FM 71-100-2 Chptr 2 Command and Control

CHAPTER 2 COMMAND AND CONTROL

In modern battle, the sheer magnitude of available information challenges leaders at all levels. Ultimately, they must assimilate thousands of bits of information to visualize the battlefield as it actually is and then to direct the military efforts they head to make them what they must be to achieve victory. Thinking and acting are simultaneous activities for commanders in battle. The commander leads, conceptualizes, synchronizes, and makes timely key decisions; the staff acquires, synchronizes, and disseminates decisions and information.

Section I. COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNDAMENTALS

Command and control (C²) is not a single term as commonly perceived and used. Command and control are separate and distinct, with differing applications to how the division fights.

Command is the art of assigning missions, prioritizing resources, guiding and directing subordinates, and focusing the entire division's energy to accomplish clear objectives.

Control is defining limits, computing requirements, allocating resources, prescribing requirements for reports, monitoring performance, identifying and correcting deviations from guidance, and directing subordinate actions to accomplish the commander's intent.

Control serves its purpose if it allows the commander freedom to operate, delegate authority, lead from any critical point on the battlefield, and synchronize actions across his entire AO. Moreover, the command and control system must support the ability of the commander and his staff to adjust plans for future operations even while focusing on the current fight. The related tools for implementing command decisions include communications, computers, and intelligence.

The size of a command post's structure depends on the amount of control demanded by the commander and higher headquarters. The more control imposed, the less command applied.

COMMAND AND CONTROL GUIDELINES

Basic, time-tested imperatives drive the successful development and efficient operations of the division's command posts (CPs) and determine their effectiveness in combat:

A headquarters must be small to be efficient.

Just as there can be only one commander, there can be only one command post exercising control at any one time.

If a commander is to be effective in a crisis, he must limit the number of voices he hears.

If a commander wants his staff to keep him informed, he should avoid lengthy prepared briefings and rely on unstructured, unscheduled discussions. This does not mean that briefings in CPs do not occur. They occur periodically to keep all up to date and to obtain needed information.

When a commander gives a subordinate a new or revised mission, he should deliver or explain it orally and, preferably, face to face.

Organizing a CP is a science whose purpose is to acquire and disseminate information in a prioritized fashion.

The commander should not stay in the command post. The best way for him to get information is by firsthand observation, from his own CPs, by visiting subordinate CPs, and by listening to subordinate command nets, including brigade, battalion, and company nets when necessary.

COMMAND POST RELATIONSHIPS

The division's command posts are generation centers for information, acquisition, processing, dissemination, and orders. They exist to support the commander wherever he maybe on the battlefield. Within current force structures, the division command and control system can be effectively organized and implemented, However, the commander and staff must clearly understand the relationship between the command and control facilities supporting the division and the doctrinal functions performed by each as part of the total effort.

Doctrinally, the division fights one battle with three different, and normally distinct, operations--deep, close, and rear. If the division fights only one battle, then the principle of unity of command and common sense mandate that it have only one central command post (Figure 2-1). In the division, unity of command is manifested in the main CP. The division resources TAC and rear CPs as extensions of the main CP, focusing on specific areas of operation. The TAC CP is concerned primarily with the close operation; the rear CP, with rear operations. Each command post performs its roles and functions within the overall mission of the division, as orchestrated by the main CP.

With three CPs simultaneously participating in the battle, confusion can often result. Who is really in charge? A clear delineation of authority and responsibility of the three CPs must be made in unit SOPs.

Division command post staff activities have five common functions:

To provide information.

To make estimates.

To make recommendations for decisions.

To prepare plans and orders.

To supervise and monitor the execution of decisions.

Only the division main CP has the capability to plan sequels to the current mission.
TAC CP

The TAC CP must be well forward to respond to the immediate tactical requirements of the close operation. It should be minimally structured and manned to support maneuver, intelligence, mobility, and fire support. Its main focus is the control of close operations; it should not be distracted from that focus. The TAC controls only units committed to or engaged in close combat with the enemy. Main or rear CPs perform all other command and control functions. The main or rear CPs also control units within the division AO which are not committed to the close operations.

Main CP

The division main CP performs seven primary functions to support the division battle as well as the collateral support functions for the tactical and rear command posts. These are--

Planning.

Coordination.

Integration.

Synchronization.

Prioritization.

Allocation of resources.

Monitoring of close and rear operations.

If units or elements are assigned to or support the division, then a staff element at the main CP must focus on those elements and integrate their current and future support to the close, deep, or rear operations. Immediate tactical decisions are rarely made at the main CP because it does not have the most current information. However, the main CP does make decisions based on requests from the TAC and rear CPs that support immediate close and rear operations.

Rear CP

The division rear CP performs the functions of sustainment, terrain management, movement control, security, and fire support. The rear area is no less an assigned AO than is a brigade AO. As in brigade areas, there will be numerous fire support requirements in the rear for rear tactical operations, tactical air support, artillery, and electronic warfare.

Section II. COMMAND POST OPERATIONS AND TECHNIQUES

ALTERNATE COMMAND POST

An alternate CP must be designated with a clear understanding of its purpose and roles. It does not have to be able to perform all main CP command and control functions. If a catastrophic loss occurs, an alternate CP enables the division to sustain continuous C² operations until surviving elements can rally at another location, assess casualties and damage, reorganize, and reestablish critical division C² functions. The alternate CP should be equipped with communications facilities capable of performing designated critical functions of the destroyed CP. The alternate CP normally does not support CP displacements.

An alternate division CP must retain the capability to command and control operations for its own units. There is no CP within the division with sufficient personnel or facilities to support its primary C² functions and also those of one of the division command posts. If this is attempted, the functions of the division CP will quickly consume the austere C² facilities and assets of the alternate CP and degrade operational effectiveness.

A designated alternate CP is activated when the survivors of an attacked CP inform the command net of its attack, destruction, or inability to function; when no element within the command post can be contacted within a specified period of time; or when a unit or element reports that the CP has been destroyed and it is verified. Alternate CPs should be designated for the tactical, main, and rear CPs and criteria established for their activation in the unit tactical standing operating procedures (TSOPs).

The alternate CP for the TAC CP should be able to perform critical functions of the TAC CP G3, G2, and fire support element (FSE), in that priority. Normally, the first choice for a TAC CP alternate is the command group vehicles. This element knows the situation and should be able to pick up the close operation without losing momentum and information transfer. It also possesses the organic communications capability and personnel to perform critical G3, G2, and FSE functions. Surviving personnel and vehicles, if any, rally at the command group and continue operations until a new TAC CP is organized. Once the new TAC is functional, information and operations transition from the command group to the TAC CP. If the command group is unavailable, then the next alternative for an adequate alternate TAC CP may be the division cavalry squadron CP. It possesses the staff, facilities, and communications to perform designated TAC CP functions.

The designation of an alternate CP for the main CP is more difficult because of the size and complexity of functions it performs. The problem becomes less complex when viewed as what critical functions can be performed at the alternate CP and what functions can be assumed by other CPs within the division. No other organic division CP is capable of assuming the functions of the main CP. External CPs that routinely send elements to the main CP assume responsibility for those functions if the main CP is destroyed.

When selecting a unit command post as the alternate for the main CP, the division must determine the effect the choice will have on current division tactical operations. For example, the division aviation brigade headquarters may be a better candidate for an alternate division main CP than the more often used DIVARTY CP. The DIVARTY TOC is neither manned nor equipped to support both division main and DIVARTY functions without serious degradation to current fire support operations. The aviation brigade has the organic communications to support only the command center, G3 operations, A²C², and planning functions. The number of surviving personnel and equipment from the main CP will determine the number of personnel and amount of organic equipment required of the aviation brigade CP. Other main CP functions must be temporarily assumed and performed by the engineer, signal, ADA, and MI battalions and DIVARTY until the main CP is regenerated. Despite a distance issue, some divisions use the division rear CP as the initial alternate CP. A conceptual allocation of C² tasks and functions for alternate command posts follows.

Main CP Function	Designated Alternate
--Command Center	Aviation Brigade
--G³ Ops/Planning/A²C²	Aviation Brigade
--G2 Ops/ASPS	MI Battalion
--FSE	DIVARTY
--Engineer	Engineer Battalion Staff
--ADA	ADA Battalion Staff
--NBC Element	Division Chemical Company
--ADSO	Signal Battalion

Divisions designate an alternate rear CP. Functionally, the division support command (DISCOM) CP is manned and equipped to assume critical functions of the G1, G4, and division transportation officer (DTO) from the rear CP CSS cell without impacting on the sustainment function. Should the DISCOM CP also be destroyed, the main support battalion (MSB) may be the next best alternative. The main CP G3operations cell can assume the rear functions of terrain management, security, and movement coordination. Selecting an alternate rear CP must not interfere with the capability of CSS elements to continue to sustain current operations logistically.

Designation of an alternate CP and subsequent transfer of functions to that CP require definitive, practiced staff drills to make the operation efficient and effective. Critical functions performed by each alternate CP must be prioritized as the transfer is made from one command post to another. Synchronization and coordination required from dispersed locations must be identified and exercised. The most critical consideration is to minimize disruption of the division's capability to command and control current tactical operations.

COMMAND POST PERSONNEL

Key to any command post operation is the type and quality of personnel that man it. Regardless of the equipment or facilities, the quality of personnel remains the constant factor that defines effective CP operations. The division's command posts must be staffed with appropriate skills and military occupational specialties (MOSs) to perform the functions of the cell to which they are assigned. Personnel in the CP structure are organic to the division headquarters and headquarters company as well as to other organic and nonorganic elements that support the division. The assigned roles of officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) within the structure are critical to the effective functioning of the command post and to mission accomplishment. Each individual must not only be capable of performing his job but also understand how his job relates to others throughout the command post and the system. With the increasing complexity of command posts and equipment that supports them, a soldier must know more than his job's physical processes. He must also know and understand the intangible effects of his job within the command post.

The officer's role within the CP is primarily one of "seeing the battlefield." Officers must be capable of assessing the tactical situation, anticipating the enemy's intent, and determining the long- and short-term impact of friendly actions. Officers issue instructions in accordance with the commander's or decision maker's guidance. They develop estimates and plans via the decision-making process. Officers should maintain a wide view of the division operation. They should not routinely post the operations map, work MCS equipment, or answer telephones. Instead, they should stand back and assess the impact of messages received and tactical situations portrayed on the operations map. Officers that work in the command post must be trained in their functions, roles, and duties in support of the CP mission.

The noncommissioned officers assigned to the command post should be an integral part of all CP operations. Their role includes active participation in the planning and decision-making process. There are four functional area NCOs within the command post--operations, intelligence, combat support, and combat service support. All assigned or supporting NCOs within the CP support one of these four functional areas. If officers are not assigned or available, NCOs perform officer roles described above.

Normally, NCO routinely focus on specific aspects of their duties or work area. Some specific responsibilities of the command post NCO are--

Collecting, processing, and disseminating information within the NCO's cell, throughout the CP, and external to the CP.

Preparing and updating staff estimates and preparing, reviewing, and issuing orders and plans. Formal training courses now available provide the capability to perform this function.

Coordinating, synchronizing, and integrating internal CP and separate cell activities, such as maintenance of map boards, status charts, shift changeover procedures, and health and welfare of soldiers.

Participating in command post site selection, reconnaissance, and movement.

Through training and practical experience, the NCO should be able to assume the duties of an officer in the event of the officer's temporary or extended absence from the command post. Command post NCOs are required to develop and train young soldiers and new NCOs in the individual and collective tasks associated with CP operations. If possible, personnel filling critical NCO positions should be graduates of, or scheduled to attend, the Battle Staff NCO Course.

The division command sergeant major (CSM) is the senior NCO in the division. His duties span a wide spectrum of NCO activities, including the CP. He must actively participate in the selection and retention of qualified NCOs for CP operations. He must rigorously enforce the use of available formal CP training courses by ensuring allocations are available and proper personnel attend. He participates in developing and implementing enlisted training and enlisted soldiers' tasks based on the unit mission essential task list (METL) and battle focus. The CSM monitors CP operations and NCO participation to ensure that all properly accomplish their specific duties. He must be able to advise and counsel NCOs actively and accurately about their command post responsibilities.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

The key to effective control in the division's command and control system is information management. All information generated by automated and manual systems of the unit has one overriding purpose--to enable the commander to make timely decisions during the turmoil and confusion of battle.

There are three modes of information exchange between commanders and staffs and between command posts. These modes are called pipelines, alarms, and trees because of the difference in their demands on the command and control system.

The pipeline mode transmits information according to a set order and an established format. Routine reports such as the commander's situation report, logistics status report, and personnel status report move through the pipeline. Pipeline information contributes to the collection and analysis of information that is generally not time-sensitive in terms of decision making. It helps anticipate, identify, and solve problems. Automation greatly assists in the rapid dissemination and collation of information into and out of various sources.

Information displays must be both functional to maintain and meaningful to the commander or decision maker. Map size and displays should be consistent among division CPs. For infantry, map size may vary from operation to operation. Normally, map scales of 1:250,000 and 1:50,000 or 1:100,000 are used to display information.

The alarm mode signals the occurrence of one or more exceptional events. Commanders explicitly set alarms. Subordinates operating within the commander's intent set them implicitly. Alarms are difficult to automate in an electronic information system because all possible contingencies cannot be identified in advance. Alarms are those pieces of information that alert the commander that his plan is not going as he envisioned it and requires some corrective action. Alarms are generally time-sensitive and a priority action for the staff.

The tree is an inquiry-based, demand-pull means of searching for and acquiring information along the paths of a hypothetical decision tree. In this mode, information is a response to specific demands, which arise in turn from previously supplied information. Computer automation is especially valuable in the rapid retrieval of information because of the complexity of even simple decision trees. The tree represents the numerous sources of information that exist in the division. It becomes the prime resource for retrieval of information or analysis of a critical decision.

Information generated by the unit is predicated upon and driven by the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). The information system must focus on getting the right information to the commander or decision maker as quickly as possible. If a piece of information does not contribute to a current or anticipated decision, that information is "nice to have," but efforts to generate it should be abandoned. The commander, not a staff officer, develops CCIR. The staff may recommend CCIR to the commander as--

Priority intelligence requirements (PIR) (how I see the enemy) to determine what the division wants or needs to know about the enemy.

Friendly forces information requirements (FFIR) (how I see myself) to allow the commander to determine the combat capabilities of his units.

Essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) to allow the commander to determine how he must protect from the enemy's information gathering sources.

The chief of staff or executive officer (XO) is the unit's information manager. He outlines and monitors the performance and responsibilities of the staff in processing information to support the operation and the flow that feeds the system. The CCIR are directly linked to present and future tactical situations and to previously identified decisions to make. The information manager collects, tasks, analyzes, and presents CCIR timely and accurately.

Specific requests for information and routine and standard reports (established by unit SOP) generate information within the division. Routine reports are provided by exception when the information changes enough to require a decision or the need to take action. To reduce the volume of data arriving at a headquarters for processing and dissemination, the using organization requests or pulls information to it. Information is not routinely pushed up to the higher headquarters. Unless specifically requested, subordinate headquarters never send unanalyzed raw data to a higher headquarters (HQ). They send analyzed data in the form of information. The sender must analyze all information coming into a headquarters and pass the results of that analysis forward. Subordinate units rarely send higher headquarters the same information from multiple sources. When all raw data is forwarded, the volume of information cripples the higher staff because it must sort out the CCIR while also coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing current operations.

The CP displays information with charts and operations maps. Task organization or mission charts reduce need for discussion. Charts also use color codes to depict current status. Color codes rapidly present a clear status of items using color criteria established in the SOP. This allows the commander to quickly assess critical elements and focus the staff efforts to "fix" or "continue to fix" the problem. If he desires further information, the CP staff can retrieve or pull it from the submitting staff section or MSC in the tree mode. Only information that directly contributes to a commander's critical decision is retrieved. This allows the staff time to continue routinely coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing current and future operations. The amount of time available and the experience of staff will be the driving factors.

A color code standard should be consistent throughout all echelons of the command. A separate color code for different elements or functions creates confusion. A commonly used standard color code is--

GREEN--80 percent or greater combat capability remains--full strength.

AMBER--60 to 79 percent combat capability remains--mission capable with only minor deficiencies.

RED--40 to 59 percent combat capability remains--marginally mission capable with major deficiencies.

BLACK--less than 40 percent combat capability remains--NOT mission capable.

Operations maps should contain only the minimum essential information to allow the commander to see the battlefield without unnecessary clutter. This is true for staff section maps, too. However, these maps must contain more detail to enable analysis of data before the staff provides information to the command center. On the other hand, the effort required to update an operations map with too much detailed information is time-consuming. It also interferes dramatically with coordination, integration, and synchronization. Commanders and staffs must discipline themselves to depict only what is critical at their level, and refrain from seeking data simply out of curiosity.

The operations NCOs of each element or section within each CP must manage information by maintaining a current operations journal. This is a chronological listing of messages, FRAGOs and warning orders received. It is a continuing requirement maintained to reconstruct events, clarify guidance, or validate requirements.

Maneuver Information

Maneuver is the responsibility of the operations officers (S3 or G3) at each echelon of command. Maneuver is the pivotal system around which all other support systems revolve. All information relating to the maneuver of forces or the coordination, synchronization, and integration of combat and CS elements passes through the S3 or G3 or supporting elements within the operations section.

Maneuver information must be distributed between the G3 operations elements at the TAC, main, and rear command posts. Command posts will receive different parts of the information, although all of it will eventually go to the G3 at the main CP for analysis and posting.

