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"Power is not revealed by striking hard or often, but by striking true. "
                                                   Honore De Balzac

Leadership is a vital element of the command and control system, which includes communications and intelligence. This is also true in a LIC environment. Performing assigned missions within the constraints of status of forces agreements and adhering to strict ROE require diplomatic leadership for success. The commander's leadership provides purpose, direction, and motivation. His intent must be detailed and complete. It includes the unit's level of involvement in tactical, intelligence, psychological, populace and resource control, civil affairs, counterterrorism, and advisory assistance operations. This chapter describes how units are organized for LIC, the command and control process, communications, and intelligence support.

Section I.

The command and control system includes the facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned.


The five interrelated elements of command and control are as follows:

a. Facilities.Command and control facilities at battalion level are classified by echelon as main, combat trains, field trains, and alternate CPs. The command group is a temporary facility. It comprises the commander, the soldiers in the command group, and the equipment the commander has with him forward to help command and control the immediate battle. The main CP includes all soldiers, equipment, and facilities employed in commanding and controlling the battalion. The TOC is the operations cell within the main CP. Integration of CSS is vital to successful combat operations. The combat trains CP is the battalion's CSS planning facility. An alternate CP is needed in case either the tactical or main CP is destroyed.

b. Equipment. Command and control equipment is provided by the specific MTOEs for each unit.

c. Communications. Command and control communications are the means by which the command transmits and receives information and orders. As such, having these means is vital to the commander and his staff in the execution of military operations. The commander and staff must understand the capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of their communications systems. They must expect and plan for interference from friendly and enemy units where radar, radios, and lasers can operate in the same electromagnetic spectrum.

d. Procedure. Command and control procedure is a mode or course of action that describes how to perform a certain task.

e. Personnel. The battalion commander has a staff to aid him in the exercise of command. The staff consists of the personnel necessary to perform command and control and supporting functions. The commander cannot abdicate his command responsibilities to the staff. Rather, the commander's job is to achieve his goals by intelligently using the unique abilities of his staff and subordinate commanders.


Command is the authority that a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling the employment of military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.


Control is the exercise of authority and is the counterpart of command. It means following up a decision and minimizing deviation from the commander's concept. Control refers to the supervision of the operation while ensuring all systems and activities are synchronized.


Commander's authority derives from law and regulation. It is accompanied by responsibilities that cannot be delegated. To accomplish specific functions, the commander can delegate his authority to his subordinates. However, the commander is solely responsible for his command. He meets this responsibility by leading, planning, making decisions, issuing orders, and supervising the execution of his orders.


The commander must position himself on the battlefield where he can exert the greatest influence. This includes face-to-face orders in the operational area. At the same time, he must avoid sacrificing the ability to influence the battle by shifting the main effort or communicating orders without a loss of coordination, cohesion, and effectiveness. At times the commander may be forward with the foremost elements, while at other times he will be in the main command post. He must have equal ability to command and control his forces from either location. The commander establishes an environment of trust in his leaders--trust that gives them the freedom to operate within mission-type orders and to use initiative.


Leadership is the key element of combat power. It is personal and intangible, and is a combination of example, persuasion, and influence. Leadership serves as an extension of the commander's self. Effective field commanders exhibit the following characteristics of leadership:

a. Supervision and Standards. The commander knows the standards that he wants to see on the ground. He communicates these standards clearly and with authority. He enforces them, holding soldiers accountable for their jobs and making rapid corrections. The commander enforces standards by supervising tasks after he gives the order; either he walks the line and inspects positions or he ensures this is done.

b. Technical and Tactical Proficiency. The commander knows the technical and tactical aspects of all assets that compose his battlefield operating systems. He understands and uses terrain well. He communicates this knowledge and his professionalism through his actions and through interactions with other officers and soldiers.

c. Time Management. The commander conducts his planning to allow subordinates the time to prepare for the next mission. He manages time well and sets work priorities.

d. Delegation. The commander trusts his subordinate leaders and delegates authority to them. He develops his leaders so the mission can continue when he is gone. This is leadership in depth throughout the chain of command.

e. Decisiveness. The commander adjusts quickly to difficult situations and makes quick, sound decisions.

f. Respect and Concern. The commander knows and cares about the people in his unit. He respects subordinates. He knows subordinate leaders' and soldiers' strengths, weaknesses, and motivations. He rewards good performers and counsels substandard performers.


The commander's intent drives mission tactics. It is the commander's stated vision that defines the purpose of the operation and the end state with respect to the relationship among the force, the enemy, and the terrain. Intent should also include how this end state will support future operations.

a. The overall purpose of the mission is more important than the individual assigned tasks. Each subordinate commander must know why and how his assigned tasks relate to the overall concept of the operation. Then, if the situation changes and contact with higher headquarters is lost, the subordinate can use his initiative to achieve the desired end results.

b. The battalion commander has a dual responsibility. He must understand the intent of the brigade and division commanders (two levels up) and must ensure his intent is understood at company and platoon levels (two levels down). The commander's intent paragraph in the OPORD should begin with the words, "My intent is . . .," so it can be understood and relayed to subordinates easily.

c. A clear commander's intent enhances agility, timing, and initiative at all levels. It helps in shifting the main effort on a fluid battlefield.


The purpose of command and control is to allow the commander to generate and apply combat power at the decisive point on the battlefield. Mission tactics is a method of directing military operations; subordinates are encouraged and expected to act alone in executing assigned missions, consistent with the intent of senior commanders. The commander must--

a. Anticipate a free-willed opponent; expect uncertainty. The enemy does not always follow his doctrine or act as IPB indicates he will. The commander must be flexible. War games, contingency plans, employment in depth, well-developed and rehearsed SOPs, and a reserve all contribute to flexibility.

b. Organize and direct operations to require minimum intervention. When precise control is required for synchronization, such as an on-order task, the commander should provide the subordinate with the criteria for making the decision.

c. Allow time for subordinate planning. The one-third/ two-thirds rule applies not only to OPORDs but also to rehearsals, briefbacks, or any other centralized event that reduces subordinates' preparation time.

d. Assign resources with as few restrictions on employment as possible. The commander allocates assets and support priorities to subordinates, and he specifies only the desired results.

e. Allow maximum freedom of action within the scope of his intent. Because battles develop in unforeseen directions, leaders often must act with incomplete information or instructions. Failure to act quickly can result in a lack of superior combat power at critical times and places. Taking advantage of opportunities to accomplish the mission is allowed, encouraged, expected, and sometimes required. Higher commanders should be informed before action is taken, if feasible.

f. Structure communication to allow subordinates to command well forward. The commander must position himself on the battlefield where he can exert the greatest influence, both through subordinate leaders and directly. At the same time, he must retain the ability to shift the main effort of the battle. The commander can be forward with the lead elements in the command group, or he can be in the main CP. He must be able to command and control all organic and supporting elements equally from either location.


