reforms. Lack of agreement between the civilian government and the army led to
the formation of a power vacuum as neither would act to solve the crisis.(3)
The army mutiny resulted in the resignation of the prime minister, Aklilu
Habte Wold, and his cabinet. Haile Selassie appointed Endalkachew Mekonnen, a
British-educated noble who had once been a candidate for the office of U.N.
Secretary General, prime minister. In addition to selecting his cabinet, the
new prime minister had to develop a reform package that would appease enough of
the factions that had triggered the unrest to buy him the time necessary to
carry it out. In addition, he had to keep the country from more violence.(4)
The first concession that the prime minister requested and received was to
make himself responsible to the Parliament and not to the Emperor. Next, the
Parliament given permission to design a new constitution that was due in six
months. The announcement of these changes did little to stop the mutiny, or
the spreading strikes. While the prime minister attempted to gather power, the
Emperor was involved with secret maneuvers to try and regain control of the
army. Intellectuals of many political persuassions were also actively trying
to put their political thoughts into practice by building up a power base that
could be later exploited. These actions tended to center in the capital where
political phamplets, leaflets and the like were printed and distributed by all
sides, sometimes even by military helocopters flying over the capital.(5)
The prime minister was a member of the Shewan nobility and was suspect by
those that resented the imperial domination of Shewa. In addition, he appeared
to be indecisive and uncertain. He was faced with an army broken into factions
with its units divided from each other and within themselves. Paratroopers,
THE HORN OF AFRICA
led by his cousin, were the only force he could count on. These troops put
down an air force revolt by arresting the ring leaders. But, control over the
army was passing to the junior troops who were listening more and more to the
radical elements of the public. Events in the rural areas were also getting
out of hand as peasants began to seize land and fight their landlords.(6)
A major grievance of the entire population was the lack of government
action in response to the Wollo drought which had killed over 200,000. The
people wanted the ministers to pay for their "crimes" and in April, the army
arrested about 200 former officials. Religious unrest joined the turmoil as
100,000 Moslems marched through the capital's streets to highlight their
oppression and to support their petition for equal rights for all Ethiopians.
In May, the constitutional committee split over how prime ministers should be
selected and over the issue of political parties. Divisive elements were be-
coming stronger and making governmental action that much more difficult.(7)
In June the Emperor was allowed to attend his last OAU meeting which was
in Somalia. Upon his return, he was forced to issue a Proclamation that formed
a commission to investigate the Wollo crimes. The Emperor was no longer able
to protect those that had served him. The army also held a meeting of junior
representatives from each unit and established the Coordinating Committee of
the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army which became known as the Derg.
In late June, army elements feared a coup and arrested 50 more members of the
nobility including members of the royal family.(8)
The Derg was composed of three representatives, all below the rank of
major, from each of the forty military and police units in Ethiopia. Their
names were kept secret in order to protect them from those in power and to
overcome the unit and ethnic rivalries of the army. Secrecy added to the
mystique of the group and played to the Ethiopian love of intrigue. In spite
of secrecy, every so often, a name or two would surface as a leader. Captains
THE HORN OF AFRICA
Mengistu and Atnafu were identified as first and second vice-chairmen when Aman
Andom was made chairman in August 1974.(9) All members of the Derg swore a six
part oath that: they would never try to gain personal power; they would not
have vendettas against each other; they would make decisions by majority vote;
they would observe no tribal or ethnic distinctions; they would quietly return
to their barracks when their temporary Derg duties were done; and, they would
accept the punishment for the betrayal of the Derg or its oath would be
death.(10) This oath was ignored by Mengistu in his rise to power.
The Derg developed the motto, "Ethiopia Tikdem" (Ethiopia First) and in
July, under the control of General Amam Andom, it began to act. It forced the
resignation of the prime minister and the appointment of Michael Imru in his
place. The leader of the Imperial Bodyguard was arrested and the Derg launched
a smear campaign in August directed at the Emperor. He was directly accused of
being responsible for the Wollo situation and demonstrations were organized to
demand his arrest. On 12 September 1974, the Emperor was dethroned and the
Crown Prince named to replace him (as soon as the Crown Prince returned from a
hospital in Switzerland). On 15 September, the Derg announced that a Provi-
sional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) under General Aman existed.(11)
The PMAC (still the Derg) had been formed under its own Proclamation 1
and had deposed the Emperor with Proclamation 2. The Derg had already arrested
all of the Emperor's servants and cut him off from outside contacts. To depose
him, they just moved him out of the Imperial Palace. The Derg was warned by
African heads of state not to harm Haile Selassie as "he belongs to Africa."
They offered assylum and it was refused by the Derg. He also wouldn't have
accepted it as as he told infrequent visitors, "I am an old man and I've been
in exile once in my life; I've no desire to become an exile again."(12)
Aman attempted to establish his control over the Derg because its 120
members proved too large and unwieldy a body to make the decisions necessary to
THE HORN OF AFRICA
reverse the increasing trend towards anarchy. In October, violence broke out
between army factions. The Derg said the fighting was tied to Communists and
those suspected of being Communists were arrested. In mid-November, the Derg
presented Aman a list of those to be executed without trial and other decisions
that Aman would not accept. When the Derg presisted, he resigned. A week
later the Derg decided to arrest him and he was killed in his home along with
two others, resisting arrest. The Derg hurriedly took 59 of their prisoners,
including two in wheel chairs and one actually in a coma, out of prison that
night and shot them. The news of these executions which included two former
prime ministers and other notables, shocked the world and marked the end of the
peaceful phase of the revolution. The "creeping coup" was now over.(13)
The next phase of the revolution was one of extreme violence and dramatic
action. December marked the start of the violent opposition to the Derg as a
bomb exploded in Addis Ababa. The Derg used this event to round up more pri-
soners including many prominent Eritreans. The Derg also announced that it
would make Ethiopia into a single-party socialist state and began the process
with nationalizing the banks.(14)
The Derg faced the problem of dealing with the peasants, conservatives
and students. Its ingenious solution was to begin the National Campaign for
Development Through Cooperation (zemecha) which sent high school and college
students into the countryside for up to two years to educate and organize the
peasants in support of the revolution. The students were more than reluctant
to go and many had to be forced to leave. They believed that it was a move by
the Derg to get them out of the cities and away from the revolt.(15) The Derg
also announced a program of land reform which nationalized all land and placed
the peasants in charge of enforcement. These actions defused the strength of
the students, destroyed the landlords and kept the peasants quiet.(16)
THE HORN OF AFRICA
In the urban areas, the Derg nationalized all land, shops, and buildings
that were not occupied by their owners. They set up "kebeles" which were
neighborhood councils similar to the rural councils that had been established
for the land reforms. These had the right to enforce the reform, try cases,
and collect rents from nationalized buildings. They were set up to break the
power of both the strong urban self-help associations and the urban landlords.
The kebeles were later used to counter the Derg's terrorist opposition.(17)
In 1975, the Derg dropped the fiction of Ethiopia being a constitutional
monarchy. The Crown Prince had not returned from Europe to assume the office
of King and the Derg published a notice which abolished the monarchy. At about
the same time the Derg held a court martial for some of its members. The court
sentenced Lt. Col. Hailu to death and five generals to life in prison. The
chairman of the Derg invoked his priviledge and increased all the sentences to
death. Hailu had been the former vice-president of the first Derg military
court. General Beru, one of the victims, was a leader of the Oromo who had
been jailed by the Emperor for fighting for land reform. The guilty men were
executed. Their crime was one of supposed opposition to land reform and "the
socialist philosophy of Ethiopia".(18)
On 28 August 1975, the Ethiopian Herald had a small notice that the former
Emperor, Haile Selassie I, had died on the 27th of circulatory failure.(19) The
Emperor had built a large, expensive mausoleum in which he hoped to lie after
his death. Instead, he was buried in an unknown and unmarked grave. "The man
who had towered over Ethiopian history like a colossus for over half a century,
thus melted into memory, unwept, unsung and in disgrace."(20)
The Derg faced opposition from many sides and responded by arresting those
whom it suspected. These arrests included six Derg members in January of 1976,
seven members of the cabinet in February, and later as many as two thousand men
and women (often wives of those executed). Some were killed resisting arrest
THE HORN OF AFRICA
such as the general who formerly commanded the Imperial Bodyguard. Even the
leader of the Church was imprisoned. In the countryside, the rural groups were
encouraged to attack reactionaries and they responded with violence directed
at former officials and landlords.(21)
The Derg had quieted the students, conservatives and peasants and had only
the increasingly radical intelligensia to contend with. To deal with them it
used a simple divide and rule policy. There were two Marxist groups that came
to be known as the All Ethiopian Socialist Movement (Meison) and the Ethiopian
People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP). Both assisted in the destruction of the
landlords but were becoming critical of the Derg. The Derg, lacking the needed
expertise, had put Meison in charge of the land reform effort. This led to the
Meison leaders becoming advisors to Mengistu and isolated Meison from the EPRP.
When the EPRP organized a protest against the Derg on the anniversary of the
overthrow of the Emperor, the Derg responed with force and many were killed.
The Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions (CELU) was closely linked with the
EPRP and when it called for democratic rights and threatened a general strike,
the Derg shot up a meeting and then replaced its leadership.(22)
The EPRP responded by declaring an urban terrorist war on Meison and the
Derg. This campaign became known as the "white terror" and included bombings
and daylight assassinations. The EPRP killed a police captain, some politicans
and even wounded Mengistu. The Derg responded by launching the "red terror."
Their antiterrorist unit, the Flame Division, began raiding houses and student
gathering places. They machine gunned those suspected of being EPRP members.
The Derg officially admitted executing 50 EPRP suspects (one 14 years old) in
November and killing 30 student demonstrators in December.(23)
The result of the red terror was described by Robert Caputo:
. . . Mengistu's response was the "red terror." Violence swept
the streets of Addis for several months in 1977 and 1978 as the
Derg's forces rounded up "counterrevolutionaries." At least 10,000
people died.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
David Wood, reporting for Time, recalls hearing gunshots every
night and going out in the morning to find bodies in the street. In
the begining, as a further humiliation, relatives of some of those
slain had to pay the government before they could claim the bodies
for burial--to reimburse the authorities for the cost of the
bullets.(24)
A writer who was once an advisor to the Derg's leader, General Aman, and
who later turned against the Derg, wrote:
This sort of terror can only be seen as a morbid expression of
the corruption of power, as the following examples of its excesses
should amply demonstrate. For the Derg, killing "anarchists" was
not enough; their bodies had to be desecrated and left lying in the
streets with placards saying "Anarchist" or "Enemy of the people"
stuck on them. Relatives were forbidden to take the bodies for cus-
tomary burial, and any display of grief was forbidden on pain of ar-
rest and possible execution. Young children of the people arrested
or killed were left without care, and their neighbors, who would
customarily have taken them temporarily, were forbidden to do so.
The fate of children was not even openly discussed--people whispered
about it in the night.(25)
The red terror was aided by Meison members that could often identify the
EPRP leaders. Later when the EPRP was largely eliminated and Meison had grown
too strong, the red terror was unleashed upon it. The Derg was now firmly in
power in spite of the many revolts raging in the provinces.(26)
In late 1976, the Derg announced a restructuring that reduced Mengistu's
power and added Aleyayehu Haile, who had authored the change, to the ruling
triumvirate of Teferri, Mengistu, and Atnafu. On 3 February 1977, an hour-
long battle occured in the Grand Palace. Teferri and many of his supporters,
including Aleyayehu, were killed. The Derg was again reorganized and the new
chairman, Mengistu, became the head of state and the commander in chief of the
army. Mengistu had seized control of Ethiopia.(27)
From 1974 to 1977, the US grew increasingly unhappy with the situation in
Ethiopia. The coup had not only resulted in a Marxist government, but it was
also turning progressively bloodier and more repressive at the same time the
President was stressing human rights. The facility at Kagnew Station was no
THE HORN OF AFRICA
longer vital and the US began gearing down its presence. Finally early in 1977,
the US cut off military aid to Ethiopia. Mengistu then threw all US military
personnel out of the country.(28)
The rest of the revolution is directly interwoven with the conflicts and
will be covered along with the conflicts in the sections below.
SECTION II - ERITREA
Eritrea sparked the "creeping coup" in Ethiopia. It also forced the Derg
to commit a large number of troops to the fighting. This drain on military
resources weakened the army throughout the country, aided the regional revolts,
and encouraged the Somalis to attack in the Ogaden.