Maneuver information is normally reported on standardized tactical spot reports or the commander's situation report, provided either manually or by computer. The critical element is the consistency of report formats. This aids in transferring data into information to higher headquarters. The division TAC CP receives maneuver information from committed brigade TAC CPs during or, as quickly as possible, after the situation has occurred in a "salute" format spot report or the more detailed commander's situation report. The need for timely maneuver decisions and the commander's ability to see the close operation require expedited transfer of information to the division TAC CP by all committed brigade TAC CPs. The division TAC CP collates, posts, and analyzes this maneuver information, turning it into current or updated close operations information which it sends to both the division main CP operations cell and the corps TAC. Maneuver information maintained at the G3 operations of the TAC CP and the G3 operations of the main CP is identical in focus. Both focus on combat capability two levels down. The information that the main CPs G3 presents to the command center is an analysis of information on brigades and separate battalions. The G3 operations cell maintains supporting data to answer questions from the commander or chief of staff. This keeps information requirements current at an appropriate level for the echelon and command post requiring it. The TAC CP must have more current information than the main CP to make decisions on close operations. The main CP makes decisions affecting the division's future.

Intelligence Information

The G2 operations cell at the main command post collates all information relating to intelligence functions. The cell can monitor the entire intelligence battlefield by placing elements at the TAC CP to focus on close operations and at the rear CP to focus on rear operations. Through these extensions, the G2 can see the complete battlefield from the main CP and make decisions about future plans or in support of current ones.

To be effective, the intelligence flow must follow a clearly defined and disciplined path using established procedures and reports throughout each echelon from company to echelons above corps (EAC). All information received from subordinate and adjacent units other than quickfire targeting information must be analyzed (in haste or in detail) to convert it from raw data to intelligence appropriate for the echelon of command for which it is intended. For example, a committed brigade S2 sends the G2 at the TAC CP an intelligence summary or intelligence spot report containing analyzed information that confirms the existence of a motorized rifle battalion at 75 percent strength facing the brigade.

The TAC CP G2 posts this information with other analyzed information received from the cavalry squadron and one other committed brigade. On the TAC CP G2's map, all this information becomes data which, after some analysis, confirms the existence of a motorized rifle regiment facing the division. The TAC G2 quickly passes this analyzed information to the G2 at the division main CP to include intelligence received from higher and adjacent units, the rear CP's G2 cell, noncommitted combat support units, and the MI battalion. This information then becomes data for further analysis by the commander in the command center.

Unless specifically requested, raw intelligence data should not be routinely passed to a higher or controlling headquarters. This will cause the bulk of data to increase greatly as it moves up each echelon, hampering staffs in effectively seeing the enemy and anticipating actions in a timely way. Intelligence that can't be seen and used is not effective, regardless of the great efforts expended to produce it.

PLANNING

The division plans element is located in the vicinity of the main CP and works for the G3. It is the only asset available to the division commander to allow him to maintain his ability to continually look towards the future and effectively transition from current to future operations. The plans element should not be diverted from its future planning process to participate in developing plans and orders to support branches to current operations. Warning orders or fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) required to support changes to the current operation (branches) are the responsibility of the G3 operations elements at the TAC, main, or rear CPs, not the plans element.

Corps and division are always planning. The division conducts planning in two types of environments--when it has a mission but is not committed to tactical operations against an enemy force, and when it is currently committed. Planning processes for both should follow the traditional, formal estimate process outlined in FM 101-5. When conducting noncommitted force planning, the division may be located in a rear assembly area. Led by the plans cell, each CP element participates in and supports noncommitted force planning. Key to noncommitted planning is time available to conduct the formal, time-consuming, step-by-step, detailed staff estimate planning process. The result is a detailed, thought-out, and war-gamed plan used to begin the tactical operations of the division. Once the division is committed to a tactical operation, planning time is greatly reduced and becomes a precious commodity. Commander involvement becomes more critical.

Transition Operations Planning

The primary role of the plans element is to remain focused on the future operation by developing plans and coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing them with current operations to allow smooth transition from current to future operations. When committed against an enemy force, the division will not have a tactical pause to conduct the formal planning processes to prepare for the next operation. It must be trained to transition smoothly from one operation to another. This requires transition planning battle drills supported by all primary and supporting staff elements. Even when the division is not committed, the plans cell leads the planning effort. Each staff section supports the planning process and also monitors the current operations in preparing for combat activities such as reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, movement, and resupply.

Several key factors are involved in the successful transition from one operation to another. They are--

Early anticipation by the commander and the assignment of one clearly articulated future operations mission (or sequel).

Development of a concept of operation that accepts risk with economy of force to allow mass.

Continuous planning, coordination, integration, and synchronization of future operations requirements with those of current operations.

The plans element helps the division transition from one operation to another, the objective being to prevent a loss of tactical integrity and momentum. In effect, the plans element performs the role of a second operations cell as it coordinates and synchronizes the future concept and plan within the context of current operations.

The main CP staff elements, less the plans element, control the current operation. They allocate resources and establish priorities in support of the current deep, close, and rear operations and monitor execution of the current plan. Each staff element in the main CP has a specific battlefield operating system (BOS) or function. In addition to monitoring current operations control requirements, staff elements work with the plans element to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize requirements for future operations. These current operations staff elements are the primary conduit for transmitting and coordinating information to their controlled elements for both current and future operations requirements.

Parallel Planning

Parallel planning is effective when dealing with reduced planning time and transitioning from one operation to another. Parallel planning is the act of conceptualizing, developing, and synchronizing a future operations plan (sequel) with a current operation and its continually changing situations. Parallel planning is used because the "one-third, two-thirds rule" and similar fractional divisions of time are often ineffective.

Parallel planning requires planners to be continually aware of current tactical developments. It emphasizes continuous information sharing through verbal and written means (warning orders, FRAGOs, and messages) to quickly distribute intelligence, planning guidance, and coordination instructions to subordinate, adjacent, and higher staff elements. Units need not wait for a detailed analysis or a single published order to begin their own parallel planning and orders development. Continuous information-sharing allows all units to receive information on the future mission early in the planning process. Thus commanders and staffs can manage their time to complete reconnaissance, troop leading procedures, and preparation for combat actions as early as possible, even when fighting a current operation. Under the one-third, two-thirds rule, lower-level units usually receive orders too late to conduct reconnaissance, and to plan for logistics support and other basic requirements of combat.

The plans cell must have one mission only to develop and coordinate in detail while the division is committed. From development through approval of a course of action, that mission is the primary focus until its plan is fully coordinated, synchronized, and ready to execute.

Involving higher, lower, and adjacent staff elements early in the planning process allows the entire staff "to see" both current and future operation and help identify known or potential problem areas. Identifying conflicts early allows time to fix problem areas without disrupting the current mission. Elements of the main CP allocate resources and establish priorities for all units supporting the division's current and future battle. Elements of the TAC, main, and rear s coordinate and employ units in support of the division current operation, understanding their roles in the future operation. If the plan needs adjusting, the plans cell modifies it, making the appropriate coordination. Once the plan is completed, coordinated, and distributed, the plans element keeps aware of the current operation. It focuses on the status, capability, and locations of units and their capability to implement the next plan. In this way, any posturing of units required by the plan can be adjusted and synchronized early enough to allow the future operation to begin from current positions. This minimizes disruptive movement and confusion on the battlefield.

REHEARSALS

A rehearsal is the art or process of practicing in preparation for a public performance. A division rehearsal for an impending combat operation ensures synchronization and agility through practice of the plan. A rehearsal reinforces the scheme of maneuver and the support of CS and CSS support units. It should identify problem areas and contingency actions, determine movement reaction times, enhance coordination, and refine the plan. A rehearsal should focus on actions critical to accomplishing the mission. This ensures the division can, in fact, accomplish the mission given its state of training, the orders issued, and the terrain and weather conditions expected. Some type of a rehearsal should always be conducted.

Rehearsals are that part of the tactical operation in which the division, or elements of the division, conduct one or more exercises. They are executed according to a plan which approximates the specific operation. Rehearsals test the--

Familiarity of all elements with the plan.

Timing of detailed operations.

Combat readiness of participating forces.

The division commander plays a crucial role. He is the driving force in the interaction which clarifies the plan in the minds of his subordinates. He must focus the staff to create conditions that replicate the upcoming operation. When conducting a rehearsal, the commander should emphasize key events that trigger friendly actions. The rehearsal is a tool the commander uses to reinforce understanding of the plan and to help subordinate commanders visualize the commander's intent and what they can do when the battle does not go according to plan. In the final analysis, whether the commander, his chief of staff, or the G3 conducts the rehearsal, its effectiveness is the commander's responsibility.

Planning Considerations

Responsibility for preparing rehearsal plans is the same as for preparing the actual operations plan. Rehearsal plans should be issued separately, but as close in time to the operations plan as practicable. In planning for rehearsals, consideration must be given to the number, nature, and scope of rehearsals; the date and time for each; and the area in which they will be conducted. Tactical forces must consider the difficulty of repair or replacement of equipment damaged or lost during rehearsals conducted after they leave the assembly area.

The number, nature, and scope of division rehearsals will be influenced by--

The complexity of the tasks assigned to the elements of the division.

The time available for rehearsals.

The state of training of forces.

The suitability of available rehearsal areas.

Special or unusual problems to be faced in the actual operation, the solution to which must be accorded special attention in the rehearsal.

Intelligence and counterintelligence considerations.

The dates of rehearsals and the time allocated for them must provide for--

Complete and careful execution of the entire rehearsal.

Repositioning of troops, equipment, and supplies which conforms to the original tactical plan.

Rehabilitation or replacement of equipment and supplies, and repair or replacement of any damaged or lost vehicles or aircraft.

Critiques at all levels of command to evaluate the rehearsal exercise, to emphasize lessons learned, and to correct mistakes.

Time to fix problems.

Finally, selection of the rehearsal area is influenced by--

Suitability of the area for maneuver.

Similarity and location of the rehearsal area in relation to the actual AO.

Feasibility of employing live fire in the rehearsal.

Security.

Susceptibility to enemy interference.

Conditions which might adversely affect the health of the force.

Activity of civilians which might interfere with the rehearsal.

Rehearsal Techniques

There are generally seven rehearsal techniques available to the division, each taking a different amount of time and producing differing results. Normally, time available dictates the technique used. A full rehearsal is normally conducted only when the division is not committed to tactical operations and is located in an area that can support a division-level rehearsal. The division cannot likely conduct a full rehearsal for a future operation while simultaneously fighting a current operation. Whatever rehearsal technique is used, the enemy should be portrayed as being highly uncooperative.

Full Rehearsal

Full rehearsal is the most effective but consumes the most time and resources. This technique involves every soldier and system that will take a direct part in the operation. If possible, the full rehearsal should be conducted under the conditions (weather, time of day, and terrain) that are expected to be encountered during the actual operation. In defensive operations, a full rehearsal can be conducted over the actual terrain given adequate covering force and counterreconnaissance security operations to protect the force. In an offensive operation, the full rehearsal can be conducted on any available terrain that closely matches the terrain and space parameters of the zone of attack. This type of rehearsal is the most difficult to accomplish because of the great demand on time and resources, but it provides the highest payoff.

Supporting forces within the division that do not participate directly in the tactical operation may not be required to participate in full rehearsals. Such forces may hold separate rehearsals or rehearse with other participants with whom they coordinate support.

Key Leader Rehearsal

Key leader rehearsal takes less time and resources than the full rehearsal because normally only division's key leaders are involved. It can be conducted day or night but should be under the conditions expected in combat. The commander decides the level of leader involvement, normally one of the orders groups from the SOP. These selected leaders rehearse the plan, in their assigned tactical vehicles, over the terrain. The terrain requirements are the same as for the full rehearsal; only the number of participants changes. This type of rehearsal is more appropriate for defensive operations.

Terrain Model Rehearsal

Terrain model rehearsal takes even less time and fewer resources than the previously described types. It can be conducted day or night under a tent or in a building. If the terrain model is accurate, this technique is an excellent three-dimensional aid to assist subordinate leaders to visualize the battle. When possible, the terrain model should be constructed overlooking the actual terrain or, if the situation requires more security, within walking distance of a point that overlooks the terrain. This positioning is more appropriate for brigade- and battalion-level rehearsals but may apply to a division axis of advance or some other critical part of the division's AO.

The terrain model should depict all information shown on the operations overlay, to include names of key terrain features, enemy positions (known and suspected), and all critical fire control measures. A directional arrow placed on the terrain model can aid in orientation to the actual battlefield. All terrain features, phase lines, and objectives should be labeled with their appropriate names. The commander then assembles his key leaders and staff officers in front of the terrain model and the commander walks each subordinate leader through an interactive verbal execution of the operation. The execution of this rehearsal is conducted sequentially, either by phase, event, or time.

Sketch Map Rehearsal

The sketch map rehearsal can be conducted day or night, almost anywhere, with minimum time and resources. The procedures are the same as for the terrain model rehearsal, except that a sketch replaces the terrain model. Using sketches that are large enough for all participants to see, the commander takes his staff and each subordinate leader through an interactive verbal execution of the operation.

Map Rehearsal

The map rehearsal takes less time and resources than the sketch map rehearsal and can be conducted day or night. The commander uses a tactical map with an operations overlay as he walks his staff and key subordinate leaders through an interactive verbal execution of the operation.

Backbrief Rehearsal

The commander uses the backbrief technique to identify flaws or problems in the operation. It reveals how subordinates intend to accomplish their mission. This technique allows the commander to clarify his intent early in his subordinates' tactical estimate procedure.

Radio Rehearsals

Radio rehearsals are conducted by staffs scheduled to participate in the tactical operation and usually take the form of command post exercises. Whenever possible, rehearsals should exercise all communication facilities and equipment.

Rehearsal Security

Because of the similarity between the rehearsal and the actual operation plan, strict security measures must be enforced during rehearsals. The reconnaissance for, selection of, and arrangements for the use of the areas in which rehearsals are to be held must be carefully conducted. Deception operations and measures may be necessary to ensure the security of the rehearsal. Operational security (OPSEC) measures can prevent unauthorized observation by personnel not part of the division, or unauthorized communication by CPs or personnel from supporting external units. Sealing off the rehearsal area with perimeter patrols or security screen is the most effective means of ensuring the physical security of the rehearsal area.

CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS

Combat operations are fast-paced, around-the-clock, and intense. These conditions challenge CP staffs as well as individual soldiers to keep going and units to accomplish their missions over extended periods of time. Soldiers must fight through 24-hour or longer periods. Stress and fatigue over time causes both individual and command post performance to deteriorate.

Continuous operations are a combat multiplier when effective performance is sustained. Performance degrades, however, when there is no opportunity for the unit to stand down or soldiers to catch more than a few minutes of sleep.

Every soldier (especially leaders), team, and unit must perform effectively in continuous combat. Being determined to endure does not ensure effectiveness. Leaders must identify, learn to cope with, and overcome adverse conditions in continuous operations.

Combat exhausts soldiers, reducing their ability to perform tasks as quickly or effectively as necessary, especially after 36 to 48 hours. Normal sleeping habits or routines are upset and soldiers feel the effects of fatigue and stress.

Soldiers accumulate a sleep debt when performing continuous operations under limited sleep conditions. The only corrective measure is sleep. Variables such as training, motivation, and interest can reduce the initial effects of sleep loss; however, no amount of training, motivation, or interest will maintain performance. Commanders must recognize the characteristics of sleep loss and understand--

Six to eight hours of sleep per night maintains performance indefinitely.

Four to five hours of sleep per night maintains effective performance for five to six days. A combination of 12 hours sleep and rest (about 8 to 10 of which is sleep) is required after 36 to 48 hours of acute sleep loss.

Thinking ability degrades more rapidly than physical strength and endurance.

Degradation of mental performance comes as early as 18 hours into sustained work.

Speed and accuracy are trade-offs during sustained operations. Generally, it is better to maintain accuracy and sacrifice speed. The likelihood of errors, especially errors of omission, increases with sustained combat.

The decline in performance when working continually without sleep is about 25 percent every 24 hours.

Commanders and staffs must consider the individual soldier's load when planning dismounted infantry operations. It impacts not only on the endurance of the soldier, but also on the performance of the mission. The soldier's load also impacts the limited transportation assets of the division, and the speed, distance, and duration of the division's operations.

FM 21-18 and FM 7-8 address soldier's loads and provide planning factors and techniques for managing soldier loads. They also provide time-distance planning factors. Commanders and staffs must consider these factors a part of METT-T when planning division operations. This is particularly true for infiltrations.

Continuous operations are combat multipliers only if commanders can manage sleep and stress to sustain effective performance. Physical conditioning and training are important. Physical conditioning delays fatigue, builds confidence, and shortens recovery times after sleep deprivation, illness, and injury. Overlearning and cross training help soldiers who perform duties requiring a high degree of mental skill. Overlearning a skill provides greater reliability and more rapid performance. Cross training permits soldiers to share duties and to cross check computations. Training under conditions of continuous and sustained operations allows units--

To develop sensible standing operating procedures (SOPs).

To develop and execute plans that provide at least four hours of uninterrupted sleep each day.

To learn additional time needed to execute tasks for each successive period of operations without sleep.

To learn recovery sleep needed to restore normal performance following sustained operations without sleep.

Before the need arises, commanders should identify and support critical skills. A critical skill is one a soldier must be able to perform, regardless of fatigue, so that he or his comrades can survive. The means for support must be familiar, practiced, and comfortable, Supports may be schemes or procedures rather than physical objects. For example, a fire support officer's (FSO's) ability to quickly call for fire on an enemy position is a critical ability. Determining accurately a set of six-digit grid coordinates to the position may be difficult for a fatigued soldier. A support example is plotting targets, groups, and series on a map from which the FSE or FSO can quickly engage the enemy. When fatigued, the soldier can do this easier than determining precise locations.