AirLand Battle doctrine requires mission tactics. This decentralization provides latitude to subordinates to make decisions rapidly within the framework of the commander's concept and intent.

a. Mission orders address only the required information. They provide the framework of what the commander wants done--not how it is to be done. Such orders need only three important things. First, they must clearly state what the issuing commander wants accomplished. Second, they must address limiting factors that must be observed for coordinating purposes. Third, they must state available resources for the subordinate commander and what support he can expect outside his command.

b. Execution of mission tactics requires initiative, resourcefulness, and imagination. Commanders must be ready to adapt to situations as they are, not as they were expected or desired to be.

c. Subordinate leader initiative is based on mission orders and on the commander's intent, which define the limits of unit operations. They allow a subordinate to take advantage of opportunities on the battlefield. The subordinate leader is positively aggressive. He asks his commanding officer for information, resources, or revision of plans as needed and stands up for his position when he feels he is right.

d. Subordinate initiative and independence, though encouraged, is limited by the requirements for unity of command, unity of effort, and the commander's intent. Subordinates who feel they must disobey orders due to a perceived change in the situation must accept the responsibility for their actions. The commander's intent must be clearly stated and foremost in the minds of subordinate leaders. To win, subordinate leaders must display initiative, but their initiative must be driven by their understanding of the commander's intent, not by a desire for independent action. For best results, unit actions are synchronized. If independent action is required to meet the commander's intent for the operation, the action is taken--but subordinate leaders must carefully balance the need for synchronized unit action with the changing tactical situation. They must look at the "big picture." Thus initiative and freedom of action are more likely used during an exploitation or pursuit; an independent action during a delay or during a withdrawal under enemy pressure could produce disaster for the entire force.

e. Commanders normally use mission-type orders. However, due to the requirement for synchronization of the overall mission, they must occasionally give subordinates specific instructions on how to accomplish a mission.


LIC operations are the result of a plan developed with many US government agencies outside the US military. These agencies can include the Department of State, US Agency for International Development, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The operation has usually been coordinated with allies in the theater. When military force is applied, the CINC responsible for the area of operation directs it. The ground commander is not normally involved in interagency planning; however, he executes the military portion of the decision. For this reason, he must know and understand the relationship the military has with other agencies.

a. US and host nation policy and agreements determine command relationships between US and host nation forces. These relationships are established by government agencies and executed by the military. The interface of civilian and military agencies, and the level of military command responsible for this interface, are key to the on-ground commander in establishing liaison, communication, and intelligence.

b. The ambassador assumes responsibility for US operations, civilian and military, within a country during peace and conflict. He heads a country team that interfaces with civilian and military agencies. The term "country team" describes in-country interdepartmental coordination among the members of the US diplomatic mission. Members ensure US interests and regional and international objectives within a country are efficiently and economically administered. A sample country team organization is provided:

  • Ambassador.

  • Deputy Chief of Mission; State Department civilian.

  • State Department economic representative.

  • DAO who reports to the DIA

  • Chief of Station with the CIA

  • USIA Information Service/PAO.

  • Security Assistance Office; CINC defense representative.

c. The JTF interfaces with the senior military defense representation on the country team, who is normally appointed by the CINC. If no JTF has been established, corps, division, or brigade headquarters may be responsible for interfacing with the country team and host nation. (See Figure 6-1. Country team.)

d. Command and control headquarters may be established with the host nation. This includes civilian and security forces such as police, paramilitary, and military. Operations must be coordinated with civilian agencies in a country to ensure no conflict of political and military objectives. Liaison is required with both military and civilian organizations.

e. A JTF is always established for the operation, but a command and control element from the division normally deploys to coordinate with the other services and to provide support to the deployed brigade. This allows the brigade to focus on the control of its assigned/attached forces.

f. PSYOP, Public Affairs, and CA initiatives, in and out of country, are coordinated through the JTF due to their political implications. The brigade performs detailed coordination to ensure that the purpose of current PSYOP and CA efforts are understood. However, PSYOP and CA may influence the planning, preparation, and execution of operations.

g. If a conventional force follows an SOF during a deployment, it should request a liaison before arriving in the operational area. Conventional forces coordinate with SOF through the JTF. However, if a JTF has not been created, SOF should be contacted through the Unified Command Special Operations Command. Before commitment, the brigade or commanding headquarters should send an advance party. If a deployment is in support of combat operations, a relief, passage of lines, or other operation must be planned and coordinated. Commanders can request direct support of SOF from the unified command's SOC, which forms a JSOTF. Also, rangers can be under OPCON with conditions for termination. They normally conduct a relief in place with conventional forces.

Section II.

Commanders establish their task organization after analyzing the political and METT-T factors. This task organization differs for each LIC category as well as for each mission within each category. Commanders must evaluate the mission against the abilities and limitations of their organic and supporting units. They must develop a clear command and control relationship that encompasses the personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, procedures for gathering and analyzing information, and planning for what must be done. Commanders must supervise the execution of operations and plan for the rapid changeover to combat operations.


The organization of a task force in LIC follows the pattern of a standard military force in terms of command and control. It includes staff support with augmented elements, logistics, and communications. While the command and control for LIC parallels that of a conventional war, there is a distinct difference in the methods and principles for planning this type of operation.

a. A difference exists in the importance that both higher level commanders and the TF commander place on the political and economic situation they encounter. In conventional war, the military is the principal element of national power used to establish conditions for a political solution. The other elements of political, economic, and psychological power support military objectives. In LIC, the military does not have the lead role. Military power supports political, economic, and psychological objectives. Commanders must understand this basic difference. Therefore, success normally cannot be measured in terms of territory gained, objectives seized, or prisoners captured. This does not reflect progress in solving political, social, or economic problems. Therefore, the political and METT-T factors apply in LIC.

b. In a LIC, commanders emphasize indirect military power. The use of CS and CSS elements is often more effective in achieving political, economic, and psychological goals. This is true as far as engineer, medical service, and materials are concerned.

c. In a LIC campaign, the military does not have the lead role, and commanders coordinate tactical execution with many civilian agencies. However, the ground commander should be involved in interagency planning, because he executes the military portion of the decision. Therefore, he must know and understand the relationship between the military and the other agencies.

d. In a LIC environment, small-unit operations are common. Normally, the brigade, battalion, and company require some reorganizing due to the terrain, threat, and civil and military situations. Task organization should strive for tactical self-sufficiency. This can be done by attaching or placing in DS adequate combat, CS, and CSS elements so that units can perform semi-independent operations. Also, resources for dealing with the civilian population must be provided. This includes CA personnel, PSYOP personnel, interrogators, and other resources from supporting organizations.


