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Related Operations

Section I. General

H-1. Five operations.

This appendix describes the five major operations found in internal defense and development, and in foreign internal defense besides tactical operations. They are: intelligence, psychological operations, civil affairs, populace and resources control, and advisory assistance.

H-2. IDAD support.

While the brigade commander is primarily concerned with tactical operations in strike campaigns, he also recognizes that these five operations exist and support a whole range of activities in a COIN program. In consolidation campaigns, these operations normally take precedence, and tactical operations assume a supporting role. While the emphasis on any single operation may shift in response to the requirements of the situation, all of these operations occur simultaneously and continuously.

Section II. Intelligence

H-3. Information sources.

a. When operating in a counterinsurgency environment, the population is considered a major source of intelligence. Since the conflict revolves around the population, the populace usually has a wealth of information that can be exploited.

b. In FID, intelligence organization requirements fall into three areas: preparedness, advice and assistance, and support of US units.

(1) The first area is preparedness. In this area, intelligence requirements are generated and filled in anticipation of a counterinsurgency. This intelligence production is designed to fulfill contingency requirements. Examples of these requirements are background biographies, area studies, and order of battle for guerrilla forces in areas likely to become involved in an insurgency.

(2) The second area. is advice and assistance to host country intelligence organizations. This advice and assistance is designed to increase the capabilities of the host country intelligence organization.

(3) The third area is designed to fulfill operational requirements for committed US units.

c. Some of the primary objectives of US intelligence organizations in FID are to:

(1) Determine the indicators of an impending insurgency.

(2) Obtain or develop enemy intelligence which can be utilized to launch surgical strikes by US forces.

(3) Obtain information about the insurgent, weather, terrain, and population.

(4) Reduce to a minimum insurgent espionage; subversion, and sabotage.

(5) Identify the main sources of discontent among the people.

(6) Identify the true nature, aims, leadership, potential power, and most likely course of action of the insurgency.

(7) Identify and penetrate the insurgent infrastructure.

d. The internal defense intelligence system consists of all host country military and civilian intelligence systems plus all US intelligence resources which are committed in-country to assist in preventing or defeating an insurgency. These agencies are coordinated and integrated under a single directorship in the National Internal Defense Coordination Center. The intelligence resources of committed counterguerrilla forces are an integral part of this intelligence system. National agencies are usually targeted toward more strategic demands that require long-term intelligence networks and systems. Counterguerrilla force intelligence assets are usually targeted toward tactical battlefield intelligence requirements and use intelligence gained through national systems.

H-4. Intelligence production.

Intelligence production in counterguerrilla operations in foreign internal defense operations is done in accordance with the intelligence cycle which consists of directing the intelligence effort, collecting raw information, processing this information into finished intelligence, and disseminating the intelligence for use by the commander and his staff.

a. Directing. The intelligence effort is directed by the intelligence officer. He translates the commander's guidance and concept of the operation into specific, prioritized intelligence requirements. A continuously updated collection plan provides the intelligence officer with a logical, orderly system for directing the collection effort. Ideally, it ensures that all information necessary is collected in time to be of use and that all possible sources of information are exploited by appropriate collection agencies.

b. Collecting. The need to exploit all sources of information will require resourceful, flexible, and aggressive direction and coordination of the intelligence collection effort. It is essential that commanders and intelligence officers be fully aware of the capabilities and limitations of all available intelligence resources in order to make the best use of them. Among the collection techniques employed is the use of standard procedures as well as the use of expedients and improvisations necessitated or permitted by local conditions and resources, and the employment of specialized intelligence personnel and equipment which may be placed in support of the brigade.

c. Processing. Processing is the phase of the intelligence cycle whereby information becomes intelligence. Raw (combat) information from all sources is evaluated, correlated, and analyzed to produce an all-source product. The effort to produce intelligence necessary to support counterguerrilla operations in foreign internal defense will require continual and close coordination with higher, subordinate, adjacent, supporting, and cooperating civil and military intelligence agencies and elements.

d. Disseminating and using. The timely dissemination of available intelligence and its immediate use is of vital importance in counterguerrilla operations in foreign internal defense. Primary, alternate, and special intelligence channels of communication may be established when facilities and resources permit.

H-5. Civilian population.

Exploitation of civilian sources of information in counterguerrilla operations normally requires a sophisticated intelligence organization which is resident within the population. However, as the counterguerilla campaign progresses, the civilian populace can be expected to volunteer increasing amounts of intelligence information within the brigade operational area.

a. Type of information. Civilian sources or informants normally may be expected to provide the following information:

(1) Details of the local terrain.

