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Military

CHAPTER 2

FUNDAMENTALS OF DIVISION OPERATIONS

Today's Army operations reflect the changing nature of modern warfare. Within these operations, divisions remain versatile organizations that perform a wide range of missions. Today's divisions must deploy, in total or in part, anywhere in the world with little notice. Additionally, divisions must operate within a joint, multinational, or multiagency environment, synchronizing all available systems-air, land, sea, space, and special operations-to be successful. Division commanders use a battlefield framework to make this synchronization work.

Fighting and winning battles and engagements remain the division's primary purpose. Division commanders think and fight in depth. Commanders attack the enemy simultaneously. They mass effects of combat power when and where necessary to quickly defeat or deter an enemy. The intent is to deny an opponent any chance to escape or retaliate. Combat should not be viewed as a fair fight between relatively equal foes.

Although this manual contains some changes to division doctrine, the way divisions attack, defend, and conduct retrogrades has changed little. However, operations are now designed to exploit our technological assets across all the battlefield operating systems. Army divisions use precision fires and the maximum range of all organic and supporting systems to set conditions for maneuver forces, which deliver the decisive blow, while minimizing risk to our soldiers. Reconnaissance and security remain crucial in division operations. Also crucial are actions to preempt and counter the enemy's reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition efforts. Deception (aligned with the corps or joint force plan) and OPSEC continue to mislead the enemy commander, prompting him to act prejudicially to his interests. Sound logistics operations sustain the force.

This chapter discusses fundamentals of division operations under five main topics. It addresses division doctrine for force-projection operations. It describes division operations in depth and battlefield

visualization. It depicts a framework for Battlefields. Lastly, it discusses the battlefield operating systems as they apply to division operations

FORCE PROJECTION

The Army today maintains only a small forward presence as opposed to large forward-deployed elements in regions vital to our national interests. Forward-presence forces can defend for a short time but depend on reinforcements from the CONUS, other areas, or other nations. Forward presence requires an Army that can rapidly project forces globally for a wide range of missions associated with regional contingencies. Once deployed, forces must have the operational capability to successfully complete their missions. Today, all divisions must be able to quickly respond to missions anywhere in the world.

Force projection is the demonstrated ability to rapidly alert, mobilize, and deploy and operate anywhere in the world for war or operations other than war (OOTW). Force-projection operations range from mobilization and deployment of forces, to redeployment and (in some cases) subsequent demobilization. Previous doctrine limited such operations to a few quickly deployed units. Today all US Army divisions must be prepared to perform force-projection operations.


FORCE PROJECTION
OPERATIONS IN DEPTH
BATTLEFIELD VISUALIZATION
BATTLEFIELD FRAMEWORK
BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEMS




Figure 2-1. Divisions and force projection

Force projection usually begins as a contingency operation-a rapid response to a crisis. Occasionally it may involve a deliberate, slow buildup and deployment. A force-projection operation may be planned at the division headquarters but only involve a smaller force, such as a battalion task force with appropriate logistics assets. During peacetime, the division trains and plans for war and specifically assigned missions, to include force-projection operations.

Divisions execute force projection in general stages (Figure 2-1). Many situations require deploying commanders to have units in more than one stage simultaneously. The following paragraphs, however, describe each stage separately. (Appendix C provides additional guidance in preparing for division force-projection operations.)

Mobilization

During mobilization, all or part of the armed forces are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating assistance

reserve components (RC) and the assembling of supplies and material. (RC units face significant challenges during mobilization. Specifics may be found in FM 100-17.) Strategic mobilization includes industry. Although there are five levels of mobilization, the process is continuous and not necessarily sequential. The levels are-

  • Selective mobilization.
  • Presidential selected reserve call-up
  • Partial mobilization.
  • Full mobilization.
  • Total mobilization.

The five levels of mobilization are further detailed in Appendix D.

Divisions rarely have specific predesignated responsibilities for mobilizing RC forces. Division (and corps) commanders, however, monitor the mobilization of units that will provide key support to their operations. Nondeployed corps and divisions may be tasked to support the mobilizations of RC units. US Army Forces


Command (FORSCOM), with assistance from state area commands (STARCs) and the continental United States armies (CONUSAs), is responsible for Army RC mobilization. In some situations, the division commander may request activating specific RC units for specific missions (such as his rear operations cell) or individual mobilization augmentees (IMAs) to round out his staff. These requests are based on mission analysis and forwarded through the corps headquarters. Appendix D and FM 100-17 provide specifics on the Army's mobilization process.

Predeployment Activity

Predeployment activities and mobilization generally occur simultaneously. Both begin with an alert process that sets into motion actions necessary for deployment and subsequent employment of forces. Predeployment activities include planning, organizing the division's forces, and preparing personnel and equipment for deployment.

When alerted, the division initiates predeployment crisis-action planning, modifying existing plans as necessary. Modifications may include readjusting task organizations for initial entry and follow-on forces into the area of operations (AO), sequencing forces into the objective area, and refining sustainment requirements. Intelligence systems shift to meet the planning needs of deploying commanders.

Key to the division's deployment is task organizing, echeloning, and tailoring its forces. Task organizing forms combined arms task forces with limited self-sustainment capability for rapid deployment. Task-organized units develop close training relationships to facilitate both deployment and employment. Echeloning is organizing and prioritizing units for movement. Echelons are often divided into elements such as advance parties, initial combat forces, follow-on forces, and closure forces. Each echelon has a designated echelon commander. Task organizing and echeloning occur during initial planning.

Tailoring is adding to or subtracting from planned task organizations. It is situational dependent and occurs after the commander and his staff complete a thorough METT-T assessment.

Divisions tailor forces after identifying initial strategic lift, prepositioned assets, and host nation and or contract services or assets. Following receipt of a mission, the division prepares its personnel and equipment for deployment through preparation for overseas movement (POM) activities. The division normally requires administrative and logistics support from the corps to accomplish POM actions. These activities ensure that deploying units meet all requirements to deploy into another theater of operation as well as those directed by Army regulations and local authorities.

US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) provides strategic lift (movement) for divisions in CONUS through the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), the Army's component of USTRANSCOM. The division's installation transportation office links the deploying units and MTMC. Based on MTMC's movement directive, operational plans, and commanders' guidance, G3s and transportation staff backward-plan the division's departure from the installation.

Prior to a deployment, the division commander executes planned actions to transfer his installation responsibilities to the installation commander or FORSCOM control. Even when deployed, however, the division commander's total mission awareness includes the division's home station. He may retain some responsibility for units and activities not deployed, such as the division's rear detachment and family support.

Deployment

Deployment is the movement of forces and their support bases from any location to an AO in response to a military need or crisis. Division units deploy via ports of embarkation (POEs). (See Figure 2-2).

The careful sequencing of forces into an AO helps stabilize the situation, allows for rapid buildup of capabilities, and maintains a viable force-protection capability. The arrival of the division's personnel and equipment is programmed by time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD). Generally, heavy equipment moves to a seaport of embarkation (SPOE) by rail or heavy truck transport. Lighter equipment and troops in deployment configurations may move to an aerial port of embarkation (APOE) by truck and bus.

Deploying units may process through an intermediate staging area (ISA) located between the POE and the port of




Figure 2-2. Division deployment

debarkation (POD). Deployed units arrive in a theater at an aerial port of debarkation (APOD) and or seaport of debarkation (SPOD). Division units then move rapidly out of the PODs through the marshaling areas, staging areas, and into tactical assembly areas or logistics bases before executing operations.

