CHAPTER 3
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
This chapter provides some examples of how the infantry division integrates and synchronizes organic and supporting combat, CS, and CSS assets to conduct offensive operations. It describes these division operations--deliberate attack, penetration, movement to contact, exploitation and pursuit, and follow and support.
Each operation is described as part of a corps operation. The infantry division operation supports the corps commander's intent and concept of operations.
Corps, divisions, and brigades use a variety of tactics and techniques to execute these operations. The tactics and techniques discussed in this chapter are meant to be illustrative in nature. They describe just one way a division may conduct operations.
The four general forms of the tactical offense are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. While it is convenient to talk of them as different forms, in reality they flow readily from the one to the other. Different forms of attack may occur throughout the depth of the battlefield simultaneously. An attack may lead to exploitation, and exploitation can lead to pursuit. But there are often occasions when pursuit can be followed by deliberate attack, or deliberate attack can lead directly to pursuit. The ebb and flow of battle opens up many avenues for attack. Victory normally goes to the bold and eludes the commander who can see only the parts and not the whole of the combat.
The forms of maneuver are envelopment, turning movement, infiltration penetration, and frontal attack. They orient on the enemy force, not terrain. The commander selects the form of maneuver which will best achieve his purpose with regard to the enemy. Forms of maneuver and forms of offensive operations complement one another. The forms of maneuver apply equally to traditional battles or to the fluid, extended contact of noncontiguous battlefields. While frequently used in combination, each attacks the enemy in a different way, posing different challenges to the attacking commander.
The primary focus of division offensive deep operations is to interdict by delaying, disrupting, or diverting enemy division reserves (battalion- or regimental-sized counterattack forces); it then shifts to enemy units defending in defensive positions in depth. Infantry divisions conducting deep operations are limited by the capabilities of their organic weapons systems and will likely require corps weapons systems augmentation, such as MLRS and attack helicopters. The following examples portray the division conducting an infiltration and deliberate attack, operating as part of the corps attack, and as such do not have a deep operation. If the division were conducting a more conventional deliberate attack, then deep operations planning and execution would be appropriate. Refer to Chapter 4, Infantry Division Defense, or an expanded discussion of infantry division deep operations.
The United States signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on 13 Jan 93 and, in doing so, effectively renounced the use of chemical weapons (CW) for any reason, including retaliation. The CWC is a major step in the US long-term goal of eliminating the threat of chemical use by achieving a worldwide ban. The United States will now attempt to deter enemy use of chemical (or biological) weapons by--
- Maintaining a strong nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defensive posture.
- Maintaining the military capabilities to deny an enemy a significant military advantage from such use.
- Updating the technology of chemical defense.
- Encouraging universality and compliance with the CWC.
The US acceptance of the CWC has resulted in eliminating or modifying several functions. Artillery units no longer train for delivery of chemical weapons and the Army does not maintain chemical stocks in a "ready-for-issue" status.
Further, recent US policy changes resulting in the elimination of short-ranged, ground-launched nuclear weapons also eliminated the US Army organic nuclear capability. Consequently, the use of nuclear weapons in support of operations will come from our sister services (Navy and Air Force). Presently, corps is the lowest level at which nuclear fire planning is conducted. The division is responsible for force protection and NBC defense only, for example, issuing strike warnings and conducting vulnerability analysis.
The infantry division normally conducts offensive operations in restricted terrain. It can conduct a deliberate attack to seize key terrain and destroy enemy forces. It attacks with surprise and violence to break the enemy's backbone. This section discusses the tactics and techniques used by the division in a deliberate attack.
In our example, corps has conducted a successful defense and is preparing to transition to the offense. The corps commander estimates the enemy is widely dispersed and at 40 to 60 percent strength. The terrain immediately to the corps front is rugged and difficult for maneuvering heavy units.
Corps requests the infantry division because of its unique capabilities to infiltrate in rugged terrain and to conduct air assault operations. The ability of the infantry division to achieve surprise and concentrate overwhelming combat power in the enemy rear is key to the success of the corps plan.
An extensive corps IPB determines the feasibility of using the infantry division. During the IPB process, enemy forces are located, terrain is analyzed, and risk is determined. The corps provides IPB products to the infantry division during the plans development process.
The corps commander's concept for the attack (see Figure 3-1) is to seize with infantry key choke points (objectives FOX and WOLF) and river crossing sites (objective DOG), penetrate enemy defenses with in-place defending mechanized divisions, and then attack with the corps reserve (an armored division) to seize objective SNAKE.
Following the attack of the armored division, the infantry division conducts consolidation and reorganization operations and prepares to follow and support the attacking armored division or conduct operations to secure the corps MSRs from the line of departure/line of contact (LD/LC) to objective DOG.
The corps operation is planned and executed in five phases. In phase one, in-place divisions continue to defend, conduct aggressive patrolling, and counter reconnaissance operations. The infantry division moves forward to tactical assembly areas in preparation for the attack.
In phase two (Figure 3-2), the infantry brigades infiltrate across the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) to designated assault positions.
In phase three (Figure 3-3), in-place divisions attack to penetrate the FEBA and create a gap to pass the lead armored division for the attack on the corps objective. Simultaneously, dismounted infantry attack to secure dominant terrain and choke points at objectives FOX and WOLF.
In phase four (Figure 3-4), the armored division attacks through the gap created in the FEBA by the in-place division, conducts linkup, and passes through choke points secured by the infantry. Once the armored division reaches PL BLUE, the third infantry brigade air assaults to seize river crossing sites on objective DOG.
In phase five (Figure 3-5), the armored division conducts a link-up operation with the dismounted infantry, conducts the river crossing, and then attacks to seize the corps objective. The infantry division may be directed to conduct follow and support operations to secure the lines of communication (LOC) from the FEBA to the corps objective.
Maneuver
The infantry division commander and staff receive the corps commander's concept. Through the decision-making process, they determine that a brigade is required to seize each objective. The commander's concept is to infiltrate two brigades to seize choke points, objectives FOX and WOLF, and a third brigade for an air assault operation to seize crossing sites at objective DOG. For reasons, one brigade will be attached to the division in the north. The commander task organizes his assets as shown, based on his concept and mission requirements (Figure 3-6). The brigade seizing objective WOLF will initially be the division's main effort.
Deep Operations
The infantry division is part of the overall corps attack. In the conduct of this mission, it has no deep operation mission. Corps coordinates its deep operations with the infantry division to synchronize the infiltration and subsequent attack into the overall corps plan. Synchronization is accomplished by detailed planning and centralized execution by corps attack assets beyond PL GREEN. Corps directs its efforts toward shaping the battlefield to ensure the infiltration is not discovered early.
To accomplish this, corps uses other assets to disrupt, delay, deceive, and confuse the enemy. When the infantry division infiltrates, the corps may portray activity or possible threats at other portions of the battlefield to divert the enemy's attention from the infiltration area.
Close Operations
The infantry division commander's concept of the operation supports the corps commander's concept. Success depends on the division's ability to seize and hold its objectives and quickly pass the armored attack force through them. The infantry division commander knows the operation depends on achieving surprise and a coordinated attack by his brigades and the defending heavy divisions. The commander's concept calls for a five-phase operation linked to the phases presented in the corps concept.
In phase one (Figure 3-7), the infantry division, with its reinforcing and augmenting elements, moves to forward assembly areas close to the LD/LC and begins reconnaissance and preparation for combat activities. It coordinates with defending divisions to position artillery and support units and identify passage points and possible infiltration corridors to attack positions. Support units move to base clusters near assembly areas. While the division is moving into assembly areas, the staff designates infiltration corridors large enough to accommodate a brigade infiltration (Figure 3-8).
The infantry division coordinates with the defending divisions for passage. Other essential information (fire support measures, ADA coverage, and engineer support) is coordinated and integrated with corps and the defending divisions to support the infiltration and subsequent attacks.
While in tactical assembly areas, the infantry brigades prepare for combat and conduct reconnaissance to confirm the viability of selected infiltration corridors. Brigades assign battalion corridors for reconnaissance. Battalions select routes inside assigned corridors. Brigades use this information to develop detailed infiltration routes. See Chapter 7 for more information on infiltration techniques.
In phase two, the 1st and 2d brigades conduct a passage of lines through in-place defending divisions and infiltrate through enemy areas to assault positions. As the brigades assemble for the infiltration and attack, boundaries are adjusted. Brigade rear boundaries are moved closer to the objective, thus establishing brigade boundaries around each objective. This meets the corps commander's guidance and provides the defending divisions room to maneuver as they transition to the attack. This maneuver room is necessary to create the penetration.