As soldiers become increasingly worn out, leaders must--

Give only simple directions. Fatigued soldiers have difficulty in understanding complicated directions and are likely to forget some of them.

Give complete, clear, precise orders. Leaders must leave no room for interpretation. Degraded soldiers have great difficulty in reasoning. They cannot "fill in" anything that has not been said explicitly.

Repeat orders and directions. Leaders must have degraded soldiers repeat orders given to them or even write them down. Soldiers' memories for new information are faulty. They are likely to forget orders or parts of orders almost as soon as they are given.

Double-check themselves and others. Orders given and acknowledged may not be carried out correctly or completely. Therefore, it is necessary to double-check constantly to see if orders have been executed as intended. Leaders should arrange a way to double-check their own activities.

Leaders, on whose decisions mission success and unit survival depend, must get the largest allocation of sleep. (This may seem contrary to military tradition, but it is sound practice.) Commanders must plan and schedule their own sleep. Sleep priority goes to soldiers whose jobs require them to perform calculations, make judgments, or evaluate information. If a single unbroken period of four to five hours is not available, naps should be taken. (This is less restorative however.) Priorities for sleep scheduling are--

2400-0600--best period.

1200-1800--next best.

1800-2400--third best.

0600-1200--least desired.

Command and control of continuous combat operations requires the CP to operate effectively over long periods of time until the unit has accomplished its mission or is pulled off line. Command post personnel will not function efficiently under the stress of combat without established work cycles that allow rest periods. To provide this rest and accomplish the continuous operations requirement, division CPs establish designated work shifts for available personnel. Most of the disruption of the continuity of TOC operations occurs during the changeover from one shift to another. Command post work cycles are established to support two 12-hour shifts with personnel availability as the primary factor influencing the length of a shift.

Scheduling en masse shift changeover of the entire CP at 12-hour intervals is not effective. It degrades efficiency of the tactical operation center (TOC) in operations and staff functions. It allows a mass departure of the last shift and a complete loss of the collective knowledge of the last 12 hours of the operation and planning coordination. Numerous incidents transpire during a 12-hour shift. Regardless of the thoroughness of the shift briefing, supporting decisions and rationale can be forgotten or deemed unimportant and not briefed in the haste to go off shift Incoming shift personnel may then confront situations early in their shift about which they have no knowledge. This places them, as well as the entire division, at an information disadvantage, and they lose effectiveness in controlling the current operation and planning the future operation. The CP loses valuable time in researching answers and the synchronization of operations suffers equally.

Another disadvantage to the mass shift change is that different cells and elements within the TAC, main, and rear CPs have different time frames within which a shift change is more practical. This is normally a result of specified times that reports are due to higher headquarters or other requirements generated by the mission or tactical situation. If the command post shift changes are scheduled to coincide with the headquarters company feeding plan and the commander's morning and evening update, then each element within each CP will not have the flexibility to establish a shift change schedule which appropriately supports its functions and time lines. Maintaining and updating knowledge and an information base is key in structuring and conducting shift changes.

The shift change should not affect TOC operations. A proven method of scheduling shifts and maintaining continuity of information is to stagger the shift change during the 12-hour shift window established in the unit SOP. The staggered shift can be conducted by the entire command post or by each cell and element independently, depending on requirements and peak load times.

The staggered shift change involves scheduling officers, NCOs, and enlisted men on overlapping shifts so that the new shift element has access to a body of knowledge four to six hours old. This technique eliminates the knowledge vacuum evident at the beginning of the shift when using the en masse method. Figure 2-2 provides an example of a shift wheel technique for use by each internal cell and element within each CP in planning and displaying shift schedules.

By staggering personnel into the shift, the unit has a constant interface of new and old shift personnel working within the CP. For example, using the shift wheel, officers can change their shift at 0900 and 2100 hours with an informal map brief and exchange of significant events and guidance. The new officer is now on duty with an NCO who has been there for six hours and is aware of the rationale and circumstances leading to the current situation. The NCOs can change at 0200 and 1400 hours, and enlisted men at 1100 and 2300 with the same types of information overlap and exchange as they pertain to their duties.

When the CP displaces, it must do so without waking up and working off-shift personnel. Every effort should be made to ensure off-shift personnel receive all the rest the tactical situation will allow so that they are mentally alert when they come on shift. When rest for the off shift is not feasible, essential rest periods must be reestablished as soon as possible.

LIAISON OPERATIONS

The division conducts liaison operations to aid in coordination, synchronization, and parallel planning. Liaison teams must have their own transportation and communications links to their headquarters. Liaison teams may require a foreign language capability when working with allies.

Reciprocal liaison involves exchange of liaison teams. Reciprocal liaison is required when a formation is placed directly under the command of a headquarters of a different service or nationality, or when units of different nations are adjacent.

The liaison officer (LO) represents the commander at the headquarters of another unit for effecting coordination and promoting cooperation between the units. The selection criteria for liaison officers should include knowledge of the unit's situation, ability to communicate effectively (language capability, as required), and other special criteria that will enhance effective liaison.

When liaison is not reciprocal, responsibility for establishing liaison is normally--

From left to right.

From rear to front units of the same echelon.

From higher to lower echelon (for operational control (OPCON) or attached brigades).

From supporting to supported unit.

From moving force to in-place force.

Liaison from left to right facilitates flank coordination and flank security. LOs must focus on comparison of the two units' concept of operations and commander's intent. Of particular concern is the horizontal synchronization of the BOS across the unit boundary:

Do intelligence systems complement each other?

Are predictions and time lines synchronized?

Do the array of maneuver forces and forms of maneuver complement each other or are there gaps or weaknesses created along the boundary?

What fire support coordination measures are established, and where?

Are there gaps in counterbattery or countermortar radar coverage?

Do mobility and survivability plans complement each other or are unit obstacles easily bypassed through the adjacent division's sector?

Does air defense coverage inadvertently create an air avenue approach into another division's zone?

Are coordinating points and the degree of coordination (exchange of LOs, visual contact, or physical contact) the same in each division?

Can emergency CSS support be coordinated?

During conduct of operations, the LO must keep abreast of the situation in each unit. He must advise his parent unit of developments in the unit he is with that may affect the parent unit. He must continue to monitor the horizontal synchronization of BOS. The LO is not a decision maker or a synchronizer, but he represents his commander and advises his parent unit of what is happening in the adjacent unit.

Liaison from rear to front is similar to liaison from left to right. The LO to the forward unit examines and reports on the forward unit's concept and intent and provides combat information and intelligence to his unit. He provides mobility and survivability information which may impact on his unit.

The LO's key role is to provide information which allows his unit to parallel plan in real time. He may recommend positions for his unit to occupy as it moves forward. He may coordinate terrain management. The bottom line is that he assist in maintaining the agility of his unit.

Liaison from higher to lower does not normally occur with brigades assigned to the division. This liaison normally occurs when a brigade is attached or is placed OPCON to the division. Additionally, divisions often send their LO to corps. The primary role of this LO is to maintain continuity of information and operations.

The LO primarily ensures the subordinate unit understands how the division operates. Many of the functions an LO conducts left to right or rear to front are fulfilled through normal command and staff relationships.

At division level, liaison from supporting to supported unit occurs when a division is given a follow-and-support mission. The LO conducts his activities much the same as a rear-to-forward unit liaison. The information he provides helps his unit to support the forward unit.

A two-person liaison team does not normally conduct liaison from a moving force to a force in place. The moving force normally collocates command posts to enhance the primary and special staff officer coordination.

Duties and Responsibilities

The liaison team's parent unit headquarters should provide the following:

Transportation.
Radio.
Signal operating instructions (SOI) (LO copy).
SOI extract for gaining unit.
KYK 13 with current and future crypto net variable (CNV) fills (if necessary).
Maps (covering sector, gaining unit sector, and route between).
Overlay paper or acetate and equipment to make overlays.
The current operations order (OPORD) and FRAGOs.
The most recent commander's situation report.

The following items represent the minimum initial information about the parent unit the LO should provide the host unit:

Current mission.

Future operations.

Task organization with changes.

Boundaries with changes and the time effective.

Fire support and engineer overlays and plans.

Current logistics situation.

Personnel situation and critical MOS shortages.

An intelligence situation update.

Current systems status.

The liaison team should be added to the TOC access roster of the host unit and able to identify security clearance (coordination with assistant chief of staff (ACofS), G2).

On arrival at the host unit, the liaison officer--

Establishes communications with his unit and receives updated information.

Reports to the commander or his representative (chief of staff (CofS), G3, operations duty officer) and should be prepared to brief his unit's situation.

Visits each staff section, provides information as required, and obtains information he must transmit to his unit.

Ensures his location at the headquarters is known at all times (for example, the G3 operations cell or command center).

Acquires as much information as available about the host unit's mission, unit locations, future operations, and commander's intent. Accuracy is critical.

During his liaison tour, the LO should accomplish his mission without interfering with host unit operations. He must stay informed of his own unit's situation and provide that information to the commander and staff of the host unit. He must keep an appropriate record of reports.

He informs the host unit commander of the content of reports sent to the LO's parent headquarters. He reports promptly to his parent headquarters if he is unable to accomplish the mission.

On returning to his parent headquarters, the LO will--

Clearly and accurately brief the commander of his representative (TOC duty officer, G3 or S3, CofS or XO) concerning the mission of the visited headquarters, unit locations, future operations, and the commander's intent.

Transmit mission requirements and requests for information from the visited headquarters.

Brief representatives from all staff sections on information received during the liaison visit.

Keep abreast of the situation and be prepared to perform his next liaison mission.

LO Techniques

Many first lieutenants and junior captains are assigned as liaison officers on brigade and division staffs. These are table of organization and equipment (TOE) positions. Unfortunately, these officers are given few opportunities to act as LOs and they know little about the job. The following are helpful LO hints:

An LO "gets as good as he gives." The LO must anticipate the types of information the visited unit will want and types of questions it will ask.

LOs should have with them a list of division, major subordinate command (MSC), and separate unit commanders and staff officers. Knowing names makes it easier to communicate when the LO's unit and the visited headquarters start talking to each other.

LOs need to take their security clearances as well as other "qualification" papers. LOs should be ready for a long stint at a TOC and prepared to sustain themselves.

As soon as an LO arrives at his destination, he should call and check in. While en route, he may be out of touch with his unit for some time, and many things can change.

An LO should meet everyone he can in a headquarters. He should keep a written record of who they are, their positions, and how to contact them. Otherwise, he will be overwhelmed by the number of people he meets. He will need to know these people to help him solve problems. Members of his own unit will ask for names and phone numbers so they can coordinate.

An LO should send a copy of the visited headquarters' SOP to his unit as quickly as possible, especially report formats.

If an LO attaches himself to the TOC watch officer and listens to what goes on (or fails to go on), he will be able to inform his unit of incoming missions. An LO is not only the official representative of his command, he is also a conduit of information for his commander.

The LO must think about his unit's needs. He must be creative in looking for information, units, materiel, or other resources. He must ask, "Does my unit know about that? Will we have a need for it?"

If the need arises, the LO must be prepared to comment on performance to watch officer or even the G3. If shortcomings hurt his unit and threaten its mission, he should inform the watch officer. He must have his facts straight, be professional, and speak in private.

The LO should ask questions. He must demand explanations. Every resource the LO fails to tap for his parent unit because he is not dynamic or creative enough to grasp the importance and value of an item may cost a life or threaten the mission. The two questions that should always be on the LO's mind are, "How can I help my unit?" and "How can I help other units?"

Before departing his own unit, the LO should receive briefings on--

His unit's mission.

The current situation.

The commander's intent and concept of operations including the following:

--Unit locations.

--A front-line trace.

--A map with overlay.

--Combat capabilities.

--Task organization and changes in detail.

--Contact points (and their effective times and call sign).

--Boundary changes, and their effective times, and current higher and adjacent unit status.

--Required road clearance.

--Friendly air defense artillery positions.

A unit estimate of enemy situation and locations, intent, and capabilities in sector.

Transportation and destruction of classified documents.

Communications, to ensure--

--Radios work.

--SOI complete.

--Challenge and password for all adjacent units.

--Variables for secure communication with parent unit.

Transportation requirements.

Language and interpreter requirements.

Security en route to the unit.

The current logistics situation.

Special requirements.

Before departure from his unit, the LO must coordinate with the CofS, G3, or TOC officer for a final update and sign out of unit, giving his estimated time of arrival to the supported unit.

COMMAND POST DISPLACEMENT

Displacing a CP is a function of training and staff battle drills that each unit must accomplish within its resources and training schedule. Normally a command post does not shut down and transfer operations to another CP while it displaces.

Each CP in the division must be able to displace during tactical operations and simultaneously conduct its C² mission. The recommended method is for each CP to split and displace by echelon. When one echelon moves, it eavesdrops during the move while the remaining stationary echelon maintains functional operations. Once the moving echelon establishes itself in its new location, an exchange of only that critical information received during the move is passed by maneuver control system (MCS), mobile subscriber equipment (MSE), and frequency modulated (FM) to the displaced echelon. Once this echelon receives and understands the information, it accepts control and the remaining echelon moves to the new location or it may leapfrog to another location past the last jump site. The displacement of division CPs should cause minimal disruption to normal C² activities. During displacement operations, a CP should perform only those functions absolutely critical to support the battle or operation.

Each CP has sufficient vehicles and personnel on each shift to move by this technique. For example, in the TAC CP, the G2 vehicle and the FSE vehicle could form one echelon while the G3 and mobility and survivability (M/S) vehicle could form the second echelon. The command group vehicle can be temporarily added to the G3 and M/S echelon to provide a fire support capability. Both echelons will, of necessity, perform reduced functions because of the doubling up of functions in each vehicle. Shift personnel can be split between echelons so that half the G3 M/S personnel function within the G2 FSE vehicles and vice versa.

Command post SOPs should determine the exact personnel breakout for command post element by shift, depending on current strength levels and authorizations. In this way, during a fast-moving offensive or defensive tactical situation, the CP can continue to perform its functions without losing its capability to continuously see the battlefield. During fast-paced offensive or defensive operations, the CP may have to perform continuously in the displacement mode to maintain contact with unit forces.

COMMAND POST SECURITY

Security of the CP takes many forms. Using MSE or other wire communications as the primary form of communications enhances electronic security. FM communications should be used only when the CP is displacing or is out of range of enemy medium artillery or electronic detection measures.

Physical security offers an entirely different set of problems. Command post security should not be confused with self-imposed requirements to limit access to the TOC. The physical security of any CP is enhanced by the use of camouflage nets. When time permits, maintaining a CP that is small in size and 100 percent mobile also enhances physical security. The use of concertina wire to improve physical security is not recommended unless the CP is in a static location for a long period of time (as fire bases in Vietnam were). The use of wire requires extraordinary human efforts to correctly emplace small amounts to be effective.

The current technique of placing a single strand of wire around a CP is also inadequate. It is ineffective against a determined enemy agent or small force. In addition, the wire signals to the enemy that the CP it surrounds is probably important and makes it a high-value target. Wire also hinders the mobility of the CP's vehicles to displace rapidly when under the threat of direct or indirect fires. Physical security must begin well away from the CP with checkpoints, patrols, listening posts (LPs), and observations posts (OPs). The G3 operations sergeant major or senior NCO is normally in charge of physical security of the CP. Command post shift personnel cannot be expected to perform both their command post functional missions and security or guard missions and maintain a continuous operations capability.

A designated security force must be task-organized from available forces to support the CP. This security force can be infantry companies or platoons, a military police (MP) platoon augmented by the division band, or any other element available and capable of performing the security mission. The CP is too valuable to the division's operation to relegate its security to only two entrance guards checking TOC passes. If classified or sensitive information is discussed or used then the unit should control access to the TOC by using organic nonshift personnel for limited periods of time.

Section III. COMMAND POST FACILITIES

This section describes critical functions required by the TAC, main, and rear CPs to effectively command and control tactical operations. Additionally, it describes an assault command post. All descriptions of CP operations derive from the functional CP study and orient on the performance of critical C² functions rather than on specific, rigidly enforced CP configurations.

There is no requirement, nor should there be, to set up command posts in these configurations only. The terrain, AO, and tactical situation will determine the set-up configuration; however, the functions performed always remain the same. This section identifies minimum quantities and types of key equipment and personnel required to perform critical C² functions continuously with two 12-hour shifts. The CP layouts are not in tended to prescribe, but only to portray the equipment and space required to perform specified functions. The C² processes and techniques apply equally to light, air assault, and airborne divisions.

The L-series TOE is the assets to support critical basis for allocating C² functions. The diagrams in this section acknowledge that differing MTOEs exist and the current L-series TOE does not authorize sufficient personnel and equipment to perform functions required by current doctrine and training literature. These diagrams do, however, reflect a realistic allocation of minimum equipment and personnel needed to effectively command and control a division in combat. The personnel diagrams reflect the minimum number of personnel required, but not necessarily authorized, by current MTOEs and TOEs. In some staff areas, bill payers have been identified from less critical functions. The personnel diagrams describe the duty position, proposed rank, number required, MOS required, and L-series TOE reference number from which the personnel were obtained. For those elements and functions for which no identified bill payers were found within the TOE, a blank space at the TOE reference number represents a critical personnel slot that should be filled with additional personnel to perform that function. It is recommended that units fill these personnel slots "out of hide" until TOEs are changed to accurately reflect realistic division C² requirements.

When the division is committed, the logistic support area should remain in the division's rear area near the rear CP. There, the logistic support area, because of its size and lack of mobility, does not represent a security risk for the main CP. The logistic support area must support the main and tactical CPs by logistics packages specially tailored to meet CP requirements. The packages function in the same manner as in our brigades and battalions. Small, mobile contact teams will perform required or emergency maintenance to the CP. They will perform only essential maintenance or repairs until time and the situation permit a more sustained effort. The headquarters company of the DISCOM provides internal supply, food service, and unit-level maintenance for vehicles, generators, and construction equipment organic to the division rear CP.