(2) Ideological motivation and sympathies of local residents.

(3) Logistical support available, or potentially available, to guerrillas operating in the area.

(4) Potential guerrilla targets or objectives.

(5) Identification of covert or part-time members of the guerrilla force.

(6) Sabotage, espionage, and terrorism techniques and activities of the guerrilla and underground support organizations.

(7) Weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the guerrilla force.

(8) Psychological operations by the guerrilla force and the impact on the local population.

b. Information source file. To expedite the evaluation of information provided by the civilian populace, it may become necessary for brigade intelligence personnel to establish records which quickly identify local sources of information and the degree of reliability of such sources. When established, this information source file should include such information as:

(1) Name, photograph, and physical description of source.

(2) Area in which source(s) can obtain information.

(3) Factors contributing to source's motivation to cooperate with counterguerilla forces.

(4) Information collection capabilities of source, to include indication of training received.

(5) Method by which source is contacted.

(6) Record of payments or other remuneration, if made to source.

(7) Record of productivity and reliability of source.

c. Overt exploitation of civilian sources. In overt exploitation, a source is contacted openly by the intelligence officer or one of his recognizable agencies, and information is solicited directly. This method has the advantage of providing for the immediate collection of information, but frequently entails significant disadvantages, to include:

(1) The information requirements of the brigade or battalion are made apparent to the source, thus entailing a security risk.

(2) The source may not cooperate fully because of lack of motivation or because of fear of reprisal.

d. Clandestine exploitation of civilian sources. Clandestine intelligence techniques are necessary in counterguerrilla operations in foreign internal defense to complement overt collection efforts in determining location, strength, and capability of guerrilla forces, underground cells, and civilian supporters. Normally, at brigade or battalion level, it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish an original clandestine collection or informant system during the time the brigade or battalion is in a particular area of operations. Therefore, the S2 should support and utilize reliable informant or clandestine collection operations being conducted by other US, allied, or host country agencies within the brigade or battalion area of interest. Intelligence collected through clandestine exploitation of civilian sources of information is made available to counterguerrilla commanders through an area control center, joint operations-intelligence center, or a similar facility established to coordinate internal defense and development operations.

H-6. Counterintelligence.

Counterintelligence increases the security of all forces and increases the probability of attaining surprise in operations against guerrilla forces. Adequate security measures are developed and continuously enforced to prevent penetration of the intelligence operation by hostile elements and to detect hostile elements already within the operation. Since guerrilla forces are usually numerically inferior to those of the host country, allied, and US forces opposing them, the guerrilla depends heavily on intelligence for successful operations. US brigades, in coordination with host country authorities, must habitually place emphasis on counterintelligence measures.

a. Denial measures. Denial measures particularly applicable to counterguerrilla operations may include:

(1) Removal of compromised informant sources from the area of operations.

(2) Restrictions on movement and communication facilities of the civilian population within the area of operations.

(3) Thorough briefing of all US, allied, and attached host country personnel in the intelligence practices and techniques used by the guerrilla and his underground support organization and on the security of information.

(4) Emphasis on the secure disposal of trash and waste matter.

(5) Employment of silent weapons by patrols.

(6) Normal activity, while preparing for operations, to preclude indication to the guerrilla force of a change in routine.

(7) Maintenance of strict security concerning current or projected logistical movements and the nature of supplies.

(8) Conduct of major troop movements under the concealment of darkness or during inclement weather and by the most rapid means of movement available.

b. Detection measures. Appropriate detection measures in counterguerrilla operations may include:

(1) Background investigations and screening of all civilians employed by, or operating with, US and host country forces, and those in civil positions. Particular attention is given to the control of guides or trackers who are familiar with the location, disposition, and objectives of the friendly forces.

(2) Surveillance of all known or suspected members of the guerrilla force and its infrastructure.

(3) Extensive employment of trip flares and ambushes in areas of suspected guerrilla reconnaissance activity.

(4) Employment of infantry scout dogs, if available, in conjunction with other security measures.

(5) Maximum emphasis on visual and electronic observation. Augmentation of organic visual aids and electronic detection devices is frequently required.

(6) Monitoring civil communication media.

(7) Employment of civil policewomen for search and interrogation of women and children.

