Noncombatant evacuation operations
(NEOs) are conducted
to evacuate civilian noncombatants and nonessential military personnel
from locations in a foreign (host) nation during time of endangerment
to a designated safehaven. NEOs are normally conducted to evacuate
United States (US) citizens whose lives are in danger from a hostile
environment or natural
disaster. NEOs may also
include the evacuation of US military personnel and dependents,
selected citizens of the host nation (HN), and third country nationals.
NEOs would not normally include retrograde operations of military
personnel solely as part of a military operation. NEOs involve
swift, temporary occupancy of an objective and end with planned
withdrawals. They may include the use of force. If so, the commander
limits the amount of force to that required to protect the evacuees
and the evacuation force.
Every US embassy is required
to maintain an emergency action plan (EAP), which includes an
NEO plan. The Department of State is the lead agency for planning
and conducting NEOs. NEO plans consider HN assets as the primary
source of security, transportation, and temporary facilities.
If HN assets are inadequate or unavailable, US military resources
are used to fill the shortfall. If military forces are employed
in a NEO, they usually comprise units from more than one service.
The combatant commander (commander in chief (CINC), on being ordered
to support a NEO, normally designates a joint task force (JTF)
commander to exercise overall control of operations involved in
the NEO. He is responsible for all activities, from initial planning
and deployment to an intermediate staging base (ISB), to conduct
of the evacuation and, if required,
operation of the safehaven.
Evacuation operations differ
from other military operations in that direction of the operation
will usually remain with the American ambassador, if present,
at the time of evacuation. Further, the order to evacuate is usually
a political decision, with extensive ramifications. It indicates
to the local population and other governments that the situation
has deteriorated to the point that the United States has lost
faith in the HN's ability to maintain control of the situation.
This, in turn, may further destabilize the situation.
Requesting military assistance
in an evacuation is potentially more destabilizing. The presence
of armed US troops may overly alarm the local population, adding
to the possibility of unnecessary violence and confusion. Should
circumstances require introduction of US troops, the commander
should plan for early execution of psychological operations (PSYOP)
to project and define his intentions to the HN government, military,
and populace. (See Appendix A for PSYOP guidance.) Although each
embassy will have an EAP, the commander should not automatically
assume its data is accurate and up to date. Prior coordination
and site survey will probably have been restricted.
The commander must be prepared
to deal with the situation as it exists at the time of evacuation.
The Department of State determines the evacuation sites and timing
of the operation. Evacuations can be politically
sensitive and are monitored, if not controlled, from the highest
level.
Military units aiding in the
evacuation of US and other noncombatants whose welfare is threatened
must protect themselves and their charges throughout the evacuation.
As a situation develops, the unit secures assembly areas and an
evacuation site, establishes defensive perimeters, and locates
and escorts evacuees. Protecting the force and its charges may
include establishing physical barriers to protect assembly areas
and evacuation sites. Crowd-control agents and tactics and employment
of tactical PSYOP teams (TPTs) may be necessary to extract evacuees
or discourage hostilities. Dissemination and enforcement of clearly
defined rules of engagement (ROE) are critical. Although the objective
is not to destroy enemy forces and armed conflict should be avoided
whenever possible, it may become necessary.
The HN government, military,
and general populace must be advised of the ROE and intent of
US and multinational forces. Well-publicized intentions preclude
operation interference. Civil affairs (CA) and PSYOP forces are
trained and equipped to develop, produce, and disseminate information
that conveys the commander's mission in the language of the country
of operation.
The situation will probably
be such that the evacuation force commander may have to defend
the evacuation from hostile forces
without first informing higher authorities. Thus, if given the
opportunity, the evacuation force commander must influence the
ROE to provide maximum leeway to the NEO force so as not to unduly
restrain use of force where necessary. (See sample ROE in Appendix
B.)
An evacuation may end with
a withdrawal under pressure. A worst-case example is the evacuation
of the US Embassy in Saigon in 1975. Evacuation may be by land,
air, or sea, using convoys, rail, fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft,
ferryboats, or ships. Helicopter or boats may ferry evacuees to
ships standing offshore.
Pursuant to Executive Order
12656, the Department of State is responsible for the protection
and evacuation of American citizens abroad and for safeguarding
their property. This order also directs the Department of Defense
(DOD) to advise and assist the Department of State in preparing
and implementing plans for the evacuation of US citizens.
The chief of mission (COM),
after approval by the Department of State's Under Secretary for
Management, can order the evacuation of US government personnel
and dependents, and other than "wartime essential" DOD
personnel assigned to military commands. Evacuation transportation
options, in order of preference, are (1) scheduled commercial
transportation, (2) commercial charter, (3) US military charter,
and (4) US military transportation. Transportation options must
be coordinated through the Washington Liaison Group (WLG) (discussed
in Chapter 2).
The following personnel can
be ordered to depart and are eligible for evacuation assistance.
Once evacuated, they may not return until approved by the Department
of State and the chief of mission. Personnel in this category
are as follows:
-
American civilian employees
of US government agencies, except mission essential DOD employees
of military commands.