A brigade task force, internally operating as part of a JTF, normally consists of light, heavy, SOF, or a combination thereof. The brigade can command and control up to five maneuver battalions. The force unit is based on the threat, environment, and type of operation to be conducted. The brigade can expect more CS and CSS units to be attached. Whether employed as a subordinate element of a division or as a separate task force, the brigade must be configured to operate as an independent or semi-independent force.

a. Combat, CS, and CSS units. These units are attached to or placed in support of the brigade, as required by the mission. In independent operations, the emphasis is on attachment. When combat arms, CS, and CSS elements are deployed as part of a light brigade, attachment is emphasized. These units must have enough CSS elements for attachment to be effective.

b. Heavy and Light Maneuver Forces. Both heavy and light maneuver forces have an important role in LIC operations. Normally, the use of a mix of light/heavy forces enhances the abilities of the task force. Each maneuver force has unique characteristics. Based on the threat and mission, a force can be employed to optimize inherent strengths.

c. Battalion Maneuver Elements. The battalion is the basic maneuver element of the brigade. The command and staff structure is designed to accept augmentation. Due to the decentralized nature of LIC operations, CS and CSS may be attached to, or placed in DS of, the battalion. It can also receive support from host country military, paramilitary, or police units.

d. Maneuver Companies. Companies are the basic maneuver element of the battalion. They must maintain combat readiness regardless of their frequency of contact. This counters a false sense of security that could result from a lack of enemy contact. The leaders within the company must be able to conduct small-scale operations over great distances. They must instill within their soldiers a high level of discipline while maintaining a high state of morale. Soldiers must constantly train for possible contingencies that are based on the mission. They must be kept current on the threat, their relationship with the local government and civilian populace, US civilian personnel/agencies, the situation, their roles, and the reasons for the unit's actions. Maneuver companies require the same combat skills in LIC as in conventional war. However, these skills must be modified to comply with ROE. Other common skills that are required are as follows:

    (1) Know how to identify, detect, and clear mines and booby traps.

    (2) Know some basic words in the native language.

    (3) Understand threat tactics, techniques, and procedures.

    (4) Understand the rules of engagement.

    (5) Know local inhabitants to include customs, religion, and food and drink habits.

    (6) Be cross trained with foreign weapons, communications, and other equipment.

    (7) Know how to use nonorganic equipment such as shotguns, boats, and demolitions.

e. Scouts. The scouts are organized, equipped, and trained to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and limited security. They can also assist in the control, movement, and positioning of units. The scout platoon is normally employed under battalion control. In addition to their standard missions, the scouts can be tasked--

    (1) To man joint checkpoints with host nation personnel.

    (2) To conduct combined operations with host nation personnel.

    (3) To conduct combined operations with host nation military, paramilitary, and police.

    (4) To observe individuals and their movements and actions.

f. Antitank Element. If no armor threat exists, the antitank element can be organized to accomplish other missions. Its employment depends on the transportation assets associated with it. Also, other weapons can be substituted for antitank weapons.

g. Mortar Section. The firing elements normally occupy positions within a fire base. If sections move to firing positions outside of the fire base, the need for security of firing positions must be emphasized. Maneuver elements may provide this security. Commanders should be aware that there will be no-fire areas, restricted fire lines, and restrictions on the type of ammunition.

h. Combat Support Units. The amount and type of support depends on the mission. Some of the types of support available and techniques of employment are listed herein. ( discusses the employment of CS assets.)

    (1) Field artillery. FA is used to support tactical maneuver units. It also can provide training advice and operational assistance for the employment of artillery and associated functions such as survey meteorology and target acquisition. (See Chapter 7.)

    (2) Aviation units. Aviation units provide the force with needed airlift to support its activities when deployed as an entity. The organization should include enough personnel and equipment to sustain organizational aircraft maintenance. Personnel, aircraft, and equipment can be employed to train indigenous units and to support PSYOP and military civil action projects. (See Chapter 7.)

    (3) Engineer units. Engineer units provide needed support to the task force (Table 6-1 ). All missions of mobility, countermobility, and survivability can be included. Also, engineers can provide training, CS, and operational assistance to indigenous military and paramilitary forces. They can also support military civic action programs that involve construction efforts. When supporting a country's civic action program, engineer units are closely coordinated with USAID and host country personnel. Engineer augmentation from corps can include combat engineers, combat heavy construction elements, or special-purpose teams. These teams can provide well drilling, terrain analysis, construction, bridging, and civic action. (See Chapter 7.)

Table 6-1 Engineer battlefield functions.

    (4) Military police units. MP units provide support and must be tailored to meet requirements of the task force. Military police units can perform the following tasks:

  • Advisory training assistance.

  • Combined police operations.

  • Enforcement and investigations.

  • Police-community relations.

  • Police intelligence.

  • Populace and resource control.

  • Prisoners of war and civilian internees.

  • Security.

  • Operations security.

  • Tactical operations.

  • Military working dog operations.

    (5) Civil affairs and psychological operations elements. US commanders should know that any military action may have psychological implications. Since most Army personnel do not have full knowledge of CA and PSYOP, CA and PSYOP units should be employed to support the operation of US forces.

    (6) Signal unit. This element must be prepared to coordinate and provide communication means to accomplish the mission and any contingencies. This includes the use of many small-unit operations over a vast area.

  • Communication with high levels of command.

  • Communication with SOF personnel in the area.

  • Communication with local military, paramilitary, and police.

      (a) CA personnel and units engage in a variety of activities. Civil-military relations, military civic action, populace and resources control, and care of refugees are important areas for CA (FM 41-10 provides guidance on CA units.)

      (b) PSYOP personnel and units support all aspects of nation-building programs. Military PSYOP provide the commander with methods he can use to accomplish his mission. All military operations in LIC should be evaluated in terms of their affect on national and regional PSYOP objectives. Both positive and negative factors must be evaluated to identify PSYOP tasks that contribute to mission accomplishment. (FM 33-1 provides guidance on psychological operations.)

    (7) Long-range surveillance units. LRSUs can be employed in a LIC. Their ability is the same as conventional conflicts, but a few factors must be considered:

      (a) More team movement may be needed to obtain information on the enemy.