Entry Operations

Entry is the sequencing of forces into an area of operations. The division arrives into the AO as either an entry force or a follow-on force. Entry forces are lethal and survivable, tailored to carry out initial combat operations to secure the lodgment. Follow-on forces expand lodgments and build up combat power to conduct extended combat operations. The division's entry may be opposed by an adversary or it may be unopposed.

During opposed entry operations, division forces conduct forcible entry into an area that may contain hostile forces. The division normally secures an airhead or a beachhead for the arrival of additional forces; however, it could be tasked to conduct immediate combat operations to defeat the enemy. In either situation, early entry forces are predominately combat units.

During unopposed entry operations, the division may serve as a deterrent, act as the advance detachment for a much larger deployment that will follow, or participate in noncombat operations. During unopposed entry operations under hostile conditions, the division deploys into an AO where combat is underway or imminent, but the APODs and SPODs are secure and under friendly control. In both opposed and unopposed entry, commanders take actions to secure their forces. The composition of the initial entry forces depends on the commanders' analysis of the situation.

Successful entry operations result from good planning and coordination. Following receipt of a mission, commanders conduct mission analysis. They determine both the mix of forces and arrival sequence. As deployment nears, timely theater-specific intelligence, operational data, and logistics information must flow directly to the units conducting the early entry operations. Initially, the force commander depends on national, theater, joint, and space-based systems for "pushed" intelligence and targeting information. However,

Early entry forces are ready to conduct immediate combat operations to defeat the enemy .


it is critical that the division's intelligence architecture can "pull" any specific information to meet the division's needs.

During entry operations, joint or multinational fires provide the division's core fire support and interdiction capabilities. Once the division establishes a lodgment and force packaging allows, organic assets augment joint fires. In entry operations, joint fires capabilities are critical to protect the force.

Entry forces are primarily active component (AC) forces. Specialized RC units may be mobilized if needed. Specific RC capabilities include seaport-and airfield-related units, civil affairs units, mortuary affairs units, and terminal operations and transfer units. Additionally, special operations forces may precede and link up with entry forces.

Operations

Operations comprise actions that lead to or directly contribute to accomplishing the combatant commander's mission. The operations phase of force projection may occur immediately or after a long buildup.

Division commanders conduct both combat and noncombat operations to achieve their higher commander's intent. During combat operations, divisions conduct offensive, defensive, and other operations detailed in subsequent chapters of this manual. The division may conduct or participate in noncombat operations as part of OOTW, described in Chapter 8.

War Termination and Postconflict Operations

Successful operations lead to accomplishing the combatant commander's mission. War termination and postconflict operations restore conditions in the area of operations favorable to US national policy.

As hostilities terminate in parts of the AO, units occupying those areas may reorganize and transition to planned postconflict activities. During this period, the division focuses on securing its force and ending hostilities throughout the entire AO. Division operations stabilize the area.

The division may restore order, establish or reestablish essential infrastructure, and prepare for redeployment of its forces. Often, this transition begins even if some residual combat is still underway. Planning is vital for successful postconflict actions, beginning well before combat operations cease. The division commander and elements of his staff consider adjusted rules of engagement, force-protection measures, interagency and host nation issues, as well as the transfer of authorities and responsibilities.

Versatility is also vital to postconflict activities. Division units may be tasked to do things for which they are not specifically trained, but can accomplish. Postconflict tasks include controlling indigenous personnel, whether hostile or friendly, in and around the unit locations; assisting with EPW control; and assisting in civil affairs. Civil affairs tasks include developing populace and resources control measures designed to deny the enemy access to the populace, assisting local civil police, and developing property control measures. These activities help restore order and protect the local population. Additionally, the division may assist with civil-military operations which include foreign nation assistance, populace and resource control, humanitarian assistance, military civic action, and civil defense. The division will also begin retraining its own forces on critical tasks.

With proper augmentation and planning, the division can provide specialized skills and training to assist the host government. Generally, these skills are found within CS and CSS units, such as staff judge advocate, PSYOP, medical, engineer, law enforcement, signal, transportation, maintenance, civil affairs, and ministry teams. The division may also be tasked to initiate nation-assistance activities and humanitarian assistance.

The division may transfer specific responsibilities within its AO to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and or private volunteer organizations (PVOs). For example, the International Red Cross may assume responsibility for medical treatment of all non-US military personnel. The corps or JTF commander may deploy specialized nondivisional military forces to reestablish and control law and order. This action may involve many US and international agencies.

Transferring responsibilities may involve merely withdrawing from a previously occupied position. In other cases, the


transfer may be more complicated. Whatever the situation, the division commander ensures an orderly, disciplined transfer within the area of operations and begins preparing units for redeployment or action elsewhere.

Redeployment and Reconstitution

This stage includes two major functions: deployment back to CONUS or to another theater, and reconstitution of division units as appropriate.

Redeployment begins as directed and as the situation allows. Initially, the division quickly redeploys advance parties and less essential units, personnel, and equipment. Preparation for redeployment begins as division units start assisting other organizations with postconflict missions. Redeployment requires task organizing and echeloning similar to deployment. During this stage, unit strength and equipment status may change often, but accurate accountability is key to the reconstitution effort. Additionally, commanders carry out training programs to maintain individual and unit mission essential task list (METL) proficiency. Protection of the force remains critical.

Reconstitution is rapid preparation for follow-on missions. Reconstitution goes beyond normal day-to-day force-sustainment actions. It is defined as extraordinary actions that are planned and carried out by commanders to restore units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and availability of resources.

Reconstitution may include reestablishing or reinforcing command and control; cross leveling or replacing personnel, supplies, and equipment; using command priorities to allocate resources; conducting essential training; and reestablishing unit cohesion. Reconstitution may be required for any combat, CS, or CSS unit and must be anticipated at all levels of command. (See FM 100-9.) Reconstitution could begin during postconflict activities. Some reconstitution actions may be completed quickly while other actions require many days to complete.

Division commanders use one of two reconstitution options to return units to a specified level of combat capability-reorganization or regeneration. Reorganization shifts internal resources within a degraded unit to increase its combat effectiveness. Regeneration rebuilds a unit through large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment,

and supplies; reestablishes or replaces essential supplies; reestablishes or replaces essential command and control; and conducts mission-essential training. The decision to regenerate is normally made at least two levels above the unit being regenerated. Reconstitution of units is significant and is done only with careful planning. Appendix E of this manual; the FM-63 series (combat service support) manuals; and FM 100-9 detail division redeployment and reconstitution actions.

Demobilization

Demobilization is the transfer of units, individuals, and material from an active to an inactive status. Generally, demobilization applies to RC units. Reserve component units face the challenge of ensuring compliance with a myriad of regulations concerning demobilization. (See FM 100-17.)

An active division's involvement is minimal in demobilizing RC units; however, division personnel may assist. Commanders are responsible for timely award recommendations as well as evaluation reports for RC units and individuals that were attached or assigned during the deployment. Additionally, the division may maintain and or safeguard strategic reserves of supplies and equipment until they are returned to the US Army Materiel Command.

OPERATIONS IN DEPTH

New Focus

Our AirLand Battle doctrine of 1986 emphasized the sequential attack of an approaching enemy force. At the operational level, deep operations included efforts to isolate current battles and to influence where, when, and against whom future battles would be fought. At the tactical level, the Army fought deep to shape the close battle.

AirLand Battle doctrine has evolved into today's full dimensional warfighting doctrine. Advances in technology and the exploitation of space-based platforms have increased the range, lethality, and accuracy of military systems. Modern-day commanders have the ability to conduct operations simultaneously throughout the enemy's depth to gain synergistic effects of modem-day systems.