THE TACTICAL COMMAND POST

During combat operations, the division tactical command post--

Continuously supports the close operation by coordinating and synchronizing the immediate tactical requirements of elements committed to the division close operations.

Receives, posts, analyzes, and distributes combat information and tactical intelligence from higher, lower, and adjacent units to support the close operation.

Synchronizes and expedites fires of all fire support assets supporting the close operation.

Coordinates and integrates mobility and survivability operations (chemical and engineer obstacles) in support of the close operation.

As an extension of the main CP, the TAC CP moves well forward to focus its efforts on the close operation. As its name suggests, the TAC CP is a combat command element capable of operating close to combat maneuver elements and subject to engagement by the enemy's direct or indirect fires. Well forward generally means in the vicinity of the lead or main effort brigade main CP, or even farther forward if the situation dictates. The TAC CP is properly positioned if it can "see the close battlefield." The TAC CP is deployed to be in a position on the battlefield to manage and control those divisional forces committed or moving to close combat with an enemy force. It serves as a net control station (NCS) to receive brigade and separate battalion requests for support, and combat status reports. It makes critical, time-sensitive tactical decisions when required. It coordinates close operations requirements for support with the main CP.

The TAC CP is designed and manned to be a small, highly mobile and survivable command post. Its survivability is directly related to its small size and capability to rapidly displace. Only essential personnel and equipment should be located at the TAC CP. When deploying the TAC CP, smaller is always better. The following paragraphs describe a functionally based TAC CP design.

Figure 2-3 depicts two basic configurations used by the TAC CP when deployed. Either configuration, with extensions out, can be used when the TAC is established in a secure area with little probability of receiving enemy indirect fire and having to displace rapidly. The end-to-end configuration without extensions is used when the TAC CP is committed to controlling close operations and rapid displacement is essential to its survivability, or it must move frequently to keep up with fast-moving offensive or defensive tactical operations. In this situation, the G3 operations establish a rally point to which each vehicle moves after dispersing in different directions.

The TAC CP is not always deployed. It deploys when the division is committed to combat operations or must coordinate, synchronize, and conduct a collateral operation, such as a passage of lines, river crossing, or relief in place.

When not required to deploy, the TAC CP remains near the main CP in a "warm" mode. When warm, the TAC CP is monitoring radio nets; MCS terminals are on, maintaining and compiling a current data base; operational maps are posted and updated as information changes. Personnel manning is at a minimum. Personnel close by, however, maintain a high state of readiness to deploy "hot" when required.

To control and support the elements committed to the close operation, the TAC CP normally comprises five mutually supporting elements--the assistant division commander for maneuver (ADC-M), G3 operations, G2 operations, fire support element, and M/S element. the HMWWVS that make up the TAC CP are configured with redundant communications equipment and C² accessories to support continuous operations. Information is normally on 1:50,000 (or 1:100,000) scale maps and 1:250,000 scale maps.

The ADC-M

The ADC-M is a brigadier general who normally locates on the battlefield at the TAC CP when it is deployed. The ADC-M must make on-the-spot decisions concerning all aspects of the close operation. He must make these decisions with an understanding of the division commander's intent and vision of how the battle should play out. He also relies on his firsthand and more immediate knowledge of the tactical situation and committed units' status. Although the ADC-M focuses on the close operation and committed units, he also knows the status of the deep and rear operations so that he can make tactical decisions for the close fight that will support those operations in the long term and benefit the overall division battle. The ADC-M is not required to seek permission from the main CP or commandgroup prior to making a tactical decision. He does, however, have to make that decision known to the TAC CP and the main CP so that they can integrate and synchronize other supporting battlefield elements and redirect their support. He functions at the TAC CP with only his organic HMMWV (Figure 2-4). The HMMWV's communications package allows him to function far forward where he can physically see or influence a battle or to accompany a unit into a hostile environment.

The G3 Operations Element

The division G3 provides a G3 operations element as an extension of the main CP G3 operations element that helps make up the TAC CP. The G3 operations HMMWV is the command center and the operational hub of the TAC CP operations and is the controlling element of the TAC CP (Figure 2-5).

The senior G3 operations NCO is responsible for the physical layout and overall functioning of the TAC CP. He establishes shift rosters, maintains security, performs maintenance on all vehicles, and controls access to the CP operations area. The G3 operations map is the focal point of all TAC CP operations and information-gathering activities. The primary task of the TAC CP G3 element is to provide and maintain the capability to see the close operation as it develops by acquiring the most accurate picture possible of the status and location of all committed elements. It establishes direct FM, AM, MSE, and MCS communications with committed brigades and separate battalions. It continually posts a current operations map with the last-known location or front-line trace and intentions of elements no smaller than battalion or squadron or separate company. Posting smaller elements becomes time-consuming, adds unnecessary clutter, and detracts from the G3's capability to see the battlefield clearly. Units should dictate a standard for map posting, but the general rule should be to post no lower than two levels down.

When the ADC-M or the commanding general is located at the TAC CP, he makes all tactical decisions that affect the close operation from the G3 operations map. The G3 operations at the TAC CP routinely sends updates to the main CP on unit locations. Resources requested by committed units are passed to the G3 operations at the main CP which allocates resources and establishes priorities based on the overall division battle. The G3 operations maps at the TAC and main CPs cannot and should not be identical because each has a differing focus, scope, and information time frame. Information critical to the TAC CP in controlling close operations may be of little value to the main CP as it assesses the overall division battle within the time window that it can affect. The G3 element at the TAC CP must resist attempts to redirect its focus from supporting committed forces.

The G3 section routinely receives and provides information to the TAC CPs of only those units committed to close operations. (The main CP handles all other units not committed to the close operation.) From the maneuver standpoint, the TAC CP G3 operations map should routinely reflect the following:

The frontline trace of battalion-sized units in contact.

The center of mass of committed battalions not in contact.

The committed brigade TAC and main CPs' current and proposed locations.

Current maneuver graphics with control measures.

The location of the reserve.

The location of adjacent units.

The location of the main and rear CPs.

The decision support template.

The TAC CP G3 operations keeps only the minimum number of charts required to see the battlefield. The following charts are normally necessary to portray maneuver:

The current mission and intent (in words).

The task organization and commander's assessment (words and gumball).

The MSC's critical maneuver systems assessment (gumball).

Figure 2-6 shows an example of a division TAC CP G3 operations task organization chart. It also reflects the current and projected combat capability of committed maneuver and combat support units. Only those units committed to close operations are monitored. Figure 2-7 shows more detail by critical weapons and CSS systems for each MSC.

These gumball charts effectively capture critical information about maneuver elements without a major expenditure of manpower. They highlight alarms without a great deal of analysis by the decision maker. For this system to work, however, each echelon must have a usable, workable common SOP. The demands of conflict may require some modification of what critical elements to monitor. The TAC CP should capture and track only information that allows it to see the close operation and respond rapidly to the requirements of elements committed to combat with the enemy.

The G2 Operations Element

The G2 element at the TAC CP is an extension of the G2 operations element of the main CP and functions from a HMMWV (Figure 2-8). It exists solely to acquire and analyze intelligence gathered from the close operation and to provide current intelligence of value to committed units. The TAC CP G2 maintains communications with the S2s of maneuver brigades, separate battalions, and separate or special purpose intelligence-gathering companies. Tactical information is gathered from the individual soldier on up.

Each echelon providing information first analyzes data received and then forwards its assessment of the enemy current status, location, and intentions to the next higher command post. For example, the G2 at the TAC CP should not receive spot reports such as "sighted three BMPs at NG631221" from an infantry squad (unless specially requested). Rather, he should receive "are engaging one MRR center of mass NG653236" from a brigade S2 that has analyzed information gathered from three or more battalion S2s who analyzed their information from companies, scout platoons, and forward observers. The TAC CP G2 should not post and analyze each intelligence spot report as that effort becomes more and more time-consuming as the battle progresses and volumes of data become available. Posting all the data a command post receives can become monumental and all-consuming. The TAC CP G2 must be able to consistently see the battlefield intelligence of the close operation. After posting and analyzing intelligence products from committed units, the TAC CP G2 also provides an analyzed product or "best guess" to the G2 operations at the main CP.

This TAC CP information, when seen with other intelligence sources available to the main CP, enables the G2 at the main CP to get inside the enemy's decision cycle by determining his tactical or operational intentions. Conversely, the G2 at the main CP must keep the TAC CP constantly informed about intelligence that will or may impact on the close operation. The TAC CP G2 passes intelligence requests and requirements from committed forces to the main CP G2. The latter establishes priorities and allocates available intelligence resources to support the close operation as well as the overall division battle.

The G2 at the TAC CP normally maintains two maps--a 1:50,000 scale map to support tactical operations and a 1:250,000 scale map to depict enemy follow-on forces and adjacent unit threats. The most important is the 1:50,000 intelligence operations map. The TAC CP G2 operations map should routinely depict the following intelligence information:

The center of mass of reported enemy battalion and separate company-level combat and combat support unit locations.

The frontline trace of enemy units.

Suspected or confirmed enemy boundaries.

The projected or confirmed enemy ground and air avenues of approach into the close operations area.

Current friendly maneuver graphics and fire control measures.

Named areas of interest (NAIs) and target areas of interest (TAIs) that affect close operations area.

The location and range fan of intelligence collection and electronic warfare (EW) assets supporting the close operation.

The TAC CP G2 maintains a separate map for the G3. They are located in close proximity to communicate and share information. The TAC CP G2 posts some specific enemy units on the G3 operations map to help orient on the enemy. Normally, enemy elements posted by the G2 on the G3 operations map consist of an enemy frontline trace and symbols that locate the enemy's regiments, reconnaissance companies, field artillery (FA) battalions, and ADA batteries. Because each operations map maintained by G2 and G3 operations is standard in size and scale (with standard drops), the G2 can overlay the intelligence operations map onto the G3 operations map.

The TAC CP G2 should also maintain a minimum number of charts. Time spent maintaining charts with no apparent value is time taken away from the analysis effort. The TAC CP G2 maintains an enemy force kill board templated to reflect enemy force positions. Figure 2-9 provides an example of a kill board. The board arrays an enemy force as it is on the ground. The G2 can show the combat capability of an enemy unit by shading in the destroyed strength. The ADC-M can quickly assess the strength of the enemy while he looks at his current disposition on the operations map.

Fire Support Element

The FSE at the TAC CP is also an extension of the main CP FSE. The TAC CP FSE comprises nine personnel (Figure 2-10). The TAC CP FSE coordinates fire support for current close operations. It coordinate and implements the fire support effort planned by the main CP FSE, responds to requests for additional fire support from subordinate FSEs, and identifies fire support requirements for the immediate and near-immediate tactical situations. A fighter liaison officer (FLO) resides in the FSE element. The FSE coordinates not only FA fires but also tactical air (TACAIR), offensive EW, and all other lethal and nonlethal fire support of the close operation. The TAC CP FSE maintains communications with subordinate FSEs and adjacent FSEs as required. It maintains the location and status of all fire support assets supporting close operations. The TAC CP FSE coordinates the priorities of fire support based on decisions by the G3, ADC-M, or command group. It should not enmesh itself in the detailed workings of individual battalion or battery operations. The FSE should maintain the capability to see, anticipate, and react to the overall fire support battlefield in support of close operations.

The FSE at the TAC CP maintains one 1:50,000 scale fire support map. It should routinely depict--

Maneuver graphics and control measures.

Location of supporting artillery battalions and multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) battery.

Location of supported unit fire support officers (FSOs).

Location of DIVARTY and corps FA brigade main CPs.

Division and corps fire support coordination graphics for the close operation.

Confirmed locations of enemy artillery units.

Airspace coordination measures.

Supporting artillery unit's maximum range fans.

Location of Q-36 and Q-37 radars and coverage fans.

Location and coverage fans of nonlethal EW assets supporting close operations.

Location of adjacent, forward, or rearward fire support units supporting the close operation.

The TAC CP FSE should maintain only the minimum number of charts. The following charts are the norm to assist the FSE to see the close operation's battlefield:

Fire support organization for combat.

High payoff target (HPT) list and target priorities.

Number of air sorties available.

The TAC CP FSE maintains estimates of the current and projected combat capability of FA assets by using the field artillery status gumball chart (shown at Figure 2-11). The FSEs at the main and rear CPs use the same chart. Information provided by the DIVARTY through their artillery-oriented commanders situation report updates it. The FSE, at the TAC CP, only monitors the status of FA units committed to the close operation. The maneuver brigade commander's situation report provides more information to the FSE. This includes the status of artillery units supporting that brigade. The FSE at the TAC CP posts all combat capability changes on its FA gumball chart; it passes the information to the FSE at the main CP and the G3 operations section. It updates FA information on the G3 maneuver gumball chart, if the information from artillery channels is more current than that received through maneuver channels.

The main CP FSE monitors the fire support requirements of the entire division battle. It also assists FSEs at the TAC and rear CPs by allocating resources and establishing priorities of fire support assets to best support current and future operations. The main CP FSE must maintain a completely accurate and up-to-date picture of the division's fire support status. This enables the commander to reallocate priorities or support in response to situations in the battlefield.

Mobility and Survivability Element

The TAC CP is formed with an engineer element to support the M/S functions of the close operation. This element, comprised of engineer and chemical personnel, does not normally establish priorities or allocate resources for engineer or chemical elements, although a situation may require it to do so. This element works for the TAC CP G3 operations officer and synchronizes M/S operations in support of committed forces. Obstacles in the form of engineer or unit-developed FASCAM routinely support the close operation. It is crucial that all obstacles (friendly and enemy) be identified and closely monitored to support branches of the current operation. Unknown obstacles are a liability on the battlefield. The magnitude of obstacle problems on the battlefield requires a dedicated effort to track location and status in synchronization with G3 operations. The engineer and chemical element works closely with the G2 and FSE to track known obstacles and plot them on the G3 operations map board. The engineer and chemical elements function out of the organic engineer battalion HMWWV located at the TAC CP. (Figure 2-12.)

This element maintains a 1:50,000 scale map on which it posts all known obstacles in the close operations area--chemical, man-made (friendly and enemy), and natural. It maintains contact with committed forces and main CP engineer and chemical elements to remain up to date on the emplacement and destruction of friendly obstacles.

THE MAIN COMMAND POST

The main CP is the heartbeat of the division C² organization and structure. It maintains a pulse of all aspects of the division battle, receiving input from the TAC CP, rear CP, and higher, lower, and adjacent units. It maintains its ability to see the battlefield and makes plans and decisions that will affect committed forces several hours out. The main CP controls all units not specifically designated as being controlled by the TAC or rear CP. It is specifically designed, manned, and equipped to directly interface with all organic and supporting elements of the division. As such, the main CP is directly responsible for planning, coordinating, integrating, synchronizing, and establishing priorities, and allocating resources to support the division's simultaneous conduct of deep, close, and rear operations.

The main CP does not normally make decisions affecting the close operation because of its delay in receiving information. The time required for information to travel from the sender through several information-controlling conduits (headquarters) negates its value. The information does confirm or deny the CP's prediction of enemy intentions and the adequacy of the division's plan against the current threat. The main CP supports the division battle by responding to requests for support by committed and noncommitted units throughout the division area. It must focus equally on the three operations supporting the division battle. As decisions are made at the TAC CP or rear CP, the main CP "tidies up the battlefield" by conducting all coordination required by the decision rapidly and effectively.

The following paragraphs describe a functionally based main CP design. The main CP normally functions in a massed (Figure 2-13) configuration. The threat acquisition and targeting capabilities, unit technology, and training will determine if the CP must disperse to survive. To function in the dispersed mode, the main CP must have the requisite computer and communications equipment that allow it to electronically collocate. Information at the main CP is normally displayed on 1:50,000 (or 1:100,000) scale maps and 1:250,000 scale maps.

The main CP contains three major functional cells: command cell, G3 cell, and G2 cell. All elements within the main CP function under the direct supervision, integration, or coordination of one of these three cells.

Command Cell

The command cell contains, and is responsible for the operation of, the command center and the commander's command group. The command center is an information and synchronization hub. It normally consists of the commanding general, CofS, secretary of the general staff (SGS), LOs, and supporting personnel and functions within the main CP from four standardized integrated command post system (SICPS) tents located in the center of the CP (Figure 2-14). The command center is the CofS's normal place of duty and the central source of information concerning the division's overall battle status. The CofS is the information manager for the division and the command center must be trained and structured to accomplish that function.

The command center is the eyes of the division for all information affecting deep, close, and rear operations. Briefings and staff huddles are held there to allow the staff to continue its routine work without excessive interference. The command center--

Is the central repository of information concerning the conduct and status of the overall division battle.

Synchronizes the functions of the main CP to support the entire division battle.

Performs the role of information manager for division operations.

Provides and accepts liaison teams.

The effectiveness of the command center depends directly on the type and quality of information it obtains. Although it rarely makes close operations decisions, it coordinates and synchronizes decisions made at the TAC CP. Decisions about future operations and the posturing of forces that affect the overall battle are made in the command center.

All information enters the command center from the TAC and rear CPs through the coordinating staff in the main CP. Information enters the main CP from both the TAC and rear CPs, and flanking and higher units. Information from the TAC CP primarily relates to units committed to close combat. Rear CP information relates to the four functions of rear operations.

