CHAPTER 8
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
US Army divisions focus on warfighting. When directed, however, divisions tailor, train, and deploy forces for operations other than war that support US national interests. Chapter 13, FM 100-5; FM 100-19; FM 100-20; and FM 100-23 are the Army's primary doctrinal references for operations other than war (OOTW). This chapter applies this doctrine to division commanders, their staffs, and division operations.
THE ENVIRONMENTTo understand the division's role in OOTW, review of the political-military environments of peace and conflict described in FM 100-5 is necessary. Peace is the state which countries presumably seek. Peace is not totally free of violence, but the violence that exists is generally not politically directed and organized. In time of peace, divisions dedicate themselves to preparing for war. Their mere existence and their activities are deterrents to war. Conflict, on the other hand, is distinguished from peace by the introduction of political violence. Conflict is neither peace nor war, at least not as the United States defines war. Conflict is a political struggle in which organized violence serves political and psychological purposes. All divisions have capabilities that apply to peace and conflict as well as war. Among these capabilities are leadership, organization, various skills, manpower, communications, mobility, and equipment. Additionally, US Army divisions can operate in all environments, have experience in multinational operations, can work under austere conditions, and can protect themselves from a wide range of threats. Army divisions may be called on to support national interests (and assist in preventing conflict and war) by applying these capabilities in OOTW. Our government may deem it necessary to employ the military element of power in OOTW for the promotion of our national interests. The Army classifies its activities during peace-time and conflict as operations other than war. Peacetime activities can occur both at home and abroad. Peacetime activities include disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, counterdrug operations, support to law enforcement, military training exchanges, and multinational exercises. Division activities in conflict could include limited attacks, raids, base defense, support to insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement.
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ROLE OF THE DIVISIONAn OOTW mission often requires only part of the division. Typically, the division deploys with less than its full complement and should expect to command and control a variety of nondivisional forces. A command and control headquarters is normally selected based on the size of the deploying forces and the complexity of their mission. Commanders should preserve unit integrity and maintain the habitual relationships established in training, if possible. Occasionally, divisional units will be attached to another headquarters, such as special operations or Marines, for these operations. Figure 8-1, depicts some of the more common OOTW activities in which divisional units participate. These are detailed in FMs 100-5, 100-20, and 100-23. Because of their versatility, division soldiers and units may be called on to perform tasks and missions for which they are not specifically trained. Commanders assess their current capabilities and apply these capabilities in OOTW. Divisions may provide forces for hurricane relief, mountain search and rescue, and fighting of forest fires. Division versatility was evident during the Los Angeles riots when DIVARTY personnel of the 7th Infantry Division performed LNO functions as part of JTF LA. The artillery personnel were well suited for the operation in terms of on-hand communication equipment and individual and collective training for the LNO functions based on their wartime METL requirements. However, commanders need to make every effort to train their forces for specific OOTW missions and tasks prior to or immediately on completion of deployment.
THE ENVIRONMENT
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specifically trained. Commanders assess their current capabilities and apply these capabilities in OOTW. Divisions may provide forces for hurricane relief, mountain search and rescue, and fighting of forest fires. Division versatility was evident during the Los Angeles riots when DIVARTY personnel of the 7th Infantry Division performed LNO functions as part of JTF LA. The artillery personnel were well suited for the operation interms
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of on-hand communication equipment and individual and collective training for the LNO functions based on their wartime METL requirements. However, commanders need to make every effort to trainn their forces for specific OOTW missions and tasks prior to or immediately on completion of deployment.
In OOTW, as in war, the division conducts simultaneous operations. For example, the division could conduct peacekeeping operations at the same time it is deploying additional forces and securing facilities. Operations other than war are usually complex. Rarely will deployed forces be given a single task to accomplish.
BATTLE COMMAND
When the division headquarters is deployed for OOTW, it is often assigned as the ARFOR and works for a joint task force commander. ARFOR and JTF duties, responsibilities, requirements, and organizations are discussed in Chapters 1 and 3. Typically, operations other than war focus on missions that require the efforts of CS and CSS units. These units work with US and foreign civilian agencies of government and with international and private organizations. The DISCOM, augmented with corps support, often has a major role providing CSS. This support includes such services as transportation, religious support, food service, water distribution, medical assistance, maintenance, and shelter. Combat support and combat service support units are frequently the main effort while combat units become the supporting effort. Although often only part of the division deploys, as a controlling headquarters, it may receive attached or OPCON units from many external sources. These sources include Army organizations, other US military services, and multinational forces. The division often coordinates for the resources and involvement of other agencies of the US or foreign governments. Divisional operations in OOTW are likely to be split-based as well as in depth. For example, a division forward C2 element may direct forces conducting several critical tasks in an OOTW mission while the rest of the division supports |
from its home
station. Split-based operations are discussed in Chapter 3. The concept of operations in depth is discussed in Chapter 2 and can be applied to OOTW.