In phase three (Figure 3-9), the assault on objectives FOX and WOLF begins and the heavy divisions attack simultaneously to penetrate and create the gap in the FEBA.
During phase four, the brigades consolidate on their objectives and link up with and pass the corps armored division. The infantry division has coordinated link-up procedures with the armored division prior to the attack. The brigade tasks battalions to establish link-up points at predetermined locations.
In phase five (Figure 3-10), the 3d brigade conducts the air assault to seize objective DOG while the lead unit of the attacking armored force simultaneously crosses phase line BLUE. The infantry brigade, which has seized objective DOG and the crossing sites, establishes link-up points to pass the armored division. It passes the division and prepares for the next mission (Figure 3-10 continued). Link-up points and procedures have been coordinated with the armored division prior to the attack.
Rear Operations
The primary role of the division rear and CSS elements is to coordinate logistics operations and support for maneuver brigades. The rear CP and the defending mechanized divisions coordinate terrain management and traffic control. The divisions' rear CPs are responsible for coordinating rear area security.
Security Operations
The corps protects the infiltrating force by deception and active security. Before the infiltration begins, the corps attempts to deceive the enemy about the infantry division's movements and intent. It may do this by conducting feints and spoiling attack operations that divert enemy attention away from the infiltration area or by a corps deception plan. Once the infiltration begins, the infantry division coordinates security with the defending divisions and corps.
Reserve Operations
The division has no designated reserve during the infiltration movement.
Intelligence
The division commander, working with the G2, G3, and FSCOORD, develops the PIR. The intelligence assets required to collect PIR are integrated into the division collection plan. The division submits requests to corps for support and taskings to support the collection plan when the plan exceeds its organic capabilities. The commander's PIR focus on enemy units or actions which may adversely affect the infiltration, attack, or air assault operation and the location of all enemy ADA assets along the air assault flight route. The commander has decided his PIR are enemy maneuver locations and movements (company and larger), artillery, mortar, and sensor locations near objectives. The division coordinates with both the corps and defending mechanized divisions for previously collected information (enemy, sensor, or OP locations). The corps Quickfix and division LRSD are used to provide real-time information and intelligence. The LRSD teams are inserted via air about the same time as the infiltration starts. They report back on the status of LZs and crossing sites.
The division's MI assets support the division collection plan for all phases of the operation. In phases one through five, the infantry division uses maneuver brigades and those assets which do not have to accompany infiltrating units to collect information. By positioning MI assets along the FEBA, they support both the division and corps collection plans. To facilitate collection of intelligence in phase five, an IEW team moves with the air assaulting brigade. The IEW team looks beyond objective DOG and is with the forward ground element.
Fire Support
The infantry division supports its attack with CAS, attack helicopters, artillery, and EW. Fires must be responsive during all phases of the operation. Task-organized division artillery and a corps reinforcing FA brigade provide responsive fire support.
Corps artillery assigns a priority of fire for each phase of the operation. During phase one, priority of fire is to the defending divisions; in phase two, the infantry division; in phase three, penetrating divisions; and in phases four and five, the attacking armored division.
The division FSE selects areas and coordinates with the G3 (or S3 at brigade level) before positioning artillery in a unit's sector. The FSE then passes approved position areas to DIVARTY which positions GS and general support reinforcing (GSR) artillery. Brigade FSCOORDs, in coordination with their maneuver commanders, position DS artillery. (Figure 3-11.) Artillery positions are well forward to provide continuous artillery coverage forward to support all phases of the infiltration operation--reconnaissance, infiltration, attack, and linkup.
Direct support artillery assets do not infiltrate with the brigades. However, the air assault brigade must take its DS artillery to provide counterfire support since counterfire targets will likely be out of the range of supporting artillery positioned behind the LD/LC.
The defending heavy divisions and corps artillery battalions are assigned nonstandard missions to allow them to fire in support of changing priorities. The nonstandard mission sets limits on ammunition expenditure and positioning. Ammunition to support the infiltration and penetration is stockpiled on the ground at battery locations. It is used to fire corps and division preparations, programs, target groups, and other types of fires. The corps artillery commander and his staff integrate fires to ensure efficient use of in-place and supporting corps artillery.
Coordination between the infantry division and corps FSE is critical to prevent fratricide. The infantry division establishes and coordinates fire support coordination measures for infiltration corridors, attack positions, objectives, and link-up points. The infantry division DIVARTY controls fire support between PL GREEN and PL BLUE during the infiltration. In-place divisions assume responsibility for fire coordination (within their boundaries to PL BLUE) once the infiltration is complete. The armored division assumes responsibility for controlling fires (beyond PL BLUE) when its lead element conducts the passage with the infantry. Corps establishes on-order restrictive fire areas (RFAs) around objectives and linkup points.
Engagement areas and family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) minefield are planned with corps to seal the objectives from possible enemy reinforcement and neutralize enemy actions to the flanks.
The corps artillery headquarters coordinates counter mortar and counterbattery radar positioning and control. The infantry division FSE coordinates radar coverages with the defending division's FSEs. Radars are positioned to provide continuous support throughout the infantry division's sector. Corps establishes Quickfire channels between radars and firing units to rapidly silence enemy indirect fire systems which may affect the corps plan. A Q-36 radar with the 3d brigade's DS artillery provides counterbattery coverage at the river crossing sites.
Mobility and Survivability
Priority of engineer support within the infantry division is mobility. Light engineer companies are attached to each brigade (See task organization at Figure 3-6.)
During the infiltration light engineer companies support the crossing of obstacles and report information on obstacles, bridge conditions, and soil composition in the areas they infiltrate. The infantry division, defending divisions, and corps use this data to prepare for the penetration, attack, and follow-on movement of CSS assets. Armor division engineers support the crossing of the LD/LC by the infantry division. Infantry division light engineer companies with brigades breach obstacles during the assault on objectives and, where possible, in and around the link-up points. The infantry division engineer plans FASCAM to block enemy counterattacks and reinforcements. The infantry division's engineer battalion retains personnel and equipment not infiltrated near the LD/LC to support on-order follow and support missions.
Air Defense Artillery
The division ADA's primary role is to provide AD coverage during all phases of the plan. For the infiltration, infantry brigades move with only man-portable air defense (MANPAD) systems. Vulcans and Avengers are left in the rear near the LD/LC. They provide coverage for the division CP and CSS assets. Stinger weapons systems provide coverage during the passage of the infantry division, the infiltration, and the attack, and at link-up points. This allows ADA systems of attacking divisions to move forward under the coverage of the infantry division systems.
During the infiltration, corps ADA priority is to infiltrating brigades. Corps pushes its high altitude ADA coverage as far forward as possible to support the operation. Division ADA weapons are under "weapons hold" during the infiltration. Passive defensive measures are the division's primary air defense. Air defense elements with infiltrating brigades form a protective umbrella around and over objective areas. They maintain this coverage and extend it to cover link-up points once objectives are secure. On execution of the air assault, the corps AD priority shifts to the attacking divisions. Air defense systems in the air assault brigade establish coverage for the assault and river crossing sites. The infantry division's G3 directs division towed systems forward with the attacking heavy division as soon as possible. This strengthens coverage over choke points and river crossing sites and provides additional ground firepower if required.
Combat Service Support
Brigades can sustain field operations for 48 to 72 hours without resupply. The division commander has determined resupply of class I, IV, and V, and evacuation of wounded, will be required on consolidation on objectives (Figure 3-12). The main effort is weighted with CSS assets, particularly HSS. Maximum use of the container delivery system (CDS) is coordinated by G4 to conduct resupply. Preconfigured class VIII packages, tailored to meet specific mission requirements, are shipped via push-packages to HSS elements.
Aerial assets accomplish resupply during the consolidation on the objective. Movement of FSB support assets is integrated into the attacking division's follow-on logistics movement. The division's DTO coordinates MSRs to locations selected by the forward brigades. FSBs move forward on order from their supported brigade. Information on requirements and displacements is provided to the DISCOM.
The infantry division DISCOM HQ may not move during this operation. Main support battalion units and elements of the materiel management center (MMC) move to the vicinity of the FSBs to support reorganization of the brigades in preparation for the next mission.
Command and Control
On receipt of the warning order, the infantry division TAC CP moves forward to coordinate the infiltration with defending divisions. The TAC CP determines brigade assembly areas, initial passage points, corridors, and link-up points as brigades prepare to move to assembly areas. In this example, the TAC CP is forward near the LD/LC to support brigade operations. To aid, the infantry division provides liaison teams to each defending division. The infantry division uses control measures established by corps for coordination. It establishes brigade boundaries and responsibilities for each phase of the infantry division operation. Brigade CPs move forward and collocate with the CPs of brigades through which they will pass, as do their battalions.