The problem of what to do with Eritrea haunted the Derg as factions fought
to implement ideas. General Amen, the first chairman of the Derg, was himself
and Eritrean and also a hero of Ethiopia because of earlier battles against the
Somalis. He favored a negotiated settlement over continued fighting.(29) The
battles in Eritrea had reached a lull during September of 1974, as the army and
the rebels waited to see what would happen after the Emperor was deposed. Aman
started talks with some of the rebels. His resigned rather than agree to Derg
demands for a harder line in Eritrea and the commitment of 5,000 more troops to
the fighting. The hard line Derg faction under Mengistu simply had him killed.
(30) Following his death, a number of Eritreans turned from the Derg and aided
the Eritrean revolt. Others became suspect and were arrested.(31)
Policies of the Derg would alternate between negotiations and combat in a
"carrot and stick" pattern. Often, the Derg would pursue both options at once.
The rebels were only receptive to negotiations when they were weak. The Derg
position was similar and all negotiations failed.(32)
The Derg sent the internally disputed 5,000 troops to the war in Eritrea
and began a new round of attacks against the ELF and the EPLF. These attacks
THE HORN OF AFRICA
were marked by a new level of brutality which included the killing of suspects.
They also resulted in an increase in rebel support and a rebel counterattack on
the Eritrean capital. The Ethiopians found that they could hold the towns and
clear roads by daylight but were unable to defeat the rebels who held the rural
areas and cut the roads at night.(33)
The intensified fighting drew a number of new donors to the Eritreans as
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and some of the United Arab Emirates contributed. The
Somalis also set up a meeting between rebel leaders and the Soviet ambassador
to Somalia so that more direct Soviet aid could be requested. It also drew aid
to Ethiopia as the US sent Ethiopia $17 million in ammunition and agreed to a
$200 million modernization program over three years for the army.(34)
By 1975, the war was costing the Ethiopians over $220,000 a day. Sources
of arms were drying up as many arms dealers demanded cash and the US seemed
hesitant on both the aid promised and new requests. The Derg also faced more
internal disagreements over the proper policy to follow.(35)
The next year, the Derg again offered negotiations and massed a peasant
army on the border. These were the vanguard of a 160,000 man force that had
been recruited with promises of new land in Eritrea for destroying the Moslem
infidels who threatened the Christian province of Eritrea. The peasants were
very poorly trained and had only World War II vintage small arms. They were
supposed to use human wave assaults to overcome the rebels. The ELF and other
rebels groups crossed into Tigray, attacked and routed the peasants.(36)
Some of the peasants had been coerced, or tricked into the peasant force
according to tales told by rebel prisoners. These prisoners became a problem
as they were not recognized as POW's by the Derg (because it considered the ELF
and EPLF to be bandits, not soldiers fighting a war) and they received little
support from relief agencies. Many prisoners were afraid to return home as
many previous returnees were killed as deserters by the Derg.(37)
THE HORN OF AFRICA
In 1976, the rebel movement was again split by agruments over which group
was "truely" progressive. In addition to open warfare between the groups, this
split had the effect of cutting down receipts of foreign aid.(38) A new force,
the Eritrean Liberation Front-Popular Liberation Forces (ELF-PLF), led by Osman
Saleh Sabbe formed. Sabbe was an early leader of the movement and had caused
many of its splits. Sabbe had been the head of the EPLF's foreign mission and
continued to receive EPLF foreign aid. Rather than pass all of it on, his
group kept most of the aid for itself.(39)
Even with the new divisions, the Eritreans won more battles and pushed the
Ethiopians back (See Map 15). In March 1977, the first major town fell to the
rebels. More cities soon joined the string of rebel victories. They became
strong enough to go outside their borders and raid towns like Adowa, which was
overrun in June.(40) By early summer, the rebels confined the Ethiopians to
the major cities, controlled 85 percent of the territory and over 90 percent of
the population of Eritrea. Rebel forces numbered about 42,000, with 25,000
being EPLF, 15,000 ELF, and 2,000 ELF-PLF.(41)
The rapid victories caused additional internal problems for the rebels.
After making a temporary deal with the ELF-PLF, which commited the mortal ideo-
logical sin of actually paying its forces, the ELF lost as much as a third of
its forces to internal dissent. The ELF executed many of those who refused to
accept the merger and other fighters defected to the EPLF. Refusal to deal
with the EPLF caused the ELF to lose a battle against Ethiopian forces.(42)
Sudan, upset over Ethiopian forays into Sudan and over the training camps
for anti-Nimeiry rebels in Ethiopia, aided the rebels. Nimeiry also aided the
EDU and threatened to recruit an army to fight Ethiopia from the over 220,000
Ethiopian refugees in Sudan. Mengistu announced that Nimeiry was Ethiopia's
worst enemy.(43) Sudan put pressure on the rebels to unite. This resulted in
the Khartoum agreements of 1977 and 1978. These agreements formed a joint
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THE HORN OF AFRICA
command, but not real unity. They also ignored the ELF-PLF which had about
5,000 fighters by 1978. When the 1978 Ethiopian offense was launched, the lack
of unity was intensified. The Sudanese aid situation changed in 1980, when
Nimeiry saw a lack of Eritean rebel success, felt pressure from the reinforced
Ethiopians, and decided to stop aiding the rebels.(45) Sudan is currently sup-
porting the EPLF and other anti-Derg rebels. Early 1984 reports also indicate
that Ethiopia is again supporting anti-Nimeiry rebels in Sudan.(46)
In spite of large increases in Soviet military aid, most of Eritrea was
under rebel control and its capital was under seige. By early 1978, only three
other cities were still in Ethiopian hands.(47) The unsuccessful rebel attack
on Mitsiwa, which was repulsed by the use of Soviet naval gunfire, lost rebel
momentum and may have sparked increased Soviet aid to Ethiopia.(48)
Mengistu attempted to get the Soviets to attack in Eritrea and was upset
when they supposedly refused to take an active combat role. They did agreed to
provide planning, advice, and logistics support for an attempt to relieve the
seige of the capital. About 100,000 Ethiopian troops and new Soviet weapons
massed just outside Eritrea and moved into battle. The offensive began in July
and rolled up the rebels as they could not stand up to the overwhelming numbers
and arms of the Ethiopians. The rebel fell back and attempted to hold Keren as
their last stronghold. It fell in late 1978.(49)
The role of the Cubans in the offensive was much greater than that of the
Soviets. Large numbers of Cubans appeared in Asmara just before the offensive.
They flew planes against the rebels and conducted ground combat attacks. The
Soviets also supported the attack with propaganda. They began to claim that
the rebels were either the "knowing or unknowing pawans of foreign powers" in
order to justify Soviet and Cuban involvement in the offensive.(50)
The rebels launched a counteroffenive and were able to make some gains.
But the Ethiopians launched new major offensives each year which were effective
THE HORN OF AFRICA
in reducing the rebels to guerrilla tactics.(51) The rebel chance for total
victory had passed as the rebels let their internal divisions keep them from
using their forces in concert to seize all of Eritrea. The Ethiopians had been
able to take care of the higher priority problem of Somalia, then turn on the
rebels and push them completely out of the towns. Under these attacks, the
ELP-PLF broke into even smaller factions and disintegrated during 1980. The
ELF had its main operating area taken over by the EPLF during 1981 and by the
next year, had largely ceased to exist.(52) The EPLF continued to be active as
evidenced by an attack on the Asmara airport in 1982, but at a lower level of
strength.(53) The large, "Red Star" offensives of 1982 and 1983, involving as
many as 30,000 Ethiopian troops cleared all towns of the EPLF but was not able
destroy it.(54) Early this year, it controlled some rural areas as well as two
towns near the Sudan border. But, it is not even close to being able to expel
the Ethiopians.(55)
The EPLF, a Christian-Marxist group, has not been as popular as the ELF,
an Arab-Marxist group, with various Arab backers of Eritrean secession. The
EPLF position in relation to the Soviets is clouded as even during the 1978
offensive, they "refused to condemn Moscow for helping Ethiopia." Once the ELF
disintegrated, Arab support for the revolt dropped. The EPLF maintains links
with both the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Oromo Liberation
Front (OLF) and also continues to battle ELF remnants.(56)
The best evidence of how poorly the rebels are doing is seen in their ac-
ceptance in 1980, of a new goal for the movement. Instead of the unconditional
demand for complete independence, their new goal is simply a referendum. The
referendum would allow Eritreans to choose between complete independence, a
federal association, or regional autonomy within Ethiopia.(57)
The story of the longest war in Africa, the secession of Eritrea is not
yet over. Over twenty-three years of struggle have seen the rebels fade after
THE HORN OF AFRICA
the losses of 1967, only to return in strength and nearly seize the country in
early 1978. Can they return again? They were so near their goal and then so
badly crushed that it may have taken the heart out of the survivors. The fact
that their former allies, the Soviets and the Cubans, are now firmly on the
side of their enemies adds to their problems. Whether or not the Soviets can
convince the heavily Marxist rebels to accept some limited rights in Eritrea
and give up the struggle is unclear. More importantly, the ability of the
Soviets to convince the Ethiopians to accept any compromise, is an even more
remote possibility. There are over 400,000 refugees, mostly from Eritrea, in
the Sudan,(58) and they provide a population base to rebuild and maintain the
struggle. However, the population of Eritrea has been bled dry by the struggle
and may not be willing or able to continue to support the war. Despite the
20,000 EPLF rebels fighting periodic offensives of over 100,000 Ethiopians(59),
it would seem that the best the rebels can do is to simply hold on, continue
guerrilla actions to gain notice and preserve their strength. In this way,
they can maintain a presence and be in position to take advantage of any
faltering of the Derg.
Some anti-Derg critics are still be optimistic:
Ultimately, however, the Ethiopian empire must be transformed.
The most likely cause will be the success of the Eritrean freedom
fighters, for a final failure of the Ethiopian military campaign will
mean the same end for the Derg that it did for Haile Selassie. The
wars of liberation in Tigray, in the Ogaden, and among the Oromo will
also contribute to the empire's fall. If and when all this happens,
there will be a new basis for a reconstructed Ethiopia. That toge-
ther with an independent Eritrea and a friendly Somalia, could change
the crisis of empire into a triumph of the people of the Horn. They
may then, if they so choose, unite to build the region on a popular,
progressive, and anti-imperialist foundation. That would indeed be
an inspiration to the rest of the continent.(60)
SECTION III - REGIONAL REVOLTS
The regional revolts which plague the Derg, have at times seen all of the
provinces of Ethiopia in revolt. While the nature of Ethiopia produces a pat-
THE HORN OF AFRICA
tern of periodic revolts, the Derg has managed to generate more revolts than
any other Ethiopian government. A factor complicates the entire insurgency
picture is factionalism. Most rebel groups in Ethiopia see other rebel groups
as threats, often larger than that posed by the central government. This leads
to war between them and possible collaboration with the government, reminiscent
of the bitter guerrilla struggles in Yugoslavia during World War II directed
against each other and the Germans.
The EPRP grew out of the split in the Marxist intelligensia along with the
party, Meison. While the Derg was temporarily able to coopt the Meison group,
the EPRP launched the "white terror." The ferocity of the Derg's "red terror"
response was totally unexpected. The EPRP soon found itself in a struggle not
so much to change the government, but just to survive. What had started out as
daylight assassinations led to EPRP use of students to battle the Derg forces
in the streets. In May of 1977 it is estimated that over 1,000 students (some
10 years old) were killed by the Derg in the streets of Addis Ababa.(61)
The red terror was less restrictive than the white terror and turned out
to be more effective. By late 1977, the Derg had almost crushed the EPRP. The
small number of survivors were broken into two factions. One wanted to fight a
rural struggle while the other wanted to continue the urban revolt. The rural
faction set up a force in Tigray as well as a smaller force in Gondar. The
urban faction was almost completely silenced.(62)
One major weakness of the EPRP was its base was confined to the cities and
especially to Addis Ababa. The EPRP was therefore unable to find sanctuaries
when the red terror was set in motion. Another weakness was the fact that it
was a movement of the intelligensia which, given the nature of Ethiopia, was
very small and easily identifiable. Meison aided in the identification process
until late 1977, when Meison was accused of attempting to plot a coup and its
leaders were rounded up or executed. While this did provide a few additional
THE HORN OF AFRICA
recruits for EPRP, the overall effect was to remove most of the Marxist intel-
ligencia from the Derg and from the country.(63)
The EPRP was reportedly active in Addis Ababa in 1979.(64) The recent
arrest of 17 members of an anti-government group called the Ethiopian Peoples
Democratic Alliance may reflect the latest incarnation of the EPRP. However,
as stated in the newspapers, the announcement of the arrests "was thought to be
the government's first admission is several years that its opponents were oper-
ating in the capital."(65)
The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) may be an outgrowth of the
traditional rivalry between Shewa and Tigray over control of Ethiopia. Since
the days of the early emperors, Tigrean nobles have been contesting the power
with the Shewans. In 1943, Tigray rebelled against Haile Selassie. The revolt
was put down by British trained and led Ethiopian forces. The Emperor's harsh
response to the revolt led to the formation of an underground rebel group. The
rebels decided that the Derg was also Shewan and formed the TPLF.(66)
The TPLF is Marxist and like the other rebel groups, is threatened by the
existence of other rebel groups. It has fought the Marxist EPRP faction that
set up in its area. It also battled the Tigrean-led Ethiopian Democratic Union
(EDU) and forced it out of Tigray. Its goal is to set up an independent area
composed of Eritrea and itself.(67) Because of its goal, it works with rebels
in Eritrea, especially the EPLF. Like the Eritreans, it suffered in the 1978
Ethiopian offensive. In 1979, it responded by temporarily capturing the Aksum
airport. In 1980, it claimed to control the roads leading into Eritrea.(68)
The 20,000 Ethiopian troops in Tigray during 1980 were doubled for an offensive
in 1981 to reduce the 60 percent of the countryside controlled by the rebels.
