Employment Of The AH-1T (Tow) Against The ZSU-23-4
SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues
EMPLOYMENT OF THE AH-1T(TOW) AGAINST
In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements
for Written Communication
The Marine Corps Command and Staff College
Major S. J. Cobain, Jr.
United States Marine Corps
April 6, 1984
EMPLOYMENT OF THE AH-1T(TOW) AGAINST
Thesis Sentence: The AH-1T(TOW) is well suited to counter
the ZSU-23-4 on the modern battlefield.
A. 1973 introduction to ZSU-23-4
B. Come as you are
C. Concerns about ZSU-23-4
II. The ZSU-23-4
A. Soviet air defense system
B. The Soviet motorized rifle regiment
C. Capabilities of ZSU-23-4
III. Countering the ZSU-23-4
A. Limitations of ZSU-23-4
B. TOW employment considerations
C. Supporting arms
A. Increased Soviet concern
B. Other threats
C. Common sense approach
EMPLOYMENT OF THE AH-1T(TOW) AGAINST
"What can be seen can be hit." For attack helicopter
pilots these words suddenly had real meaning in 1973. The
event that gave meaning to these words was the 1973 Mid-East
War; the weapon was the ZSU-23-4. During that conflict,
nearly one-half of all the aircraft that the Israeli forces
lost were to the ZSU-23-4.1 The significance of that
accomplishment was not lost on the attack helicopter com-
munity. No single event has had such a profound effect on
the tactics of the AH-1.
The ZSU-23-4 is the backbone of a Soviet maneuver
echelon's formidable air defense system. Although it first
appeared in the mid-sixties, it was not until the 1973
Mid-East War that the ZSU's capabilities became widely known
and appreciated. It immediately became apparent that the
ZSU-23-4 was a deadly threat to any low flying helicopter
that came within its sight and range. This disconcerting
development quickly became a source of concern to attack-
helicopter pilots who had previously enjoyed a relatively
free rein during the Vietnam conflict. As a result of that
concern, radical changes in tactics and increased emphasis
on survivability equipment evolved.
What are the significant developments of the last ten
years that will enhance attack helicopter survivability
against the ZSU-23-4? The Soviet Union has approximately
3,000 ZSU's in active divisions, while the U.S. Marine Corps
has only forty-three AH-1T's. The numerical odds are not
good, and they get much worse when the other weapons of the
Soviet's tactical air defense system that compliment the ZSU
are considered, which include, the SA-6, SA-7, SA-8, and
SA-9 surface-to-air missiles (SAM). In a "come as your are
war," the Marines will be further limited; only a portion of
the Marine Corps AH-1T (Cobra) assets will be on hand.
Today, a typical Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) has four to
six attack helo's. A Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) could
be expected to have from twelve to twenty-four.
In order to gain an accurate perspective, an exami-
nation of the Soviet tactical air defense system is
appropriate. The lowest echelon of Soviet tactical air
defense is organic to the infantry or tank company, which
employs the shoulder launched infrared (IR) homing SA-7.
A motorized rifle division has a total of over 100 SA-7's,
which have a range of five to six kilometers. The next
higher echelon of Soviet air defense is the air defense
battery, organic to the motorized rifle regiment. This
battery is equipped with the ZSU-23-4 23-mm gun and the
SA-9. Each air defense battery has a platoon of four
ZSU-23-4's and a platoon of four SA-9's, giving a motorized
rifle division a total of sixteen ZSU-23-4's and sixteen
The SA-9 has four infrared homing missiles mounted on a
BRDM-2 amphibious vehicle. The BRDM-2 is a wheeled, light-
armored vehicle that provides the SA-9 good mobility. The
SA-9 is an improved version of the SA-7 with a range
extended to approximately eight kilometers. The SA-9, an
area defense weapon, is deployed between the first and
second assault echelons of the regiment to provide
protection for both echelons while avoiding exposure to
direct enemy fire.