      (b) Teams may be less oriented toward the guerrilla order of battle and more toward insurgent activity.

      (c) The deployment distance may be less and mission duration longer.

      (d) Operations are more likely to be about restrictive terrain such as jungles, mountains, and urban areas.

      (e) Foot movement may become the dominant method of infiltration.

i. Combat Service Support Units. The amount and type of support depends on the mission. Some of the types of support available and techniques of employment are listed below. (Chapter 8 describes the employment of CSS assets for each LIC category in greater detail.)

    (1) Medical unit. The medical unit must be tailored to meet the needs of the task force. With some training, the medical unit can provide training and advice to indigenous military forces. It may also assist with military civic action programs.

    (2) Personnel section. The personnel section operates the same as it does in other types of conflicts. However, it must make adjustments to provide service for units and small detachments in many locations. Morale support activities are of vital importance.

    (3) Chaplain. The chaplain acts as advisor and consultant to the commander on all matters of religion, morals, and morale as affected by religion. He fosters understanding of the customs, practices, and people in the host country. He coordinates and maintains liaison with local churches, indigenous religious bodies, and religious groups throughout the communal area of responsibility. The chaplain provides unit, area, and denominational ministry for US personnel.

    (4) Finance unit. The finance unit provides the means to sustain the force with supplies, services, and equipment through its commercial vendor services operation. It also provides support to soldiers through pay account maintenance, check cashing, and currency conversion. This element cooperates and coordinates with the S4, the CA unit and SJA.

    (5) Staff judge advocate. The SJA is the commander's advisor on all issues of military and international law to include treaties and other international agreements such as SOFA and laws of war. He also advises on US domestic law as it applies to the deployment and activities of US forces abroad. SJA legal services are required when interpreting host country laws and procedures, and in matters relating to the US military relationship with the host country. They are most important in the area of claims, contracting, and construction.

    (6) Provost Marshal. The provost marshal advises the commander on all aspects of MP capability and employment. He coordinates and maintains liaison with host nation national and paramilitary police forces.

    (7) Public Affairs. The public affairs officer is a personal staff officer who advises the commander as to the command and public information programs within the command and media relations. Public affairs units are configured and tailored to accomplish various missions and to provide the supported unit with several abilities. They are most important in the areas of command information and media relations.

Section III.

The command transmits and receives information and orders by a combination of combat net radio, area communication, and data communication. Commanders must understand the strengths, weaknesses, and limitations of his communications system. In LIC, the CE resources must be tailored to meet the wide operational dispersion and requirements of a unique force. The specific communications means available to a brigade are radio, wire, messenger, sound, and visual. This section discusses the planning considerations in developing a communication plan for predeployment, deployment, employment, and sustainment of a tactical force.


Since communications are usually limited, failure to set priorities for information may result in a delay. The commander must set the communication priority for his command based on political and METT-T factors. Information can be divided into four distinct types for allocation priority, which are discussed in this paragraph.

a. Intelligence. Exchange of information on threat forces, terrain, and weather between levels and elements of command.

b. Command. Issuance of execution orders or guidance to subordinate commanders.

c. Control. Exchange of information between levels and elements of command to provide dynamic command of fires and maneuver forces.

d. Sustainment. Exchange of logistic information between levels and elements of command.


Overall mission requirements dictate the task force size and command relationships with other US, allied, and host country commands. All of these factors influence the communications tasks and systems required to support and sustain operations. Communications planners must backward plan to determine the personnel and equipment needed for the mission. Any constraints, such as lift capability or range limitations, must be applied. Risks must be identified and stated clearly to the commander. In developing the communications plan, planners must consider the certain factors, which are discussed in this paragraph.

a. Due to wide operational dispersion and limitations on FM radio and wire lines, the organic communications ability of tactical units may be reduced. Operations may require that units establish communications with the armed forces of a host country, paramilitary units, and civilian agencies. Therefore, frequency coordination is vital to maintain effective communication. Consideration must also be given to FM retransmission, HF radio, and TAC-SAT to supplement organic communications.

b. Security of communications sites is paramount. They are prime targets for guerrilla, terrorists, and sabotage tactics, as well as coordinated attacks by an insurgent force.

c. In LIC, communications security is of prime importance. It is hard to distinguish the enemy from the ally or when and where the enemy is listening to task force communications. All forces must deny the enemy the opportunity to learn TF intent.

d. Maintenance and resupply of CE elements may present a problem because of unsecured road networks. The following should be considered:

    (1) Aerial supply and decentralized maintenance can be accomplished by attaching personnel to the unit area of operations or by using air-transported contact teams.

    (2) Adequate supplies, backup equipment, and repair parts should be maintained at the communications sites. If weather or enemy actions prevent air transportation for a few days, supplies are on hand.

e. Communication should be planned considering the following phases.

  • Predeployment.

  • Deployment.

  • Employment.

  • Sustainment operations.

f. The brigade or battalion deployed must be prepared to operate as an independent task force. When elements from a signal battalion are attached to a brigade or battalion task force, those elements come under the command and OPCON of the unit's signal officer. The task force signal officer must provide general communication planning, SOI, COMSEC, frequency management, and telephone system planning for the entire task force.

g. Manpack-type radios with long-range capability are main requirements of maneuver battalions. Wire communications are normally used only for internal communication within secure bases. It is vulnerable in nonsecure areas. The force will use MSE from the division signal battalion to provide a usable telephone and teletype area communication system.

h. All command levels should emphasize the use of visual communications. Planned visual signals are most effective for surface-to-surface communications between small units close to each other and for surface-to-air communication. Panels, smoke, and light (infrared and visible) should be employed.

i. Motor messengers are open to snipers, mines, and roadblocks. They should be employed only in a relatively secure area. Air messengers should be employed. For economy, the force can use aircraft on resupply missions, medical evacuation, or transport missions to deliver messages.

j. Requirements for communications with SOF and host country forces/agencies will be satisfied by exchange of communications equipment, SOI, and liaison personnel.

k. Use of aircraft for many types of missions increases the need for a responsive and reliable air-ground communications system. Any ground unit operating alone must communicate directly with Army air support and tactical Air Force support.

l. Communications aspects of a LIC operation must complement the overall security plans for the operation.

    (1) If a cover and deception plan is executed, the communications signature should be radiated with false traffic when nonsecure radio or telephone systems are used. If a cover and deception plan is not executed, preparation and execution of the operation should be employed under radio silence or normal secure radio operation.