This offensive also recaptured all the towns and proved unable to destroy the
rebels. The EPLF continues its guerrilla attacks and announces it periodic
victories, but it cannot retake the cities which are under firm Ethiopian
THE HORN OF AFRICA
control.(69) It also continues to battle the EPRP which considers the EPLF to
be fighting for local, rather than Ethiopian interests.(70)
The Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), was the only non-Marxist guerrilla
force fighting the Derg. It was made up of "a makeshift amalgam of liberals
and conservatives" including former officials of the old imperial government.
It was based on the fact that in many of the northern provinces, the peasants
were not as oppressed as those in the conquered south. They were conservative
in nature and often had some ownership of the land. The land reform policies of
the Derg threatened them and allowed their leaders to marshal their support
into a war against the Derg.(71)
At its strongest point, the EDU numbered about 6,000 troops and was led by
many former army officers as it operated from bases in Sudan. In 1977, it de-
feated Ethiopian troops in northern Gondor. By 1980, most considered the EDU
to be have been wiped out as Ethiopia reestablished control over its operating
areas. However, there are still reports of EDU actions from Gojam.(72)
Another rebellion is that led by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). This
is an ethnic based, Marxist revolt that aims to liberate the Oromo from Amharic
oppression. It reflects opposition to Derg collectivization of farm lands and
high taxes.(73) This movement had only several hundred fighters in 1980, and
was noted for its cooperation with the Somalis fighting in the Ogaden. Like
many of the resistance groups, its headquarters are in Khartoum.(74) Much of
the support and publicity for the OLF comes from students living in places like
the US. The OLF publishes political papers inside Ethiopia and attempts to
cultivate support in rural areas. Evidence of its lack of success is seen in
the large numbers of Oromo that are members of the Ethiopian army.(75) The OLF
and the TPLF have formed links with the EPLF to better battle the Derg. The
results of that linkage are not yet clear.(76)
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In 1982, the leaders of the OLF answered questions and outlined their pos-
itions in an interview. They took credit for the Derg land reform as the Oromo
had seized the land before the Derg announced its land reform program. They
claimed that the Derg had resettled over 250,000 settlers in Oromo lands, that
military actions were frequent, and that the OLF had killed many Ethiopian
troops. They also have established OLF offices in Somalia.(77)
The Oromo are so split by internal divisions (urban, rural, Christian,
Moslem, settled, nomadic, etc.) reflecting those found in the rest of Ethiopia,
that they have not been able to direct efforts into armed struggle. Their
scattered nature and ethnic dilution continue to make this a small rebellion.
However, it is one with a great deal of potential as the Oromo population is
the largest in Ethiopia. If a charismatic leader could be found, or an issue
developed that would catch the attention of the people, the Oromo could perhaps
topple the Derg. This likelihood is remote.
The last group to be addressed is the Afar Liberation Front (ALF). This
revolt is a direct result of the Derg upsetting the previous arrangements that
existed between Haile Selassie and Sultan Ali Mireh Hanhare, the leader of the
Afars. The Sultan asked the Derg for the same loose restrictions that he had
been allowed to retain by the Emperor in exchange for his loyalty. The Derg
responded with land reforms and a program to move additional highland settlers
down into the Danakil lands. The Derg, perhaps fearing a threat to the lines
of communication to both Aseb and Djibouti, attacked the Sultan and forced him
into Djibouti. He armed 5,000 of his tribe and the war was on in earnest.(78)
The ALF is composed of Danakils who are noted throughout the area as being
skilled warriors and bandits. They were able to cut the road to Aseb and the
railroad to Djibouti. They also aided the ELF against the Ethiopians. Heavy
fighting was able to reopen the road to Aseb in 1980. Internal divisions have
arisen and splinter groups are also reducing the effectiveness of the ALF.(79)
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The weakness of the ALF is the small population that it can draw on for
support and recruits. Its strengths are the Danakils' fighting experience and
a group sanctuary in Djibouti. The ALF position is a two edged sword. While
the ALF can hurt the Derg, it directs the full attention of the Derg to them.
Heavy use of force can keep the Ethiopian lines of communication open and the
revolt under control. Settlement of many non-Danakils in the area is a also a
long term solution that could overwhelm the ALF. War started over political
and economic issues and a possible solution would be a compromise acceptable to
both sides. This is the most likely option if the Derg seems to be firmly in
control in the rest of Ethiopia.
The fighting in each of these regional revolts was tied to that in the
other regions and in Eritrea. It also led to the Somali-Ethiopian War.
SECTION IV - THE SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN WAR
The Somalis supported most of the revolts that were directed against the
Derg. Two rebel groups, not yet mentioned, were the Western Somalia Liberation
Front (WSLF) and its ally, the Somali-Abo Liberation Front (SALF)(as the WSLF
was the strongest group, we will use it to refer to both). They fought to join
the Ogaden to Somalia and were trained by Somali, Soviet and Cuban forces. As
the Derg's problems increased, Somali support for both groups increased.
The WSLF began to engage Ethiopian troops in 1975, raiding military and
police targets across the Ethiopian border. As Ethiopian forces were drawn to
Eritrea, the WSLF became more successful. By 1977, it had about 6,000 troops,
was attacking railroad bridges on the Djibouti rail line and controlled a good
portion of the Ogaden countryside.(80)
In contrast to former conflicts, Ethiopia was now seriously weakened and
the Somalis were extremely well armed. In 1976, Somalia had a 23,000 man army
which was heavily armored with 250 tanks (T-34 and T-54) and over 300 armored
THE HORN OF AFRICA
personnel carriers. These armored forces were three times larger that those of
the Ethiopians. The large (for Africa) Somali airforce of 52 combat aircraft
included 24 MiG-21's. The Ethiopians had only 16 aircraft that were comparable
to the MiG-21. The Ethiopian army had mutinied, fought internally and arrested
its own officers. Its spirit in Eritrea seemed to be breaking down and it was
being pressed on all sides by successful rebel attacks.(81)
In early 1977, Sudan and Ethiopia came close to war. The Derg's problems
resulted in the February shootout and the EPRP was actively attacking the Derg
in the streets of Addis Ababa. The US halted all in process arms deliveries
and had been expelled from Ethiopia.(82) Ethiopia seemed ready to splinter.
The only problem was that the Soviets support of the Derg. After the big
shootout, they and the other Soviet dominated countries were the first to wire
Mengistu with their congradulations and to increase their aid.(83)
In March, Fidel Castro made a secret visit to Aden. A meeting between
himself and the hostile factions was arranged. He proposed a solution to their
conflicts, a federation of the Horn which would include all the factions. This
plan would unite the socialist states, allow the disputed regions to have a
level of autonomy, allow the Soviets to supply all types of economic aid, and
at the same time, guarantee Soviet control of the Red Sea. Barre wanted the
Greater Somalia question resolved first and so the Castro plan died.(84)
The Soviet interest in Ethiopia worried Barre and he went to an summit
meeting in North Yemen to discuss regional security. The Arabs were proposing
to turn the Red Sea into an "Arab lake" that would exclude both the Israelis
and the Soviets. He listened to the proposals which included a large amount of
aid in exchange for eliminating Soviet influence in Somalia. He did not make
any decisions or promises at that time.(85)
The march of the peasant army on Eritrea and its dismal defeat showed how
desperate the Ethiopians were becoming. In May, Mengistu signed an agreement
THE HORN OF AFRICA
with the Soviets that provided Ethiopia with another $500 million worth of mod-
ern military arms.(86) This agreement may have convinced Barre that he had to
strike before the Soviet aid could strengthen Ethiopia.
In June of 1977, the Ethiopians accused the Somalis of committing regular
Somali forces to fighting in the Ogaden. At the same time, the WSLF began to
broadcast the reports of its victories over Radio Mogadishu. While these were
plainly exaggerated, it was clear that the WSLF was being more successful.(87)
In fact, the war had started. While Ethiopia and Somalia were involved,
the rest of the world was not really sure of what was going on as both sides
kept reporters out of the area and closely guarded all information. To add to
the confusion, the Somalis continued to deny that their regular forces were in-
volved in the Ogaden until long after everyone was sure of their presence. The
war therefore did not generate detailed accounts or publicity about most of its
battles (see Map 16).
While many Somali "volunteers" were allowed time off from their military
duties to fight in the Ogaden prior to July of 1977, the commitment of armor
and the rest of the Somali army was not made until July. These regular army
forces captured Gode and pushed on into the interior. In August, the Somalis
tried, unsuccessfully to capture Jijiga and Dire Dawa. At Jijiga, three tank
battalions attacked and lost half their forces as they were repulsed. At Dire
Dawa, a combined arms attack proved too weak and was defeated. In September,
the Somalis attacked Jijiga again. After suffering heavy armor losses, the
Somalis were victorious as the Ethiopians mutinied and were routed. Somalis
then advanced to Harar where they were later able to enter the city, but were
not able to take it or Dire Dawa.(88)
The Somalis reached the limit of their advance for many reasons. First,
the Ethiopian air force proved superior to the Somalis. Air supremacy allowed
them to easily interdict Somali supplies. Second, the Soviets had turned off
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THE HORN OF AFRICA
the supply pipeline to the Somalis in August. The Somalis were running out of
supplies, spare parts, and ammunition. Third, the Somalis had suffered heavy
armor losses in battle. They could not replace the losses and also had pro-
blems maintaining those vehicles that weren't lost. Fourth, the rainy season
hdd begun and the movement of troops and equipment on dirt roads proved diffi-
cult. Fifth, the Somalis had participated in their first major, all out war
and they simply had to get themselves sorted out, reorganized and ready to
fight again.(90) In addition, the Soviets previously had handled most of the
Somali logistics and once they pulled out, the Somalis had to try to do it all
themselves, compounding the other problems listed.(91)
Ethiopia began to receive Soviet arms in May of 1977. The Ogaden war was
going very badly from their perspective as they conceeded the rural areas to
the Somalis. When Jijiga fell, things looked bleak. The Derg responded by
mobilizing retired army personnel and peasants and sending them to the Ogaden
cities by all means possible.(92)
On the diplomatic front, the OAU held a meeting during which the Somalis
tried to get the OAU to examine the Ogaden question and hold talks with the
WSLF. When this failed, the Somalis left the meeting. The OAU proposed that
hostile actions cease in order to comply with the OAU charter. This was a
Somali defeat as the charter prohibited changing borders by force.(93)
In mid-August, Barre threatened intervention if foreign troops, such as
the Cubans were used in the Ogaden. The Soviet position hardened against the
Somalis. At the end of the month, Barre visited Moscow and was unable to im-
prove relations with the Soviets. About this time, Barre found out that the US
would be slow to supply arms, despite what may have been promised before.(94)
On 18 October, the Soviets offically stopped all remaining aid shipments
to Somalia. Three days later Barre verbally attacked the Soviets and Cubans
for supporting Ethiopia. On the 23th, both Communist countries announced full
THE HORN OF AFRICA
support for Ethiopia. In the middle of November, Barre expelled the Soviets
and Cubans from Somalia and revoked the 1974 Soviet Treaty of Friendship.(95)
The Soviet reaction to Somalia was typified by a remark made by the Soviet
Ambassador to Somalia Georgy E. Samsonov, "We will teach (the Somalis) a les-
son they will not forget. We will bring them to their knees."(96)
Barre's reaction to a question about whether or not the US had promised
him arms includes some anger:
. . .The US subsequently changed its mind. Now they say they will
help if we are invaded. That's like telling a sick man you will
help cure him after he dies."(97)
A Soviet air lift began to rush tons of military equipment and thousands
of troops to Ethiopia. It went on for several months and involved 225 aircraft
(15 percent of the Soviet transport fleet) which flew many routes to reach
Ethiopia. These routes were often in violation of other countries' air space
and of previous Soviet agreements as they ignored protests or declared cargos
very different from those unloaded in Ethiopia.(98) They provided the first
deputy of the Soviet armed forces, General Vasily Ivanovich Petrov, to direct
the war effort. His assistant was Cuban Division General Arnaldo Ochoa, who
had been with Castro in the Sierra Maestra mountains.(99) Mengistu announced:
The Cubans, who are renowned for shedding their blood anywhere
and at any time for a just struggle and cause, are standing along-
side the Ethiopian People's Army at the front line."(100)
The Somalis proved unable to take the two remaining major cities of the
Ogaden, would not retreat, and were not able to obtain the necessary amounts of
supplies, equipment and ammunition needed to hold what they had taken. Their
stalemated position had but one possible conclusion as the Somalis could get no
stronger while the Soviets were pouring more forces into Ethiopia. The Somalis
simply sat and waited for the ax to fall.