The ZSU is a self-propelled, four-barrel, automatic,
23-mm antiaircraft gun mounted on an ASU-85 chassis. It has
the capability to fire at a cyclic rate of 4,000 rounds per
minute, although short bursts are normally used to reduce
ammunition expenditure. The ZSU-23-4 is equipped with an
onboard fire control, "Gun Dish" radar that provides the gun
with a maximum effective range of 3,000 meters. With less
effective optical tracking, a range of only 2,500 meters can
be achieved. The ZSU is normally employed in the Forward
Click here to view image
The motorized rifle division also has an organic air
defense regiment which is equipped with either the SA-6 or
the SA-8. The division has a total of 20 SA-6 transporter-
erector-launchers (TEL's) which have three missiles per TEL,
or 20 SA-8 TEL's each carrying four missiles. The TEL's
provide excellent mobility for their sophisticated surface-
to-air missile systems. These systems provide extended area
coverage, out to 30 kilometers for the SA-6 and out to 10-15
kilometers for the SA-8.
The Soviet tactical air defense weapons make up a
protective umbrella that is unequalled; there is little
dispute in this matter. The system is highly mobile and the
missiles can be expected to work as intended by intercepting
low and medium altitude aircraft that attempt to penetrate
Soviet formations. Why then should the attack helicopter
community be primarily concerned about the ZSU-23-4 and
virtually exclude the surface-to-air missiles as a threat to
conducting the anti-armor role?
SAM's, especially the SA-6 and SA-8, were designed to
have maximum effectiveness against targets that fly faster
and higher than helicopters. Certainly a helicopter could
be shot down by an SA-6 or SA-8, but only if the helicopter
is flown with disregard to tactics and common sense. We
know that an SA-6 is only marginally effective against any
aircraft below 300 feet.3 A helicopter flying in accord-
ance with its doctrine, maintaining 200 feet or less and
utilizing terrain masking, (cover and concealment for heli-
copters) to the maximum extent possible, will be out of the
engagement envelope of the SA-6. The SA-8, which also
acquires and tracks aircraft with radar, is also not in-
tended to engage low flying helicopters. The AH-1T(TOW),
employing nap-of-the-earth (NOE) tactics as it approaches
Soviet formations, will be well below the threat from the
SA-8 or the SA-6.
The SA-7 and the improved SA-9 are a threat to heli-
copters, but these missiles have several shortcomings that
reduce their effectiveness against the Cobra. The Soviets,
in their literature, indicate that they have faith in the
ability of the SA-7 to bring down low-flying helicopters.4
However, their optimism seems to stem from experience in
1972 during the Vietnam conflict, where SA-7's were employed
against helicopters that were not flying NOE (while flying
NOE, a helicopter maintains 50 feet or less as it follows
the contours of the terrain). According to western sources,
though, three SA-7's were required for each aircraft
downed.5 It would not be unusual for the Soviets to
launch several SA-7's at one target. A Soviet Lieutenant
General put it this way: "When the probability of
destorying a helicopter with just one missile is very small,
a subunit, according to the situation, can launch several
missiles simultaneously, without waiting for the results of
the first launch."6
The SA-7 and SA-9 home on the infrared signature of an
aircraft, not necessarily the aircraft itself. This
provides the helicopter with several countermeasure options.