The infantry division TAC CP moves forward behind the last maneuver brigade of the attacking armored division with the reconnaissance squadron ground troop; this provides security to the TAC while it moves. The TAC CP repositions forward in the vicinity of objective DOG. The command section air assaults with the 3d brigade as the river crossing sites are secured. Main and rear CPs move on order.
Divisions equipped with a lightweight tactical fire direction system (LTACFIRE) may use burst transmissions for communications during the infiltration. This reduces radio transmission time and provides additional security.
Penetrations are used when enemy flanks are not assailable and no other form of maneuver is permitted. This is the least desirable form of maneuver performed by light divisions. Since it pits the attacker's strength against the defender's, penetration may result in higher casualty rates than other forms of maneuver.
The penetrating unit masses sufficient combat power at the points of penetration to overwhelm the enemy. The infantry division masses effects from fires of all available means to breach enemy defensive positions along a narrow front, hold open the shoulder, and degrade the effects of a counterattack. Follow-on friendly forces rapidly exploit success of the penetrating forces. Multiple penetration points may be desirable for the attacker if it causes the enemy to disperse his fires and consider multiple threats before committing.
In this example, the corps has conducted a successful offensive operation that has defeated the enemy's main and secondary defensive positions forcing the enemy to withdraw. The corps, approaching its culmination point, has halted further exploitation operations and has ordered its divisions to establish hasty defensive positions. This operational halt provides the corps time to reposition resources and forces in preparation of renewing the offensive.
Enemy forces, significantly weakened by the corps' initial success, are attempting to reestablish their defensive positions. Taking advantage of the corps' temporary halt, the enemy anchors its defense on restrictive terrain which dominates the armored approaches within the advancing corps sector. Except for these few roads, terrain within the corps sector is generally inaccessible to armored forces. Remaining enemy forces are positioned loosely across the frontage, forming a screen line to locate friendly infiltrations. Enemy locations are generally known and the corps covering force is maintaining contact with the enemy.
The corps commander continues the offensive as soon as possible, maintaining pressure on the enemy and allowing him little time to strengthen his defenses with reinforcements. The commander maintains a corps defensive frontage with two divisions in hasty defensive positions that are tied into the adjacent corps on the right flank. The operational pause allowed the corps time to consolidate and prepare for a penetration attack in the corps eastern sector.
As the corps main effort, the light division has the mission to conduct the penetration, given the restricted terrain; the western division conducts a feint as a supporting attack to confuse and hold repositioning of forces by the enemy. The corps attack is synchronized with the adjacent corps attack, presenting the enemy with multiple threats across a wide frontage and preventing him from consolidating fires. An artillery preparation phase precedes the corps attack to weaken the defender, limiting his ability to react against the penetrating force, and to cover the light division movement. Once the light division makes the penetration, the follow-on armor division exploits it and continues the attack. The remaining corps' divisions roll up the enemy flanks and conduct follow and support missions behind the exploiting armored division. The corps orchestrates deep operations during the penetration. This rapidly executed operation quickly defeats the weakened enemy before he can reinforce his defense, thus denying him defensible terrain.
Maneuver
The division commander moves through the emplaced friendly defending division to conduct a coordinated night attack to secure selected objectives as the corps penetration force. Taking advantage of limited visible and restricted terrain, the division commander conducts the penetration with two brigades at two separate points. The eastern penetration point is the division's main attack. (See Figure 3-13 and Figure 3-14.)
An intense artillery preparation precedes the blocking positions. The division commander penetration attack to cover the division's movement, soften the enemy's defenses at the penetration points, and close the area to enemy reinforcements during the attack. On order, a brigade (-) air assaults to secure blocking position forward of the penetration attack to prevent enemy reinforcements. Once the initial penetration is made, the attached armored brigade (OPCON) moves rapidly through the created rupture, clearing the road and executing a linkup with the brigade (-) occupying forward intends to maintain a battalion-sized reserve capable of influencing the penetration and or committing to secure flanks, if required. Success is the penetration of the enemy's defense, facilitating movement of the follow-on corps forces through the division's assigned sector.
Deep operations for the division are fought by the corps. Close coordination between the division and corps staffs synchronizes the corps deep operations with the division's penetration. The division commits its assets and efforts to the penetration.
The division attacks under the cover of darkness and the corps' artillery preparation. On order, the division conducts a coordinated attack with two brigades attacking to seize their designated division objectives. Seizure of these two objectives provides flank security for the exploiting armored brigade. The 3d brigade (-), which is held to weight the initial penetration if required, on order conducts an air assault to establish blocking positions forward of the penetrating brigades to prevent enemy reinforcing forces from entering or influencing the penetration. On seizing the objectives, the attached armored brigade attacks to clear a route through the enemy's defenses for the corps follow-on forces. The armored brigade conducts a linkup with the air assault brigade and establishes a hasty defense that strengthens the division's forward defense in advance of corps follow-on forces. On order, the division passes the corps' follow-on divisions through sector.
The aviation brigade supports 3d brigade's air assault, establishing a frontal screen forward of 3d brigade on executing the air assault. The screen provides early warning for the division and delays enemy reinforcements from entering the penetration. The division cavalry is attached to the aviation brigade during this operation.
Intelligence
The commander develops his PIR to pinpoint enemy positions and movement of maneuver, artillery, mortars, and sensor locations. The division coordinates with both the forward defending friendly division and corps for additional collection support. LRSD teams and corps Quickfix assets provide real-time intelligence before and during the penetration. Division intelligence assets are positioned along the FEBA except for the LRSD and IEW teams attached to the air assault brigade.
Fire Support
As the corps main effort, the division receives additional corps fire support. The corps allocates a FA brigade to support the division's penetration and coordinates the defending division fires to ensure massing of fires in the vicinity of the penetration point. All artillery units available support the penetration except for the western division artillery conducting the corps feint.
Each infantry brigade retains its DS artillery battalion. The air assault brigade takes its DS artillery battalion to provide fires and counterfires support.
Mobility and Survivability
Priority of the engineer efforts is initially to mobility. Engineer assets assist in the breaching and forward momentum of the exploiting armored brigade. Each penetrating brigade receives an engineer company to assist in its initial breach. These light engineer companies assist in eliminating obstacles during the assault. The noncommitted personnel and equipment of the light engineer battalion are positioned near the LD/LC to support the penetration and follow-on forces when required. A mechanized engineer battalion is attached to the armored brigade to clear the road network as the brigade attacks. The air assault brigade engineer company assists in establishing countermobility obstacles to block enemy reinforcements. As heavy equipment arrives and countermobility efforts are completed, survivability positions become priority for the blocking brigade. The infantry division engineer battalion plans FASCAM to block enemy counterattacks and reinforcements during this operation.
Air Defense
Air defense's primary role is to provide the division defense coverage during the penetration and follow-on operations. Avengers and Vulcans are located near the LD/LC. Coverage by the forward defending division ADA is integrated into the attacking division coverage. Attached brigade Stinger teams provide coverage to the penetrating and air assault forces and attached Avengers provide coverage for the exploiting armored brigade. With organic and corps-coordinated coverage, the division has ADA coverage throughout this operation.
Command and Control
The TAC CP moves forward to coordinate the passage of the division's attacking forces on receipt of the corps warning order. The TAC CP coordinates passage lanes, attack positions, collocation of CPs, supporting fires, and placement locations for supporting division assets. The TAC CP remains near the LD/LC until the brigade objectives are seized and then moves forward with the attacking armored brigade. The TAC CP will be established in the vicinity of the blocking brigade once linkup with the armored brigade is complete. The main and rear CPs remain in the division's assembly areas initially, then displace on order with follow-on forces.
The division conducts a movement to contact to gain or regain contact with the enemy and in a way that risks the smallest possible part of the force. This keeps the remainder available to respond immediately when the division makes contact. When executed against a force of comparable mobility in restrictive terrain, movement to contact is viable for the infantry division. Once the enemy is found, the ability to move rapidly to conduct hasty attacks or mass additional combat power is the key to success. Movement to contact operations include the approach march, search and attack, and reconnaissance in force.
The Approach March
In this example, the corps has been successful in driving back enemy forces from their initial lines of defense. Contact with the enemy has been lost as the enemy has withdrawn. (Figure 3-15). The nature of the terrain causes the corps commander to use his infantry division in a movement to contact to reestablish contact with the enemy. If successful, the corps commander will commit his armored force. The corps commander's intent is to regain contact with the enemy and exploit success. The current tactical situation and intelligence reports indicate:
- The enemy's location is unknown.
- Corps has no covering force.
- The enemy has the capability to disrupt or delay the corps.