Simultaneous application of combat power throughout the depth of the battle area defeats the enemy rapidly with minimum friendly casualties and is preferable to the attrition nature of sequential operations.

FM 100-5

Operations now set the conditions for maneuver forces to deliver the decisive blow. Our technological assets and precision fires minimize risk to our soldiers while increasing our lethality. These actions place multiple critical enemy functions at risk at the same time. They desynchronize the enemy's plan and his ability to generate combat power. They also deny an enemy cohesion to execute his plan. In sum, division commanders degrade the enemy's will and capability to fight.

Expanded Battlefield

Operations in depth are not the same as deep operations. Operations in depth expand the battlefield in purpose, space, time, and resources and allow the division commander to completely dominate the tempo of the battle. Commanders strive to continuously engage the enemy throughout the depth and breadth of the battlefield.

With access to national reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) assets, corps and divisions acquire deep and improved real-time targeting information. The division commander can employ fires and maneuver deeper than ever before in history. Soon, such fires may include the Army tactical missile system (ATACMS), Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM), as well as multinational deep attack assets.

Long-range, real-time acquisitions, combined with precision fires, help the division defeat enemies at great distances or reduce enemy combat capability before joining the close fight. ATACMS, MLRS, TLAM, and fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft may support operations day or night, under most weather conditions, and at significant stand-off ranges. Improved munitions, such as dual-purpose improved conventional munitions

(DPICM) and family of scatterable mines, increase the division's lethality.

Today's division commanders must think as well as fight in depth.

At all echelons in the division, a commander's vision and intent drive the use of forces throughout the battlefield. The division commander translates his vision into a clearly articulated commander's intent that provides subordinate commanders the overall purpose and the desired end state of the operation. (See FM 101-5.) The intent statement guides the force as a whole. The more fluid the battle and the more dynamic the tempo of operations, the more important it is for subordinate commanders throughout the battlefield to understand the operation's purpose. This allows them to act with initiative and agility under changing circumstances.

Division commanders attack opposing enemy forces in multiple dimensions. Early doctrine focused on the destruction and or defeat of enemy maneuver forces in the close battle. Those commanders conducted deep operations to shape the close fight or to control the rate at which enemy forces entered the close fight. Now, commanders attack the enemy simultaneously as part of joint operations.

The division commander can engage (using maneuver or lethal and nonlethal fires) the enemy using counterfire against his fire support systems. Simultaneously, the division can attack the enemy's command and control (C2) using fires or EW and attack the enemy's reserve with a full complement of long-range joint fires. Deception, PSYOP, special operations, and similar means are integrated to maximize synergistic effects. The enemy is confused and frustrated, incapable of generating combat power or sustaining his tempo, gaining the initiative, or executing any course of action.

Division commanders and staffs think of a compressed battlefield (deep, close, and rear) and one fight, occurring during a single window of time. Commanders leverage technology and information to improve the assimilation, production, and distribution times of key information (intelligence, technical fire support, and C2). Automated systems provide near-real-time connectivity from "sensor to shooter" required to effectively and safely conduct simultaneous attacks in depth.

Additionally, operations in depth allow division commanders to control the tempo of friendly and enemy operations. As the tempo increases beyond the enemy's ability to react


effectively, commanders exploit these conditions through aggressive joint fires (destructive and disruptive) and maneuver. This results in prioritized, multidimensional attacks at decisive points and critical times on the battlefield at the time and place of the division commander's choosing.

Resources available to division commanders are limited. Therefore, each commander must best use what is available to successfully conduct operations in depth. Competition for strategic lift assets will require hard decisions and careful prioritization of requirements. Future operations require a vision of the integrated employment and support from many organizations, such as national, joint, multinational (particularly host nation), and interagency.

As part of a joint force, divisions may have these fires available:

  • Artillery fires.

  • Air support.

  • Naval surface fire support.

  • Missiles.

  • Electronic warfare support

By their nature, these fires are delivered primarily by joint or multinational forces and enable simultaneous attacks in depth. As with all fires, care is taken not to damage protected targets.

PSYOP forces plan, conduct, and support military operations (war and OOTW) at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. PSYOP activities are tailored to meet the type of operations the division conducts. During the defense, PSYOP forces can assist an economy of force capability through

deception operations at the same time the division is conducting a counterattack into the enemy's flanks.

Electronic warfare uses electromagnetic or directed energy to degrade, neutralize, or destroy enemy combat capability. Electronic warfare (nonlethal attack) includes jamming and electromagnetic deception. Division commanders can use EW to jam enemy AD radars and C2 nets during air assault operations.

The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) appeared in Operation Desert Storm. Using UAV imagery to conduct air and artillery strikes is an effective means to attack deep targets. UAVs have the potential for performing such tasks as situation development, target development, intelligence gathering, and battle damage assessments (BDAs).

As commanders conduct operations throughout the depth of the battlefield, our logistics system integrates supply and transportation functions. The right supplies must be delivered at the right time and place to avoid logistic culminating points. The timing and delivery of supplies depends on-

  • Real-time monitoring of corps and division operations.

  • In-transit visibility over logistics.

  • Mobility of sustainment assets.

Future requirements must be anticipated to enable timely, consistent resourcing of operations, while reducing backlogs and stockpiles.

BATTLEFIELD VISUALIZATION

Battlefield visualization is a key aspect of battle command. It is the process whereby the commander develops a clear understanding of his current state, envisions a desired end state, and then subsequently visualizes the sequence of activity that will move his force from its current state to the end state. Once the commander has been assigned an area of



Battlefield visualization is vital in battle command. The commander develops a clear understanding of the current state, envisions the desired end state, and visualizes the sequence of activity that will move his office to the end state.

operations (AO), he begins to visualize the operation he will conduct before any mental constraints (boundaries phase lines, and fire control measures) are emplaced.

The first aspect in the commander's visualization is gaining an understanding of the current state of his unit and that of the enemy. This includes gaining an awareness of the enemy and friendly full status, to include combat readiness, logistical status, location, speed of advance, tempo of operations, known vulnerabilities, and probable course of action. Also included for both the enemy and friendly force are environmental factors such as terrain and weather, human factors such as morale and fatigue, and less tangible influences such as culture, religion, and similar factors.

The second aspect of the commander's vision is his ability to clearly discern a desired end state. Initially, this involves foreseeing a feasible outcome to the operation which results in mission success and leaves the unit postured for the next mission.

The third aspect of battlefield visualization is the commander's ability to envision a sequence of actions (an intellectual war game) that will cause his force to arrive at the desired end state. Included in his visualization are the contingencies (branches) and follow-on missions (sequels) which the commander might encounter when conducting the operation. Ultimately, the commander articulates his battlefield

vision to his subordinates and staff through his commander's intent statement which guides the development of his concept of operations.

The ability to visualize a battlefield is an essential leadership attribute of our commanders. It is learned and attained through training, practice, experience, wisdom, and available battle command technologies. It is critical to accomplishing the mission.

Battlefield visualization is fundamental to the establishment of a battlefield framework. A battlefield framework for any operation results from,and is a natural extension of, this process.

BATTLEFIELD FRAMEWORK

A battlefield framework helps commanders relate friendly forces to one another and to the enemy in terms of time, space, and purpose. The concept of a battlefield framework is not new, but the proliferation of military and advanced technology, and the influence of joint doctrine, have caused the battlefield framework to evolve.

The battlefield framework is relevant to any battlefield, to include those in military operations other than war (OOTW). However, the following discussion applies primarily to conventional combat operations.

The battlefield framework consists of four interrelated components: area of operations, area of interest


(AI), battlespace, and a specific battlefield organization. As a result of the battlefield visualization process, and given his AO, the commander can translate his vision into his framework.