The display charts and tactical maps maintained within the command center should provide an understandable visual picture of the total battlefield. They should enable the commander to initially see one echelon up and down. Any changes to the command center map and status boards are the responsibility of the CP's staff element. One person is usually placed in charge of the charts and maps. He is responsible for maintaining the currency of their information from data supplied by the staff. A conceptual representation of a command center information display array is shown at Figure 2-15.

Charts displayed within the command center should be kept to an absolute minimum. Routine command center information and the CCIR dictated by the commander determine the charts presented. These charts may differ for each unit depending on the commander's style of leadership and the factors of METT-T. However, they all serve the same function; they support the commander's ability to see the battlefield. The staff and commander should determine the value of any additional chart (if any) to command center functions and critical decisions.

Used properly and with discipline, gumball charts can greatly reduce the need for word charts. They can present sufficient information for the higher level commander at the main CP to make decisions on current or future operations.

Figure 2-16 shows an example of a commander's current and future assessment of major Army commands (MACOMs) using the task organization chart. Figures 2-17 through 2-24 show BOS and functional elements assessment charts and critical elements that should be maintained and evaluated. These charts reflect only one level down, to the brigade and battalion levels. The supporting staff sections maintain a "smart book" of information concerning elements two levels down. This supports the summaries presented in the command center.

A critical function of the command center is the accepting and dispatching of LOs. LOs can represent adjacent, attached, or OPCON units at the main CP. The CofS supervises all LO activities in support of the division. The LOs may work the out of the command center if room is available or the division may erect a tent near the entrance to CP. (See LO Techniques for liaison officer duties and responsibilities.)

The command group is provided to the division commander for protection in movements in the forward areas of the battlefield. Two HMMWVs are configured with FM, AM, and MSE communications equipment. They allow the commander to command well forward where his presence can be seen and felt and he can make timely decisions based on his personal observations of the close operation (Figure 2-25).

The manning of the command group is a unit decision normally stated in the SOP. As a matter of technique, the command group should be mini really manned with a G3 officer or an operations NCO, a G2 officer or an NCO, a fire support officer or an NCO, and the FLO, if required. Decisions made by the commander at the command group is quickly relayed to the TAC and main CPs to begin staff coordination and synchronization.

G3 Cell

The division G3 cell, located at the main CP, is the synchronization hub for the division battle. It is the most important staff element supporting the division tactical operations. The G3 cell normally comprises these elements--G3 operations, G3 plans, A²C², fire support, assistant division signal officer (ADSO), and NBC. Also performing functions within the G3 section are representatives with a habitual relationship from the ADA battalion, engineer battalion, G1/G4, aviation brigade, and Air Force. The G3 cell is manned by approximately 85 personnel for continuous 24-hour operations.

Success on the division battlefield depends on its ability to fight according to the five basic doctrinal tenets of initiative, agility, versatility, depth, and synchronization. Synchronization of the many facets of the division battle is the most important function of the G3 section at the main CP. The G3 arranges battlefield activities in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum combat power at the right place and time. Within the main CP, the G3 has 24-hour access to representatives of each BOS--intelligence, maneuver, M/S, fire support, air defense, C², and CSS. With the exception of intelligence and CSS, BOS representatives work for and respond directly to the G3 in support of their synchronization responsibilities. Through these BOS representatives in the main CP, the G3 develops a common base for grouping subordinate activities. Time is the most critical element in synchronizing current and future operations.

The division G3 must routinely work out of the main CP. To win the division battle requires the full synchronization of all organic and supporting combat, CS, and CSS systems. Only the main CP is designed and structured to provide the G3 staff, functions, and command and control hardware required to see the complete division battlefield and synchronize deep, close, and rear operations. At the main CP, the G3 operates by moving between the G3 current operations and the command center. The G3 works closely with the CofS in coordinating tactical operational requirements of the division. The G3 should not position himself at the TAC CP. Here he will see and control only the maneuver aspects of the close operation, essentially neglecting his responsibilities to the equally important rear and deep operations; critical collateral operations such as targeting, and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD); and future operations planning. Synchronization of the division battle requires the G3 to orchestrate the various elements within the main CP so that they can anticipate events and place assets at the right place at the right time.

G3 Operations Element

The G3 operations element is the primary asset with which the G3 sees the battlefield and executes his battle synchronization requirements. The G3 operations element--

Coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes organic and supporting combat, CS, and CSS assets to support current and future deep, close, and rear combat operations for the division.

Allocates resources and establishes priorities in support of the division battle.

Prepares and issues warning and FRAGOs to support the current operation.

Coordinates and conducts deep operations in support of close and rear operations.

Monitors the operations of higher, lower, and flank units.

Monitors close and rear operations.

The G3 operations element works out of a HMMWV and SICPS tent within the main CP (Figure 2-26). Operationally, the G3 operations element serves as the net control station for the division. It responds to communications from the TAC CP, rear CP, and noncommitted combat and CS units. The G3 operations element maintains current combat situation data, as received from the TAC CP for friendly forces. In the conduct of the current operation, it prepares and issues FRAGOs, develops branches to current operations, and coordinates the allocation of resources and establishment of priorities by other G3 elements and the G2 cell. It works closely with the plans element to synchronize future operations and the transition from the current operation to a future division battle without loss of momentum and unit tactical integrity. When necessary, the G3 operations element synchronizes and controls the division's deep operations. Working with the TAC and rear command posts G3 elements, the G3 operations element at the main CP manages the terrain assigned to the division for the conduct of tactical operations.

The G3 operations element functions primarily with current operations requirements within short-term time frames. A 1:250,000 map is maintained by the G3 operations element to post information from corps adjacent units and LOs that involves information outside the division current AO in the division area of interest. The G3 operations element maintains one 1:50,000 scale current operations map of the division AO. The operations map depicts current maneuver graphics, the location of TAC and rear CPs, the current committed force locations (at battalion level), and the frontline trace. It also displays the decision support template and locations of major enemy units and brigade and separate battalion CPs. This map becomes the focal point of G3 current operations capability to see the friendly battlefield. The G3 operations element must also transfer this picture to the tactical situation map in the command center, but with less detail. Both maps are posted with only the minimal essential information to reduce the clutter that builds up on a map. Normally, unit locations and status are not reported to the division main CP G3 operations element below the battalion and separate company level.

All tactical information contained on the main CP G3 current operations map is historical in nature and thus cannot be used for tactical maneuver decisions. Those must be made at the TAC CP. The information presented does, however, confirm or deny the adequacy of the division's plan and allows the development of branches to the division battle plan if required. Maneuver unit status is maintained by colored gumball charts that reflect the relative combat status and capability of all maneuver units. This chart is identical to the one used by the TAC CP G3 operations (Figure 2-27).

Requests for support by the TAC CP, rear CP, and combat units not committed to close operations are immediately passed to the G3 and CofS for decision. They are then coordinated with the CP staff element responsible for the overall coordination, synchronization, and integration of that BOS in the current and future operation. The BOS of maneuver is the specific responsibility of the G3 operations cell.

Working for G3 operations are representatives of the G1 and G4. The timely integration of personnel replacements and logistics activities with changes to the current operations is critical to the division's success. These G1 and G4 representatives function as G3 operations officers. They are the main CP's direct link to the CSS operations cell in the rear CP for responding to immediate tactical requirements and coordinating personnel and logistics support for a future operation.

The G1 and G4 representatives in the G3 operations element do not maintain formal information presentations. However, they do have access to G3 operations communications facilities, and communicate with the G1 and G4 at the rear CP. Through this dialogue, they maintain and update the CSS status chart (Figures 2-28 and 29) located in the command center.

G3 Plans Element

There is only one plans element within the division CP structure; it is located in the main CP. The plans cell is equipped and manned to--

Conduct parallel planning with the G2 and G3 elements to facilitate transitioning from current operations to implementing future operations plans.

Plan, integrate, coordinate, and synchronize all BOS into future operations.

Produce operations plans (OPLANs), FRAGOs, and warning orders to support transition to future operations.

Continuously monitor current operations to anticipate and adjust future planning requirements.

The plans element consists of sufficient personnel and equipment to perform continuous planning operations (Figure 2-30).

A²C² Element

The division A²C² element in the main CP coordinates, integrates, and regulates division airspace. It functions from within a G3 HMMWV and SICPS tent with sufficient personnel for continuous operations (Figure 2-31). It normally locates adjacent to the FSE to allow continuous, critical, and face-to-face coordination for effective functioning of the two cells. The A²C² element monitors deep, close, and rear operations continuously. It also deconflicts division airspace for using TACAIR support, Army aviation, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), ADA, FA, and EW assets. The A²C² cell--

Coordinates airspace within the division's AO to support tactical and logistics operations.

Integrates and coordinates Air Force and Army tactical air support for deep, close, and rear operations.

Integrates, coordinates, and synchronizes the division's organic and supporting ADA assets in support of the division's battle.

The A²C² element works directly for and responds to taskings by the G3. It consists of the G3 air, an air defense coordination section, an aviation brigade section, and an Air Force TACP. Personnel from these staff sections and subordinate units collocate within the A²C² to perform full-time A²C² functions. They routinely accomplish two separate, but interrelated tasks. First, they integrate, coordinate, and synchronize their BOS or parent or supporting units into the division's current and future operations. Second, they assist the G3 air in the A²C² process by synchronizing the airspace requirements of their parent units with the airspace users supporting the division. All sections performing functions within the A²C² element support and respond to the G3 air. It, in turn, is responsible to the G3 for operations of the A₂C² element. The G3 air ensures that the airspace over the division's entire AO is appropriately coordinated, integrated, and synchronized to support deep, close, and rear operations.

The A²C² element coordinates and controls the division's airspace through interface with the corps air traffic control center (ATC) and G3 elements at the TAC and rear CPs. The A²C² element maintains current data on air traffic service (ATS) facilities, current and planned airspace restrictive measures, and special joint use requirements. The G3 resolves conflicts regarding divisional airspace use that command guidance, orders, and SOPs cannot resolve. He provides hostile air activity data obtained through the G2 and air defense channels to other elements of the CP.

With the supporting ATS unit at corps, the A²C² element develops plans to provide ATS assistance to aircraft operating within the division's AO and to units conducting tactical operations. The corps ATS unit supporting the division is linked with the A²C² system, the host nation's ATS, and the tactical air control system (TACS). The ATS system supports aircraft of other component forces operating in the division's AO, and divisional aviation brigade units conducting tactical operations. It is also the interface between aircraft in flight and the element at the CP. ATS support includes--

Navigational assistance.

Air threat warnings.

Weather information.

Notice to airmen.

Artillery advisories.

Airfield and landing site terminal control.

Other assistance required to ensure near real time coordination and integration of air traffic.

The A²C² element disseminates this information directly to the appropriate airspace users and ATS facilities.

Aircrews routinely monitor ATS frequencies and may request flight assistance, including flight following and current information on weather, NBC, airspace restrictions, and ongoing friendly air operations. When necessary, the division commander may direct mandatory flight following for all aircraft within the division's AO. Flight following may be accomplished with an aviation unit's organic flight operations section or with an ATS facility. Division A²C² cells coordinate with the corps A²C² element; corps coordinates the input of its subordinates units. The element also recommends air corridors to corps for use by the division to support division aviation operations. Normally, these air corridors have a beginning altitude of 100 feet above ground level. Below this altitude, aircraft may fly in a visual flight rules (VFR) "see and avoid" mode. They do not have to report flight operations to the corps ATC or the aviation brigade air traffic control element.

Air Defense Coordination Section. The division's organic AD battalion provides the air defense coordination section (ADCS) for the A²C² element. Its primary role is to integrate, coordinate, and synchronize all AD operations and units, both organic and supporting, in support of the division's current and future operations. It is the main CP's focus and direct link for all AD assets within the division's AO. It continuously monitors the ADA unit's dispositions and ranges of weapons systems to ensure that the division conducts tactical operations under an overlapping coverage of both divisional and corps ADA assets. The ADA section maintains communications with corps ADA units to integrate divisional ADA employment with that of the corps'.

To maintain an accurate picture of the air defense battlefield, the ADA element receives the air defense commander's situation report directly from all AD battalion-sized (and above) units supporting the operation. Air defense elements in direct support of a maneuver force report their status not only to their parent organization, but also to the supported force. This assists the supported unit in seeing its air defense battlefield. The main CP ADA element maintains the total division air defense picture by posting data on the air defense status gumball chart. (See Figure 2-32.)

The ADA cell also maintains air defense-related information on the operations map shared with the G3 air. Information normally found on the ADA element operations map consists of--

Probable enemy air avenues of approach and designated ADA coverage.

Location of ADA batteries with range fans.

Location of point targets covered by ADA elements with range fans.

Location of corps ADA coverage supporting the division.

Readily available overlays that show the division early warning grid.

Word chart requirements for the ADA element is kept to a minimum. The only requirements for word charts are--

Air defense organization for combat.

Air defense weapons control status.

Air defense warning.

The ADA element posts graphics in conjunction with the A²C² graphics and control measures, rapidly identifying synchronization requirements that would interfere with both ground and air concepts of operation. In this way, the ADA element can react more rapidly to quickly changing A²C² requirements and coordinate them with the supporting air defense unit.

Aviation Brigade Section. Aviation brigade representatives function within the A²C². They are assigned to the aviation brigade, but function as part of the division staff. Aviation personnel assigned A²C² staff responsibilities accomplish two tasks. First, they assist the commander in the proper employment of aviation assets, provide the necessary functional area expertise, and serve as a liaison between parent unit and the supported commander and his headquarters. Second, they assist the A²C² process by synchronizing the airspace requirements of Army aviation units with other airspace users of the combined arms team and services. The element continually provides information concerning ongoing and future aviation operations and their status to the FSE, TACP, ADA element, and G3 operations.

The aviation element is the central receiving point for aviation information concerning combat operations. It receives this information from the division's organic aviation brigade and supporting corps aviation units. The gumball chart at Figure 2-33 depicts the CCIR for aviation. Using this chart, the aviation element determines the capabilities of aviation assets. It then applies the appropriate color-coded capability to the maneuver status chart in the G3 operations cell and the command center.

The aviation element also maintains a chart that shows the current aviation organization for combat and an operations map shared with the TACP. The aviation elements operations map should routinely maintain the following information:

Division maneuver graphics.

Aviation element maneuver graphics.

Location of current and projected aviation brigade and battalion CPs.

Location of current and projected airfields and landing zones.

Location of current and projected forward arming and refueling points (FARPs).

Air Force Tactical Air Control Party. The Air Force provides a TACP element to the division to support all operations. The TACP advises the commander and staff on the capabilities, limitations, and employment of tactical air power. The TACP works closely with the main CP to integrate Air Force fires to support the division battle. It also controls Air Force assets, such as close air support (CAS) sorties distributed to the division. The TACP works closely with the G3 plans and current operations cells to preplan CAS sorties in advance of a current or future operation. The TACP also participates in nominating air interdiction (AI) targets. It works closely with the other elements of the A²C² cell to coordinate air space for Air Force operations.

A division air liaison officer (ALO), normally a lieutenant colonel, leads the division TACP. The ALO is supported by an assistant ALO who is the division FLO. The FLO normally works at the TAC CP or accompanies the commander in the command group. A tactical airlift liaison officer (TALO) is also a member of the TACP and normally functions at the rear command post with the G1, G4, and DTO. In addition, the ALO at the main CP has four enlisted tactical air command and control specialists, six radio maintenance personnel, two administrative personnel, two supply personnel, and two generator maintenance personnel. The division ALO also supervises the activities of brigade and battalion TACPs within the division's task organization. He reports to and coordinates Air Force support for the division with the corps ALO. Internal to the division main CP, the ALO coordinates with the G3 air for air space coordination requirements and the G3 and FSE for Air Force employment requirements.

The TACP normally supports the division main CP with four HMMWVs, each containing a GRC 206 communications pallet mounted in the rear. The AN/GRC 206 communications pallet contains HF, UHF, VHF, and FM radios, all of which are remoted from the HMMWV to the section. The TACP uses the HF radio primarily to support the Air Force air request net (AFARN) with which he talks to the corps air support operations center (ASOC) and brigade or battalion FLOs. The FM radio is a backup for the HF in support of the AFARN. The UHF and VHF radios are used primarily as ground-to-air communications. With these radios, the TACP has the organic capability to--

Monitor how a current mission is flying.

Monitor in-flight reports from mission pilots.

Monitor battle damage assessments from pilots returning from missions.

Obtain real-time intelligence from pilots.

Coordinate any changes to airspace control measures with the mission pilots or FLO controlling the missions.

The FLO at the TAC CP works out of the FSE. The FLO element brings its own communications equipment which it remotes from its wheeled vehicle into the FSE. With this unique Air Force communications equipment, the FLO can communicate with the ABCCC aircraft, brigade ALOs, and TACP at the main CP. The TAC CP FLO focuses primarily on responding to requests for immediate or preplanned air support for committed units. The FLO at the TAC CP works the FSE 1:50,000 scale map. Normally, he does not maintain graphic control measures on this map nor does he maintain any formal charts. He does however routinely track known bomb damage assessment (reflected on the G2 killboard), sortie availability, frequencies, weather, and rules of engagement.

The TACP works at the main command post inside the A²C² section because of the continuous operations requirement to coordinate airspace for high-performance aircraft. The TACP coordinates closely with the FSE in planning for the future employment of air resources in a fire support role. The TACP does not maintain a separate map within the A²C² section but works off the combination ADA and A²C² map. There is no information that the TACP routinely maintains on this map. He does, however, require continuous access to the control measures that are maintained not only on the ADA and A²C² map, but also on the aviation brigade and FSE maps. The TACP does not maintain charts. He does, however, maintain current information on updated and projected target lists, future sortie availability, rules of engagement, frequencies, and weather. He also actively seeks bomb damage assessment information and provides this data to the G2 for updating the enemy killboard.