Again, the engagement envelope, with a minimum altitude of
about 50 feet, can be underflown and destruction avoided by
employing NOE tactics. Additional measures that can be
taken to defeat an IR missile are employment of the ALQ-39
flare dispenser, which releases flares to decoy missiles and
the ALQ-144 infrared jammer, which transmits modulated IR
signals to confuse an IR missile and cause it to seek fasle
IR sources rather than the helicopter. Low infrared paint
and exhaust heat suppressors are passive measures which also
reduce the effectiveness of IR homing missiles. According
to the "Aircraft Survivability Equipment Special Issue" of
Army Aviation, test results indicate that when both passive
and active infrared countermeasures are employed, ground
launched infrared heat-seeking missiles are simply not
Having considered the spectrum of dedicated Soviet
tactical air defense systems, it should be apparent that
the ZSU-23-4 is the most likely threat to the AH-1T(TOW)'s
capability to conduct its anti-armor mission. This is
because the ZSU has a lethal gun, mounted on a highly mobile
vehicle, that can use its "Gun Dish" radar to acquire and
track low-flying helicopters and to direct highly accurate
fire. It is also the only air defense weapon that can
acquire and track a target optically when necessary. It
does not rely exclusively on electronics, which are subject
to countermeasures. Any exposed helicopter is likely to
lose a head to head gun dual with a ZSU. However, knowing
the limitations of the ZSU and considering them along with
the capabilities of the AH-1(TOW), there are some employment
options that will make it an excellent counter threat to the
Surprisingly, one of the most important limitations of
the ZSU is that, actually, there are not very many of them.
Contrary to initial impression, considering the forces that
a flight of four AH-1T's in direct support of a regiment and
assigned to support a battalion front could expect to face,
the odds against ZSU's are fairly even. A Soviet motorized
rifle regiment (MRR) has only four organic ZSU-23-4's. Even
if the division augmented its front line regiment with
additional ZSU's, it is unlikely that the division would
give up many of its 12 additional ZSU's, which are needed to
protect a large front and rear area. The four ZSU's of the
MRR are heavily committed providing protection to the 146
armored vehicles organic to the regiment.8
Although the radar system of the ZSU is an asset, as
was previously mentioned, it also has liabilities. The
"Gun Dish" radar is an excellent narrow beam radar that
works well against aircraft at 300 feet out to a range of
ten to fifteen kilometers. However, it has difficulty
detecting low-flying helicopters in hilly or mountainous
terrain because of "ground clutter" which interferes with
the signal being reflected back to the radar. One article
mentions that helicopters, flying at low altitudes "can
appear in the area of the target completely undetected."19
The limited ability of the Gun Dish radar to detect
AH-1T(TOW)'s employing NOE tactics is substantiated by
operational squadrons. Flying against radars comparable to
the "Gun Dish" during the Electronic Warfare Close Air
Support (EW CAS) exercise and during Red Flag Exercises, at
Nellis Air Force Base, AH-1T(TOW)'s have been able to con-
sistently position themselves within striking range of air
defense weapons simulating Soviet systems and destroy their
targets before being detected.10 It is important to note
that this was accomplished after intelligence information
was evaluated by the pilots and a well conceived plan was
executed in terrain that favored terrain masking and NOE
tactics. But, it does demonstrate that a Cobra can operate
in this environment.
Another drawback of the ZSU's radar is that during
operation it radiates energy, making it susceptible to
detection and giving away the position of the unit it is
attempting to protect. The AH-1T(TOW) employs the AN/APR-39
radar warning receiver to notify the pilot when he is
nearing the vicinity of a radar and indicate the direciton
of the "target". An operating radar is also a magnet to
anti-radiation missiles (ARM) that home on the radar's
antenna. The SideARM, a modified AIM-9 missile, is designed
to home on the Gun Dish radar.
The Soviets are well aware of these electronic warfare
capabilities of the AH-1T(TOW) as well as other counter-
measures that can be employed against them. As a result,
the ZSU can be expected to keep its radar off to avoid
detection until it is absolutely necessary to engage a
As with any radar, the Gun Dish radar is a "soft"
target, making it susceptible to artillery or rocket
fragments. A ZSU that has elected to maintain "radar
silence" or that has had its radar destroyed has a
significantly degraded capability to acquire and hit an
aerial target, because it must conduct its fire mission
manually, utilizing optical sighting.
As previously cited the range of the ZSU-23-4 employed
in the optical mode is 2500 meters, 500 meters less than the
radar aided range of 3000 meters. More significantly
though, the reaction time required to put accurate fire on
target is significantly increased. A Soviet article
describes the procedures for engaging a target in the
optical mode in the following manner.