- US forces have air superiority.
- The corps heavy division is in a hasty defensive and has an on order mission to continue the attack.
- Terrain is restrictive with limited movement routes for armored forces.
Maneuver
The division commander's concept of operations requires aggressive and deliberate movement over restrictive terrain. The division will conduct an approach march, crossing the LD/LC in brigade column to locate and establish contact with the enemy. Once the division makes contact, it will develop the situation. The division has the option to destroy or contain the enemy, depending on the size of the enemy force and the situation at the time of contact. If the division does not make significant contact, it continues to move until it traverses the restrictive terrain at phase line GREEN (Figure 3-16) and armored forces pass forward.
Deep Operations. The corps conducts deep operations against uncommitted enemy forces and lines of communications and supply of those forces. It provides the division with intelligence on these uncommitted forces.
Close Operations. While the division conducts a movement to contact to gain or regain contact with the enemy, it must do it in a way that risks the smallest possible part of the force while the remainder is available to respond when the lead element makes contact with the enemy.
In this example, the division's approach march is task-organized and moves in brigade column along one axis. (See Figure 3-17.) The cavalry squadron conducts a zone reconnaissance in front of the brigades to locate enemy forces.
A battalion task force constitutes an advance guard force which moves to the front of the lead brigade. The lead brigade (-) follows the advance guard while the other two brigades follow in trail. Elements from the trail brigade form a rear guard. Flank security is provided by the brigades and a screen is established on their flanks. Combat support and limited CSS assets are integrated into brigade columns.
The division cavalry squadron locates the enemy, develops the situation within its capability, and maintains contact until the advance guard is committed. If the division commander decides to conduct a hasty attack, the lead brigade is in position to do so. If the enemy force is of sufficient size to preclude an attack by one brigade, the lead brigade may fix the enemy force as the second brigade in column swings to the flank to attack the enemy.
Rear Operations. Rear units, DISCOM, and division troops remain in the DSA. The in-place unit provides security until committed. The rear CP will coordinate and synchronize both air and ground movements forward. Sustainment units move on order once the restrictive terrain is secured.
Security Operations. In addition to the advance, flank, and rear guards, the division maintains security by positioning its assets within mutually supporting distances as it moves. Early warning is critical to its security. Long-range surveillance (LRS) patrols and electronic intelligence gathering assets help locate the enemy and indicate his possible locations and intent.
Reserve Operation. There is no dedicated reserve for this operation. The reserve mission is given to the least committed brigade in the event of contact.
Intelligence
The primary mission of intelligence assets is to find the enemy and report to the commander in a timely manner. The commander establishes his critical information requirements (CIR) early to focus the efforts of all collection assets. The commander approves a collection plan and specific PIR, the acquisition asset to use, and actions to take once PIR are reported. For more information on this process, see Chapter 5.
The division requires intelligence information continuously as it moves forward. The cavalry squadron reports directly to the TAC CP where the intelligence staff officer analyzes the information along with other sources, such as division and corps long-range surveillance units. Collection of information from designated NAIs and TAIs also aids the development of intelligence to locate the enemy.
Intelligence acquisition gaps may occur. Due to the area covered by the division, the G2 must plan for possible gaps and have a means to ensure the enemy is not hidden, awaiting the division passage. In this example, the G2 has employed MI assets in layers to see the battlefield with electronic detection equipment. Maneuver units accomplish forward and flank information gathering. If maneuver units find enemy concentrations and if the decision has not already been made in the targeting process, the commander will have to decide whether to attack or assume a hasty defense. The MI battalion moves its assets as directed by the G2 in coordination with the G3.
Fire Support
Primary fire support considerations in a movement to contact include anticipating enemy actions during the movement, task organizing for combat, and moving artillery battalions forward. Also important is the ability to provide rapid and accurate fires on targets which affect the survivability and mission of the force.
In this example (Figure 3-18), the division commander has integrated fire support into the total mission. A Quickfire channel is established to improve fire support to the aviation brigade and cavalry squadron. The task organization provides flexibility, responsiveness, and agility whenever and wherever the division makes contact with the enemy.
As the division moves across the LD/LC, DS and GS artillery will be in position to support. Once maneuver brigades have determined routes to move the artillery, batteries and battalions move on order by echelon. Since artillery follows its brigade, movement control is maintained at brigade level except for the GS battery. This battery moves once the FSE coordinates land in sector and passes the approved position to DIVARTY who positions the battery. The division commander uses the battery with the aviation brigade to provide additional fire support rapidly as needed on the battlefield.
During the movement, maneuver elements are extremely vulnerable to enemy indirect fires. If possible, corps augments the division with the capability to plan, execute, and coordinate effective counterbattery and counterfire programs. In this example, a corps MLRS battalion has been given the mission to reinforce the DIVARTY and provide the required coverage from the LD/LC. Corps has also provided associated Q-36 and Q-37 radars electronically linked to the MLRS battalion to destroy any enemy artillery units which fire in the division AO. Artillery units will carry maximum amounts of ammunition but will still require resupply.
As maneuver units move forward, fire support control measures ensure rapid coordination of fire support assets and preclude delays in tiring in areas already passed. The DIVARTY headquarters is located near the LD/LC. From this position, it maintains C2 and sustainment requirements for the division artillery. The DIVARTY repositions forward as required to maintain the capability to coordinate fires.
Mobility and Survivability
The primary engineer mission is to locate and breach enemy obstacles to facilitate mobility of CSS elements and the corps follow-on force.
Division engineer companies are task-organized to each brigade and the cavalry squadron. Engineers with the cavalry squadron identify obstacles and report conditions of routes. They provide limited capability to breach obstacles.
Engineers with brigades identify obstacles and report route conditions along routes of march and to the flanks. If required, engineers on the flanks can construct situational obstacles to stop possible enemy penetrations from the flank. Engineers coordinate with the division FSE to emplace FASCAM. The engineer battalion headquarters coordinates support to forward engineer companies to expedite division movement.
Air Defense Artillery
The infantry division has limited ADA assets. Resources identified as critical to the division have priority for ADA coverage. Stinger teams are in DS to brigades. For the movement, towed Vulcans and or Avengers are kept under the control of the ADA battalion. The division requests additional ADA support it needs from corps.
In this example, the ADA battalion has been tasked to protect key elements and resources of the division. Air defense assets are moved based on mission requirements and the developing enemy threat. Maneuver brigades use passive ADA protection to conceal themselves from the enemy threat. Corps assets provide ADA protection for the rear area.
Combat Service Support
The division is task-organized for speed and stealth. Units carry a 48-hour LOGPAC (class I, III, & V). In this example (Figure 3-19), limited CSS assets are pushed forward with brigades, and remaining elements are under the control of the DISCOM. This ensures limited logistics support is with the brigades. The FSBs move forward by wheeled vehicle.
The DISCOM and the rear CP work together to coordinate limited wheeled vehicle routes in the division area between the corps force and division resupply requirements. The DISCOM and the rear CP displace on order when the corps force has passed through the division and when MSRs are secure.
Command and Control
Brigades are task-organized into self-contained task forces to enhance flexibility and the ability to attack enemy forces as they locate them.
The division TAC CP moves behind the lead brigade and maintains communications with the cavalry squadron. The division main CP stays at the LD/LC until the division secures the restrictive terrain and the corps heavy division passes through. The rear CP maintains a position in the rear behind the main CP. The command group positions itself well forward to see the battlefield.
Search and Attack Operations
The search and attack operation is a likely mission for any infantry division. Although brigades and battalions conduct it as a decentralized mission, it requires division support to allocate resources; move troops, supplies, and material; and assimilate and distribute intelligence. The division commander and staff must understand that search and attack operations are time-consuming. They must allow subordinate commanders enough time to develop intelligence for their AOs before expecting results.
The infantry division conducts search and attack operations against enemy forces with the primary objectives of finding, fixing, and destroying the enemy; destroying or seizing his equipment, food, and safe-base areas; and, whenever possible, destroying his political and military infrastructure. A secondary objective is to keep the enemy on the move and dispersed, to prevent him from planning, assembling, and executing operations on his own initiative. Most search and attack operations are conducted without detailed prior information about the enemy. The commander must produce much of his own intelligence as the operation unfolds. Historically, search and attack operations have been conducted--
- In an environment of friendly air and fire superiority.
- Against squad- to company-sized forces equipped with small arms and mortars, but normally without artillery support.
- Against both regular and guerrilla forces whose locations are unknown.
- In an environment where the enemy has the advantage of knowing both the terrain and the local populace.
- At company, battalion, and brigade levels with divisional support.