(8) Counterintelligence screening of the entire population of settlements suspected of intelligence activities in support of guerrilla force.

(9) Wide distribution of photographs of known guerrillas or key underground personnel to assist in the apprehension.

(10) Offering rewards for information leading to the capture of informants or other agents supporting the guerrilla force.

(11) Periodic photographs of all residents of villages within the guerrilla area of influence and comparison of these photographs to determine additions to, or deletions from, the population during the interim period.

(12) Issue of closely controlled identification cards to all residents of the area of operations. In counterguerrilla operations, counterintelligence activities normally are complicated by the presence of large numbers of civilians of unknown reliance; it is difficult to distinguish among the friendly, neutral, and hostile elements. All possible security measures which facilitate identification of these elements are employed continually.

c. Deception measures. In counterguerrilla operations, units habitually plan and execute small-scale cover and deception.

Section III. Psychological Operations

H-7. Create support.

Psychological operations in foreign internal defense include propaganda and other measures to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile, neutral, or friendly groups to support the achievement of national objectives. (For further information on psychological operations, see FM 33-1.)

H-8. Brigade PSYOP.

The purpose of brigade psychological operations is to enhance the probability of accomplishing the brigade's various foreign internal defense missions. This is achieved by employing psychological principles to lessen or exploit the effects of tactical or nontactical operations upon the population and/or the guerrilla force.

H-9. Concept.

a. The overall psychological operation program for a given host country is established at the national level by a US-host country agency. This program provides guidelines for succeeding lower military and civilan echelons to use in the quest for popular support.

b. Counterguerrilla units must ensure that their PSYOP is consistent with and supports US national objectives and the host country national PSYOP program. The brigade employs psychological operations to support its tactical strike and consolidation missions and to support intelligence operations, civil affairs operations, and advisory assistance operations. Care is exercised to ensure that the allegiance of the people is directed toward the host country rather than toward US brigade forces, and that announced programs and projects are attainable. Coordination is accomplished in the local area control center.

H-10. Organization.

a. The psychological operations staff officer(s) and unit(s) perform assigned missions in the same manner as other specialized units or staff members that are attached to, or placed in support of, the brigade or battalion. When such support is not available, a member or section of the unit staff is assigned responsibility for incorporating psychological operation considerations into plans, action, and operations.

b. Psychological operation resources are provided either from higher headquarters units or from TOE resources. Psychological operation units provide, in addition to advice, support in the form of loudspeaker teams, leaflets, and various other audiovisual media.

H-11. Operations.

a. Properly integrated and employed in the planning and conduct of operations and activities, psychological operations can facilitate the accomplishment of the brigade's mission. Counterguerrilla forces must consider the employment of psychological operations in all missions. Commanders and staff officers must realize that all military operations have psychological implications. PSYOP officers must be included in planning all activities.

b. The establishment of support bases and operational support bases necessitates gaining the support of the populace in the vicinity. Propaganda themes stress the purpose of US support and the military civic action program; the need for laborers; the effects of pilferage on the counterguerrilla effort; and that people do not discuss US and host country military activities.

c. Within an insurgency context, PSYOP has five major objectives:

(1) Assist the government in gaining the support of its population.

(2) Assist the government in defeating the insurgent movement.

(3) Assist the government in providing psychological rehabilitation for returnees from the subversive insurgent movement.

(4) Establish and maintain a favorable image in the host country.

(5) Influence neutral groups and the world community.

d. The major tasks of US PSYOP in an insurgency (when US combat forces are not yet committed) are to:

(1) Advise host country PSYOP personnel on how to best exploit government programs.

(2) Recommend techniques for maintaining morale of host country forces.

(3) Assist host country and US information agencies and activities in coordinating their efforts.

(4) Assist host country personnel regarding PSYOP programs which will motivate the people to actively support their government.

(5) Recommend programs which will adversely affect the insurgent.

e. The major tasks of US PSYOP personnel in an insurgency (when US combat forces have been committed) are to:

(1) Coordinate PSYOP activities with host country units.

(2) Advise US and host country commanders regarding insurgent activities and effects.

(3) Advise US commanders regarding the psychological effects of military actions.

(4) Assist in developing a PSYOP capability within host country military forces.

f. There are five major target groups for PSYOP: the insurgent, the population supporting the insurgent, the uncommitted population, government personnel, and foreign audiences. Themes are tailored to each of these groups to gain maximum effective support for the government.

g. When targeting the insurgent:

(1) The major PSYOP objective is to discredit the insurgent and to isolate him from the population.