Fire Support Element

The main CP FSE is the division's focal point for planning, coordinating, and integrating all fire support for division operations. The FSE functions out of a HMMWV and SICP tent which is organic to the DIVARTY. In addition to the DIVARTY personnel, the assistant division engineer (ADE) element and the division electronic warfare element normally work in the FSE (Figure 2-34). The functions of the FSE include--

Synchronizing all organic and supporting lethal and nonlethal fire support for division deep, close, and rear operations.

Establishing priorities and allocating available fire support resources to support the division battle.

Planning and controlling all deep fires in support of division deep operations.

Providing field artillery intelligence officers to the all source production section (ASPS) to facilitate the division targeting process.

Responding to requests for additional fire support from the TAC CP FSE, rear CP, or other subordinate FSEs.

Participating in and supervising the routine activity and coordination of the targeting process within the division main CP.

Coordinating with the A²C² element regarding current artillery firing unit locations, changes to fire support coordination measures, and significant fires which may impact airspace users.

The main CP FSE continuously interacts with other elements in the G2 and G3 operations cells to plan, coordinate, and integrate fire support for current and future operations. Additionally, the main CP FSE provides the command cell with current decision information as required. The division main CP FSE may also receive artillery LOS or representatives from other fire support means.

DIVARTY Section. The DIVARTY section in the FSE works for and responds directly to the division G3 in support of the division's battle. It is responsible for all FSE functions and exercises overall coordination responsibilities of other sections within the fire support cell. The FSE is responsible to the G3 for allocating FA resources and FA priorities in support of deep, close, and rear operations. Fire support elements located at the TAC and rear CPs are an extension of the main CP FSE. They assist the main FSE in controlling those assets' functioning within the close and rear areas of operations.

The main CP FSE functions similar to the TAC CP FSE, although its scope is much broader. The main CP DIVARTY section maintains a 1:50,000 fire support operations map that is standard throughout the CP. It does not maintain duplicate maps for the G3 operations or the command center. Information on the main CP fire support operations map includes--

Division's and corps' maneuver graphics and control measures.

Locations of all organic and supporting FA battalions and MLRS batteries with range fans.

Division's and corps' fire control measures and graphics.

Location of nonlethal EW assets supporting the division.

Location of adjacent, forward, and rearward fire support assets capable of supporting the division.

Known locations of the enemy's FA battalions.

This information is routinely overlaid on the G3 operations map and the command center map to maintain a central perspective on the location of fire support assets in relation to maneuver units. From this detailed overlay, the FSE updates the command center map with changes to fire control measures. The main CP's FSE normally maintains the fire support organization for combat chart and the high-payoff target list and priorities.

The main CP FSE also maintains a FA status chart (Figure 2-35). However, the main CP FSE tracks all field artillery units supporting the division, not just those supporting close or rear operations. This chart becomes the basis for the fire support capability, both current and projected, that the division uses to support current, and plan future, operations. The FSE posts and analyzes information received from the DIVARTY and supporting corps FA brigade headquarters in the artillery commander's situation report. Changes in combat capability as pertains to FA units is quickly posted on the FA status chart and task organization chart located in the command center. The FSEs at the TAC and rear CPs also support the status charts as information becomes available to them. Normally, reports from the TAC and rear CPs either update information already on hand or support information provided by the DIVARTY.

Engineer Section. The engineer section that functions next to the FSE is organic to the division's engineer battalion and is led by the ADE. It recommends to the division commander engineer work and support priorities and allocates engineer resources to support the division battle. It is a direct link to the division's organic engineer battalion and other corps engineer battalions to support current, and plan future, operations. In this CP design, the engineer section is located in the fire support cell. There, it ensures that throughout the division AO, obstacles are synchronized and covered with fires. Additionally, it coordinates fire support for breaching operations and scatterable mines.

To maintain an accurate picture of the battlefield for engineers, the engineer element receives a commander's situation report directly from organic and supporting engineer headquarters. Engineer units in direct support to a maneuver force report their status not only to their parent unit but also to the supported force to assist them in seeing the battlefield. The main CP engineer element posts information requirements on the engineer status gumball chart (Figure 2-36). The status of brigade and separate battalion obstacle belts on enemy avenues of approach is maintained with the gumball chart shown at Figure 2-37. This chart uses the same green, amber, red, black percentages as all other gumball charts. Here, the colors also depict the capability and degree of completion of obstacle belts.

In addition to maintaining the unit and obstacle status gumball charts, the engineers also maintain specific data on their operations map and charts. The only word chart the engineer section requires is the task organization chart. Critical information normally found on the engineer operations map includes--

Location of engineer battalion or brigade CP.

Location of bridging assets (not including armored vehicle launched bridges (AVLBs)).

Maneuver graphic control measures.

Division and corps-directed obstacle free zones and belts.

Division-directed obstacle zones.

Brigade and separate battalion obstacle belts.

Location and status of division- and corps-directed obstacles.

Location of division and corps reserve targets.

Current priorities of effort and support in the division sector.

The engineer section at the main CP cannot--and must not--try to track each individual obstacle in the division's AO unless those obstacles are part of the CCIR. Obstacle zones and belts, with their completion status, are enough to see the engineer battlefield. Information on the status of an obstacle may be obtained from the engineer headquarters that emplaced it or the maneuver headquarters that directed it.

Electronic Warfare Section. The EW section is located in the FSE. It is organic to the division's G3 cell. Under the deputy fire support coordinator (FSCOORD), the EW section plans, coordinates, and monitors nonlethal EW operations in coordination with the FSE, A²C², G2 and G3 current operations, and plans elements. The EW section works closely with the ADSO to implement electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) and manipulative electronic deception. With the G2 and military intelligence (MI) battalion technical control and analysis element (TCAE), the EW section continually evaluates the vulnerability of enemy emitters to electronic countermeasures (ECM). It advises the G2, G3, and DFSCOORD on recommended courses of action. It recommends enemy targets vulnerable to effective ECM to support current and planned operations; it also tasks the appropriate supporting EW unit. Additionally, the EW section recommends to the G3 priorities for jamming by direct support (DS) and general support (GS) assets for current or future battles. The EW section integrates, coordinates, and synchronizes all E W assets in support of the division battle.

Assistant Division Signal Officer Element

The ADSO element is located at the main CP adjacent to the G3 plans. The ADSO's personnel and equipment are organic to the division's signal battalion. The ADSO element performs its functions from a HMMWV (Figure 2-38). While supporting the main CP, the ADSO--

Coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes all organic and supporting communications assets (including satellite communications) to support the division battle.

Allocates resources and establishes priorities for deep, close, and rear operations.

Anticipates and plans for the employment and positioning of communication assets for future operations.

The ADSO works for and reports to the G3. Its most critical role is to serve as the primary staff coordination element between the main CP and the signal battalion and other supporting signal elements. Therefore, the ADSO continuously monitors current deep, close, and rear operations, recommends changes to signal support, and keeps the supporting signal elements advised of immediate and future changes. The ADSO element does not install or fix telephones or radio equipment. If necessary, the signal battalion will perform these tasks. The ADSO manages the signal support provided the TAC, main, and rear CPs in support of the division battle. It synchronizes all aspects of signal operations in support of deception and EW operations.

Organic and supporting signal units provide their status to the ADSO cell. The gumball chart at Figure 2-39 provides those CCIR from a communications perspective. The ADSO also maintains a word chart and an operations map that contain other critical information not suitable for gumball display. The only word chart required by the ADSO depicts the signal element organization for combat. Common signal information normally found on the ADSO's operations map is as follows:

Maneuver graphic control measures.

Location of organic and supporting battalion and company CPs.

Location of key signal-supported CP facilities.

Current and projected node center locations.

Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Element

The NBC element performs its functions from a HMMWV and SICPS tent (Figure 2-40). When functioning in support of the main CP, the NBC element works for and reports to the G3. The NBC element--

Allocates resources, and establishes priorities for NBC in support of the division's deep, close, and rear operations.

Operates the division NBC warning and reporting system.

The division's chemical officer oversees all NBC elements within the main CP. He is the catalyst who must position himself where he can best influence the division's chemical battle and synchronize it with all BOS. He is the advisor to the division commander and G3 on all NBC-related matters. He supervises the overall NBC function. The division chemical officer works out of the NBC section in the main CP. He coordinates, synchronizes, integrates, and plans NBC operations to support current and future operations. He recommends how to allocate resources and plan priorities of work for chemical units assigned, attached, or OPCON to the division. The NBC section is the focal point for all NBC-related operations at the main CP and within the division.

As the hub of NBC operations for the division, the NBC element prepares NBC estimates, and monitors equipment status and the host nation's NBC support requirements. It coordinates the use of deliberate smoke for current and future tactical operations. It also disseminates contamination overlays and NBC reports to all units.

From an NBC perspective, the chemical platoon provides the commander's critical information both to the supported units, if it is in direct support of them, and to the parent chemical company. The NBC element maintains a status of all chemical elements capability. This comes from commanders' situation reports and from the organic chemical company and any supporting chemical element. Gumball charts at Figures 2-41 and 2-42, depict the commander's critical NBC information requirements. The NBC element also maintains a picture of NBC equipment survivability. It depicts this status through spot reports from MSC chemical personnel and close coordination with the G4 at the rear CP. This status is maintained by the division chemical section to NBC logistics.

Additionally, the NBC element maintains an NBC operations map. Information normally on the NBC operations map is as follows:

Maneuver graphic control measures.

Current and projected decontamination sites.

Location of organic and supporting chemical units.

Location of chemical attacks and contaminated areas.

Location and range fans of enemy units capable of firing chemical munitions.

Overlay for preplanned smoke operations.

Word charts also contribute to the NBC element's capability to see the NBC battlefield. The NBC element normally requires word charts that display--

Chemical units' organization for combat.

Division-directed mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) status.

The MSC MOPP status, if it is different from the divisions.

G2 Cell

The G2 cell, located at the main CP, requests, collects, analyzes, produces, and distributes weather and combat intelligence, and time-sensitive information about the enemy for the division's deep, close, and rear current and future operations. It comprises a G2 operations element, an ASPS, an Air Force weather team, and a division terrain team. The functions of the G2 cell are to--

Provide intelligence to the commander and staff in support of the division battle.

Coordinate, integrate, and synchronize intelligence, counterintelligence, all source production, SSO, weather, and engineer topographic operations.

Coordinate with the division's staff to ensure intelligence operations support maneuver and targeting.

Coordinate and direct tactical reconnaissance and surveillance operations.

The G2 and his staff are the commander's experts on the enemy and provide critical intelligence for divisional operations. They analyze the data being presented concerning the enemy force and translate it to the commander in terms understandable by US doctrinal concepts. The G2 is responsible for the overall intelligence effort for the division's battle, both current and future, and the analysis of terrain, weather, and the enemy situation. He must predict the tactical intentions of the enemy force confronting the division and identify the enemy's strengths and weaknesses. From the commander's guidance and concept of the operation, the G2 develops and implements the division's PIR and intelligence requirements (IR) and translates them into taskings or requests for intelligence. He ensures collection priorities are synchronized with and support the concept of operation. He is a critical element in the development of targeting guidance. Under the G2's supervision, corps and tactical intelligence is fused into an integrated all-source product that is rapidly disseminated. The G2 has, and exercises, primary staff responsibility for planning, coordinating, and executing electronic support measures (ESM) operations throughout the division's AO.

The division's intelligence system is linked to the theater, corps, and allied intelligence systems. It relies heavily on a combination of sophisticated collection assets for support. SLAR, Guardrail, Quicklook, and EAC intelligence assets feed the intelligence system near real-time intelligence to support the division's deep, close, and rear operations. HUMINT, IMINT, and SIGINT assets available to the division provide surveillance and reconnaissance information. Information is also obtained by requesting it through the corps.

The G2 cell sends out requests and taskings to higher and lower echelons. SIGINT and EW assets report information back to the MI battalion TCAE where the collected information is analyzed, correlated, and transmitted as intelligence to the ASPS.

The G2 cell monitors reporting and completion of assigned tasks and further disseminates intelligence and information to appropriate commands, agencies, or staffs. Military intelligence assets such as interrogation, counterintelligence (CI), and aerial surveillance personnel send information directly to the ASPS for analysis and integration into the all-source data base.

G2 Operations Element

The G2 operations element is located at the main CP (Figure 2-43). The G2 operations is the hub of intelligence operations within the division. Both the TAC CP and rear CP have G2 elements that support the G2 operations at the main CP, focusing on close and rear operations respectively. The G2 operations directs collection, management, and dissemination of intelligence. It translates intelligence requirements into collection missions for intelligence assets supporting the division. It receives, analyzes, consolidates, and assigns priorities to intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) requirements generated by current and future tactical operations. It must disseminate combat information and intelligence to the right user at the right time. The G2 operations coordinates and directs tactical reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, and surveillance operations.

The G2 and G3 operations elements work closely with the command center to maintain an enemy "picture of the battlefield, " to support the development of branches to current operations and future planning. The G2 operations element coordinates daily G2 operations requirements with other elements and sections of the main CP and elements of the TAC and rear CPs. In close coordination with G3 operations, the G2 operations integrates and coordinates intelligence requirements. It continuously converts elements of enemy information into analyzed combat intelligence, providing it to the G3 operations cell and command center. Additionally, the G2 operations element shares this intelligence with all other elements of the main and other CPs as appropriate.

Sharing of intelligence aids in developing knowledge of the enemy's current situation and projecting his future intentions. Through continuous intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and intelligence collection planning, the G2 operations gathers information to detect and track the enemy's critical HPTs. It provides this time-sensitive information to the fire support cell for immediate engagement by lethal or nonlethal fires. It tasks the MI battalion as the principal agency for this information. It tasks all divisional and supporting elements with collection missions within their capabilities. The G2 operations plans, directs, and coordinates counterintelligence operations throughout the division's AO. It coordinates with corps counterintelligence elements and various division elements to satisfy support requirements. It also works closely with the G3 operations to develop OPSEC to protect friendly essential elements of friendly information (EEFI).

The G2 at the main CP maintains two separate maps. Routine intelligence operations supporting the current operation are normally on a 1:50,000 scale map. This map is standardized with all other maps in the CP. It depicts the enemy and intelligence situation within the division's AO. A 1:250,000 scale or larger (depending on the theater of operations) depicts the division's area of interest and facilitates future planning. The G2 operations map should routinely display the following intelligence information:

Current and projected locations of enemy units one level up and two levels down.

Friendly force maneuver graphics and control measures.

NAIs, TAIs, and other intelligence-oriented decision graphics.

Location of critical intelligence collection assets with orientation or range fans.

Enemy threat to flanking units.

Projected enemy course of action graphics.

From this central bank of intelligence information, G2 operations personnel extract trends, confirm or deny the enemy's intentions, project the enemy's future intentions, and transfer selected or analyzed information onto the command center operations map. The G2 operations map and the command center map, however, do not duplicate each other.

Word charts required by the G2 operations cell are kept to an absolute minimum. Normally, it requires only two charts--one showing the task organization of MI battalion and supporting corps intelligence assets, and the other, the PIRs, Weather and light data charts and an enemy kill board similar to Figure 2-17 are other potentially useful charts.

The intelligence status board depicts the status of critical items supporting the intelligence collection effort. (See Figure 2-44.) This board tracks key equipment of the MI battalion and corps supporting units. The command center has a similar board that depicts a summary of this board for battalion or larger elements.

All Source Production Section

The ASPS works for, and is supervised by, the division G2. The section performs its functions within a HMMWV and SICPS tent, located adjacent to the G2 operations element. It contains 21 personnel to support continuous operations (Figure 2-45). The ASPS is responsible to the G2. Specifically, it develops and maintains the division's intelligence data base and identifies gaps in intelligence. It reviews and forwards all-source intelligence products to the G2 operations for inclusion with other intelligence products, analysis, and dissemination. Supported by the USAF weather team and the corps topographic team, the ASPS conducts situation and target development functions using IPB and other methodologies. It supports the G2 operations in collection planning and targeting. It continuously monitors the division PIR and IR and recommends changes and information requirements as necessary. It continuously monitors the collection plan to identify gaps and adjusts it to the changing tactical situation. It supports the EW effort of the fire support cell with intelligence on the enemy radio electronic combat (REC) threat. It can also provide electronic order of battle data.

The ASPS routinely converts reported intelligence and information from sources into all-source intelligence using a basic production process. The ASPS receives data in two forms. It receives information--data that has not been subjected to correlation or analysis. It also receives processed intelligence. It correlates and analyzes both types of data to provide refined intelligence. Entrance into ASPS is controlled. All personnel working within the ASPS must have proper security clearances and be cleared for access to sensitive compartmented information (SCI).

Two field artillery intelligence officers (FAIOs) are normally provided by the FSE to work within the ASPS--normally one per shift.

The FAIO is a vital link in the rapid identification and attack of time-sensitive HPTs. FAIOs must have SCI access to function within the ASPS. They must have a detailed understanding of the threat, the target development process, and targeting process actions. The FAIOs--

Are key participants on the targeting team.

Provide the interface between the targeting team and the ASPS.

Provide attack system requirements for accuracy and timeliness to the ASPS.

Help the G2 section translate targeting time requirements into guidance for collection and ensure the collection plan focuses, in part, on detecting HPTs.

Provide the G2 section with expertise on FA target acquisition systems capabilities and limitations.

With ASPS, determine and inform the targeting team when major changes in the tactical situation warrant reevaluation of the HPT list and attack guidance matrix.

With ASPS, evaluate information received to produce targets, If necessary, the FAIO will ask the G2 to focus collection assets to further develop selected targets.