First, the commander mentally establishes an area in which he must focus his intelligence gathering means to ensure he is aware of those factors which may have a near-term impact on his operation. This is called the area of interest.

Next, the commander determines the three-dimensional area in which he seeks to dominate the enemy. This volume is referred to as the commander's battlespace. Finally, he lends structure to the AO through a specific battlefield organization using boundaries, phase lines, and similar measures.

Figure 2-3 depicts the battlefield framework. Two of the components are depicted with military operational graphics. These are the area of operations and the battlefield's organization within an area of operations. The other two components, battlespace and area of interest, are not depicted as operational graphics. They are mental constructs which commanders use to form an orderly arrangement of the battlefield in order to gather information and dominate the enemy.


Figure 2-3. Battlefield framework
Area of Operations

A commander is assigned an area of operations by his higher commander. An AO is a three-dimensional volume, prescribed by boundaries on the ground, and includes the airspace above.

The size of the AO depends on METT-T, but must be large enough for the commander to accomplish his mission and to protect the force. Boundaries may require frequent adjustment based on the actual and projected rate of maneuver and the operational environment. Areas of operations may be used to divide large areas into smaller geographical areas in which tactical-level battles are fought. However, due to advances in technology and capabilities of our battlefield systems, an assigned area of operations may not necessarily allow the commander to employ all his organic, assigned, and supporting assets to their fullest capabilities.

Area of Interest

The area of interest is a geographical area from which information and intelligence are required to execute successful tactical operations and to plan for future operations. Because staffs need time to process information and to plan and synchronize operations, the tactical commander's area of interest is normally larger than his battlespace and area of operations. Normally, the area of interest includes any threat or characteristic of the battlefield environment that will significantly influence a commander's current or future mission. A commander's area of interest also includes areas adjacent to the area of operations


(forward, flanks, and rear) in which enemy actions and the environment will affect current and future battles. Each commander determines his own area of interest.

Battlespace

Battlespace is the volume in which the commander seeks to dominate the enemy. It is through his battlefield visualization that a commander decides where, when, and how he will dominate the enemy within his battlespace.

A commander's battlespace expands and contracts in relation to the ability to acquire and engage the enemy with joint or multinational forces. It can change as the commander's vision of the battlefield changes. It is influenced by time, tempo, depth, and synchronization.

Battlespace is not assigned by a higher commander. Although not depicted on a map or on a computer monitor, it usually extends beyond the commander's area of operations, and may overlap with the battlespace of other commanders. At the tactical level, the area in which a commander dominates an enemy, his battlespace, is normally smaller than his area of interest.

Key considerations in determining the size of battlespace include the depth and resolution of supporting intelligence, the commander's concept for employing both organic and supporting weapons, and the disposition of the opposing force.

Battlefield Organization

Three closely related sets of activities characterize operations within an AO-deep, close, and rear (see Figure 2-4). Commanders think through and fight throughout the depth and breadth of their AO in a way that deep, close, and rear operations appear to the enemy as one continuous operation. Simultaneous operations in depth seek to attack the enemy concurrently throughout the battlefield.

Tactical commanders consider all aspects of three-dimensional battle and use standard control measures to organize battlefields within their AO.


Figure2-4. Tactical battlefield organization

Battlefields may be linear, asymmetrical, or noncontiguous (see Figure 2-5). Generally, tactical battles include deep, chose, and rear components. Each is part of the entire tactical battle-each operation is part of the whole. Intrinsic to each operation is a fight to protect the division's force.

At higher echelons (for example, divisions, corps, JTFs), phase lines or forward boundaries separate corps or joint force deep attack areas from the division's deep attack area. More important, commanders at these echelons agree on actions, responsibilities, effects, and desired outcomes relative to their deep operations. The following paragraphs discuss this organization of tactical battlefields as it relates to division operations.

Deep Operations

Deep operations are normally those conducted against the enemy's forces or resources not currently engaged in the close fight. They prevent the enemy from using his resources where and when he wants to on the battlefield. Deep operations are not necessarily a function of depth, but rather a function of what forces are being attacked and the intent of the operation. Division deep operations dominate the enemy by nullifying his firepower, disrupting his C2, disrupting the tempo of his operations, destroying his forces, preventing reinforcing maneuver, destroying his installations and supplies, and breaking his morale. Maneuver, precision fires, and command and control warfare (C2W) supported by intelligence can be combined to execute deep operations. Divisions conduct deep operations in both the offense and the defense.

Deep operations normally occur forward of ground reconnaissance and security forces. They may-

  • Limit the enemy's freedom of action.

  • Alter the tempo of operations in favor of the division.

  • Deny the enemy the capability to concentrate his forces.

  • Isolate the close operation.

  • Destroy the enemy's will to fight.



Figure 2-5. Tactical battlefield organization continued

Whether in the offense or defense, deep operations perform one or more of the following functions:

  • Interdict enemy lines of communication.

  • Prevent the employment of enemy counterattack or follow-on force.

  • Destroy units and critical targets.

  • Cut off routes of withdrawal.

Division deep operations that focus on the enemy's lines of communication not only disrupt his supply (effects may not be immediately felt), but also cut off his avenue of retreat. The destruction of forces or supplies affects the enemy both physically and psychologically. Deep operations may not always require the physical destruction of the enemy force, the disruption of his lines of communication, or the interdiction of his reserves to decisively affect the close operation.

Deep operations will often occur simultaneously with other operations (close and rear), or they may occur sequentially. Simultaneous deep and close engagements prevent the enemy from concentrating his strength. These engagements force the enemy to fight in one direction and protect himself in another. This causes the enemy to commit his forces where not intended and weakens both his overall posture and his plan. Simultaneous operations allow commanders to control the tempo of the battle; sequential operations "shape the battlefield." Sequential operations are normally designed around the commander's concept for the close fight.

The commander and staff must clearly understand the purpose and objectives of deep operations. They must recognize the potential benefits of a deep operation versus an operation against committed forces on the forward line of own troops (FLOT).

More important, the commander must have the experience to appreciate or justify the risks involved in sending a force deep. To recognize which objectives are worth those risks and when to take them comes from experience, training, and knowledge of the capabilities and intent of friendly and enemy units.

Deep operations are often joint operations, combining a variety of service systems to achieve the best possible results. Systems and forces may include field artillery, missiles (joint and multinational), air interdiction (joint and multinational), attack helicopters, air assault forces, airborne forces, ground maneuver forces, special operations forces joint and multinational), and C2W assets joint and multinational).

Deep Maneuver. Maneuver forces can attack deep. Both armored and light forces have utility in a deep maneuver, depending on the factors of METT-T. Division aviation units are also capable of conducting deep maneuver. Because divisions have relatively few attack aircraft, commanders must weigh the risk to deep attacking helicopters against expected results. They also consider the planned use of and unexpected need for Army aviation units throughout the battlefield.

Fire support, tailored according to the mission, accompanies the deep maneuver forces. When required, artillery can accompany deep maneuver forces through its self-propelled or towed capability, or through the use of aviation lift assets. However, if possible, supporting fires should be fired from the friendly side of the FLOT. Without accompanying indirect fire support assets, the deep maneuver force is smaller and more mobile, requiring less ammunition and other classes of supply. A rapidly moving offensive force requires special coordination to provide close air support (CAS) in route, and in the objective area. All air requirements must be identified early in the planning process to allow time to request and coordinate the support.