(2) The most important direction of attack is against insurgent unit morale.

(3) Themes should publicize and exploit differences between cadre, recruits, supporters, and the local population. Other themes might stress lack of support, isolation, homesickness, and hardships.

(4) Amnesty programs often prove useful in neutralizing insurgencies. Amnesty programs are most effective when they are sincere, credible, well publicized, directed against lower ranking members of the insurgency, and offer sufficient reason and benefits for quitting the insurgent threat.

(5) Amnesty programs do, however, have several disadvantages: they recognize the insurgents as quasi-legitimate; they forgo punishment of anyone accepting amnesty; and they increase the image of the insurgent threat.

h. When targeting the population supporting the insurgent:

(1) The PSYOP objective is to achieve withdrawal of support for the insurgent and defection in place or person to the legitimate government.

(2) Themes should highlight insurgent shortcomings, ultimate governmental victory, government successes, and the practical advantages of surrendering or of accepting amnesty.

i. When targeting the uncommitted population:

(1) The major PSYOP mission is to build national morale, unity, and confidence in the government.

(2) There should also be a major effort to win popular acceptance of the government force, and convince the people that government programs serve their interests, government forces can protect them, ultimate government victory is assured, and the people have major intelligence and counterintelligence roles to play.

j. When targeting government personnel:

(1) Seek to maintain loyalties and develop policies and attitudes which will result in group members who will realize the importance of popular support, promote public welfare and justice, take action to eliminate the basic causes of the subversive insurgency, and protect the population from the subversive insurgent.

(2) Indoctrinate host country security and military forces regarding the importance of the civilian population in IDAD operations. Each soldier must understand that his actions toward the people may spell the difference between success and failure.

(3) When government personnel interact with neutral and nonhostile elements of the population, the emphasis should be positive and constructive. PSYOP efforts should publicize the tangible and visible accomplishments of the legitimate government.

(4) PSYOP should discourage public apathy and activity that helps the insurgent.

(5) The people should not be asked to undertake any activity which is contrary to their own best interests.

k. When targeting foreign audiences, there are two major groups to be addressed: neutral nations and hostile nations. For neutral nations, the purpose of PSYOP is to achieve friendly neutrality or active support for the legitimate government. For hostile powers, the major PSYOP objective is to influence public opinion against involvement in supporting the insurgency.

l. US PSYOP attempts to establish and maintain a favorable US image. The themes most useful in establishing an image are that the US presence is requested by host country government, it is legal and necessary, it is temporary, and it is advisory.

m. In combat actions, every effort is made to provide for the safety of the civilian population and, if possible, to separate them from the guerrilla forces so that maximum available firepower can be employed against the guerrilla. The decision to employ psychological operation media to accomplish this task is carefully weighed against compromising surprise and security.

n. Intelligence operations are facilitated by employing psychological operation media to inform the people that they should report to the proper authority information pertaining to strangers, suspicious persons, unusual activities by neighbors, and guerrilla activities. Posters and leaflets provide definitive instruction as to persons and places that are available to receive this information. The message indicates what rewards, if any, are available.

o. Captured or defected leaders of the guerrilla force are exploited. Written and broadcast messages prepared by these individuals and reviewed by trained psychological operation personnel are used in communities suspected of supporting guerrilla forces, and in tactical operations against guerrilla forces.

Section IV. Civil Affairs

H-12. Government-building.

a. The civil affairs (CA) role in FID takes the form of civic assistance and civic action.

b. Civic assistance is defined as providing advice and assistance to indigenous civil and military authorities in the sociological, economic, and political aspects of a civil emergency, disorder, or IDAD. It is commonly referred to as "government-building" since it is directed toward the structures of government. Military civic action is defined as the participation findigenous military forces in short-term projects which are useful to the local population and which contribute to social and economic development.

c. Civic action programs are divided into long-range and short-range programs. The former deals with the resolution of social and economic problems; the latter is designed to gain and retain the loyalty of the population.

d. CA operations are a responsibility of military commanders at every echelon. They include any activity of military forces concerned with relationships between the military forces and the civil authorities and people in the area. Activities may range from military civic action projects to the exercise of certain authority that normally is the responsibility of the local government.

H-13. Operational scope.

a. The scope of CA operations varies with the type of local government and is influenced by the economic, social, and political background of the country and people. Some major CA activities include:

(1) Prevention of civilian interference with military operations.