-
US military
personnel assigned to the
embassy (such as Marine security guards, defense attaché,
and security assistance personnel).
-
Peace Corps volunteers.
-
American citizens employed
on contract to a US government agency if the contract so provides.
-
Dependents of those above.
-
Dependents of other US military
personnel, including those assigned to military commands.
-
Americans employed by non-US
government organizations.
-
Americans employed by or assigned
to international organizations.
-
Americans employed on contract
directly by the host government, even if the contract is funded
by the US government.
-
Americans employed by private
entities, such as relief organizations, even though the employer
may receive some US government funding.
-
Fulbright grantees and private
American citizens.
-
Family members of private
American citizens, to include alien spouses, children, and other
bona fide residents of the household.
-
Other individuals designated
by Department of State.
As a rule, if the US government
is controlling the evacuation, the priorities for assistance are
as follows:
-
Priority I: American citizens.
-
Priority II: Alien immediate
family members of American citizens.
-
Priority III: Third country
national and designated foreign service national employees of
the US government.
-
Priority IV: Eligible non-Americans
who are seriously ill or injured or whose lives are in imminent
peril as determined by Department of State (but who do not qualify
for a higher priority).
-
Priority V: Others that are
eligible as determined by Department of State.
The military command tasked
with conducting a NEO tailors its planning and action for evacuation
assistance according to the anticipated situation. The three operational
environments that the military may face in evacuation operations
are permissive, uncertain, and hostile. These environments may
exist due to an unfavorable political environment, conflict, or
natural disaster in the host nation.
In a permissive environment,
there is no apparent physical threat to evacuees. The host government
will not oppose their orderly departure or US military assistance.
Military assistance is normally limited to medical, logistics,
military police (MP) or other security, and transportation. Security
forces are tailored to what is required to protect military property
and personnel. Depending on the political situation in the HN,
however, the JTF commander may elect to have a reaction force
on standby to respond rapidly if the environment becomes less
permissive.
Military assistance maybe
required because of a natural or man-made disaster or because
of inadequate transportation facilities. US military support could
then involve engineer units or contractors. Local law enforcement
agencies may request MP or other US military forces to assist
in maintaining and restoring order. During Operation Fiery Vigil,
June 1991, 20,000 US military personnel and dependents were evacuated
from Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay, Philippines, because
of the eruption of Mount Pinatubo. Although not popular with the
local population, this evacuation was unopposed and took place
in a permissive environment.
In an uncertain environment,
the degree of danger is uncertain. The host government may or
may not be in control but cannot ensure the safety of US citizens.
Because of the uncertainty, the JTF commander may elect to reinforce
the evacuation force with additional security units and TPTs.
The need for a reaction force becomes more important. Opposed
entry operations may be required. In this environment, the JTF
commander will probably elect to issue weapons and ammunition
to evacuation force personnel. The ROE must be disseminated early
enough to ensure troops are trained, and they must be strictly
enforced to avoid escalation of hostilities. Advising the local
populace, combatant and noncombatant, of the ROE and the intent
of US or multinational forces decreases the likelihood of interference
and inadvertent escalation of hostilities due to misunderstanding.
In January 1991, when US Marines
were ordered to execute Operation Eastern Exit, the evacuation
of Mogadishu, Somalia, the civil war had escalated to the point
that the Somali government could not guarantee the safety of evacuees
and the evacuation force.
In a hostile environment,
host government or other forces are expected to oppose evacuation
and US military assistance. The JTF commander may elect to deploy
a sizable security element with the evacuation force. He may position
a large reaction force either with the evacuation force or at
an ISB. Opposed entry operations may be required. The ROE must
be strictly enforced.
Regardless of the environment
at the operation's onset, the commander must plan for the possibility
that it may change. Volatile situations that would trigger a NEO
also provide ripe environments for spontaneous or organized violence.
Unfortunately, US citizens are often direct or indirect targets
of this violence. Prior to the evacuation of Monrovia, Liberia,
in August 1990, factions that had been ambivalent toward the United
States suddenly threatened to take hostages. This is an example
of an uncertain environment that became hostile.
The most volatile situation
will occur when a major US ally, where substantial US government
and nongovernment personnel are stationed, comes under direct
attack and major US forces are involved. While the process for
evacuation may remain the same, the nature will likely change.
Control of the evacuation may pass from the ambassador to the
military commander. Evacuation will not be the focus of military
operations in the country. Mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and
time available (METT-T) may cause large adjustments. The evacuation
commander may have to rely on retrograde transportation, as opposed
to dedicated assets. The urgency for completing the evacuation
will increase.
All commanders must be prepared to deal with large numbers of displaced civilians and noncombatants, both US and other. This makes the presence of CA units critical along with the possible requirement to setup and operate temporary holding camps. The mission of the evacuation force is to safeguard and evacuate US citizens. The force should avoid engaging in combat operations whenever possible. Execution of PSYOP during the earliest phases of the NEO will minimize the potential for hostilities. If combat is unavoidable, the commander should use the minimum force required to ensure the safety of his command and its charges.
NEWSLETTER
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|