    (2) All operational communications means should be secure to include commercial telephones and radios. The administrative and logistic planning, routinely discussed as unclassified information, should be secured to avoid disclosure of sensitive plans. During the planning phase, commanders should use couriers. Local phone systems may be used when secured with Minterm, Vinson, or STU-III telephones.

    (3) Multichannel and MSE system radios are secure. Total system security, allowing user-to-user security, is ensured only if every wire line and terminal instrument using the multichannel system are physically safeguarded with controlled access. Each commander must ensure his area of responsibility is secure, otherwise the entire system is declared nonsecure. A nonsecure system, such as a local telephone network or AUTOVON circuit, should not interface with the secure system without proper controls in place to ensure system security is not compromised.

m. Commanders use deception to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of information, which causes the enemy to act in a way prejudicial to his interests. (See FM 90-2 for a discussion on the use of deception.) In LIC, deception planning is integral to operational planning. However, it is difficult due to continual liaison with host nation elements. Detailed information on operations are always subject to compromise.


Planners must include adequate redundant and multiple communications systems in unit movement plans to ensure reliable communications in the deployment area.

a. Table 6-2 shows a matrix of communications means and characteristics.

    (1) The combat net radio (CNR) secure single-channel radio provides the most responsive means of communications on the battlefield. It allows direct voice communications between personnel using highly mobile communications terminals. Each system provides unique characteristics that complement each other by including various combinations of range, threat ECM vulnerability, and inherent reliability. The types include UHF/TACSAT, VHF/FM, and HF/SSB. Also, these radios support data system operations such as TACFIRE The RATT systems support transmission of hard copy messages. Careful use of unsecured radios reduces the intelligence value of transmitted information. Handheld commercial radios are vulnerable to interception and exploitation; they must be secured if used to support any phase of an operation.

    (2) The area communication system provides the user with high capacity, supporting a multitude of users with voice, data traffic, and facsimile. Secure line-of-sight radio links interconnect switching facilities that can also accommodate and integrate with single-channel CNR (net radio interface). Local and remote radio access units allow for mobile telephone use. The available systems are restricted to LOS operations, with a limited number of relays available to overcome terrain obstacles or to extend system range.

    (3) Long wire lines are not practical when rapid and frequent CP movesare planned. However, local wire networks are required to install telephones and facsimiles in local CP areas.

    (4) The courier is the most secure means of communication in a high-threat EW environment. If messenger service is required over long distances or for crucial messages, the commander requests an aircraft from division assets.

b. The choice of communications means depends on the available means that interconnects the desired locations, the urgency of the message, and the risk involved. One of the facets of the division is its ability to operate over vast distances and rugged terrain. This usually requires the use of NLOS communications. The only NLOS systems available are single-channel, multichannel TACSAT terminals, and HF/SSB radios. These systems are open to threat ECM activity. HF/SSB radios depend on favorable atmospheric conditions and sunspot activity level, combined with strict frequency management techniques. TACSAT systems are limited in both terminal and space segment.

c. The most available and commonly used tactical communications system is the VHF/FM radio. Although this system is constrained by distance, larger units have at least one retransmission system. A strategically located retransmission unit, either air or ground, can overcome terrain masks and extend the radio net operating range. Also, units may use communications windows or report by exception. A frequency-hopping operation provides ECCM capability.

d. Command and Control Console (AN/ASC-15B). This console contains three radios VHF/UHF-FM/AM satellite communication/ HAVEQUICK/Maritime band capability and one HF/SSB radio. The radios are securable with on-line encryption devices. The console is interoperable with Air Force, Navy, and Coast Guard radios and is installed on UH 60 and UH-1 helicopters. The system contains a map board, work table, generator, and ground antennas for operation when dismounted from the aircraft. At present, there is no SINCGARS frequency-hopping capability. For additional information see Table 6-3 ( AN/ASC-15B console components.).


ITU regulations guide frequency support for US forces in a foreign host nation. The host nation, also guided by ITU regulations, assigns and controls frequencies.

a. US forces have no rights to any part of the frequency spectrum other than those authorized by host nation assignments. Frequency assignments contain authorizations as well as limitations. Misuse of such assignments or use of unassigned frequencies can cause interference to authorized users, danger to life and property, and embarrassment to the US government and the respective host nation.

b. The senior US military signal officer in a foreign country obtains frequency support from the host nation. The host nation usually provides a frequency assignment list. Requests for frequencies are submitted through the signal chain.


Deploying units and supporting organizations must take advantage of the existing CONUS TDA and commercial infrastructure (in-place systems). They must reduce exposure of tactical communications to intercept. At this phase, the use of AUTOSEVOCOM or locally secured telephones, teletypewriter/data (AUTODIN), and couriers must be emphasized. These combine to protect the security of the planned operation and to free tactical communications systems for deployment.

a. Table 6-4 contrasts predeployment missions and possible communications means.

b. TACSAT terminals should not be committed for administrative communications unless they can be quickly recovered and redeployed. These limited assets are vital in the initial deployment and employment phases. This is due to their high mobility and ease of operation in most worldwide locations.

c. Planners must consider provisions for external support. This support provides access into the DCS or DTS in the deployment area if elements of the division are deploying. The DTS interfaces with the DCS, allowing the exchange of both secure voice and teletype/data traffic. Also, the embassy or consulate can assist with the local telephone system in the deployment area. Existing tactical communications systems, with the exception of the UHF/TACSAT, do not have enough range to communicate out of many contingency deployment areas. Forces could deploy to an area where even the UHF/TACSAT radio cannot communicate directly back to CONUS.


Planners must identify mission capability packages as mission planning develops. Deployment by increments may be required based on mission needs and lift constraints (Table 6-5 ). The communications system packages must be complete for mission accomplishment. For example, the system must include the basic radio, prime mover, generator, and operators; otherwise, any isolated part is useless. Sustained operations include a maintenance package; a combination of replacement parts, repair parts, tools, and maintenance facility; and trained personnel.

Table 6-5. Deployment missions and communications means.

a. Combat forces are most vulnerable during the initial phase of tactical deployment. This phase is the process of assembling, uploading, and preparing for combat.

b. Commanders deploy communications equipment forward to ensure essential command, control, and intelligence communications are available upon arrival.

c. The existing infrastructure should continue to be exploited as much as possible. This frees the tactical communications systems to deploy forward with the combat forces, aiding the changeover to tactical operations.

d. Secure en route communications packages (SECOMP) aboard MAC aircraft allow commanders to receive updates while the aircraft are en route to the objective area.

e. USAF ABCCC aircraft can provide initial command and control communications to a deployed task force. These scarce assets usually support joint headquarters deployments.

f. OPSEC is the key to survival as relays or any isolated signal elements are deployed. Where possible, deploying teams should move only during periods of limited visibility. They should have camouflage systems installed before direct or overhead observation occurs. Resupply vehicles and routes should be concealed. Failure to observe OPSEC leaves these small teams open to hostile action. This also simplifies hostile correlation of data on friendly force deployments.