(2) Support of government functions.

(3) Community relations.

(4) Military civic action.

(5) Assistance for populace and resources control.

(6) Civil defense.

b. The overall objective of CA in FID is to mobilize and motivate civilians to assist the government and military forces. The operations are directed at eliminating or reducing military, political, economic, and sociological problems. Close and continuous PSYOP support is needed to maximize the effect of CA.

c. All military units have a capability to conduct CA, particularly military civic action. Major roles in military civic action are frequently undertaken by engineer, transportation, medical, and other units having assets suited to support military civic action projects.

d. There are several judgmental factors that should be considered before a military unit undertakes a civic action project:

(1) Is the project needed and wanted?

(2) Will military participation compromise civilian authority and responsibility?

(3) Does the project support the unit's political-military mission?

(4) Does the project comply with the host country FID plan?

(5) Will the project duplicate other efforts?

(6) Will the people be involved in the project?

(7) Will there be continuity of effort?

e. Both civic assistance and civic action are geared to the phase of insurgency they are facing.

H-14. US role.

a. The normal role of the US military in civic assistance and civic action is to advise and assist host nation military forces. Under some rare conditions, US military units may enter into direct civic action programs.

b. Units as small as a battalion task force may be assigned CA elements to assist in carrying out CA plans. A civil-military operations staff officer may also be assigned to such a task force.

c. CA liaison and coordination should be established between military forces and government agencies. This can be accomplished through organizations specifically designed for this purpose or through CA staff elements.

d. CA operations require good relationships with the population. To establish a good relationship, troop discipline, courtesy, and honesty in dealings with the people are emphasized. Where rapport has been established between host country forces and the population, properly administered CA operations contribute to the attainment of FID objectives.

H-15. Planning--five phases.

a. CA planning includes political, economic, social, psychological, and military considerations. These considerations include:

(1) A national development plan that involves projects which support development programs that meet the needs and desires of the people. Civic actions projects conducted simply for the want of something to do may be counterproductive.

(2) Military civic action projects conducted by military forces.

(3) CA personnel and units required to support host country agencies at subnational levels.

(4) CA mobile training team requirements and resources.

(5) CA training program requirements for host country and allied forces.

(6) CA requirements to provide (where needed) government administration in areas of the country.

b. CA responsibilities assigned to a tactical unit commander may require the employment of specialized civil affairs personnel or units. Host country CA plans should include provisions for CA support to tactical unit commanders. (For further information on CA organization, see FM 41-10.)

c. Emphasis on military civic action varies with the intensity of insurgent activities. Whatever the level of military civic action, projects are planned and coordinated with internal development programs. During Phase I of an insurgency, military civic action concentrates on the development of the socio-economic environment. In the absence of tactical operations, many military resources may be devoted to military civic action projects providing both long-range and short-range benefits.

d. During Phases II and III, military civic action is concentrated on projects designed to prevent intensification of the insurgency. These projects produce noticeable improvements in a relatively short time. Examples of such projects are farm-to-market roads, bridges, short-range educational programs, basic hygiene, medical immunization programs, and simple irrigation projects.

e. Advice is sought on projects to ensure they are needed, wanted, and coincide with development plans for the area. In the advanced stages of insurgency, priorities on military operations may reduce military civic action to such immediate tasks as providing medical aid to civilians and procuring and distributing food and shelter for displaced persons.

Section V. Populace and Resources Control

H-16. Population protection.

a. Population and resources control (P&RC) operations are generally classified as nontactical, police-type operations.

b. Populace and resources control is government action to protect the populace and its materiel resources and to deny those resources which would further hostile objectives against the government.

c. The objective of populace and resources control operations is to assist in preserving or reestablishing a state of law and order within a nation or area. There are three main tasks involved in reaching this objective:

(1) Providing security for the populace.

(2) Detecting and neutralizing the insurgent apparatus.

(3) Severing any relationship between the insurgent and the populace.

H-17. Forces available.

a. There are three forces available to conduct populace and resources control operations:

(1) The civil police are the first line of defense in the battle against an insurgency.

(2) Paramilitary forces may augment or assist the civil police.

(3) The nation's military forces should be employed only when civil police and paramilitary units cannot cope with the insurgent activity. Even then, priority should be given to employing military police units rather than combat forces.

b. Control of the populace and resources should be performed by host country agencies. This is a matter of practicality, but there are also legal and psychological implications. US military should be used as a last resort and only as augmentation to host country units. Military police should be utilized before combat troops.

c. Populace and resources control measures can be classified into three categories:

(1) Surveillance of individuals, groups, activities, or locations by overt or covert means.