First, the target must be visually acquired,
then the command given: target on the left,
helicopter. Range 2000 meters, Destroy!
"...the operator must lay the tubes in the
direction of the target by turning the handle
of the control panel, shift the sight lever
to the "double position",align the open sight
with the axis of the bore, set the distance
grid with the indicated range, bring it up
under the target, and finally, press the
button on the control lever to fire a short
In this example, the target was missed during the first
burst of fire. A second long burst destroyed the target.
The length of time required to complete the operation
previously described will depend on gunner proficiency and
training, but a Soviet article in 1979 stated that in a
timed test of ZSU's engaging targets without radar "the
majority of the crews were lost, much time was wasted
finding targets, refining and using the fire data. The
result of this is that gun crews opened fire, as a rule,
minutes after the helicopters appeared."12 The best
trained crew and most experienced in the test took 32
The time required by the ZSU-23-4 to engage targets in
the optical mode is a significant consideration. The
difficulty that the crew members of the ZSU had in acquiring
helicopter targets is also important to note. These two
weaknesses can be exploited by a Cobra and its advantageous
characteristics can be brought into play.
The AH-1T(TOW)'s ability to maneuver rapidly on the
battlefield allows it to employ its weapons and quickly move
to alternate firing positions. The flexibility of the AH-1T
combined with its small size and narrow silhouette make it
very difficult to detect when it is using NOE tactics, even
when it has its target in view and is engaging. The U.S.
Army has conducted scientific analysis of the effectiveness
and survivability of attack helicopters. A test conducted
in 1976 consisted of trials using ten ground observers with
an unobstructed line of sight to attack helicopters at a
range of 3000 meters. The attack helicopter would appear
for 60 seconds each time, and observers would attempt to
detect the attack helicopter during this interval. In the
majority of the trials, the Cobra was not detected within
the constraint of 60 seconds.13
A well trained AH-1T(TOW) crew should be able to
deliver a TOW missile well within 60 seconds. The FAIRPASS
HELO computer simulation model used to assess attrition of
attack helicopters by ZSU-23-4's, uses the following
representative times in the performance of the attack
Click here to view image
These times, however, assume optimum performance. The
variable in these times is "gunner reaction" which involves
acquiring the target, sighting the target, and aligning the
aircraft with the target. This could increase the actual
gunner response time by ten to fifteen seconds or more,
depending on the situation and the proficiency of the
gunner. The attack helicopter crew should still be able to
deliver the TOW missile in well under one minute. A common
sense rule used by AH-1T(TOW) pilots in tactical squadrons
is: If a target has not been acquired and engaged within 20
seconds, remask and move to another firing position and
attempt to reengage.
Other findings of the Army's observation trials can be
exploited by attack helicopter pilots. Dealing in proba-
bilities of detection the trials found that:
1. Lateral maneuver or movement increased the
probability of detection from .30 to .64
2. Wide lateral separation (over 500 meters)
between the aircraft of a section decreased
the probability of detection from .55 to
.44 for observing either aircraft and from
.28 to .03 for observing both aircraft.
3. When the scan sector of the observer is
expanded from 60 degrees to 120 degrees
the probability of detection for either
aircraft of a section goes from .42 to
.33 and from .19 to .09 for both aircraft.
4. Terrain background decreased the probability
of detecting either aircraft from .68 to .44
and from .19 to .11 for both aircraft.
The lessons learned are: (1) avoid lateral movement
while exposed, (2) maintain terrain background, (3) after
remasking, remain masked for 60 seconds prior to unmasking,
(4) maintain good separation between aircraft in a section
and (5) maintain maximum range from observers, up to maximum
Another test, conducted by the U.S. Army Combat
Developments Experimentation Command, determined that it
takes, on the average, 45.2 seconds to detect an attack
helicopter that is utilizing nap-of-the-earth tactics. In
all these experiments, it is important to remember that the
observers were not "buttoned up" in armored vehicles, there
were no artillery rounds exploding, and there was no smoke
or dust to obscure vision. The ZSU itself does not provide
good visibility, and depends on its radar to locate targets.