Operations Overseas, operations other than war require the fully integrated efforts of US and multinational (military and civilian) organizations. When directed, the division headquarters provides C2 and integrates these resources and their actions. In interagency operations, the division commander usually does not have directive authority over other agencies. Interagency operations include both US and non-US governmental and nongovernmental activities. In these operations, the division (or elements of the division) will participate in a consensus decision-making process. Military commanders present the military position in a calm, persuasive manner and influence decisions with the force of their logic and the strength of their leadership skills. They focus on achieving unity of effort. The division and its subordinate units exchange liaison parties (and equipment) with many organizations at several echelons. Civilian organizations, in particular, do not have the communications, data processing, and other equipment for controlling operations that is equivalent to, or compatible with, the military's. Therefore, the division may have to
![]() The division's rote in operations other than war includes humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities. |
provide equipment, operators, communications, and other assets to civilian participants. Because TOEs authorize only enough material for the division's own needs, providing these resources to civilian agencies may require assets from a subordinate element or from outside the division.
In conventional operations, a headquarters exchanges liaison parties with adjacent and higher organizations. Liaison requirements for OOTW are much larger. The division may exchange liaison parties with other service components, US government agencies (such as embassy, US Agency for International Development (USAID), US Information Service (USIS)), foreign and international government agencies, multinational military forces, as well as private organizations. Because units may operate in widely separated locations, subordinate commands also exchange liaison parties with a variety of organizations. Communication systems are of special concern. They require special emphasis to ensure their availability. Liaison in OOTW involves complex and politically sensitive issues requiring LNOs with maturity and experience. They may also have to be language-qualified or able to work effectively through an interpreter. Foreign area officers and special operations forces (Special Forces, PSYOP, and civil affairs) personnel, specialized in area studies and language-qualified, are well suited to liaison missions. The US Army's use of SOF liaison teams with multinational forces during Operation Desert Storm was extremely successful.
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he mission of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was limited. It was simply to protect
the humanitarian relief convoys. UNPROFOR was not charged with ending the conflict and solving the political problems. In Somalia, US forces had a similar mission during 1993-94. Success of attaining military objectives is measured against the stated military mission. Division commanders should not, themselves, expand the mission; they must keep the political goals and objectives in mind. Commanders understand that goals and objectives (and their missions) may be expanded by a higher headquarters with perceived successes or setbacks.
Most operations other than war do not involve clear lines of command and control for all agencies (foreign and domestic) participating in the operation. Often military commanders and their units contribute towards the final objective instead of leading the way. In this regard, the concept of unity of command gives way to the concept of unity of effort. All actions by all agencies should support success of the overall mission. The overall goal is for all actions to contribute to unity of the effort. Legitimacy is relative. Some people will always support a US political-military operation; others will always oppose it. The balance, however, is likely to shift |
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with changing perceptions.
The way the division conducts its operations will shape both domestic and foreign public opinion. Use of force must be seen as necessary only after peaceful means have been exhausted. The violence employed must be proportional to the threat; it must never be seen as excessive. Military public affairs and PSYOP, through their communications and information channels, can support legitimacy of the division's operation by explaining Army actions. Equally important is the legitimacy of the host nation government-the willingness of the population to accept the right of the government or other group or agency to make and enforce decisions. Popular vote does not always confer or reflect legitimacy. It derives from the perception that authority is genuine and effective and uses proper agencies for reasonable purposes. Legitimacy is the central concern of all parties directly involved in a conflict. It is also important to parties involved indirectly. Rules of engagement (ROE), when properly prepared and applied, clarify the proper restraint necessary to aid in accomplishing the mission. ROE may be prepared by the division commander or promulgated by higher authority. They are designed to protect the force, to prevent escalation of hostilities, and to avoid casualties. Although ROE are determined by the factors of METT-T, they may or may not |
Figure 8-3. Pitfalls of OOTW
be very restrictive. The issuing commander
must determine just how much force is enough to accomplish his mission. He must understand the threat and provide a force package that includes appropriate protection. (See the discussion of ROE.)