Corps or a JTF may direct a division to conduct combat operations to "clear the enemy in zone." It maybe to eliminate an enemy's ability to interfere with current or future combat operation or with a host nation government's ability to protect its population. Search and attack operations orient on the enemy and not on taking or holding terrain.
A division order directing the conduct of search and attack operations assigns brigade AOs (Figure 3-20 and Figure 3-21) and task organizes them as self-contained forces with combat and CS forces. Brigades normally establish fire support bases for DS artillery and organic mortars. Brigades assign battalions AOs and battalions further subdivide these areas into company zones of action. The tactics and techniques for brigade search and attack operations are covered in FM 7-30.
Maneuver
The success of search and attack operations depends on carefully searching for the enemy and, on finding him, massing superior forces to destroy him. On finding an enemy force, friendly units take one of several actions. If the searching force is able to mass sufficient combat power to overwhelm the enemy, it may conduct a hasty or deliberate attack to destroy the enemy force. If it is not able to mass sufficient combat power, it may keep the enemy force under surveillance until reinforcements and blocking forces arrive. If the search and attack force is discovered by a larger enemy force, it may be forced to withdraw or assume a hasty defense pending reinforcement.
Whenever a contact is made, or intelligence indicates the presence of an enemy force, actions should be taken to entrap or encircle the enemy force. It is not sufficient, in most cases, to use only an attacking and a blocking force. Ground combat units should cover the most likely routes of withdrawal, and light reconnaissance elements, the less likely routes. They may be placed and extracted by air, or other mobile means, to exploit time and space advantages.
Commanders must be prepared to rapidly adjust plans to enemy movements and alter schemes of maneuver to fix and destroy the enemy. Speed and deception characterize tactical maneuver. While speed is essential, commanders must pay meticulous attention to continuous provision of air, artillery, and, if available, naval gunfire support. The division task organization for a search and attack mission may be as shown in Figure 3-22.
Intelligence
Reconnaissance. Aggressive, continuous reconnaissance is essential in all search and attack operations. Saturation patrolling by platoon-or squad-sized units, either on foot or delivered by helicopter, is a prime source of information. Intelligence acquired through these contacts should be exploited immediately. Commanders must understand and accept that searching is time-consuming and can only be effective if done methodically.
The division long-range surveillance unit (LRSU) observes likely enemy avenues of approach. It also observes and reports on areas the G2 has identified as potential enemy base camps or cache sites. Since some of these operations may occur within brigade areas of responsibility (AORs), the G2 must closely coordinate the collection plan with brigades and exchange information to prevent fratricide or duplication of effort. Use of the LRSU is in addition to the acquisition efforts of brigades and battalions.
The division cavalry squadron is also an integral part of intelligence acquisition. The squadron is in GS to the division. The G2 tasks both air and ground elements with intelligence collection tasks. Like the LRSU, the squadron operates within brigade AORs and must be part of the overall acquisition plan. The division does not give these assets to brigades for their use.
Special operations forces (SOF) within the division AOR are another important intelligence acquisition source. The division can request special reconnaissance missions through the corps and joint special operations task force headquarters. Division forces must know the locations and missions of these forces to prevent fratricide and duplication of effort.
HUMINT. Information on enemy forces can often be obtained by establishing close liaison with province, district, and village leaders. Frequent visits to local villages by searching forces often yield accurate and timely information on local enemy forces. This technique may be especially effective if enemy forces have been oppressive to the local population.
Aerial Surveillance and Acquisition. Aerial platforms can yield valuable information on enemy forces. The division should maximize infrared detection, visual observation, and communications intercept.
Fire Support
Fire support during search and attack operations is provided by artillery, mortars, attack helicopters, CAS aircraft, and, when available, naval gunfire. Brigades establish fire support bases for supporting artillery and organic mortars within brigade AOs. Bases should provide complete coverage of the AO and be mutually supporting. Establishment of these bases will often require insertion and resupply by helicopters. When fire support bases are established, sufficient security forces must be on hand to protect these assets.
Fire support bases should be fully fortified defensive positions that provide all-around security. This includes countermobility obstacles and survivability positions.
Attack helicopters normally operate from the division rear area and are not located within the search AO. They must be positioned, however, to provide rapid and responsive fire support when enemy units are located.
Air Defense
Normally, enemy forces will not have air assets in this environment. In most cases, the division will only require ADA if it conducts operations in proximity to a hostile nation which possesses an offensive air capability. The division G3 normally positions AD assets in the division rear area (DRA).
Mobility and Survivability
The division engineer must understand the search and attack technique being employed by the maneuver brigades and battalions to effectively integrate engineer support. The division engineer allocates engineers to the brigades primarily to support M/S requirements in the brigade close fight and rear area operations. The division engineer will normally task organize engineers in a command relationship based on the nature of decentralized, small-scale search and attack techniques. Typical missions requiring engineer effort include--
- Engineer reconnaissance.
- Breach operations.
- Ammunition cache destruction.
- Protective obstacle support.
Combat Service Support
Combat service support for units conducting search and attack operations normally is provided on an area support basis. Resupply is normally by both ground and air, depending on terrain. Medical evacuation normally is by aerial evacuation to brigade rear support areas. Increases in class V small arms, hand grenades, claymores, and mortar and artillery ammunition can be expected. Forward-deployed units are almost always resupplied with small arms by air. Convoy escorts in the search and attack environment are critical to protect resupply efforts.
Command and Control
During search and attack operations, the division TAC CP is normally forward deployed in the AO, generally in the vicinity of a major reserve force. The TAC CP's primary mission is to provide division-level intelligence and attack assets to maneuver brigades. The TAC CP commands and controls all divisional assets in support of search and attack operations. This includes the division cavalry squadron and attack helicopters.
Although C2 of search operations in the search and attack is usually decentralized, C2 of the attack portion must be centralized to be effective. Once an enemy force is discovered, the division or brigade must immediately mass combat power to prevent the enemy's escape. The division controls the helicopter assets needed by brigades and battalions to mass combat power and prevent the enemy's escape. The main CP must make these assets available as quickly as possible.
Rear Operations
The division normally maintains a rear area with division support elements and the aviation brigade. Depending on the tactical situation, at least one brigade probably secures this area, which may be adjacent to the search and attack AOs or some distance away. Both the division main and rear CPs are located in this secured area. The rear CP is responsible for conduct of rear operations.
Reconnaissance in Force
The reconnaissance in force is used when enemy disposition is unknown and the information provided from reconnaissance will outweigh the risk of obtaining it. The infantry division can move forward to do limited reconnaissance in force in rugged or compartmentalized terrain. It can find enemy strong points and weaknesses in the enemy's main defensive positions and create gaps in it. Keys to the success of this mission are coordination and speed. An infantry unit cannot sustain itself over prolonged periods. Thus, the reconnaissance is limited in nature and depends on corps to take advantage of the information it obtains. The reconnaissance in force finds the enemy and sets the stage for his defeat.
The reconnaissance in force may develop a situation more rapidly than other movement to contact methods. When deciding to conduct a reconnaissance in force mission, the commander considers--
- His knowledge of the enemy situation.
- The efficiency and speed of other intelligence collection assets.
- The extent to which the reconnaissance in force may divulge his plan of action.
- The possibility the reconnaissance in force may lead to a general engagement.
The division has sufficient firepower to cause the enemy to react to probes and limited objective attacks. This discloses his locations, dispositions, strengths, planned fires, and use of reserves. The corps commander must anticipate the enemy reaction to a reconnaissance in force operation and plan either to exploit weaknesses, or withdraw the division pending the assembly of sufficient combat power to destroy or defeat the enemy force.
In this situation (Figure 3-23), the enemy has attacked the corps and committed its second echeon. After several days, the attack has reached its culminating point. The enemy withdraws and initiates a defense out of contact on favorable terrain. The corps commander decides to take advantage of the situation. Due to limited current information on new enemy dispositions and strengths, the commander decides to use an infantry division for a reconnaissance in force mission in preparation for a corps attack. The terrain immediately to the front of the corps is rugged and suited for infantry operations.
The corps commander's concept requires the division to move through the enemy security zone, identify the main defensive positions, find weak areas or gaps, and attack to create or widen gaps for the corps to exploit.
Maneuver
The infantry division commander analyzes the mission. He knows this enemy has a security zone in front of a main defensive position. The security zone is normally 15 to 20 kilometers in depth and fortified by strong points with overlapping and interlocking indirect and direct fire systems.
The enemy main defensive position is constructed with mutually supporting positions and supported by his regimental and division artillery. Since the enemy has had limited time to dig in, it is important to get through the enemy's security zone as soon as possible.
The division will conduct a reconnaissance in force using probes and limited objective attacks to discover enemy strengths and weaknesses. It should then be able to pick locations to conduct deliberate attacks to create a gap or gaps to support the corps attack and penetration.