Nominate valid targets to the FSE for attack. The FAIO may pass identified HPTs and other targets directly to the fire control element at the DIVARTY CP or, if approved by the command cell, directly to a firing unit.

Coordinate with the collection manager to ensure that TDA data is acquired for selected targets. With the ASPS, the FAIO analyzes TDA data and informs the FSE of the results of this analysis.

Provide new coordinates to the FSE if the target has moved.

Staff Weather Officer Element

The US Air Force provides a USAF weather team (WETM) to the division to provide weather support to division operations. The equipment used by the WETM is normally organic to the division. The WETM cell performs its functions from a HMMWV and SICPS tent located a short distance from the main CP (in its massed configuration) (Figure 2-46). All equipment used by the USAF WETM is provided through the division TOE. The USAF WETM performs its functions throughout the division's AO. The staff weather officer (SWO) works for and reports to the division G2. The WETM provides weather observations and forecast support to the division. It works closely with the ASPS and terrain team to integrate weather information into the IPB.

The WETM supports the division's current and future operations in trafficability, maneuverability, visibility, and soldier comfort. It provides the G2 a daily 24-hour operations forecast and continuous input to the IPB process as well as producing basic wind data for the NBC. On demand or as required, the WETM updates and changes forecasts for a two- to six-hour time frame. The WETM obtains its weather information from a variety of sources, both internal and external to the division. Figure 2-47 depicts the weather operations concept currently used within the division.

Using either the Goldwing or UAWS systems, the WETM has contact with weather satellites on a 24-hour basis. The USAF WETM has contact with Army theater forecast facilities and available weather satellite sources using TOE equipment. The combination of surface and upper air observations, theater forecasts, and reception of satellite cloud imagery of current conditions are used to make forecasts. The WETM can also communicate with the WETM element at the corps CP. Within the division, the WETM interfaces with brigade and battalion S2s for current weather information in their AOs. Combining all available sources of weather information provides the USAF WETM with an accurate description of current weather conditions in the division AO and is part of the data base used to forecast and evaluate weather effects on operations. The SWO also uses divisional and Air Force transient aircraft for pilot reports of weather encountered either en route or exiting from a target area. Collectively, all of these sources provide the most accurate forecast possible to support tactical operations.

Division Terrain Team

The division terrain team is attached to, and supervised by, the division G2. The section performs its functions within a HMMWV with standard shelter and SICPS tent located a short distance from the main CP (in its massed configuration) (Figure 2-48). The team consists of eight soldiers to support continuous operations.

The terrain team's primary role is to support the IPB process through production of the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) and related terrain analysis overlays. It supports the planning cell with analysis of trafficability, routes, choke points, zones of entry, and obstacles. The team supports the G2 collection manager with visible area infiltration route, helicopter landing zone (HLZ) and drop zone (DZ), cover and concealment analysis for siting intelligence collectors, and development of long-range surveillance detachment (LRSD) target folders. It supports targeting with line-of-sight (LOS), mobility, and cover and concealment studies, and with structural information on man-made targets. Additionally, the team responds to terrain requests for information (RFIs).

THE REAR COMMAND POST

The rear CP is an extension of the main CP. It focuses on the command and control of all elements located within the division's rear AO. It also synchronizes rear operations for the division battle. The rear CP normally contains three cells--headquarters, operations, and CSS (Figure 2-49). This austere structure controls all the elements functioning, residing, or transiting through the rear AO. Units should not enter the division's rear area without prior coordination with the rear CP. This will clarify and approve routes and locations of bases or base clusters, integrate this information into the security plan, and address requirements for sustainment. The rear CP passes this data to the main CP for information and the main's terrain management requirements.

The rear CP normally collocates with the DISCOM CP in the established DISCOM base within the division support area (DSA) in the division rear area. They are located side by side or end to end for ease of transit and coordination. The rear CP also collocates with the DISCOM CP to use DISCOM organic life support and security. This collocation does not imply that together they constitute the rear CP. On the contrary, they are two separate and distinct CPs with different but critical functions which require extensive cooperation and coordination (Figure 2-50). The rear CP is primarily concerned with terrain management, security of the rear area, tactical and logistics movement within and through the rear area, and synchronization and direction of sustainment. The DISCOM CP is primarily concerned with the execution of sustainment. The rear CP contains elements from the assistant division commander for support (ADC-S), G2, G3, FSE, G1, G4, DTO, ADSO, G5/CIMIC, provost marshal (PM) operations, and G1 support element.

The rear CP's most critical role is to synchronize and integrate rear operations with close and deep operations. The rear CP and the DISCOM CP jointly analyze future division plans for their impact on current and future rear operations to ensure logistics and personnel support is available. The rear CP deconflicts tactical and nontactical moves where needed and controls them when required. The rear CP manages the terrain in the rear area. It assigns units to bases, designates base clusters when necessary, and appoints commanders for bases and base clusters. The rear CP coordinates and synchronizes rear security operations. It integrates base defense plans and designates and coordinates tactical combat forces (TCFs). The rear CP monitors activity in the brigade's rear, adjacent divisional rear areas, and corps rear area to prevent potential conflicts with the division's rear operations. Additionally, the rear CP monitors close and deep operations. When augmented, it may assume control of the fight if the main and TAC CPs can no longer function.

Information at the rear CP is normally displayed on 1:50,000 (or 1:00,000) scale maps and 1:250,000 scale maps. The following paragraphs describe a functionally based CP.

Headquarters Cell

The ADC-S is a brigadier general who normally functions as the rear operations commander. He is responsible for the conduct of both the rear and DISCOM CPs for the division battle. The headquarters cell consists of one vehicle (Figure 2-51). The ADC-S accomplishes C² of rear operations through the rear CP. He routinely makes decisions that affect the conduct of operations of the rear area without prior approval or coordination with the main CP. However, he always makes his decisions within the division commander's specific guidance or intent. Any decision made by the ADC-S or the rear CP must be transmitted immediately to the main CP to coordinate and synchronize the division battle. He receives unscheduled informal briefings, and ensures coordination among the operations cell, CSS cell, and DISCOM CP. He normally remains at the rear CP but, when required, he travels throughout the rear area to synchronize operations. His primary concern is to sustain the division's deep, close, and rear operations.

Rear Operations Cell

The rear operations cell functions from HMMWVs and SICPS tents. A small active duty element mans it until augmentation personnel arrive. It is responsible for terrain management, security, and movement deconfliction and control. The cell maintains the rear operations map (1:50,000) and the intelligence/FSE map (1:50,000) and, when required, manages specific terrain from individual map sheets (1:50,000). The operations cell monitors close operations to ensure rear operations respond to current and future requirements. Until the operations cell is augmented, risk is accepted in continuous operations and the number and types of functions that can be performed. The operations cell is divided into three elements--operations, intelligence, and fire support.

G3 Operations Element

The operations element functions from a HMMWV and SICPS tent and is responsible for terrain management of the division rear area, deconfliction of tactical and nontactical movement, control of movement, and security of rear operations (Figure 2-52). Responsibilities include coordination of response and tactical combat forces and use of host nation assets. The operations element continuously monitors close operations and adjacent rear operations. It apprises the rear operations commander of significant events which impact on the conduct of rear operations.

The division G3 provides an officer and NCO, augmented by an operations NCO and generator operator-driver. One of the operations NCOs is on duty at all times. The G3 officer sets his schedule based on the situation. The generator-operator maintains the vehicle and generator. He assists the operations NCO whenever possible.

The operations NCO concentrates on terrain management to position the division's support units to meet mission requirements. As bases are formed and base clusters designated, he recommends base cluster commanders and headquarters to the G3 officer. The G3 approves or adjusts these recommendations on his perceptions of the current situation. The operations NCO posts only base markers on the 1:50,000 operations map. The G3 officer designates base clusters by drawing a line around clustered bases and giving them unique identification. He adjusts them as often as needed to ensure he does not overextend the operations cell's span of control.

The operations map shows brigade boundaries, assembly areas, base locations, base cluster designations, main supply routes (MSRs), location of combat forces in the rear area, and last known frontline trace. Unit symbols are usually limited to brigades or separate battalions to limit clutter and posting time. The operations map has the most current close and rear operations tactical information in the rear CP.

The G3 operations element works closely with the PM operations element located nearby. The PM element coordinates traffic control measures when needed, security of designated critical assets, and employment of MP assets. The rear operations element also coordinates with the G3 operations cell in the main CP to designate or dedicate the division's tactical combat force. It also continually monitors its need for commitment. The G5 coordinates host nation assistance. The rear operations element also coordinates the positioning, status, and security of signal assets with the ADSO element. When engineer, AD, or other units are under the control of the rear CP, the rear operations element exercises direct control of each unit. Each supporting unit establishes either a command post near the rear CP or provides a LO to ensure the units' activities are properly integrated, synchronized, and coordinated.

The G3 operations in the rear CP maintains charts and an operations map to see the rear operations battlefield and provide required information to the G3 operations cell at the main CP. The operations map should depict--

Current operations maneuver graphics.

Rear operations graphics.

Location of designated bases and base clusters.

Location of MSRs and their status with traffic control points (TCPs).

Location of response forces.

Location of designated or dedicated TCF and graphics.

Locations and routes of transiting units.

Location of all CPs in the rear area.

Word charts depict the rear CP's task organization with the unit's status, and base and base cluster security status.

The gumball chart at Figure 2-53 shows those elements normally located in the rear area which rear command post G3 operations monitor through spot reports and commander's situation reports. Each category displays combat and maneuver capability of known or potential units in the rear area under the OPCON of the rear CP G3 operations. The rear G3 operations provides this data to the G3 at the main CP.

G2 Intelligence Element

The intelligence element shares a HMMWV and SICPS tent with the FSE (Figure 2-54). It is responsible for continuous IPB and a systematic watch of the rear area. It supplements IPB products received from the main CP to illuminate rear area terrain, enemy capabilities, and the enemy's most probable courses of action (COAs) within the rear area. The intelligence element also manages the overall division counterintelligence effort, coordinating closely with the PM and G5 to accomplish refugee screening and rear area intelligence collection. The intelligence element recommends rear area PIR to the division G2 and develops the rear area reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan for ADC-S approval. The intelligence element also exercises oversight over the division enemy prisoner of war (EPW) interrogation facility, screens interrogation reports for relevance, and passes significant reports to the G2 at the main CP and to rear area consumers. The intelligence element consists of a G2 officer, an NCO, and an intelligence analyst until augmentation assets arrive.

The officer and NCO are scheduled on opposite shifts; the intelligence analyst is scheduled as the situation dictates. The intelligence analyst assists with posting of both the intelligence and operations maps.

The G2's understanding of the friendly situation is essential for the conduct of rear area IPB and development of the R&S plan. The intelligence element's map should depict in minimum detail the current situation of the enemy forces opposing the division's frontline forces.

The rear CP G2 element maintains one 1:50,000 scale map (which it shares with the FSE) and a 1:250,000 scale map to track the following items:

Rear area graphics.

Locations of enemy activities as reported by supporting units.

Locations of MI and EW elements supporting the rear CP.

Locations of anticipated landing zones (LZs), DZs, and air and ground avenues of approach.

High-value targets within the rear area.

Base and base cluster security and reconnaissance graphics.

Charts required by the rear CP's G2 include the rear area's PIR and the task organization of MI and EW units supporting the G2 in the rear.

The rear CP G2 maintains gumball and killboard charts similar to those used in the TAC and main CPs. The gumball chart depicts units that directly support the intelligence effort in the rear. The killboard charts reflect known enemy units operating in the rear area.

Fire Support Element

The division rear CP FSE is composed of DIVARTY personnel designated by the DIVARTY commander and augmented with reserve personnel when reserve components are activated. Functioning from the rear CP operations cell, the FSE is responsible for fire support for rear AOs. The division rear CP FSE must also initiate detailed coordination with the DISCOM CP which collocates with the division rear CP. The rear CP FSE--

Plans and coordinates fire support for base and base cluster defense plans, response operations, and TCF operations.

Coordinates the composite rear operations fire support plan with the division main CP FSE, corps FSE, rear operations centers (ROCs), and host nation support headquarters as required.

Coordinates with the division main CP FSE for on-call or preplanned fires to assist in fire support for rear operations.

Forwards requests for immediate additional fire support for rear operations to the main FSE.

Coordinates plans for fires and positioning of fire support assets in the division rear area. Specific items requiring coordination include radio nets for fire requests; communications-electronics operations instruction (CEOI), call sign, and communications security (COMSEC); lines of authority and command; and liaison and FSO requirements and duties.

Maintains information and status on all fire support assets accessible by and responsive to the division rear CP.

Plans for and incorporates rear CP reserve component augmentation into the rear CP FSE operations.

The G2 and FSE share a 1:50,000 scale map within the rear operations cell. The intelligence-gathering capabilities of fire support units support the compatibility of these two functions sharing the same map. The G3 operations map also maintains most information required by the FSE to coordinate fire support such as location of base and base clusters and location of the TCF. Fire support information on this map which the FSE normally maintains is as follows:

Location of direct support artillery units supporting the rear operations (battalion and battery) with range fans.

Location of organic unit mortars with range fans.

Current or proposed locations of artillery units transiting the rear area.

Rear area fire control measures and graphics. The rear command post FSE maintains charts depicting the rear area fire support organization for combat, and designated rear area high-value targets.

The combat capability status of field artillery is maintained on the same type of charts used by the TAC and main CP FSEs. The rear CP FSE only tracks the status of those fire support units supporting the rear operations. Changes in the status of support are rapidly posted and forwarded to the main CP FSE.

Assistant Division Signal Officer Element

The division's signal battalion provides a small ADSO element to the rear CP to support rear operations and signal support. Its functions for the rear CP are the same as those for the main CP. The ADSO element at the rear CP works for the senior G3 officer in the operations cell. The ADSO element functions from a HMMWV and SICPS tent (Figure 2-55).

Provost Marshal Element

Also working under the supervision and coordination of the rear operations cell is the PM element, The PM establishes a separate working area near the rear CP. The PM comprises SICPS tents and organic vehicles with radios and electronic equipment hardwired for quick connect and disconnect, remote operations, and rapid displacement (Figure 2-56). From this location, the PM supports the division battle and rear operations. However, the PM must maintain the flexibility to send representatives to the main and TAC CPs during critical times for planning and coordination subject to METT-T.

The division PM provides the staff planning, direction, supervision, and coordination of the organic MP company and all supporting MP units and law enforcement activities throughout the division's AO. Units within the division forward all requests for MP support through the division PM operations cell at the rear CP. Units assigned or attached to a brigade with a direct support MP platoon should coordinate with the brigade S3 for their support requirements. The cell continually updates the rear operations cell on MP assets throughout the division's AO. The PM performs the priority tasks of battlefield circulation control, rear area security, and EPW operations and law and order missions as required.

To accomplish battlefield circulation control missions, the PM tasks MP units to conduct route reconnaissance and surveillance of critical main supply and tactical movement routes. Military police routinely operate TCPs, roadblocks, checkpoints, and holding areas at critical points along the route. They also conduct straggler and refugee control, allowing the PM to assess the impact on current and future operations.

The PM employs his MP and other OPCON assets in a security role to conduct area reconnaissance to detect unexpected attacks by the enemy in the rear area. Military police units screen the rear and flanks of affected units during special operations (for example, a TCF operation). In this role, the MPs can identify, intercept, and destroy small enemy forces before they can close on their objectives. Area damage control operations are conducted to seal off an area engaged by indirect attacks by artillery or air. Working closely with the rear operations G2 cell, the PM employs MPs to collect information from friendly units, civilians, local authorities, and civilians about suspected enemy and terrorist activity.

The PM coordinates EPW activities to establish centralized EPW collection points within the division's rear AO. Capturing units evacuate all their prisoners to a collection point. Then the MPs escort the EPWs from the brigade area to the divisional collection point.

G5 Element

The G5 is responsible for all civil-military operations supporting the division battle. The G5 element locates near the rear CP and PM element to coordinate and synchronize host nation support activities. The primary functions of the G5 are to--

Identify and coordinate unit requirements for local resources.

Minimize local population interference with military operations.

Advise the commander and staff on the division's legal and moral obligations to the local population.

Plan routes, collection points, and assembly areas that least interfere with tactical and logistics activities, and establish control over the movement of refugees.

Coordinate all host nation requirements for the division. Those resources not vital to the survival of the civilian population are coordinated and provided for military use. The division's requests for local resources should reflect the minimum required for division elements to effectively sustain and conduct operations.

The G5 normally requires augmentation from division assets until the arrival of reserve civil affairs element. A technique for augmenting the G5 element is to use a portion of the staff judge advocate (SJA) element to support the G5 operations. (The skills of the SJA personnel can easily support the missions and functions of the G5.) With the arrival of division and or reserve civil affairs (CA) units, the G5 element becomes the core and supervisor of the division civil-military operations center (CMOC). Figure 2-57 shows G5 vehicle and personnel.

Combat Service Support Cell

The major functions of the CSS cell are to plan and coordinate sustainment operations--man, arm, fuel, fix, move, and sustain soldiers and their systems. The cell also interfaces with the main CP, the rear CP operations cell, and subordinate units. The CSS cell functions from within its HMMWVs and SICPS tents. The G1 and G4 elements each provide personnel to the main CP G3 operations cell. These G1 and G4 personnel talk directly with the G1 and G4 elements in the rear CP, updating them on current and future operations. The CSS cell is divided into two elements--
logistics and personnel.

Logistics Element

The logistics element comprises the G4 and DTO sections. (Figure 2-58.) The G4 plans, coordinates, directs, and synchronizes the division's arm, fuel, fix, and move operations. The G4 coordinates logistics support which exceeds the DISCOM's capability with the corps rear CSS cell and corps support command (COSCOM). One member of the DTO element functions within the G3 plans at the main CP.