Operations other than war are normally executed in response to a political directive, such as a resolution of the United Nations Security Council. The directive provides the authority for and limits of military action. The staff judge advocate assists the division commander and G3 in preparation of ROE. His recommendations are based on the authoritative political and appropriate legal directives. The rules of engagement should provide first for the protection of the force. Then, they should authorize such coercive options as may be required and appropriate while avoiding casualties and unnecessary property damage. Generally the purpose of OOTW is not to destroy an opponent's capability, but to change his behavior, stabilize the situation, and return life to "normalcy." Regardless of their mission, commanders secure their forces. The presence of division forces in any operation around the world evokes a wide range of actions and |
reactions. US Army commanders act to ensure hostile
factions do not acquire an unexpected advantage. Commanders and staff should never be lulled into believing that nonhostile missions or environments do not contain risk. Commanders protect their soldiers and soldiers have the right to protect themselves.
Conflict resolution is a time-consuming process and military support may require a long-term commitment. A conflict may continue for months, years, or decades. Division elements employed in OOTW must exercise patience and perseverance to continue the mission for as tong as it takes. Operations in an environment of conflict may not lead to a conclusive victory. Instead, such operations may be reduced gradually in scope and eventually ended without significant measurable result. However, even limited success in OOTW is preferable to war. The division must be patient, adaptable, and determined to support national policy for as long as may be necessary. Success of operations in conflict comes from avoiding the pitfalls depicted in Figure 8-3. Success also comes from an understanding of the cause of the conflict, a consistent concern for legitimacy, the determination to persevere for the long haul, the patient use of restraint, and a continuing explanation of Army actions to all interested publics. |
BOS CONSIDERATIONSDivision forces may deploy to support OOTW activities as individual units, or as task forces. The division may deploy as a whole unit during large-scale disaster relief efforts or deploy as a single unit in a peacekeeping operation. Whatever the mission, commanders task-organize their forces for operations, normally as a component of an interagency, a joint, or a multinational operation. The following paragraphs discuss specific considerations within each battlefield operating system.
IntelligenceTailored Intelligence In OOTW, as in war, the intelligence cycle continues to be to plan and direct, collect, process, produce, and disseminate information and intelligence products. The division's intelligence staff tailors traditional products to meet specific needs of commanders conducting OOTW missions. Care is taken to ensure intelligence activities do not violate US law pertaining to both military intelligence actions in CONUS and to US citizens overseas. Greater Human Intelligence OOTW will often cause a greater reliance on and access to HUMINT. Contacts with host nation, governmental agency, and multinational personnel will result in overtly collected HUMINT intelligence and other information which is of value to commanders. Sharing of Intelligence Downgrading and sharing US intelligence with non-DOD US agencies as well as military and non-military multinational organizations challenges commanders and their intelligence staffs at all levels. Special arrangements and specific guidelines must be established to meet this need. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Missions in operations other than war, as in war, require intelligence preparation. The IPB process applies in OOTW; however, its focus is on terrain, weather, and socio-political issues as well as on the threat. In some cases, the threat may not be "enemy personnel," but factors such as underlying causes of instability or extant conditions in the host nation. |
In OOTW, terrain and weather considerations or activities such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance are of major importance. Considerations include-
Planners throughout the division anticipate specific OOTW mission requirements. They develop creative, useful IBP products to display this information.
ManeuverAnalysis of Plans Once tasked to support outside continental United States (OCONUS) OOTW activities, the division staff analyzes appropriate theater strategy, campaign plans, and concept plans (CONPLANs) of the gaining combatant command. The theater strategy articulates the CINC's vision for his theater. In most cases, it provides guidance, direction, and opportunities for peacetime activities in general terms of ends, ways, and means. The campaign plans and CONPLANs identify theater objectives, sustainment concepts, needed resources, and specified and implied tasks. Supporting plans developed by the Army service component command provide more definitive guidance on essential tasks. Interoperability The division considers potential interoperability with other US and non-US organizations. Planning |
for interoperability includes appropriate liaison, supplies, equipment, guidance, instructions, and procedures that are useful to the intended user.
Training The division considers training with both US and non-US agencies who will be involved in the operation. This training may occur prior to deployment or in the area of operations after deployment. Such training may include (but is not limited to) tactics, techniques, and procedures; nation assistance; cultural and environmental issues; liaison; and vehicle and equipment maintenance.
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audiences, respectively, his actions and intents. PSYOP and civil affairs are well suited for both short- and long-term OOTW missions. The division commander's cooperation with the media is important to strengthen legitimacy and promote both foreign and domestic popular support for his effort. Finally, in some OOTW situations, the division commander may employ electronic attack as part of his nonlethal fires.
The division considers requirements and augmentation for general engineering. These may include planning for reconstruction and new construction of transportation and public utilities, such as public hygiene facilities, waterworks, sewage treatment, telephone, and power plants and facilities. In some operations, division engineers may be asked to clear mines and provide limited vertical and horizontal engineering construction.