To accomplish his mission, the division commander task organizes the division as shown in Figure 3-24. Corps provides additional artillery and aviation assets to aid the mission; these assets are OPCON to the division.
Deep Operations. The infantry division has no deep operation during a reconnaissance in force mission. Corps provides intelligence and conducts operations beyond the division AO. The corps looks deep to provide early warning and interdict enemy movement of additional units into the sector.
Close Operations. The corps establishes a clearly defined reconnaissance AO to the front of the corps area of operations supporting the upcoming corps attack. The division then establishes brigade reconnaissance zones within its AOs (see Figure 3-25). The factors of METT-T determine brigade zones, widths, and depths.
The division mission is planned as a three-phased operation. In phase one, the division moves quickly through the security zone. The defending division supports the passage of brigades through its lines. Brigades seek to avoid contact with the enemy in the enemy security zone but report enemy dispositions and weapons systems. If contact is made, units attempt to break contact and continue movement toward the enemy's main defensive position. If units become decisively engaged in the security zone, defending divisions provide fire support and other assistance to help defeat the enemy force or expedite disengagement.
In phase two, the purpose of the operation is to locate the enemy's main defensive position and to conduct aggressive patrolling operations to find weak areas or gaps in the enemy defense.
In phase three, the focus is on the attack of weak areas to create a gap for passage of the lead division of the corp attack. The infantry division may place its reconnaissance squadron OPCON to the lead division to facilitate linkup and passage of the corps' main attacking force.
Rear Operations. The rear CP controls the division's rear area. Since the division will be in the defending division's forward areas, the corps has designated assembly areas controlled by the infantry division. The rear CP coordinates movement control and terrain management for these areas and routes to release points with the in-place division. The infantry division rear CP coordinates rear area security with the defending divisions. There is no TCF.
Reserve Operations. The division reserve, the aviation brigade, is located in the division rear area. It can also conduct on-order attack helicopter operations to support both the reconnaissance in force and the attack to create a gap. It can rapidly focus firepower, providing the commander the ability to take advantage of unexpected opportunities or to assist in disengagement operations.
Intelligence
The infantry division's G2 conducts the IPB of the area where the reconnaissance in force is to be conducted. Using doctrinal templates, the G2 approximates enemy locations and possible gaps in the security zone and main defensive positions. The commander's PIR for the reconnaissance in force are to locate enemy strong points in the security zone, find the main defensive positions, and locate weak points or gaps in the main defensive positions.
The G2 develops a collection plan to provide PIR for the commander. Brigades execute the collection plan. As information flows back to the G2 from the brigades, the G2 adjusts the IPB to confirm actual enemy locations on the situational template.
The MI battalion keeps the majority of the division intelligence assets in the division rear area near the LD. These are used as corps assets to collect information and jam enemy C2 nodes as they are located. The corps uses the infantry division's intelligence assets to support its attack until linkup.
Fire Support
Fire support for the reconnaissance in force consists of the organic artillery of the division, a FA brigade (OPCON), and the defending division's artillery. The DIVARTY positions GS and GSR artillery after clearing positions through the division FSE. Corps priority of fires is to the infantry division until the corps attack begins. Artillery is positioned on the friendly side of the forward line of own troops (FLOT) and does not initially move with the infantry division. At no time is the reconnaissance in force out of the range of FA coverage. All available artillery is positioned to provide fires in depth for the reconnaissance in force elements (Figure 3-26).
Brigades in DS to artillery battalions are prepared to conduct air assault operations to provide deep fires, if required, to support brigade probes. They can also support limited-objective attacks or, in the deliberate attack, create gaps in the enemy's main defensive positions. Corps provides long-range artillery support to the division by assigning a FA brigade and giving the GSR mission to the defending division artilleries.
The DIVARTY positions firefinder radars after clearing positions through the division FSE. Their primary mission is counterfire. Destruction of the enemy's artillery are critical to the success during all phases of the operation.
Close air support is coordinated for the attack on HPTs. The priority during all phases of the attack will be the destruction of enemy artillery.
The FSE recommends positioning EW assets to support attacks on enemy C2 nodes. This disrupts communications between the security zone and main defensive positions.
Target information collected by the reconnaissance is passed to the infantry division where it is processed for developing integrated, coordinated, and synchronized corps and division fire support plans. The corps and divisions use these plans in executing the corps attack. Target planning is continuous and constantly updated to support all phases of the division mission. The use of global positioning systems (GPS) by infantry reconnaissance forces allows for pinpointing detected enemy in both the security zone and main defensive positions. This allows for their suppression or destruction by artillery and CAS.
Mobility and Survivability
During the reconnaissance in force, priority of engineer work is mobility reconnaissance. Engineers with brigades report locations of enemy obstacles to facilitate future operations. Marking of bypasses, preparation of breach lanes, and limited route clearance operations are executed given time and resources. Remaining divisional engineer assets stay in the engineer battalion near the LD. Once the division attacks and penetrates an enemy weak point, the engineer priority shifts to countermobility and survivability. In this phase engineers seal the battlefield by planning FASCAM in and around the gap created.
Air Defense Artillery
Protection of the force is vital during the reconnaissance. The ADA battalion provides assets to each brigade to aid the operation. ADA teams accompany brigades in their reconnaissance with MANPAD systems. The ADA battalion retains and deploys other systems in the rear. Corps provides high to medium altitude air defense (HIMAD) coverage to the division.
The primary means of AD for the reconnaissance in force are passive camouflage techniques and MANPAD systems.
Combat Service Support
Brigades initially carry enough supplies forward for 48 to 72 hours of operations. The MSB and FSBs are located well forward close to the FEBA, keeping a minimum distance from the maneuver brigades. Once MSRs are secured, convoys push supplies forward (Figure 3-27). The rear CP coordinates with the attacking division and corps for MSRs to resupply the forward infantry positions by ground vehicles. Resupply convoys initially carry only those items necessary to maintain the division's attack. As the corps attack proceeds, additional routes and convoys continually resupply the infantry division.
Command and Control
The division establishes control measures within brigade sectors to coordinate actions.
The TAC CP is well forward and collocated with the corps lead division's TAC CP to coordinate the operation. Brigades report their own and enemy locations to the infantry division TAC CP. This information is passed to the main CP and to corps to facilitate planning for the attack. The TAC CP moves with the attacking lead division, while the main CP stays in position to facilitate future operations. The rear CP remains in place but moves forward on order from the main CP.
The infantry division conducts exploitation and pursuit operations to take advantage of a weakened or collapsed enemy defense. The exploitation's purpose is to prevent the enemy from reconstituting a defense and withdrawing to other defensible terrain, and to destroy his command and control. The exploitation may follow a deliberate or hasty attack when--
- The enemy is unable to maintain or establish a defense.
- The enemy's artillery and positions are overrun.
- There is an increase in captured enemy equipment and prisoners.
- Enemy supply dumps are captured.
The pursuit normally follows a successful exploitation. Its intent is to completely destroy the enemy force. The transition from exploitation to pursuit begins when--
- The division advances without a strong enemy reaction.
- There is an increased number of captured prisoners, abandoned weapons, and unburied enemy dead.
- There is a lessening of enemy artillery fire.
- There is a lack of enemy obstacles.
The division executes the pursuit when the enemy tries to escape. The commander normally uses a direct pressure force, usually the lead force from the exploitation, and an enveloping force to block the enemy's escape. The intent is to catch the enemy between these two forces and destroy him.
Decentralized execution characterizes exploitation and pursuit operations, However, the corps commander and his staff continuously monitor exploitation and pursuit operations to prevent the division from overextending the corps and to prevent it from being put at risk by an enemy counterattack.
Although transitioning from the attack to the exploitation and pursuit may present a major opportunity to destroy enemy forces, extreme care must be exercised. Too rapid an advance risks overextending lines of supply and communications. This may give the enemy an opportunity to isolate the pursuing force, or to counterattack into an exposed flank.
The transition from deliberate attack to exploitation and pursuit may be abrupt or so gradual it is hardly distinguishable from current operations. Once the transition is conducted, every effort is made to maintain pressure on the enemy. Small enemy units are bypassed by the direct pressure force unless they are a threat to the division or cannot be bypassed. These bypassed forces are destroyed by maneuver elements of the division main body or by follow and support operations of other units. The exploiting force directs follow and support units to enemy positions.
Maneuver
In this example (Figure 3-28), the infantry division has conducted a deliberate attack as part of an overall corps attack. The division took its initial objectives with little or no organized resistance. The commander reported the situation and has been directed to continue the attack. Intelligence confirms enemy strength is lower than originally thought and the enemy is trying to assume hasty defensive positions. The enemy is establishing a defense out of contact near objective EAGLE. The division exploitation operations objectives are to seize objectives EAGLE and HAWK.