(2) Restrictions such as curfews, travel permits, registration of firearms, national registration and identification of all persons, and control of selected foodstuffs, medical supplies, and equipment.

(3) Enforcement through the use of roadblocks, checkpoints, rewards, amnesty programs, and selective inspections of homes at night.

d. These control measures should be well-planned and coordinated to ensure rapid and efficient operations, with a minimum of delay and inconvenience to the people.

e. Populace and resources control is designed to complement and support other counterguerrilla operations and environmental improvements being conducted by the military forces, and to contribute to the overall stability of the country or the operational area.

H-18. Central theme.

a. The central theme of populace and resources control is population protection and resource management. PSYOP should convey this theme and be designed to accomplish the following:

(1) Persuade the people to accept the necessary measures, priority to their implementation.

(2) Convince the people that their full support will minimize the inconvenience of the measures.

(3) Place the blame for any inconveniences or discomfort squarely upon the insurgents.

b. Border operations are taken (as part of populace and resources control) to isolate the insurgent from his outside support. Outside support covers a variety of activities. It may range from provision of funds and training of individual insurgents by an outside power to providing an active sanctuary for combat forces.

c. The most frequent populace and resources control operations US units may participate in are:

(1) Border operations.

(2) Cordon and search.

(3) Augmentation of enforcement operations (roadblocks, checkpoints).

Section VI. Advisory Assistance

H-19. Tactical backup.

a. Advisory assistance is advice and assistance provided by US personnel to host country regular, paramilitary, and irregular forces and to civilian agencies to help them become effective in the performance of their missions.

b. These activities support and, in turn, are supported by tactical operations, intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations, and military civic action. Such assistance is designed to:

(1) Provide military assistance in conjunction with the Navy and Air Force to the host country.

(2) Participate with other services in joint internal defense training and exercises as mutually agreed upon by the services concerned.

(3) Provide mobile training teams, combat service support, and combat support to advise, train, assist, and support host country forces.

H-20. Army assistance.

a. The primary purpose of US Army assistance is to increase the capabilities of host country armed forces.

b. The brigade may be required to organize, train, equip, and advise host country civil and military personnel and units to perform counterguerrilla missions. Tasks include:

(1) Organizing, equipping, training, and advising paramilitary and irregular forces (locally recruited) to assume local defense missions from the brigade.

(2) Equipping, training, and advising host country regular armed forces on new equipment provided by military assistance programs (MAP) and foreign military sales (FMS).

(3) Organizing, equipping, training, and advising host country police organizations.

(4) Advising host country regular armed forces, paramilitary forces, and local governments in all aspects of internal defense and development.

c. Brigade advisory assistance to host country personnel and organizations, as differentiated from military civic action, usually is performed to extend security assistance activities. Such activities as organizing, equipping, training, and advising host country forces may be accomplished while in base areas or during the defensive phase of consolidation operations of counterguerrilla tactical operations.

d. If US military assistance organizations are operational, advisors usually are provided for this purpose. However, in cases where US advisors or mobile training teams are not available, brigades may be required to assume this function. Advisory assistance is coordinated closely with both the internal defense and the internal development programs through the local area control center.

H-21. Brigade organization.

a. All brigade organizations should be prepared to provide individuals or teams capable of performing advisory assistance within their areas of specialization, if the need arises. Organization for advisory assistance operations may require the tailoring of specific teams to accomplish specific missions:

(1) Military police, augmented by brigade elements, may be required to train host country military police organizations in the area, while combined arms teams may be required to train local host country artillery and armor units in artillery and armor tactics and techniques.

(2) Training centers may be required if the training load is sufficient to warrant them.

(3) Teams from brigade units may be organized for on-duty training of host country specialists. These specialists are trained in the use of specialized equipment which is organic to brigades but which will be supplied to host country forces at some future date.

(4) Mobile training teams formed by the brigade may be dispatched to local host country forces to conduct training at host country unit bases or training centers.

b. Advisory assistance operations inherently involve the requirement to use advisory techniques. Consequently, tact, discretion, language qualification, expertness in the subject, and other qualifications normally associated with US advisors and advisory operations must be stressed. (For further information on policy governing advisory assistance activities, see FM 100-5 and FM 100-20.)

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