The division's air defense officer coordinates and recommends to the commander appropriate integration of joint and multinational air defense systems. He should consider the availability, coverage, capability, and interoperability of joint, host nation, and multinational air defense assets. If reliable air defense is available from other sources in country, the commander may choose to rely on them as opposed to deploying additional divisional and nondivisional assets. This is especially useful if an in-country troop ceiling exists. Additionally, the commander ensures that detailed air defense ROE are established and deploying forces undergo specific hostile aircraft identification training. |
terminal operations, warehousing, loading, and distributing
of food, water, equipment, and fuel.
Health Support Traditionally, OOTW missions require extensive health support. The division plans for increased preventive medicine and veterinarian services. A tailored medical support unit will be configured considering the stated mission and objective within the framework of local as well as US legal requirements. (See Appendix E and FM 8-18.) Law and Order OOTW may require additional military police (MP) for the division. When required, the corps MP brigade augments division MPs for law and order support. MPs conduct joint patrols with host nation or multinational forces to maintain order, evaluate host law enforcement operations, as well as conduct security operations. (Note, however, that the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 forbids the military from training host nation police.) Division MPs will establish liaison with local host nation police. Funding and Contracting Funding and contracting for host nation (or another nation's) support require special planning and attention by resource managers, S5 and G5, division staff judge advocate, and the supporting finance battalion commander. Additionally, these officers determine contracting procedures to be used in the assigned AO. The division contracting officer works closely with the G4, G5, division engineer, and DISCOM commander to determine contracting requirements prior to, during, and after the operation. Staff Judge Advocate The division SJA advises commanders and 63 and S3 on legal limitations and Title X restrictions concerning the use of forces. The SJA receives the JTF or corps ROE from the division 03. He recommends changes to the division commander and 03. The SJA works with the division staff and subordinate commanders to ensure that ROE support the operation. Generally, ROE explain the circumstances and |
limitations under which US forces initiate and continue engagements
with hostile forces. In all operations, commanders are legally responsible for the care and treatment of civilians and property within their areas of operations until they are transferred to a proper authority. ROE assist the commander in fulfilling these responsibilities as well as completing his mission. Often ROE must be accompanied with commander's guidance for clarity. While ROE are tailored to each situation, nothing negates the commander's obligation to take all necessary and appropriate action in unit self-defense.
Detailed ROE and self-protection often appear as an appendix to the division's OPORD. (Additionally, commanders often publish and distribute pocket-sized ROE card for soldiers to carry.) ROE prevent indiscriminate use of force or other violations of law or regulations. ROE and self-protection issues include:
Personnel The 61 continues to provide routine personnel support to the division. For OOTW missions, the 61 initially focuses on unit strengths and low density military occupational specialties (MOSs) that may be critical to the particular mission. Language or specific skills (such as medical, legal, religious, or cultural) may require augmentation. |
Logistics The G4 monitors the division's logistics status. The G4 compiles detailed estimates for all classes of supply and equipment. He determines what prescribed load lists (PLLs) are critical and recommends increases in quantities to the division commander. The G4 also estimates the type and amount of support needed and available from the Army service component command or other agency within the AO. For disaster relief or humanitarian assistance missions, the G4 may assume a leading role in division. These operations revolve around the distribution of food and supplies, shelter, and medical evacuation and support. The division's logistics system may be required to coordinate with many agencies and distribute large quantities of government and nongovernment supplies. Civil Affairs Staff The G5 reviews regional studies of AOs and, through the G3, coordinates for, and recommends to the commander appropriate use of, civil affairs. The G5 also examines needs assessments conducted for the AO to see what units must actually do and requests PSYOP in support of CA-related activities. The G5 identifies the NH agency responsible for the operation, the level of HN participation, and points of contact within the HN government.
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planning may include some of the following:
Public Affairs The role of public affairs and coordination with news agencies will be important to how the division is viewed and to the perceived success of each operation. In OOTW, the PAO may be the centerpiece of the commander's special staff officers because of the nature of OOTW and the principle of legitimacy, which can be greatly influenced in an OOTW environment. Agency Coordination Support to US civil authorities, other than counterdrug operations, is usually a crisis response, but in either case, US government agencies may have the lead in planning and employing division assets. Once committed, the divisions normally initiate direct coordination with local government agencies (such as Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), US Forestry Service, US Coast Guard, or Foreign Relief Agency) to analyze their plans, receive their guidance, and make recommendations. This coordination is always performed through the division CMOC. |
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