The combination of the airlift and sealift from 1977 to 1980 provided the
following: 150 T-34 and 600 T-54/-55 tanks; 40 BMP-1 and 500 BTR-40/-60/-152
THE HORN OF AFRICA
armored personnel carriers; 16 Mi-24 helocopters; 17 MiG-17, 50 MiG-21, and 20
MiG-23 aircraft; as well as tons of other equipment which included artillery,
rocket launchers, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, and even an 0SA patrol
boat.(101) All of this equipment and about 15,000 to 18,000 Cubans flooded in
to Ethiopia and turned the tide against Somalia.(102) Ethiopia had stabilized
the situation at the end of 1977, and even though unable to take the offensive,
proved able to defend the two threatened cities until the Cubans and Soviets
arrived. In December, Cubans were joined in the defense of these cities.(103)
The counter-attack devised by the Soviets and carried out by Cubans and
Ethiopians was a master stroke. The first phase was a direct attack on the
Somalis in the mountain passes to Jijiga. At the same time, a heavy tank and
armored vehicle column made an end run around the mountains. These end run
forces bogged down in a rain storm and lost 11 of the heavy Soviet tanks before
they broke through the Somalis. Soviet helocopters flew in additional forces
(perhaps even light tanks) and hit the Somalis from two sides while also using
well coordinated artillery and close air support. The Somalis fought bravely
with little armor, no air cover, and few supplies. When their supplies ran
out, they broke. Thousands were killed and the Somalis were crushed.(104)
On 5 March 1978, Jijiga fell after two days of fighting involving four
Somali brigades suffered 3,000 troops killed. Within the week, all towns in
the Ogaden had been retaken. On 9 March, Barre recalled his forces from the
Ogaden. The war had cost him over 8,000 men, three fourths of his tanks, and
half of his aircraft.(105)
The US, Iran, Saudi Arabia and others warned the Soviets not to cross into
Somalia as the buildup and battle progressed. They threatened the possible use
of an armed response to any violation of Somalia's borders. In spite of the
Somali collapse, the Soviets did not press their advantage into Somalia.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
The WSLF reestablished itself with a leadership that was less closely tied
to Somalia and returned to guerrilla tactics. Its goal became a totally inde-
pendent Ogaden. Not all of the Somali armed forces left the Ogaden as some
supported the WSLF in another round of battles. The fighting was on a lower
level than previously, but still accounted for WSLF control of 60 percent of
the Ogaden in 1980. In 1981, the Somali regular forces finally withdrew into
Somalia. After cutting the WSLF support, the Somalis are now again providing
low levels aid to the rebels. The war continues with sporatic actions by the
WSLF countered by periodic offenses by the Ethiopians.(106)
The Derg then organized a guerrilla movement directed against Barre using
those disgruntled Somalis that have left the country. Many of these are from
the Majerteyn clan which was the ruling clan that Barre deposed. Their aim is
to topple Barre because of his harsh rule (61 public executions from the coup
until mid-1980 along with many arrests and imprisonments), in order to return
the country to democracy.(107)
To support the movement, the Derg has set up a new radio station, Radio
Kulmis (the unifier) along with the Somali Salvation Front (SSF), a guerrilla
force under a former Somali army colonel, Abdullahi Yusuf. The SSF attacks
towns and targets in Somalia. In addition to the SSF, the Ethiopian air force
makes periodic attacks into Somalia to add to Barre's problems. Another anti-
Barre group is the Somali Democratic Action Front (SODAF) which is also makes
broadcasts from its headquarters in Nairobi.(108)
In August of 1982, the Derg launched a large ground attack into Somalia
that was aided by tanks and artillery. This was supposedly an attack by the
SSF to liberate Somalia. It captured the town of Goldegob and was then halted
by the Somalis when the expected popular uprising did not take place. "A cap-
tured Ethiopian brigade commander admitted to foreign observers that of his
4,000 troops, only 90 were Somali rebels."(109) The Somalis periodically claim
THE HORN OF AFRICA
that the Ethiopians have attacked them. Some of these attacks have also been
independently verified by the US which rushed defensive arms and ammunition to
Somalia in 1982.(110) Incidents of this nature can be expected to continue on
both sides of the border.
The US is a source of aid that could balance the Soviet aid to Ethiopia.
It has made a treaty with the Somalis to obtain use of their bases if needed to
support the Rapid Deployment Force. While still supporting the WSLF, OLF, EPLF
and the rest, the Somalis have promised not to transfer arms to third parties
without American approval. The Somalis have also agreed not to allow their
regular army units to fight in the Ogaden. In return for the agreements, the
US began by providing over $40 million in aid to Somalia.(111)
Those that have visited Somalia in the past few years tell of two main
impressions. The first is of the Somalis' extreme poverty. The second is of
the grim determination still directed at obtaining the Ogaden. They also say
that the Somalis are extremely anxious to do anything they can for Americans
because they feel that only with American support can they defend and develop
Somalia.(112) Their conflict with the Ethiopians is not over, only awaiting
the next round.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
NOTES - CHAPTER 4
1. Clapham, op. it., p. 191.
2. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 264.
3. Colin Legum, Ethiopia: The Fall of Haile Selassie's Empire, (New York:
Africana Publishing Company, 1975), p. 2.
4. Bereket, op. cit., p. 25.
5. Legum, op. cit., pp. 39-41.
6. Ibid., pp. 41-43.
7. Ibid., p. 44.
8 Ibid., pp. 44-45.
9. Bereket, op cit., p. 29.
10. Legum and Lee, op. cit., p. 38.
11. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 51.
12. Quoted in Legum, op. cit., p. 49.
13. Ibid., pp. 54-56.
14. Ibid.
15. Bereket, op. cit., p. 31.
16. Nelson and Kaplan, loc. cit.
17. Farer, op. cit., pp. 59-60.
18. Legum, op. cit., pp. 71-72.
19. Brand and Mroczkowska-Brand, op. cit., p. 164.
20. Madan M. Saldie, Ethiopia, (New York: Apt Books, 1982), p. 181.
21. Legum and Lee, op. cit., pp. 39-40.
22. Bereket, op. cit., pp. 30-35.
23. William F. Lee, "Ethiopia: A Review of the Derg," Africa Report,
March-April, (1977), pp. 9-10.
24. Robert Caputo, "Ethiopia: Revolution in an Ancient Empire," National
Geographic, 163, No. 5, (1983), p. 617.
25. Bereket, op. cit., p. 42.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
26. Farer, op. cit., p. 63.
27. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 54-55.
28. Frost, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
29. Legum, op. cit., p. 51.
30. Ibid., p. 52.
31. Bereket, op. cit. p. 30.
32. Papp, op. cit., p. 8.
33. Farer, op. cit., pp. 42-43.
34. Papp, loc. cit.
35. Legum, op. cit., p. 76.
36. Sherman, op. cit., p. 86.
37. "Ethiopia: Conquest and Terror," op. cit., pp. 18-19.
38. Sherman, op. cit., p. 51.
39. Ibid., p. 62.
40. Ibid., pp. 88-90.
41. Papp, loc. cit.
42. Sherman, op. cit., pp. 62-64.
43. Lee, op. cit., p. 11.
44. Sherman,op. cit., p. 50.
45. Ibid., pp. 64-66.
46. "Three Foreign Oilmen Murdered in Sudan," Washington Post, January, 1984
47. Erlikh Hagai, The Struggle Over Eritrea, 1962-1978, (Stanford, Califor-
nia: Hoover Institution Press, 1983), p. 110.
48. Sherman, op. cit., p. 92.
49. Ibid., pp. 113-116.
50. Papp, op. cit., pp. 13-15.
51. Bereket, op. cit., p. 72.
52. Paul Kelemen, "A Critique of the Ethiopian Revolution," Horn of Africa,
5, No. 2, (1982), pp. 18-31.
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53. David Pool, Eritrea, Africa's Longest War, (London: Anti-Slavery
Society, 1982), p. 59.
54. David Wnder, "Quietly, Ethiopians Mount Drive to Oust Eritrean Seces-
sionists," Christian Science Monitor, 18 Aug 1983, p. 5.
55. Ellison, op. cit., pp. A-21 and A-23.
56. James E. Dougherty, The Horn of Africa, (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1982), p. xii.
57. Pool, op. cit., p. 57.
58. Robert Caputo, "Sudan, Arab-African Giant," National Geographic, 161, No.
3, (1982), p. 357.
59. Ellison, loc. cit.
60. Bereket, op. cit., p. 171.
61. Gorman, op. cit., p. 60.
62. Bereket, op. cit., pp. 45-46.
63. Ibid.
64. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 272.
65. "Ethiopia Announces Arrests," Washinton Post, 5 February 1984, p. A-16.
66. Bereket, op. cit., pp. 86-93.
67. Ibid.
68. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 274.
69. Winder, loc cit.
70. Bereket, loc. cit.
71. Farer, op. cit., p. 62.
72. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 272-274.
73. Farer, op. cit., p. 64.
74. Nelson and Kaplan, loc. cit.
75. Bereket, op. cit., pp. 84-85.
76. Dougherty, loc. cit.
77. "Ethiopia's Hidden War," loc cit.
78. Farer, op. cit., pp. 64-65.
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79. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 274-275.
80. Nelson, op. cit., p. 244.
81. Ibid., pp. 243-244.
82. Olusola Ojo, "Ethiopia's Foreign Policy Since the 1974 Revolution," Horn
of Africa, 3, No. 4, (1980-1981), pp. 3-12.
83. Ibid.
84. Gorman, op. cit., p. 55.
85. Ibid.
86. Richard B. Remnek, "Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa: The Decision to
Intervene," Strategic Issues Research Memorandum, Strategic Studies
Institute,U.S.Army War College, 1980, p. 2.
87. Nelson, op. cit., p. 244.
88. Ibid., pp. 245-246.
89. Farer, op. cit., p. 121.
90. Nelson, loc. cit.
91. Farer, op. cit., pp. 124-125.
92. Ibid.
93. Gorman, op. cit., p. 116.
94. Ibid., p. 117.
95. Ibid., p. 119.
96. Quoted in "War in The Horn," Newsweek, 13 Feb 1978, p. 45.
97. Quoted in an interview with Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Russia's Grand
Design," Newsweek, 13 Feb 1978, p. 47.
98. Kim Willenson, et. al., "Airlift to Ethiopia," Newsweek, 23 Jan 1978, pp.
35-36.
99. Kim Willenson, et. al., "Red Stars Over Africa," Newsweek, 13 Mar 1978,
p. 39.
100. Quoted by Angus Deming, et. al., "The Cubans in Africa," Newsweek, 13 Mar
1978, p. 36.