US forces should continue the use of existing communication infrastructure to include both US and host nation assets. Division communications assets augment the task force as required. A task force deployed separately can expect to be supported by long-range communications systems from the division signal battalion, if available. However, each brigade and battalion must be prepared to provide long-range communications using organic HF radio systems. Host nation military and commercial interests in the contingency areas make constant and extensive use of HF radio systems (Table 6-6 Employment missions and communication means ).

a. A separate battalion task force deploys with organic manpack VHF/FM and limited vehicular-mounted VHM/FM and HF/SSB radio sets. It is deployed as either the initial combat element of a larger force or as a small force tailored for a short duration and limited mission. If required by the mission, one or two TACSAT teams from the division signal battalion are attached to the task force.

b. Wire should be used to interconnect local elements within CP areas, but long wire lines should be avoided. Long wire lines may be monitored, and their installation is time-consuming. The resulting lines may be destroyed by vandals, track vehicles, or hostile forces. If any wire line is extended outside of a secure area, then the entire telephone network must be considered nonsecure.

c. Division CP supports deployment of a brigade task force to provide added communications and logistic and personnel support. If appropriate, the division CP controls base area operations. The division CP includes a task force signal officer. The signal officer provides signal planning and technical support either directly or through coordination with a supporting signal element. The division task force signal officer exercises command and OPCON of all deployed signal battalion elements.


Communications and COMSEC DS maintenance facilities must be deployed in OSBs to ensure reliable operation of a secure communications system. Development is essential of supporting high-capacity communications for the logistics base and high-capacity systems linking that base and the deployed division. An expanded base communications system and DCS access are required to support sustaining operations. The communications system includes the use of the local infrastructure on a contract basis.

Section IV.

IPB and the intelligence cycle are the cornerstones for successful LIC operations. It can help the commander determine who the enemy is, what his abilities are, and where he can be found. It also serves as the planning basis for creating the unit's concept of operations and for allocating combat power as reflected in the unit's organization for combat. The IPB process examines five areas (see FM 34-130). This section discusses these areas in relationship to each other and the estimates of the situation. The data to be developed and compiled vary with the intensity of the battlefield area evaluation and commander's intent. The types of overlays and categories of subjects plotted vary according to mission needs. Using a graphic keying system and color scheme on large-scale maps aids data analysis when using transparent overlays. A modified form of IPB can be used to graphically portray the intelligence estimate to the commander in a LIC situation. It stems from three crucial factors inherent to most LIC battlefields. The intelligence cycle includes the following:

  • Directing: PIR, IR

  • Collecting: Collection plans,IPB

  • Processing: Transfer information into intelligence

  • Disseminating: Aids in the tactical decision process

  • The nature of the LIC threat.

  • The importance and welfare of the civilian population.

  • The role of the host nation government and military.


Critical factors that must be considered not only include the threat but also the civilian population and host nation.

a. Threat. The threat may blend with the population. He can also use a variety of tactics and levels of violence to accomplish his goals (propaganda, terrorism, guerrilla tactics, crime, and so forth). Building a threat model is key to the IPB process. In LIC, the threat model must be developed based on the situation and geographic area of concern. PIR/IR can include--

    (1) The identity, location, and political predispositions of individuals.

    (2) Those policies that can influence certain elements and individuals to support the US forces.

b. Civilian Population. The main focus of LIC operations is the control and support of the people. Constant awareness of the population factor is crucial to the long-term success of LIC operations. FID missions involve combat, CS, and CSS operations near host nation civilians. Main objectives of these operations are to protect and secure the population and to separate them from the insurgent. These efforts place heavy constraints on the careless use of weapons and require well-managed use of force. Key to effective application of force in LIC is a detailed analysis of the civilian population during IPB. Operations deemphasize support to indirect fire or air-delivered weapons. Intelligence operations and small-unit action are preferred. Political action is always the first option, then military.

c. Host Nation Government and Military. Success lies with the host nation. Host nation civil and military authorities are mainly responsible for military operations, CA, PSYOP, and population/resource control. US forces avoid these tasks but may be required to provide advice or backup. Maintaining the legitimacy of the host nation government is vital. Also, knowledge of the host nation's military tactics, operations, and intelligence functions and their capabilities are crucial for effective integration of a US military effort.


Most intelligence requirements can be met with IPC, especially in the planning phase. The IPB process in low-intensity conflict is the same as in mid- or high-intensity conflict. It is still a five-function process whereby the S2 considers the METT-T factors to fulfill the commander's PIR/IRs (Figure 6-2. ). However, each operational category consists of a unique combination of critical factors or data, which are included in the battlefield area evaluation function of IPB. The particular LIC operational category or mission also influences how the other four IPB functions process the data. The final product of the IPB process is an intelligence estimate in graphic form that meets the commander's PIR/IRs. The following paragraphs are detailed instructions on how to perform IPB in support of a LIC. (For additional information, see FM 34-130.)

Figure 6-2. Intelligence preparation battlefield process.


During this function, the analyst begins to collect data to meet basic intelligence requirements in five areas: political, economic, social-geographic (demographic), military, and threat intelligence. Host nation and population tactics are developed along with the weather, enemy, and terrain data. This basic intelligence must be tailored to the specific battlefield area. During this function, specific areas of operations and interest are determined. As in mid- and high-intensity conflicts, the next-higher headquarters designates LIC areas of operations. These areas of operations represent where the commander has the authority and responsibility to conduct operations. The commander determines the areas of interest based upon the recommendation of the S2. Both areas are analyzed with respect to political and METT-T factors. However, in LIC, evaluation of both areas is also vital to host nation civilian or military activity.