During movement operations involving the entire division, DTO and PM personnel may locate temporarily at the TAC CP. This allows them to assist the TAC CP staff in monitoring the progress of the move and coordinate contingencies occurring during the move. The DTO, DISCOM movements control officer (MCO), and PM representative assist in planning and enforcing movement priorities.

The TALO works from the rear command post G4. He facilitates the coordination of cargo aircraft to support division operations. He also does not routinely maintain formal charts or post operations maps. However, he has certain information requirements--runway availability and projections, cargo handling capability, and locations of brigade medical treatment facilities and landing areas.

Personnel Element and G1 Support Element

The G1 personnel section (Figure 2-59) plans, coordinates, directs, and monitors all personnel service support operations. The G1 directs the activities of the personnel section. When the division moves to combat operations, the G1 focuses primarily on personnel replacement management, strength management, casualty management, coordination of external support requirements (postal, morale, welfare, and recreation), and medical evacuation. He develops replacement priorities from input by the G3.

The G1 support element, located near the rear CP, coordinates and executes the personnel element functions. This element comprises the major sections of the G1 and special staff (such as inspector general (IG), public affairs officer (PAO), chaplain, surgeon, and SJA). Elements from a corps personnel service company normally augment the personnel section. Personnel functions are physically executed from within several SICPS tents. This includes strength management, casualty reporting, replacement operations, health service support (HSS), chaplain services, and legal services. It also includes morale support activities, postal services, and public affairs (PA). Finance support is provided by the corps finance unit assigned to the division area.

The vehicles used for the G1 support cell are organic to the G1 or supporting organizations. Each vehicle has communications and computer equipment mounted inside it. Each vehicle is configured and wired to support operations through remoting without having to download all equipment each time the element is set up. Figure 2-60 depicts one configuration for setting up the G1 support element with organic vehicles. Some sections are more fully manned than others. The G1 should distribute labor equitably throughout the cell to ensure each element's critical functions are performed to support continuous operations.

The G1 support element functions under the supervision of the chief of the strength management division. (See Figure 2-61.) Its primary responsibilities are personnel strength and accountability reports, personnel replacement operations, casualty reporting, and postal operations. The G1 also serves as the coordination point and liaison for limited finance operations.

Personnel accounting and strength reporting is delivered to the division rear in the hasty (manual) format when the division is committed to combat operations. The G1 receives strength-related reports directly from brigades, separate battalions and squadrons, and separate companies by any means available. All strength reports submitted to the G1 from organic subordinate units include the strength of attached and OPCON units under their control. The strength accounting and management section consolidates these reports into a divisional strength report and immediately provides it to the G1 element in CSS operations. The unit SOP states the frequency of strength reporting. Normally, it is only when a significant change has occurred that affects the unit's combat power. This reduces the number and frequency of reports to those deemed critical. The G1 consolidates these reports into a divisional strength report and furnishes it to the corps adjutant general (AG).

Replacement operations is the most critical battlefield function of the division G1. The G1 works closely with the rear CP G3 and G4 elements to develop and implement replacement priorities. He considers input from unit strength management reports and knowledge of current and future tactical and sustainment operations, The G1 coordinates the assets required to aid rapid transmission of priority replacements to receiving units. He must maintain close coordination with the strength managers in the G1 support cell to anticipate future requirements. He also coordinates with the medical manager to manage return-to-duty soldiers.

Casualty management and forecasting are critical to the division's combat posture. Casualty forecasting is an integral part of the G1 support cell in CSS operations. It is accomplished by analyzing recent battle losses and overlaying this information with the replacement flow to the division from corps. Battalion S1s should collocate one personnel and administration center (PAC) member within the medical company of each support battalion to ensure that casualty data is submitted accurately and timely. In addition, it is a good back-up system to ensure continuity of casualty reporting.

Postal operations manages and operates a postal network to move, collect, and sort mail, critical spare parts, and medical supplies for the deployed force. The G1 provides information to the DS postal platoon servicing the division to update the postal delivery scheme. The G1 arranges transportation for onward movement requirements to brigade support areas (BSAs) or combat trains. Once mail reaches the BSA, it is placed on the logistics package convoy supporting the unit.

Staff Judge Advocate Section. The SJA section supports the division by providing professional legal services as required. While the division fights, judge advocates focus primarily on operational law issues. They--

Monitor the care and treatment of captured or detained persons and refugees.

Determine the legality of targets and plans.

Interpret rules of engagement (ROE).

Requisition or confiscate property for military use.

If the situation permits, SJA section personnel may supplement the G5 cell to augment their austere staff. As the battlefield stabilizes, SJA section personnel provide the full spectrum of legal services, including, but not limited to--

Assistance to soldiers with their personal legal affairs.

Disposition of violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) by article 15, UCMJ, or court-martial.

Settlement of foreign claims by foreign claims commissions.

Preparation and review of contracts for locally available goods and services.

Assistance in the investigation and disposition of alleged war crimes. Figure 2-62 shows the SJA section's organic vehicle and personnel.

Public Affairs Section. The PA section responds to all queries from the news media. The public affairs officer--

Regulates media correspondents' activities within the division's AO.

Briefs the media on division operations and ground rules for media coverage of those operations.

Reviews material scheduled for release to the media for OPSEC limitations or requirements.

Provides guidance to news media personnel concerning field censorship procedures and guidelines.

The PAO does not conduct censorship activities. Figure 2-63 shows the PA section's organic vehicle and personnel.

Division Surgeon Section. This section plans, coordinates, synchronizes, and integrates HSS operations to support the division battle. The division surgeon functions from the G1 support cell under the supervision of the division G1. He coordinates HSS initiatives through the G1 and exercises technical control of all HSS activities within the division. The division surgeon is assisted by his immediate staff and the staff of the division medical operations center (DMOC). Organic to the division HQ is the surgeon's section and treatment team. The surgeon's section provides administrative support while the treatment team provides echelon 1 (unit level) medical support to the division HQ. Corps ground and air patient evacuation and surgical assets in support of the division normally preposition with DISCOM medical companies. The division surgeon, assisted by the DMOC, supervises and synchronizes division-wide HSS.

The primary means of medical evacuation is by ground and air ambulance. Any vehicle capable of transporting casualties may be used if medical vehicles are not available. Organic echelon 1 medical elements in support of maneuver unite evacuate patients to unit aid stations. The forward support medical companies station ambulances with supported maneuver battalions and establish ambulance exchange points. The medical company evacuates the patient from the battalion aid stations to patient transfer points (ambulance exchange point) or directly to a treatment facility when required. Corps evacuation assets evacuate patients from the division area to corps medical facilities. Figure 2-64 shows the division surgeon section's organic vehicles and personnel.

Inspector General Section. This section provides division commanders with a continuous objective assessment of their command's effectiveness. The IG accomplishes missions through inspections, assistance, investigations, follow-ups, teaching and training, planning, analysis, and information resource management. The effort during combat is not as extensive as during garrison operations, but no less important. The IG examines and measures the division's economy, efficiency, discipline, morale, esprit de corps, and readiness.

The IG positions himself where soldiers can file IG reports for investigation and other IG services and he can monitor the battle and receive guidance and direction from the commander. Figure 2-65 shows the IG's organic vehicles and personnel.

Division Chaplain Section. This section provides area religious support for units in the division's AO. During combat operations, chaplains normally cover combat units and medical facilities. The division's chaplain and assistant chaplain assign chaplains and coordinate their activities within the division. Figure 2-66 shows the division chaplain's organic vehicles and personnel.

Division Band. The band's primary mission is to provide music during peace and war, promoting troop morale and unit esprit, and to support civil military operations. Under most situations, the mission of playing music is practical only when the division is not committed to tactical operations. When the division is committed to combat, the division band may become a combat multiplier. There are several roles that band personnel can fill, if the roles are properly identified, and personnel are trained and equipped for them during peacetime.

Security augmentation is the band's most common secondary role in combat. When performing its security mission, the band is routinely placed OPCON to the provost marshal. The PM may assign personnel to provide security to the division CPs, augment the military police response forces as a dismounted infantry platoon, or operate a holding area for EPWs. Each of these missions requires that band personnel undergo specific training and be issued equipment not normally on their TOE.

The band may perform other secondary missions, working under the supervision of the appropriate staff leader. The duration and activity of the secondary mission, however, must be considered. The band must be able to quickly resume its primary mission when called on. If at all possible, unit integrity should be maintained when assigning the band a secondary mission. Figure 2-67 shows the organic vehicles and personnel of the division band.

Reserve Component Augmentation

When the rear CP is augmented by reserve components, the rear CP operations cell becomes fully capable of continuous operations. The reserve component augmentation normally consists of 19 personnel (Figure 2-68). The operations cell is now better able to plan, coordinate, and direct rear security operations, deconflict and control movement, manage the terrain allocated to the division rear command, and plan and direct area damage control operations on a continuous basis.

With reserve augmentation, a base defense and area damage control element is added. This allows the operations cell to assist base and base cluster commanders to plan and coordinate base defenses, plan area damage control, and assess damage and reconstitution as needed. With the addition of this reserve augmentation element, the bases and base clusters within the division's rear area report directly to the base defense operations element. It maintains the G3 operations map of current locations and the defensive status of each base and base cluster. It works closely with the FSE and G2 elements to coordinate intelligence gathering and fire support coverage. This element operates with the PM using mobile teams, configured according to need.

Life Support Area Operations

The LSA is an area normally occupied by the division's headquarters commandant and higher headquarter's commander as a base of operations to support the main and TAC CPs with food, fuel, ammunition, and maintenance. Figure 2-69, depicts the personnel and vehicles from the HHC which normally form the nucleus of the ISA. Typically, the LSA is large and noisy and poorly lit. Its mission and size make it ponderous to move. The staff G3 and the headquarters commandant must consider how to employ it to ensure that it becomes a combat multiplier rather than a restraining factor.

The LSA can effectively support CPs in two ways. Both are driven by whether the division is committed or noncommitted to tactical operations. If the division is not committed to combat and security, and movement is not a factor, the LSA should be near the division's main CP. Being in a noncommitted status and located well to the rear of harm's way allows more risk in employing the LSA forward to provide effective support. This location facilitates the LSA's support of preparation for combat tasks and establishment of sleeping quarters and hygiene facilities for CP personnel.

When the division is committed, the LSA should remain in the rear area near the rear CP. There, its size and lack of mobility does not represent a security risk for the main CP. The LSA supports the main and tactical CPs by logistics packages (LOGPACs) specially tailored to meet the requirements of the CP. The packages function in the same manner as in brigades and battalions. Small, mobile contact teams provide required or emergency maintenance to the CP. They perform only essential maintenance or repairs until time and situation permit a more sustained effort. The HQ company of the DISCOM provides internal supply, food service, and unitlevel maintenance for vehicles, generators, and construction equipment organic to the division rear CP.

THE ASSAULT COMMAND POST

During contingency operations, the assault CP normally provides temporary C² until the main CP deploys into an AO. Normally austere, its specific design is driven by METT-T and may vary from deployment to deployment. The assault CP controls all elements committed to the close operation, and conducts those critical C² functions required to support the division in tactical operations as it initially deploys into an unsecure, hostile contingency area.

To be effective, the assault CP is normally sequenced in the deployment to arrive as soon as possible after the initial assaulting brigade or the airhead or beachhead has been secured or a perimeter established. It fights the current fight with division forces on the ground, synchronizing the flow of follow-on units into the AO and phasing them into the fight to expand and secure the airhead or beachhead. It also begins initial planning for the conduct of future operations (sequels). It serves as the division C² link early in the deployment between division forces on the ground, in the air, and at home station and the higher corps or JTF headquarters. It continues this function until the remainder of the division C² systems arrive. Normal doctrinal functions can be performed at the TAC, main, and rear CPs as they arrive in the deployment sequence.

There may be no set design for the assault CP. Each situation or contingency mission demands different requirements, depending on the specific mission. However, each assault CP is designed around a basic functional structure of G3 operations, plans, G2 operations, fire support element within an ALO, signal element, and G4 operations. The size of the assault CP normally depends on the number of airframes available. As a general rule, the assault CP should be deployable in no more than two C141 aircraft. Concurrent with critical functions is a requirement to deploy sufficient personnel for each element to effectively sustain continuous, 24-hour C² functions and operations.

The division TAC CP is often used as the base from which to build the assault CP. It is used with the intent of peeling off functions as the main and rear CPs are established and eventually reverting back to the original TAC CP with its traditional functions. A concept of a base case assault CP is presented at Figure 2-70. This assault CP deploys with nine HMMWVs, eight SICPS shelters, and sufficient personnel to perform critical C² functions. The HMMWVs contain all communications and computer equipment hard mounted into the rear. This equipment can be used either in the HMMWV, remoted to the SICP shelter, or in a combination of both. A description of the roles and functions of each area follows along with personnel and equipment layouts.

Command Center

The command center is the information hub of the assault CP. It is the focal point into which all assault CP staff elements provide all information obtained to enable the commander to see the battlefield. It is where tactical decisions are made. The command center is the workplace for the ADC-M and CG and serves the same functions, although abbreviated, as the command center in the main CP.

The command center maintains its capability to see the battlefield and unit combat capability through reporting criteria based on CCIR. It contains a 1:50,000 scale map of the AO with current selected friendly and enemy unit locations as fed from the staff sections. Personnel manning the command center come from the division chief of staff section. A CofS for the assault CP must be designated to facilitate continuous and efficient staff support to the operation. Communications are provided to the command center by remoting from the ADC-M HMMWV attached to the command center. The command center is located centrally within the assault CP configuration to facilitate the flow of information with the other staff elements. Figure 2-71 presents the command center with required equipment and personnel.

Plans Element

The plans element is included in the assault CP to facilitate future division operations. It consists of selected plans element personnel from the division main CP plans element. During the deployment phase of the operation, the plans element supports the G3 operations element by developing FRAGOs and warning orders to support the current operation. At some point, however, the division will begin planning for a subsequent mission. This will be the task of the plans element. Having deployed early and working in support of the G3, the plans element develops a current, up-to-date working knowledge of the strengths, disposition, and capabilities of units on the ground and those incoming. This knowledge assists the plans element in the planning process parallel to the continuing conduct of the close operation. When the main CP deploys and begins establishing itself, the plans element moves from the assault CP to the main CP to resume normal planning with current information. The plans element should locate as close to the G3 and G2 operations and command center as practical. A diagram of the plans element and required personnel is shown at Figure 2-72.

G3 Operations Element

The G3 operations element controls all combat and CS forces (less fire support) deployed on the ground to support the current operation. It comprises primarily the TAC CP G3 element personnel and is augmented as needed. It serves the same functions as described for the TAC CP G3 operations element. It is the NCS for the assault CP and receives, logs, and posts information received from tactical and situation reports. It issues warning orders and FRAGOs to control and fight the current and close operation. It maintains the combat capability status of all committed forces two levels down. It analyzes information received and provides required information to the command center to support the CCIR. Included in the personnel requirements for the G3 operations element is a SJA officer to inform the commander on legal ramifications of operations and COAs. This officer must be knowledgeable of the legal system, procedures, and laws of the host nation. The SJA is a critical element in the assault CP during the early stages of the deployment. The G3 operations element is located adjacent to the command center. Figure 2-73 shows the G3 operations element's required equipment and personnel.

G2 Operations Element

The G2 operations element in the assault CP performs those functions primarily associated with the TAC CP G2 operations section. The assault CP G2 operations is primarily manned by the personnel of the TAC CP and augmented as required. They receive, post, and analyze intelligence data and reports received from committed units and provide them to the command center and higher headquarters. They also receive intelligence information from higher intelligence assets and pass it down to major subordinate units' S2s for their use. They maintain that information from intelligence assets required to support the CCIR to see current and future enemy capabilities and COAs and assess friendly intelligence asset capabilities. Figure 2-74 shows the G2 operations element's required equipment and personnel.

Fire Support Element

The FSE and ALO in the A²C² element perform essentially the same functions as those of the TAC CP. Personnel and equipment of the assault CP FSE are those of the TAC CP with required augmentation. The FSE coordinates and synchronizes all fire support assets committed to the current fight. Until the arrival of the DIVARTY HQ and the main CP FSE, the assault CP may perform some of their functions, depending on the situation. The FSE responds to requests for fire support and tactical air support from units committed to combat operations. It also sequences incoming fire support assets into the fight as they arrive. It maintains information to support the commander's critical fire support information requirements and assesses the combat capability of committed units. Figure 2-75 shows the required FSE equipment and personnel.

A²C² Element

The A²C² element in the assault CP works for the G3 and coordinates airspace within the division's AO. This element maintains control of air-space to facilitate attack helicopter operations as well as Air Force transport flights into and out of the airfield. It maintains positive control of all AD assets protecting the AO. Figure 2-76 shows the equipment and personnel requirements of the assault CP element.

G1 and G4 Element

The G1 element of the assault CP maintains contact with subordinate unit S1s to have an accurate picture of the personnel strength of committed units. It advises the commander and G3 on the arrival of personnel into the AO. The G1 receives and maintains reports that support the commanders critical personnel information requirements. The primary focus of the G4 is the status of committed unit class I and V in support of the CCIR.

The G4 maintains an accurate status of the quantity and location of critical logistics supplies as they arrive in the AO and recommends their allocation to the G3 and ADC-M. Located next to the G1 and G4 operations element are the DTO and TALO. These two elements coordinate incoming flights and reception. They also coordinate the disposition of personnel and cargo offloading. They maintain contact with aircraft on the ground, inbound to the AO, and at the departure airfield. They advise the commander on the status of deployment and arrival of division units. Figure 2-77 shows the equipment and personnel requirements of the G1 and G4 element.

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