101. Edward J. Laurance, "Soviet Arms Transfers in the 1980's: Declining
Influence in Sub-Saharan Africa," Arms for Africa: Military Assistance and
Foreign Policy in the Developing World, ed. Bruce E. Arlinghaus, (Lexington,
Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 46.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
102. Papp, op. cit., p. 14.
103. Remnek, op. cit., p. 11.
104. Kim Willenson, et. al., "The Ogaden Debacle," Newsweek, 20 Mar 1978, pp.
46-47.
105. Nelson, op. cit., p. 246.
106. Ibid.
107. David Laitin, "The Political Crisis in Somalia," Horn of Africa, 5, No.
4, (1982), pp. 60-64.
108. Abdi Sheik-Abdi, "Somali Dissidents in Ethiopia," Horn of Africa, 3, No.
4, (1980-1981), pp. 50-52.
109. Fay Willey, et. al., "Somalia: The Spreading War for a Wasteland,"
Newsweek, 30 Aug 1982, p. 47.
110. Marian Smoak, "Correcting Mistakes in the Horn of Africa," Christian
Science Monitor, 16 Aug 1982, p. 23.
111. "American-Somali Military Alliance?" Horn of Africa, 3, No. 3, (1980),
pp. 54-55.
112. Personal interview with Major John Garvin, former member of the Joint
Staff, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
CHAPTER 5.
CONCLUSIONS
SECTION I - SOVIET ANTI-GUERRILLA TACTICS
Much of the instruction at the Command and Staff College rightfully cen-
ters around the major threat facing the US, the Soviet Union. We have spent
many hours studying, discussing, and, or wargaming various aspects of Soviet
equipment, tactics and strategy. In addition to this, we live under an almost
constant barrage of media reports concerning the Soviets. Yet, most of the in-
formation presented doesn't really deal with Soviet anti-guerrilla operations.
In doing research into the Horn of Africa I was struck by the extremely
large numbers of refugees reported. By 1981, these estimates ran as high as
two and a half million Ethiopian refugees scattered around its borders(1), and
their numbers have continued to increase since then. Most of these refugees
are being caused by Soviet anti-guerrilla tactics as practiced by Ethiopian
troops with Soviet bloc advisors.
I began to notice a recurring theme:
The Ethiopian and Cuban troops rarely leave their garrisons.
Their main battle strategy . . . is to eliminate the threat of in-
surrection by making the Ogaden uninhabitable. Refugees who stream
into Somalia tell of indiscriminate bombing of villages by Ethiopian
warplanes, of bombed or poisoned water holes, slaughtered catttle,
rape and murder. . . . More routine bomb attacks are usually un-
leased after WSLF raids.(2)
An interview with a Somali refugee:
"I would not have left but finally I got too scared," she said,
holding her youngest child close to her breast. "The Ethiopian
planes came often, bombing our villages and water holes, and many
died in their attacks. There are Cuban soldiers everywhere, trying
to drive us from our land. It was time to run."(3)
"A land laid waste." Soviet strategy has been to maintain
control of the major towns and to bomb everything and everyone that
moves in the bush. Destruction of water holes has driven about 1
million ethnic Somali civilians from the Ogaden into Somalia itself,
and the region is pockmarked by deserted and bombed-out villages.(4)
However, the gradual depopulation of the region has set the
stage for a calculated Ethiopian policy of resettlement by non-
THE HORN OF AFRICA
Somalis, akin to Israeli policy in the Palestinian West Bank, that
threatens to undercut the social base of the guerrilla war.
Future plans are reported to call for the movement of up to three
million farmers to the Ogaden in an effort to dismantle the Somali
nation.(5)
The only major town administered by the front (EPLF), Nakfa, at
first glance seemed abandoned. Once the home of 6,000 mountain
farmers, its stone houses, shops and cafes have all been bombed to
rubble, and its wide, treelined avenues are a museum of Soviet shell
casings and rocket fragments left after constant attacks by the
Ethiopian Army.(6)
In all, seven Somalis were killed; twenty or thirty were
gravely wounded. The attack was apparently designed not to destroy
Jijiga, but only to demoralize the people there.(7)
The theme in these examples indicates a much different Soviet strategy
than the one taught in our military schools. US strategy revolves around the
effort "to win the hearts and minds of the people." Once that happens, the
people will no longer support the guerrillas. Without the peoples support, the
guerrillas are be as vulnerable as fish out of water. We stress massive eco-
nomic and social programs to better the lives of the population in a form of
not too subtle bribery. We also try to ensure that the host country meets our
perception of the proper political needs of the population. As a slightly em-
barassed aside, we also deal with purely military operations to kill those
guerrillas that we can. We look to send out masses of personnel to saturate
the area with small groups that will live with the population, protect them,
and when possible, kill or capture the guerrilla. But, even in this effort, we
stress minimum necessary force, attention to human rights, and attempting not
to adversely impact the rest of the population.
The Soviet strategy as evidenced by operations in the Horn, in Afghanistan
and in other areas, seems to be to: hold the major population centers; indoc-
trinate and convert the children; drive off, terrorize, or kill the population
that supports the guerrillas; resettle the area with those that are loyal; and
then, wait for the guerrilla movement to wither and die.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
Western attempts to deal with guerrilla movements have often defeated the
guerrillas militarily and still lost the area politically as their public grew
tired of the war. Western public opinion has been the fatal ingredient for
many of these losses. As Western countries lost their will to resist, areas
gradually fell prey to insurgency. This has happened in many areas such as
Algeria, India, Aden, and Viet Nam.
While some may already be aware of the Soviet strategy, I was surprised to
see it spelled out so clearly in an article by Claude Malhuret:
Totalitarian regimes have analyzed these repeated failures and
found a new answer to the guerrilla "problem," one that is simple,
logical and effective. . . . an effective counter-strategy in the
face of guerrilla action involves massive reprisals against the pop-
ulation, sometimes including the extermination of a large part of
that population.
The reason for this difference in anti-guerrilla tactics is
very simple: the Soviets are not as naive as the Westerners. They
understood long ago--perhaps back at the time of the 1933 Ukrainian
genocide when this tactic was used quite successfully--that a war
involving guerrillas and anti-guerrilla fighters would never be won
by either side if the emphasis was placed on being in the good graces
of the population. On the contrary, the war would be won by she side
that succeeded in making terror reign.
These refugees should not be considered in the traditional
way, as an unfortunate but unintended consequence of the war, but
rather as part of the Soviet warfare strategy, the same that was used
in Kampuchea, the Ogaden and Eritrea. The objective is, as mentioned
earlier, to evacuate the country in order to isolate the guerrilla
fighters.
The Russians do not need smashing victories to annnunce to their
citizenry, as Soviet public opinion does not influence Soviet policy.
The Soviet army can wait it out as long as it did for the Bas-
machi revolt to end--and it waited for that for 20 years. It can
wait even longer if necessary.(8)
This Soviet strategy is not overly concerned with short term losses as it
is geared to long term victory. Guerrillas can be allowed to control portions
of the countryside and some of the people. But, true long term control is
gradually being established by the patient Soviets. This strategy is proving
effecive in the Ogaden where the WSLF continues its raids, but has no long-term
military strategy other than an indefinite war of attrition.(9) It may also
THE HORN OF AFRICA
prove to be effective in Eritrea where in early 1984, the EPLF could claim to
control large rural areas but only two towns, both within 25 miles of its
Sudanese sanctuary.(10)
Edward Luttwak identifies another reason for the Soviet strategy.
for all its 130 divisions, the Soviet army does rot have much
infantry in its highly mechanized forces, and no real foot infantry
at all. It is therefore thoroughly unsuited for the control of
large, densely populated areas, and for all manpower-intensive forms
of combat, from street-fighting to rear-area security duties against
large numbers of elusive guerrillas. With helicopters, even the
small number of infantrymen in the all-mechanized divisions of the
Soviet army can easily control the guerrillas in open country that
offers little cover, but elsewhere there is no substitute for large
forces of infantry.(11)
It is interesting to note the large number of Cuban "infantry" troops used
by Soviet clients in Africa to combat insurgencies. Where the insurgencies are
supported by outside countries, the Soviets and their proxies seem to be having
difficulties. It is estimated that 25,000 Cuban troops are in Angola and the
situation would require 10,000 to 20,000 more to overcome the South African
supported UNITA guerrillas.(12) There are also reports of the Cubans sending
most of their forces in Ethiopia (over 7,500 of the garrison of 10,500) to
Angola.(13)
The Soviets, even with Cuban help, may be vulnerable to guerrillas that
can operate in densely populated or very rugged areas.(14) Covert support of
the guerrillas may also prove successful in countering their tactics. It also
helps tie down their formations. However, given the Soviet patience, such
support may be required indefinitely.
Another counter to the Soviet strategy is that recommended by Malhuret,
publicity. Documentation of Soviet terror tactics and practices in sufficient
amounts to arouse world public opinion might cause the Soviets to change.(15)
This effort, even if unsuccessful, could prove beneficial in countering some
Soviet political moves by making the Soviets more politically unpopular.
However, no course other than direct confrontation is likely to have any
THE HORN OF AFRICA
lasting effect on the Soviets. We definitely do not want that confrontation to
occur unless we are vitally threatened. Therefore, perhaps a combination of
publicity and covert support would be the best that we can do.
SECTION II - SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN WAR QUESTIONS
Why did Somalia go to war? Why did the Soviets intervene on behalf of
Ethiopia? Where did the Somalis go wrong?
Why did Somalia go to war?
The Somali decision to support insurgencies in the Ogaden and Kenya had
been made in the early 1960's. Support for many other insurgencies aimed at
Ethiopia began at that time. The decision for that type of war is not at issue
as expansion, using the Greater Somalia concept, is fundamental to the Somali
state. What this question addresses is the rationale for the Somali decision
to commit their regular forces to the Ogaden in 1977.
The exact date that Somali regular army formations entered the Ogaden is
not yet clear, though Cubans report that the Somali forces were committed on 13
July(16). Soviets have said that the actual Somali decision to intervene in
the Ogaden was taken during a 10-hour meeting of Somalia's ruling Central Com-
mittee.(17) The Somalis obviously thought that they had a chance to take the
Ogaden, in spite of the fact that they made the move against the wishes of the
Soviets who provided the military equipment and training for the Somali army.
(18) What was their decision based upon?
In early 1977, the Ethiopian government looked very vulnerable. The Derg
was under extreme pressure from many sources which included the EPRP's terror
campaign, the startling successes of the Eritrean rebels, the victories of the
EDU, and its own internal divisions which had resulted in a shootout for power
in February.(19) The morale of the Ethiopian army seemed to be breaking as
they lost ground at a faster and faster pace.(20) The rebel forces in the Og-
THE HORN OF AFRICA
aden controlled by the Somalis, the WSLF and SALF, were also enjoying a great
deal of success. The Ethiopians were also weakened by a change over from US to
Soviet military equipment. This meant than their US equipment would have in-
creased maintenance problems as spare parts ran out, and that the army would
require training before being able to use any of the new Soviet equipment.(21)
The negative side of the situation was the growing Soviet relationship
with the Derg. This resulted in agreements to provide Soviet arms and in the
attempt by Castro to settle the dispute by proposing the federation of the en-
tire Horn. The Soviet admonitions for Somalia to be patient and allow the
Soviets to help solve the dispute fell on deaf ears. As Barre said:
But who can guarantee us that once his regime is consolidated
and his army strengthened, Mengistu will consent to negotiate the
territorial conflict between us so as to find a solution that com-
plies with the wishes of the Somali people in the Ogaden?(22)
Turning to a comparison of strengths, we find that the larger population
of Ethiopia allowed it to field only a slightly larger army, yet with much
greater reserve and milita forcos. However, much of that army was tied down in
Eritrea and in the fights against the various revolts. Somali military advan-
tages included not only more modern equipment but also, strong numerical ad-
vantages in armor, aircraft, and the ability to mass in the Ogaden.(23)
Other advantages included domestic and political factors. The Somalis had
traditionally supported the Greater Somalia concept and could be counted on to
fully support an active intervention. Somalia was also the best Soviet client
in Africa. They had been the first black African country to sign a treaty of
Peace and Friendship with the Soviets(24). They provided the Soviets with the
military important naval facilities at Berbera(25). The Soviets had invested
heavily in Somalia and had previously encouraged them in regards to the Ogaden.
A Somali determination of risks would have included the possibility of
military defeat as well as the possible adverse reactions of various concerned
parties. Military defeat was not likely as the lightly armed guerrilla forces
THE HORN OF AFRICA
of the WSLF were pushing the Ethiopians back in all areas. The WSLF didn't
have the equipment or strength to take the larger cities but the regular army
forces did. Once the major cities fell, the Ethiopians would have no choice
but to give up the areas. In the unlikely event of a defeat, the consequences
might be reduced if Somalia refused to admit that its regular forces were par-
ticipating. Then it could meet a defeat by withdrawing to its own borders.