Generally CSS is provided to the deep maneuver force through self-sustainment or lines of communication (LOC). If the force is task-organized to be self-sustaining, its endurance and range are limited to the quantity of supplies it can carry. The primary constraints will be class III and class V, and medical evacuation for the division. Keeping the lines of communication open to the maneuver force and providing support from the rear area increase the endurance and range of the force but require additional forces to secure the LOC from vulnerability.

Infantry forces used in a deep maneuver role may remain behind in the enemy rear as "stay behind" forces, use infiltration, or be inserted by airborne and air assault operations. Armored forces are used when a penetration or an envelopment of the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) is made. Unless required, the deep maneuver force does not conduct its own penetration; rather main battle area (MBA) units on the FEBA accomplish this mission. Finally, the division commander must carefully consider the time and resources required for the deep maneuver force to strike and return or link up with the main body. Misjudging either can result in loss of the deep force or failure of the force to accomplish its mission.

Deep Fires. Commanders normally conduct deep fires with organic and supporting Army field artillery and joint fires-both air and ground. Fires of sufficient intensity, even without maneuver, can disrupt and force changes in the enemy plan. Division deep fires must focus on developed high-payoff targets.

Division deep operations often require packaged flights of Air Force, Marine, or Navy aircraft with the full complement of munitions, electronic combat, joint suppression of enemy air defenses (JSEAD), and force protection against enemy air.

Deep Command and Control Warfare. Command and control warfare (C2W) is a relatively new joint term and new to Army doctrine. It is a key component of information warfare. (See FM 100-6.) C2W integrates OPSEC, military deception, jamming, and physical destruction to deny information to an enemy;

to influence, degrade, or destroy an enemy's C3 capabilities; and to protect friendly C3 capabilities against such enemy actions. C2W supports the tactical plan. C2W disrupts the enemy's troop control process, increases enemy decision times, and reduces his ability to concentrate forces throughout the battlefield.

One component of C2W is electronic warfare. Electronic warfare enables the division to protect its own electronic systems while electronically attacking those of the enemy. During deep operations, commanders use EW assets for jamming, electronic deception, and targeting to degrade, influence, or destroy enemy electronic capabilities. The goal is to identify high-value C2 nets and to disrupt enemy electronics and communications activities at critical times during his decision cycle.

OPSEC, deception, and jamming result in a combination of lethal and nonlethal attacks on the enemy. These attacks disrupt enemy target acquisition, intelligence gathering, and command and control systems while simultaneously protecting the division's own C3 system from similar enemy activities. The object is either to completely destroy the enemy's C2 system or to create ambiguity and interrupt the enemy's ability to decide and transmit plans and orders.

To be effective, C2W must be part of top-down planning in concert with the commander's overall concept of operation. Based on the mission and the commander's concept for C2W employment, the commander and operations officer use intelligence assets to select and prioritize targets to support the continuous nature of planning and execution in the operation.

Deep Command and Control. All resources attacking deep must understand the commander's intent. Nowhere is this need greater because the commander rarely, if ever, leads a deep force himself. A clear intent, mission-type orders, and detailed, but simple, plans are the keys to successful division deep operations.

Deep operations are normally planned and controlled where the most information is available to the staff-the division's main CP. Subordinate headquarters establish a temporary CP, if required, near. the main CP to further coordinate and augment the division's C2 efforts.


Once the division's commanding general decides to execute deep operations, planning and coordination are normally done from a division's deep operations coordination center (DOCC) at the main CP. The DOCC may be formed by linking selected staff members from the appropriate main CP cells, either physically or electronically, under the direction of the division chief of staff. (See Figure 2-6.) The G3 assists in coordinating the deep operations. The division commander determines the configuration of the DOCC from his assessment of mission requirements, available personnel, and equipment capabilities. However, the DOCC is not ad hoc. It is a trained entity. The DOCC continuously synchronizes all BOS functions.

The DOCC is often configured to monitor close and rear operations and continually assess their relationship with planned deep operations. Normally, the division DOCC requires a Warrior terminal, communications, and automation equipment. The deep operations coordinator is given the requisite authority to plan and integrate specified deep


Figure 2-6. Example of DOCC
operations. The DOCC concept provides the commander with a means to focus the activities of all the units, agencies, and cells involved in supporting deep operations. The overall responsibility for the synchronization of all operations-deep, close, and rear-remains with the main command post.

Close Operations

Close operations are those in which friendly forces are in immediate contact with the enemy. Commanders defeat an enemy with precision fires and maneuver, concentrating the effects of all available combat power. Commanders should strive to dictate when, where, and against what enemy units close fights will occur. A division's close operations normally include the deep, close, and rear operations of its subordinate brigades and battalions. Close operations consider and include reconnaissance and security actions, a main effort, and reserve actions. Reconnaissance and security are critical to battles and engagements.

Reconnaissance in the division is continuous. It must precede all operations. Reconnaissance actions yield information on terrain and the enemy force. Effective reconnaissance allows the commander to gain and maintain contact with the enemy and to direct friendly units into the fight. Reconnaissance units normally orient their movement on the movement of the enemy. They fight for information but usually avoid decisive combat.


Security protects and conserves the combat power of friendly units. It denies the enemy knowledge of current and future friendly force actions. Security is inherent in all military operations. At the tactical level, security actions protect the command against surprise attack and hostile air and ground observation. While all units conduct security actions, specific units are tasked to conduct security missions (such as screen, guard, cover, and area security). Security forces orient their movements on the force or facility to be secured. Appendix A discusses reconnaissance and security in detail.

The main effort is assigned to only one unit at a time. It accomplishes an action critical to the overall mission. The commander applies combat power as necessary to support his main effort. Subordinate and supporting commanders focus on the main effort to link their actions with those around them. This part of a commander's concept permits initiative but maintains direction and cohesion. Supporting the main effort requires synchronization of combat, CS, and CSS resources.

Reserves give a commander options and flexibility, providing an edge against uncertainty. Reserves exploit successes, gain opportunity, and expedite victory. They are used to weight the main effort to maintain momentum, provide security, and defeat enemy counterattacks. Note that reserve actions are not solely in response to unforeseen enemy actions.

See Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 for information on close operations in the offense, defense, retrogrades, and other division operations.

Rear Operations

The objective of rear operations is to ensure freedom of action and continuous operations. Rear operations are numerous, complex, and never ending. Commanders and their staffs synchronize the rear operations functions of sustainment, terrain

management, movement control with close and deep operations, and security in consonance with the commander's concept and intent.

The assistant division commander for support (ADC-S) plans and controls division rear operations from the division rear CP. He exercises his responsibilities through the division rear CP and the DISCOM CP which is normally collocated for life support, local security, and ease of coordination.

Sustainment. Rear area operations include planning and directing sustainment. Synchronizing these actions with the concept of operation is critical to the success of close and deep operations. Rear operations also ensure that sustainment is not degraded by, and does not limit, the force commander's freedom of maneuver and continuity of operations. The rear CP and the DISCOM anticipate, plan, and coordinate the relocation of CSS units in rear areas as the situation changes. CSS facilities disperse to minimize the effect of threat attacks.

Normally, the rear CP plans and coordinates the sustainment effort while the DISCOM focuses on its execution. The DISCOM recommends the location of the division support area (DSA) and the positions of units within the DSA. The DISCOM directs subordinate units, monitors their ability to provide support, and makes rear operations recommendations to the rear CP. The G5 works with the rear CP and the DISCOM to procure any needed host nation sustainment support. (See Appendix E for further discussion of sustaining division operations.)

Terrain Management. While G3s and S3s have overall responsibility for terrain management, rear CPs usually position supporting units in rear areas to support both current and future operations Their location depends on their missions, the division's concept of operation and concept of support, and current rear area intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).