If it appears that too much emphasis is being placed on
observation, then it should be pointed out that the Soviets
are also very concerned about detecting attack helicopters.
The U.S. Army Russian Institute indicates that Soviet
authors have pointed out in several articles the difficulty
their air defense forces have in locating helicopters flying
nap-of-the-earth in sufficient time to take them under
Up to this time the TOW missile has been the weapon
traditionally considered for employment against the
ZSU-23-4. It is a very accurate weapon and its maximum
range of 3750 meters gives it a good stand-off capability.
However, its main drawback is that the Cobra is exposed
during the entire time of flight. As mentioned previously,
the 14.5 seconds time of flight results in an exposure time
of 26 to 40 seconds. At 3750 meters the time of flight is a
full 21 seconds, resulting in exposure for up to one minute.
This is a long time to be exposed, even if attack heli-
copters are difficult to detect.
A new munition is now becoming available to Marine
aviation, the 20mm SABOT discarding, heavy metal sub-caliber
penetrator round. Its aerodynamic characteristics and
velocity give the AH-1T(TOW)'s 20mm cannon the increased
range and the punch to kill a ZSU-23-4. This round, because
of its flat trajectory and high velocity should allow the
AH-1T(TOW) to engage light armored targets, such as the
ZSU, out to 3000 meters. This is a significant improvement
over the 1500 meter range of the standard 20mm round.
Because the ZSU is lightly armored, having a maximum of
9.2mm (just over one-third inch) of armor protection, it is
susceptible to the new SABOT round. This improved munition,
coupled with the Helmet Sight Subsystem (HSS) of the
AH-1T(TOW), will provide attack helicopters the capability
to respond very rapidly to targets as they are acquired.
The following table depicts the penetration capabilities of
the 20mm SABOT round:19
Click here to view image
The HSS system electronically aligns the 20mm cannon
with the helmet. The helmets of both the pilot and gunner
have a small sight mounted on them. When the gunner looks
through his sight at a target, the gun is also sighted on
the target. To engage, the gunner need only keep his "eye"
on target and pull the trigger. With a time of flight to
3000 meters of under four seconds, and the HSS's capability
to engage a target with a quick turn of the head, exposure
times can be reduced from the 26 to 40 seconds required for
TOW to ten seconds or less with the gun. When avoiding
detection while killing targets is the name of the game, the
SABOT round gives the AH-1T a whole new option.
As with any weapons system, the AH-1T(TOW) is not
without limitations and vulnerabilities. Regardless of the
weapons system, to effectively employ the AH-1T(TOW) and
still survive, these factors must be considered:
(1) The attack helicopter pilot's need for current and
accurate intelligence cannot be over-emphasized. Success
depends on knowing the "situation". However, the intelli-
gence that is required does not necessarily need to come
solely from the S-2 prior to launch. Information on the
situation may be provided by the Forward Air Controller or
ground commander. The TOW team leader may also provide
information to his flight, or the attack helicopter pilot,
by conducting a reconnaissance, can obtain current infor-
mation for himself. The point is, on a highly mobile
battlefield, the weapons system that can locate and fix the
enemy first will, more often than not, be the winner. With
its thirteen power optical sight, the AH-1T(TOW) is
especially suited to reconnoitering the battlefield to
collect information, especially if the Cobra's superior
mobility and flexibility are used to the maximum advantage.