Since enemy forces are normally fewer in number and lack sophisticated logistics backing, they avoid positional warfare. They also avoid seizing, controlling, or defending conventional key terrain. One of the enemies greatest assets is rapid foot movement across difficult terrain. Therefore, traditional combined obstacles overlays have limited bearing on the analysis of threat movement. The most important aspects of the terrain to the enemy are those that provide logistic support and security. Terrain analysis requires detailed analysis of historical and current aerial imagery, along with intelligence reports.

a. Cover and Concealment. An enemy cover and concealment overlay is prepared. It identifies areas the enemy can use for cover and concealment to protect them from aerial reconnaissance. Such areas offer rugged terrain or dense vegetation. Key terrain favors the defense and covers withdrawals. As with conventional IPB, the canopy closure overlay identifies areas that offer concealment from aerial observation or from elevated points of terrain. The effectiveness of a canopy closure varies with the seasons.

b. Key Terrain. Although the definition of key terrain remains the same in LIC operations as in other military operations, selection criteria differ. In LIC operations, the selection of key terrain is influenced by the local populace and logistic resources in the area. The S2 must be aware of these matters and how they affect the use of the area of operations by both friendly and enemy forces.

    (1) The population is the "key terrain" in LIC. It can provide both support and security to the enemy and can represent the only terrain feature that must be seized, controlled, or defended. With the proper data base and collection effort, the S2 can begin classifying the population in the battlefield area into logical groups (tribal, religious, ethnic, political, and so forth). Their affinities, loyalties, and susceptibilities to enemy and friendly propaganda can be evaluated, graphically portrayed, maintained, and updated using the population status overlay. The S2 normally relies on higher headquarters and host nation and US civilian agencies for this information.

    (2) Enemy logistic sustainment includes not only availability of arms, ammunition, and demolition materials, but also other supplies. An overlay is prepared to identify areas that provide water and food to the enemy, that provide easy access to such supplies, or where no such supplies are available. Of special interest are the locations of all small settlements and farms in or near suspected enemy areas (within one day's journey) that may provide food and act as outposts. If guerrillas are known or suspected to have contact with regular enemy forces, units should plot locations of areas suitable for airdrops, or for boat or submarine rendezvous; and roads/trails leading into enemy-held areas or neutral countries friendly to the enemy. Medical supplies are often in demand by an enemy force. Therefore, the area or locality of such supplies may be key terrain. This is due to the advantages the seizure or control would provide to the enemy and that its denial to the enemy would provide the friendly force.

    (3) Some localities may have no tactical significance. They may, however, have a psychological or political significance such as a provincial or district seat of government. These localities are considered key terrain. Other localities include the birthplace of a national hero or a religious shrine. The enemy may defend it, avoid military actions near it, or use US presence for PSYOP purposes.

c. Avenues of Approach. Avenues of approach are identified after considering other military aspects of terrain. This is the same as in conventional operations.

    (1) The road/trail overlay highlights roads and trails in the operational area. Units should be aware of lines of communication that are in potential enemy areas, that support a potential enemy area, or that are new. Many times aerial imagery can find new trails by discovering destroyed vegetation or by comparing current with past imagery. Special consideration should be given to the following:

      (a) Roads and trails approaching suspected or possible insurgent areas.

      (b) Principal roads and trails traversing and passing along the outside of suspected insurgent areas.

      (c) Principal routes connecting separate insurgent areas.

      (d) Roads and trails near friendly installations and lines of communication.

      (e) Location of fords, bridges, and ferries across rivers; seasons of the year when rivers are in the flood stage.

      (f) Location of water points.

      (g) Navigable waterways.

      (h) Subterranean routes such as sewers and subways.

    (2) The bulk of friendly operations is that of small-unit actions. Enemy actions involving company-size and larger units are the exception rather than the rule. Therefore, the citerion for identifying avenues of approach with adequate maneuver space is changed. Both the brigade and battalion S2s must be concerned with identifying and analyzing platoon-, section-, and squad-size avenues of approach (including subterranean) into areas and installations defended by their units, and into objective areas.

    (3) Since the brigade or battalion may often conduct semi-independent or combined operations, S2s must identify, select, and recommend not only ground avenues of approach but also air and water avenues. In each case, the principles of terrain analysis apply, with emphasis on the details of terrain required for small-unit operations. All avenues of approach should be considered even if the terrain seems impassable. In fact, those avenues of approach over hard and impassable terrain normally offer the greatest opportunity for achieving surprise by friendly forces. General avenues of approach can be identified by studying the avenues of approach overlay. Usually, personnel or supplies may move through areas where the population is sympathetic to the enemy.

d. Named Areas of Interest. The combination of overlays for population, enemy cover and concealment, canopy closure, and logistic sustainability identifies those areas where enemy elements are likely to operate. Areas that provide cover and concealment, a friendly or neutral population, and ready access to supplies are likely to support the enemy. They can become NAIs to confirm or deny enemy presence in the area or, with other indicators, to determine his intentions. Where areas of population or logistic support are well separated from areas of cover and concealment, the enemy may move between the them. The next step is to identify potential enemy targets.

e. Trap Overlay. The trap overlay identifies those targets the enemy may find attractive to sabotage, mine, booby trap, or attack. These may include bridges, power stations, transmission lines, sites that favor ambushes, or likely kidnap targets. Such areas are marked on the map emphasizing possible enemy access and escape routes. The trap overlay may be combined with the logistic sustainability overlay to form a completed picture of the situation.


The same weather considerations and overlays apply to LIC as to mid- and high-intensity conflict. For example, weather effects on observation and fields of fire, camouflage, helicopter LZs and LOS, and radio/radar equipment still apply.

a. The S2 must have knowledge of climatic conditions and short-duration weather forecasts. This is vital in his accurately determining weather effects on the unit mission. In the areas of extreme seasonal climatic change, terrain intelligence produced during one season may be useless in another. Therefore, climatic weather and terrain intelligence must be constantly produced and reviewed to ensure it is current.

b. The nature of LIC tactics may involve frequent combat action at short ranges. Therefore, knowledge of the effects of the weather and natural illumination on visibility is crucial to planning and conducting operations. The S2 must try to determine the exact visibility conditions at certain times of the day in certain types of terrain.

c. Mobility is vital to both enemy and friendly force offensive operations. Therefore, knowledge of the effects of the weather on trafficability will have great bearing on the timing and nature of operations. Normally, the enemy will rely on foot movement, small watercraft, and animal transport. Therefore, the effects of the weather on wheel and track trafficability and on air and amphibious mobility are more significant to the counterinsurgent force. Adverse weather conditions often hinder the friendly forces more than their enemy; however, the flooding of rivers and streams, and the creation of swamps and marshes greatly reduce the enemy's ability to withdraw.

d. Other S2 weather considerations include the following:

    (1) The enemy normally uses poor weather conditions or darkness to their tactical advantage. These conditions reduce the effect of government force observation, direct fire, air support, and artillery--all factors that a friendly force has to its advantage.