Contingency plans for exploitation and pursuit operations are sequels in planning for the deliberate attack. There is no change in task organization for the exploitation from the deliberate attack (see Figure 3-29).
Deep Operations
The division has no deep operations. As the lead element in the corps deliberate attack, the division depends on corps and higher headquarters to look deep. Corps provides intelligence and early warning of changes to enemy forces in the division area of interest.
Close Operations
The commander's intent is to prevent the enemy from reconstituting his defense and prevent his withdrawal by securing objectives EAGLE and HAWK, then execute pursuit operations if he attempts to retreat. (This is a force-oriented mission.) The commander's concept is to continue the attack, maintaining direct pressure on the enemy, forcing him to fight, and thereby etting the conditions for his envelopment and destruction (Figure 3-30).
The reconnaissance squadron finds the enemy; the advance guard and other lead brigade maneuver units fix the enemy while trailing brigades move to envelop him. If the enemy attempts to withdraw, division aviation assets are directed to conduct air operations to block his withdrawal. If the enemy is able to withdraw and is retreating, the division begins pursuit operations, informs corps of the situation, and maintains pressure on the enemy. Air assault operations are used to block the enemy during the pursuit. The objective is to stop the enemy and either destroy him or force him to surrender.
Rear Operations
The division rear is located where it was when the deliberate attack started, the defending division's brigade areas. The attacking brigades are reinforced prior to the attack to sustain the attack and support possible exploitation operations. The rear CP plans for exploitation and pursuit operations prior to the deliberate attack. Coordination for transportation, routes, and logistics resupply is accomplished directly with corps once the exploitation starts. Security for the infantry division rear is coordinated with corps as the defending units move forward. The rear CP moves on order.
Security Operations
Direct pressure and speed are critical to security during exploitation and pursuit operations. The corps commander must look deep to ensure enemy reinforcements or counterattack forces do not surprise the exploiting force. The corps commander may stop the operations when the exploiting or pursuing force has overextended the corps' capability to synchronize and integrate operations or when there is a risk to the force which the corps cannot counter.
Close-in division security is a brigade responsibility. Brigades extend security to the flanks and maintain contact forward and to the rear during the exploitation and pursuit. Aviation assets are used to envelop the enemy. Security for air assaults are coordinated between affected units by the TAC CP. Integration of CAS and indirect fires seals LZs off from the enemy and prevents him from moving.
Reserve Operations
The division has no reserve. The corps has assigned a follow and support force to assist the division.
Intelligence
Based on the commander's guidance, the division plans to conduct exploitation and pursuit operations, if appropriate, after the attack. The commander's PIR are the locations and sizes of enemy units. The G2 bases his collection plan on the commander's PIR. The plan depends on intelligence from advancing divisional forces and the deep-look capability of division and higher headquarters MI assets. Battlefield damage assessment is incorporated into the collection plan to support the commander's PIR.
The G2 plans the insertion of division LRSD teams to observe activity in and around objectives and to look deep. Electronic collection systems are emplaced on the friendly side of the LD and are moved to forward positions on order as the situation permits. Air platforms fly patterns progressively deeper as enemy territory comes under friendly control. Enemy prisoner of war integration teams are assigned to forward maneuver units. They must quickly gather information as prisoners are captured.
Electronic warfare jamming systems support the attack. They are positioned to degrade enemy C2 during the initial attack and the exploitation and pursuit.
Fire Support
The division FSE develops fire support task organization and coordination measures for deliberate attack and exploitation and pursuit contingency plans (see Figure 3-31). The FA organization for combat provides a fire support and radar umbrella to protect advancing forces during the attack, exploitation, and pursuit. Fire support control measures provide for rapid coordination of fire support to maneuver forces (see Figure 3-31). Direct support artillery, organic to the division, moves with maneuver brigades and provides artillery fire support. Artillery may be air-assaulted to provide increased firepower to assist in the envelopment of enemy maneuver forces. Corps artillery assets move behind the lead maneuver brigade. Close air support and attack helicopters destroy enemy artillery out of range of friendly artillery.
Counterbattery and countermortar radars are positioned to maintain radar coverage over forward maneuvering forces (the reconnaissance squadron and advance guard). The DIVARTY manages radar coverage to ensure continuous coverage during the rapid movement forward.
Combat operation laser teams (COLTs) are task-organized to weight fire support to the lead elements.
Mobility and Survivability
Engineers are task-organized to support the exploitation and pursuit. Their priority is to enhance mobility. Light engineer companies move with each brigade and a team is in DS to the reconnaissance squadron. Engineers report and remove obstacles as they are found. Each trailing light engineer company enlarges the maneuver area.
The division engineer works with the G2, G3, and FSE to plan FASCAM minefield to block the enemy's withdrawal. The corps engineer work line moves forward with the follow and support division.
Air Defense Artillery
Air defense artillery focuses on likely enemy air avenues of approach which might interfere with the attack, exploitation, or pursuit. The corps commander weighs the enemy's ability to obtain local air superiority when a division executes exploitation or pursuit operations. Corps and division ADA assets move forward rapidly to cover and protect vital points the enemy may try to attack.
Combat Service Support
Staff planners prepare contingency plans when planning the deliberate attack. These plans address the continuation of the attack and its transition into the exploitation and pursuit. Priority of support is to resupply of class I and V and evacuation of wounded. Each unit receives a tailored CSS support package following the attack to support exploitation and pursuit operations. Resupply is pushed to units by both ground and air assets. (See Figure 3-32.)
Command and Control
The division TAC CP exercises C2 during the attack and during exploitation and pursuit contingency operations. The corps tactical CP monitors the transition from the attack to exploitation and pursuit operations.
The TAC CP and command group move behind the lead brigade of the division. The TAC CP maintains contact with the reconnaissance squadron and advance guard. As enemy forces are fixed or bypassed, the TAC CP issues appropriate orders. The TAC CP passes locations of bypassed units to the main CP which in turn coordinates the actions of follow and support units.
The rear CP pushes units and supplies forward in coordination with the TAC CP, main CP, and follow and support unit. The rear CP's primary concerns are deconfliction of ground routes and logistics support to forward elements. The rear CP assigns separate MSRs when coordinating with a follow and support unit.
The infantry division may be assigned the mission of follow and support. As a follow and support force, the division is not a reserve. It is a committed force provided with the appropriate amount of combat, CS, and CSS assets to accomplish its mission. As a follow and support force, the division must retain the agility and flexibility to respond rapidly to the needs of the supported force. A successful follow and support force provides the lead division with the ability to regenerate combat power and maintain offensive momentum. The follow and support force can--
- Relieve halted units and contain or destroy enemy forces specified by the supported commander.
- Secure key terrain along routes which support the main effort.
- Widen or secure an area of exploitation.
- Block movement of enemy reinforcements into an area or guard prisoners, key areas, and installations.
The follow and support mission requires centralized planning and decentralized execution. The division can expect to commit elements piecemeal, from company to battalion size, when reacting to bypass situations created by the lead division. Because of transportation mobility differences, the infantry division will probably need augmentation to achieve mobility comparable to that of the division it supports.
In this example, the corps attack has succeeded. Objective SNAKE has been secured with little resistance (Figure 3-33). The corps commander sees an opportunity to execute a pursuit. He directs the infantry division to conduct follow and support missions behind a lead mechanized division to prevent "bleeding off' combat power during the pursuit. The corps commander's guidance to the mechanized division commander is to bypass (and maintain observation on) enemy units up to company size. His intent is to maintain the momentum of the pursuit. In this tactical situation--
- The division remains attached to the corps.
- The division has been resupplied.
- Current strength is 80 percent overall or greater.
- Random and intermittent fighting is still occurring.
- LOCs from corps to the lead division are secure.
- Terrain is restrictive, but has sufficient avenues of movement to permit heavy forces to conduct the pursuit.
- Stay-behind enemy units are expected to defend throughout the area.
Maneuver
The corps main effort is to pursue enemy forces rapidly with an armored division while the infantry division conducts follow and support operations. The infantry division commander has developed his concept of the operation within the offensive battlefield framework. To accomplish the follow and support mission, the commander task organizes the division as shown in Figure 3-34.
Deep Operations
The follow and support force has no deep operation. However, the lead division continues to tight both deep and close operations. The division receives intelligence and tasks based on operations conducted by the lead division. The lead division directs the follow and support force to enemy locations.