Adverse reactions could come from the Soviets, the OAU, the Western
powers, and the Arab countries. Clearly the most important of these was she
Soviets. But, what might the Soviets actually do? Cut down their military
supplies, break relations, increase aid to Ethiopia, send in Soviet troops?
The Soviets and the Somalis may have discussed some of these aspects. The
Castro federation proposal was most likely tied to some additional economic
benefits.(26) A likely Soviet response would be to cut back aid, attempt to
talk the Somalis into negotiation, and perhaps, provide additional aid to
Ethiopia. Aid that the Soviets here providing Ethiopia had been directed at
Ethiopia's greatest threat, which was Eritrea, not the Ogaden.(27) The Somalis
might have thought that a successful attack would finally make the Ethiopians
go to the negotiating table where the Soviets would act as the mediator.(28)
If that happened, any temporary Soviet reaction could be reversed and the Sov-
iets would, in effect, guarantee the gains in the Ogaden.
The OAU had already placed itself firmly behind the principle of not
changing borders by force of arms. A Somali attack would undoubtedly result in
some sort of OAU disapproval. However, this would be a sanction with no real
effect in military terms. The Somalis would regain any losses in the OAU if
Ethiopia were to recognize Somali gains. The OAU response was therefore likely
to have been discounted.
The Western response was unlikely to involve force and could even favor
the Somalis. As the year progressed, the Ethiopians threw the US out of the
THE HORN OF AFRICA
country in response to a cut off of US military aid. The US began looking to
the Somalis as a counter to the Soviets in Ethiopia. President Carter sent a
secret intermediary, Dr. Kevin Cahill, to Somalia as part of his plan to "get
Somalia to be our friend." The substance of what transpired is still debated
as Barre interpreted it as a promise of US support.(29) In mid-July, the US,
France and Britain agreed, in principle, to provide defensive support to the
Somalis.(30) Intervention in the Ogaden shouldn't change that support as
Cahill had supposedly passed to Somalia the US position that was "no longer
averse to further guerrilla pressures in the Ogaden."(31) The West was lining
up on Somalia's side.
The Arab states were typically divided with the more radical countries
supporting Ethiopia and the rest tending to support Somalia. Libya and South
Yemen in spite of earlier support of the Eritrean rebels, supported Ethiopia.
The conservative Arab states were interested in making the Red Sea into an
"Arab lake," that is, a sea totally controlled by the Arabs. The "Arab lake"
would exclude both the Israelis and the Soviets.(32) Saudi Arabia, Iran, and
Egypt led the conservative Arab countries in promising support to Somalia, if
they would expel the Soviets.(33)
The Somalis could see that they had a golden opportunity to strike at an
Ethiopia that was seriously weakened by strife in all areas, and especially in
Eritrea. Their forces were much superior to those of their enemy, although the
Soviets were begining to arm the Ethiopians. While there were risks, even an
adverse reaction by the Soviets could be countered by promised Arab and Western
aid. The situation clearly favored the Somalis and if they did not strike, it
would shift more to the Ethiopian side. They took the risk and committed their
army.
Why did the Soviets intervene on behalf of Ethiopia ?
THE HORN OF AFRICA
This question covers the reasons for both the original support given to
the Derg and, more importantly, the large scale direct intervention provided to
the Derg after the Somali attack.
First attempts at gaining influence in Ethiopia were based on targets of
opportunity. Ethiopia had long been a major ally of the United States and any
lessening of US influence in the country would be to the Soviets' advantage.
The Soviets had offered, as early as 1959, to provide arms to Ethiopia. Later,
when Haile Selassie was having problems in obtaining the arms he wanted from
the US, he used a visit to the Soviets in 1973, to put pressure on the US.(34)
As the Derg established power, the Soviets saw a chance for gaining
another ally on the Horn. The first Soviet military aid package for the Derg
was secretly signed near the end of 1976. This package, worth $100 million,
provided largely second line equipment such as the older T-34 tanks. Once
Mengistu took power in February, the level of Soviet support increased.(35)
At that point, the Soviets had visions of having all the countries of the Horn
of Africa as allies. Somalia, the Derg, the Eritrean rebels, and the major
revolts, were all supposedly Marxist. With a friendly Soviet Union to resolve
differences, perhaps the conflicts could be ended.(36)
Somali rejection of the federation, US expulsion, and a quickly deterior-
ating situation in Eritrea made increased and to Ethiopia urgent. Mengistu
signed another aid package, worth $400 million, in May.(37)
As the Soviets provided aid to Ethiopia, relations became strained with
Somalia. The Soviets could see a way to gain total dominance in the Horn if
they brought Ethiopia under their influence. But the Somalis would have to
cooperate on the question of the Ogaden. The more the Somalis refused to com-
promise, the more the Soviets ware forced to choose between the two. An as-
sessment of the tangible benefits provided to the Soviets favored Somalia.
However, Ethiopia's potential, with ten times the Somali population, far
THE HORN OF AFRICA
greater natural resources, and good ports on the Red Sea was much greater than
Somalia's(38) The Soviets supported the Derg because of that potential and the
hope that something might be worked out to keep Somalia as well. Besides,
Castro had obtained promises from Somalia that "they would never invade Ethi-
opia, that they would never carry out a military attack against Ethiopia."(39)
The Soviets were being pressured to choose sides, yet they did so very
slowly. They tried to salvage both sides. The Soviets first stopped delivery
of major items of equipment to Somalia. But, they did not cut off Somalia
completely as they signed new economic agreements, continued to ship small arms
and parts, and had Barre visit Moscow in August for talks aimed at resolving
the situation. When Barre refused to call off his attack, the Soviets cut off
weapons deliveries.(40) The Soviets added another $385 million in military aid
to the Derg's total commitment and began to speed up deliveries. Mengistu then
pushed them again with his public remarks made on 18 September:
If socialist countries are still supplying arms to Somalia,
then this is not only violating one's principles, but also tanta-
mount to complicity with the reactionary Mogadiscio regime.(41)
In mid-October, the Soviets announced that all shipments to Somalia had
ceased. At the end of October, they increased the number of Cuban military
advisors. But, they still had not made a final choice. Only when the Somalis
threw the Soviets out did they step up the massive intervention of the side of
the Ethiopians. In other words, while they were tilting to the Ethiopians, the
Somalis forced their hand throughe expulsion.(42)
The Soviets were clearly angry with Somalia. The Soviets also used in-
tervention to send a clear message to the world that was a response to previous
expulsions from other countries, to Sadat's announcement that he was going to
Jerusalem, and to the US political meddling with Somalia. That message was
simple: the Soviets were the equal of the US; they had a great capacity to
THE HORN OF AFRICA
intervene in Africa; they would do so in the Horn in strength; and the US could
do little or nothing about it.(43)
The Soviets could make such a strong stand because they had a situation
that held very little real risk. The Somalis were the aggressors, so the Sov-
iets would be defending OAU principles. The Somali offensive had already bog-
ged down and the Ethiopians were able to hold the last cities in the Ogaden.
The Soviets had already seen that the Western powers' hands were tied by public
opinion as they could not support Somali aggression with military aid. To en-
sure Western power inaction, the Soviets were very careful to use Cuban, not
Soviet ground forces; to publicly limit their goals to the expulsion of the
Somalis from the Ogaden; and to guarantee that they wouldn't invade Somalia.
The Soviets also knew that Arab financial assistance, though considerable,
would not be able to buy the major items of military equipment that the Somalis
would need in order to replace their losses or to capture the Ogaden. And
finally, they knew that they could put all of the forces and the material
needed into Ethiopia to crush the Somalis.(44) It was a made to order situa-
tion for the Soviets and they took full advantage of it.
Where did the Somalis go wrong?
Clearly the catalyst to the full scale Soviet intervention in Ethiopia was
the Somali. expulsion of the Soviets in mid-November. Yet, the Somalis really
had little choice in the matter. Their offensive was bogged down; their Soviet
military equipment, which was mostly Soviet maintained, was wearing down as
their spare parts were cut off; and, most of the Arab support to Somalia was
contingent on getting rid of the Soviet presence.
While the decision to throw out the Soviets was a gamble, it had a good
chance for success. The real key to where the Somalis went wrong was in their
belief that the US and the Arabs would support them with arms needed to win in
THE HORN OF AFRICA
the Ogaden. The failure of the Somalis was clearly identified by the Czech
Ambassador:
The Somalis made a terrible mistake. They will soon find out
that the people they believe are their new friends will do nothing
to help them.(45)
This prediction came true largely because of US actions. The Saudis,
Egypt and some of the other Arab states tried to help the Somalis but were
hindered by the US. They provided a few tanks, other arms, some Egyptian
technicians to maintain Somali Soviet equipment, and considerable financial
aid. But, they were not allowed by the US to transfer enough arms to the
Somalis. When Carter visited the Middle East in 1978, many of the Arab leaders
tried to convince him of the necessity of either the US or the Arab allies be-
coming more involved with the Somalis in order to stop the new Soviet-Cuban
adventures in Africa. Carter refused to change the faltering US policy.(46)
Iran, provided some aid and threatened to intervene if Somalia were in-
vaded. However, it continued to supply Ethiopia with Iranian oil during the
conflict. In February of 1978, Iran limited future Somali aid to humanitarian
items. A lack of tangible Iranian support during the agony of conflict disap-
pointed Somali leaders.(47)
The Somalis definitely took a gamble in attempting to capture the Ogaden,
they compounded and lost the gamble by relying on the promises of aid. The end
result of the Somali belief in the promises of aid was the total defeat of the
regular army units in the Ogaden.
SECTION III - CURRENT STATUS
The overall status of the Horn of Africa is continuing conflict. While the
intensity and numbers of combatants have decreased, the basic causes of the
conflicts still exist. Those areas in which the fighting was most severe have
been ravaged by the struggle and many of the contesting groups shattered. Yet,
some revolts go on and the countries themselves are changing.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
Ethiopia
The fall of Haile Selassie was an event both expected and shocking. His
status as a world political figure his long reign made him seem almost immune
to attack. Yet, the plight of the country and the rising tide for change
pointed to change. The timing and form of the coup were the result of his
successes and failures to modernize Ethiopia.
Many criticize the Emperor for not changing his methods of rule blaming
his failures for causing the coup.(48) They forget some important facts.
Haile Selassie was born in 1892, he first took power as regent in 1916, and
then as Emperor in 1930. His methods of government were the result of a half
century of experience. I would contend that he simply could not change the
patterns of a lifetime of rule and that he may not have thought it necessary.
Those that surrounded the Emperor, would have the most to lose in a change and
would naturally continue to find the positive side of any unrest. Droughts,
revolts, discontent, and student uprisings had all happened before, they were
not new and they had been overcome many times. Why change?
Besides the fact that the system worked to keep him in power, what was the
alternative? Its easy to point to one's own favorite political system and to
say that the Emperor should have moved in that direction, but when looked at
from the other side, how many different forms are there? How do you pick one
form over another? The Emperor had picked his own form of modernization. He
set the pace and adjusted it as he went along. Evidently, he thought that he
was doing enough.
The answer to why the coup was successful is tied to many factors. First
of all, there was the combination of all the factors that tended to overload
the system such as the: need for land reform, drought, inflation, method of
government, and others. These were too many things to handle in aggregate.
The spark of the army mutinies set the process in motion. All shades of poli-
THE HORN OF AFRICA
tical idealists from Maoists, to Marxists, to those that qualify as fascists,
saw a chance to have their philosophies put into practice. Once the process
started, it was a free for all. Of these, the Marxists were best organized to
gain and maintain power if given the opportunity. But, they and most of the
other idealists lacked the key ingredient, power.
Haile Selassie had been very successful in his quest to modernize most of
the country. He had curbed the nobility, built up a governmental bureaucracy,
and formed an educated class. Yet none of these could produce a successor.
The old system of kings and regionalism had been overcome. In a marked
contrast to the history of Ethiopia, the nobility who ruled in the provinces or
participated in the Parliament had little power. There was no charismatic
leader within the ruling structure of the government, or with his own power
base in the provinces that could use the discontent as a road to power. They
had all been done away with. The Emperor's relatives could have provided such
a leader to save the imperial system, except that they were weak physically,
and perhaps, too long over-controlled and manipulated by the Emperor.