    (2) Weather can affect the availability of food supplies such as crops and livestock. Growing seasons, crop life cycles, and harvesting constraints must all be considered.

    (3) The enemy has problems in caching supplies in areas that flood often.

    (4) Mass demonstrations are planned for periods of forecasted good weather to ensure maximum participation.

    (5) CA projects and PSYOP media may be degraded by poor weather conditions. Poor weather can degrade already bad road networks, which are common in active enemy areas.


Threat evaluation for LIC must start early and include a wide range of factors to build an accurate threat model. These factors involve all aspects of leadership, objectives, organization, tactics, external support, timing, and environment related to enemy involvement. Doctrinal templates normally developed during the threat evaluation function are not feasible in LIC. Therefore, doctrinal templates do not apply to enemy tactics. During the threat evaluation, units should try to identify the enemy's patterns of operation and tactics, and specific targets to exploit during threat integration.

a. Threat Database. The S2 collects information from all available sources, including host nation assets. The first step in collecting information on the enemy infrastructure is to study the enemy's organization and tactics. He should also study a specific element against which his unit could be engaged. The effect of the S2's planning and direction of the collection effort, his processing of information, and his use of intelligence in his estimate all depend on how familiar he is with enemy tactics and techniques. DIA country studies, both classified and unclassified, will help the G2/S2 find the information he needs to expand the database.

    (1) Enemy. Enemy tactics are usually characterized by small-scale operations, although they retain the ability to mass company- and battalionsize units. The enemy can conduct these operations over an extensive area with hit-and-run offensive techniques and with withdrawal and dispersion instead of terrain defense. He may be able to attack, defend, withdraw, and reinforce. Therefore, commanders must consider all enemy information and intelligence.

    (2) Strength. Enemy forces may be accounted for in terms of military units (that is, cells, squads, sections, platoons). However, his organizational structure must be known. This structure provides useful information to guide the commander and other staff members. If not known, enemy strength can be accounted for in terms of total numbers or numbers of units in each location. All crew-served weapons, armor vehicles, artillery fires, and aircraft are accounted for individually.

    (3) Personality files. Personality files should be maintained on enemy commanders and on members of the underground and civilian support. All names and data are collected on persons likely to be connected with the resistance movement. This includes persons known to adhere to the philosophy of the resistance movement, former members of the armed forces, and all persons with strong leadership abilities. The names and locations are obtained of sweethearts, relatives, and friends of insurgents and underground members. These persons are valuable as sources of information and as bait to trap visiting enemy personnel. In communities friendly to the enemy, certain persons are responsible for collecting food and other aid, and for furnishing message centers and safe houses. These persons must be discovered; however, they should not be arrested immediately but should be watched for their activities and contacts. Enemy couriers should be apprehended.

b. Evaluation of Threat Capabilities. After collecting the available enemy information, the S2 evaluates what the enemy can actually do. He must judge whether or not the enemy can--

  • Conduct sabotage and, if so, to what extent.

  • Collect intelligence.

  • Use mines and booby traps.

  • Attack defended positions.

  • Directly engage government forces.

  • Sponsor public demonstrations.

  • Conduct large scale military operations.

  • Conduct acts of terrorism.

c. Situation Map. The S2 prepares the enemy situation map during this portion of the IPB. This map includes all the permanent information available on the enemy. Information such as enemy camp locations, unit operating areas or boundaries, and trails. The map is modified as the enemy moves and his abilities change.

d. Incident Map. Much of the information used to prepare and update the enemy SITMAP is based on the incident map. Depending on the amount of activity in an area, the incident map overlay can be laid over the SITMAP for immediate comparison.

e. Population Database. The S2 reexamines the local civilian population. Although the population is not a threat, a clear understanding of it is needed beyond that of the population status overlay. The S2 gathers all the data available on local culture, customs, and economics. He can use other factors to evaluate how to gain the confidence of the civilian population or the effects of operations in the area.


Threat integration relates enemy doctrine to the terrain, weather, and population. Commanders use it to determine what type of operation the enemy might conduct, and when and where it will occur.

a. Situational Templates. Since there is no doctrinal template for IPB in LIC, the situational template is based on types of activity, and when and where they will occur. This information is based on what is known about thelocal enemy's capabilities, and trends that indicate where and how he operates.

    (1) The first step is to identify the key action or series of missions the enemy may want to conduct (sabotage, direct attack, disruption of the economy, and so forth). Each mission requires different types of weapons, training, and tactics. These prerequisites for and indicators of enemy actions are then templated.

    (2) For example, a situational template to analyze a possible enemy attack against a defended point would require the following:

      (a) Key terrain providing observation on the target area.

      (b) Ambush points on friendly avenues of approach into the area.

      (c) Possible assault positions.

      (d) Possible locations for mortars within range of the target.

      (e) Enemy routes into assault positions or near targets.

      (f) Enemy escape routes after the attack.

    (3) Activity indicators before the attack could include:

      (a) Increased caching.

      (b) Increased enemy movement.

      (c) Increased sighting of enemy personnel in area.

      (d) Reoccupation or reverification of established camps within one to two days' march of the target.

    (4) In preparing a situational template for the enemy's abilities, the enemy often performs multiple types of activities within an area. Only through pattern analysis can the S2 identify the enemy's emphasis.

b. Event Template. Situational templating provides the basis for event templating. This involves identifying and analyzing major battlefield events and enemy activities that provide indicators of probable enemy courses of action. NAIs are identified through terrain analysis and situational templating. From the trap map, NAIs are potential ambush points the enemy may use. By combining the cover and concealment, logistic support, and population status overlays, potential enemy camps in the area can be identified that are also NAIs From the situational template, routes, terrain features, or enemy camps in the area become NAIs.

c. Target Areas of Interest. As with the doctrinal template, the decision support template will not be used. However, TAI, based on NAI, are important. For example, an S2 whose unit is moving along a road will already have potential ambush points identified as NAI. These points are targeted by collection assets before and during movement. They have also been coordinated as TAI with the FSO and S3. If potential enemy activity is identified with a TAI, the commander decides how to deal with it. The activity must be confirmed as enemy related--not civilian related.

d. Target Value Analysis. TVA is also accomplished during this phase. HVTs are identified, which can include CPs and logistic elements. An evaluation of specific enemy capabilities is directly related to identifying HVTs. For example, if the sabotage threat is high, HVTs would be locations of explosives or areas where sabotage training is conducted. Persons can also be HVTs. These include persons whose death or capture would degrade the enemy group's leadership, espionage, population control, or operational abilities.

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