(2) To effectively employ NOE tactics, the terrain
must have some relief. Relief provides the masking that the
AH-1T(TOW) requires to maneuver within range of its target
(3) The AH-1T(TOW) must not get so involved in killing
the ZSU that it fails to protect itself from its biggest
threat, enemy infantry. The AH-1T(TOW) has virtually no
protection from enemy fire. If it can be hit, it can be
destroyed. As was mentioned previously, the attack
helicopter is exposed for extended periods while firing the
TOW missile and should receive protection during these
vulnerable periods. The protection can be provided by
friendly infantry, artillery, suppressive fire, or escorting
There are several actions that can be taken and con-
siderations that can be made to overcome the weaknesses of
the attack helicopter. The aircraft can be made more
survivable with improved engines. More powerful engines
will allow the cobra to carry more ordnance to the
battlefield, and they will provide systems redundancy in the
event one engine takes fire. The dual engined AH-1T(TOW)
would be able to return to base on a single "more powerful"
engine. There is a need for more protective armor on the
aircraft and for improved component parts that can withstand
small arms impacts. For example, hardened flight control
tubes are now in development and need to be incorporated in
Although the AH-1T(TOW) provides a solid foundation
as an attack helicopter, new equipment and systems to
complement its capabilities are still needed. The main
concerns now are for an accurate Doplar navigation system to
relieve pilots of constant, detailed map reading require-
ments. And, to reduce pilot workload, a "cleaned-up"
cockpit that has guages that are easy to read and controls
that are easy to reach is needed. These improvements would
allow pilots to concentrate on their mission. Finally, a
Forward Looking Infrared imaging system is required to give
the Cobra a night anti-tank capability.
The key to success, though, is training -- training to
know the threat, to know the aircraft, its capabilities and
limitations, and to know employment tactics. Training is
needed to familiarize the pilot with the increasingly
sophisticated equipment being incorporated into the Cobra.
And most of all, training is needed so that pilots will
"get smart," and go beyond the mechanics of maneuvering the
aircraft, to improve their instincts, enabling themselves to
employ the Cobra to its maximum capabilities.
Pilots will need to be prepared to face an ever
growing threat. As the capabilities of the attack heli-
copter have increased, there has been a corresponding
increase in Soviet concern. Improvement is a double edged
sword. As the AH-1 becomes a better weapon, it also becomes
a higher priority threat to the Soviets. The Soviets
become more aware of shortcomings in their tactical systems
and they are forced to expend resources in order to overcome
deficiencies. Because of their concern, the enemy has taken
greater steps to defeat the Cobra threat. Today, the attack
helicopter is one of the most prized targets on the battle-
field because of its anti-tank capabilities. A Soviet
gunner, when simultaneously confronted with a fixed wing
target and an attack helicopter target, is trained to fire
at the attack helicopter first.
The Soviets stress that all weapons are to engage
attack helicopters whenever possible. Small arms, machine-
guns, tanks, and artillery are trained to mass their fires.
The Soviets also train their own MI-24 attack helicopter
pilots to engage and destroy Cobras. Destruction of attack
helicopters has actually become a primary mission for the
MI-24 Hind. Certainly follow-on Soviet attack helicopters
will be designed with enhanced capabilities to engage their
Obviously the Cobra is not invulnerable. In order to
survive, it must exploit its capabilities to the maximum
extent possible. However, the Cobra attack, coordinated
with artillery and tactical air, can overwhelm the Soviets'
air defense system and take advantage of the resulting
synergistic effect. The more diverse the attack, the more
difficult it will be for the air defense system to counter
The AH-1T(TOW), employing its tactics as part of a well
organized attack, coordinated with other supporting arms,
has the firepower and survivability that are suited to
counting the ZSU-23-4 threat. And, if the going gets tough,
good Marine Cobra pilots will remember to "stay low and keep
1Michael L. Brittingham, Attack Helicopter
Employment Options, U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College, June 11, 1980, p. 27.
2Michael H. Crutcher, Soviet Tactical Air Defense,
Defense Intelligence Report DDB-1140-6-8, December 1, 1979,
3Daniel Bauer, "Tank Killer," Armor, May-June 1977,
4Brian P. Mullody, Soviet Air Defenses Against
Attack Helicopters, U.S. Army Russian Institute, June 1980,
5Ibid., p. 10.
6Gatsoloyen, "Kogda v Vozdukhe Vertolety, Voyennyy
Vestnik, p. 112, as quoted in Mullady, p. 11.