The members of the bureaucracy composed part of the educated class and had
some power but were very closely tied to the Emperor. They were not trained to
use that power independently. Beside that flaw, they received blame for most
of the failures of the government as their carried out imperial policies. The
Emperor was seen by most of the population as a popular, and often times loved,
supreme father figure who had the best interests of Ethiopia at heart. The
people thought that his officials were the ones who caused problems. When the
Derg was deposing the Emperor, they treated him as royalty(49) and were forced
to stage a media blitz to convince the people that he should be removed.(50)
Another large part of the educated class was either actively or covertly
against the government. These were mostly idealists with little appreciation
for the mundane realities of government. They were full of ideas and mottos
THE HORN OF AFRICA
but, weak on the mechanics of putting them into practice. This class included
most of the EPRP and Meison. The EPRP tried to use the educators, students and
the unions while Meison thought it was using the army. As they had no power of
their own and proved unable to mobilize the mass of the population, they too,
fell by the wayside.
The key to power in the new, more modern Ethiopia, as it is in most areas
of the world, was the army. It had the education, communications, and arms to
take control. Its problem was a lack of unity bred by the Emperor.(51) In a
way, it was almost inevitable that an army leader would take the Emperor's
place as military leaders held the only independent power base in the country.
Various military men tried to grab that power. The nature of the Derg, with
its low ranking members, fought that tendency by imprisoning or executing most
of the old military leaders. The key to power soon turned out to be control of
the Derg. The Derg allowed itself to be led. But, each time a new leader came
to power, the rest of the Derg kept him from total power by having a ruling
group. Only one rose throughout the process of conflicting factions, was able
to break the pattern and establish total power, Mengistu.
The successes of the Emperor in curbing the nobility, educating larger
portions of the population, and building a strong, modern army did not excuse
his failure to build a governmental infrastructure that could exist without
him. He was at fault for not recognizing and taking actions to defuse the
situations in the drought areas and in the military, and for allowing his pow-
erful allies to be overwhelmed one by one without any counterattack by him-
self. The impression of Haile Selassie in 1974, is one of a tired, almost un-
caring leader who simply gave up without much real struggle. A public coun-
terattack aimed at the population could have overcome much of the disorganized
opposition and formed a basis of popular support for a less radical change.
This never took place.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
Mengistu fits the tradition of the modern Emperors tho have all seized the
throne. In doing this, he has used the only tools that he had: his position on
the Derg, his skill at politics, the rhetoric of Marxism, nationalism, and an
inate ruthlessness, to gain and cement his power. He now rules all of Ethiopia
with many of the same trappings of the former Emperor.(52) In the words of
Robert Caputo:
The press is censored now as it was under Haile Selassie.
Strikes are almost unknown, and dissent is branded counterrevolu-
tionary. Critics see little change in the style of government:
"Ethiopians are used to autocratic rule," one Addis resident told
me. "It is our tradition to obey strong rulers. Haile Selassie was
the 'Elect of God, Defender of the True Religion.' Mengistu is the
'Elect of Marx, Defender of Socialism.' We are very religious
people, you see. Dissent has always been heresy."(53)
The Derg has been pressured by the its various factions, the remainder of
the educated class and the Soviets to form a broad based political party in
order to confirm the revolution. Attempts at forming this party since 1974
have met with several failures. The latest attempt is the Commission of the
Progressive Workers of Ethiopia (COPWE) which was formed in 1979.(54) This one
is sucessful enough for Mengistu to use it as a vehicle to move the country
firmly into the Communist camp. With this party, Ethiopia will supposedly
become a member of Comecon as well as a full fledged Communist country later
this year.(55)
The Derg faced the usual separatism that characterized each previous
succession to power. This was compounded by the military situations in Eritrea
and the Ogaden. Their handling of the situation, aided by the massive Soviet
support, has proved successful. Eritrea, the Ogaden and the rest of the areas
are under control. The revolts continue, but on a lower level and they do not
seriously threaten the government. An example of the strength of Mengistu, is
the reported departure of most of the Cuban troops from Ethiopia. Of the ori-
ginal 15,000 troops, only 3,000 are scheduled remain by June(56). This would
seem to contradict the 28 October 1983, statement of Noel Koch, Principle
THE HORN OF AFRICA
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs, that the mil-
itary situation is deteriorating in Ethiopia.(57)
On the economic front, Ethiopia has the advantage of being able to draw on
the Soviets, being a recipient of US aid, as well as being the recipient of the
largest amount of European Economic Community (EEC) aid in Africa.(58) This
leads to a scene witnessed by a reporter in the Ogaden:
Everywhere I went, I saw food from America--wheat, cooking
oil, soya and milk powder. It struck me as ironic that the
Ethiopians' closest ally, the Soviet Union, supplies them with
weapons, while America, which they condemn, keeps them from starving
to death.(59)
Ethiopia needs foreign aid because of the costs of the wars that it has
fought. The Ethiopians have the many revolts under control because of Soviet
aid and their own expansion of the military. In 1982, there were an estimated
130,000 troops in Eritrea conducting another offensive and defending the area
from guerrillas(60), which ammounted to about half of the total armed forces.
The costs of raising and maintaining the army from 1978 to 1981 were estimated
to be 50 to 70 percent of the national budget. While the Soviets provided over
$2 billion worth of military aid, about half of that total was sales, the bill
for which is still payable to the Soviets. These factors plus the lack of de-
velopment in Ethiopia continue to be a problem, but one that should work itself
out as Ethiopia slowly pays off its debt.
The massive land reforms, the drive to educate the country, and the over-
throw of the imperial system are having a great impact on Ethiopia. As the
Derg moves more towards implementing Marxist principles, it may coopt much of
the support for the various liberation movements that are also Marxist such as
the EPLF, TPLF, and EPRP. Even if it doesn't coopt the guerrillas, the Derg is
building a solid foundation of support among the peasants who were given land,
the students who are being carefully indoctrinated, and the intellectuals who
are now a part of the government.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
The future for Ethiopia seems fairly set. While Mengistu could at any
time be eliminated, the structure of government in Ethiopia has changed. The
new structure is not yet solidified and may continue to be modified, but it
will not be easily replaced. The many revolts of the past are no longer as
critical and none seem to have sufficient strength to succeed. The Soviets
would also appear to be deeply entrenched for a long time to come. However, as
in Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia, this situation may change.
What is unclear is the use that the Soviets will make of the Ethiopians in
regards to the rest of Africa. The Derg is supporting guerrilla activities in
conjunction with Libya and the Soviets aimed at various areas. The obvious
target, Somalia, has been previously addressed. Another target, Sudan, has
only been mentioned in passing and deserves a bit more attention. Sudan is a
large and valuable area that some see as the "future breadbasket of the Arab
world." It is geographically, Africa's largest country and has a population of
18 million. It is split into a mostly Moslem north, and a black, Christian
south. It suffers from a 17-year long civil war between these two areas which
ended in 1972, but which still has possibilities of future conflict.(61) Com-
munist control of Sudan would: connect Libya and Ethiopia and thus surround
Egypt; control the headwaters of the Nile, thereby potentially controlling the
power of Egypt; provide a wedge into the heart of Africa which could be used to
export subversion to adjacent countries; provide more agricultural, mineral and
population resources; and, if Nimeiri were overthrown, revenge the 1971 Soviet
expulsion from the Sudan.
Other targets include Egypt and that treasure chest of the Western world,
the Persian Gulf oil states. Working in conjunction with Libya, South Yemen,
Cuba, and the Soviets, there are a number of possibilites for all of these
targets. However, some observers point to the fact that the Derg has refused
to give the Soviets full military bases (use of Dahlac anchorage excepted) and
THE HORN OF AFRICA
argue that the Derg was forced to use Soviet arms in order to survive. They
see a great deal of opportunity for reestablishment of close ties to the US and
the West as the fighting and the need for Soviet arms are decreased.(62) As
stated above, the situation is still unclear. But, if the Soviets and Ethiopia
follow a very active policy of exporting Communism in the area, the results
will bring them into conflict with the US. Given the past pattern of Soviet
expansion, the probability is that such a conflict will occur.
Somalia
Turning to the other major player on the Horn of Africa, Somalia, we find
a country that is totally exhausted from conflict. Facing external subversive
threats from Ethiopia and Kenya as well as internal discontent, it also has
massive economic problems now compounded by over 1 million refugees. Holding
it all together is Barre, an embattled and beleaguered military dictator.
Internal discontent grows out of two areas. The first is criticism over
the course of the Somali-Ethiopian War. Just after the major retreat from Ji-
jiga, six generals were executed "for activities against the security of the
state." Then there was a coup attempt by military officers directed at Barre.
After the attempt (mostly by those with Majerteyn clan ties), 36 people were
imprisoned and 17 executed. Some of the military feel that the Soviets were
kicked out too soon, or that the original attacks un Jijiga and Dire Dawa were
ill prepared, others are upset that the Somalis didn't make their move intc the
Ogaden earlier.(63) The other area of discontent is based on politics and the
clan rivalries of Somalia. Barre is a member of the Marexan clan. Many of
those that he deposed were members of the Majerteyn clan. Several of those
that have defected, plotted coups, or that actively campaign against him are
also members of the Majerteyn clan. In addition to the clan politics, many
idealists are upset over the lack of basic freedoms and the dictatorship of
THE HORN OF AFRICA
Barre.(64) The strength of such discontent is hard to measure. Barre is still
in power and seems secure.
Somalia has been termed "dirt poor" by many of those that have visited it
in recent years.(65) The aftermath of the Ogaden left it with a continuing
need to devote 40 percent of its budget to the military , with over a million
refugees (1/4 of the entire population of Somalia), and without a superpower
benefactor. The US is slowly getting involved in helping Somalia counter the
Soviets in Ethiopia, but the actual delivery of aid has not kept up with the
need. The US approved $42 million in aid in 1981, and an additional $20 mil-
lion in 1982, but these do not compare with the $2 billion that the Soviets had
poured into Somalia in the decade prior to 1977, or the over $2 billion in arms
that have gone to Ethiopia since that time. US Bright Star exercises have be-
gun to use Somali facilities and more aid has been promised. They are anxious
for the US to take a bigger role. When asked if Americans could be permanently
based in Berbera, Barre replied, "If our common interests required it, why
not?"(66)
The future of Somalia is not bright. Problems will continue to mount as
the Ethiopians get stronger and more settled in the Ogaden. Somalia's goal of
a Greater Somalia will become more and more distant. Its primary goal at the
present is simple survival and the continuation of at least some pressure on
the Ethiopians. Once that survival is assured, then a greater amount of aid
could be given to the WSLF and all the other revolts directed against the Derg.
However, a return to the Soviet orbit cannot be automatically ruled out as the
Somalis did not sever diplomatic relations with the Soviets (only the Cubans)
when they threw out the Soviet advisors and revoked the treaty.(67)
What course the Somalis will take is very unclear and can best be de-
scribed by the following quotation:
The standard cliches about Somalis being independent, winsome,
open, proud, and entrepreneurial do indeed have some basis in fact.
So does their reputation for vigorous opportunism; in fact, oppor-
THE HORN OF AFRICA
tunism is a way of life. The inescapable conclusion is that Somalis
will ultimately pursue whatever political and economic tacks are
open to them. Ideology has little sway; expediency and pragmatism
are the Somali modus vivendi.(68)
Republic of Djibouti
The possible future of Djibouti is an interesting matter to consider in
light of the past history of the Horn and the allies of the opposing forces.
In the past decade, there have been many who thought Djibouti was ready to join
with Somalia on a moment's notice. Yet, the divided population tends to keep
it independent. Many of the Afars would not welcome absorbtion into Somalia
and often look to Ethiopia for support.(69) Whether anti-Ethiopian sentiment
could overcome the natural and traditional rivalry between the Afars and the
Somalis to the point where it resulted in Djibouti joining Somalia is really
problematical as the Ethiopians have too much economically tied to the port of
Djibouti to allow Somalis absorbtion. In the recent past, they fond the
French acceptable holders of Djibouti as Ethiopia did not have the strength to
take it. Now, they have the strength to seize it in spite of the Somalis. The
main reason that they have not done so is the token French defense force.