Close Operations
The follow and support division follows the lead division with brigades in column and the TAC CP and reconnaissance squadron well forward. The TAC CP assigns missions to the lead brigade as the pursuit develops until all forces of the brigade have been committed. Then, the second brigade assumes the lead until all its units are committed. Finally, the last brigade assumes the lead.
The division has additional corps transportation assets to aid mobility. It tailors each mission to use available air and wheeled assets to move to required locations. The division moves on foot only as a last resort. To improve communications and see the battle, the division reconnaissance squadron (ground troop) and division TAC CP move to the rear of the rear brigade of the lead armored division.
Once the lead division locates enemy units and has them under observation, it hands off the enemy units to the follow and support division. This is first received as a task in the follow and support TAC CP. As the lead division moves, the reconnaissance squadron maintains contact with the trailing brigade. The TAC CP directs the reconnaissance squadron to send elements to the lead division unit observing the bypassed enemy.
The reconnaissance elements link up with the unit and relay critical information to the TAC CP. They expedite the follow and support lead brigade unit's assumption of the task. Reconnaissance elements remain on site to guide the lead brigade into position, provide liaison, or establish contact and coordination points. Once the handoff is completed between the follow and support brigade and the observing unit, the reconnaissance squadron moves to a location specified by the squadron CP. When the lead infantry brigade assumes its first mission, the TAC CP establishes brigade boundaries, beginning with the creation of a brigade AO (see Figure 3-35). When all the forces of the lead brigade have been committed, the TAC CP designates the brigade's area of interest and assigns the next brigade to the following mission.
Brigade commanders determine the appropriate force required for each mission. The division provides assets to accomplish follow and support requirements as needed or requested. The TAC CP commits attack helicopter elements and TACAIR as required to support each committed brigade.
Brigades continue to be committed as necessary until the follow and support division is fully committed or receives a change of mission. When all brigades are fully committed and the division can no longer conduct the follow and support mission, corps must then assign the mission to another unit. (See Figures 3-36, 3-37 and 3-38.) If brigades accomplish assigned missions and are still able to mass sufficient combat power to continue the follow and support mission, the division continues to fight.
Once brigades are fully committed, they respond to C2 from the main CP. The lead brigade and reconnaissance squadron continue to work under the C2 of the TAC CP. The main CP arranges for fully committed brigades to turn over their AO to other organizations when they secure the areas or have completed their assigned tasks. Brigades are then available to continue the follow and support mission without a loss of offensive momentum. Brigade units provide flank and route security while trailing the lead division.
Rear Operations
The rear CP controls the division's rear area. Its primary concerns are sustainment, terrain management, movement of forces forward, and security of the division rear. Utilizing MP elements, the rear CP establishes movement control and terrain management from the previous division rear area to the trailing infantry's brigade rear boundary. The rear CP, main CP, and corps COSCOM manage logistics forward through the division without interfering with follow and support operations. As brigades move forward the division adjusts its rear area.
Security Operations
Close and continuous coordination between the lead division and the reconnaissance squadron maintains forward security. Brigades secure the division flanks and rear driving movement. The rear CP coordinates rear security with the corps. It immediately responds to a threat with an on-order mission to the division aviation brigade and fire support units.
Reserve Operations
No division reserve is assigned for this mission. Follow and support divisions do not routinely require reserve forces, although brigades should designate reserves to reinforce committed units.
Intelligence
The division G2 maintains continuous and direct contact with corps and lead division intelligence staffs to obtain current information on enemy forces and to anticipate future tactical requirements. Close coordination between division intelligence organizations and brigade S2s is critical.
The follow and support division commander's PIR are the size and location of enemy forces observed by the lead divisions and enemy potential to disrupt lead division operations from the flanks. The infantry division staff reviews the lead division's PIR to see if they apply to the follow and support mission. Upon recommendation from his staff, the follow and support division commander identifies his PIR.
The division G2 and MI battalion commander use these PIR to develop the division collection plan and to allocate intelligence resources. Only intelligence assets and systems necessary for the follow and support mission are used. Each brigade has a MI team to support intelligence operations.
Division MI assets focus on the division's flanks. They concentrate on potential enemy counterattacks along identified avenues of approach, and enemy reinforcement of forces already observed and engaged. Quickfix is in GS to the division to provide early warning on enemy movement along the flanks. The division G2 integrates EW jamming and collection assets into attack plans of the brigades to disrupt enemy and locate enemy elements.
Fire Support
Fire support is used to neutralize, fix, or destroy pockets of resistance prior to direct fire engagement by the infantry when possible. The division has limited organic artillery assets. In this example, a FA brigade reinforces the DIVARTY. Each brigade has a 105-millimeter artillery battalion in direct support. The DIVARTY controls the fires and positioning of the general support artillery battery and corps FA brigade. DIVARTY-controlled artillery units move behind the lead maneuver brigade to provide additional fire support as required (see Figure 3-39). The division FSE integrates CAS and EW into brigade operations.
The lead division's fire support measures remain in effect until the boundaries of the follow and support brigade are established. Brigade and division fire support measures are put in effect when elements of the lead infantry brigade relieve the fixing unit. The infantry division FSE and DIVARTY continually update fire support measures during the follow and support mission. The infantry division FSE continually reviews the positioning of GS artillery to provide massed fire support at critical times and locations.
DIVARTY positions countermortar and counterbattery radars and assigns radars sectors of search. It assigns Quickfire channels to artillery units covering those sectors with priority to units initially committed to a mission.
Mobility and Survivability
Engineer assets are in DS of brigades. They give each brigade a limited breaching capability. Priority of effort is to mobility. Coordination with the forward division identifies obstacles and the need for road repairs.
Division engineers plan situational obstacles on likely enemy avenues of attack. The division engineer coordinates FASCAM targets with the FSE, G2, and G3 to isolate by-passed units.
Air Defense Artillery
Direct support ADA assets provide protective umbrellas to the brigades while general support ADA protects critical division locations. Each brigade has limited ADA. Most ADA assets are under division control. These are positioned on potential enemy air avenues of approach and around friendly HPTs such as the TAC CP, main CP, MSRs, and brigade CPs. The priority of effort is to protect key areas where attack would disrupt the corps operation. The lead division and corps provides enemy air IPB.
Combat Service Support
Division CSS (Figure 3-40) must be mobile and continuous during the movement. In this example, the lead division identified two MSRs for the follow and support division. The division rear CP controls movement on these MSRs (in coordination with the main CP). Tailored FSB units move with their brigade. Remaining FSB elements move on order as the brigade areas are established. The TAC or main CP assigns priority of support on a situational basis.
Brigades tailor their combat loads based on the factors of METT-T. Nonessential CSS assets remain with the FSB. The G4 and G3 ensure CSS units use movement windows to push supplies forward to FSBs. Casualties are evacuated as expeditiously as possible by both ground and air assets. The DISCOM and remaining division troops move forward on order.
Command and Control
The division TAC CP establishes control measures with the lead division to unify their efforts. The infantry division provides a liaison team to the lead division main CP to maintain continuous contact and facilitate this effort. The TAC CP moves with the lead brigade of the division. This strengthens communications with the lead division main CP. The infantry main CP and the rear CP move on order.
As lead division units bypass pockets of enemy resistance, the lead division tasks the infantry division TAC CP to eliminate these enemy forces. The TAC CP coordinates the battle handoff between the observing lead division unit and the lead brigade of the infantry division. The reconnaissance squadron coordinates with the observing unit and identifies routes and measures to aid in linkup. The TAC continues forward with the lead brigade of the division as it moves forward and commits units.
Once the division establishes a brigade AO, control of that brigade passes to the main CP. The rear CP controls and prioritizes sustainment along division MSRs. It also performs terrain management in the division rear area. As the division moves forward, the rear CP coordinates and prioritizes sustainment along routes within the division's AO.
If friendly defense is successful, the enemy reaches a culminating point within the main battle area (MBA); that is, the combat power of the attacking enemy at the point of his attack no longer exceeds that of the friendly defender. The enemy attack has floundered and the enemy is transitioning to a defense.
During this transition period, time becomes critical. The friendly force commander must already have a plan to attack quickly. He rapidly reorganizes, refits selected units, moves to attack positions, and attacks. Unless moved, friendly MBA units will be in positions known to the enemy and subject to the enemy's artillery. Time is critical to the enemy also. He uses this time to reorganize, establish a security zone, and dig in his defensive positions.
Unless the friendly commander has a large, uncommitted reserve prepared to quickly exploit the situation, he must reset his defense and maintain contact with the enemy. At the same time, he must move forces to prepare for his attack or conduct a frontal attack with units in contact (normally the least favorable COA). Successful friendly force commanders must think through this transition period and have a plan to execute.
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