7"Aircraft Survivability Equipment Special Issue,"
Army Aviation, June 30, 1978, p. 53.
8Mullady, p. 10.
9Ibid., p. 15.
10"AH-1T(TOW) Suppression of AAA and SAM Threats,"
Point Paper, Marine Attack Helicopter Squadron 169,
November 9, 1983.
11Senior Sergeant A. Zakharov, "Tsel 'Na Nizkoy
Visote", Znamenosets, No. 1 (1978); p.11, as quoted in
Mullady, p. 16
12Colonel S. Bulyzhkin, "Batareya v Nastupienii",
Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 2 (1979); p. 66, as quoted in Mullady,
13Rudolph J. Pabon, Robert A. Davison, William I.
Parks, Technical Report TR 2-76, U.S. Army Combined Arms
Center, February, 1976, p. iii.
14J. L. Freeh, Fire Support Against Massed Armor and
Fire Support at Night, Institute for Defense Analysis,
August 1974, p. 42.
15Ibid., p. 61.
16Helicopter Relative Detectability Test, Joint-
Countering Attack Helicopter (J-Catch) Phase V and VI,
17John B. Woods, Soviet Perceptions of NATO's Anti-
tank Defense, U.S. Army Russian Institute, 1981, p. 14.
18Marino S. Melsted, SABOT Projectile Test and
Evaluation, Gun System Branch, Naval Weapons Center,
October 27, 1980, p. 9.
"Aircraft Survivability Equipment Special Issue." Army
Aviation, June 30, 1978.
Bauer, Major Daniel R. "Tank Killer." Armor, May-June
1977, pp. 8-10.
Blewitt, Stephen J. Investigation of Helicopter Visual
Detection. Boeing Vertol Company. Philadelphia, 1974.
Brittingham, Major Michael L., Attack Helicopter Employment
Options. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
Fort Leavenworth, 1980.
Bulyzhkin, Colonel S. "Batareya v Nastuplenii." Voyennyy
Vestnik, 2 (1977), as quoted in Major Brian T. Mullady,
Soviet Air Defense Against Attack Helicopters. U.S.
Army Russian Institute. APO New York, 1980.
Crutcher, Major Michael H. Soviet Tactical Air Defense.
Defense Intelligence Agency Report DDB-1140-6-80,
December 1, 1979.
Freeh, J. L. Fire Support Against Massed Armor and Fire
Support at Night. Institute for Defense Analysis,
Gatsolayev. "Kogda v Vozdukhe Vertolety." Voyennyy
Vestnik, as quoted in Major Brian T. Mullady, Soviet
Air Defense Against Attack Helicopters, U.S. Army
Russian Institute. APO New York, 1980.
Melsted, Marino S. Sabot Projectile Test and Evaluation.
Gun System Branch, Naval Weapons Center. China Lake,
Mullady, Major Brian P. Soviet Air Defenses Against Attack
Helicopters. U.S. Army Russian Institute, APO New
Pabon, Rudolph J., Robert A. Divison and William T. Parks.
Technical Report TR 2-76. U.S. Army Combined Arms
Center. Fort Leavenworth, 1976.
U.S. Army. U.S. Army Combat Developments Experimentation
Command. Helicopter Relative Detectability Test,
Joint-Countering Attack Helicopter (J-Catch) Phases V
and VI. Fort Ord, 1980.
U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Attack Helicopter Squadron 169.
Point Paper. AH-1T(TOW) Suppression of AAA and SAM
Threats. Camp Pendleton November, 1983.
Woods, John B. Soviet Perceptions of NATO's Anti-Tank
Defense. U.S. Army Russian Institute, APO New York,
Zakharov, Senior Sergeant A. "Tsel 'Na Nizkoy Visote."
Znamenosets. (1978). As quoted in Major Brian T.
Mullady, Soviet Air Defense Against Attack Helicopters.
U.S. Army Russian Institute. APO New York, 1980.
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