While both Somalia and Ethiopia claim Djibouti, the status quo is likely
to continue. If one side were to try and seize it, the other would aid France
in its defense. Given the unlimited potential for a French response, neither
side is ready to try overt military action. Instead, the most likely means
would be the use of subversion. France's treaty with Djibouti is only designed
to protect it from outside military action, not internal subversion. A strong
internal rebellion could force France to leave. Djibouti could then join the
country that had supported the revolt. While the other country could complain,
if it didn't have the strength to attack, it could only support more subversion
attempts. The scenario of Ethiopia causing unrest among the Danakil and over-
throwing the ruling powers and joining Ethiopia is thus, the most likely.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
Without that subversion, and as long as the situation remains the same,
the country of Djibouti will continue to exist. The longer it does so, the
bore chance there is that somehow, an actual Djibouti nationality will develop
to form a true nation.
SECTION IV - US POLICY OPTIONS
United States foreign policy in the Horn of Africa has not been a shining
success. It saw a long time ally of the US overthrown and replaced with a
Marxist government. The US attempted to counter that influence with Somalia
and that attempt started a war. The Soviets then staged a huge intervention in
the Horn and promptly defeated the Somalis. During the intervention, the US
policy makers were in open argument with each other and no real strategy was in
effect. The Arabs were pressuring the US to take action and to counter the
Soviets and yet nothing was done. After the Somalis had been trounced, there
was an almost comical scene where the US was embarrassed by the Soviets not
sending the Cubans home as they had previously "indicated' that they would do
so.(70) The result finds the Soviets and the Cubans deeply entrenched in
Ethiopia while Somalia is near ruin.
This section attempts to determine what policy options the US should
follow in the area in light of the past conflicts. To do this it looks at the
value of the Horn, the US goals in the area, and the potential risks of that
involvement.
We have already addressed the fact that most observers would credit the
Horn of Africa as being a very strategic area. However, not everyone agrees.
There are some that do not consider the potential control of the Red Sea as
being that critical. They argue that the blocking of the Bab el Mandeb would
not occur as the effect could be easily overcome. The passage of oil through
the Red Sea is significant, but if Suez were again shut, the oil would travel
THE HORN OF AFRICA
the alternate route around Africa, as much of it does alreay in super-tankers.
Attacks on ships traveling by the Horn of Africa could be important in a war,
but extremely unlikely in peace time as the attacks would start a war.(71)
The key areas of concern for the US in that part of the world are the
Persian Gulf states and Israel. In comparison to them, the Horn of Africa is a
smaller sideshow. However, it can aid those areas by providing possible bases
for use by the Rapid Deployment Force and for wartime control of the chokepoint
of the Bab el Mandeb. It is also important because the Soviets and the Cubans
are in the Horn. Much of our policy is in direct response to the Soviets.
While we no longer adopt an automatic counter move to every Soviet action, we
are still driven to contest areas with them. Their policy is also partially
based on the US policy. In the words of one observer,
The Soviets are using the Cubans as a reminder that they have
caught up with the US and are now a superpower with a global reach. A
lot of their moves in Africa are based on testing the US reaction
--or lack of it.(72)
What we end up with is a battle over influence. Once either side gains
influence, the other side attempts to counter it. Before, the US held sway in
Ethiopia while the Soviets were in Somalia. Now the positions are reversed.
What do we want in the area? Some of our strategic aims would be: to
ensure US access to the area, to deny Soviet access, to avoid direct US-Soviet
conflict, and to carry out the policy with minimal costs. We would also
prefer to have peace and stability in the region.(73)
While we are drawn to counter the Soviet influence and carry out actions
to reach our goals, there are a number of means to do so. These include the
use of proxies, covert and direct support. Each option has its drawbacks and
limitations.
There are a number of proxies in the area that could be used to build up
the Somalis and counter the Soviets and Ethiopia. However, the use of Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, or any single country can lead to conflicts of interest
THE HORN OF AFRICA
as the interests of the US do not coincide with all those of the proxie. The
same problem exists in the use of proxie organizations such as the OAU, the
Arab League, or the U.N., with the addition of more interests and opinions
which tend to defeat unity of purpose.(74)
Covert aid, sent either by proxie or directly, to the many revolts in the
Horn entails some risk of public opinion exposure. While it can apply
pressure to Ethiopia, it can provide the excuse for the Soviets and Ethiopia
to directly attack the proxie country or those used as staging points to
deliver it. Even if the revolts were successful, the result of Ethiopia
disintegrating would not favor the longer term interests of peace and
stability in the region.(75)
Simply arming the Somalis would be very dangerous as they have proved to
be almost unrational in their pursuit of the "lost territories." If they were
strong enough, they would most likely go after Ethiopia again. We would then
be drawn into a confrontation with the Soviets which could escalate beyond our
control.(76) Besides that possibility, the Ethiopians are now very strong and
the Somalis are weak. If the Ethiopians saw the US start to heavily rearm the
Somalis, they would be naturally tempted to make a preemptive strike. The
ground attack in 1982 could be considered a sort of warning against the US
building up the Somalis too quickly or, too much. The solution is to provide
increased quantities of what are considered defensive arms so that Somalia is
able to defend itself, but not encouraged to attack.
There is another area in which we are strong and which could be used to
advantage in the Horn. That is the economic power of the US and its ability
to help develop an area. We can help to build up Somalia and the rest of our
allies in the area with more economic aid.(77) This will expose the weakness
of the Soviet's purely military aid. While "The Soviets . . . have turned the
military aid spigot wide open, leading their clients in . . . Addis Ababa to
THE HORN OF AFRICA
seek spectral victories," there is a heavy cost tied to it. These costs
include the molding of the host's political system into the Soviet model and
the economic costs of paying for the aid.(78) Economic development is a need
for all the countries of the area. The use of US economic aid could play on
the natural tendency of Third World countries to play off one superpower with
the other, and drive a wedge between Ethiopia and the Soviets. This use of
the economic weapon would have the long term possibility of building up the
region and at the same time, meeting our other objectives.(79)
In our dealings in the area, we have to remember our other allies such as
Kenya, Sudan, and Egypt. However, we must also remember that our policy needs
have precedence over those of our allies. We cannot let them set our goals
for us. We must take those actions that are necessary even if some of our
friends may be a little upset by them. An example of this problem can be seen
in Kenya as it protests every time we provide arms to Somalia. We must still
get all the guarantees we can from Somalia that the arms won't be used against
the Kenyans and provide some guarantees to Kenya that we will back them if it
becomes necessary.(80)
In summary, US policy on the Horn had the goal of countering the
influence of the Soviets with as little cost and risk as possible. In
contrast to our inept policies during the Somali-Ethiopian War, we should take
advantage of the situations in the Horn to achieve our purposes. Our policies
should: highlight and publicize the barbaric Soviet anti-guerrilla tactics;
provide Somalia with the defensive weapons it required to protect itself;
allow our allies to supply those revolts in the area which maintain pressure
on the Derg to negotiate; strive for negotiated settlements of the problems
underlying the revolts; avoid becoming too deeply entangled; and, it should
concentrate on its best weapon which is economic aid which can be used to
build up the entire region, displace the Soviets, and stabilize the area. In
THE HORN OF AFRICA
doing all of this, there will still be conficts on the Horn, but long term
economic development has the possibility of providing an incentive for the
peoples of the Horn to work together in peace. The only alternative is
continued war and bloodshed until one side is conquered or is completely
eliminated.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
NOTES - CHAPTER 5
1. "Ethiopia: Conquest and Terror," op. cit., p. 19.
2. Nicolas Proffitt, "A Nasty Little War," Newsweek, 3 Dec 1979, p. 81.
3. David Lamb, The Africans, (New York, Random House, 1982), p. 198.
4. Dennis Mullin, "Another Place the Kremlin is Bogged Down," U.S. News &
World Report, 3 Mar 1980, p. 23.
5. Dan Connell, "New Ethiopian Offense in the Ogaden," Horn of Africa, 3, No.
4, (1980-1981), pp. 51-54.
6. Katherine Ellison, op. cit., p. A-23.
7. Lamb, op. cit., p. 209.
8. Claude Malhuret, "Report From Afghanistan," Foreign Affairs, Winter
1983/1984, pp. 426-435.
9. Connell, loc. cit.
10. Ellison, loc. cit.
11. Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union, (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 103-104.
12. Don Oberdorfer, "Portugal's Soares Sees Cuba Quitting Angola," Washington
Post, 16 Mar 1984, p. A-26.
13. "Cuba Expected To Cut Troops," Washington Post, 25 Jan 1984, p. A-14.
14. Lutwak, op. cit., p. 103-106.
15. Malhuret, loc. cit.
16. Kenneth G. Weiss, "The Soviet Involvement in the Ogaden War," Profes-
sional Paper 269, Center for Naval Analyses, 1980, p. 8.
17. Remnek, op. cit., p. 15.
18. Ottaway, op. cit., p. 114.
19. Ibid, pp. 112-113.
20. Remnek, op. cit., p. 10.
21. Gorman, op. cit., p. 68.
22. Quoted in: Weiss op. cit., p. 6.
23. Gorman, op. cit., pp. 65-67.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
24. Dougherty, op. cit., p 25.
25. Remnek, op cit., pp. 5-6.
26. Farer, op. cit., p. 123.
27. Remnek, op. cit. p. 8.
28. Gorman, op. cit., p. 72.
29. Ibid, pp. 70-71.
30. Dougherty, op. cit., p. 30.
31. Quoted in: Gorman, op. cit., p. 70.
32. Weiss, op. cit., p. 7.
33. Gorman, op. cit., p. 71.
34. Ottaway, op. cit., p. 103.
35. Weiss, op. cit., pp. 3-4.
36. Ottaway, op. cit., p. 111.
37. Weiss, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
38. Gorman, op. cit., p. 127.
39. Quoted in: Weiss, op. cit., p. 5.
40. Ottaway, op. cit., pp. 114-115.
41. Quoted in: Remnek, op. cit., p. 14.
42. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
43. Ibid., p. 16.
44. Weiss, op. cit., pp. 22-25.
45. Quoted in "War in the Horn," Newsweek, 13 Feb 1978, p. 45.
46. Gorman, op cit., pp. 135-136.
47. Ibid.
48. See Section II of Chapter 3, or: Marcus, op. cit., pp. 170-190.
49. Brand and Mroczkowska-Brand, op. cit., pp. 139-163.
50. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 51.
51. See the begining of Chapter 4, or, Clapham, op. cit., p. 191.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
52. See: James Pringle, "Havana on the Horn," Newsweek, 6 Mar 1978, p. 36,
or, Ray Wilkinson, "Ethiopia: The Reign of King Mengistu," Newsweek, 6 Jul
1981, pp. 46-47.
53. Caputo, "Ethiopia," op. cit., p. 617.
54. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 219-220.
55. "Ethiopia, Newest Communist Nation?", Christian Science Monitor,
February, 1984.
56. "Cuba Expected to Cut Troops," loc cit.
57. Noel C. Koch, "Third World Problems & International Security," Defense 84,
February (1984), p. 24.
58. "Ethiopia, Newest Communist Nation?", loc. cit.
59. Caputo, "Ethiopia," op. cit., p. 626.
60. Ibid., p. 642.
61. Caputo, "Sudan," pp. 346-379.
62. Ojo, loc. cit.
63. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 265.
64. Laitin, op. cit., pp. 60-64.
65. Garvin, loc. cit.
66. Ray Wilkinson, "Somalia: Washington's Short Leash," Newsweek, 11 Jan
1982, pp. 32-33.
67. Nelson and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 234.
68. Norman H. Miller, "The Other Somalia. Part II: Foreign Aid and Local
Politics," Africa, No. 30, (1981), p. 8.
69. Doughtery, op. cit., p. xi.
70. Kim Willenson, et. al, "Horn of Africa: The Cubans Stay," Newsweek, 27
Mar 1978, p. 71
71. James F. Fitgerald, "Gunboat Diplomacy and the Horn," Horn of Africa, 2,
No. 2, (1979), pp. 52-53. This is also a part of the main theses put forward
by Farer.
72. Rashna Writer quoted in: Deming, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
73. John R. Hornor, "The Horn of Africa: Analysis and Assessment of U.S.
Security Assistance Policy," Air Command and Staff College Report No. 83-
1135, 1983, pp. 27-28.
74. Ibid., pp. 35-37.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
75. Ibid., pp. 38-39.
76. Ibid., p. 23.
77. Frost, op. cit., pp. 43-44.
78. Koch, loc cit.
79. Frost, op. cit., p. 45.
80. Abdi Sheikh-Abdi, "Somalia: A Litmus Paper for U.S. Foreign Policy in the
1980's?' Horn of Africa, 3, No. 2, (1980), p. 42.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
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