The positioning of the DSA is key in terrain management. The rear CP, with the G3 and the DISCOM commander, designates the DSA. All units entering or desiring to relocate


within the division rear must coordinate with the rear CP to ensure that their proposed locations do not conflict with current or projected operations, positioning, or movement priorities.

Once positioned, these units form bases (unit or multiunit positions with a definite perimeter) and base clusters (mission grouping of bases or security requirements lacking a clearly defined perimeter). The rear CP commander normally designates the senior commander within each base or base cluster as its commander. Base and base cluster commanders are responsible for positioning units within their respective areas of responsibility. Bases and base clusters fall under the control of the division rear CP for positioning, security, and movement within the division rear area. Additionally, the division rear CP (through the division G5) coordinates with HN authorities to ensure that HN facilities or units do not conflict with the division's concept of operation or concept of support.

Movement Control. Movement control includes the planning, prioritizing, deconflicting, and execution of movement plans, both internal and external (other US forces and host nation) to a unit. G3s and S3s are responsible for the movement of tactical units through or within areas of operations. Rear CPs are generally responsible for administrative moves. Additionally, they prioritize and deconflict movements within rear areas as well as plan for the sustainment of tactical movements within the division.

The G4 recommends main supply routes (MSRs) to the G3 and the commander. The G4 controls use of MSRs within the division and coordinates supply routes for supporting corps units. He identifies critical points along MSRs to the G3 who coordinates with the division provost marshal and the assistant division engineer (ADE) for security, area damage control, and MSR maintenance. The G4 coordinates with the ADCOORD for air defense coverage of MSRs.

The G3 establishes priorities for movements along division MSRs based on the overall sustainment priorities in support of the operation. Movement priorities are passed to the division provost marshal who enforces them.

Security. The rear operations cell coordinates and assigns specific security responsibilities to all forces in the rear area to ensure sustainment is not interrupted. Rear area security includes intelligence and early warning actions, response operations, base and base cluster self-defense, and rear area fire support.

The rear CP is responsible for maintaining and updating the rear area IPB. The intelligence cell at the main CP produces IPB products used and updated by the rear operations cell. The rear operations cell then produces a predictive intelligence estimate,

identifying likely threat targets and intentions. This estimate, along with information on the current threat situation, is sent to all units in the division rear area. It forms the basis for planning and conducting the other three components of rear security operations.

The rear CP gathers, and disseminates to all rear area units, early warning information regarding threat air activities. The rear operations cell collects information from the Army airspace command and control (A2C2) element at the division main CP. It also collects information from division and corps air defense artillery units located in the division rear area, Air Force TACP airlift element at the rear CP, other Air Force control teams that may be operating in the division rear, and other rear area units. This early warning information is required to anticipate threat airborne and air assault insertions in the rear areas.

Division rear area operations must be able to respond simultaneously to a wide range of rear area threats. The rear CP plans and coordinates actions when enemy activity is discovered in the division's rear area. The division commander's concept and intent, the rear area IPB, and the ADC-S's established protection priorities drive response force planning. The rear CP melds this information with its own IPB. It positions itself in the division area where it can best provide timely support to the highest-priority facilities-those most likely to be attacked by threat forces.

Rear area threats are shown in Figure 2-7. Base or base cluster self-defense provides Level I responses to small, localized enemy threats such as-

  • Enemy-controlled agent activities.

  • Enemy sympathizers and saboteurs.

  • Terrorist activities.

  • Electronic intelligence collection devices.

Normally MP units (with appropriate supporting fires) respond to Level II threats. These threats exceed base or base cluster self-defense capabilities but do not require commitment of a TCF. MPs can defeat-

  • Unconventional forces-conducted diversionary and sabotage operations.

  • Small combat unit-conducted raid, ambush, and reconnaissance operations.

  • Special warfare intelligence collection and operational missions.

When the MP response force encounters or engages threats beyond its ability to defeat, it immediately notifies the rear CP. The response force maintains contact with the enemy and continues to develop the situation until the rear CP commits the division's TCF.



Figure 2-7. Rear area threat levels

The TCF responds to Level III threats. The TCF is normally a combined arms organization, Its specific size and composition, however, is determined by a METT-T analysis. The TCF can counter limited enemy-

  • Heliborne operations.

  • Airborne operations.

  • Amphibious operations.

  • Infiltration operations.

  • Ground force attacks in rear areas.

The G3 may designate a TCF as part of the division's overall task organization to respond to rear area threats. The designation of the TCF is based on a rear IPB, an analysis of METT-T, and the division commander's assessment of the overall enemy capabilities. It receives fire support from either DS field artillery units or fires from the division's GS and general support reinforcing field artillery units. The TCF will often have aviation support. When the TCF is designated, the commander coordinates with the ADC-S and division rear CP to develop multiple contingency plans for its employment in the division rear area.

The TCF is normally allocated to rear operations and committed by the ADC-S. Its premature commitment may rob the division of the flexibility and initiative required to counter the most significant enemy actions in the division's area. This decision is made when the ADC-S determines that both base or base cluster defense forces and Level II response forces are unable to counter a threat incursion or that the threat poses such a risk to the success of the division's rear operations that commitment of the TCF is necessary.

When appropriate, the TCF task-organizes its units and maneuvers them to where they can best interdict or engage the

enemy force. The TCF focuses on those threat targets critical to the division-ground and air avenues of approach, drop zones, and landing zones.

The TCF coordinates with response forces (normally MPs) regarding the exchange of reconnaissance information, battle handover procedures, and contingency plans for TCF operations. The rear CP ensures that movements in the division rear do not impede TCF operations.

When the TCF is committed, its movements take priority over all other movement and sustainment activities. If the tactical situation warrants, the rear CP or the main CP requests additional corps assets to assist the TCF. Such assets include other maneuver units, fire support assets, assault helicopters, and CAS. All requested support for TCF operations is initially placed OPCON to the TCF commander.

When the TCF is committed, the rear CP designates an AO for the TCF. At that time, units, bases, and base clusters within the designated TCF area of operations are OPCON to the TCF for tactical operations until the threat is eliminated.

Base and base cluster commanders develop a base or base cluster defense plan designed to detect and defend against enemy actions. Each commander bases his plan on the division rear CP IPB, his own IPB, the current intelligence situation, and an analysis of his unit's mission requirement. To maximize unit mission accomplishment, defense plans are flexible and allow for differing degrees of security based on the probability of threat activities. Defense plans should clearly delineate C2. This includes detection of threats through the use of observation posts (OPs) and patrols; assignment of defense sectors of responsibility to subordinates; integration of available weapons into the defense plan; identification of unit response forces to bolster the defense during an attack; obstacle, area damage control, internal air defense, and fire support planning; and air, ground, and NBC attack alarm systems.

Defense plans are given to MP units providing area security or battlefield circulation control near the base or base cluster. Defense plans are also given to forces designated to respond to attacks beyond the base or base cluster self-defense capability, and to the rear


operations cell for integration into the overall division rear defense and the support plans. Defense plans are coordinated with adjacent bases or base clusters to maximize mutual support and to prevent fratricide.

Base or base cluster commanders establish an operations center capable of maintaining 24-hour communications with the division rear operations cell for intelligence, tactical information, and direction and with their parent organization for unit mission guidance. Additionally, base or base cluster commanders establish communications with, and direct defensive operations of, other units occupying terrain within their base or base cluster.

The operations cell within the rear CP is responsible for planning rear area fire support operations. The operations cell collates base and base cluster fire plans and response force fire support plans. The rear FSE coordinates the composite rear operations fire support plan with the division FSCOORD and the FSE at the division main CP.

BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEMS

A variety of functions help commanders build and sustain combat power. These functions, called corn-bat functions, are described fully in TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9 and FM 100-5. Division commanders and their staffs translate combat functions into more specific strategic and operational functions when conducting theater- or operational-level missions and tactical-level functions when conducting tactical operations. The majority of division operations are tactical; operational-level missions are rare. Strategic theater-level missions for a division are more rare. The strategic level of war major functions, the strategic operating systems, occur at the national military and theater strategic levels performed by civil and military organizations and unified, joint, and combined strategic forces for successfully executing strategic plans and theater campaigns.

The operational level of war major functions, the operational operating Systems (OOS), are defined as those occurring in the theater (or area) of operations, performed by joint and combined operational forces, for successfully executing subordinate campaigns and major operations to accomplish the strategic objectives of the unified commander or higher military authority and operational objectives. The tactical level of war major functions, the battlefield operating systems (BOS), are defined as those occurring on the battlefield, performed by the force to successfully execute operations (battles and engagements) by the Army to accomplish military objectives directed by the

operational commander. (See Figure 2-8.)

Intelligence

Intelligence is a continuous process that occurs in peacetime as well as in war or conflict. Corps, joint, and national intelligence systems support the division intelligence effort. Collectively, this flexible array of systems and units provides the capability to locate and track the threat in support of close, deep, and rear operations. This intelligence architecture plans and directs, collects, processes, produces, and disseminates the information and intelligence commanders need to make timely decisions.

Tactical-level intelligence is required for planning and conducting tactical operations. It focuses on enemy formations, local terrain, and weather. It attempts to predict enemy tactical courses of action (COAs). Division and brigade commanders drive the intelligence they receive. Commanders focus intelligence primarily through priority intelligence


Figure 2-8. The battlefield operating systems

requirements (PIR) and designation of high-payoff targets. During war gaming, the 62 develops information requirements (IR) for each friendly COA. Each IR is linked to a specific enemy action that requires a friendly response. PIR are those information requirements critical to the accomplishment of the mission. The commander incorporates PIR into his commander's critical information requirements (CCIR).

The commander is intimately involved with PIR. He personally selects and updates them. He ensures they are tied directly to the maneuver scheme and his foreseen decisions. Because of limited collection assets, PIR must be limited to only his most critical needs. Organic collection systems may not satisfy all the commander's PIR. In that case, commanders must aggressively seek higher echelons' intelligence collection of, and answers to, their PIR. Since limited assets require tough decisions, some subordinate commanders will not have all their priority in formation requirements answered.


Commanders view the battlefield through intelligence. They tailor intelligence assets to get the information they need. Division intelligence assets are not normally held in reserve. Commanders weight their main effort with intelligence support. Intelligence assets are employed to their maximum capability.

Division intelligence accomplishes its missions through six primary tasks that tailor products for commanders and their staffs. (For detailed information on these tasks, see FM 34-1.)

Indication and Warning

The indication and warning task provides timely combat information and intelligence necessary for planning to many users. To prevent surprise to the force, it provides as much early warning as possible. It detects enemy actions that prove or run counter to planning assumptions, thereby alleviating risk. Indication and warning tasks intelligence systems, processes and analyzes information, and produces and rapidly disseminates intelligence to commanders and staffs to support planning and ongoing operations.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

The IPB is a continuous process that integrates the operational environment, weather, and terrain with the enemy's capabilities and doctrine. IPB is the responsibility of commanders. It allows commanders at all levels to understand the battlefield and synchronize all operating systems. The IPB results in products used by commanders and staff that display both enemy and friendly capabilities and vulnerabilities and predict potential enemy COAs. The IPB process is detailed in FM 34-130.

Situation Development

Commanders and staff use IPB products to provide an estimate of the enemy's combat effectiveness and present enemy courses of action. Situation development products confirm or deny enemy COAs. These products help the commander "see" the battlefield and provide a basis for prosecuting his plan or making appropriate changes.

Target Development

Target development products provide targets and target identification for attack with fire (lethal and nonlethal) and maneuver. The commander uses customized collection system downlinks and targeting products with fires to destroy, suppress, or neutralize targets.

Battle Damage Assessment

Battle damage assessment is an analysis of the results of a military operation for physical damage and its impact on enemy combat effectiveness. It estimates the enemy's combat effectiveness and capabilities needed to assess his probable COAs. As a function of the targeting methodology, BDA measures progress toward accomplishing the targeting effort.

Force Protection

Force protection seeks to identify and counter enemy intelligence collection capabilities and to assess friendly vulnerabilities and risk to the force. It includes all-source counterintelligence efforts, OPSEC, threat evaluations, and early warning.

The division's collection and jamming capabilities include-

  • The ground-based communication intercept, direction finding, and jamming.


  • Aerial communications intercept, DF, and jamming (Quickfix).

  • UAV.

  • Ground surveillance radars (GSRs).

  • Counterintelligence and interrogator personnel.

Ground-based EW Systems, when combined with Quickfix, provide communications intelligence (COMINT), intercept, and, in the near future, UAV to provide near-real-time electro-optical or forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) imagery.

The division's mobile integrated tactical terminal (MITT) can receive and exploit secondary imagery and SIGINT from corps processors as well as other systems. JSTARS and UAV downlink data and Guardrail-collected SIGINT are available to the division and brigades via the ground station module. Brigades will also be able to receive secondary imagery through the GSM. As in the corps, the All Source Analysis System (ASAS) is the backbone of division analysis with ASAS terminals at the brigades ensuring a common view of the battlefield. Trojan SPIRIT ensures reliable intelligence communications connectivity with corps and EAC.

Maneuver

The maneuver elements of a division are its ground brigades, attack helicopter battalions, and cavalry squadron. The objective of maneuver is to gain positional advantage over an enemy and, when the conditions have been met, to strike the final decisive blow-that is, to close with and defeat the enemy while minimizing risk to our soldiers. Maneuver units avoid head-on encounters.

Maneuver units purposefully strike vulnerable enemy flanks and rear areas to achieve superior combat power and inflict the greatest damage upon the enemy.

Reconnaissance and Security

Reconnaissance and security operations are subsets of the maneuver BOS. Reconnaissance allows commanders to gain and maintain contact with the enemy and to develop the situation for the employment of other assets and units. It provides information on terrain and the enemy to commanders and their staffs. Reconnaissance verifies or refutes analyzed information in IPB products. It is accomplished by ground (mounted or dismounted), air, or technical means.

Ground reconnaissance near the enemy is often risky. Technical and air assets, rather than soldiers, are used to gather information when possible. However, all division units can and do perform some ground reconnaissance in the conduct of their operations to provide the commander with an all-weather, eyes-on-target capability.

Air reconnaissance assets are lower in risk, but subject to extreme weather conditions. These systems can, however, cover large areas relatively quickly. Using technical means is relatively low in risk and can cue other reconnaissance assets. Technical assets can cover extremely large areas or focus on very precise targets. The complementary use of all these assets provides commanders an accurate picture of the battlefield.

Reconnaissance does much more than provide information. Reconnaissance missions include route, zone, area, and reconnaissance in force. Reconnaissance orients on an enemy force or area in enemy territory. NBC weapons.


Reconnaissance is discussed fully in Appendix A.

Security operations orient on friendly forces and focus on providing the division forces reaction time, maneuver space, and protection. When properly task-organized, augmented, and supported, any element assigned to or supporting the division may perform security operations. There are four general security missions: screen, guard, cover, and area security. However, the division conducts other security actions as part of tactical operations that also protect the force and its mission. These actions include (but are not limited to) electronic attack, electronic warfare support, deception operations, OPSEC, and cover and concealment. Security operations are also detailed in Appendix A.

Armored, Mechanized, and Aviation Forces

Armored and mechanized maneuver units are normally used in the division close operation to close with and destroy enemy forces. Attack helicopter units are integrated, as part of the combined arms effort, into deep, close, and rear operations.

The division employs these units as part of its security operation in both the offense and the defense.

Armored, mechanized, and aviation forces are particularly appropriate as reserves because of their mobility, lethality, and firepower. They can strike the enemy at critical times and places to seize or regain the initiative through destruction of the enemy force. They can also stop sudden enemy penetrations or incursions into the division rear. The division may, on occasion, commit armored and mechanized maneuver forces and its aviation brigade in support of deep operations.

Light Forces

Although light forces can operate in any environment, they are best used to exploit restricted terrain, limited visibility, adverse weather, and urban warfare. Light forces depend on terrain for their survival in both the offense and the defense. In the offense, light maneuver forces are employed in restrictive terrain. They infiltrate at night or conduct stay-behind operations to secure limited objectives and to attack high-payoff targets. They are well suited for air assault operations. They also close with and destroy the enemy. In the defense, light maneuver brigades position battalions laterally and in depth to make the best use of terrain. Even in the defense, light forces conduct air assault and infiltration operations.

Light divisions are augmented based on METT-T factors. They require additional artillery, engineer, and antiarmor forces and mobility augmentation when defending against heavy enemy forces in open terrain. Light forces will normally not be task-organized below brigade level. However, the light battalion can be attached to armored units to conduct specific special operations for a short time.

Fire Support

Fire support is the collective and coordinated use of the fires of armed aircraft, land- and sea-based indirect fire systems, and EW systems against ground targets to support land operations at both the operational and tactical levels. Within the division, these systems include field artillery, mortars, EW, tactical fixed-wing aviation, PSYOP and, when available, naval surface fire support and SOF direct actions. The division fire support plan is synchronized with and integrated into the scheme of maneuver. The plan must be consistent with the division commander's intent.


Fires supporting the division allow the commander to mass combat power quickly at appropriate times and places. Fires aid in seizing the initiative deep, close, and rear. Fires destroy, disrupt, and delay the enemy. The commander allocates fires to support his maneuver elements. In some cases, he may allocate maneuver elements to exploit his fires.

The key to receiving timely and effective joint fires is understanding the joint targeting process. At tactical levels, the commander and staff use a targeting methodology based on the decide, detect, deliver, and assess functions. (See Figure 2-9.) Each function occurs both simultaneously and sequentially. Target tracking is not a separate function, but is inherent throughout the targeting process. Target tracking must be planned simultaneously with the development of the intelligence collection plan (decide). It is executed during the targeting function of detect and supports both targeting functions of deliver and assess. For more detailed discussion, see FM 6-20-10.

The Army does not fight alone. The Army achieves victory more quickly and with fewer casualties with the integration of its own capabilities


Figure 2-9. Target methodology

with sister services and allied partners. Joint and multinational fires enhance Army division operations. (Army corps and divisions may also provide fires for the joint or multinational force.) No target model exists in joint doctrine however. The joint targeting process is described in Joint Publication 2-01.1. To obtain efficient joint fire support, division planners must comply with the sister service time requirements for submitting requests. All these requests should be prioritized.

Mobility and Survivability

The mobility and survivability BOS includes bothengineer and NBC functions. Specifically, it addresses mobility, countermobility, survivability, smoke, and NBC defense operations. These actions provide mobility to the division units, degrade the enemy's ability to move on the battlefield, and provide protective emplacements for personnel and equipment. Plans for mobility, countermobility, and survivability operations are consistent with the commander's intent and complement the concept of operation. Engineers normally mass to support the main effort. They normally require support from a higher supporting headquarters. They support the division's deep, close, and rear fights and must be active players in the IPB process.

Mobility operations generally breach both friendly and enemy minefields and obstacles. They also conduct gap crossing, maintain supply routes, prepare combat trails between battle positions, and support forward aviation units.

Countermobility operations attack the enemy's ability to execute his plan. These operations use terrain, friendly and enemy-emplaced obstacles, and fires. Slowing enemy movement creates opportunities that other combat systems can exploit. Commanders and their staffs ensure that obstacles support the intent, mission, scheme of maneuver, and branches and sequels to the operation but that they do not degrade their mobility. Well-planned countermobility operations are combat multipliers, enhancing the effects of friendly direct and indirect fires.

Survivability operations incorporate vulnerability analysis and countermeasures. These countermeasures include contamination avoidance, protection, decontamination, and use of smoke and obscurants.

This battlefield operating system is also concerned with international and host country environmental laws that impact on the operation. Commanders consider these regulations and integrate appropriate directives into their plans and orders. Environmental law has now become a cost of doing business. For specific guidance, see Army Regulations (ARs) 200-1 and 200-2.


Air Defense

Division air defense operations consist of all passive and active measures that degrade the effects of enemy air attack on friendly units, supplies, and facilities and include Air Force, Navy, and Marine aviation direct and indirect fires. Passive AD measures include camouflage, concealment, dispersion, and deception. The best self-defense against air attack is to avoid being seen. Active air defense is direct defensive action taken to destroy or reduce the effectiveness of enemy air attack.

The division air defense system is capable of prioritized protection of division forces and must be integrated with the corps and JTF air defense plan. Ideally, the air defense system identifies and engages enemy aircraft before friendly forces can be attacked. This integrated system has the capability to engage targets simultaneously to support division close, deep, and rear operations.

The current joint approach for air defense optimizes each service's AD capabilities against a variety of targets. These range from high- and low-speed aircraft at various altitudes, to long- and short-range ballistic missiles, to an emerging UAV threat. The air defense BOS is also concerned with aerial IPB, predictive assessment of enemy AD weapons in accordance with the commander's priorities, early warning of an impending air threat, and massing of AD fires.

Combat Service Support

The division CSS system must support the overall intent and concept of the commander. Sustaining the division fight requires all CSS elements to adhere to the logistics characteristics of anticipation, integration, continuity, responsiveness, and improvisation. The division CSS system can support deep, close, and rear operations simultaneously. Division CSS elements are

integrated into the division C2 system so that they can shift support effort to the critical place and time to weight the battle. Sustainment operations enable the division commander to mass combat power.

Prior to tactical operations, the division commander establishes criteria for withdrawing units for reconstitution. The reconstitution effort focuses on reorganizing organic assets to quickly return them to combat. Coordination between the G1 for personnel replacements and the G4 for equipment allows combat systems to be distributed in a ready-to-fight configuration. The division commander always sets priorities for distribution for replacements and supplies. His unit's combat capability is directly related to available leadership, manned and operable systems, and morale.

This BOS includes both public affairs (PA) services and civil affairs. These activities are located as the commander deems appropriate, based on the nature of the operation. The commander employs his public affairs activities to communicate the policies, US resolve, and actions through US and international news media. PA and CA efforts (as well as PSYOP) must be coordinated through the planning process and information exchanged continually during current operations. Although PA, CA, and PSYOP each has some discrete audiences with tailored messages, the information overlap between their audiences is growing. The different messages must not contradict one another or the credibility of all three is lost.

Command and Control

The concept of battle command was introduced in the 1993 edition of FM 100-5, and expands the Army's notion of command and control (C2). Battle command includes our previous thoughts, but incorporates the art and the science of decision making and leadership to accomplish missions. Chapter 3 applies the concept of battle command to division operations in detail.





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